

PHILO

FOUNDATIONS OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY
IN JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY, AND ISLAM

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VOLUME I



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PREFACE

RELIGIOUS philosophies without a scriptural preamble, such as those with which we are nowadays acquainted, were unknown throughout the Middle Ages. To mediaeval philosophers of the various creeds, religion was not an outworn survival of primitive times, which, with the magic wand of philosophy, they tried to transform into something serviceable. Nor was it to them a peculiar kind of human experience, which, by philosophic probing into the mysterious workings of the subnormal or super-normal human mind, they hoped to track down to its hidden sources. Nor, again, was religion to them a floating wreckage of an ancient term, gutted out of its original contents, which, in accordance with the salvage-laws of language, they appropriated and used as a designation for their own particular brands of philosophy. It was to them a certain set of inflexible principles, of a divinely revealed origin, by which philosophy, the product of erring human reason, had to be tested and purged and purified. What these principles were, how in the light of them philosophy for the first time was rewritten, and how also for the first time the principles themselves were recast in a philosophic mould — this is the burden of the present study.

In a previous study, we tried to show how the entire seventeenth-century-old philosophic structure raised upon the principles of a common preamble of faith was overthrown by Spinoza. When that study, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, was published in 1934, we conceived the idea of working out more fully the background of some of the problems dealt with in Spinoza's philosophy. Starting with one problem and working backwards and sideways, we gradually managed to draw into our purview all of its major problems, treating of them in their historical development, through mediaeval Latin and Hebrew philosophy, from the

thirteenth to the seventeenth century; back of that, through Arabic Moslem and Jewish philosophy, from the eighth to the thirteenth century; and back of that, through the Church Fathers, through Philo, and through classical Greek philosophy. The outcome of this effort will be published in a series of books under the general title *Structure and Growth of Philosophic Systems from Plato to Spinoza*. The present two-volume study constitutes the second book of the series. Other studies on philosophers following Philo, as well as a general introductory study on Greek philosophy, to the latter of which occasional references are made in the footnotes of this book, will appear at reasonably short intervals. A revised and expanded edition of the two volumes on Spinoza will complete the series.

Primarily this is a study of Philo, and as such it is an attempt to build up, out of innuendoes, a systematic structure of his thought and also to piece together, out of allusions and implications, the story of its growth. But the work is also designed to serve as a general prolegomenon to the major problems of religious philosophy for the seventeen centuries following Philo. The structure of the problems as herein presented will provide a general framework for the same problems as they appear in the works of later philosophers. The texts from various sources brought together in the story of their growth will furnish the most fundamental texts which will come into play in the subsequent history of these problems. The section in each chapter of this book under the heading "Conclusion, Influence, Anticipation" furnishes a brief forecast of the general lines of development of the essential points of the Philonic philosophy in later philosophies down to Spinoza. In the volumes to follow, the story of this development will receive a fuller and more formal treatment.

The preamble of faith with which the philosophy of Philo begins, though no longer universally accepted unchallenged,

has not completely disappeared. It is still the preamble of the living philosophy of the greater part of mankind. At the present time, under the name of one of the most distinguished of mediaeval Christian exponents of Philonic philosophy, a modernized version of that philosophy, in its metaphysical as well as in its ethical and social teachings, based upon the same principles of the same old preamble of faith, is ably defended by an organized school of thought. While it is to be admitted that for one who believes, or is willing to believe, in the principles of the old preamble of faith, it is no more difficult to build up and defend a Philonic type of philosophy at the present time than it was for many a century in the past, we have not attempted here to modernize Philonic philosophy nor have we dealt with the attempts of others at its modernization. The purpose of this book has been to delineate and depict the philosophy of Philo as it shaped itself in his own mind and in its own setting and to indicate briefly how in its main features it was the most dominant force in the history of philosophy down to the seventeenth century. We have not touched upon its fortunes after that century nor upon the story of its resurgence in recent times.

The peculiar literary form in which the works of Philo are written has made him the subject of a variety of interpretations. In the presentation of our own understanding of him, with the exception of a few instances when we have openly taken issue with certain views, either generally accepted or individually espoused, and with the further exception of general references to the literature on Philo whenever they were necessary either as an acknowledgment of indebtedness or for the bibliographical guidance of the reader or to indicate the termini at which Philonic studies halted and from which our own investigation proceeded, we have refrained from entering upon an examination or comparison or criticism of the various current interpretations of Philo — a subject which, if dealt with at all, is to be dealt

with elaborately and with all the fullness it deserves. We have attempted here a fresh examination of Philo both in his relation to his predecessors and with a view to those who came after him — and this on the basis of texts which are fully deployed and studied.

For their generous help and advice I am grateful to Professor Arthur Darby Nock, of Harvard; Professor Francis Howard Fobes, of Amherst; Professor Milton Vasil Anastos, of Dumbarton Oaks, Harvard; and Professors Richard Peter McKeon and Ralph Marcus, both of the University of Chicago. The publication of this work was made possible by the Lucius N. Littauer Foundation.

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PHILO

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VOLUME I

CHAPTER I

HELLENISTIC JUDAISM AND PHILO

I. HELLENISTIC JEWISH ATTITUDE TOWARD GREEK RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

WITH a single exception, none of the peoples who after the conquests of Alexander began to participate in Greek philosophy contributed anything radically new to it. All they did was to master its teachings and furnish teachers. The Phoenician population of Citium in Cyprus furnished Zeno, the founder of Stoicism; Sidon furnished another Zeno, who became the head of the Epicureans; Carthage furnished Hasdrubal, who under the name of Clitomachus became the head of the New Academy; the Hellenistic population of Ascalon in Palestine furnished another head of the New Academy by the name of Antiochus; Tyre furnished Diodorus, who became the head of the Peripatetic school; and Apamea in Syria furnished Posidonius, who established a Stoic school in Rhodes, the only Greek philosophic school which flourished at that time outside of Athens. But all of these, though coming from the new centers of Greek culture, and perhaps also of non-Greek origin, were thoroughly Hellenized, not only in language but also in religion, and they appear on the scene of history as Greeks, carrying on the traditions of Greek philosophers. The schools which they came to preside over, and, in the case of Zeno, the new school which he founded, were Greek schools, flourishing in the ancient seat of Greek civilization. The gods, the myths, and the religious and political institutions which as philosophers they had occasion to take as the subject of their speculations were all the same as those of their predecessors from Thales

to Aristotle. If certain vestiges of foreign beliefs and certain undertones of foreign thought are sometimes said to be discerned in their teaching, they themselves had no consciousness of them; and in fact it takes all the skill and imagination and insight of searching scholarship to get even a scent of their presence. The single exception was the Jewish population in Alexandria. This Alexandrian Jewish population produced out of its midst a school of philosophers who consciously and deliberately and systematically set about remaking Greek philosophy according to the pattern of a belief and tradition of an entirely different origin.

The rise of that school and the continuity of its existence for about three centuries, from the translation of the Pentateuch into Greek (*c.* 260 B.C.) to the end of the activity of Philo (*c.* 40 A.D.),¹ was made possible by the nature of the dominant element, if not the basic stock, of the Jewish population in Alexandria and by the nature of the social economy of the Alexandrian Jewish community. That dominant element came from Palestine at a time when Judaism in its native home had already been molded by the teaching and preaching and disciplinary training of the Scribes into that particular form which ultimately gave rise to Pharisaism. From its native home this dominant element of the Jewish population in Alexandria had brought with it not only a Scripture and a tradition, but also a knowledge of that Scripture and tradition, an ordered mode of life and thought based upon them, and a firm resolve to preserve that mode of life and thought under whatever conditions it might find itself. Conditions in Alexandria were such as to favor the maintenance and preservation of this mode of life and thought. Politically the Jews of Alexandria had the right to organize a community of their own within which they were

¹ Cf. below, p. 94.

free to live according to their own religion. Socially they lived in compact masses within certain areas of the city, which provided them with the necessary facilities for the practice of their religion. Economically, though the community as a whole depended upon the outside non-Jewish environment for the main source of its wealth, the majority of Jews within the community gained their living there, without being forced to seek occupation among non-Jews outside. Culturally, though one generation after their settlement in Alexandria the Jews had adopted Greek speech, they remained a separate group, with a system of education and intellectual life entirely their own.² Constant communication with the home country in Palestine had kept Alexandrian Judaism, despite the inevitable rise of certain local changes, from becoming completely separated from its original source.

Now the political and social conditions which enabled the Jews to preserve themselves as a special religious entity in Alexandria were enjoyed also by all the other groups which made up the Alexandrian population, and at least one group, the native Egyptians, with a religious mode of life firmly established and with a highly organized class of learned priests, attempted also to develop a religious philosophy of its own, though whatever is known of it comes to us only indirectly. Externally the Egyptian and the Jewish religious philosophies would seem to be alike, both of them, seemingly in imitation of the Stoics, attempting to apply philosophy to their respective religions and justifying these attempts of theirs by claiming, each of these two groups for itself, to have been the originators of that philosophy.³ But the conceptions which the Egyptians and Jews had of their own religions were so fundamentally different that the philosophies developed by them from the application of Greek

² Cf. below, pp. 78 ff.

³ Cf. below, p. 141.

philosophy to their respective religions also proved to be different, the one being simply an adoption of Greek philosophy; the other being a transformation of it into something new.

Egyptians, like all the heathen nations of antiquity, started with the belief that their own gods were different only in name from the gods of other peoples with whom they came in contact and that the worship of their own gods was different only in form from the worship of other gods by other peoples. From the writings of Herodotus we learn that even before the time of Alexander Egyptian priests claimed that certain Greek gods were borrowed from the Egyptians,⁴ and these priests probably also shared in the belief, expressed by Herodotus himself, that certain forms of religious worship, including the mysteries, were similarly borrowed by the Greeks from the Egyptians.⁵ When, therefore, later, with the establishment of Alexandria as a center of Hellenistic civilization, Egyptian priests attempted, in imitation of the Stoics, to apply Greek philosophy to their own religion, this attempt was accompanied by a similar attempt to syncretize their own religion with the religion of the Greeks. The religious philosophy resulting therefrom was therefore bound to display no essential difference from the religious philosophy of the Stoics of that time. This conclusion with regard to the nature of Egyptian philosophy, which must inevitably follow from a consideration of these known facts in the case, lends credence to the account given of it later by Plutarch. From that account we gather that the starting point of the philosophy of the Egyptians was the syncretization of their own religion with that of the Greeks. Their own gods were identified with Greek gods;⁶ their own stories about their

⁴ Herodotus, II, 4, 42, 50.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 51; II, 171.

⁶ Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*, chs. 9, 354 C-D; 13, 356 B; 34, 364 D; 61, 375 F-376 A.

gods were identified with Greek mythology; ⁷ and their own worship of the gods in the form of mysteries was identified with the Greek mysteries.⁸ Having thus syncretized their own religion with that of the Greeks, and having also laid claim to the origin of Greek philosophy, they next tried, in conscious imitation of the Stoics, systematically to give a philosophic meaning to their own religion. The chief Egyptian god Ammon becomes to them, of course, nothing but the Greek Zeus, and consequently, like Zeus among the Stoics, he is nothing but the universe.⁹ The Egyptian goddess Isis is nothing but the Greek word for "knowledge," and her temple, which is called Iseion, is nothing but a combination of two Greek words meaning the knowledge of true being.¹⁰ The priests of Isis are not mere supervisors of religious worship; they are philosophers, for "the true priest of Isis is he who, when he has legitimately received what is set forth in the ceremonies connected with these gods, uses reason in investigating and in studying the truth contained therein." ¹¹ The laws relating to priests, such as the shaving of their heads, their wearing of linen garments, their restrictions in matters of diet, their abstention from wine, and all the sacred and religious rites which are prescribed for them, have in them "nothing that is irrational or fabulous or prompted by superstition, as some believe," but they contain either some "moral and practical values" or some "refinement of history or natural science." ¹² The stories about the gods, such as their wanderings, dismemberments, and many experiences of that sort, are not to be taken literally; ¹³ they are like similar Greek stories about the gods,¹⁴ and they are to be given explanations "not far unlike the explanations which

⁷ *Ibid.*, chs. 25, 360 E-40, 367 E.

⁸ *Ibid.*, chs. 27, 361 D f.; 68, 378 B f.

⁹ *Ibid.*, ch. 9, 354 C-D. Cf. below, p. 176.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, ch. 2, 351 F-352 A.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, ch. 3, 352 C.

¹² *Ibid.*, ch. 8, 353 E.

¹³ *Ibid.*, ch. 11, 355 B ff.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, chs. 25-40.

the Stoics used to give of the gods.”¹⁵ To take these stories literally and refuse to explain them philosophically is to think impiously about matters religious.¹⁶ Such philosophic explanations are to be applied to every belief and practice, including the worship of animals. The Egyptian animal worship, properly understood, is no more mere folly than the Greek idol worship. The latter, in its true meaning, does not imply that “the bronze, the painted, and the stone effigies” are gods themselves; it takes them only as “statues of the gods and dedications in their honor.”¹⁷ So also Egyptian animal worship does not imply that the animals themselves are gods; they are to be taken only to represent various powers of God.¹⁸

The conception of their own religion on the part of the Alexandrian Jews, trained as they were in Scripture as interpreted by tradition, was fundamentally different. The term monotheism by which Judaism is generally described

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, ch. 40, 367 c.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, ch. 68, 378 b.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, ch. 70, 379 c-d.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, ch. 74, 380 r ff.

On Egyptian philosophy, see also Diogenes, I, 10-12, drawing upon Manetho and Hecataeus. Not much is known directly about the attempts on the part of the Egyptians to give a Greek philosophic interpretation to their religion, and from the little that is known it may be inferred that it was not widespread. But undoubtedly such a philosophic interpretation was attempted by a few Egyptians, and it may be assumed that on the whole the attempt followed along the lines indicated by Plutarch. With regard to Plutarch, it must be added that his account of the Stoic interpretation of the Egyptian religion is generally taken to be an invention of his own, just as is the later Neoplatonic interpretation of it by Iamblichus. This analogy between the two, however, does not seem to us to be correct. In the case of Plutarch, there is reason to believe that he was actually reporting the teachings of certain philosophic priests in Egypt. The works of writers on Egypt, such as Apion and Hecataeus, are generally considered as sources used by Plutarch. Moreover, an Egyptian priest of the first century A.D., Chaeremon, is said to have recognized the Stoic philosophical teachings in the priestly traditions of the Egyptian religion. Cf. W. Otto, *Priester und Tempel im hellenistischen Ägypten*, 1908, II, pp. 215-224; F. Cumont, *Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*⁴, 1929, p. 212, n. 24; p. 82; p. 238, nn. 48, 49; A. H. Gardiner, “Philosophy (Egyptian),” *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, IX, p. 859.

may perhaps, in its positive sense, as expressing a belief in the unity of God, lead to endless discussions as to whether that belief was really peculiar to the Jews or as to whether the Jews were really the originators of that belief. But the term in its negative sense, as expressing a unity of attitude — a special kind of attitude — toward other gods, is admittedly to be assumed as something peculiar to Judaism and as something by which it was distinguished from all other religions in antiquity.

This special attitude of the Jews toward other gods has a twofold aspect. On the one hand, the Scripture-trained Jew unconsciously approached other gods with the attitude of a student of comparative religion. Scripture had indeed instilled into him the belief in one God, but he knew that other peoples also believed in the existence of gods, and the same general Hebrew term *Elohim* is used in Scripture to designate both the Jewish God and the gods of the other nations. The Jewish God is worshiped in a special place, called "house"¹⁹ or "sanctuary,"²⁰ but so also are the gods of other nations worshiped by their adherents in a place described as "house"²¹ or "sanctuary."²² The Jewish God is worshiped by means of various kinds of sacrifices offered on altars by men called priests, and by means also of libation or incense, but so also are worshiped the gods of other nations, and the same Hebrew terms for sacrifice and altar and priest and libation and incense are used to describe these various forms of worship whether they are offered to the Jewish God or to the gods of other nations.²³ The Jews pray to their God and bow down to Him, but so do also other people pray and bow down to their gods.²⁴ On the other hand, however, the Jew was also trained by Scripture to approach other gods with the

¹⁹ I Kings 5: 19.

²⁰ Exod. 25: 8.

²¹ I Sam. 5: 2.

²² Isa. 16: 12.

²³ II Kings 10: 19; Jer. 44: 19.

²⁴ Isa. 16: 12; II Kings 19: 37.

attitude of a dogmatic theologian who is sure he knows what is true and what is false in religion. Indeed, he knew that other people too have gods and their gods are known by the same name as the Jewish God, but he was enjoined not to have any of those other gods before his God²⁵ and he was also told that all these other gods are "no-gods,"²⁶ they are "lying vanities,"²⁷ they are things of "nought,"²⁸ they are "falsehood,"²⁹ they are "lies,"³⁰ they are "dead,"³¹ they are carcasses,³² they are "worthless,"³³ they are "dumb idols."³⁴ Indeed he knew that other gods are also worshiped, and in a manner not unlike that in which his own God is worshiped, but he was enjoined not to bow himself down to them nor to serve them,³⁵ he was ordered to break down their altars, and dash in pieces their pillars, and burn their graven images with fire,³⁶ and he was told that sacrificing and offering incense to them was wrong³⁷ and that praying to them brings no help or salvation.³⁸

This twofold view marked the attitude of the Scripture-trained Jews toward all the religions with which they came in contact in the ancient world. With the example of Scripture before them they were not afraid to make use in the description of their own religion of terms used in the description of other religions, but whatever common terms they used, the difference was never blurred for them between truth and falsehood in religious belief and right and wrong in religious worship. For the understanding of the nature of Judaism throughout its history, and especially during the Hellenistic period, this twofold aspect of its attitude toward

²⁵ Exod. 20: 3.

²⁶ Isa. 37: 19.

²⁷ Ps. 31: 7.

²⁸ Jer. 2: 5.

²⁹ Jer. 10: 14.

³⁰ Amos 2: 4.

³¹ Ps. 106: 28.

³² Lev. 26: 30.

³³ Jer. 2: 11; 16: 19.

³⁴ Hab. 2: 18.

³⁵ Exod. 20: 4.

³⁶ Deut. 7: 5.

³⁷ Lev. 17: 7; Jer. 44: 3.

³⁸ Isa. 45: 21.

other religions is of the utmost importance. Those who seem to see evidence of religious syncretization in every use of a pagan term by a Hellenistic Jew simply overlook this one important aspect in the attitude of Judaism toward other religions.

The gods with which the God in Scripture was contrasted were the gods of those neighboring peoples with whom the ancient Jews came in contact. Many of these gods are only named, without any further identification, and it is left to scholarship to trace them to the various neighboring countries mentioned in Scripture. Some of them are specifically identified. There is Baal Zebub of Ekron,³⁹ Dagon of the Philistines,⁴⁰ Chemosh of the Moabites,⁴¹ Ashtoreth of the Zidonians,⁴² Milcom of the Ammonites,⁴³ and Rimmon of Aram.⁴⁴ There are also vague references to "the abomination of the Egyptians,"⁴⁵ "the idols of Egypt,"⁴⁶ "the pillars of Beth-shemesh, that is in the land of Egypt,"⁴⁷ "the houses of the gods of Egypt,"⁴⁸ "other gods in the land of Egypt,"⁴⁹ "Egypt with her gods,"⁵⁰ and "the devices of Egypt,"⁵¹ and allusions to the proper name of one Egyptian deity are to be found in the expressions "Amon mi-No"⁵² and "No Amon."⁵³ No reference, however, is to be found in Scripture to Greek gods. But with the establishment of the Jewish community in Alexandria, living there side by side with Greeks and Egyptians, the Jews became acquainted with the names of altogether new "other gods" who are not mentioned at all in Scripture and with the proper names of

³⁹ II Kings 1: 2.

⁴⁰ I Sam. 5: 7.

⁴¹ II Kings 23: 13.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ II Kings 5: 18.

⁴⁵ Exod. 8: 22.

⁴⁶ Isa. 19: 1.

⁴⁷ Jer. 43: 13.

⁴⁸ Jer. 43: 13.

⁴⁹ Jer. 44: 8.

⁵⁰ Jer. 46: 25.

⁵¹ Ezek. 20: 7 (LXX).

⁵² Jer. 46: 25.

⁵³ Nahum 3: 8.

the "other gods" of Egypt which Scripture only vaguely refers to. The Scripture-inspired attitude toward other gods, in its twofold aspect, was now extended to the new form of heathenism with which the Alexandrian Jews became acquainted. On the one hand, they did not hesitate to borrow Greek terms from popular Greek religion and apply them to their own religion, but, on the other hand, the application of these Greek religious terms to their own religion did not altogether obliterate for them the difference between these two religions. In the Greek translation of the Bible, when the translators came to translate the various Hebrew terms for God, they did not attempt to coin new Greek terms; they borrowed terms already used in Greek religion. Elohim becomes *θεός*, even though the Greek term had already various connotations in Greek religion. Adonai and Jehovah, the latter of which was pronounced by Jews Adonai, are translated *κύριος*, Lord, even though in Greek literature that term is used as an epithet of various gods.⁵⁴ *Shaddai* becomes *παντοκράτωρ*, almighty, even though, again, in Greek literature that term is used of Hermes.⁵⁵ The expression *ha-El ha-Gadol*,⁵⁶ the great God, is translated by *ὁ θεὸς ὁ μέγας*, even though in Greek the epithet "great" is applied to various gods.⁵⁷ The expression *El Elyon*,⁵⁸ the most high God, is translated by *ὁ θεὸς ὁ ὑψίστος*, even though in Greek that expression is used of Zeus.⁵⁹ Similarly in the translation of

⁵⁴ Cf. *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* (A. Boeckh), Index III, under *κύριος*; G. Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, s.v., III, 1045-1047.

⁵⁵ *Anthologia Palatina*, append. 282, cited in Liddell and Scott.

⁵⁶ Deut. 10: 17.

⁵⁷ Cf. *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*, Index III, under *μέγας*.

⁵⁸ Gen. 14: 20; Ps. 78: 35.

⁵⁹ Cf. *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*, Index III, under *ὑψίστος*; E. Schürer, "Die Juden in bosporanischen Reiche, etc.," *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie*, 1897, p. 209, discusses the application of this expression to Apollo, Attis, and Mandulis.

Hebrew terms connected with divine worship, such as sanctuary, altar, sacrifice, incense, libation, sprinkling, laver, votive offering, the firstlings or the first-fruits for offering, the Jews did not hesitate to borrow terms from the Greek religious practices. All of these of course meant some sort of Hellenization, but a Hellenization in language only; not in religious belief or cult. This Hellenization in language quite certainly gave to the Jews a wider knowledge of other religions, but it did not cause them to change their conception of their own religion. It indeed made them acquainted with the fact that the Greeks too describe some of their gods as lord, almighty, great, and most high, but that did not shake their belief that their God alone is the Lord, the Almighty, the Great, and the Most High in the true sense of the terms. While with all other peoples in the Hellenistic world the adoption of the name of a Greek deity for one of their own gods meant a religious syncretism, in the case of the Jews it meant only a recourse to the convenience of language. In the case of all those other peoples, no sooner had they learned Greek than they tried to identify their native gods with the Greek gods; in the case of the Jews, no sooner had they acquired a knowledge of Greek than they began to denounce Greek gods and Greek religious worship with the same zeal with which the prophets had denounced the gods and the religious worship of their own Semitic contemporaries and neighbors.

All the Hellenistic Jewish writers before Philo, or those who are reputed to have lived before him, denounce the heathenism of their new environment, its polytheism, its mythology, and its mysteries.

Making use of scriptural terminology, these Hellenistic Jewish writers denounce polytheism. They are conscious of the fact that they are the only people who do not worship many gods. "All mankind except ourselves believe in the

existence of many gods.”⁶⁰ These many gods whom other people worship are no longer those who are mentioned in Scripture. They are the new gods worshiped by their new neighbors, upon whom they shower the ancient invectives. Evidently acquainted with Plato’s view that “the earliest men in Greece believed only in those gods in whom many foreigners believe today — sun, moon, stars and sky,”⁶¹ in condemning the “other gods” of their new environment they mention especially those who “deemed either fire or wind or swift air or circling stars or raging water or luminaries of heaven to be the gods which govern the world.”⁶² They characterize as “false” the god “Phoebus”⁶³ and they denounce as “utterly foolish” the Greek deification of heroes⁶⁴ and the Egyptian deification of the dead⁶⁵ and of kings.⁶⁶ The stories about those heroes who falsely became gods are to them inventions of men, who are referred to by the Platonic derogatory term mythmakers (*μυθοποιήσαντες*).⁶⁷ The mythical deities are thus to them only deified human beings, or more particularly deified dead rulers, and their story is therefore recast by them to fit the scriptural story of the distribution of mankind and the formation of nations and states after the confusion of tongues.⁶⁸ Reëchoing the scriptural prophecy that “the Lord rideth upon a swift cloud, and cometh unto Egypt, and the idols of Egypt shall be moved at

⁶⁰ Aristeeas, 134.

⁶¹ *Cratylus* 397 c-d.

⁶² Wisdom of Solomon 13: 2.

⁶³ Sibylline Oracles IV, 4; cf. V, 324, 326.

⁶⁴ Aristeeas, 135-137.

⁶⁵ Wisdom of Solomon 14: 14-16. Cf. A. Erman, *Handbook of Egyptian Religion*, p. 90, and below, p. 31. S. Holmes in his note *ad loc.*, in Charles’s *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, takes it as a modification of the theory of Euhemerus that idolatry arose from the worship of deceased heroes. Cf. also P. Heinisch, *Das Buch der Weisheit, ad loc.*

⁶⁶ Wisdom of Solomon 14: 17-21. Cf. Erman, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

⁶⁷ Aristeeas, 137; cf. *μυθοποιους* in *Republic* II, 377 b.

⁶⁸ Sibylline Oracles III, 105 ff.; cf. *Conf.* 38, 190.

His presence,"⁶⁹ they prophesy that the Egyptian goddess Isis and the Graeco-Egyptian god Serapis shall pass away at the presence of the immortal God.⁷⁰ While, with the example of Scripture before them, they have no objection to describing God by general Greek terms for the gods, they never apply to God the proper name of any of the Greek deities. If Aristeas in his letter is made to say that the God worshiped by the Jews is the same as that which the Greeks call Zeus it is only because Aristeas is presented as a non-Jew and a Stoic philosopher to whom Zeus meant the same as the God worshiped by the Jews, "He through whom all things are endowed with life and come into being."⁷¹

Then also, using terms borrowed from the Greek translation of Scripture, they describe the various forms of idolatry practiced among the Greeks and Egyptians in Alexandria as "idols" (εἰδωλα),⁷² "dumb (κωφὰ) idols,"⁷³ "vain things" (μάταια),⁷⁴ "dead things" (νεκροί),⁷⁵ hand-made things (χειροποίητα).⁷⁶ Having been brought in closer contact with Egypt-

⁶⁹ Isa. 19: 1.

⁷⁰ Sibylline Oracles V, 484-490.

⁷¹ Aristeas, 15-16. Or, perhaps, in Hellenistic times the term Zeus ceased to be the proper name of a god and came to mean "chief god," on which see Roberts-Skeat-Nock, "The Gild of Zeus Hypsistos," *Harvard Theological Review*, 29 (1936), p. 59. The same authors also raise the question whether a Jew or Judaizer could use the name Zeus as a god, and their answer is: "Possibly; we simply do not know the limits of Jewish divagation" (*ibid.*, p. 65, n. 69). Ralph Marcus, in his "Divine Names and Attributes in Hellenistic Jewish Literature," *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, 3 (1931-32), pp. 43-120, has shown that out of 470 terms selected from the entire literature, with the exception of Philo, only 130 do not occur in the Greek bible, and of these many are merely formal variants of expressions which occur in it (*ibid.*, pp. 47-48). No proper name of any deity is found among them.

⁷² Wisdom of Solomon 14: 12.

⁷³ III Macc. 4: 16; cf. εἰδώλοισι ἀλάλοισι in Sibylline Oracles IV, 7; III, 30; cf. Habakkuk 2: 18.

⁷⁴ Sibylline Oracles V, 31; cf. Aristeas, 134.

⁷⁵ Wisdom of Solomon 13: 10; cf. Ps. 106: 28.

⁷⁶ Wisdom of Solomon 14: 8; 13: 10; cf. Septuagint Isa. 21: 9.

tian religion, they are especially emphatic in their denunciation of the Egyptian worship of "beasts and most kinds of creeping things and animals,"⁷⁷ "irrational creeping things and wretched animals,"⁷⁸ "animals which even their enemies held in dishonor,"⁷⁹ "serpents," and "cats."⁸⁰ All these seem to be used by them only as an expansion of what Scripture refers to vaguely as "the abomination of the Egyptians."

With their condemnation of polytheism and idolatry they also condemn all the evil practices which they believe to emanate from them. According to Jewish tradition, the basis of all moral evil is idolatry,⁸¹ and two of the greatest moral evils which are closely connected with idolatry are adultery and murder.⁸² Reflecting this tradition, the author of the Wisdom of Solomon says that "the worship of those unnamable idols is the beginning and cause and end of every evil"⁸³ and that those who worship idols "no longer guard either life or purity of marriage, but one slays another treacherously, or grieves him by adultery."⁸⁴ As an example of murder connected with idolatry, he speaks of "slaughtering children in solemn rites," an allusion not only to the Moloch worship condemned in Scripture but also to one which was common in early times among the Greeks and which at the time of this author still survived in some modified form.⁸⁵ As an example

⁷⁷ Aristeas, 138.

⁷⁸ Wisdom of Solomon 11: 15.

⁷⁹ Wisdom of Solomon 12: 24.

⁸⁰ Sibylline Oracles III, 30. A similar repulsion at the Egyptian animal worship was also felt by Graeco-Latin writers. Cf. F. Cumont, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-74.

⁸¹ *Sifre Num.*, § 111, F, pp. 31b-32a; H, p. 116.

⁸² *Sifra, Aḥare, Pereḳ* 4, p. 81c; *Jer. Pe'ah*, I, 1, 15d.

⁸³ Wisdom of Solomon 14: 24.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* 14: 23.

⁸⁵ In this verse, unlike in 12: 5, the reference is not exclusively to Moloch. Cf. W. J. Deane's note in his edition of *The Book of Wisdom*, *ad loc.*; P. Heinisch, *Das Buch der Weisheit*, *ad. loc.* cf. also Clement of Alexandria, *Cohortatio ad Gentes*, c. III, PG, 8, 124 c ff.

of adultery connected with idolatry the same writer mentions "celebrating secret mysteries (*κρύφια μυστήρια*), or holding frantic revels of strange ordinances" ⁸⁶ — an allusion to the Dionysiac orgies connected with the mysteries of Eleusis.⁸⁷ In the Third Book of Maccabees, initiation into mysteries is spoken of as being synonymous with the abandonment of Judaism.⁸⁸

But in the course of time, among the Scripture-trained Jews in Alexandria there appeared those who besides an acquaintance with the heathenish worship and practices of their neighbors learned also to read Greek, and among the books they read were not only Homer and Hesiod but also the works of the philosophers. And of these philosophers — even of the earliest among them, to say nothing of the Stoics — they could not help getting the impression that they had risen above the idol-worshiping and abomination-loving heathen. Not idols did these philosophers worship, but one God, invisible, immaterial, good, and just. Xenophanes exclaims: "One god, the greatest among gods and men," ⁸⁹ and Aristotle endeavors to prove by arguments that there cannot be more than one god.⁹⁰ In those works of the philosophers the Hellenistic Jewish writers also found expressions of opinion against anthropomorphisms. Xenophanes again exclaims that his one god is "neither in form like unto mortals nor in thought," ⁹¹ and Aristotle tries to prove that God is not corporeal.⁹² In Heraclitus, furthermore, they found an attack upon the veneration paid to images, for, he says, "they

⁸⁶ Wisdom of Solomon 14: 23.

⁸⁷ Cf. W. J. Deane's note in his edition of *The Book of Wisdom*, *ad loc.*

⁸⁸ III Macc. 2: 30.

⁸⁹ H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*¹, I, p. 62, Fr. 23; J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*², p. 119, Fr. 23.

⁹⁰ *Phys.* VIII, 6, 259a, 8 ff.

⁹¹ *Loc. cit.*, above, n. 89.

⁹² *Phys.* VIII, 10, 266a, 10 ff.

pray to these images, as if one were to talk with a man's house, knowing not what gods or heroes are." ⁹³ In Xenophanes they also found a denunciation of Homer and Hesiod, who "have ascribed to the gods all things that are a shame and a disgrace among mortals, stealings and adulteries and deceivings of one another." ⁹⁴ Moreover, among the philosophers they also found denunciations of certain religious practices like those denounced by the prophets. Heraclitus thus denounces the mysteries and the Dionysiac orgies: "The mysteries practiced among men are unholy mysteries," ⁹⁵ and "if it were not to Dionysus that they made a procession and sang the shameful phallic hymn, they would be acting most shamelessly." ⁹⁶ As in the prophets, they found in Plato a denunciation of those who believe that the gods "are easy to win over when bribed by offerings and prayers" ⁹⁷ or that they would betray justice "for the sake of gifts offered by unjust men." ⁹⁸ More especially did they find in the works of the philosophers a preoccupation with the question with which they were already acquainted from the prophet Micah's question: "Must thou, O man, be told what is good?" ⁹⁹ And the answer they found in the works of the philosophers was almost like those they found in the answer given by the prophet: "What doth the Lord require from thee, but to do justice and to love mercy, and to be prepared to walk with the Lord thy God?" ¹⁰⁰ Justice and mercy are what philosophers would include in their various lists of what they call virtues, and the practice of virtue is what to the

⁹³ Diels, *op. cit.*, I, p. 78, ll. 10-12, Fr. 5; Burnet, *op. cit.*, p. 141, Fr. 126. Cf. below, II, 116.

⁹⁴ Diels, *op. cit.*, I, p. 59, Fr. 11; Burnet, *op. cit.*, p. 119, Fr. 11.

⁹⁵ Diels, *op. cit.*, I, p. 81, ll. 4-5, Fr. 14; Burnet, *op. cit.*, p. 141, Fr. 125.

⁹⁶ Diels, *loc. cit.*, ll. 6-8, Fr. 15; Burnet, *loc. cit.*, Fr. 127.

⁹⁷ *Laws* X, 885 B; *Republic* II, 364 B.

⁹⁸ *Laws* X, 907 A. Cf. below, II, 242-246.

⁹⁹ Micah 6: 8 (LXX). ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

philosophers is the good. Exactly like the prophet's advice "to be prepared to walk with the Lord thy God" were the statements they found among the philosophers that "every man ought so to devise as to be of the number of those who follow in the steps of the God"¹⁰¹ and "to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise."¹⁰² Moreover, all the philosophers, dissatisfied with existing laws, planned to establish laws for the guidance of individuals and states which, like the laws of Moses, were aimed to establish justice and righteousness so as to assimilate the conduct of men to that of God.

And so in presenting the beliefs and laws and practices of Judaism to a hostile world — beliefs which were characterized as atheism, laws which were described as inhospitable, and practices which were condemned as superstitious — they tried to show that their God, though not one of the gods of popular religion, is the God of philosophers, that their laws, though not the same as the laws of the city religions, were like the ethics and politics recommended by philosophers, and that their practices, though outlandish, could be explained as being based upon reason, hoping perhaps that those for whom their writings were intended might recall that some of the Greek philosophers also were accused of atheism and impiety. Thus God who in Scripture describes himself as "I am He who is" ($\delta \acute{\omega}\nu$)¹⁰³ begins to be referred to as $\delta \acute{\omega}\nu$,¹⁰⁴ with the philosophical connotation of real being, reflecting Plato's use of the term $\delta\upsilon\tau\omega\varsigma \delta\upsilon$ in its application to the ideas.¹⁰⁵ The creation of the world is expressed in philosophic terms as a creation "out of formless matter" ($\acute{\epsilon}\xi \acute{\alpha}\mu\acute{o}\rho\phi\omicron\upsilon \upsilon\lambda\eta\varsigma$).¹⁰⁶ The

¹⁰¹ Plato, *Laws* IV, 716 B.

¹⁰² *Idem.*, *Theaetetus* 176 B.

¹⁰³ Exod. 3: 14.

¹⁰⁴ Wisdom of Solomon 13: 1.

¹⁰⁵ *Phaedrus* 247 E.

¹⁰⁶ Wisdom of Solomon 11: 17.

Law is described in terms of philosophy as having been drawn up "with a view to truth and the indication of right reason (*δρθοῦ λόγου*)," ¹⁰⁷ and its commandments are identified with what philosophers call virtues (*ἀρεταί*).¹⁰⁸ And the description of the world and man and society in Scripture is reproduced with an admixture of philosophic terminology. The Hellenistic Jewish writers, who condemned Greek popular religion and mythology and mysteries, saw in the Greek philosophers the spiritual kindred of the Jews, just as Aristotle, according to a story told by a Greek writer, on his first meeting with a Jew, saw in him the representative of a race of philosophers.¹⁰⁹

Still, to these Alexandrian Jewish writers, while philosophy in its teachings about God and about the duties of men was reminiscent of the teachings of Scripture, it never really reached the full truth of Scripture. It only groped after it, and occasionally approached it in a vague way. The full truth in all its splendor is to be found only in Scripture, which was revealed to men directly by God; philosophy is only the product of the human mind, and hence subject to error.

The conception of the divine origin of the Law as it formulated itself in the minds of these Hellenistic Jewish writers reflects what by that time was already an established Jewish belief. Its origin, of course, is the testimony of Scripture itself that Moses spoke the word of God. But the formulation of that belief must have arisen out of the many passages in Scripture about wisdom and the Law and their relation to each other. There was, to begin with, wisdom, which says of itself, "The Lord created me in the beginning of His way,

¹⁰⁷ Aristeas, 161.

¹⁰⁸ Aristeas, 144; Aristobulus in Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* XIII 12; IV Macc. 5: 23; Wisdom of Solomon 8: 7.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Josephus, *Apion*. I, 22, 177-181.

before His works of old." ¹¹⁰ Then there was the identification of that wisdom, which was created before the creation of the world, with the Law which long after the creation of the world was revealed by God through Moses. Just as of that wisdom it is said that in the finding of it man is to be happy ¹¹¹ and that it is to keep him from the strange woman, ¹¹² so also of the Law it is said that man is not to forget it ¹¹³ and that it is to keep him from the evil woman, ¹¹⁴ and it is the Law which is "your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the nations." ¹¹⁵ Out of this there grew up the view that the revelation of the Law was the revelation of that wisdom which had been created by God and existed with Him prior to the creation of the world. As expressed by later rabbis, "The Law is a species of wisdom come down from wisdom on high." ¹¹⁶ But this Law, which is preëxistent wisdom revealed, was revealed only to Israel, for it is the peculiar "inheritance of the congregation of Jacob." ¹¹⁷ To other peoples God has given another kind of wisdom, wisdom acquired by them through their own effort, though with the help of God, and this human wisdom is shared by "the children of the east" and "Egypt" ¹¹⁸ and "Teman" ¹¹⁹ and Tyre ¹²⁰ and Babylon ¹²¹ and Gebal. ¹²²

In Palestinian Judaism this conception of the divine origin of the Law is given expression by Ben-Sira. To begin with, prior to the creation of the heavens and the earth there had already existed wisdom, for "before them all was wisdom created." ¹²³ Then this antemundane wisdom was revealed in the Law of Moses, for "if thou desire wisdom, keep the

¹¹⁰ Prov. 8: 22.

¹¹¹ Prov. 3: 13.

¹¹² Prov. 7: 4-5.

¹¹³ Prov. 3: 1.

¹¹⁴ Prov. 6: 23-24.

¹¹⁵ Deut. 4: 6.

¹¹⁶ *Genesis Rabbah* 17, 5.

¹¹⁷ Deut. 33: 4.

¹¹⁸ I Kings 5: 10.

¹¹⁹ Jer. 49: 7.

¹²⁰ Ezek. 28: 5.

¹²¹ Jer. 50: 35.

¹²² Ezek. 27: 9.

¹²³ Sirach 1: 4.

commandments, and the Lord will give her freely unto thee . . .¹²⁴ and he that taketh hold of the Law findeth her¹²⁵ . . . and all wisdom is the fulfilling of the Law.”¹²⁶ But it is only the wisdom of Israel which is the Law that was divinely revealed, for God who created wisdom and revealed her to men said unto her: “Let thy dwelling-place be in Jacob, and in Israel take up thy inheritance . . . and I took root among the honoured people.”¹²⁷

This conception of the divine origin of the Law can also be pieced together from the various philosophic writings of Hellenistic Judaism prior to Philo. In the Letter of Aristeas the books of the Law are described as oracles (λόγια) of God,¹²⁸ and the Law is said to be “sacred and of divine origin.”¹²⁹ No mention is made in this letter of the identification of the Law with wisdom nor of the antemundane existence of wisdom. But the Fourth Book of Maccabees, after reproducing the Stoic definition of wisdom,¹³⁰ explicitly identifies wisdom with the Law, in its statement: “This I take to be the culture acquired under the Law.”¹³¹ No mention, however, is made of the antemundane existence of that wisdom which is acquired under the Law. But in Aristobulus there is a direct reference to “one of our forefathers, Solomon” as saying that wisdom “has existed before heaven and earth.”¹³² A direct statement as to the antemundane existence of wisdom, reflecting the Book of Proverbs, is found in the Wisdom of Solomon, in the verse saying that “with Thee was wisdom, which knoweth thy works, and was present when Thou wast making the world”;¹³³ and the identification of wisdom with

¹²⁴ Sirach 1: 26.

¹²⁵ Sirach 15: 1.

¹²⁶ Sirach 19: 20; cf. 21: 11; 24: 23; 34: 8.

¹²⁷ Sirach 24: 8, 12.

¹²⁸ Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* XIII, 12, 376b; cf. VIII, 14, 324b.

¹²⁹ Wisdom of Solomon 9: 9; cf. below, p. 183.

¹²⁸ Aristeas, 177.

¹²⁹ Aristeas, 313; cf. 31.

¹³⁰ IV Macc. 1: 16.

¹³¹ *Ibid.* 1: 17.

the Law is implied in the same book, in the verse saying that "love [of wisdom] is observance of her laws."¹³⁴

Now Hellenistic Jewish writers must undoubtedly have been acquainted with the claim of popular Greek religion that certain laws were revealed by the gods.¹³⁵ But no mention of this claim is made by them. To them, since the Greek gods are false gods, the claims that they had revealed laws are false claims. Undoubtedly, too, these writers must also have known about the various philosophic speculations on wisdom as belonging to God,¹³⁶ but when they happened to come upon any such speculation they must undoubtedly have tried to evaluate it in the light of their own native Jewish tradition about wisdom as coming from God. When, for instance, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato maintain that God alone is wise (*σοφός*) but man can only be a lover of wisdom (*φιλοσοφος*),¹³⁷ the Jewish writers must have seen in such statements, in so far as they attribute wisdom to God, an approach to the truth of Scripture; but in so far as they deny wisdom to man, a confession of the impossibility of man's attaining true wisdom without revelation. When, on the other hand, Aristotle and the Stoics maintain that man can have wisdom but that wisdom (*σοφία*) is to be defined, in the words of Aristotle, as "any science that deals with divine objects" (*θεία*)¹³⁸ and, in the words of the Stoics, as "the science of things divine and human,"¹³⁹ the Hellenistic Jewish writers must have seen in these statements a use of the term wisdom in the sense of wisdom attained by man through his own powers as contrasted with revealed wisdom.

¹³⁴ Wisdom of Solomon 6: 18.

¹³⁵ Cf. below, II, 191.

¹³⁶ Cf. H. Leisegang, "Sophia," in Pauly-Wissowa. 2. Reihe, 5, cols. 1019-1039.

¹³⁷ *Phaedrus* 278 D; *Symposium* 203 E; cf. Diogenes, I, 12. On the earlier use of *σοφός* in the general sense of philosopher, see E. Frank, *Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer*, 1923, p. 298, n. 1.

¹³⁸ *Metaph.* I, 2, 983a, 6-7.

¹³⁹ Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 13.

This, then, is how the Law and philosophy must have contrasted themselves in the minds of the Hellenistic Jewish writers. The former was wisdom revealed by God; the latter was wisdom attained by man's own powers. A direct reference to this contrast between revelation and philosophy is to be found in the Wisdom of Solomon, in its author's declaration that he will declare what wisdom is and how she came, and will not hide "mysteries" (*μυστήρια*).¹⁴⁰ Now the term mysteries in its ordinary sense refers to certain hidden and sacred rites practiced throughout the heathen world, the nature of which their participants were not allowed to divulge, and the obvious meaning of this verse, therefore, would seem to be that, while wisdom is of the nature of a mystery, unlike the heathen mysteries it is to be divulged.¹⁴¹ But it happens that the term mysteries by that time had acquired in Greek philosophy an additional meaning. It referred to that kind of wisdom which some philosophers believed, as we have seen, to belong only to the gods and which had to be imparted in secret only to a chosen few. Of Protagoras, whom he describes as a very wise man (*πάσσοφος*), Plato suggests that he must have told "the truth to his pupils in secret" (*ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ*),¹⁴² and this truth is described by him as mysteries (*μυστήρια*).¹⁴³ Aristotle, who uses the term wisdom to mean the science of things divine and maintains that man can have wisdom, divided his philosophy into "exoteric" and "esoteric" or "acroastic"; and to the latter, because it dealt with "a more profound and recondite philosophy," it is said he "did not ordinarily admit any pupil

¹⁴⁰ Wisdom of Solomon 6: 22 (23); cf. below, pp. 43 ff.

¹⁴¹ Cf. S. Holmes's note *ad loc.* in Charles's *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*. Cf. also notes in the commentaries of L. W. Grimm, W. J. Deane, and P. Heinisch, *ad loc.*

¹⁴² *Theaetetus* 152 c.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* 156 a.

until he tested his ability, his elementary knowledge, and his zeal and devotion to study.”¹⁴⁴ These esoteric doctrines of Aristotle are in a later time described by Themistius (4th century A.D.) as being of the nature of mysteries (*μυστικοί*) and sacred initiations (*τέλη*).¹⁴⁵ The Stoics, who describe wisdom as the knowledge of things divine and human and consider it accessible to men, still consider discourses about the gods as mysteries (*τέλετα*),¹⁴⁶ evidently to be kept secret from the common people. In general, it may be said that the practice of keeping certain doctrines secret was common among all the schools of Greek philosophy.¹⁴⁷ We therefore take it that it is in contrast to this wisdom or philosophy of the Greeks that the author of the Book of the Wisdom of Solomon says of the wisdom which was revealed in the Law, that “what wisdom is, and how she came up, I will declare, and I will not hide mysteries (*μυστήρια*) from you; but I will seek her out from the beginning of her birth and bring the knowledge of her into clear light, and will not pass by the truth.”¹⁴⁸ By all this he means to say that he is going to tell the story of wisdom or the Law “from the beginning of her birth,” that is, from the time it was created by God before the creation of the world; “how she came up,” that is, how she was revealed by God through Moses; and finally “what wisdom is.” Evidently having in mind the statement that “the divine cannot be envious (*φθονερόν*),”¹⁴⁹ which is used by Aristotle as a refutation of Simonides’ statement that

¹⁴⁴ Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* XX, 5.

¹⁴⁵ Themistius, *Orationes* XXVI, 319 D, ed. Dindorf, p. 385, ll. 32-33. Cf. Zeller II, 24, pp. 155, n. 7; 116, n. 4 (*Aristotle*, I, pp. 112, n. 1; 113, n. 1).

¹⁴⁶ Arnim, II, 42 and 1008.

¹⁴⁷ Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* V, 9, PG, 9, 90 A f.

¹⁴⁸ Wisdom of Solomon 6: 22 (23).

¹⁴⁹ *Metaph.* I, 2, 983a, 2-3. I take the reference in the Wisdom of Solomon to be to the statement in Aristotle, unlike the reference later in Philo (cf. below, p. 37), which is to a similar statement in Plato.

“God alone can have this privilege [i.e., wisdom],”¹⁵⁰ he says: “Neither indeed will I take pining envy (*φθβνω*) for my companion, because envy shall have no fellowship with wisdom,”¹⁵¹ and also “As I learned without guile, I impart without envy (*ἀφθβνως*); I do not hide her riches.”¹⁵²

This wisdom which is the Law, having a divine origin, is also superior to the wisdom which the philosophers have attained to. The latter only remotely approaches certain truths of divine wisdom. In their extant writings, pre-Philonic Alexandrian Jewish philosophers do not criticize Greek philosophy; that was not their purpose. Their main purpose was, as we have said, to show that, while the Jews rejected the heathen deities, they were not atheists; that while their laws were peculiar, they were not inhospitable; and that while their practices were outlandish, they were not superstitious. But still, with all their desire to present Judaism as a philosophy like that of the Greek philosophers, they constantly stress certain fundamental differences. The Jewish God indeed is incorporeal and free of emotions as is the God of the philosophers, but still He is not without personal relation to man. He can be prayed to.¹⁵³ God has established a fixed order of nature, but still He can miraculously change that order.¹⁵⁴ God is providence, as philosophers say, but His providence is individual: He rewards and punishes.¹⁵⁵ Man is a part of nature, and his actions follow the laws of cause and effect, but God by His grace has given him freedom.¹⁵⁶ The soul is immortal, as philosophers say, but it is also destructible as a punishment.¹⁵⁷ The laws of Moses aim

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 982b, 30-31.

¹⁵² *Ibid.* 7: 13.

¹⁵¹ Wisdom of Solomon 6: 23 (24).

¹⁵³ *Aristeas*, 192.

¹⁵⁴ Wisdom of Solomon 11: 17-20; 19: 6-12, 18-22; cf. 12: 18.

¹⁵⁵ Wisdom of Solomon 14: 3-4; 19: 13.

¹⁵⁶ *Aristeas*, 231, 236, 237; Wisdom of Solomon 1: 12.

¹⁵⁷ Wisdom of Solomon 3: 11; 4: 19; cf. below, p. 409.

to implant virtue as do the laws recommended by philosophers, still these laws are not merely a means which can be replaced by other means; they are the best means, the means revealed by God, and they are to be obeyed for their own sake as divine ordinances.¹⁵⁸ The superiority of Scripture to philosophy is brought out dramatically by the author of the Letter of Aristeas in his account of the table-talk between the Jewish sages and King Ptolemy Philadelphus. The king asks these Jewish sages all kinds of questions. They answer each question. But the common recurrent refrain in all their answers, expressing the same sentiment in different words, is that God is the source of everything we know and everything we do. Thereupon, says the author, "with loud voice the king greeted them all and spoke kindly to them, and all those who were present expressed their approval, especially the philosophers, for they were far superior to the philosophers both in conduct and in argument, since they always made God the starting-point."¹⁵⁹

II. PHILO ON POLYTHEISM, MYTHOLOGY, AND MYSTERIES

The same attitude toward these various phases of Greek religion — its polytheism, its mythology, and its mysteries — is reflected also in the writings of Philo.

First, whenever he happens to comment upon a scriptural condemnation of the worship of "other gods," those "other gods" become with him the gods of the Greeks and Egyptians. Like the Wisdom of Solomon,¹ evidently again following Plato's view that "the earliest men in Greece believed only in those gods in whom many foreigners believe today — sun, moon, earth, stars and sky,"² he mentions as an example of the most characteristic form of polytheism the deification

¹⁵⁸ Aristeas, 127; 313; Wisdom of Solomon 6: 18.

¹⁵⁹ Aristeas, 235.

¹ Cf. above, p. 14.

² *Cratylus* 397 c-d.

of earth, water, air, fire, sun, moon, planets, and fixed stars.³ But he then adds the Greek names by which these natural objects came to be popularly known as deities — Kore or Demeter or Pluto for earth, Poseidon for sea, Hera for air, Hephaestus for fire, Apollo for sun, Artemis for moon, Aphrodite for Venus or the morning-star, Hermes for Mercury or the Shiner, Castor and Pollux or the Dioscuri for the two hemispheres — that above the earth and that below the earth; and he alludes to other names of deified natural objects.⁴ Those who have invented these names he calls “sophists,”⁵ evidently using this term here, not in the sense in which he often uses it, as referring to the Sophists of Platonic fame,⁶ but in its earlier sense as meaning wise men, not only philosophers but also poets, including Homer and Hesiod.⁷ Among the “other gods” which he denounces he includes “opportunity” (*καιρός*), upon whom, he says, “the wickedest of men” look as a god,⁸ and he denounces also what he describes as “the impious doctrine of the Epicureans,”⁹ referring thereby, as we shall see, to the gods of the popular teachings of Epicurus.¹⁰ So does he denounce the deification of heroes, to whom he refers also as “demigods” (*ἡμιθεοί*),¹¹ describing them as being “both mortal and immortal.”¹² Of these demigods he mentions especially Dionysus, Heracles, and the Dioscuri,¹³ the last of whom, as we

³ *Decal.* 12, 53; *Cont.* 1, 3-6.

⁴ *Decal.* 12, 54-57; *Cont.* 1, 3.

⁵ *Cont.* 1, 4.

⁶ Cf., e.g., *Post.* 11, 35: “one of the ancient Sophists named Protagoras.”

⁷ Cf. Diogenes, I, 12. Cf. Zeller, I, 2⁵, p. 1074, n. 2 (*Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, II, p. 430, n. 1). In this sense also does Philo use the term “sophists” as a description of the traditional Jewish scholars in Alexandria (cf. below, p. 59).

⁸ *Qu. in Gen.* I, 100; Harris, *Fragments*, p. 19.

⁹ *Post.* 1, 2.

¹⁰ Cf. below, pp. 166, 176, 177.

¹¹ *Cont.* 1, 6; cf. *Congr.* 4, 15; *Probus* 16, 105.

¹² *Cont.* 1, 6; *Probus* 16, 105. ¹³ *Legat.* 11, 78.

have seen, he mentions also among the gods¹⁴ without distinguishing them as demigods. Besides heroes, he denounces also the deification of kings, with especial reference to the claim of Caligula, considering such a claim as being only a ridiculous imitation of ancient Greek deification of heroes¹⁵ and suggesting that this deification of kings, with particular reference to the case of Caligula, found no recognition among people, whether Greeks or barbarians, except among the native Egyptians of Alexandria, who were susceptible to it by reason of their belief in animal worship.¹⁶ He evinces no knowledge of the belief among ancient Egyptians, long before his time, in the divine origin and nature of their kings;¹⁷ nor does he seem to know that Ptolemy II was deified during his life.¹⁸ In his condemnation of idolatry, while drawing upon the vocabulary of Scripture, he applies it to the idolatry of his own time. "The world as we know it," he says, "is full of idols of wood and stone, and suchlike images."¹⁹ He refers to them as those who are accounted as gods "in the different cities,"²⁰ and describes them as "being fashioned by the arts of painters and sculptors,"²¹ out of wood or stone or silver or gold.²²

¹⁴ Cf. above, p. 28.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 25, 162-165.

¹⁵ *Legat.* 11, 78 ff.

¹⁷ Cf. above, p. 14.

¹⁸ Cf. W. S. Ferguson, in *Cambridge Ancient History*, VII, p. 17.

¹⁹ *Mos.* II, 38, 205.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*; *Decal.* 14, 66; *Spec.* I, 4, 21.

²² *Decal.* 14, 66; cf. *Mos.* II, 38, 205; *Spec.* I, 4, 21; *Cont.* 1, 7. The expression "fashioned by the skill of painters and sculptors" in *Mos.* II, 38, 205, as well as the expression "fashioned by the craftsmanship of sculpture and painting" in *Decal.* 14, 66, does not mean that Philo believed that the painting of images was prohibited by the Mosaic law. In both these passages, it will be noticed, the images fashioned by painting and sculpture are said to be (1) ξάνα, which definitely means a wooden statue, and (2) ἀγάλματα, which, judging from the expression ἀγάλματα καὶ ξάνα καὶ ζωγραφήματα in *Abr.* 45, 267, means here also a statue made either of stone or of metal. This clearly shows that the condemnation of images in these two passages is not of painted images but rather of statues painted with color. The painting of statues is known to have been customary in Greek sculpture, and Plato speaks of

As a native of Alexandria and one who was acquainted directly with the Egyptians, he devotes special attention to their religion. In one passage, he refers in a general way to "the atheism (*ἀθεότης*) of the Egyptians."²³ In another passage, he specifies what that atheism is. "Moses," he says, "has branded the Egyptian character as atheistical, because it values (1) earth above heaven, (2) the things that live on the land (*χερσαῖα*) above those that dwell on high, and (3) the body above the soul."²⁴ In this passage, it will be noticed, he denounces three forms of atheism which he ascribes to Egyptians. First, their valuation of earth above heaven, by which he undoubtedly means the various earth deities worshiped by the Egyptians. In his discussion of this form of atheism he mentions especially the Egyptian deification of the Nile, under which he undoubtedly includes the various Nile deities. Similarly, in another passage he describes the Egyptians as being "almost alone among the nations" in their deification of the earth, including under this also their deification of the Nile,²⁵ and characterizes this deification of earth and the Nile as "the atheism of those people."²⁶ Second, their valuation of things that live in the land above

"painting statues" (*Republic IV*, 420 c). So also in the Wisdom of Solomon 15: 4, the condemnation of "the painters' fruitless labor, a form stained with varied colors" does not refer to a painted picture but rather to a painted statue (cf. P. Heinisch, *Das Buch der Weisheit, ad loc.*). According to the Talmudic interpretation of the prohibition against the making of "any likeness" (Exod. 20: 4), this prohibition applies only to carved figures but does not apply to images not projecting (*'Abodah Zarah* 43b; Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah*, 'Akum, III, 10). This interpretation of the law was quite evidently that which was followed both by the author of the Wisdom of Solomon and by Philo, as well as also later by the Jews in Dura-Europos, as may be judged from the paintings in their synagogue (cf. Du Mesnil du Buisson, *Les Peintures de la Synagogue de Doura-Europos, 245-256 après J.-C.*, Roma, 1939). But even in the case of carved figures, the law was not always interpreted with the same rigidity (cf. E. L. Sukenik, *Ancient Synagogues in Palestine and Greece*, London, 1934, pp. 63-65).

²³ *Post.* 1, 2.

²⁵ *Mos.* II, 36, 194-195.

²⁴ *Fug.* 32, 180.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 193; cf. 37, 196.

those that dwell on high, by which he quite evidently means their deification of animals. Similarly, in another passage he uses the term atheism as a description of Egyptian animal worship.²⁷ Third, their valuation of the body above the soul, by which, we take it, he means the deification of the dead²⁸ and the identification of all the dead with the god Osiris.²⁹ The terms "heaven," "those that dwell on high," and "the soul," which he mentions as being undervalued by the Egyptians, are used by him here as symbolic of the immaterial beings which, in contrast to the atheism of the Egyptians, constitute what he considered as theism — the belief in an incorporeal God and incorporeal ideas above this corporeal world of ours.³⁰ The terms "heaven" and "those that dwell on high" refer here respectively to God and the ideas, for "heaven" has the meaning of God both in Greek and in rabbinic Hebrew.

Denunciation of animal worship as a practice peculiar to Egyptians occurs also in many other passages in Philo. As in the Wisdom of Solomon, he goes into a detailed enumeration of the animals worshiped by the Egyptians. They worship, he says, "irrational animals," not only domestic animals, such as rams and goats and dogs and cats, and especially bulls, but also wild animals, such as the lion and the wolf among the land animals and the crocodile among the aquatic animals, added to these also the asp among the reptiles, ibises and hawks among the birds, and finally also fishes, either their whole bodies or particular parts.³¹ He describes this form of worship as "the folly (*ἡλιθιότητα*) of Egypt,"³² which probably reflects the scriptural expressions

²⁷ *Legat.* 25, 163.

²⁸ A. Erman, *A Handbook of Egyptian Religion*, p. 90.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

³⁰ Cf. below, pp. 164, 177 ff.

³¹ *Decal.* 16, 76-79; *Post.* 48, 165; *Legat.* 20, 139; *Spec.* I, 15, 79; *Mos.* I, 5, 23.

³² *Spec.* I, 15, 79.

“the abominations (βδελύγματα) of Egypt”³³ and “the devices (ἐπιτηδεύματα) of Egypt.”³⁴

His application of the term “atheism” to the particular kind of Egyptian polytheism needs some comment. Atheism to him is not the same as polytheism, and the term is not used by him as a rule as a description of polytheism.³⁵ When, therefore, he describes Egyptian polytheism as atheism, he is using that term in some special sense. What that special sense is may be gathered from two passages. In one passage, he says that “polytheistic creeds” finally lead to “atheism,”³⁶ and so we may assume that the polytheism of the Egyptians is called by him atheism because atheism is that which it finally must lead to. In another passage, he seems to indicate that the term atheism as a description of Egyptian animal worship is used by him in the rather loose sense of excessive folly (πολλὴ ἡλιθιότης) or excessive impiety (ἀσέβεια),³⁷ for, as he says in still another passage, animal worship is the worst of all the forms of polytheism.³⁸ So also Plutarch, speaking of Egyptian animal worship, says that it plunges the weak and the innocent into “sheer superstition” and the more cynical and bold into “atheistic and brutish reasoning,”³⁹ maintaining, with regard to “superstition,” that it is no less an evil than “atheism.”⁴⁰

Second, Philo denounces mythology, having in mind usually Greek mythology but occasionally making reference also to Egyptian mythology.⁴¹ Myths to him are man-made.

³³ Exod. 8: 22.

³⁶ *Praem.* 28, 162.

³⁴ Ezek. 20: 7, 8.

³⁷ *Legat.* 25, 163.

³⁵ Cf. below, p. 166.

³⁸ *Decal.* 16, 76, and 80.

³⁹ Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*, ch. 71, 379 E.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, ch. 11, 355 D; cf. ch. 67, 378 A; *De Superstitione*, ch. 1, 164 E; ch. 2, 165 C. So also Philo says that “superstition” is a brother of “impiety” (*Sacr.* 4, 15). Similar statements with regard to the connection between “superstition” and “impiety” are to be found also in *Deter.* 8, 24; *Immut.* 35, 164; *Spec.* IV, 27, 147; *Praem.* 7, 40.

⁴¹ *Decal.* 16, 76; *Spec.* I, 15, 79; *Migr.* 14, 76.

The expressions "to coin myths" (*μυθοπλαστεῖν*),⁴² "making of myths" (*μυθοποιεῖν*),⁴³ and "coiners of myths" (*μυθοπλασται*)⁴⁴ are used by him in a derogatory sense with reference to mythology and mythologists. Myths are not only man-made, they are also false. They have been handed down "for the deception of mortal kind" and consequently they fill one with "false opinions."⁴⁵ Mythology is "sophistry" opposed to "wisdom"; "imposture" opposed to "truth."⁴⁶ It invents "mythical devices contrary to the truth,"⁴⁷ and its gods are "cunningly invented myths."⁴⁸ The myth-makers are described by him as those "who have infected our life with falsehoods and chased away truths from its borders."⁴⁹ "The hippocentaurs and chimeras and the like" are "forms of life hitherto unknown and with no existence outside mythology,"⁵⁰ the story of Gorgon is "an invention of a myth,"⁵¹ and the "mythical stories" about an original human being who combined the characteristics of both sexes⁵² are regarded with supreme contempt by "the disciples of Moses trained from their earliest years to love the truth."⁵³ The mythologists are "impious," for in their "mythical inventions" they represent God "in word indeed as only endowed with human form, but in fact as possessing human passions."⁵⁴ Evidently referring to Plato's condemnation of mythology,⁵⁵ he says that even philosophers speak of "myth

⁴² *Post.* 15, 52; *Gig.* 13, 58; *Conf.* 3, 6.

⁴³ *Leg. All.* I, 14, 43; *Sacr.* 4, 13; 21, 76; *Immut.* 2, 59; *Fug.* 22, 121; *Spec.* I, 15, 79.

⁴⁴ *Conf.* 3, 6; *Aet.* 11, 56; 12, 68.

⁴⁵ *Sacr.* 21, 76.

⁴⁶ *Praem.* 2, 8.

⁴⁹ *Aet.* 11, 56; cf. 12, 68.

⁴⁷ *Post.* 15, 52.

⁵⁰ *Spec.* III, 8, 45.

⁴⁸ *Praem.* 28, 162.

⁵¹ *Legat.* 32, 237.

⁵² Cf. Plato, *Symposium* 189 D-190 D.

⁵³ *Cont.* 7, 63. But the same view is also found in *Genesis Rabbah* 8, 1; *Midrash Tehillim*, on Ps. 139: 5; *Tanhuma: Tazri'a* 1; *Berakot* 61a; *Erubin* 18a. So also Philo himself in *Opif.* 24, 76. Cf. discussion in Ginzberg, *Legends of the Jews* (Jewish Publication Society, 1909-1938), V, 88, n. 42.

⁵⁴ *Immut.* 12, 59.

⁵⁵ *Republic* II, 378 D.

and fiction" as "obscuring the truth,"⁵⁶ and complains of those who "make counterfeit impressions in the yet tender souls of the young, employing their ears as their ministers, and filling them with mythical nonsense."⁵⁷ Mythology is not the invention of virtue, but the invention of pleasure.⁵⁸ In the second of the ten commandments, therefore, he finds a prohibition not only of the worship of idols but also of the worship of "all those deities which the myth-writers have invented and spread delusion therewith" and for the promotion of which they make use of "melody, metre and rhythm" as well as of the arts of "sculpture and painting."⁵⁹ Moreover, not only is it prohibited by this second commandment to worship or to make these mythological deities but it is also prohibited "to believe in (*προσεσθαι*) the mythical inventions about the marriage of gods and the birth of gods and the numberless and very grave scandals associated with both of these."⁶⁰ Proselytes are described by him as those who "spurn mythical inventions and embrace truth in its purity"⁶¹ or as those who take up their abode "with the truth and with the honor of the one Being who is entitled to honor, abandoning the mythical inventions and multiplicity of sovereigns."⁶²

As contrasted with mythology, which is man-made and false, Scripture is the work of God, and "in the work of God you will find no mythical invention, but only inexorable rules of truth firmly established, nor will you find in it metres and rhythms and tuneful verses charming the ear with their music, but nature's own consummate works, which possess a harmony all their own."⁶³ Moses "refrained from inventing myths himself or acquiescing in those composed by

⁵⁶ *Opif.* 61, 170.

⁵⁷ *Post.* 48, 165.

⁵⁸ *Sacr.* 5, 28.

⁶² *Spec.* IV, 34, 178; cf. *Virt.* 20, 102; 33, 178.

⁵⁹ *Spec.* I, 5, 28-29.

⁶⁰ *Decal.* 29, 156.

⁶¹ *Spec.* I, 9, 51.

⁶³ *Deter.* 33, 125.

others.”⁶⁴ Unlike myths which, being man-made, are described by him as belonging to the past and as being old and obsolete and effete, the thoughts contained in Scripture are said by him to be always “new and fresh and in the vigor of youth,” for they come from God “who never grows old.”⁶⁵ Unlike myths, too, which, being man-made, are not only false as literal facts but also contain no underlying meaning, the words of Scripture, being divinely revealed, are true literally when they are meant to be taken as literal truths, but even when they are not meant to be taken as literal truths they still contain an underlying meaning which teaches a true doctrine, to be elicited by the allegorical method. Thus the stories of creation, even though not to be taken as literal facts, “are no mythical fictions, such as poets and sophists delight in, but modes of making ideas visible, bidding us resort to allegorical interpretation guided in our renderings by what lies beneath the surface.”⁶⁶ Thus also the things told about “the serpent speaking in a human voice” — when taken literally, “these things are like prodigies and marvels” in myths, “but when we interpret words by the meanings that lie beneath the surface, all that is of the nature of a myth is removed out of the way, and the true sense becomes as clear as daylight.”⁶⁷ Hence the story of the giants is unlike “the myths of the poets about giants,”⁶⁸ not because it is literally true, but because it contains an underlying meaning.⁶⁹ When certain people deride the story of the confusion of tongues,⁷⁰ arguing that it is not different from similar Greek myths, his answer is that it differs from Greek myths in that it contains an underlying meaning which can be elicited by the allegorical method. Similarly, in the

⁶⁴ *Opif.* 1, 2.

⁶⁵ *Sacr.* 21, 76.

⁶⁶ *Opif.* 56, 157.

⁶⁷ *Agr.* 22, 96-97.

⁶⁸ *Gig.* 13, 58.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁷⁰ *Gen.* 11: 1-9. Cf. *Conf.* 2, 2 ff.

story of Lot's wife, Moses "is not inventing a myth, but indicating precisely a real fact," the real fact being the inner meaning it contains.⁷¹ The point is that when Philo, in various ways, maintains that some scriptural story is not like a myth, he means that it is not like a myth because a scriptural story, whether literally true as a fact or not, always has some underlying meaning, whereas myths neither are literally true nor have an underlying meaning. Even the true historical events of the past recorded by Greek authors, he maintains, are not to be compared to Scripture. "No doubt it is profitable, if not for the acquisition of perfect virtue, at any rate for the life of civic virtue, to feed the mind on ancient and time-honored thoughts, to trace the venerable tradition of noble deeds, which historians and all the family of poets have handed down to the memory of their own and future generations."⁷² Moreover, there is a certain intrinsic satisfaction in the knowledge of men and deeds of old, "for truly it is sweet to leave nothing unknown."⁷³ Still, all this knowledge is only of human origin, whereas all the knowledge that is contained in Scripture is of divine origin, having come to us by way of revelation. Revelation to him is self-taught wisdom, for God has caused it "to spring up within the soul."⁷⁴ In the presence of the knowledge which comes from Scripture, the knowledge which comes from Greek sources grows into insignificance and disappears, for "it is impossible that God's scholar or pupil or disciple, or any other name which one may think fit to call him, should tolerate the rules of guidance of mortal men."⁷⁵

Third, he denounces the Greek mysteries. He dwells upon the licentiousness and effeminacy which are associated with the mysteries. Male prostitutes, he says, some of them

⁷¹ *Fug.* 22, 121.

⁷² *Sacr.* 22, 78.

⁷³ *Ibid.* 23, 79; cf. *Metaph.* I, 980a, 21.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* 22, 78; 23, 79.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* 23, 79.

eunuchs, are to be seen "continually strutting about through the thick of the market, heading the procession at the feasts, appointed to serve as unholy ministers of holy things, leading the mysteries and initiations and celebrating the rites of Demeter." ⁷⁶ In the words "there shall be no *τελεσφόρος* of the daughters of Israel, neither shall there be a *τελισκόμενος* of the sons of Israel," which in the Septuagint are added to the verse "there shall be no harlot of the daughters of Israel, neither shall there be a whoremonger of the sons of Israel," ⁷⁷ Philo finds a prohibition against receiving or conferring initiation into "occult rites and mysteries" (*τελετὰς καὶ μυστήρια*). He describes them as "imposture and buffoonery," as "mummies and mystic fables." He objects to them on the ground that they shut themselves up "in profound darkness and reserve their benefits for three or four alone," arguing that "if these things are good and profitable," they should be produced "in the midst of the market-place," where "you might extend them to every man and thus enable all to share in security a better and happier life." ⁷⁸ Like the author of the Wisdom of Solomon, who, as we have seen, draws upon Aristotle's saying that "the divine cannot be envious," ⁷⁹ he paraphrases a similar saying from Plato to the effect that "virtue has no room in her home for envy." ⁸⁰ The consorting by the children of Israel with the daughters of Moab at Shittim ⁸¹ is interpreted by him as "spurning their ancestral customs and seeking initiation (*τελουμένους*) into the mythical rites of mysteries (*μυθικὰς τελετὰς*)." ⁸² Using the very language of mysteries, he says of "barbarian and Greek nations" ⁸³ that they are celebrating "mysteries uninitiated" (*ἀμυήτους μύσεις*) and "rites unorgiastic" (*ἀνοργιάστους τελε-*

⁷⁶ *Spec.* III, 7, 40-41.

⁷⁷ Deut. 23: 18 (17).

⁷⁸ *Spec.* I, 59, 319-320.

⁷⁹ Cf. above, p. 25.

⁸⁰ *Spec.* I, 59, 321; cf. *Phaedrus* 247 A.

⁸¹ Num. 25: 1 ff.

⁸² *Spec.* I, 10, 56.

⁸³ *Cher.* 27, 91.

τάς),⁸⁴ that is to say, their mysteries and rites are a mockery.

Still, despite his condemnation of popular religion, mythology, and mysteries, Philo does not hesitate to make use of the vocabulary of all these in his description of the beliefs and institutions of Judaism.

With regard to popular religion, he does not hesitate to speak of the stars as "the gods which sense descries in heaven"⁸⁵ and of the heaven as the "great visible god."⁸⁶ Nor does he hesitate to speak of the Furies as "the venerable goddesses" (*σεμναὶ θεαί*),⁸⁷ the name by which they were commonly called in Athens. Nor, again, does he hesitate to speak of God as "the Lord of gods and men"⁸⁸ or "the supreme Father of gods and men"⁸⁹ or as being "God not only of men but also of gods,"⁹⁰ though the description "Father of gods and men" is usually applied by Homer to Zeus.⁹¹ In wishing to describe the greatness or powerfulness or goodness of God, or any other of His attributes, he does not hesitate to make use of certain stereotyped epithets which in Greek literature are used with reference to other deities. He thus describes God as "the God of liberty (*ἐλευθέριον*) and hospitality (*ξένιον*) and of suppliants (*ικέσιον*) and of guests (*ἐφέστιον*),"⁹² even though all these are titles commonly applied to Zeus.⁹³ He thus also describes God as "the victory-giver" (*νικηφόρος*),⁹⁴ "the benefactor" (*εὐεργέτης*), "the saviour" (*σωτήρ*)⁹⁵ and "the overseer" (*ἐφορος*),⁹⁶ even though all these terms are applied to Greek deities.⁹⁷ He had no objection to the use of all these terms

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* 28, 94.

⁸⁵ *Spec.* I, 3, 19; cf. *Opif.* 7, 27.

⁸⁶ *Aet.* 3, 10; 5, 20.

⁸⁷ *Probus* 20, 140.

⁸⁸ *Mos.* I, 7, 36.

⁸⁹ Cf. L. Preller, *Griechische Mythologie*⁴, pp. 958-959.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 30, 171.

⁹¹ Cf. Preller, *op. cit.*, pp. 942, 950, 958, 959.

⁸⁵ *Mos.* II, 38, 206.

⁸⁶ *Spec.* II, 29, 165.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* I, 56, 307.

⁸⁸ *Iliad* IV, 68, *et passim*.

⁹⁴ *Congr.* 17, 93.

⁹⁶ *Abr.* 15, 71.

⁹⁷ Cf. Bréhier, pp. 74-75.

because he knew full well that, while in form they were borrowed from Greek popular religion, in substance they expressed certain characteristics of God which are to be found in Scripture. In Scripture, God the Lord is called "God of gods and Lord of lords" ⁹⁸ and also "Father," ⁹⁹ and there is no reason therefore why, writing in Greek, he should not describe Him in the Homeric phrase "Father" or "Lord" of "gods and men." In Scripture, too, God is described as one who chooses to let the oppressed go free,¹⁰⁰ who loves the stranger,¹⁰¹ who brings victory over enemies,¹⁰² who does good,¹⁰³ beside whom there is no saviour,¹⁰⁴ and who from the place of His habitation looks upon all the inhabitants of the earth,¹⁰⁵ and there is no reason again why, writing in Greek, he should not condense these scriptural descriptions into commonly used Greek epithets for Greek gods.

Sometimes, however, when he happens to use such common Greek religious terms he tries to show that in their application to God he uses them in a somewhat different sense. Thus Philo felt himself justified in calling God "peace" (*εἰρήνη*), even though in Greek that is the name of a goddess, inasmuch, evidently, as in Scripture God is described as he who gives or makes peace; ¹⁰⁶ still, in order to show that he does not confuse the Jewish God with the Greek goddess Irene, he says, "God alone is the real veritable peace" ¹⁰⁷ and, if Melchizedek is called "king of peace," it is God who made him that.¹⁰⁸ In another place, he similarly felt himself justified in saying of God that "He is great (*μέγας*) and strong

⁹⁸ Deut. 10: 17.

⁹⁹ Isa. 63: 16.

¹⁰⁰ Isa. 58: 6. The term used in this verse is *ἀφείσις*, but *ἐλευθέρσις* and *ἀφέσιος* are both used as epithets of Zeus in the same sense.

¹⁰¹ Deut. 10: 18.

¹⁰² Ps. 18: 48-49.

¹⁰⁴ Isa. 43: 11.

¹⁰³ Ps. 119: 68.

¹⁰⁵ Ps. 32: 13.

¹⁰⁶ Exod. 6: 26; Isa. 26: 12; 45: 7; Job 25: 2.

¹⁰⁷ *Somn.* II, 38, 253.

¹⁰⁸ *Leg. All.* III, 25, 79; cf. Gen. 14: 18.

(ισχυρός) and mighty (κραταίος),”¹⁰⁹ evidently because Scripture also describes God as “great (μέγας) and strong (ισχυρός) and awful (φοβερός)”¹¹⁰ or “mighty” (κραταίος),¹¹¹ still, in view of the fact that other gods are similarly described as great gods,¹¹² he elsewhere describes God as “the all-great (πάντα μέγας) God.”¹¹³ In still another place, he happens to quote from the Septuagint the divine appellation “the Most High” (ὁ ὑψίστος),¹¹⁴ which he undoubtedly knew to be used as a Greek appellation of Zeus,¹¹⁵ and consequently, in order to show that the application of that term to God does not imply a polytheistic belief, as it does in its application to Zeus, he immediately adds: “not that there is any other not most high . . . but to conceive of God not in low earthbound ways but in lofty terms.”¹¹⁶ Again, Philo could not help noticing that festivals like those prescribed in Scripture are celebrated also by heathen and that in the Septuagint the terms used in translating the various Hebrew terms for festivals are the same as those used as descriptions of heathenish

¹⁰⁹ *Spec.* I, 56, 307; cf. *Cher.* 9, 29.

¹¹⁰ Deut. 10: 17.

¹¹¹ The same Hebrew term נורא which in Deut. 10: 17 is translated by φοβερός is in Deut. 7: 21 translated by κραταίος.

¹¹² Cf. above, p. 12.

¹¹⁴ Gen. 14: 18.

¹¹³ *Somn.* I, 16, 94.

¹¹⁵ Cf. above, p. 12.

¹¹⁶ *Leg. All.* III, 26, 82. The expression *Theos Hypsistos* was used as an appellation of God by the Jews in Egypt (cf. Roberts-Skeat-Nock, “The Guild of Zeus Hypsistos,” *Harvard Theological Review* 29 (1936), p. 69) and in Asia Minor and Delos (cf. W. W. Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilization* (Edward Arnold & Co., 1936), p. 193). U. v. Willamowitz-Moellendorff, in “Alexandrinische Inschriften,” *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie*, 1902, p. 1094, arbitrarily takes the use of this expression by Jews in Athribis, Egypt, to imply their belief in polytheism and hence to indicate their religious Hellenization. An inscription from Egypt, published by O. Rubensohn in *Archiv für Papyrussforschung*, 5 (1909), p. 163, which shows pagan influence, is taken by A. Tschirikower (*Ha-Yehudim ve-ha-Yevanim ba-Teḥufah ha-Hellenistit*, p. 359) to be of Jewish origin on the ground of its use of the expression θεὸς ὑψίστος(ς). This is inconclusive. This expression had also an independent non-Jewish background (cf. E. Schürer, “Die Juden im bosporanischen Reiche, etc.,” *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie*, 1897, p. 214, n. 1; Roberts-Skeat-Nock, *op. cit.*, p. 64).

festivals. And so Philo tries to show the difference between the two kinds of festivals. "Let us consider," he says, "our famous festal assemblies (*πανηγύρεις*). Different nations, whether Greek or barbarian, have their own," but these are "the product of myth and fiction, and their only purpose is empty vanity," whereas the festivals prescribed in Scripture, "whether they be weekly Sabbaths or feasts, are His, who is the Cause, and pertain not to any man at all."¹¹⁷ Writing in Greek, he naturally had occasion to refer to the Olympic games,¹¹⁸ but still when in the course of a discussion of the verse "Let Dan be a serpent on the road, seated upon the track, biting the heel of the horse; and the horseman shall fall backwards, waiting for the salvation of the Lord,"¹¹⁹ he happens to remark that "the Olympic contest is the only one that can rightly be called sacred," he immediately adds, "not that one which the inhabitants of Elis hold, but the contest for the winning of virtues which are divine and really Olympian."¹²⁰

Nor has he any objection to the use of mythological references. Quite unhesitatingly he refers to "the earliest men" who thought fit to call earth Demeter,¹²¹ to "other philosophers" who liken the number seven to the motherless Nike and Parthenos,¹²² to "men of old" who called earth Hestia,¹²³ and to similar other mythological terms. He does not even hesitate to quote mythology for the purpose of illustrating a certain scriptural verse. The reason why no mention is made of the death of Cain is, according to him, to show "in a figure that, like the Scylla of myth, folly is a deathless evil."¹²⁴ In his comment upon the name of Zillah¹²⁵ he refers to dis-

¹¹⁷ *Cher.* 27, 91.

¹¹⁸ *Immut.* 31, 147; *Cont.* 5, 42.

¹¹⁹ *Gen.* 49: 17-18.

¹²⁰ *Agr.* 27, 119.

¹²¹ *Opif.* 45, 133.

¹²² *Ibid.* 33, 100.

¹²³ *Cher.* 8, 26.

¹²⁴ *Deter.* 48, 178.

¹²⁵ *Gen.* 4: 19.

tinguished men in former times who had gone up to Delphi and dedicated there records of their prosperous lives.¹²⁶ Jethro is compared by him to the Egyptian Proteus.¹²⁷ The three virtues symbolized by Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and also the gifts with which Moses was endowed, are likened by him to the Graces.¹²⁸ God's blessing is said by him to be "better than the nectar and ambrosia of the myths."¹²⁹

But in the case of mythology, as in the case of polytheism, he occasionally tries to show that the use of such mythological terms should not be taken as an indication of belief in what the terms stand for. The Septuagint usually translates the Hebrew Sheol by the Greek Hades, and so the following verse, wherein the word Sheol occurs, is translated by it: "Let the impious (*ἀσεβείς*) be shamed and driven down to Hades."¹³⁰ Evidently with this verse in mind Philo says: "He banishes the unjust and ungodly soul from himself to the furthest bounds and disperses it to the place of pleasures and lusts and injustices; that place is most fitly called the place of the impious" (*ἀσεβῶν*). However, he immediately adds: "But it is not that mythical place of the impious in Hades, for the true Hades is the life of the bad, a life of damnation and blood-guiltiness, the victim of every curse."¹³¹ Perhaps this true Hades of Philo is not the true Sheol of the Hebrew Scripture either, but at any rate he takes pains to show that the Hades of the Septuagint is not the Hades of mythology. When therefore he says of apostates that "they

¹²⁶ *Post.* 33, 113.

¹²⁸ *Abr.* 11, 54; *Mos.* II, 1, 7.

¹²⁷ *Ebr.* 10, 36.

¹²⁹ *Immut.* 33, 155.

¹³⁰ *Ps.* 31: 18 (17).

¹³¹ *Congr.* 11, 57; cf. *Heres* 9, 45; *Somn.* I, 23, 151. This non-mythical conception of Hades as referring to punishments for crime as well as to tortures of conscience in this world reflects the view of ancient moral philosophers (cf. Hans Lewy's note to *Congr.* 11, 57, in *Philos Werke*, VI, p. 19, n. 3, referring to Lucretius, III, 978 ff. and Heinze in his commentary *ad loc.*). It must, however, be added that, in addition to a Hades in this life, Philo also believed in the punishment of the wicked after death (cf. below, pp. 409 f.; 412 f.).

will be dragged down and carried into Tartarus itself and profound darkness,"¹³² he must have mentally added that he does not mean thereby that mythical place of the impious in Tartarus.

No more does he hesitate to use the language of mysteries in his description of the religion of Scripture. The covenant into which the children of Israel and the strangers that were among them as well as their future generations entered with God through the agency of Moses¹³³ is described by him as an act by which Moses "initiated them into the mysteries" (*μυσταγωγῶν*).¹³⁴ Within these mysteries of Moses, as in the Eleusinian mysteries, he distinguishes between the lesser mysteries (*τὰ μικρὰ μυστήρια*; ¹³⁵ *βραχύτεραι τελεταί*)¹³⁶ and the greater mysteries (*τὰ μεγάλα μυστήρια*)¹³⁷ or perfect mysteries (*τέλειαι τελεταί*).¹³⁸ God,¹³⁹ Moses,¹⁴⁰ the seventy elders of Moses,¹⁴¹ the high priest,¹⁴² and Jeremiah¹⁴³ are each described by him by the term Hierophant (*ιεροφάντης*), the technical term which designated the highest officer of the heathen mysteries and the demonstrator of its sacred knowledge. Finally, as in the heathen mysteries, he who has been initiated into the mysteries of Moses is not to divulge them to any of the uninitiated¹⁴⁴ or to any one,¹⁴⁵ but he is to "treasure them up" and, keeping check over his speech, he is to "conceal them in silence."¹⁴⁶

¹³² *Praem.* 26, 152.

¹³⁴ *Virt.* 33, 178.

¹³³ *Deut.* 29: 11-14.

¹³⁵ *Sacr.* 16, 62.

¹³⁶ *Abr.* 24, 122.

¹³⁷ *Leg. All.* III, 33, 100; *Cher.* 44, 49; *Sacr.* 16, 62.

¹³⁸ *Sacr.* 15, 60.

¹³⁹ *Somn.* I, 26, 164.

¹⁴⁰ *Spec.* I, 8, 41; II, 32, 201; IV, 34, 176; *Virt.* 11, 75; 32, 174.

¹⁴¹ *Sobr.* 4, 20.

¹⁴² *Spec.* III, 24, 135.

¹⁴³ *Cher.* 14, 49.

¹⁴⁴ *Cher.* 14, 48; cf. also *Fragmenta*, Richter, VI, 2c6 (M, II, 651); 217 (M, II, 658).

¹⁴⁵ *Sacr.* 15, 60.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

These statements on mysteries have been taken by certain students of Philo as evidence either for the existence of mysteries among the Alexandrian Jews or for the influence of mysteries upon Philo's philosophy. "From many hints up and down in the works of Philo," says Conybeare, "it is certain that among the Alexandrian Jews there existed a system of mysteries, perhaps in imitation of the Greek mysteries of Demeter which were celebrated year by year on the hill of Eleusis close to Alexandria."¹⁴⁷ Ziegert raises the question "whether Philo, in drawing upon the Greek mysteries, had a certain definite and consciously designed purpose in mind, or whether, following the example of Greek writers, he uses the rich vocabulary in the treasure-house of the mysteries only for the purpose of embellishing his style,"¹⁴⁸ and also "whether it would be right to say that on the basis of the mysteries Philo had built up a distinct and comprehensive system of religion or philosophy."¹⁴⁹ His answer to these questions is that "Philo, starting with the view that the mysteries are already contained in the Old Testament,"¹⁵⁰ came to conceive the "brilliant idea of transferring the system of ancient mysteries to his own religion, or, rather, to his own Alexandrian religious philosophy, but though he had made an attempt at it, he never brought it to completion, for, as so often elsewhere, so here, too, Philo lacked the power to carry out any planned thought to a consistent and clear conclusion."¹⁵¹ Goodenough, however, thinks that Philo had not only made a tentative attempt at his plan but had also carried it out successfully, for the entire philosophy of Philo is interpreted by him as a mystery. The Jew in Alexandria,

¹⁴⁷ F. C. Conybeare, *Philo concerning the Contemplative Life*, 1895, p. 303.

¹⁴⁸ P. Ziegert, "Über die Ansätze zu einer Mysterienlehre aufgebaut auf den antiken Mysterien bei Philo Judäus," *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 67 (1894), pp. 706-732.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 721-722.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 722.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 724.

he says, "met not Aristotle or Zeno, but the mystic philosophy which was transforming every other oriental mythology into a mystery religion," with the result that "Judaism in the Greek Diaspora did, for at least an important minority, become primarily such a mystery,"¹⁵² for "since a Jew could not now simply become an initiate of Isis or Orpheus and remain a Jew as well, the amazingly clever trick was devised, we do not know when or by whom," of identifying, by means of allegory, the religion of Scripture with the religion of the mysteries, and thereby "Judaism was at once transformed into the greatest, the only true, Mystery," within which "God was no longer only the God presented in the Old Testament: He was the Absolute, connected with phenomena by His Light-Stream, the Logos or Sophia."¹⁵³ Similarly the Law was no longer merely "a set of commands for physical life" to be obeyed, but rather "the *ιερός λόγος* of the Mystery," though for those who, like Philo, wished to continue to obey its commands, again by a "clever" device, it was made to mean "the material copy of a Platonic original."¹⁵⁴

Our own interpretation of Philo as the author of a philosophy like any of the religious philosophies which later appeared in Christianity and Islam and Judaism, and in fact as the mainspring of those philosophies, will be unfolded in the succeeding pages of this study. If our interpretation is right, then the relation of Philo to Greek philosophy is like that of any medieval philosopher, be he Christian or Moslem or Jewish, and the relation of his God to the God of Scripture is like that of the God of any of these medieval philosophers, and the allegorical method used by him is exactly like that used by any one of the medieval philosophers, and his conception of the preëxistence of the Law, which conception he

¹⁵² E. R. Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, 1935, pp. 4-5.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

quite naturally identified with the Platonic theory of ideas, is like that of any of the medieval philosophers, and his belief in obedience to the Law and in its eternity is like that of any of the medieval Jewish philosophers. He uses terms borrowed from the mysteries in the same way as he uses terms borrowed from popular religion and from mythology, all of them because they were part of common speech. Moreover, just as Philo himself sometimes explains the special sense in which he uses terms borrowed from polytheism and mythology, so also he explains in what special sense he compares the covenant with God to an initiation into mysteries and in what special sense he enjoins silence with regard to what he calls the mysteries of God.

The explanation of his comparison of the covenant between Israel and God to initiation into mysteries may be pieced together from several passages.

In one place, after dwelling on the virtue of repentance and its importance for all men who by their very nature cannot be altogether free from sin, he says: "And, therefore, when Moses convokes such people and would initiate them into his mysteries, he invites them with conciliatory and amicable offers of instruction, exhorting them to practise sincerity and reject vanity, to embrace truth and simplicity as vital necessities and the sources of happiness, and to rise in rebellion against the mythical fables impressed on their tender souls from their earliest years."¹⁵⁵

In another place he describes those who have been "initiated into the true mysteries of the Existent" as "those to whose lot has fallen a generously gifted nature and an education in all respects blameless" and who therefore "do not attribute to God any of the properties of a created being."¹⁵⁶ He contrasts them with those "whose natural wit is more

¹⁵⁵ *Virt.* 33, 178.

¹⁵⁶ *Immut.* 13, 61-62.

dense and dull and who have been wrongly educated as children" and, therefore, on account of all this, have a cruder conception of God.¹⁵⁷

In still another place, after dividing the mysteries of Moses into the lesser and the greater, he places under each of these mysteries two distinct things. The first thing under the lesser mysteries is described by him as the taming of the passions by a method "derived from some divine inspiration,"¹⁵⁸ that is, by the laws of Moses, so that initiation into the lesser mysteries marks "the passage from the life of the passions to the practice of virtue."¹⁵⁹ By the practice of virtue, as we shall see later, he means the practice of the laws of Moses.¹⁶⁰ The second thing under the lesser mysteries is the acquisition of a knowledge of God indirectly "through His actions, as either creative or ruling"¹⁶¹ or "from created things."¹⁶² By this indirect knowledge of God, again as we shall show later, he means a knowledge of God based upon reason and philosophy.¹⁶³ Under the greater mysteries he similarly includes two things. The first thing under the greater mysteries is the knowledge that besides the conception of virtue in the mind of man by means of sense-perception, symbolized by the verse "and Adam knew Eve his wife,"¹⁶⁴ wherein Eve stands for sense-perception,¹⁶⁵ there is a kind of virtue which comes directly from God, symbolized by the stories of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Moses, who are not represented as knowing their wives.¹⁶⁶ In their case God himself "takes away [from the soul] the degenerate and emasculate passions which unmanned it and plants instead the native growth of unpolluted virtues,"¹⁶⁷ for "He is himself Father of the

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.* 14, 63.

¹⁵⁸ *Sacr.* 16, 62.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 17, 63.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. below, II, 200 ff.

¹⁶¹ *Abr.* 24, 122.

¹⁶² *Leg. All.* III, 33, 100.

¹⁶³ Cf. below, II, 89.

¹⁶⁴ *Gen.* 4: 1.

¹⁶⁵ *Cher.* 12, 41.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 12, 40.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.* 14, 50.

perfect nature, sowing and begetting happiness in men's souls." ¹⁶⁸ What he means by these statements is the view which, as we shall see, he maintains against philosophy, that besides freedom — which results from the control of the passions by reason — and besides virtuous conduct — which may be attained by the guidance of reason — there is a freedom which comes directly from God as a special grace from Him ¹⁶⁹ and a guidance to righteous conduct which comes directly from God as a revelation, again by a special grace from Him, and that revelation is embodied in the Law of Moses. ¹⁷⁰ The second thing under the greater mysteries is the knowledge of God as one who is directly "visible apart from His powers," ¹⁷¹ and this direct knowledge of God is described by him as "a clear vision" of God which is perceived directly, and "not from created things." ¹⁷² By this, as we shall see, he means a knowledge of the existence of God attained by means of revelation. ¹⁷³ It will be noticed that the two things under the greater mysteries correspond exactly to the two things under the lesser mysteries. All these four meanings of the Mosaic mysteries are summed up by him in the statement that the mysteries contain "the knowledge of the Cause and of virtue and, third, of the offshoot of them both." ¹⁷⁴

Finally, in one place, he seems to indicate that allegorical method, whereby the true knowledge of God and of virtue is to be extracted from the letter of the Law, was regarded by him as a mystery; for he speaks of those who are not versed in the allegorical method as those "who are not initiated (*ἀμύητοι*) in allegory," and allegory itself is described by him as "the nature which loves to hide itself." ¹⁷⁵

¹⁶⁸ *Leg. All.* III, 77, 219.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. below, pp. 445-454.

¹⁷⁰ Cf. below, II, 51.

¹⁷¹ *Sacr.* 15, 60.

¹⁷² *Leg. All.* III, 33, 100.

¹⁷³ Cf. below, II, 89.

¹⁷⁴ *Cher.* 14, 48.

¹⁷⁵ *Fug.* 32, 179.

From all this we may gather that by those who have been initiated into mysteries he means men of good native abilities and proper education who have succeeded in mastering their passions and in acquiring a true knowledge of the existence and nature of God. The knowledge of the existence of God, according to him, may come to them either indirectly through God's actions in the world or directly through revelation. The knowledge of the true nature of God means to him the knowledge that God is incorporeal and unlike any of the created beings, and also that by a special grace He has endowed men with a part of His own power of freedom of action and has revealed to them a Law which is to guide them in their free action. These things are called by him mysteries for two reasons. First, they are called mysteries because the true knowledge of them lies hidden in Scripture, and has to be extracted from it by means of the allegorical method, which requires instruction. For this use of the term mysteries Philo had ample justification, since by his time that term had come to be applied to all matters of science which required instruction.¹⁷⁶ Philo himself uses the term mysteries in this sense when he says of Joseph that he "was both the initiated and the initiator in the mysteries of dreams."¹⁷⁷ Second, they are called mysteries as a challenge to the heathen mysteries. Philo seems to say to the votaries of the heathen mysteries: the communion with God and the salvation and the better way of life which you all aspire after are not to be attained by the sacred rites which you practice in secret, by your mummeries and mystic fables, but by obedience to the teachings and practices of the Law of Moses. These are the true mysteries.

This challenge to the heathen mysteries is directly brought

¹⁷⁶ Cf. Liddell and Scott, under *μυστήριον*, and above, pp. 24 f.

¹⁷⁷ *Somn.* II, 12, 78.

out in that passage quoted above in which Philo tries to explain the scriptural teaching of how God by special grace may directly plant in man the growth of virtue. This scriptural teaching, which is described by him as one of the "divine mysteries" (τελεταί θεΐαι)¹⁷⁸ or "holy mysteries" (ιερά μυστήρια),¹⁷⁹ is derived by him allegorically from the fact that Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Moses, and others of the same kind, are not represented in Scripture as knowing their wives. He then proceeds to say: "Man and woman, male and female of the human race, in the course of nature come together to hold intercourse for the procreation of children. But virtues whose offspring are so many and so perfect may not have to do with mortal man, yet if they receive not seed of generation from another they will never of themselves conceive. Who then is he that sows in them the good seed save the Father of all, that is God unbegotten and begetter of all things?"¹⁸⁰ Then, commenting upon the verse which he quotes as reading "Hast thou not called Me as thy house and thy father and the husband of thy virginity,"¹⁸¹ he interprets it to mean that God is "the husband of wisdom, dropping the seed of happiness for the race of mortals into good and virgin soil."¹⁸² Now in itself there is nothing strange in the use of this metaphor of sex and marriage in describing God as the source of virtue and happiness in man. Such a metaphor is also used by Plato in describing the ideas as the source of knowledge and truth in man. "It is the nature of the real lover of knowledge," he says, "to strive emulously for true being . . . and the edge of his passion would not be blunted nor would his desire fail till he came in touch (ἄψασθαι) with the nature of each thing in itself . . . and through that approaching (πλησιάσας) it, and consorting

¹⁷⁸ *Cher.* 12, 42.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.* 14, 48.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.* 13, 43-44.

¹⁸¹ *Jer.* 3:4.

¹⁸² *Cher.* 14, 49.

(μυεῖς) with reality really, he would beget (γεννήσας) intelligence and truth . . . and so find surcease from the travail (ᾠδίνος) of soul." ¹⁸³ But it happens that in the mysteries the marriage between some deity and man was not only used as a figure of speech but also was symbolically enacted as a rite. In modern historical reconstructions of the ceremonies performed at the various mysteries we are told that "the culminating rite of Sabazios was a sacred marriage in which the god, represented by the golden adder, was drawn through the bosom of his worshipper; and here the worshipper, whether man or woman, is conceived as female, being none other than the bride of the god." ¹⁸⁴ All this had for its purpose the establishment of a symbolic union between the votary and the deity. Philo undoubtedly was acquainted with this kind of rite, and by using in this passage the symbolism of marriage between God and men he meant to challenge all such rites of heathen mysteries. All these mummeries, he seems to say, are unnecessary. There is an unbroken and constant union between God and men, for God is in a sense always in men; He is the source of virtue in them, He has endowed them with a part of His own power to act with unrestrained freedom, and He directly communicates to them His will, whenever they prove themselves worthy of it.

This then is the meaning of Philo's comparison of the covenant between Israel and God to initiation into mysteries.

Let us now see what Philo, on the show of his own explanation, means by his injunction of silence on the part of those who have been initiated into what he calls mysteries.

¹⁸³ *Republic VI*, 490 A-B.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, I, p. 396, referring to A. Dieterich, *de hymnis Orphicis*, 1891, pp. 38 f. (= *Kleine Schriften*, 1911, pp. 98 f.); *id.*, *Mutter Erde*, 1905, pp. 110 ff.; *id.*, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*, 1910, pp. 123 ff.; cf. also G. W. Butterworth's Appendix to his edition of Clement of Alexandria's *The Exhortation to the Greeks*, in The Loeb Classical Library, p. 388.

To begin with, he means thereby that man is to be modest about the special grace he may receive from God in aiding him to overcome the passions of his body, and he is not to boast about it. Thus, speaking of one of the two of his so-called lesser mysteries, that is, the taming of the passions by the practice of virtue, which he finds symbolized by the baking of the dough into unleavened bread by the children of Israel on their exodus from Egypt,¹⁸⁵ he makes the following statement: "And the method of the softening and improvement of the passions, which was revealed to them by a sort of divine inspiration, they did not utter aloud, but treasured it in silence, not being elated at the knowledge of the mystery (τελετη), but yielding and being lowly as to their boasting."¹⁸⁶ Not to blab the mysteries and to conceal them in silence in this case merely means not to boast about them and not to feel proud of oneself for having been favored by God with a special revelation. This is in accord with Jewish teaching that one must not be boastful of the knowledge he has attained through his own efforts or through divine revelation, for "whoever is boastful, if he is wise, his wisdom will desert him and, if he is a prophet, his prophecy will desert him."¹⁸⁷

Then, he means by his injunction of silence that the allegorical method of the interpretation of Scripture, whereby one is to discover its hidden mysteries, is not to be taught to persons who do not possess the required qualifications for it. To be initiated into these mysteries, as we have seen, means to Philo to be in possession of native ability, a good education, and a moral character.¹⁸⁸ When he says, therefore, that those who have been initiated into the holy mysteries of Moses should not divulge them to any of the "uninitiated,"

¹⁸⁵ Exod. 12: 39.

¹⁸⁶ *Sacr.* 16, 62.

¹⁸⁷ *Pesahim* 66b.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. above, p. 49.

he means thereby that the mysteries should not be taught to those who do not possess the required threefold qualification. When he says that these perfect mysteries are not to be divulged to "anyone" (*μηδενι*),¹⁸⁹ by "anyone" he means anyone who is not properly qualified. He himself would withhold the allegorical interpretation from the "superstitious" and from those "who are inflicted with the incurable disease of conceit, with petty quibbling about expressions and words, and with juggling tricks of manners."¹⁹⁰ He would impart them only to those who are "worthy" of it, and those only are worthy of it "who, with all modesty, practise true and really unadorned piety."¹⁹¹

This need of intellectual and moral qualifications for the study of the inner truths of Scripture is stressed by Philo in many other passages. In one place, commenting upon the verses, "and Moses took the tabernacle, and pitched it outside the camp, afar off from the camp . . ."¹⁹² and when Moses entered into the tabernacle, the pillar of cloud descended and stood at the door of the tabernacle and [the Lord] talked with Moses,"¹⁹³ he interprets them to mean that only those who "have put off all the things of creation and the innermost veil and covering of mere opinion" are allowed to enter into the invisible region and to remain there while learning "the most sacred mysteries."¹⁹⁴ In another passage he says that the souls which "make a quest of God's hidden mysteries" first "build up the actions of virtue," so that only "the virtuous man" receives "wisdom."¹⁹⁵ In still another place he says that God manifests himself and reveals His "secret mysteries" only to a soul that He deems worthy of them, and such a worthy soul is one "that longs for all beauteous

¹⁸⁹ *Sacr.* 15, 60.¹⁹⁰ *Cher.* 12, 42.¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*¹⁹² *Exod.* 33:7.¹⁹³ *Exod.* 33:9.¹⁹⁴ *Gig.* 12, 53-54.¹⁹⁵ *Leg. All.* III, 1, 3.

things" and shuns "evil" and destroys "passions."¹⁹⁶ In a fourth place he says that "when the mind soars aloft and is being initiated into the mysteries of the Lord, it judges the body to be wicked and hostile."¹⁹⁷ In the Wisdom of Solomon this view is succinctly expressed in the verse, "For into a malicious soul wisdom shall not enter; nor dwell in the body that is subject unto sin."¹⁹⁸

For Philo to have made intellectual and moral qualifications a condition for the study of the inner philosophic meaning of Scripture was only to follow a tradition common in Greek philosophy. There was, to begin with, Aristotle's theory as to the subordination of moral to intellectual virtues¹⁹⁹ and as to the need of proper training in order to attain intellectual virtue.²⁰⁰ Philo has only slightly revised this view by making moral virtue a condition of intellectual virtue, and this under the influence of certain religious preconceptions of Judaism.²⁰¹ Then also, as we have already seen, Protagoras, Aristotle, and the Stoics had regarded certain doctrines of their philosophy as mysteries, imparting them to their students in secret, and Aristotle would not impart them to any of his students "until he had tested his ability, his elementary knowledge, and his zeal and devotion to study."²⁰² The importance of certain preliminary knowledge for the study of the higher branches of learning is emphasized by Philo himself elsewhere, in his statement that one should not enter upon the study of "philosophy" until he had mastered the program of encyclical studies such as grammar and geometry and similar disciplines.²⁰³ By the same token, the highest study of God, which, as we shall see, he calls wisdom and which is considered by him higher than philoso-

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.* III, 8, 27.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.* III, 22, 71.

¹⁹⁸ Wisdom of Solomon 1:4.

¹⁹⁹ *Eth. Nic.* X, 7-8.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.* II, 1, 1103a, 15-16.

²⁰¹ Cf. below, II, 261 ff.

²⁰² Cf. above, pp. 24 f.

²⁰³ *Ebr.* 12, 48-50.

phy,²⁰⁴ should not be undertaken by anybody, nor should it be imparted to anybody, who has not been initiated into the study of philosophy. Not long after the time of Philo, when certain allegorical interpretations of Scripture, of a cosmogonical and theosophical nature, appeared in Palestinian Judaism, the rule was laid down that "one must not discourse on the work of creation before two students, nor on the work of the chariot before one student, unless that student be wise and able to speculate by himself."²⁰⁵ So also, in a comment upon the verse "Now these are the judgments which thou shalt set before them,"²⁰⁶ playing upon the verb *tasim*, "thou shalt set," and the noun *simah*, "treasure," and therefore taking the verse to mean "thou shalt set before them as a treasure," Rabbi Simeon ben Yohai says: "Just as a treasure is not revealed to every one, so thou art not allowed to discourse on the profundities of the Law except in the presence of worthy persons."²⁰⁷ The term mystery that Philo applies to the allegorical method and his warning not to blab it out to those who have not been initiated mean nothing more than that rule laid down by philosophers with regard to certain doctrines and by rabbis with regard to discoursing on the work of creation and on the work of the chariot and on the profundities of the Law.

III. DISCORDANCE, CONFORMITY, APOSTASY

The warning by Philo against divulging the allegorical interpretation of Scripture to those not qualified for it by native

²⁰⁴ Cf. below, pp. 147 ff.

²⁰⁵ *M. Hagigah* II, 1. The reference is to the story of creation in Gen. 1 and to the vision of the four wheels in Ezek. 1. So also Maimonides, for the same reason, enjoins secrecy in the teaching of metaphysics. Cf. Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* I, Introduction, 17, 33, 34, and 71; III, Introduction.

²⁰⁶ Exod. 21: 1.
²⁰⁷ *Jer. 'Abodah Zarah* II, 8, 41d; cf. L. Ginzberg, "Der Anteil R. Simons an der ihm zugeschriebenen Mechilta," *Festschrift zu Israel Lewy's siebzigstem Geburtstage*, 1911, pp. 406-408.

abilities, proper training, and moral character was timely and necessary. Like any religious rationalism in history, whether Greek before Philo or Christian, Moslem, and Jewish after Philo, Alexandrian Jewish rationalism was an attempt on the part of a chosen few to reconcile two extremes, a religious tradition which was untouched by philosophy and a philosophy which was unconcerned with that tradition, or even unconscious of its existence. Alexandrian Judaism, like any other religious body either before it or after it, was not a religion of philosophers only. Not all Greek-speaking Jews read Plato: most of them read only the Septuagint, and some of them could not read at all, though by reason of the religious obligation to meditate in the Law day and night the rate of literacy among the Jews in Alexandria must have been higher than among non-Jews.

Alexandrian Judaism at the time of Philo was of the same stock as Pharisaic Judaism, which flourished in Palestine at that time, both of them having sprung from that pre-Maccabean Judaism which had been molded by the activities of the Scribes. Though in the new land to which it had been transported it subsequently developed certain peculiar local characteristics, it did not altogether detach itself from its native source, nor did it remain completely unaffected by the subsequent development of Judaism in Palestine. Judaism in Alexandria started upon its new career with an initial stock of oral traditions and an incipient method of scriptural interpretation, both of which it had brought from Palestine and continued to share in common with those who in Palestine subsequently became the Pharisees. But in their new environment some Alexandrian Jews came into possession of a new body of knowledge derived from Greek philosophy, and out of this new body of knowledge they developed a new method of the interpretation of Scripture, to which the name

allegory was given, meaning thereby philosophic allegory exclusively. This new method of interpretation naturally gave rise to a new problem. On the one hand, those unaffected by philosophy were fully satisfied with the traditional method of interpretation, and proved themselves, therefore, indifferent to the new philosophical method of allegory; on the other hand, some of those who adopted the allegorical method somehow were led to disregard the traditional method. It was Philo's purpose, therefore, to combine the traditional with the allegorical method, preventing the former from becoming hostile toward the latter and guarding the latter against breaking itself loose from the former. As in many instances under similar conditions in the later history of religions, Philo found it necessary to restrict the teaching of the philosophic interpretation of Scripture to properly qualified and properly equipped students.

Specific references to the actual existence of two such extreme tendencies in Alexandrian Judaism, between which Philo was trying to hold the center, are to be found in the works of Philo himself.

The traditionalists are usually described by him as upholders of the literal meaning of texts, both in the legal and in the narrative part of Scripture, as against the allegorical interpretation of them. In one place, trying to justify his allegorical interpretation of a law on the ground of certain difficulties he finds in it if taken literally, he concludes: "Now whether in the plain and literal sense of the ordinance these things are consistent with each other is a matter for those who are in the habit of pursuing such investigations and are fond of them." ¹ In another place, again, after enumerating certain difficulties in a certain law if taken literally, he concludes with the following words: "These things, then, and

¹ *Imm.* 28, 133.

other things of the same kind, may be urged in reply to those who are experts (*σοφιστάς*) in the study of literal interpretation." ² Similarly, with regard to the narrative part of Scripture, in connection with the story of the confusion of tongues, after quoting in the name of others certain objections to it which he himself answers by giving to them an allegorical explanation, he refers to possible refutations of these objections by "those who can provide for all questions as they arise explanations from the plain letter of the law." ³ Explanations of scriptural narratives from the plain letter of the text, as alternatives to his own allegorical explanations, are quoted by him also in the name of those whom he describes as "some persons" (*nonnulli*)⁴ or "certain persons" (*quidam*).⁵ From his references to these traditionalists it is quite evident that he calls them literalists not because he thought that they considered themselves bound by the letter of the Law, without allowing themselves any freedom of interpretation whatsoever, nor because he thought that they considered the Law only as a collection of arbitrary commands and senseless stories in which there was no inner significance; he calls them literalists only because they were opposed to the philosophical kind of allegory advocated by him. In their own way they seem to have had their own method of interpretation and their own method of discovering in those commands and stories some inner meaning. The few examples of their interpretation of the letter of scriptural narrative and the numerous examples of his own exposition of what he would describe as the letter of the law bear a

² *Somn.* I, 16, 102.

³ *Conf.* 5, 14.

⁴ *Qu. in Gen.* I, 8; I, 10; II, 28; II, 58.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 64. Cf. M. J. Shroyer, "Alexandrian Jewish Literalists," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 55 (1936), 261-284. Under the "Literalists" Shroyer also includes (pp. 275-279) those of whom we shall treat later under the third class of apostates (cf. below, pp. 83 f.).

close resemblance to the interpretations of the narrative and legal portions of Scripture by those rabbis who regarded themselves as opponents of the literalism attributed to the Sadducees. The literalists of Philo are presented by him as being conscious of problems and difficulties in the text of Scripture, as pursuing investigations of their own, as being able to match wits with captious critics, and as discovering moral lessons in scriptural stories. The term σοφισταί which he applies to them, we take it, is used by him here not in its derogatory sense of "sophists" but rather in its laudatory sense of "sages" and "experts." Taken in this sense, it may reflect the Hebrew term *hakamim*, "sages," which is one of the names by which the Pharisaic interpreters of the law are known. In fact, in Josephus, the Greek term σοφισταί is used as the equivalent of the Hebrew *hakamim*, in the sense of men learned in the law.⁶

As a philosopher, Philo was partly critical of them. But when we study carefully the thought behind his uttered words in the passages in which he expresses his criticism of the traditionalists, we shall find that he does not really argue against them but rather with them against themselves. His main criticism of them is that, by their refusing to interpret texts philosophically, they sometimes take Scripture to affirm views, especially about God, which upon a closer examination of their own conscience they would themselves find objectionable. Take, for instance, the verse stating that "God took to heart (ἐνεθυμήθη) that He had made man upon the earth, and He thought upon it (διενοήθη); and God said, I will destroy man whom I have made from off the face of the earth."⁷ This verse, he says, if not interpreted philosophically, would imply that "the Creator repented (μετέγνων) the

⁶ *Bell. Jud.* I, 33, 2, 648; II, 17, 8, 433; 9, 445.

⁷ Gen. 6: 6-7 (LXX).

creation of men when He beheld their impiety, on which account He determined to destroy the whole race,"⁸ but this would imply a change in God, and the implication of any change in God — we may complete his argument for him — would be rejected even by the traditionalists themselves on the simple ground of the explicit statement in Scripture that God "will not change (*ἀποστρέψει*) nor repent (*μετανοήσει*), for He is not a man that He should repent."⁹ Consequently, he accuses the traditionalists that by their rejection of philosophical interpretation of texts they act like unthinking persons who have not examined themselves (*ἀνεξέταστοι*)¹⁰ and are therefore full of inconsistencies.¹¹ Similarly, he argues, the verse in which God says to Moses, "I have shown it to thine eyes, but thou shalt not enter therein,"¹² if taken literally as meaning that Moses would not be allowed to enter into the Promised Land, would imply an injustice on the part of God in that He did not allow to Moses, who was one of the "friends of God," that which He had granted to all others, who were only the "slaves" of God, but to assume that would be "folly," for — and here again we may complete his argument for him — Scripture explicitly says with regard to God that "all His ways are acts of judgment; a faithful God, He doth no injustice."¹³ Consequently, he again accuses the traditionalists that by their rejection of philosophical interpretation they prove themselves to be inconsiderate and thoughtless persons (*ἀπερίσκεπτοι*).¹⁴ Furthermore, he seems to argue, the traditionalists, with all the

⁸ *Immut.* 5, 21.

⁹ I Sam. 15: 29 (LXX).

¹⁰ *Immut.* 5, 21.

¹¹ Cf. *Virt.* 3, 10, where the expression *ἀνεξέταστοι ἄνθρωποι* is used to describe those who expose the inconsistencies (*ἀνωμαλίας*) of their soul by random talk.

¹² Deut. 34: 4.

¹³ Deut. 32: 4 (LXX).

¹⁴ *Migr.* 9, 44-45.

minuteness with which they examine, after the manner of the Scribes and Pharisees, the accuracy of every word and letter in Scripture, through their refusal to make use of philosophical allegory sometimes fail to live up to their own standard of accurate and precise study of the choice of words in scriptural texts (οἱ μὴ λαν ἡκριβωμένοι), for only through the allegorical interpretation can one explain, for instance, why in one place Scripture uses the term "husbandman" (γεωργός) and in another the term "soil-worker" (γῆς ἐργάτης), and why in one place it uses the term "shepherd" (ποιμήν) and in another the term "cattle-rearer" (κτηνοτρόφος).¹⁵

Now Philo has no objection to the traditional method of interpreting texts as such; he himself often follows that method of interpretation; but he insists that the philosophical method of interpretation should be added to the traditional. Take, for instance, the scriptural story about the four wells dug by the servants of Isaac.¹⁶ This story, says Philo, may be taken by the traditionalists as a mere story of four wells dug by the servants of Isaac, but philosophers will take it to refer allegorically to the "four parts of the universe, land, water, air, heaven." No objection to the literal interpretation of the story is raised by Philo; still, the traditionalists, because in this particular instance they take the story to refer only to the small world of Isaac, are called by him "citizens of a petty state" (μικροπολίται), whereas the allegorists, because they interpret the verse to refer to the parts of the universe, are described by him as "those on the roll of citizens of a greater country, namely, this whole world" and as men of "more perfect wisdom."¹⁷ There is no implication

¹⁵ *Agr.* 6, 26-29; cf. 5, 20-21; 9, 42-43; 13, 57. The references are to the use of these four terms respectively in (1) Gen. 9: 20; (2) Gen. 4: 2; (3) Gen. 30: 36, and Exod. 3: 1; (4) Gen. 46: 34.

¹⁶ Gen. 26: 19, 21, 22, 32.

¹⁷ *Somn.* I, 7, 39.

in this statement, as we see it, of a general contrast between two conceptions of Judaism — the so-called narrow, nationalistic conception of the traditionalists and the so-called broader, universal conception of the allegorists. Such a contrast between two conceptions of Judaism is never consciously made by Philo. Judaism to him, as to the rabbis of his time, was both national and universal; and the synthesis of the two is fully developed by him, as we shall see, in his political theory, and especially in his view on the Messianic age.¹⁸ Similarly the verse, “a spring went up out of the earth and watered all the face of the earth,”¹⁹ may be taken by those “who are not initiated into allegory” to refer to a real spring which watered the land like the Nile, and Philo expresses no objection to such an interpretation; but still, he says, allegorically this spring means the mind.²⁰ Finally, in connection with the story of the confusion of tongues,²¹ of which he himself gives an allegorical interpretation,²² he says explicitly, with regard to those who follow “the outward and obvious” and take the story literally as an explanation of the origin of the Greek and barbarian languages, that he would “not blame (*αἰτιασάμενος*) such persons, for perhaps the truth is with them also”; he would only exhort them “not to halt there but to proceed onward to figurative interpretations.”²³

There is one passage which contains a derogatory description of people who are evidently not allegorists, but it is not clear whether this passage refers to these traditionalists or not. In this passage Philo says that he would not expound his allegorical interpretations of Scripture, which he calls here

¹⁸ Cf. below, II, 354 ff., 415 ff.

²⁰ *Fug.* 32, 179 ff.

¹⁹ Gen. 2: 6 (LXX).

²¹ Gen. 11: 1 ff.

²² *Conf.* 5, 15 ff.

²³ *Ibid.* 38, 190. The term “perhaps” here is an expression of modesty, not of doubt. Cf. below, pp. 66, 125 f.

“the sacred mysteries,” to “the superstitious” and to “those who are afflicted with the incurable disease of conceit, with petty quibbling (γλισχροῦτητι) about expressions and words, and with juggling tricks of manners, and who measure holiness and piety by no other standard.”²⁴ If this passage were meant to be a characterization of the anti-allegoristic traditionalists of Alexandria as a class, then we would have here a condemnation of the Alexandrian counterpart of the Palestinian Pharisees like that which we find among the rabbis of certain types of Pharisees and in the New Testament of all the Pharisees. But it is more likely that the condemnation in this passage refers to certain individuals who were to be found in all the classes of the Jewish population in Alexandria rather than to the traditionalists alone as a whole. It will be noticed that one of the special characteristics ascribed to these people is their “petty quibbling (γλισχροῦτης) about expressions and words.” Elsewhere, quite on the contrary, as we shall see, Philo makes the traditionalists condemn the allegorists for their “petty quibbling” (γλισχρολογία)²⁵ about words.

What the attitude of those traditionalists toward allegory exactly was may be gathered from two brief descriptions of them found in Philo. In one place he describes them as “drawing up the eyebrows overmuch” (λαν τὰς ὀφρῦς ἀνεσπακότες),²⁶ that is to say, putting on a supercilious air and contemptuously dismissing allegorical explanations as something worthless. In another place, where, in anticipation of an allegorical interpretation of the verse “thou shalt stand meeting him on the lip of the river,”²⁷ he raises the question “why Moses speaks of the river of Egypt alone as having ‘lips,’” he refers to some people who, “in a spirit of ridicule,

²⁴ *Cher.* 12, 42.

²⁵ *Somn.* II, 45, 301; cf. below, p. 64.

²⁶ *Somn.* I, 17, 102.

²⁷ *Exod.* 7: 15.

may say that such points should not be brought into our inquiries, for they savor of petty quibbling rather than of any profitable process." ²⁸

From these two passages it is quite evident that the opposition to allegory attributed to the traditionalists by Philo is that characteristic of men who, not having been trained in philosophy, have no interest in it and see no use in it and are quite contented to abide by whatever interpretation tradition and the exigencies of life may suggest to them. These traditionalists also seem to have been oblivious of the social significance of the philosophical interpretation of Scripture either as a means of satisfying the inquiring minds among the Jews or as a means of defending Judaism against the attacks of heathen writers. They display a self-confidence and self-contentment which flow from a consciousness of strength and from a faith in the loyalty of their adherents among the great masses of the Alexandrian Jews. Whether among these traditionalists of Alexandria there was also an opposition to philosophy on religious grounds, condemning it as a form of impiety or heresy, cannot be ascertained from the literature of the time. From the analogy of the form which the opposition to philosophy took in the later history of religions, whether Christian or Moslem or Jewish, one is not justified in assuming that such an opposition existed also in Alexandria, for later in the history of religions, again whether Christian or Moslem or Jewish, there were other factors, new and unprecedented, which gave rise to this kind of opposition to philosophy.

These traditionalists are not represented in Hellenistic Jewish literature. All we know about them is derived from Philo's references to them. That they should have left no written records of their interpretations of the Law is un-

²⁸ *Somn.* II, 45, 301.

doubtedly due to the fact that these interpretations constituted what they, like the Palestinian Pharisees, regarded as oral law, and consequently, again, like the Palestinian Pharisees of that time, they did not allow themselves to commit it to writing.²⁹ Certain historical works in Hellenistic Jewish literature, such as the Second and Third Books of Maccabees, may perhaps have come from their circle. But such an assumption can be based only upon the slender evidence of silence, that is, the absence in these works of any philosophical discussions. In the case of the Second Book of Maccabees one might perhaps add also the dubious evidence of its assertion of a belief in the resurrection of the body,³⁰ if one were only certain that the question of resurrection as against immortality was an issue upon which non-allegorists and allegorists were divided.³¹ The positive views expressed in these works, such as devotion to the Law, fidelity in its observance, and readiness to die for it, are such as Philo as well as all the other philosophers of his type could wholeheartedly subscribe to. There is no basis for the assumption that these works represent the view of the literalists as against those of Philo and of the other philosophers simply on the ground that they "speak in praise of 'normative' legalism"³² or on the ground that they ask the Jews "to

²⁹ According to Stein (*Pilon ha-Alexandroni*, p. 68), the Alexandrian Jews did allow themselves to write down the oral law, and as evidence he points to Demetrius and Aristeeas whose works contain some elements of oral law. This is inconclusive. It merely shows that in historical writings the authors allowed themselves to make casual references to oral laws. Similarly in Palestine those who composed historical books allowed themselves to make casual references to oral laws. No general conclusion can therefore be drawn from this circumstance with regard to the legal authorities among the Alexandrian Jews. On the whole, the prohibition against writing down the oral law was subject to certain exceptions (cf. I. H. Weiss, *Dor Dor ve-Dorshav*, I, Wilna, 1904, pp. 87-89).

³⁰ II Macc. 7: 9; 7: 23; 14: 46.

³¹ Cf. below, pp. 396 ff.

³² Goodenough, *By Light, Light* (Yale University Press, 1935), p. 5.

die bravely for the law of their fathers, and to keep away from the mysteries of the Greeks.”³³ To speak in praise of “normative legalism” and to bid the Jews to die for the law of their fathers and keep away from the mysteries of the heathen was something which Philo and all the Hellenistic Jewish writers have done in their writings.

In contrast to those traditionalists who rejected philosophical interpretation altogether, there were those who in their excessive use of philosophic interpretation rejected the literal meaning of the law altogether. Philo refers to them as “some who, regarding the laws in their literal sense in the light of symbols of matters belonging to the intellect, are overpunctilious about the latter, while with light-heartedness they show but little esteem for the former.”³⁴ Unlike the literalists, concerning whom he says that he would “not blame (*αἰτιασάμενος*) such persons, for perhaps the truth is with them also,”³⁵ with regard to these extreme allegorists he says that “such men for my part I should blame (*μεμψαλμην*) for handling the matter with recklessness; for they ought to have given careful attention to both aims, to an accurate investigation of the invisible and also to an irreproachable observance of the visible.”³⁶ But though he blames them and censures them and finds fault with them, he does not condemn them. He rather pleads with them, pointing out the error of their way and trying to rouse their own disapproval of their own view. His pleas to them are threefold. First, he pleads that by disregarding the literal meaning of the law they place themselves in the position of defying public opinion and of impairing their reputation with their own people, consequences which he assumes they themselves would deplore if they only realized what they were doing.

³³ Shroyer, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

³⁴ *Migr.* 16, 89.

³⁵ *Conf.* 38, 190. Cf. above n. 23.

³⁶ *Migr.* 16, 89.

"As it is," he says of them, "as though they were living alone by themselves in a wilderness, or as though they had become disembodied souls, and knew neither city nor village nor household nor any company of human beings at all, overlooking all that the mass of men regard, they explore reality in its naked absoluteness."³⁷ But he reminds them that "sacred Scripture teaches these men to take heed of a good reputation,"³⁸ and concludes that, by observing the laws, "one will escape blame and accusation from men in general."³⁹ Second, he reasons with them that the practical observance of the laws is of great antiquity and recalls to their mind that Scripture teaches "not to do away with any of the established customs which divinely empowered men greater than those of our time have laid down,"⁴⁰ for these laws, he concludes with an appeal to their loyalty to Judaism, were bequeathed by Abraham as an inheritance to Israel.⁴¹ Third, he tries to show to them the importance of the outward observance of the Law for the understanding and the preservation of its inner meaning, for, he says, the outward observance of the law and its inner meaning are related to each other as body and soul, and just as we must take care of the body because it is the abode of the soul, so also it is only through the outer observance of the law that we can gain a clearer conception of its inner meaning.⁴² He finally concludes this argument with a general exhortation to all and sundry that by attaching importance to the inner meaning of the laws about the Sabbath, the festivals, circumcision,

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 89-90.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 90; cf. Prov. 4: 24 (cf. *Ketubot* 22b); 22: 1.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 93.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 90. The reference is to his own interpretation in *Spec.* IV, 28, 149-150, of the verse "Thou shalt not remove thy neighbor's landmarks which thy forefathers have set" (Deut. 19: 14). Cf. below, p. 192.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 94.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 93.

and the Temple, we must not on that account "abrogate" (λύωμεν) or "give up" (ἀποταξώμεθα) or "abolish" (ἀνελώμεν) or "neglect" (ἀμελήσομεν) these laws.⁴³

From this analysis of Philo's discussion of the extreme allegorists, we gather the general impression that they were a group of well-meaning though rather misguided people who did not themselves realize the implications of their own view, and Philo felt that all he needed was to point out to them those implications in order to make them turn aside from the error of their way. This impression is still further deepened when we compare Philo's description of this group of allegorists with his description elsewhere of another group of allegorists, the Therapeutae. His description of this group of extreme allegorists as being overpunctilious in regarding the laws as "symbols of matters belonging to the intellect" is reminiscent of his description of the Therapeutae as those who "read the Holy Scriptures and seek wisdom from their ancestral philosophy by taking it as an allegory, since they think that the words of the literal text are symbols of something whose hidden nature is revealed by studying the underlying meaning."⁴⁴ But still, in contradistinction to the Therapeutae, who are described by him as being observant of the literalness of the Law,⁴⁵ these extreme allegorists are said by him to show little esteem for it. Again, unlike the Therapeutae, who formed an organized community in the neighborhood of Alexandria, these extreme allegorists are

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 91-92.

⁴⁴ *Cont.* 3, 28.

⁴⁵ They observe the Sabbath and the other holidays (*Cont.* 3, 30 ff.) and are described as "disciples of Moses" (7, 63; 8, 64). Cf. F. C. Conybeare, *Philo concerning the Contemplative Life*, pp. 301 and 316. In one thing alone Conybeare finds them in departure from ordinary Judaism, and that is the celibacy of women (*ibid.*, pp. 316-317). According to rabbinic law, however, the commandment to perpetuate the human species by marriage (Gen. 1: 28) was not binding upon women (*M. Yebamot* VI, 6).

represented as isolated individuals scattered within the Alexandrian Jewish community.⁴⁶ Like the Therapeutae, however, they are possessed of a longing to flee from active life in order to commune with God. This would seem to have been a common tendency among Jews in Alexandria, especially among those trained in philosophy. Philo repeatedly refers to those who, "filled as with pure wine, with the longing for holiness, bade a long farewell to all other affairs and offered up their own lives wholly to the service of God";⁴⁷ and he refers to himself as having once been inspired by such a desire.⁴⁸ Unlike the Therapeutae, therefore, who sought to gain communion with God through both contemplation and work in a specially organized social setting and by means of a religious discipline based upon traditional Jewish customs, these extreme allegorists remained individual recluses within the madding rush of everyday life in Alexandria, each by himself seeking the way to God through his own individual effort, outside organized religious life, and without the aid of other kindred spirits. As detached individuals, in search of the perfection of their own souls through the life of pure contemplation, they gradually drifted away from the common life of the community into a neglect, and often into an open violation, of the Law — that Law which they themselves admitted to be of divine origin; and they did so without perhaps having ever openly declared that the Law was never meant to be literally observed, and certainly without having ever openly demanded its abrogation. Or, perhaps, they may have developed the view that for the selected few like themselves, devoted as they were to

⁴⁶ Gfrörer, I, p. 106, however, takes Philo's characterization of these extreme allegorists in the passage, "as though they were living alone by themselves in a wilderness, etc.," quoted above (n. 37), as being aimed at the Therapeutae.

⁴⁷ *Decal.* 22, 108.

⁴⁸ *Leg. All.* II, 21, 85.

the study of the Law and to the discovery of its inner meaning, the Law was never meant to be followed literally in all its details: the literal observation of the Law was meant to be binding only upon the common run of men who needed it as a moral discipline and an intellectual symbol. To judge from what Philo tells us about them, they never consciously separated themselves from the body of Alexandrian Judaism, nor did they militantly try to propagate their views. Quite on the contrary, from Philo's description of them we gather the impression that, in their absorption in their own individual perfection, they have become oblivious of the social implications of their own personal neglect of the observance of the Law. In his reasoning with them he assumes that they still possessed a sense of regard for the public opinion of the Alexandrian Jewish community and a sense of loyalty to ancient Jewish traditions, that they could still be swayed by the mention of the example of men of past Jewish history, and that they could still be convinced of the disciplinary value of Jewish practices as the only means which could lead to the life of contemplation.

If we are right in our analysis of Philo's description of this group of extreme allegorists, then we may dismiss as historically unfounded the view that they constituted a distinct sect within Hellenistic Judaism and that they were militantly engaged, in anticipation of Paul, in the struggle for the abrogation of the Law, and that as such, therefore, they had placed themselves outside the Jewish community.⁴⁹ Still

⁴⁹ M. Friedländer, (1) *Das Judentum in der vorchristlichen griechischen Welt*, 1897, pp. 56-57; (2) *Geschichte der jüdischen Apologetik als Vorgeschichte des Christentums*, 1903, pp. 438-440; (3) *Die religiösen Bewegungen innerhalb des Judentums im Zeitalter Jesu*, 1905, pp. 282-286. Cf. review of the last of these books by D. Feuchtwang in *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 50 (1906), pp. 497-509; cf. also J. Klausner, *From Jesus to Paul*, Eng. tr. by W. F. Stinespring (The Macmillan Company, 1943), pp. 27-28.

less historically founded is the view that the alleged antinomian teachings of these allegorists are represented in the Fourth Sibylline Oracle.⁵⁰ The basis for this latter view is twofold. First, in that Fourth Oracle the Sibyl proclaims to the gentiles that those happy men who "truly love the almighty God" and who, like pious Jews, "bless Him before eating and drinking . . . shall, when they see them, disown all temples and altars, vain erections of senseless stones, befouled with constant blood of living things and sacrifices."⁵¹ Second, the Sibyl sheds no tears when she refers to the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem in the lines, "To Solyma too the evil blast of war shall come from Italy, and shall lay in ruins God's great temple."⁵² Neither of these two passages proves an antinomian tendency. A Jew trained upon the teaching of Scripture and post-scriptural Jewish traditions as to the relative importance of sacrifices and other means of worshiping God⁵³ — especially a Jew living after the destruction of the Temple, when evidently this Oracle was composed⁵⁴ — did not have to be an opponent of the observance of the Law in order to tell the gentiles that the worship of the Jewish God does not depend upon a temple and altars and sacrifices.⁵⁵

These three tendencies in Alexandrian Judaism, the traditional, the allegorical, and the extremely allegorical, thus did not constitute sects. They merely represented a certain conflict of ideas the like of which will be found existing subsequently in both Christianity and Judaism during the periods of their greatest internal unity. They represent that conflict of ideas which is inevitably bound to appear in any

⁵⁰ *Idem, op. cit. (1)*, p. 58.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 115-116.

⁵¹ Sibylline Oracles IV, 24-29.

⁵³ Cf. below, II, 241 ff.

⁵⁴ The date generally given is that of about 80 A.D. Cf. Introduction to this book in Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, II, p. 373.

⁵⁵ Some take the author to be an Essene or a Christian.

religion based upon a Scripture and a native tradition when on its coming in contact with a philosophy from another source attempts are made on the part of some to reconcile the two. The great mass of believers who will not have felt the impact of the foreign philosophy will see no need of any reconciliation between them. This great mass of believers will either remain indifferent to the innovations of the philosophic reconcilers, or will superciliously look upon them as mere triflers, or, if given provocation, will militantly oppose them as disturbers of the religious peace. Among the reconcilers themselves there are bound to appear all kinds of shades of opinion, differing as to the relative proportion of the traditional ingredients and philosophical ingredients that should be properly entered into the mixture. In such conflicts there are bound to appear extreme views which, if hard pressed, might transform a mere internal conflict of ideas into an open schism. There is no hard and fast rule by which one can determine with accuracy when an internal conflict of ideas ends and a schism begins. But on the whole one may say that a schism in any religion appears when a conflict of ideas leads to the establishment of separate institutions of worship and discipline or to a struggle for the control of institutions already in existence. Such a struggle for control, we know, was going on in Palestine at the time of Philo between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, the stake in the struggle being the control of the Temple and of the Sanhedrin. No such struggle, as far as we know, existed in Alexandria. The synagogues there were the houses of prayer and study for both the literalists and the philosophers. The extreme allegorists, as we have seen from our analysis of the only reference to them in Philo, tried neither to get control of the existent synagogues nor to set up rival synagogues of their own. Even the Therapeutae, in their own community,

with the exception of their ascetic manner of living, did not depart from the established traditions and customs of the people. Nor is there any indication of a partisan conflict in Alexandrian Judaism for the control of such social institutions as the gerusia and the courts of justice.

But besides the traditionalists whom Philo does "not blame" for their disregard for the allegorical interpretation of Scripture, and the extreme allegorists whom he does "blame" for their neglect of the literalness of Scripture, there were those whom he condemns as "apostates (*ἀποστάτες*) from the holy laws,"⁵⁶ as outlaws (*ἔκνομοι*) and lawless (*ἄθεσμοι*)⁵⁷ and as captious critics of the Law,⁵⁸ who denounce and decry and deride the Law,⁵⁹ and whom he places under the anathema of the curses proclaimed by Moses in the name of God against all those who in the future would break their covenant with God.⁶⁰

From the various passages in which he touches upon apostasy it may be gathered that Philo has distinguished three types of apostates.

First, those who forsook Judaism out of the weakness of the flesh. There are "apostates from the holy laws," says Philo, who, being incontinent, "have sold their freedom for luxurious food . . . and beauty of body, thus ministering to the pleasures of the belly and the organs below it."⁶¹ Now the desire for luxurious eating is that which, according to Philo, the dietary laws of the Pentateuch are meant to restrain;⁶² and the desire for the beauty of body is that which would usually lead to marriage with heathens, which kind of marriage is prohibited, according to Philo, by the law of the

⁵⁶ *Virt.* 34, 182.

⁵⁷ *Praem.* 20, 126.

⁵⁸ *Lev.* 26: 15 ff.; *Deut.* 28: 15 ff. Cf. *Praem.* 20, 126 ff., and cf. 26, 152.

⁶¹ *Virt.* 34, 182. Cf. III Macc. 7: 11: "Those who for their belly's sake had transgressed the divine command."

⁵⁸ Cf. below, n. 108.

⁵⁹ Cf. below, nn. 109-113.

⁶² *Spec.* IV, 17, 100 ff.

Pentateuch.⁶³ Accordingly, what he means to say here is that among the Jews of his time and place apostasy from the Law started in some cases with those who, out of a lack of self-restraint, broke away from the dietary laws and from the laws prohibiting marriage with the heathen. From a strictly legal point of view, perhaps, the dietary laws and the prohibition of intermarriage are no more weighty than many of the other prohibitive commands in the Pentateuch. But, owing to the fact that the breaking of these laws proved to be, by common observation, the beginning of the breaking away of the social barriers between Jew and non-Jew which ultimately led to a complete abandonment of Judaism, these laws were raised, by the time of Philo, both in Palestine and in the Diaspora, to the status of a fundamental religious principle. Among the rabbis in Palestine, an apostate with reference to the eating of forbidden meat was singled out for special mention,⁶⁴ and new dietary laws were added prohibiting the partaking of certain foods or drinks of gentiles.⁶⁵ Similarly, intermarriage came to be regarded by the rabbis as a form of apostasy on a par with the worship of Moloch⁶⁶ or with heathenism in general,⁶⁷ and the prohibition of intermarriage, which in the Pentateuch applies only to the original inhabitants of Canaan,⁶⁸ was extended by them to apply

⁶³ *Ibid.* III, 5, 29.

⁶⁴ *Abodah Zarah* 26b.

⁶⁵ See below, n. 70.

⁶⁶ *Midrash Tannaim* on Deut. 18: 9, p. 109, and cf. *Sifre Deut.*, § 171, HF, p. 219: " 'Whosoever he be of the children of Israel . . . that giveth of his seed unto Moloch; he shall surely be put to death' (Lev. 20: 2). Rabbi Ishmael says: this refers to one who cohabits with an Aramean woman and begets from her a son who is a hater of God."

⁶⁷ *Sanhedrin* 82a: "Said Rabbi Hiyya bar Abuyah: He who cohabits with a Cuthean woman is as if he connects himself with idols, for it is said, 'Judah hath dealt treacherously . . . and hath married the daughter of a strange god' (Mal. 2: 11)."

⁶⁸ Exod. 34: 15-16; Deut. 7: 3-4.

to all other heathens.⁶⁹ The reasoning underlying these new prohibitions is summed up in the statement that the rabbis prohibited "the bread and oil of the heathen on account of their wine, and their wine on account of their daughters, and their daughters on account of idolatry."⁷⁰ Similarly, among the Hellenistic Jews, both Philo⁷¹ and the Fourth Book of Maccabees⁷² dwell upon the importance of the dietary laws as a moral discipline, and in the latter work they are treated as a symbol of any law for which a Jew is to give up his life if forced openly to violate it.⁷³ And so also in the case of intermarriage, Philo's restatement of the scriptural law assumes that the prohibition applies to all heathen,⁷⁴ and not only to the original inhabitants of Canaan; and, taking his cue from Scripture, he tries to show how intermarriage must inevitably lead to heathenism. An indirect allusion to apostasy with reference to intermarriage may also be discerned in Philo's description of the apostate as "a man of noble descent who has debased the coinage (*παρακόψας τὸ νόμισμα*) of his noble birth."⁷⁵ This metaphor is used by Philo often as a general description of the breaking of any established law, but always with the connotation that the breaking of the law in question involved the adulteration of something which is pure by nature or birth.⁷⁶ Consequently, when he speaks here of an apostate as having "debased the coinage of his noble birth," he means not only that he has been disloyal to the laws inherited from his fathers but also that he has been led to this disloyalty by his marriage to a heathen.

⁶⁹ On the history of the laws with regard to intermarriage in rabbinic literature, see L. M. Epstein, *Marriage Laws in the Bible and Talmud* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), pp. 153-177.

⁷⁰ *Shabbat* 17b.

⁷¹ *Spec.* IV, 17, 100 ff.

⁷² *IV Mac.* 5:6 ff.

⁷³ *Sacr.* 40, 137; *Mut.* 31, 171; 37, 208; *Spec.* I, 45, 250; I, 60, 325; III, 7, 38;

Cont. 5, 41.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 5:27 ff.; cf. *Sanhedrin* 74a.

⁷⁵ *Spec.* III, 5, 29.

⁷⁶ *Praem.* 26, 152.

From Philo's description of this class of people as having sold their "freedom" (*λευθερία*),⁷⁷ it is quite evident that he does not deal here merely with men who, while remaining within the Jewish community, have out of the weakness of the flesh violated the dietary laws and the laws of intermarriage, but rather with those who, starting with the breaking of these laws, have been led to a complete abandonment of Judaism. "Freedom" here is used by Philo in the sense of that which only the virtuous man possesses,⁷⁸ and the virtuous man among Jews is he who obeys the law,⁷⁹ for he alone is free who, like Abraham, is a "friend of God" and emancipated from "vain opinion."⁸⁰ These apostates, therefore, by forsaking the Law, are described by him as having sold their "freedom." There can be no doubt that in the Alexandrian Jewish community, as in any other Jewish community throughout history, and in Palestine itself at the time of Philo, there were many Jews who out of the weakness of the flesh ate forbidden food and married forbidden women. As a preacher he undoubtedly urged them to mend their ways. But these did not constitute any special problem in Alexandrian Judaism, beyond the general problem of human imperfection and human sinfulness. In one place, speaking of those who have sinned "by necessity, overwhelmed by the force of an inexorable power,"⁸¹ by which, as he says later, he means those who have sinned "involuntarily,"⁸² by their inability to resist temptation, he does not condemn them too harshly. He says of them that they "deserve pity rather than hatred."⁸³ The pity which they deserve is evidently for the regret and the plague of conscience by which they will be beset. Without a word of condemnation or re-

⁷⁷ Cf. above, p. 73.

⁷⁸ *Probos* 1, 1.

⁷⁹ Cf. below, II. 192 ff.

⁸⁰ *Sobr.* 11, 55-57.

⁸¹ *Post* 2, 9.

⁸² *Ibid.* 3, 10.

⁸³ *Ibid.* 2, 9.

proach he describes this common garden variety of sinners among Alexandrian Jews as having a consciousness of sin and as being occasionally moved to repentance, for in a passage in which he speaks of the Day of Atonement as a day "of purification and escape from sin" and as a day of "repentance,"⁸⁴ he says that that fast day is "carefully observed not only by the zealous for piety and holiness but also by those who never act religiously in the rest of their life."⁸⁵ There was evidently no professional class of religious leaders among Alexandrian Jews to acclaim the increasing sins of their patrons as successive stages in the progress of their religion. These casual and regretful transgressors of the law who remained within the Jewish fold are therefore to be distinguished from those described by Philo as apostates who have come to their apostasy through the transgression of the dietary and connubial laws.

Another motive of apostasy discussed by Philo is that which may be described as the vulgar delusion of social ambition. Wealth in the Alexandrian Jewish community was derived from the non-Jewish environment through contacts with heathens. Such contacts with heathens thus became financial assets, and financial assets naturally became marks of a delusive social distinction, and the delusion of social distinction, in turn, led to snobbishness, obsequiousness, self-effacement, aping, simulation, pretense, and ultimately to a begging for permission to join whatever one had to join in order to become a heathen. This, we imagine, was the progressive pilgrimage of certain Alexandrian Jews from a seat in the front row of the synagogue to a place at the tail end of the mystery processions of the heathen. Philo gives us a vivid description of this class of apostates. "Men in

⁸⁴ *Spec.* I, 35, 187.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 186.

general," he says, "even if the slightest breeze of prosperity does only blow their way for a moment, become puffed up and give themselves great airs, becoming insolent to all those who are in a lower condition than themselves, and calling them dregs of the earth, and annoyances, and sources of trouble, and burdens of the earth, and all sorts of names of that kind . . . look down upon their relations and friends and transgress the laws under which they were born and bred, and subvert the ancestral customs to which no blame can justly attach, by adopting different modes of life, and, in their contentment with the present, lose all memory of the past." ⁸⁶ To adopt different modes of life and to lose all memory of the past naturally means to become completely severed from the body Israel.

Besides those who sank down into apostasy through a desire for easy living and those who thought they had climbed up into apostasy through a delusion of social distinction, there was in Alexandria a class of apostates who dropped out of Judaism through an unconscious shifting of intellectual interest. They were the intellectually uprooted.

We are apt to think that all Alexandrian Jews, because they spoke Greek, began their education by reciting Homer in Greek schools together with their heathen schoolmates, and, after a lifetime of active participation in the cultural affairs of the city, spent their declining years in some corner of the Alexandrian library discussing with old heathen cronies some passage in Plato or Aristotle or Zeno. But from what we know of political and social conditions in that heterogeneously populated city we have reason to conclude that there was as little intellectual contact of a personal nature between Jew and heathen in Alexandria as there was centuries later, in the Middle Ages, when both Jew and

⁸⁶ *Mos.* I, 6, 30-31.

Christian studied Aristotle, and Christians quoted Maimonides from a Latin translation and Jews translated St. Thomas into Hebrew. In Alexandria, the city did not provide a common elementary school system for all the groups of the population.⁸⁷ Whatever elementary education existed was furnished privately. In the case of Egyptians and Greeks, elementary education is known to have been of a religious nature,⁸⁸ and so also must it have been in the case of the Jews. Gymnasia and ephebea, which served as centers of higher education, were similarly of a religious nature,⁸⁹ and were primarily Greek institutions, from which, we know, Egyptians were excluded⁹⁰ and so undoubtedly were also Jews.⁹¹ Jewish higher education, whether of a purely religious nature or of a general nature, was provided by the Jews themselves, either in school houses attached to synagogues, as in Palestine, or in the synagogue houses themselves, and this higher education naturally was under the auspices of Jewish teachers. Philo himself refers to the custom of Alexandrian Jews of occupying themselves every Sabbath day with the "philosophy of their fathers" as well as with the "speculation about problems concerning nature," that is, problems of general philosophy, in "places of instruction" (*διδασκαλεία*).⁹² Of such "places of instruction" he says in another passage that they are "innumerable in every city" and that people receive there instruction in "philosophy" from teachers whom he describes as being "most experienced" (*ἐμπειρότατοι*).⁹³ In this passage, "philosophy" is defined by him as dealing both with "duty to God" and with

⁸⁷ Cf. L. Mitteis-U. Wilcken, *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde*, I, i, p. 137; cf. W. W. Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilization*², p. 174.

⁸⁸ Cf. L. Mitteis-U. Wilcken, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

⁸⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 140.

⁹⁰ Cf. *ibid.*

⁹¹ Cf. below, n. 105.

⁹² *Mos.* II, 39, 216.

⁹³ *Spec.* II, 15, 61-62.

“duty to men,”⁹⁴ that is, theology and ethics.⁹⁵ “Philosophy” as the subject of study on the Sabbath is also mentioned by him in another place, and there it is defined by him as dealing with “the improvement of morals and the examination of conscience.”⁹⁶ In still another passage he speaks of the interpretation of the Law to the people in the synagogues on the Sabbath day by “some priest who is present or one of the elders.”⁹⁷ This synagogal school for higher education must have been so well established in the tradition of the Alexandrian Jews that when the Therapeutae organized a community of their own outside of Alexandria they continued that kind of school, calling it “the sanctuary” (τὸ σεμνεῖον).⁹⁸ These “places of instruction,” which, according to Philo, were used on Sabbaths as centers of higher religious as well as of secular education for the great mass of Alexandrian Jews, must have been used during the rest of the week as school houses for higher education for the youth of the community, and perhaps also as centers of all kinds of other activities.

Besides such “places of instruction” for the “philosophy of their fathers” and “speculation about problems concerning nature,” Alexandrian Jews at the time of Philo must have had also other kinds of educational and cultural organizations. In an inscription from Asia Minor of a later period there is thus reference to a young men’s Jewish sporting organization.⁹⁹ Organizations of this kind may have also existed in Alexandria during the time of Philo, and perhaps also

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 63.

⁹⁵ Cf. below, p. 147.

⁹⁶ *Opif.* 43, 128.

⁹⁷ *Hypoth.* 7, 13 (Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VIII, 7, 359d-360a).

⁹⁸ *Cont.* 3, 30-32. Cf. F. C. Conybeare, *Philo concerning the Contemplative Life*, p. 310, §LI, on the question whether this sanctuary was the synagogue itself or a school attached to the synagogue.

⁹⁹ Cf. A. Tscherikower, *Ha-Yehudim ve-ha-Yevanim ba-Tekufah ha-Hellenistit*, p. 358; E. Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi*⁴, III, p. 15; S. Reinach, “Les Juifs d’Hypaepa,” *Revue des Études Juives*, 10 (1885), pp. 74 ff.

young men's Jewish dramatic organizations, where Greek plays, as well as the dramatization of Biblical themes by Hellenistic Jewish writers such as Ezekiel, the tragic poet, were also presented. When Philo, therefore, speaks of his own presence at a contest of Pancratiasts,¹⁰⁰ or at chariot races,¹⁰¹ or at the performance of a tragedy by Euripides,¹⁰² it may refer to events which took place in such strictly Jewish organizations, or it may perhaps only indicate that he had the curiosity to see these things performed by non-Jews and had the money to pay the admission fee; it does not indicate any participation, even on the part of men of the type of Philo, in the general sporting and intellectual life of the city. Similarly, when he discusses the relative position of the various branches of liberal disciplines and philosophical studies in a school curriculum,¹⁰³ his discussion may perhaps reflect conditions in the school in which he himself was educated, but in that case that school was under Jewish auspices and undoubtedly attached to a synagogue. More likely his discussion is not drawn from actual experience; it is merely a restatement of the Stoic theories of the order of studies for the purpose of making use of them in his allegorical interpretation of the scriptural story of Sarah and Hagar.¹⁰⁴

Among Alexandrian Jews, however, there were no doubt some whose contacts with non-Jews in trade or profession, in military life or in the administration of civil government, led to a closer contact with non-Jews both socially and intellectually. Despite the exclusion of Jews from the gymnasium and ephebea, some Jews must have managed to gain that privilege for their children. Shortly after the time of

¹⁰⁰ *Probus* 5, 25.

¹⁰¹ *Provid.* 2, 58 (Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VIII, 14, 397a); Aucher, II, 103.

¹⁰² *Probus* 20, 141.

¹⁰³ *Congr.* 14, 73 ff.

¹⁰⁴ *Gen.* 16: 1-6.

Philo, Claudius, evidently with reference to those Jews who had managed to intrude themselves where they were not wanted, bids the Jews of Alexandria not "to strive in gymnastic or cosmetic games,"¹⁰⁵ that is to say, he bids them not to send their children to gymnasia and ephebea. Perhaps there were also some Jews who had managed to place their children in private heathen Greek schools. There must have thus arisen in Alexandria a class of educated Jews, well versed in the arts and the sciences and philosophy, but devoid of any religious training — not only Jewish but also heathen — having therefore no interest in the application of philosophy to religion, either for the defense of Judaism or for the defense of heathenism. They constituted the free-thinkers of the time, those who were usually referred to as atheists, by which was primarily meant those who denied divine providence — a doctrine which, after a manner, was defended also by heathen philosophers. Philo's own nephew, Tiberius Julius Alexander, with whom Philo debated the problem of divine providence in his treatise "On Providence," seems to have belonged to those uprooted Jewish intellectuals. To such uprooted Jewish intellectuals, all the attempts of the Jewish philosophers within the Jewish community to show that scriptural stories are superior to mythology and that the method of philosophic allegory can be properly applied only to Scripture and never to mythology seemed only evidence of narrow-mindedness. To them Scripture was no better than mythology; and perhaps to some of them it was even worse.

These uprooted Jewish intellectuals, whether they found it advantageous to themselves to join any of the numerous heathen religious *thiasoi* or not, certainly had no reason to

¹⁰⁵ H. J. Bell, *Jews and Christians in Egypt* (Oxford University Press, 1924), p. 25, ll. 92-93, and p. 29.

remain within the religious Jewish community. External political and social and economic conditions of the time did not force de-Judaized Jews to cast in their lot, despite themselves, with the Jewish community. Still less did external conditions force them to assume communal or religious leadership. It was comparatively easy at that time for a Jew to escape Judaism.¹⁰⁶ Those at that time who cut themselves off from the body Jewish cut themselves off completely, leaving no dangling shreds of festering dead tissue. They wrote neither books against Jews nor books about Jews. Nor did any of them try to remake Judaism into a sort of inferior heathenism, with Dionysus or Serapis as central figures — if not as deities, then at least as prophets by the side of Moses. Perhaps some of these apostates, either for devious reasons of some practical advantages or for the simple reason that it was easier for them to lose their relish for the God of their fathers than for the cooking of their mothers, had remained within the Jewish part of the city, though without being part of its religious life; and, with all their indifference toward Judaism, they could not completely refrain from taunting their fellow Jews, especially the philosophers among them, for maintaining that Scripture was of divine origin and that its stories were something superior to the mythological fables of the Greeks. Now, in Palestinian Judaism of about that time, as may be gathered from its literature, such “deniers of the divine revelation of the Law” were regarded not as ordinary sinners but rather as those who have converted themselves completely to heathenism.¹⁰⁷

It is apostates of this kind that Philo refers to as “malicious critics” (*κακοτεχνούντες*) of the Law, who “are impu-

¹⁰⁶ Tscherikower (*op. cit.*, p. 302), however, thinks that “the Jews enjoyed many special privileges, and it was not therefore always worth while for them to forgo these privileges in order to join the Greek community.”

¹⁰⁷ *Tos. Sanhedrin XIII, 5.*

dently bold in inventing objections" (*εὐρεσιλογῶν θρασύνηται*) against it.¹⁰⁸ It is apostates of this kind, too, that he has in mind when, in his discussion of the story of the confusion of tongues, he says: "Those who are discontented with the constitution of our fathers and always seek for an opportunity to denounce and decry the laws find in these and similar passages openings as it were for their godlessness, for, say these impious persons: 'Can you still speak seriously of the ordinances as containing the canons of absolute truth? For see, your so-called holy books contain also myths, at which you are accustomed to laugh when you hear them related by others.'" ¹⁰⁹ It is apostates of this kind among whom he suspects there may be found "some one who may laugh" (*derideat*) at the story of God's making garments of skins for Adam and his wife,¹¹⁰ or some who, described by him as "being wholly foolish and keeping aloof from the divine company," "mock" at the story of God's changing the name of Abram to Abraham,¹¹¹ or some who, again described by him as "unrefined and inept by nature," as "unable to discern any form of virtue," and as "lacking in knowledge and wisdom and prudence," see in the story of the pottage sold by Jacob ¹¹² nothing but an object of "laughter and derision."¹¹³ Undoubtedly among these uprooted Jewish intellectuals there were also materialists and other kinds of atheists, but we do not think that it was Jews of this kind in particular ¹¹⁴ that Philo has in mind when he takes the Ammonites and the Moabites, in the verse excluding them from the congregation of the Lord,¹¹⁵ as referring to champions of

¹⁰⁸ *Agr.* 36, 157.

¹⁰⁹ *Conf.* 2, 2.

¹¹⁰ *Qu. in Gen.* I, 53.

¹¹⁴ Which is the view of M. Friedländer, *Geschichte der jüdischen Apologetik, etc.*, pp. 443-446; *Die religiösen Bewegungen, etc.*, pp. 487-488.

¹¹⁵ *Deut.* 23: 4.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* III, 43.

¹¹² *Gen.* 25: 29.

¹¹³ *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 168.

the senses and champions of the mind.¹¹⁶ As we shall see in a subsequent chapter,¹¹⁷ this allegorical interpretation of the verse is part of Philo's more comprehensive criticism of various schools of Greek philosophy, in conformity with his view that Scripture not only approves in anticipation whatever is good in philosophy but also rejects in anticipation whatever is false in it.

The picture which we have tried to draw of Alexandrian Judaism is that of a community united in its essential beliefs and practices. By the constant attrition and attraction of the environment, every upgrowth of dissent was worn away and carried off; those who remained within did so by choice and out of a sense of unity and loyalty. Whatever differences of opinion existed among them with regard to the interpretation of the Law — whether it should be traditional or allegorical and, if allegorical, to what extent — they all believed in the divine origin of the Law and in its perfection. This belief was their justification, to the world at large and to their own selves, for their continued existence as a people apart, which they knew was a source of annoyance to others and which, being only human, they must have occasionally felt also as a burden upon themselves. They all also presented a common attitude toward the religion and culture of the outside world, and this they proclaimed courageously and forthrightly — Greek religion was false; Greek philosophy was an inferior form of Judaism. That courage and forthrightness was caught by early Christianity, when it was only a struggling minority in a pagan world, and, with but one slight change in the wording, it repeated the same proclamation — Greek religion was false; Greek philosophy was an inferior form of Christianity. Indeed, Alexandrian Jews craved good-will, but good-will to them meant to bury the

¹¹⁶ Cf. *Spec.* I, 61, 333 ff.

¹¹⁷ Cf. below, ch. iii, pp. 167 ff.

hatchet; it did not mean to bury convictions and cover up differences. They never fawned, they never crawled, they never yielded what they considered to be the truth.

With all their endeavor to present Judaism to the world in an understandable and acceptable form, the Alexandrian Jewish writers never compromised with popular Greek religion or mythology or the mysteries. They never tried to present the Jewish God as any of the gods of popular religion, or Jewish tradition as myths, or Jewish religious rites as rites of mysteries. If they ever happen to use certain common Greek divine epithets with reference to God, it is only because the use of such epithets is justified by corresponding descriptions of God in Scripture; and then, too, they use them always with the proviso, often expressed, that only their own God is worthy of such epithets. If they ever happen to use mythological allusions, it is only as literary forms of expression and then, too, always with the proviso, sometimes expressed, that the use of a mythological allusion should not be taken as an expression of belief in the myth alluded to. If they ever happen to use the terminology of the mysteries in their presentation of Jewish rites, it is either for the purpose of emphasizing the contrast between the religion of the Jews and the mysteries of the heathen, or because the terms derived from the mysteries have become part of the common speech and are used in a sense completely divorced from their original meaning. Indeed they did try to present Judaism as a philosophy, but philosophy had to yield to Judaism on every point on which the two met in real conflict. This was the common attitude of all the Hellenistic Jewish philosophers before Philo, and this, we shall now try to show, is what we have found to be the attitude of Philo in all his philosophic writings.

CHAPTER II

HANDMAID OF SCRIPTURE

I. BEHIND THE ALLEGORICAL METHOD

OF ALL THE WRITINGS of Philo, which bear thirty-eight titles,¹ four are treatises on certain special problems of philosophy,² with only occasional references to Scripture or Jews in two of them.³ All the others are primarily of Jewish content, and of these, with the exception of three treatises which deal with contemporary Jewish events in Alexandria,⁴ all are written in the form either of a running commentary on certain books of the Pentateuch⁵ or of discourses on certain topics selected from the Pentateuch. The latter deal with the creation of the world to the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the garden of Eden,⁶ Cain and the other generations of Adam,⁷ the generation of the deluge,⁸ Noah,⁹ the tower of Babel,¹⁰ Abraham,¹¹ the dreams of Jacob and Joseph,¹² Joseph,¹³ Moses,¹⁴ the ten commandments,¹⁵ and all the other laws and teachings of the Pentateuch.¹⁶ Within these commentaries upon the Pentateuch, which he calls "Law,"

¹ Exclusive of the *De Mundo*, *De Sampson*, *De Jona*, *Interpretatio Hebraicorum nominum* and *De Biblicis antiquitatibus*, which are generally acknowledged to be spurious, and exclusive also of the books which are entirely lost. Cf. E. Schürer, *A History of the Jewish People at the Time of Jesus Christ*, II, iii, pp. 321-361; L. Cohn, "Einteilung und Chronologie der Schriften Philos," *Philologus, Supplbd.* VII, iii (1899), pp. 387-435; L. Massebieau, and E. Bréhier, "Essai sur la chronologie de la vie et des oeuvres de Philon," *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, LIII (1906), 25-64, 164-185, 267-289.

² *Probus*; *Aet.*; *Provid.*; *Alexander, sive de eo quod rationem habeant bruta animalia.*

³ Cf. *Probus* 7, 43; 8, 57; 12, 75-87; *Aet.* 5, 19.

⁴ *Flac.*; *Legal.*; *Cont.*

⁵ *Qu. in Gen.* I, II, III, IV; *Qu. in Ex.* I, II.

⁶ *Opif.*; *Leg. All.* I, II, III; *Cher.*

¹¹ *Migr.*; *Heres.*; *Congr.*; *Fug.*; *Abr.*; *Mut. De Deo.*

¹² *Somn.* I, II.

¹³ *Jos.*

¹⁶ *Spec.* I, II, III, VI; *Virt.*; *Praem.*; *Hypoth.*; *Apologia pro Judaeis.*

⁷ *Sacr.*; *Deter.*; *Post.*

⁸ *Gig.*; *Immut.*

⁹ *Agr.*; *Plant.*; *Ebr.*; *Sobr.*

¹⁰ *Conf.*

¹⁴ *Mos.* I, II.

¹⁵ *Decal.*

Philo includes also passages from some of the other books of the Scripture to which he refers as "Prophets and the Psalms and other Writings,"¹⁷ and these passages are dealt with by him in the same way as the passages from the Pentateuch. Altogether, eighteen of the twenty-four books which constitute the Hebrew Bible are either named or quoted by him.¹⁸ Of those which he does not happen to name or quote, some may have been omitted because he had no occasion to use them. On the whole it may be assumed that his Scripture consisted of all those books which shortly after are referred to by Josephus as the "twenty-two" justly accredited books.¹⁹ He may have also drawn upon some of the books of the Apocrypha, though none of them is mentioned by him.²⁰

The text of Scripture used by him is not the original Hebrew but the Greek translation, and sometimes it is the wording of that translation that is made the subject of his interpretation. Still it is not to be inferred from this that Philo had no knowledge of Hebrew. Writing in Greek for Greek readers, he would naturally quote the translation familiar to his readers, even though his knowledge of Hebrew was such that he could himself without too much effort provide his own translation. As for his taking the Greek wording of the text as the subject for his homiletical interpretation, it may be due to the fact that in common with all the Alexandrian as well as Palestinian Jews he shared the belief that the Greek translation of the Law was made with the aid of divine inspiration.²¹ That he had a knowledge of Hebrew may be

¹⁷ *Cont.* 3, 25; cf. below, p. 117.

¹⁸ Cf. H. E. Ryle, *Philo and the Holy Scripture*, xix-xxxiii; "Index Locorum Veteris Testamenti" in Leisegang, *Indices*, pp. 29-43.

¹⁹ *Apion*. I, 8, 38. Cf. R. H. Pfeiffer, *Introduction to the Old Testament* (Harper & Brothers, 1941), p. 64.

²⁰ Cf. Ryle, *op. cit.*, pp. xxxiii-xxxv.

²¹ Cf. below, II, 54.

derived from the following facts. First, sometimes his interpretation of a verse turns upon the wording of the original Hebrew which is not represented in the Septuagint.²² Second, his etymologies of proper Hebrew names, though containing some errors, show that he had a knowledge of Hebrew, for only one who had some knowledge of Hebrew could unconsciously make such errors, and only one who had a thorough knowledge of the language could deliberately allow himself to depart from the true meaning of words.²³ To be sure, neither of these facts is irrefutable as evidence of Philo's knowledge of Hebrew. As for his displaying a knowledge of the Hebrew text in places where the Septuagint text differs from the Hebrew, it may be due to the fact that Philo had before him other Greek translations which kept closer to the Hebrew original.²⁴ As for his etymologies of proper Hebrew names, they could be explained as having been taken from the works of other Alexandrian Jews. Then there is always the possibility that whatever knowledge of Hebrew he displays in his writings he may have gotten from somebody who knew that language. Still, while there is no positive evidence of his knowledge of Hebrew, the burden of proof is upon those who would deny that he possessed such a knowledge. It is true indeed that the Alexandrian Jews found it difficult to preserve the knowledge of Hebrew as the common possession of all the people, but there can be no doubt that provision for instruction in that language was made by them and that the more learned among them had a knowledge of it. The study of foreign languages in the ancient world was pursued whenever there was need for it. In Alexandria itself, when after the reign of Diocletian a

²² See some examples below, pp. 190, 211, 256 ff., 267 ff., 336; II, 145.

²³ Such deliberate departures from the true meaning of words are found in the etymologies of the rabbis.

²⁴ Cf. Ryle, *op. cit.*, p. xxxix.

knowledge of Latin became politically important, the study of that language became a part of the school curriculum.²⁵ There is no reason, then, why Jews, for religious motives, should not also have studied Hebrew. In some of the etymologies of Philo, such as Aaron meaning "mountainous," Bilhah meaning "swallowing," and Samuel meaning "appointed by God," we may even get some idea as to the manner of their study of Hebrew, for the confusion of certain Hebrew letters displayed in these etymologies can be explained on the assumption that Hebrew was studied in Alexandria from texts in which the Hebrew words were transliterated in Greek characters. With the device of vowel points in Hebrew not as yet invented, such transliterations were a pedagogical necessity. So also the study of Latin in Alexandria, it is known, was from texts in which Latin words were transliterated in Greek characters.²⁶ The question therefore is really not whether Philo knew Hebrew, but rather to what extent he knew it. On the whole, it may be said that, while he did not know enough of the language to write his interpretations of Scripture in Hebrew, he knew enough of it to read Scripture in the original and to check up on the Greek translation whenever he found it necessary.²⁷

Besides the written Scripture, Philo also draws upon certain unwritten traditions. These traditions are referred to by him in various terms.²⁸ Parallels to many of these un-

²⁵ Cf. Mitteis-Wilcken, *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyrskunde*, I, p. 138.

²⁶ Cf. the same reference. Similarly in Origen's Hexapla by the side of the Hebrew text there was a transliteration of the same text in Greek characters.

²⁷ On the question of Philo's knowledge of Hebrew, see Siegfried, 1875, pp. 142-145, with references to earlier authors in nn. 1, 2, 3, on p. 142; L. Cohn, *Philos Werke* I, 1909, p. 29, n. 3 on *Abr.* 3, 17; and I. Heinemann's review of it in *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschafts des Judentums* 54 (1910), pp. 506-507 and *idem*, *Bildung*, 1932, p. 7, n. 1; E. Stein, *Die allegorische Exegese des Philo aus Alexandria*, 1929, pp. 20-26, and R. Marcus' review of it in *Jewish Studies in Memory of George A. Kohut*, 1935, pp. 469-470; J. Klausner, *Pilosofim ve-Hoge De'ot*, I, 1934, pp. 66-68.

²⁸ Cf. below, pp. 188 ff.

written traditions reflected in the writings of Philo are to be found in the collections of Palestinian traditions known as the Mishnah, the Midrash, and the Talmud.²⁹ Though these collections were not made and written down until long after the time of Philo, much of the material contained in them, and sometimes even the literary formulation of this material, must already have existed in oral form by the time of Philo. On the whole the relation between the parallel traditions in Philo and the rabbis may be assumed to be of a fourfold nature. First, some of them undoubtedly emanate from a common source, the traditions of early Palestinian Judaism which the Alexandrian Jews had brought with them from their home country. Second, some of them are later innovations independently arrived at by the rabbis and Philo, owing to the common method of interpretation employed by them. Third, some of them may have been borrowed by Alexandrian Jews from their contemporary Palestinian Jews through the various channels of intellectual communication that existed between them. Fourth, some of them were probably borrowed by Palestinian Jews from the works of Philo.³⁰ Nowhere in the Talmudic literature, however, is there any evidence that the knowledge of Philo reflected in it, and for that matter the knowledge of any other Greek philosopher, is directly derived from literature; more likely it all came by hearsay.³¹ In the entire Greek vocabulary that

²⁹ The search for such rabbinic parallels began with Azariah dei Rossi in his *Me'or 'Enayim: Imre Binah*, ch. 4, 1573-1575.

³⁰ Cf. J. Freudenthal, *Hellenistische Studien*, Heft 1 und 2, 1875, pp. 67-68; Z. Frankel, *Ueber den Einfluss der palästinensischen Exegese auf die alexandrinische Hermeneutik*, 1851; N. Bentwich, *Philo-Judaeus of Alexandria*, 1910, pp. 208-211.

³¹ On rabbinic passages which are supposed to be dependent upon Philo, see Freudenthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-77; J. Perles, "Notes et Mélanges," *Revue des Études Juives*, 3 (1881), 114; A. Epstein, "Le Livre des Jubilés," *Philon et le Midrasch Tadsché*, *REJ*, 21 (1890), 80-97 (cf. below, p. 306, n. 60); 22 (1891), 1-25; W. Bacher, *Die Agada der Amoräer*, I, 1892, p. 107, n. 2; N. J. Weinstein, *Zur Genesis der Agada*, II: *Die Alexandrinische Agada*, 1900; cf. Review by W. Bacher in *REJ*, 43 (1901),

is embodied in the Midrash, Mishnah, and Talmud there is not a single technical philosophic term.³² Moreover, of those Greek terms embodied in them, which in Greek literature have a philosophic meaning in addition to their popular meaning, none is used in its philosophic meaning.³³ Nor are there to be found in them Hebrew or Aramaic terms which may be taken with certainty as direct translations of Greek philosophic terms.³⁴ All these four possibilities are to be borne in mind whenever one is tempted to assume on the basis of some resemblance any literary dependence between Philo and the rabbis. In our present study, the rab-

139-145; D. Neumark, *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters*, I, 1907, pp. 85, 98 (Hebrew: *Toledot ha-Pilosofiah be-Yisra'el*, I, 1921, pp. 69, 85); L. Treitel, "Agada bei Philo," *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 53 (1909), 28-45, 159-173, 286-291 (reprinted in *Philonische Studien*, 1915, pp. 85-113); A. Marmorstein, "Ra'ayonot ha-Agadah we-Ḳorot ha-Zeman," *Tarbiz*, 5 (1934), 134-147; L. Finkelstein, "Is Philo Mentioned in Rabbinic Literature?" *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 53 (1934), 142-149; M. Stein, "Ha-Midrash ha-Hellenisti," *Seneh*, 1 (1929), 141-154; *idem*, *Pilon ha-Alexandroni*, 1937, pp. 299-300; N. Bentwich, *Hellenism* (Jewish Publication Society, 1943), pp. 250-296.

³² Cf. classification of such terms in S. Krauss, *Griechische und Lateinische Lehnwörter im Talmud, Midrash und Targum*, II, pp. 623-658. Nor does S. Lieberman's *Greek in Jewish Palestine*, 1942, show any influence of Greek philosophic terminology upon the vocabulary of the Midrash, Mishnah, and Talmud.

³³ For instance, the terms ἀνάγκη, ἀρκχῆ, δόγμα, θωπλα, תוריאה, חוריאה, תוריאה, הדיוט, παραδείγματα, פרדימטט, σοφιστής, סופיסטט, are none of them used in their philosophic sense. Neumark in his *Toledot ha-Pilosofiah be-Yisra'el*, I, p. 75 seems to take דתמה, דע'גמ, in the expression הוא ברבבה ש'ו דתמה (Hagigah 16a) in its technical sense of the paradigmatic nature of the ideas. But דע'גמ is never used in Greek in that sense; only παράδειγμα has been used in the sense of ideas (cf. below, p. 238). This shows that the term here has its origin not in literature but in speech. The Talmudic expression סטטורין ש' הקב"ה (Genesis Rabbah 50, 9; 68, 12) corresponds exactly to Philo's expression θεοῦ μυστήρια (Leg. All. III, 1, 3). But mysteries were practiced among the heathen in Palestine and it is therefore from common speech that the expression was picked up by the rabbis. With regard to the term תוריאה, there is no evidence in support of Neumark's contention (*op. cit.*, I, 99) that it is used in a technical philosophic sense; it is rather used in its ordinary Greek sense of θωπλα, a looking at.

³⁴ D. Neumark (*op. cit.*, I, p. 64) seems to suggest that the Hebrew צייר הוא (Genesis Rabbah 1, 9) is the Greek δειμιουργός. But the allusion to the *demiourgos* there is attributed to a non-Jewish philosopher.

binic parallels quoted may indifferently belong to any of these four types of parallels, for they are not essential to our interpretation of Philo as a critic of Greek philosophy;³⁵ they are used only as corroborative evidence. Our interpretation of Philo is based chiefly upon a study of his own writings in relation to his Greek and scriptural sources.³⁶

Interwoven with his treatment of these strictly scriptural topics are discussions of many of the outstanding philosophic problems of the day: the existence of ideas, the origin of the world, its structure and the laws which govern it, the nature of the soul and the realm of living beings, problems of human knowledge, man's knowledge of God's existence and God's nature, and the problem of human conduct both individual and social. The philosophers Philo draws upon, whom he either mentions by name or to whom passages in his works can be traced, come from all the periods of Greek philosophy down to his own time. Of pre-Socratic philosophers, he mentions the Pythagoreans, Parmenides, Zeno, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Philolaus, the Sophists, and the individual Sophist Protagoras. Then he mentions also Socrates; the Cynic school, naming especially "Aristippus and Diogenes" as following the teachings of that school; Plato; Aristotle. Of post-Aristotelian philosophy he mentions the various schools or their leaders: the Stoics in general and individual Stoics, such as Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Diogenes the Babylonian, Boethus the Sidonian, and Panaetius; Epicurus; the Peripatetic philosophy in general and individual Peripatetics, such as Theophrastus and Critolaus; the Sceptics in general; the Academicians in general; and finally the Neopythagorean Ocellus. Without mentioning names, he quotes, or draws upon, Anaximander, Anaximenes, the Pythagorean Epicharmus, the

³⁵ Cf. below, pp. 103-113.

³⁶ Cf. below, II, 465-491.

Atomist Anaxarchus, the Sophist Prodicus, the Stoics Aristo of Chios and Posidonius of Apamea, the Peripatetic Aristoxenes, and the Sceptic Aenesidemus.³⁷ Besides these philosophers, Philo also mentions Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, Solon, Hippocrates, Ion, Euripides, Sophocles, and Aeschylus.³⁸ Some of these may have been quoted by him from secondary sources, but some of them quite evidently are quoted directly from their own works, and even in the case of authors whose works are no longer extant it is quite possible that he quoted them from their original works which were still extant at his time.

Philo was not the first to interpret Scripture in terms of Greek philosophy. The beginning was made in the Greek translation of the Pentateuch. That translation, to be sure, was meant to be a faithful rendering of the Hebrew text into Greek and not a philosophic interpretation of it. But every translation of a religious or philosophic work from one language into another, no matter how faithfully literal it is meant to be, is unconsciously bound to be also an interpretation of one system of thought into another. Some scholars, moreover, think to have discerned in that Greek translation of the Pentateuch a conscious effort on the part of the translators to identify scriptural teachings with corresponding teachings in Greek philosophy.³⁹ This conscious effort to interpret scriptural teachings in terms of the teachings of Greek philosophers becomes unmistakably clear in the sub-

³⁷ Cf. Leisegang, "Index Nominum" in his *Indices*, pp. 1-26, for proper names in the works which are extant in Greek. "Academicians" occur in *Qu. in Gen.* III, 33; "Parmenides" and "Empedocles" in *Provid.* (Aucher) II, 48. For Aenesidemus see Arnim, "Quellenstudien zu Philo," *Philologische Untersuchungen* 11 (1888), 55 ff., and cf. Zeller, III, 24, p. 390, n. 4, and p. 9, n. 7. The identification of sources in the case of passages where the name of the author is not mentioned by Philo is, of course, conjectural and incomplete. ³⁸ *Ibid.*; cf. Siegfried, pp. 137-141.

³⁹ Cf. survey in Freudenthal, "Are There Traces of Greek Philosophy in the Septuagint?" *Jewish Quarterly Review*, 2 (1890), 205-210; Drummond, I, 156-166.

sequent writings of Jewish authors in Greek — such as the letter of Aristeas,⁴⁰ which in its external literary form is a historical exposition, and the Wisdom of Solomon,⁴¹ which is written in the form of the scriptural Book of Proverbs. More like the writings of Philo in their external literary form are the works entitled *An Explanation of the Mosaic Law* attributed to Aristobulus⁴² and the Fourth Book of Maccabees.⁴³ The dates of the composition of these books are not certain; every one of them is placed by some scholar after Philo; but we may quite safely consider them all as antedating Philo. Philo himself refers to certain oral philosophical interpretations of Scripture which existed at his time⁴⁴ and also to certain written philosophical interpretations of Scripture in the possession of the Therapeutae.⁴⁵ It is Philo, however, who brought to full development this peculiar method of interpreting Scripture and also this peculiar form of philosophic literature and it is to him that their vogue in the subsequent history of philosophy is to be traced.

The external form given by Philo to his writings is a purely Jewish form of literary exposition. It had sprung up in Palestine when, together with the establishment of the custom of public reading of portions from the Pentateuch in the synagogue on the Sabbath, there grew up the custom of delivering an oral interpretation of certain selected verses out of the text read. From Palestine the custom of the public

⁴⁰ Cf. Schürer, *A History of the Jewish People in the Times of Jesus Christ*, II, iii, pp. 306–312; E. Bickermann, "Zur Datierung des Pseudo-Aristeas," *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der ältern Kirche*, 29 (1930), 280–298.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, II, iii, pp. 230–237.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 237–243; Drummond, I, pp. 242–252.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 244–248. Cf. also Introductions to these books in R. H. Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, 1913.

⁴⁴ *Deter.* 8, 22; *Plant.* 17, 69; *Heres* 57, 281; *Mut.* 25, 141; *Abr.* 20, 99; 38, 217; *Jos.* 26, 151; *Somn.* I, 19, 118; *Spec.* I, 2, 8; *Spec.* III, 32, 178; *Qu. in Gen.* I, 10.

⁴⁵ *Cont.* 3, 29. Cf. Siegfried, p. 26.

reading of the Law on the Sabbath together with oral instruction in the form of a sermon or homily was brought over to Alexandria by the early Jewish settlers there. Philo himself has several references to this kind of instruction in the synagogues on the Sabbath.⁴⁶ Perhaps Philo himself was one of those who gave such instruction in the synagogues. But, whether the result of such actual instruction or only modeled after the formal manner of such instruction, his writings have the form of sermons or homilies on verses or topics selected from Scripture.⁴⁷ Now it happens that only the Pentateuch was read serially in public at the synagogue on the Sabbath and it was usually completed in Palestine, and hence probably also in Alexandria, in cycles of three years. Of the other books of Scripture, only selections from the Prophets were read as an appendage to the reading from the Pentateuch. As a result of this, the formal homilies in the synagogue always turned on a text or a topic taken from the Pentateuch. This is the reason why the homilies of Philo take the form of discussions directly based on the books of the Pentateuch only. For a similar reason, in Palestinian Judaism, too, the early collections of literature, when arranged in the form of homilies in Scripture, were externally based upon the books of the Pentateuch or upon topics derived from the books of the Pentateuch.

This external literary form of his writings determined the order of Philo's treatment of philosophic problems. He was guided by the scriptural verses which he happened to make

⁴⁶ *Opif.* 43, 128; *Mos.* II, 39, 216; *Spec.* II, 15, 61-62; *Hypoth.* 7, 13 (Eusebius, *Præparatio Evangelica* VIII, 7, 359d-360a); cf. L. Cohn, *Philos Werke*, I, 7.

⁴⁷ The similarity between the diatribe and the homily (cf. P. Wendland and O. Kern, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie und Religion*, p. 5) and the evidence of the use of topics dealt with in the diatribe form of literature in some of Philo's treatises (cf. the same reference, pp. 8 ff.) does not eliminate the native Jewish Midrashic character of Philo's writings. Cf. M. Stein, *Pilon ha-Alexandroni*, pp. 77-78; Schürer, *op. cit.*, pp. 243, 331; Freudenthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-68

the pegs upon which to hang his philosophic speculations. One verse may have suggested to him a topic in the theory of ideas, another a topic in the nature of virtue, a third a topic in the nature of the soul, and so on throughout the manifold items in the various minutiae of problems of philosophy. Philosophical problems are thus invariably presented by him in fragmentary form. Never does a problem appear in its full coherent structure; never is it treated as a whole.

And as the order of his presentation of problems was dictated by the order of scriptural texts, so is also the manner of their presentation. The language of Scripture determines his choice of vocabulary in philosophy. Because Scripture uses the terms heaven and breath by the side of the terms earth and water, he will call the elements fire and air by the terms heaven and breath.⁴⁸ Because Scripture says that God breathed into man a breath of life, he will call the human mind breath or spirit.⁴⁹ Because Scripture speaks of the word of God and the wisdom of God he will call the divine mind Logos and Sophia.⁵⁰ Because Scripture speaks of the Lord of glory and the Lord of the powers he will call ideas glory and powers.⁵¹ Wishing to keep close to the scriptural modes of speech, he will clothe his philosophic thought in scriptural imagery. There is a variety and mixture of vocabulary in the presentation of his philosophy, and there is no attempt to adhere to the technical vocabulary of the schools or to one consistent technical set of terms of one school.

The fact that so many philosophers belonging to opposite schools of thought are drawn upon by him without any evident discrimination, the fact also that philosophic problems are not treated by him systematically but are dragged in, as it were, upon the casual suggestion of scriptural texts, and

⁴⁸ Cf. below, pp. 313, 394, n. 45.

⁴⁹ Cf. below, p. 394.

⁵⁰ Cf. below, pp. 254-255.

⁵¹ Cf. below, pp. 218 ff.

moreover the fact that he never seems to have any difficulty in connecting any philosophic thought with any scriptural verse create the impression that Philo was a preacher with a flair for philosophy rather than primarily a philosopher. That he was a good preacher — in fact, the founder of the art of preaching as we know it — and perhaps the greatest philosophic preacher that has ever lived, can be readily admitted. But was his flair for philosophy of significance enough to entitle him to a place among the founders of new schools in the history of philosophic thought? The general answer to this question is in the negative. An early student of his philosophy expressed the view that Philo “neither founded any sect whatever, nor in my opinion possessed such powers of intellect as to be able to reject the theories of other philosophers, and to strike out a new and hitherto untrodden path for himself,”⁵² and the same view is expressed by modern scholars in such statements as that “he was not an original philosopher at all, and anything philosophic to be found in his writings can confidently be taken as genuine teaching of his environment,”⁵³ or that “as a philosopher Philo is negligible” and the fact that he “is not an original thinker but a compiler is clear not only from his total lack of original thought but from the slovenliness with which he incorporates his material,”⁵⁴ or that one of Philo’s characteristics is his “normal lack of originality.”⁵⁵ To one student of his philosophy, Philo seems “a polyhistor of the first rank” but at the same time also a man “who, on account of his enormous knowledge, is incapable of gaining

⁵² J. L. Mosheim in his notes to R. Cudworth, *The Intellectual System of the Universe*, Book I, Chapter IV, §XXXVI, ed. 1845, II, 321.

⁵³ E. Goodenough, *An Introduction to Philo Judaeus* (Yale University Press, 1940), p. 124.

⁵⁴ W. L. Knox, *Some Hellenistic Elements in Primitive Christianity* (London: Humphrey Milford, 1944), p. 34.

⁵⁵ A. D. Nock, Review of the preceding in the *Guardian*, January 26, 1945, p. 36.

clearness and of building up, either in religion or in philosophy, a scientific system which is consistent and free from contradictions." ⁵⁶ The characterization most often applied to him by students of his writings, ever since the seventeenth century, is that of eclectic, ⁵⁷ in the damnatory sense of the term. As to what the dominant element in that eclecticism of Philo is, there exists a difference of opinion. Among the Church Fathers, Clement of Alexandria characterized him as a Pythagorean, Eusebius characterized him as both a Platonist ⁵⁸ and a Pythagorean, ⁵⁹ and Jerome characterized him as a Platonist. ⁶⁰ Besides Platonism and Pythagoreanism, later students began to stress also the influence of Stoicism upon Philo. All this is summed up by Zeller in his statement that the philosophers who had the greatest attraction for Philo are Plato, the neo-Pythagoreans, and the Stoics. ⁶¹ A new influence discovered by more recent students of Philo is that of the Greek mysteries. ⁶² The prevalent view of Philo as a philosopher is well expressed in the following statement: "Philosophers have patronized him as a lowly step in their lofty ladder, and have labelled him according to their fancy or their knowledge of more ancient philosophers." ⁶³ The

⁵⁶ P. Ziegert, "Über die Ansätze zu einer Mysterienlehre aufgebaut auf den antiken Mysterien bei Philo Judäus," *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 67 (1894), p. 724.

⁵⁷ P. Allix, *The Judgment of the Ancient Jewish Church Against the Unitarians*, 1699, p. 357; E. Schürer, *A History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, II, iii, p. 364; E. Meyer, *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, 1921, II, p. 366.

⁵⁸ *Stromata* I, 15 (PG, 8, 781 A); II, 19 (PG, 8, 1044 B).

⁵⁹ *Historia Ecclesiastica* II, 4, 3.

⁶⁰ *De Viris Illustribus*, c. 11. Cf. Dähne, I, p. 31, n. 6; Zeller, III, 24, p. 390, nn. 3 and 4; Schürer, *op. cit.*, II, iii, p. 364, n. 110.

⁶¹ Zeller, III, 24, p. 390.

⁶² The earliest writer to call attention to this influence upon Philo is P. Ziegert, 1894 (cf. above p. 44, n. 148). For later literature, see H. L. Goodhart and E. R. Goodenough, *The Politics of Philo Judaeus with a General Bibliography of Philo* (Yale University Press, 1938), pp. 269-273.

⁶³ Cf. J. H. A. Hart, "Philo and Catholic Judaism in the First Century," *The Journal of Theological Studies*, 11 (1909), p. 27.

only dissenting voice, as far as I know, is that of Azariah dei Rossi, in the sixteenth century, who describes Philo as follows: "He was a great philosopher — learned in the works of Plato and Aristotle as well as in those of every other wise man — whose renown went forth from before him among the gentiles. He moreover adds new things of his own, so that, while sometimes he appears to be following in their footsteps, sometimes he turns aside from following them, for his way is contrary unto them." ⁶⁴

Influence is a vague term, and in the case of Philo the methods by which influence upon him is determined are also vague. Sometimes this influence is determined on the basis of the honorific titles which he happens to apply to certain philosophers. Thus, for instance, Philo happens to describe the society of Pythagorean philosophers as "most sacred" (*ιερώτατον*)⁶⁵ and Plato either also as "most sacred" (*ιερώτατον*) or as "most clear-toned" (*λιγυρώτατον*)⁶⁶ and Parmenides, Empedocles, Zeno and Cleanthes as "divine men" (*divi homines*),⁶⁷ and consequently it is inferred that he must have been influenced by them. Now, while from these passages it may be safely inferred that Philo was acquainted with the names of all these philosophers and perhaps also that he had read their works, and furthermore that he was willing to repeat certain conventional, laudatory

⁶⁴ *Me'or 'Enayim: Imre Binah*, ch. 4, ed. Wilna, 1866, p. 97.

In the passage quoted in the text, I take the clause "whose renown went forth from before him among the gentiles" to refer to Philo, and not to "any of the other wise men." It thus reflects the description of Philo in Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica* II, 4, 2, which in the Latin translation accessible to dei Rossi reads as follows: "a man held in highest esteem by many not only of our own but also of the gentiles—vir a plurimis non modo nostrorum, verum etiam gentilium maximo in pretio habitus."

⁶⁵ *Probus* 1, 2.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 2, 13, where these two terms are alternative readings.

⁶⁷ *Provid.* (Aucher) II, 48.

titles that were attached to their names ⁶⁸ and perhaps also that he himself went so far as to coin these laudatory titles by which he describes them, it does not necessarily mean that he followed their teachings. In fact it may only show that he was magnanimous enough to speak of them in laudatory terms even though he disagreed with their philosophy; this is true in the case of most of them, as we shall see later. Sometimes the influence upon him is determined on the basis of the literary origin of terms and expressions which he happens to use. Now if Philo does happen to use terms and expressions borrowed, for instance, from some Stoic author or from some Neopythagorean author, or from the vocabulary of the Greek mysteries, it does not necessarily mean that his philosophy was Stoic or Neopythagorean or that it was really not a philosophy at all but only a mystery; the borrowed expressions only throw light upon the kind of books that students of philosophy at the time of Philo in Alexandria used to read, and show that Philo's language represented the literary philosophic language of his time with all its richness and all the variety of elements that entered into its making. Philosophic language by the very history of its formation is bound to be heterogeneous, and it is for this reason that one cannot determine the affiliation of a philosopher by the parentage of the terms he uses. Every word, indeed, has an etymology, and every term has a history. But the use of a term by a philosopher goes beyond its etymology and history, though a knowledge of both of these is essential

⁶⁸ The term divine (*divus*, *θεῖος*) which Philo applies to various philosophers is a common Homeric epithet applied to such persons as Ulysses (*Odyssey* IV, 17) and Epeus (*Iliad* XXIII, 689). The expression "divine Plato" occurs in Themistius (*De Anima*, ed. Heinze, p. 4, l. 15) and "divine Aristotle" in Simplicius (*Physica*, ed. Diels, p. 611, l. 8). Plato himself says that it is in imitation of Homer that he applies the epithets "venerable" (*αἰδοῖος*) and "awful" (*δευρός*) to Parmenides (*Theaetetus* 183 ε).

for the understanding of its use. By the time of Philo, the vocabulary of men dealing with philosophic or religious topics was a mosaic of terms derived from all kinds of opposite schools of thought, but molded by their users, if they used them understandingly, to a common, consistent meaning. Whatever one thought of "matter," he would not hesitate to describe it by the Platonic "receptacle" (*ὑποδοχή*), the Aristotelian "hyle" (*ἕλη*), or the Stoic "substance" (*οὐσία*), despite differences in the conception of matter implied in these terms. Whatever one thought of "soul," he would not hesitate, whenever the exigencies of style demanded, to call it indiscriminately *psyche* or *nous* or *pneuma*, despite the different meanings these terms have in certain systems of philosophy. Whatever one thought of "God," he would not hesitate to call him indiscriminately Demiurge, Prime Mover, or Soul of the Universe, despite the difference in the conception of God which these terms imply. The style of Philo, like that of any writer, is the product of all that has been written before him. It has absorbed within itself terms and expressions and allusions derived from the philosophers of the various schools, as also from popular Greek religion and mythology and mysteries. But in the case of Philo, as in the case of any other author, while the outer speech of style may be the man, it is the inner speech of thought, and the latent processes of reasoning behind it, that is the philosopher.

The question is thus again before us, Is there a philosopher in Philo behind the preacher? Is there behind all his fragmentary and often inconsistent statements a unifying principle of thought, a coherent system, in the light of which his expressed utterances, drawn from such a variety of contradictory sources, can be completed, unified, and interpreted in their true meaning, as used by him, as understood by him, and as he wanted us to understand them? It is not impossi-

ble, indeed, that they are right who say that Philo did not possess "such powers of intellect as to be able to reject the theories of other philosophers, and to strike out a new and hitherto untrodden path for himself" or that he was not capable "of building up, either in religion or in philosophy, a scientific system which is consistent and free of contradictions," or that he was only an "eclectic"; but at least we must make an effort to find out whether he was really nothing more than all that has been said about him.

To study any philosopher in the midstream of a tradition we must approach him from upstream and we must also follow him downstream. The former approach supplies us with the material with which he has started; the latter may show us the direction in which he has steered the material. As for Philo, he is not only in the midst of a general philosophic tradition, which was started with Plato, but he is also the founder of a new trend within that tradition — a trend which continued without any interruption for about seventeen centuries, terminating ultimately with Spinoza. In the study of the use made by Philo of the material he inherited from Greek philosophy we may therefore learn something of essential importance from the manner in which the same material has been treated subsequently by those who have followed in his footsteps.

Now, for those who have followed in his footsteps — not so much his immediate and direct successors, the Church Fathers, as those who followed him later indirectly, namely, the Moslem and Jewish and Christian mediaeval philosophers — the interpretation of Scripture in terms of philosophy was not simply a matter of mechanically substituting one set of terms for another or of arbitrarily identifying one set of doctrines with another. To all of them it was a complicated study of similarities and differences. They all started with

certain general conceptions as to what constituted true religious doctrines, conceptions which ultimately go back to the Hebrew Scripture and Jewish tradition. Corresponding to these they all had another set of conceptions derived from Greek philosophy. Between these two sets of conceptions they all tried to show there could be no real contradiction. But no sooner had they started to show the absence of any real contradiction between them than they found themselves confronted by all sorts of vexatious problems. No system of philosophy proved itself acceptable to them in its entirety. Every system of philosophy, they discovered, contained views which were true and views which were false; and even the views which were true occasionally were contaminated by elements of falsehood, from which they had to purge them before they could take them into the religious philosophy which they were trying to build up. The effort to reconcile Scripture with philosophy was thus with them not a mere search for the underlying philosophic implications of scriptural texts; it was also, and often primarily, a searching examination into philosophic problems themselves, and it is this latter searching examination into philosophic problems that they most dwell upon in their writings.

It is the same scriptural conceptions as those of later Christian and Moslem and Jewish philosophers that Philo takes to constitute what he considers the inflexible doctrines of true religion, and it is the same literary sources as those used by his followers from which he derives his philosophic conceptions. Like all of his followers, he also started with the belief that there could be no real contradiction between Scripture and philosophy. Like all of them, therefore, he must have been aware — we have reason to assume — of the fact that certain contradictions do seem to exist between Scripture and philosophy, and that these contradictions

would have to be removed. We have also reason to assume that he was not less perceptive than they in seeing that certain philosophic views were absolutely irreconcilable with the teachings of Scripture. Similarly we have reason to assume that he was not less ingenious than they in knowing how some refractory philosophic views, with certain revisions, could be reconciled with scriptural teachings. So also we have reason to assume that he was not less painstaking than they in examining thoroughly every philosophic view before deciding whether to accept it or not. If all this is not apparent in his writings, it is perhaps because he is one of those philosophers who does his thinking in private and presents to the public only the maturity of his thought. If, with the exception of an occasional groan at some pet aversion, he does not dwell much upon the erroneous views of philosophers to which he objected, it is perhaps because his purpose was not to teach true philosophy to students of Scripture but to show the truth of Scripture to students of philosophy. If almost without any exception he adopts philosophic views without telling us that he adopts them only according to a new version of his own, it is perhaps because at his time philosophic views and concepts had not yet become rigidly fixed by the constant hammering of commentators and one could still freely reshape them for some particular use without having to offer an apology or explanation. Perhaps, also, at his time he could envisage a class of readers who were so well acquainted with the original meaning of the views and concepts with which he dealt that he felt no need of constantly reminding them of the revisions he had introduced. Do we not all sometimes quite deliberately pervert a familiar quotation, without stopping to insult the intelligence of the reader by pointing out the liberty we have taken with it?

If this is how we are to approach the study of Philo, then

to get at the true meaning of his philosophy it is not sufficient to collect related passages in his writings, to arrange them under certain headings, and to place in their juxtaposition parallel passages from other philosophers and the Bible. We must try to reconstruct the latent processes of his reasoning, of which his uttered words, we may assume, are only the conclusions. We must do for him what he would have done for himself had he lived at a later time and followed the literary method of that time. We must constantly ask ourselves: What were the scriptural presuppositions with which he started? What were the corresponding philosophic conceptions with which he matched those scriptural presuppositions? Could he have followed those philosophic conceptions? If he could not, but still seems to follow them, how would he have to modify them in order to justify the fact of his following them? And it is in the light of these reconstructed processes of his latent reasoning that we must then study his own uttered words. This method of study we have chosen to call the hypothetico-deductive method of text study.⁶⁹ We have already had occasion to describe it elsewhere in its application to a study of two other authors,⁷⁰ and we shall describe it in greater detail in our general introduction to the entire series of studies of which this present study of Philo constitutes the second book. Briefly stated, the basis of this method is the assumption that every philosopher in the main course of the history of philosophy either reproduces former philosophers or interprets them or criticizes them. Now if every philosopher in the past did actually tell us the processes of his own reasoning from the very inception of his thought to its complete maturation, then the history of

⁶⁹ Cf. *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle* (Harvard University Press, 1929), p. 25.

⁷⁰ Cf. the same reference, pp. 24-29; *The Philosophy of Spinoza* (Harvard University Press, 1934), I, 20-31.

philosophy would be simply a matter of collecting and classifying philosophic data. But no philosopher has ever given expression to the full content of his mind. Some of them tell us only part of it; some of them veil their thought underneath some artificial literary form; some of them philosophize as birds sing, without being aware that they are repeating ancient tunes. Words, in general, by the very limitation of their nature, conceal one's thought as much as they reveal it; and the uttered words of philosophers, at their best and fullest, are nothing but floating buoys which signal the presence of submerged unuttered thoughts. The purpose of historical research in philosophy, therefore, is to uncover these unuttered thoughts, to reconstruct the latent processes of reasoning that always lie behind uttered words, and to try to determine the true meaning of what is said by tracing back the story of how it came to be said, and why it is said in the manner in which it is said.

As a result of such a study, Philo emerges primarily a critic of all schools of Greek philosophy, whether those which by his time had already become obsolete or those which were still flourishing. Believing as he did in the existence of incorporeal beings, he could never be a follower of any of the pre-Platonic schools of philosophy, however much he may praise their founders and however much he may quote with approval some of their sentiments. He may indeed describe the Pythagorean society as "most sacred"⁷¹ and quote with approval their statement that equality is the mother of justice⁷² and make use of their theory of numbers in his allegorical interpretation of Scripture,⁷³ but the metaphysics that is behind the conception of equality and of num-

⁷¹ *Probus* 1, 2; cf. above, p. 100.

⁷² *Spec.* IV, 42, 231; cf. below, II, 391.

⁷³ *Opif.* 30, 89-43, 128; cf. Bréhier, p. 43, n. 1.

bers among the old Pythagoreans and the combination of the theory of numbers with the Platonic theory of ideas among the Neopythagoreans are not followed by Philo. Parmenides may indeed be included by him among the "divine men,"⁷⁴ but his theory that the world is eternal and that plurality and variability within the world are mere appearances is not followed by Philo. Empedocles also may indeed be included by him among the "divine men,"⁷⁵ and yet Heraclitus is condemned by him for teaching that the whole world is ruled by the law of opposites without the assumption of a divine agency beyond the world,⁷⁶ even though that is also the view of Empedocles. The Sophists are explicitly rejected by him and are represented unfavorably in their traditional character as those "who sell their tenets and arguments like any bit of merchandise in the market, men who for ever pit philosophy against philosophy without a blush,"⁷⁷ pretending an "ever-curious scepticism" and rejoicing in "disputatious arguments";⁷⁸ and, as we shall see later, he also criticizes the Sophist principle enunciated by Protagoras in his statement that "man is measure of all things,"⁷⁹ giving to that principle an interpretation of his own.

He similarly dissociates himself from some of the post-Aristotelian schools of philosophy. He openly disagrees with the Epicureans on the most essential points in their doctrine. In physics, he rejects their atomism; in ethics he rejects their hedonism; in theology he denounces the belief in the existence of gods in the form of human beings, as taught by Epicurus in his popular writings,⁸⁰ and he denounces also the denial of providence and the doctrine that the world is gov-

⁷⁴ Cf. above, p. 100.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Leg. All.* III, 3, 7; *Spec.* I, 38, 208.

⁷⁷ *Mos.* II, 39, 212.

⁷⁸ *Fug.* 38, 209.

⁷⁹ Cf. below, pp. 168 ff.

⁸⁰ Cf. below, p. 176.

erned by chance,⁸² as taught by Epicurus in his philosophic writings. Similarly the Sceptics are denounced by him in such a statement as that in which he says that they "do not concern themselves with the best things in nature, whether perceived by the senses or the mind, but spend themselves on petty quibbles and trifling disputes."⁸² So also the Middle as well as the New Academy is denounced by him in a statement in which he says of the "Academicians and inquirers" that, "preferring neither this one nor that one among the opinions which they investigate, they admit those men to be philosophers who attack the opinions of every sect."⁸³ Indeed he sometimes repeats the words of the Sceptics about our inability to know certain things, such as the origin and the future of the world, the constitution of the translunar part of the world, and the nature and powers of our own soul.⁸⁴ But the repetition of these words is not an endorsement of Scepticism; it is only an expression of his own view against both the Sceptics and the non-Sceptics among the philosophers, trying to show that, while we can have a true knowledge of things, that knowledge can only partly be based upon reason; in part it must be based upon revelation.⁸⁵

His attitude toward Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics is not so clear.

With regard to Aristotle, no philosopher at the time of Philo could be expected to be completely free from his influence. Aristotelian terms, expressions, and formulae occur throughout his writings. Sometimes the Aristotelian influence is apparent even in a context which on the whole is not

⁸² *Conf.* 23, 114.

⁸³ *Congr.* 10, 52.

⁸⁴ *Qu. in Gen.* III, 33.

⁸⁴ Cf. (1) *Heres* 50, 246; (2) *Somn.* I, 4, 21-24; (3) *Cher.* 20, 65; 32, 113; *Somn.* I, 6, 30-32; *Leg. All.* I, 29, 91; *Mut.* 2, 10.

⁸⁵ Cf. below, pp. 152 ff.

Aristotelian, such for instance as his argument for the existence of one world only.⁸⁶ Sometimes he aligns himself with Aristotle on questions on which the Stoics differ with him, as, for instance, the denial of a void outside the world,⁸⁷ and various problems in connection with virtue.⁸⁸ But his use of Aristotelian terms, expressions, and formulae does not indicate a conscious discipleship of Aristotle. Most of these terms and expressions and formulae by that time had already become the common property of philosophy. Sometimes, as for instance in his classification of the four causes⁸⁹ and his distinction between active and passive,⁹⁰ it is quite evident that he has drawn his Aristotelian material from secondary sources. Nor does his preference for some view of Aristotle to that of his opponents, either in physics⁹¹ or in ethics,⁹² indicate a conscious discipleship of Aristotle, for in almost every such instance he considers himself consciously a disciple of Moses rather than of Aristotle. And it is also as consciously a disciple of Moses that he found himself obliged to oppose Aristotle, either indirectly or directly, on doctrines which are characteristically Aristotelian. When he condemns all those who reject the existence of ideas,⁹³ Aristotle is undoubtedly meant to be included among them. When he condemns "some men" for their belief in the beginninglessness of the world,⁹⁴ these "some men" are the followers of Aristotle. Similarly, therefore, when he praises Aristotle by name for his belief in the indestructibility of the world, it is not because the authority of Aristotle carried weight with him but rather because he found it in agreement with what he believed to be the teachings of Moses.⁹⁵ It is sig-

⁸⁶ Cf. below, p. 312.

⁸⁷ Cf. below, p. 312.

⁸⁸ Cf. below, II, 268 ff.

⁸⁹ Cf. below, p. 265.

⁹⁰ Cf. *Opif.* 2, 8.

⁹¹ Cf. below, pp. 312, 314.

⁹² Cf. below, II, 272 ff.

⁹³ Cf. below, p. 164.

⁹⁴ Cf. *Opif.* 2, 7, and below, p. 295.

⁹⁵ Cf. below, p. 295.

nificant, however, that he never opposes Aristotle by name as he does Heraclitus, Protagoras, and the Sophists and Academicians.

Stoicism is most frequently drawn upon; its terminology and phraseology occur in every topic of philosophy touched upon by Philo. The Stoics were great disseminators of knowledge which they borrowed from others and are too often given credit by historians for views to which their only contribution was a change in the vocabulary or a minute classification or reclassification of parts of a general view held by others. The frequency with which Philo follows the Stoics merely shows that like many others of his time he used the Stoic compilations as a short cut to philosophic knowledge. But despite all this, and despite also his inclusion of Zeno and Cleanthes among the "divine men," when we examine the use made by him of the Stoic material we shall find that he is their critic rather than their follower. He differs from them on the definition of philosophy and wisdom, though ostensibly he quotes their definition of these two terms.⁹⁶ He rejects their conception of God,⁹⁷ though he makes use of the Stoic expression that God is the soul or mind of the universe.⁹⁸ He specifically denounces those who deny the existence of ideas, among whom he undoubtedly included the Stoics.⁹⁹ His use of the term *Logos* may show in some respect the influence of the Stoics, but he uses it in a sense entirely different from that of the Stoics.¹⁰⁰ In his theory of the creation of the world he openly rejects the Stoic view.¹⁰¹ In his classification of the faculties of the soul, indeed, he more often follows the Stoic scheme than that of Plato or of Aristotle, and in his description of the rational

⁹⁶ Cf. below, p. 148.

⁹⁷ Cf. below, p. 176.

⁹⁸ Cf. below, pp. 345 ff.

⁹⁹ Cf. below, pp. 164, 200.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. below, pp. 253, 327.

¹⁰¹ Cf. below, pp. 295, 299.

soul he uses such Stoic terms as "breath" or "spirit" and "ether" and "a divine fragment," but his conception of the soul is in direct opposition to that of the Stoics and consequently the Stoic terms used by him are not to be taken literally.¹⁰² In his proof of the existence of God he makes use of some proofs derived from the Stoics, but he modifies it so as to use them against the Stoic conception of God and in proof of his own conception of Him.¹⁰³ In his discussion of the virtues and emotions one may discern the influence of the Stoics' vocabulary, but here again the influence is only that of vocabulary; in the definition of virtue and its relation to the emotions he is opposed to them. In fact, the entire philosophy of Philo may be reconstructed as a criticism of Stoicism.

Now in all those points in which he is opposed to Aristotle and the Stoics and the Epicureans he is in agreement with Plato. One would therefore be inclined to take him as a follower of Plato. But the Platonic views which are accepted by him are all radically changed. Such radical changes are to be found in his treatment of the theory of ideas,¹⁰⁴ of the creation of the world,¹⁰⁵ of the conception of the laws of nature,¹⁰⁶ of the soul,¹⁰⁷ of the theory of knowledge,¹⁰⁸ of the proofs of the existence of God,¹⁰⁹ of the knowability of God,¹¹⁰ of the basis of right conduct, and of the ideal state.¹¹¹ But whereas his departure from the Stoics was due to a criticism of their views, with regard to his departure from Plato it is partly due to a criticism and partly to an interpretation. The Platonic doctrine was still in a plastic state, and all those who considered themselves its disciples could allow them-

¹⁰² Cf. below, pp. 393-395.

¹⁰³ Cf. below, II, 78 ff.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. below, pp. 200 ff.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. below, pp. 300 ff.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. below, pp. 347 ff.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. below, pp. 395 ff.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. below, II, 3 ff.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. below, II, 92.

¹¹⁰ Cf. below, II, 111 ff.

¹¹¹ Cf. below, II, 180 ff., 378 ff.

selves to knead it so as to suit their own particular use. Philo's treatment of Plato may therefore perhaps be considered as a criticism of the common understanding of Plato, or of Plato in its original version, but at the same time also as an adoption of Platonism in its essential principles and a revision thereof and an adaptation thereof to certain essential teachings of Scripture.

Philo is thus a critic of Stoicism and a reviser of Platonism. But we may now ask ourselves whether he himself had a coherent system. How would he have presented that system if he had not scattered his remarks in flashes as homilies on texts? Can we reconstruct that system out of his own writings? He speaks of ideas, powers, Logos, wisdom, and an intelligible world, and what he says of them seems too fragmentary or vague or inconsistent. Can we reconstruct all this into a coherent whole? He speaks of creation, throws out hints of criticism of other theories, and uses enigmatic phrases which mean both that the world was created out of preëxistent matter and that the world was created out of nothing. Can we reconstruct systematically his criticisms of other theories of creation and state once and for all what he really did mean by creation? He speaks of a Logos within the world, expressed in terms borrowed both from Plato and from the Stoics, and he speaks also of laws of nature and of miracles. Can we reduce all this to a system? What did he actually take from others and what were his innovations? What were his laws of nature, and how many of these were there, and how do miracles come in? And can we discover some system and find some characteristic contribution in his scattered sayings about souls and angels and demons and immortality? And what about the freedom of will of which he speaks so often? Is it the same as that freedom of which others before him have spoken? If not, what is the reason

behind his departure from his predecessors? Prophecy is a Greek term. Is there anything new in his treatment of prophecy? And does he treat it in a coherent and systematic manner? People before him had tried to prove the existence of God. Has he anything new to say about the subject? And similarly is his treatment of the unknowability of God something new? If so, what has led him to this view and what consequences followed from it? And when he deals with right conduct, of both the individual and the state, does he only repeat the commonplaces of all good and true men, or does he introduce something new into the philosophic discussion of ethics and politics? This is the task we have set before us.

To all these questions we will try to give an answer in the present study. If the answer given by us is correct, then Philo will emerge from our study as a philosopher in the grand manner, not a mere dabbler in philosophy. He did have the power of intellect to be able to reject the theories of other philosophers and to strike out a new and hitherto unknown path for himself. He is to be given credit for originality in all the problems dealt with by him, for in this particular set of problems he was the originator of every fundamental concept which continued to be discussed thereafter throughout the history of philosophy. Like any great and original philosopher in the history of philosophy, Philo's own philosophy was a reaction against that of his predecessors and contemporaries and, in that sense, like any philosopher in history if not properly studied, he may be called an eclectic. Indeed his learning, like that of many a philosopher in the past, was great and varied, and the artificiality of the literary form of his writings, again like that of many a philosopher in the past, often obscures his thought; but despite all this he built up a system of philosophy which is consistent,

coherent, and free from contradictions, all of it being based upon certain fundamental principles. Finally, while indeed for various historical and perhaps personal reasons he did not found any "sect" in the sense that the Academicians and Peripatetics and Stoics and Epicureans are said to constitute philosophical sects (*αἱρέσεις*),¹¹² it is most remarkable that without a group of official disciples his teachings became the most dominant influence in European philosophy for well-nigh seventeen centuries.

II. THE ALLEGORICAL METHOD

In his attempt to interpret Scripture in terms of philosophy, Philo assumes that scriptural texts have a twofold meaning, a literal (*ῥητή*)¹ or obvious (*φανερὰ*)² meaning and an underlying meaning (*ὑπόνοια*).³ The underlying meaning he describes by a variety of terms, among them also the term allegory (*ἀλληγορία*),⁴ and to interpret a text according to its underlying meaning is therefore described as to allegorize (*ἀλληγορεῖν*).⁵ The underlying meaning of a text as well as the allegorical interpretation of it is said by him to be "obscure to the many,"⁶ to be clear only to "those who can contemplate bodiless and naked facts,"⁷ to appeal only to "the few who study soul characteristics rather than bodily forms,"⁸ and to be dear to "men who are capable of seeing."⁹ "Allegory" is also described by him as something

¹¹² Cf. Diogenes, I, 19.

¹ *Cont.* 3, 28; *Abr.* 36, 200.

² *Abr.* 36, 200.

³ *Cont.* 3, 28; cf. Plato, *Republic* II, 378 D.

⁴ *Plant.* 9, 36, *et passim*. Cleanthes was the first to use the term *ἀλληγορικῶς*. Cf. H. J. Rose, *A Handbook of Greek Literature* (London: Methuen & Co., 1934), p. 392.

⁵ *Migr.* 37, 205.

⁶ *Abr.* 36, 200.

⁷ *Ibid.* 41, 236.

⁸ *Ibid.* 29, 147.

⁹ *Plant.* 9, 36.

“which loves to hide itself” and into which one has to be “initiated.”¹⁰ All this, as we have seen, means that only those who are qualified both by natural abilities and moral character and by preliminary training are to be instructed in the method of the allegorical interpretation of Scripture.¹¹

Of these two methods, the literal and the allegorical, the allegorical is made use of by Philo without any reservation. Everything in Scripture, from names, dates, and numbers to the narration of historical events or the prescription of rules for human conduct, is to him subject to allegorical interpretation. But as for the literal method, it is to be used, according to him, with certain reservations. One general rule laid down by Philo is that no anthropomorphic expression about God is to be taken literally. As proof-text for this general rule he quotes the verse “God is not as man,”¹² which is taken by him to contain the general principle that God is not to be likened to anything perceptible by the senses.¹³ And so, for instance, he says, the verse “and Cain went out from the face of God”¹⁴ is to be taken “in a figurative sense,” since, if taken literally, it is “greatly at variance with truth.”¹⁵ If the question is raised why Scripture makes use of such anthropomorphic expressions, the answer given by him is that such expressions “are introduced for the instruction of the many”¹⁶ and out of regard “for the ways of the thinking of the duller folk,”¹⁷ so that “it is for training and admonition, not because God’s nature is such, that these words are used.”¹⁸

This general rule, however, opens up some new questions. Suppose God is described in an anthropomorphic way as

¹⁰ *Fug.* 32, 179.

¹¹ Cf. above, p. 49.

¹² *Num.* 23: 19.

¹³ *Immut.* 13, 62; cf. below, II, 97.

¹⁴ *Gen.* 4: 16.

¹⁵ *Post.* 1, 1.

¹⁶ *Immut.* 11, 54.

¹⁷ *Somn.* I, 40, 237.

¹⁸ *Immut.* 11, 54.

having said something or as having done something. The anthropomorphic manner of expression, to be sure, is not to be taken literally. But what about the thing said by God or done by God? Should that be taken literally as a fact, communicated or performed by God in a manner not anthropomorphic, or should that, too, be rejected in its literal sense? Then, also, how about all the statements in Scripture which do not involve anthropomorphisms? Should they all be taken literally, without any restriction, or is there any restriction to their literal sense?

No general answer is given by Philo to these questions. But indirectly we may gather that different answers would be given by him with regard to different parts of Scripture.

Scripture is divided by Philo into three parts: "[1] Laws and [2] oracles delivered through the mouth of prophets and [3] psalms and other books which foster and perfect knowledge and piety."¹⁹ This corresponds exactly to the traditional Jewish division of Scripture into Law, Prophets, and Hagiographa. The first of these three parts, the Pentateuch, which, in accordance with Jewish tradition, he calls the Law²⁰ (*ὁ νόμος, Torah*), is subdivided by him into two main parts, the historical (*ιστορικόν*) and the legislative (*νομοθετικόν*); and the historical part is further subdivided into the story of the creation of the world (*κοσμοῦ γένεσις, κοσμοποιία*) and all the other stories which in their totality he describes as genealogical (*γενεαλογικόν*).²¹ The story of the creation of the world apparently refers to the six days of creation, for he defines it as "beginning with the genesis of heaven and ending with the construction (*κατασκευήν*) of man";²² the last part of the definition would thus refer to the creation of man described in the verses "God made (*ἐποίησεν*) man"²³ and

¹⁹ *Cont.* 3, 25.

²⁰ *Mos.* II, 6, 31. Cf. *Berakot* 5a: "Torah means the Pentateuch."

²¹ *Mos.* II, 8, 46-47; *Praem.* I, 1.

²² *Praem.* I, 1.

“God formed (ἐπλασεν) man.”²⁴ However, from the contents of his work *De Opificio Mundi* (περὶ τῆς κοσμοποιίας), it may be inferred that he has extended it to the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the garden of Eden.²⁵ It is not impossible therefore that the expression “ending with the construction of man” refers to the verse “and the Lord God made for Adam and his wife garments of skins and clothed them,”²⁶ which is the last act mentioned before the expulsion. Indeed, in connection with this act of furnishing them with garments one would expect here the Greek παρασκευή rather than κατασκευή, for the former refers to an equipment that is movable and temporary, whereas the latter refers to an equipment that is fixed and lasting. But Philo himself interprets this verse in its allegorical sense as meaning that God “made a body” for Adam and his wife, wherein He clothed “the mind and the senses as in a garment of skin,” for “by what power can the construction (*apparatus*) of the human body be put together more excellently, and in a more becoming manner, than by God?”²⁷ The Latin term *apparatus* in the text quoted undoubtedly stands for the term κατασκευή in the original Greek text.²⁸ What Philo calls the creation of the world thus includes not only the stories contained in the account of the six days of creation but also the stories of the planting of a garden in Eden,²⁹ the growing of a tree of life

²⁴ Gen. 2: 7. H. E. Ryle, in *Philo and Holy Scripture*, p. xxi, takes the expression “the story of the creation of the world” in Philo to refer only to the story of the six days of creation in Gen. 1: 1–2: 4.

²⁵ Gen. 3: 24.

²⁶ Gen. 3: 21.

²⁷ *Qu. in Gen. I*, 53. The same allegorical interpretation of the expression “garments of skins,” or, rather, as the original Hebrew reads, “garments of skin,” is to be found in Abraham Ibn Ezra’s Hebrew commentary on Gen. 3: 21. Cf. J. Bernays, *Theophrastos’ Schrift über Frommigkeit*, pp. 143–144; D. Rosin, “Die Religionsphilosophie Abraham Ibn Ezra’s,” *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums*, 42 (1898), p. 489.

²⁸ This underlying Greek term, I am informed by Professor Ralph Marcus, is also indicated by the Armenian version.

²⁹ Gen. 2: 8.

in the midst of the garden,³⁰ the four rivers,³¹ the putting of Adam into the garden of Eden,³² the giving of names to cattle, fowl and beasts,³³ the creation of Eve out of the rib of Adam,³⁴ the speaking of the serpent,³⁵ and the making of garments for Adam and Eve.³⁶ There is a very good justification for Philo's inclusion of all these things in the story of the six days of creation, for all of them, according to Jewish tradition, occurred on the sixth day of creation.³⁷ Though the opening four verses of the second chapter in Genesis, which immediately follows the account of the six days of creation in the first chapter, is described by Philo as the "epilogue to the narrative of the creation,"³⁸ it is to be assumed that this description is applied by him not only to these four verses but also to the entire two chapters, the second and the third, which intervene between the story of the six days of creation and the birth of Cain. As for the term "genealogical," by which he describes the post-creation historical part of the Pentateuch, it is derived from its use in Greek as a description of that part of history which deals with persons rather than with places, dates, or events.³⁹ But its application by Philo to the historical narrative of the Pentateuch is due to the fact that that narrative from Adam to Moses and Aaron is presented in the form of a succession of generations, introduced by the words these are "the generations" (*γενέσεις*) of so and so.⁴⁰ Philo himself indicates

³⁰ Gen. 2: 9.

³¹ Gen. 2: 20.

³² Gen. 2: 10-14.

³⁴ Gen. 2: 21-22.

³³ Gen. 2: 15.

³⁵ Gen. 3: 1 ff.

³⁶ Gen. 3: 21.

³⁷ *Sanhedrin* 38b; *Tanhuma* ed. Buber, *Bereshit*, §25, p. 9b.

³⁸ *Post.* 18, 64-65; cf. *Fug.* 32, 178, where Gen. 2: 6 is described as coming "immediately after the narrative of the creation of the world."

³⁹ Cf. Colson, VI, p. 606, §47; VIII, p. 313, n. a.

⁴⁰ Gen. 5: 1; 6: 9; 10: 1; 11: 10; 11: 27; 25: 12; 25: 19; 36: 1; 36: 9; 37: 2; Num. 3: 1.

both of these reasons for his use of that term when he describes the historical part of the Pentateuch as being "a record of the good and bad lives and of the rewards and punishments set aside for each of them in each generation" (*γενεαῖς*).⁴¹

Let us then see what we may gather about his view with regard to the literal sense of each of these parts of Scripture.

With regard to the story of creation, commenting upon the verse which in the Septuagint reads, "and God finished on the sixth day His works,"⁴² he says: "It is quite foolish to think that the world was created in six days or in a space of time at all."⁴³ The term six is taken by him to mean "not a quantity of days, but a perfect number,"⁴⁴ to indicate that the world was created according to a certain plan and order.⁴⁵ Moreover, the story of creation is interpreted by him so as to make the account of the first day of creation⁴⁶ and the subsequent repetition of the same account⁴⁷ refer to the creation of the intelligible world.⁴⁸ But, having laid down these two reservations, he declares "that what has been related about the creation of the world is consistent with strict truth."⁴⁹

As for the other stories in what he calls the story of the creation of the world, he has four sets of statements. First, sometimes he rejects their literal meaning altogether. Thus in connection with God's planting of a garden in Eden, His creation of Eve out of the ribs of Adam, and the speaking of the serpent, he characterizes these stories, when taken lit-

⁴¹ *Praem.* 1, 2.

⁴² Gen. 2: 2. Hebrew: "on the seventh day."

⁴³ *Leg. All.* I, 2, 2; cf. *Opif.* 3, 13; 7, 26; *Qu. in Gen.* I, 1.

⁴⁴ *Leg. All.* I, 2, 3.

⁴⁵ *Opif.* 3, 13; cf. below, pp. 311 f.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 22, 67.

⁴⁷ Gen. 1: 1-2; 2: 4-5.

⁴⁸ *Opif.* 7, 29-10, 36; 44, 129-130; cf. below, p. 306.

⁴⁹ *Qu. in Gen.* I, 1.

erally, as "mythical nonsense" ⁵⁰ or "incurable folly" ⁵¹ or as being "of the nature of a myth." ⁵² Second, however, in connection with the stories that God put man into the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it, that Adam gave names to the various animals, and that the serpent spoke, he sometimes accepts them all in their literal sense.⁵³ Third, he sometimes advances two interpretations, a literal and an allegorical, both of them evidently of equal acceptance to him. He does this in connection with God's planting of a garden in Eden,⁵⁴ His creation of Eve,⁵⁵ and His making of garments for Adam and Eve.⁵⁶ Fourth, sometimes he reproduces a literal interpretation in the name of "some persons," but expresses his own preference for an allegorical interpretation. This occurs in connection with the putting of man into the garden of Eden,⁵⁷ the tree of life,⁵⁸ and the four rivers.⁵⁹ In accepting the literal meaning of these stories, he sometimes tries to show how in telling them Scripture had the purpose of teaching mankind an object lesson. Adam was placed in the garden of Eden to cultivate it, not that the garden needed cultivation, but that "the first man should be as it were a sort of pattern and law to all workmen in future of everything which ought to be done by them." ⁶⁰ God made garments of skin for Adam and his wife, in order to teach "wisdom" to those who waste their time in the production of useless things and of objects of luxury and to point out to them the virtue of "frugality," by showing that "the gar-

⁵⁰ *Leg. All.* I, 14, 43, in connection with the planting of the garden.

⁵¹ *Plant.* 8, 32, again in connection with the planting of the garden.

⁵² *Leg. All.* II, 7, 19, in connection with Eve, and *Agr.* 22, 97, in connection with the serpent.

⁵³ *Qu. in Gen.* I, 14; 20-22; 32.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* I, 6.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* I, 8.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* I, 25.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* I, 10.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* I, 53.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* I, 13.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* I, 14. Cf. the common rabbinic statement "The Torah teaches incidentally proper conduct (*derek eres*) (*Tos. Soṭah* VII, 20).

ment made of skins, if one should come to a correct judgment, deserves to be looked upon as a more noble possession than a purple robe embroidered with various colors." ⁶¹

These last three sets of statements, in which Philo either accepts the literal meaning of these stories or pays some regard to them, all occur in his *Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesin*, whereas the first set occurs in his other writings. It is quite possible, therefore, that the difference of attitude toward the literal sense between the first set of statements and the other three sets is due to a difference in the type of reader to which these two groups of writings were addressed, and presumably the type of reader to whom the *Quaestiones* were addressed was less philosophical than that to whom his other writings were addressed. But this does not help us to explain Philo's own attitude toward the question under consideration. One thing, however, is quite certain. On purely philosophic grounds Philo had no reason for rejecting any of these stories, for throughout his writings he maintains, as an essential part of his philosophic system, that God can miraculously change the order of nature.⁶² Once he declares this possible, he can reject nothing in any of these stories of creation on the ground that it was contrary to the order of nature. In the *Quaestiones*, in his attempt to explain the literalness of the story of the speaking of the serpent with a human voice, one of the explanations he offers is that it was a miracle, for, he says, "when anything miraculous is to be done, God changes the nature of the things by which he means to operate."⁶³ Such an explanation could be of-

⁶¹ *Ibid.* I, 53. Cf. below, p. 272, n. 59.

⁶² Cf. below, pp. 349 ff.

⁶³ *Qu. in Gen.* I, 32. Two other explanations are offered by him: "In the first place, it may be the fact that at the beginning of the world even the other animals besides man were not entirely destitute of the power of articulate speech." This undoubtedly reflects the myth, reproduced by Plato, that during the golden age of

ferred by him, quite consistently with his philosophy, as an explanation of all the stories of creation. If sometimes he shows a hesitation in resorting to the use of miracles as an explanation,⁶⁴ it is only because, like so many philosophers after him, with all his belief in the possibility of miracles, he did not want to overuse the privilege of that kind of explanation.

With regard to the historical events after the creation of the world, the only qualification of their literal truth made by him is that their literalness must be rejected whenever by the acceptance of it "the inspired words of God" would compel one "to admit anything base or unworthy of their dignity,"⁶⁵ which, of course, leaves a great deal to the reader to decide for himself if a story in its literal sense is base and unworthy of the dignity of the words of God. We may mention, for the purpose of illustration, a few of the stories which he does not consider acceptable in their literal sense. First, there is the story of Cain that "he builded a city."⁶⁶ Taken literally, he says, it would mean that he builded a city all by himself, but this, he adds, "runs counter not only to all our ideas but to our reason itself";⁶⁷ and hence he interprets it allegorically. Second, there is the story of Joseph that he was sent by his father to his brethren to see whether it was

Cronus beasts were endowed with speech (cf. *Statesman* 272 B-C). Elsewhere, the story "about the days when all animals had a common language" is ascribed by Philo to "devisers of myths," evidently without himself crediting it (*Conf.* 3, 6; cf. E. Stein's note *ad loc.* in *Philos Werke* V, p. 104, n. 1; Ginzberg, *Legends of the Jews*, V, p. 94, n. 58). The other explanation reads as follows: "Thirdly . . . the souls of those who were first created were rendered acute to thoroughly understand every voice of every kind." The superiority in mental powers of the first created man is also dwelt upon by him in *Opif.* 49, 140-141.

⁶⁴ Cf. below, p. 353.

⁶⁵ *Deter.* 5, 13. In this passage, I take it, the expression "the inspired words of God," which is parallel to the expression "laws of God-beloved men," refers to the historical and other non-legal parts of the Pentateuch. Cf. below, II, 190 f.

⁶⁶ *Gen.* 4: 17.

⁶⁷ *Post.* 14, 50.

well with them and well with the flocks.⁶⁸ In its literal sense, he says, this story cannot be accepted by any sensible person, for "is it likely that Jacob, who had the wealth of a king, was so badly off for household servants or attendants as to send a son out abroad to bring word about his other children, whether they are in good health, and about the cattle to boot?"⁶⁹ and hence he interprets it allegorically. Third, there is the statement that "the king of Egypt died and the children of Israel groaned under their labors and raised a loud outcry."⁷⁰ Taken literally, the statement would seem to give the impression that there was a causal connection between the death of the king and the groaning and crying of the children of Israel, but this, he says, is "contradictory to reason" and "contrary to expectation, for one would expect, when a tyrant dies, those over whom he has tyrannized to be glad and rejoice";⁷¹ and hence he interprets it allegorically. Fourth, there is the story of the confusion of tongues, concerning which he says that those "who cherish a dislike of the constitution of our fathers" find in it similarities to certain myths among the Greeks and also raise objections to the underlying assumption of the story that a common language is conducive to iniquity.⁷² And consequently, while admitting that these insidious criticisms can be answered even by those who are content with a literal interpretation of the story, still he offers an allegorical explanation.⁷³

Now there is nothing in any of these statements to show that by his offering an allegorical explanation for the purpose of removing certain difficulties in the external form of the text Philo actually discarded the entire historical set-

⁶⁸ Gen. 37: 13-14.

⁶⁹ *Deter.* 5, 13.

⁷⁰ Exod. 2: 23.

⁷¹ *Deter.* 25, 94-95.

⁷² *Conf.* 2, 2-4, 13.

⁷³ *Ibid.* 5, 14 ff.

ting of the story. All these statements merely show that by the allegorical method Philo found it possible to explain away any narration of incident in Scripture that seemed to him to run counter to reason or expectation or to have some similarity with Greek myths, without necessarily impugning the historicity of the essential basic fact of the story. Indeed Cain did not build a city all by himself as the statement would literally imply, but still there is no doubting of the fact that Cain was a real person and the founder of a city. Indeed Joseph was not literally sent by his father to bring tidings from his brethren, but there is no doubting of the historical fact that Joseph went to see his brethren and was sold by them. Indeed the children of Israel did not lament the death of the king of Egypt, as a careless reader of Scripture might be misled to think, but still there is no doubting of the story that after the death of the king of Egypt the children of Israel did groan under their labors. Indeed there are certain rational objections to the underlying assumption of the story of the confusion of tongues and indeed there is also an external resemblance between this scriptural story and certain Greek myths, but the objections are not unanswerable and there is also a fundamental difference between this story and its parallel myths in that the myths, according to Philo, never have an inner meaning,⁷⁴ whereas this story has an inner meaning. There is, however, no doubting on the part of Philo of the authenticity of the main story as a historical fact. He explicitly says that he would not censure those who accept the story of the confusion of tongues literally, "for perhaps the truth is with them also."⁷⁵ The qualifying term "perhaps" (*ἴσως*) is used in this passage after the manner of the Greek usage of this term on certain

⁷⁴ Cf. above, p. 35.

⁷⁵ *Conf.* 38, 190.

occasions, not as an expression of doubt but rather as an expression of modesty.

To Philo, then, we may assume, no allegorical interpretation of a scriptural story, whether justified by him on the ground of some inherent difficulty of the text or not so justified by him, means the rejection of the story itself as a fact. A clear indication of this attitude is to be found in his prefatory comment to his allegorical interpretation of the name Samuel. "Now Samuel," he says, "was perhaps in reality only a man, but here he is conceived, not as a compound living being, but as a mind which rejoices only in the service and worship of God."⁷⁶ Here, too, the qualifying term "perhaps" is used only as an expression of modesty and not of doubt. What he quite evidently means is that his treatment of Samuel as an ideal type does not deny the existence of Samuel as a real person. And so also his allegorical treatment of all other persons or events in Scripture does not mean his denial of their historicity. When, speaking of Enos, Enoch, and Noah, he remarks, "whether we think of them as men or types of soul,"⁷⁷ he implies that they are both. The Patriarchs, indeed, are symbols of elevated philosophic thoughts,⁷⁸ but still they are historic persons and everything that is told of them is a true historic event. The three persons who appeared to Abraham as he sat in the tent door in the heat of the day⁷⁹ are indeed profound metaphysical symbols about the nature of God,⁸⁰ still they were three real beings, two of them angels, who actually appeared to Abraham.⁸¹ And the same is true about all the stories narrated in the Pentateuch. Not even the miraculous events are de-

⁷⁶ *Ebr.* 36, 144.

⁷⁷ *Abr.* 9, 47.

⁷⁸ *Abr.* 24, 119 ff.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* 22, 107 ff.; 28, 143 ff.; cf. Gfrörer, I, pp. 290, 291, 293; Drummond, II, p. 243; and below, p. 379.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* 20, 99 ff.

⁷⁷ *Gen.* 18: 1.

nied by him as historical facts, though he sometimes tries to explain them either as natural occurrences or as having some allegorical meaning.⁸² Statements like "here we may leave the literal exposition and begin the allegorical"⁸³ occur frequently in his discussion of historical persons and events.

With regard to the legislative part of the Pentateuch, he makes two statements. On the one hand, as in the case of the non-legislative part, he says of it that the "laws of God-beloved men" are not to be taken literally, whenever their literal acceptance would compel one "to admit anything base or unworthy of their dignity."⁸⁴ This, again, leaves it to the individual student of Scripture to decide for himself which laws in their literal sense are base and unworthy of their dignity. But, on the other hand, he denounces those of his own time who saw in the law an underlying meaning only and treated its literal meaning with easy-going neglect. The inner meaning and the external performance of the law are to him of equal importance. "We should look on all these outward observances," he says, "as resembling the body, and their inner meanings as resembling the soul." He especially mentions the Sabbath, the festivals in general, circumcision, and the sanctity of the Temple, as examples of laws which have an inner meaning and are also to be externally observed.⁸⁵ But what constitutes a law in the Pentateuch? Is every statement in the Pentateuch with regard to doing or not doing something to be taken as a law? This problem is not openly raised by Philo, nor is a direct answer to it given by him, but from various statements he makes about the laws we may gather that he was both coping with that problem and trying to get a solution for it. Technically, the legislative part of the Pentateuch is defined by him as

⁸² Cf. below, pp. 350-354.

⁸³ *Abr.* 24, 119.

⁸⁴ *Deter.* 5, 13; cf. above, n. 65.

⁸⁵ *Migr.* 16, 89-93.

that which is concerned with "commands" (*προστάξεις*) and "prohibitions" (*ἀπαγορεύσεις*),⁸⁶ but he finds that besides laws in the strictly technical sense of the term the Pentateuch contains also that which he calls "recommendation" (*ἐντολή*) or "exhortation" (*παραίνεσις*) or "teaching" (*διδασκαλία*).⁸⁷ Laws in their strictly technical sense are to him the ten commandments, which he calls, as in the original Hebrew, "Ten Words," and which also, because of their divine origin, he calls by the Greek term "Oracles,"⁸⁸ and he takes pains to inform his readers that they are not merely prudent words of advice and gnomic sayings but that they are "in reality laws or statutes."⁸⁹ Similarly, such laws in their strictly technical sense are all the special laws which he happens to discuss under the headings of these ten commandments.⁹⁰ But how many of the laws which he does not happen to discuss among his special laws did he consider as law? Or, were they not considered by him as laws at all? And what was the criterion by which he determined whether a statement in the Pentateuch is to be taken as law or not? In Palestine, some rabbis happened to say that the Pentateuch contained six hundred and thirteen commandments or laws.⁹¹ This necessarily implied certain principles of selection. Centuries later, different lists of the six hundred and thirteen commandments began to be drawn up by various rabbis, and

⁸⁶ *Mos.* II, 8, 46; *Immut.* 11, 53; *Praem.* 9, 55; cf. below, II, 200.

⁸⁷ *Leg. All.* I, 30, 93-94. A similar classification is to be found in St. Thomas. What Philo calls "commands" and "prohibitions" are included by St. Thomas under the general term *praecepta*. What Philo calls "exhortations" and "recommendations" St. Thomas calls *mandata*. The latter is explained by him as being expressed by way of inducement and persuasion and is illustrated by the law about returning a pledge before sunset (*Exod.* 22: 25-26), which law, as we shall see later (below nn. 96-99), is not taken by Philo literally. Cf. *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 99, 5 c.

⁸⁸ *Praem.* 1, 2.

⁸⁹ *Decal.* 9, 32.

⁹⁰ *Praem.* 1, 2.

⁹¹ *Mekilta, Bahodesh*, 5, F, p. 67a; W, p. 74a; L, p. 236 n.; *Makkot* 23b.

Maimonides tried to lay down certain principles of selection.⁹² Did Philo have in mind a list of commandments and some principle of selection? In the Talmud, on the basis of the verse "Thy name shall no more be called Abram, but thy name shall be Abraham,"⁹³ one rabbi declares that this verse constitutes a mandatory commandment and another rabbi declares that it constitutes two commandments, a prohibitive and a mandatory,⁹⁴ and yet it is counted neither as a prohibitive nor a mandatory commandment in later lists. But, according to Philo, mocking at this verse is wickedness which deserves divine punishment, though he himself interprets it allegorically.⁹⁵ Did he take this verse to constitute literally a legal commandment?

Philo's answer to this question may be gathered indirectly from the passages in which he happens to touch upon this problem. In one passage, in connection with the law about returning a pledge before sunset,⁹⁶ he first criticizes the literal meaning of the law as too trivial,⁹⁷ then he shows from the wording of the law that, by its use of a future indicative instead of an imperative, it could not have meant to be a law in its literal sense,⁹⁸ and finally, on the basis of these two considerations, he interprets it allegorically.⁹⁹ In another passage, in connection with the law that the unclean does not

⁹² *Sefer ha-Miṣṣot, Shoresh 1-14.*

⁹³ Gen. 17: 5.

⁹⁴ *Jer. Berakot, I, 9, 3d.*

⁹⁵ *Mut. 8, 60 ff.; cf. Ritter, Philo und die Halacha, p. 12, n. 1.*

⁹⁶ Exod. 22: 25-26.

⁹⁷ *Somm. I, 16, 93-100.*

⁹⁸ *Ibid., 101; cf. Colson, ad loc. (V, 599).* In the Hebrew, mandatory commandments use either (a) the imperative or (b) the imperfect, which are usually translated in the Septuagint by (a) the imperative and (b) the future. Prohibitive commandments in the Hebrew use the imperfect with either (a) the negative *lo*, usually translated into Greek by the future indicative with *ou*, or with (b) the negative *al*, usually translated into Greek by the imperative or aorist subjunctive with *μη*. Cf. M. Adler, *Philos Werke, V, p. 53, n. 1.*

⁹⁹ *Ibid., 17, 102 ff.*

become clean until sunset,¹⁰⁰ he similarly infers from the use of the future indicative that the law is to be interpreted allegorically, but still the law in its literal sense is described by him as an "inexorable law."¹⁰¹ In two other passages, in connection with laws relating to priests and the year of Jubilee,¹⁰² from the use of the future indicative he maintains, with regard to the former law, that Scripture "speaks not so much by way of prohibition (*ἀπαγορεύων*) as by way of stating an opinion (*γνώμην*)," ¹⁰³ and, with regard to the latter law, that it "does not so much exhort (*προτρέπει*) as state an opinion (*γνώμην*)." ¹⁰⁴ Then in several other passages, in connection with the laws of leprosy, kingship, and war, without mentioning that the laws in question ¹⁰⁵ are stated in the future indicative, but criticizing their literal meaning as being unreasonable on various grounds, he takes all of them to have some inner meaning.¹⁰⁶ Finally in the case of one law,¹⁰⁷ stated also in the future indicative, in one place he criticizes its literal meaning and interprets it allegorically,¹⁰⁸ but in another place he accepts it as a law in its literal meaning.¹⁰⁹

From all this it may be inferred that, while believing that

¹⁰⁰ Lev. 22: 6-7.

¹⁰¹ *Somn.* I, 14, 81.

¹⁰² (1) That the priests should not drink wine when they enter the tabernacle (Lev. 10: 9); (2) "Ye shall not sow, nor shall ye reap its growths that come up of themselves" (Lev. 25: 11).

¹⁰³ *Ebr.* 34, 138.

¹⁰⁴ *Fug.* 31, 171.

¹⁰⁵ (1) Leprosy in the skin (Lev. 13: 11-13); (2) the plague of leprosy in a house (Lev. 14: 34-36); (3) that a king "shall not multiply horses to himself" (Deut. 17: 16); (4) the exemption of certain persons from war (Deut. 20: 5-7).

¹⁰⁶ (1) *Immut.* 27, 127-128; (2) *Immut.* 28, 131-133; (3) *Agr.* 18, 84-19, 88; (4) *Agr.* 33, 148-36, 157.

¹⁰⁷ That the unintentional manslayer is to remain in the city of refuge until the death of the high priest (Num. 35: 25).

¹⁰⁸ *Fug.* 20, 106-108; 21, 116-118.

¹⁰⁹ *Spec.* III, 23, 131-133.

all the laws are to be observed literally, he feels that not every statement in Scripture is law in the technical sense of the term, and therefore he is trying to find some criterion by which to determine what statements in the Pentateuch were to be taken as law. He makes a faint suggestion that the wording of the statement, as to whether it is in the future indicative or in the imperative, should decide it, but he does not follow out this distinction consistently. He makes another suggestion that the importance or reasonableness of the statement should decide it, but this at best is only a subjective criterion, and he himself does not consistently follow this criterion either. He attempts to combine these two criteria, but that, too, is not followed by him consistently. All we may gather from his discussion is that while to him all the laws are both to be observed literally and to be interpreted allegorically, as a philosopher he only knew how to interpret the laws allegorically and to give reasons why certain laws should be interpreted allegorically, but, not being a jurist, he was not always certain as to what the literal meaning of the law was. In some places, he expresses his willingness to leave all questions about the literal meaning of the law to those "who are in the habit of pursuing such investigations and are fond of them."¹¹⁰

This method of interpreting one system of thought in terms of another was not unknown in Greek literature. For the Greeks, too, had something like a Scripture besides their philosophy, the poems of Homer and Hesiod, which contained the teachings of popular belief. From the earliest times, Greek philosophers appropriated many of the terms of popular religion and endowed them with a philosophic

¹¹⁰ *Immut.* 28, 133, cf. *Agr.* 36, 157; *Somn.* I, 17, 102. The reference is undoubtedly to the members of the court of Jewish law (*bet din*) which existed in Alexandria (cf. *Tos. Pe'ah* IV, 6; *Ketubot* 25a).

meaning. The first philosopher, Thales, in his reported statement that all things are full of gods,¹¹¹ gave to the popular term "gods" a philosophic significance.¹¹² With the formal introduction of the allegorical interpretation of Homer by Theagenes of Rhegium, this method was followed by such philosophers as Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Diogenes of Apollonia, and Democritus.¹¹³ Plato makes Socrates say that the poets are inspired and that one has to look in their utterances for some hidden inner meaning.¹¹⁴ Plato himself, despite his expression of disapproval of the allegorical interpretation of the poets,¹¹⁵ does not hesitate to endow the popular deities with philosophical significance and to give them a place in his philosophy by the side of his philosophic God, the Demiurge, calling them the "visible and created gods" and "descendants of gods"; and while he ¹¹⁶ does not allegorize upon ancient myths and fables, he does not hesitate to make use of them in stating his own philosophic views.¹¹⁷ Aristotle, also, despite his dismissal of popular beliefs as mere fables,¹¹⁸ occasionally interrupts himself in the midst of metaphysical discussions to refer, in support of his views, to some tradition handed down from the most remote ages, and he does not hesitate to describe such a tradition as "an inspired utterance" and as "relics of an ancient treasure."¹¹⁹ Among the Stoics, Zeno, Cleanthes,

¹¹¹ Aristotle, *De Anima* I, 5, 411a, 8.

¹¹² Cf. Zeller, I, 1⁶, 264-266 (*Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, I, 221-223); Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*², 49-50).

¹¹³ Cf. J. Geffcken, "Allegory, Allegorical Interpretation," *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, I, 328; J. Tate, "The Beginnings of Greek Allegory," *Classical Review*, 41 (1927), pp. 214-215.

¹¹⁴ *Apology* 22 B-C; *Ion* 533 D-534 E; *Protagoras* 342 A-347 A.

¹¹⁵ *Cratylus* 407 A; *Phaedrus* 229 c; *Republic* II, 378 D. Cf. J. Tate, "Plato and Allegorical Interpretation," *Classical Quarterly*, 23 (1929), pp. 142-154.

¹¹⁶ *Timaeus* 40 D.

¹¹⁷ *Timaeus* 40 D; *Statesman* 268 D-274 E.

¹¹⁸ *Metaph.* III, 4, 1000a, 9-19.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.* XII, 8, 1074b, 9, 12-13.

Chrysippus, and Diogenes all applied the allegorical interpretation to the poems of Homer and Hesiod.¹²⁰

Philo, as we have seen,¹²¹ does not admit with the Greek philosophers that man-made Greek mythology contains philosophic truths which are to be discovered by the allegorical method. But what he denies to mythology he claims for the divinely revealed Hebrew Scripture. The readiness with which Philo, and by the same token also his predecessors among Hellenistic Jews, adopted the allegorical interpretation was facilitated by the fact that in Jewish tradition the Jew was not bound to take his Scripture literally. What is known in Judaism as the Oral Law meant freedom of interpretation of the scriptural text, whether dealing with some legal precept or some historical event or some theological doctrine. Every verse in Scripture, whether narrative or law, was subject to such free interpretation. Some of such interpretations may be called allegorical in the strict sense of the term,¹²² such, for instance, as when it is said that the word "water" in the verse "they found no water"¹²³ and the word "tree" in the verse "and the Lord showed him a tree"¹²⁴ both refer to the Torah,¹²⁵ or that the words "Gilead," "Ephraim," "Judah," "Moab," and "Edom" in a certain verse in the Psalms¹²⁶ refer respectively to Ahab, Jeroboam, Ahithophel, Gehazi, and Doeg,¹²⁷ and finally that the lover and the beloved in the Song of Songs symbolize

¹²⁰ Zeller, III, 14, p. 333, n. 1 (*Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*?, 356, n. 1).

¹²¹ Cf. above, p. 36.

¹²² On allegorical interpretations in Talmudic literature see L. Ginzberg, "Allegorical Interpretation," *Jewish Encyclopedia* I, 403 ff. (1901), with bibliography; I. Heinemann, *Altjüdische Allegoristik*, 1936.

¹²³ Exod. 15: 22.

¹²⁴ Exod. 15: 25.

¹²⁵ *Mekilta, Wayassa'*, I, F, pp. 45a-b; W, pp. 52b-53a; HR, pp. 154-156; L, II, pp. 89, 92.

¹²⁶ Psalm 60: 9-10.

¹²⁷ *Sanhedrin* 104b-105a.

God and the congregation of Israel.¹²⁸ All these are allegorical interpretation in the comprehensive sense of the term allegory. They are as allegorical as the interpretation by Church Fathers of such terms as stone, king, priest, Jacob, and Israel in various parts of Scripture as referring to Christ,¹²⁹ and the lover and the beloved in the Song of Songs as referring to Christ and the Church.¹³⁰ Now none of these is philosophical allegory of the kind we find in Philo. But that is not of importance. Altogether too much importance is attached by students of allegory to the kinds of things which allegorists read into texts, and too much attention is given to minute classifications of various types of allegory and to distinctions, mainly arbitrary, between what is real allegory and what is not real allegory. The allegorical method essentially means the interpretation of a text in terms of something else, irrespective of what that something else is. That something else may be book learning, it may be practical wisdom, or it may be one's inner consciousness. All these are matters which depend upon external circumstances. The Palestinian rabbis of that time, unlike Philo, happened to have no acquaintance with the literature of Greek philosophy, and consequently they did not interpret Scripture in terms of Greek philosophy; but they interpreted it in terms of something else which they did happen to know, the accumulated wisdom of ages, their own practical experience and speculative meditations, the urging necessities of changed conditions of life, the call of an ever-growing moral conscience, and undoubtedly also repercussions of all kinds of foreign lore. The main thing is that by the time of Philo

¹²⁸ Cf. *Canticles Rabbah* to Cant. 1: 2 ff.

¹²⁹ Cf. Justin Martyr, *Dialogus cum Tryphone*, 76 and 113; 118; 135.

¹³⁰ Cf. Origen, *In Canticum*, Lib. I (PG, 13, col. 83); St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XVII, 20.

the principle was already established in native Judaism that one is not bound to take every scriptural text literally.

Not to be bound by the literal meaning of the text with the rabbis did not mean, of course, that the literal meaning was to be rejected. But even to this there were certain exceptions.

In the first place, anthropomorphic expressions were rejected in their literal sense. Referring to various anthropomorphic expressions in Scripture,¹³¹ the rabbis say "we describe God by terms borrowed from his creations in order to cause them to sink into the ear,"¹³² that is, in order to assist men in their understanding of what is said. Commenting on the verse, "and upon the likeness of the throne was a likeness as the appearance of a man upon it above,"¹³³ a rabbi exclaims: "Great is the boldness of the prophets who describe God by the likeness of the creature."¹³⁴ In the Aramaic version of the Pentateuch intended for popular use, various circumlocutions are employed to avoid a literal translation of the anthropomorphic expressions.¹³⁵ A general rule laid down by the rabbis, whenever they find it necessary to reject the literal meaning of a text is "The Torah speaks according to the language of men."¹³⁶

Then, with regard to the historical narratives in Scripture, while all of them were taken literally as facts, there are at least two exceptions. The historical framework of the book

¹³¹ Amos 3: 8; Ezek. 43: 2.

¹³² *Mekilta, Bahodesh*, 4, F, p. 65a; W, p. 73b; HR, p. 215; L, II, 221.

¹³³ Ezek. 1: 26.

¹³⁴ *Genesis Rabbah* 27, 1. Maimonides (*Moreh Nebukim* I, 46) uses this as the principal rabbinic proof-text for the free interpretation of anthropomorphic expressions in Scripture.

¹³⁵ Cf. Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* I, 27, with reference to Onkelos.

¹³⁶ *Berakot* 31b, and parallels, used by Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* I, 46, especially as an explanation of the anthropomorphisms in Scripture.

of Job was declared by one rabbi to be a mere parable,¹³⁷ and the story of the resurrection of the dry bones in Ezekiel¹³⁸ was declared by another rabbi to be a mere parable.¹³⁹

Finally, with regard to the laws, again, they were all to be observed in their literal meaning and were not to be explained away as allegories. But their supposed literal meaning was not really what the letter of the law meant. It was what custom and tradition and free interpretation made them mean, and often it resulted in what was in reality an abrogation of the law as it is written. The best known example is the law of retaliation, which was interpreted to mean compensation in money.¹⁴⁰ In this case the rabbis may have been less bound by the strictly literal meaning than Philo.¹⁴¹ But whatever their own interpretation of a particular law happens to be is not so much of importance to us as some of the reasons given by them to explain why certain laws are not to be taken literally. Often they are exactly the same kind of explanations that are given by Philo as to why certain laws should have an allegorical meaning, namely, the unreasonableness and the impossibility of the law in its literal sense as it is written. Two examples of laws which have been referred to above in our discussion of Philo will show how often the very same reasoning that led Philo to conclude that certain laws must have an allegorical meaning, led the rabbis to give a new interpretation of the law or to hint at some unknown hidden meaning which the law may have.

First, the law about a king who "shall not multiply horses

¹³⁷ *Baba Batra* 15a.

¹³⁸ Ezek. 37.

¹³⁹ *Sanhedrin* 92b.

¹⁴⁰ *Mekilta, Neziḥin*, 8, F, p. 84b; W, p. 91b; HR, p. 277; L, III, p. 65. *Sifra, Emor, Pereḥ* 20, p. 104d; *Baba Kamma* 83b.

¹⁴¹ On the question whether Philo understood the *lex talionis* literally, see Belkin, *Philo and the Oral Law*, pp. 96-103.

to himself.”¹⁴² Philo argues that this must be interpreted allegorically on the ground that its literal meaning is unreasonable, for “the strength in cavalry is a great asset to a king” in time of war.¹⁴³ The rabbis, probably for similar reasons, also rejected the literal meaning of the law and interpreted it, on the basis of the use of the singular in the expression “to himself” in its wording, that the law applies only to horses for the king’s personal stables, but does not apply to horses to be used in the cavalry of the king’s army.¹⁴⁴

Second, with regard to the law about leprosy.¹⁴⁵ Philo argues that the law must have some inner meaning and is to be interpreted allegorically on the ground that in its literal sense it seems to be quite paradoxical. “One would probably have conjectured the opposite,” he argues, “as indeed it would be reasonable to suppose that leprosy, if limited and confined to a small part of the body, is less unclean, but if diffused, so as to embrace all the body, is more unclean.”¹⁴⁶ The Palestinian rabbis similarly wonder and wish to know why in the case of leprosy “a bright white spot on the skin of the size of half a bean is unclean, but, if it spread over the entire body, it is clean.”¹⁴⁷ And their answer is that it belongs to that class of laws of which God alone knows the reason, and concerning one of this class of laws they say that God revealed the reason thereof to Moses but withheld it from all other people.¹⁴⁸ The only difference between the

¹⁴² Deut. 17: 16.

¹⁴³ *Agr.* 18. 85.

¹⁴⁴ *Sifre Deut.* 158 (on 17: 16), F, p. 105b; HF, p. 209; *Sanhedrin* 21b; *M. Sanhedrin* II, 4.

¹⁴⁵ Lev. 13: 11–13.

¹⁴⁶ *Immut.* 27, 127.

¹⁴⁷ *Numbers Rabbah* 19, 1; *Tanḥuma Num. Hūḫḫat*, § 3; *Tanḥuma* ed. Buber, *ibid.*, § 4.

¹⁴⁸ *Numbers Rabbah* 19, 6.

rabbis and Philo is that they did not try to guess what the hidden meaning of that law was.

This is the conception of Scripture with which Philo started. The principle that Scripture is not always to be taken literally and that it has to be interpreted allegorically came to him as a heritage of Judaism; his acquaintance with Greek philosophic literature led him to give to the native Jewish allegorical method of interpretation a philosophic turn. The example of the Greek allegorical method, of course, helped and encouraged him and served him as a model. But it is conceivable that his allegorical method could have become philosophical even without such models. When the Palestinian type of Judaism, many centuries later, came in contact with philosophy, the native Jewish conception of the freedom of the interpretation of Scripture led it to develop a philosophical method of allegorical interpretation of Scripture which has many striking resemblances to that of Philo not only in its general character but also in many details. Whatever models of that method they had before them, they were all Christian and Moslem, and we have reason to believe that without the support they found for the allegorical method in native Jewish tradition they would not have been so prone to follow those models.

III. ORIGIN OF SCRIPTURE AND ORIGIN OF PHILOSOPHY

The theory underlying the allegorical interpretation of texts is that the text to be allegorically interpreted contains implicitly the truth which the allegorical interpretation attempts to elicit. But there is a difference between the attitude of the Greek philosophers toward the texts of Homer and Hesiod which they interpreted and the attitude of Philo toward the Scripture which he was to interpret. Greek

philosophers, even those who did apply the allegorical method of interpretation to the poets, never believed that the works which they undertook to interpret allegorically were divine revelations in the sense in which Scripture was considered by Philo as a divine revelation. From the description of the inspiration of poets and statesmen in Plato we gather that it was regarded by him as being on a level below the inspiration of philosophers, and as being also a type of knowledge opposed to reason.¹ The general attitude of Greek philosophers toward the popular beliefs as embodied in the poets was that they constituted a primitive and rather lower form of knowledge, far inferior to the knowledge attained by philosophers through reason. If popular religion was conceded by them to attain some truth which could be elicited by the method of allegorical interpretation, it was because the human mind, from the very time it began to wonder about the world, saw a glimpse of truth, however imperfectly it may have conceived it. Nor did the Greek philosophers consider the popular form of religious worship as being divinely ordained and of intrinsic merit. Plato indeed recommends the maintenance of the popular forms of religious worship,² as does also Aristotle,³ and, of course, the Stoics⁴ and even the Epicureans.⁵ But this recommendation was dictated only by practical considerations, such as the preservation of the stability of social institutions. Nor, finally, did the Greek philosophers consider the constitutions and the legal codes of the various states as being of divine origin and hence as perfect.⁶

¹ *Meno* 99 A ff.; *Phaedrus* 249 D f. Cf. below, II, 20.

² Cf. Zeller, II, 14, p. 932, n. 7 (*Plato*, p. 501, n. 40).

³ *Ibid.* II, 23, p. 796, n. 3 (*Aristotle*, II, p. 334, n. 3).

⁴ *Ibid.* III, 14, pp. 320-321 (*Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, pp. 343-344).

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 444-452 (464-471).

⁶ See below, II, 168-169.

Quite different was Philo's conception of the Pentateuch and the religious rites and laws contained therein which he was going to interpret. The Pentateuch to him was a divinely revealed document, and the beliefs about God which its narrative parts implied, the manner of divine worship which it directly prescribes, and the constitution of the state and legal codes which it contains are all of divine origin⁷ and hence intrinsically true and perfect. And what was true of the Pentateuch was also true of the other parts of Scripture, though, in accordance with native Jewish conceptions, the recommendations in them were not considered by him as Law, and all the utterances in them were considered by him as a type of divine inspiration inferior to those of the Pentateuch.⁸ Scripture, the whole of it, was looked upon by him as containing a knowledge and truth revealed by God. It is not a primitive form of knowledge in which the human mind through its native power happened to anticipate in a misty kind of way the clear and certain knowledge discovered much later by philosophers through the working of the human reason. It is a knowledge clearer and more certain than the knowledge attained by philosophers. If it does not appear clear and certain, and if it is couched in language of which the true meaning is concealed by misleading words, it is because God purposely addressed himself in a way understandable to all sorts and conditions of men.

But if the truth revealed by God in Scripture is in agreement with the truth of philosophy, the question may be asked how the philosophers happened to arrive at that truth without the aid of revelation. Philo does not directly raise this question, but he anticipates it by offering three possible explanations of how the philosophers happened to arrive at a truth which is in agreement with that of Scripture.

⁷ Cf. below, pp. 184-185.

⁸ Cf. above, p. 117.

Sometimes his explanation is a sort of primitive attempt in the study of comparative beliefs, customs, and institutions. Similarities mean to him samenesses, and samenesses suggest to him dependence, and so whenever he seems to find similarities between what Greek philosophers attained by reason and what Moses attained by revelation he attributes it to a dependence of Greek philosophers upon Moses. Thus in referring to Heraclitus' theory of the opposites, he describes Heraclitus as "conceiving" ⁹ these opinions from Moses or as "snatching" them from Moses "like a thief." ¹⁰ Similarly, referring to certain Greek laws, he says that the Grecian legislators "copied" from the Laws of Moses.¹¹ Whether this view of the dependence of Greek philosophers upon Moses was something which suggested itself to the mind of Philo as a plausible explanation of the similarities, or whether he was following a belief already current among Hellenistic Jews, which had by his time already found expression in a work containing interpretations of the Mosaic law attributed to Aristobulus, is a question the solution of which depends upon whether that work, of which only fragments have survived in the form of quotations in the works of later authors, was a genuine work of an author who lived before Philo or a later fabrication.¹² But with whomsoever this view was originated, it has its counterpart in the claim of Egyptian priests of the same period that Greek philosophy was borrowed from the Egyptians.¹³

Philo himself, however, does not always insist upon the

⁹ *Qu. in Gen.* III, 5. Translation by Ralph Marcus from the Armenian. Latin: *mutuatus*, having borrowed.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* IV, 152. Translation by the same from the Armenian. Latin: *furtim* . . . *dempta*, having plagiarized.

¹¹ *Spec.* IV, 10, 61.

¹² Cf. above, p. 95.

¹³ See Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca Historica* I, 96-98; Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*, ch. 10. Cf. Zeller, I, 1⁶, p. 22, n. 2 (*Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, I, p. 27, n. 1).

dependence of Greek philosophers upon Moses. Sometimes, in dealing with similarities between certain views of Greek philosophers and those of Moses, he merely dwells upon the greater antiquity of the Hebrew writings, without asserting the Greek dependence upon the Hebrew. Thus referring, again, to Heraclitus' theory of the harmony of the opposites, he merely says that he was anticipated in it by Moses.¹⁴ Similarly, referring to a moral maxim of Zeno, he says rather cautiously that "he seems to have drawn his maxim as it were from the fountain of the legislation of the Jews,"¹⁵ and again, referring to some moral maxims of the philosophers, he merely points out that Moses had said the same thing before them.¹⁶ Evidently Philo assumes here that philosophers discovered the same truths by their native reason.

Sometimes, however, without directly dealing with the similarities between the Greek philosophers and Moses, he suggests that philosophy itself was a divine gift to the Greeks to enable them to discover by reason with the aid of the senses what to the Jews was made known by revelation. "It is heaven," he says, "which has showered philosophy upon us; it is the human mind which has received it, but it is sight which as guide has brought the two together";¹⁷ and "Philosophy," he continues to say, "is the fountain of good things, all that are truly good, and he who draws from that spring deserves praise, if he does so for the acquisition and practice of virtue, but blame, if it is for knavish ends and to outwit another with sophistry."¹⁸ The entire passage in which he describes the importance of the faculty of sight as a guide to philosophy is based upon Plato.¹⁹ But the statement that "it is heaven which has showered philosophy upon

¹⁴ *Heres* 43, 214.

¹⁵ *Probus* 8, 57.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 186.

¹⁹ *Timaeus* 47 A; cf. Colson on *Spec.* III, 34, 185.

¹⁶ *Mut.* 31, 167-168; *Migr.* 23, 128.

¹⁷ *Spec.* III, 34, 185.

us" is his own addition and, judging by the same expression used by him elsewhere,²⁰ it means here that philosophy is a special gift of God to those upon whom he has chosen to shower it. Philosophy was thus in a sense revealed to the Greeks as the Law was to the Jews. It is thus contrasted with the laws revealed by God, concerning which he says that "they are signs of the divine virtues, graciousness and beneficence, by which he incites all men to noble conduct, and particularly the nation of His worshippers, for whom He opens up the road which leads to happiness."²¹ Philosophy is thus just as much a gift of God to non-Jews as revelation is to the Jews. This is in accordance with his general view, based upon Scripture, that all knowledge comes from God.²²

IV. FAITH AND REASON

This difference between the attitude of the Greek philosophers toward their poets and popular Greek religion and laws and the attitude of Philo toward Scripture and Jewish religion and laws gave rise to another difference between them. While Greek philosophers interpreted mythology in terms of philosophy, philosophy never yielded to mythology. Plato's God and the God of Aristotle and the God of the Stoics always continued to be what reason had shown him to be — an impersonal deity, free not only from the anthropomorphisms of the popular deities but also from all the elements of personality that lay behind these anthropomorphisms. Similarly, in all the other questions of philosophy they felt themselves free to accept any view they happened to favor, on purely intellectual grounds, without feeling any compulsion to follow certain preconceptions of

²⁰ Leisegang, *Indices*, sub *δμβρεῖν*.

²¹ *Mos.* II, 35, 189. Cf. below, II, 51 and 190.

²² Cf. below, p. 202; II, 4 f.; Ps. 94:10; Prov. 2:6; Sirach 1:1.

popular religion — and this despite the fact that Stoic writers speak of God in anthropomorphic terms. If the Greeks had a priesthood, like the original priesthood in Judaism, namely, an organized class of men who acted as custodians and teachers and expounders of the inherited religion, and if such a priesthood had undertaken the work of the interpretation of traditional beliefs in terms of philosophy, then perhaps the result would have been a religious philosophy in which philosophy had yielded also something to religion. But among the Greeks there was no such a priesthood and the task of the harmonization of religion and philosophy was therefore devolved upon the philosophers, who had no interest in the defense of popular religion as such and who had started on their career as opponents of popular religion, and consequently, while as statesmen and citizens they were quite willing to lend the sanction of their authority to the beliefs and practices of the common people, they remained intransigent with regard to their own philosophic convictions. Philo and the other Hellenistic Jewish philosophers, on the other hand, though not priests in the technical sense of the term, still, like their contemporary lay Jewish sages in Palestine, had succeeded to one of the original functions of priesthood in Judaism, that of guarding, teaching, expounding, and handling the Law. To Philo, therefore, as an upholder of the religion of Scripture, while Scripture was to be allegorized in terms of philosophy, the latter had also to meet certain conditions laid down by Scripture. There were certain fundamental beliefs in Scripture which he considered as essential and to which philosophy had to subordinate itself. The subordination of philosophy to Scripture, in matters which were considered by him as constituting the essentials of the religion of Scripture, is a fundamental principle in his conception of the relation between Scripture and

philosophy, with the result, as we shall see, that not only does he interpret Scripture in terms of philosophy but also philosophy in terms of Scripture.

This conception of the subordination of philosophy to Scripture is expressed by Philo in a statement which is commonly known through its later version: philosophy is the handmaid of theology. Let us study the origin and development of this statement.

In Greek philosophy a distinction is made between what was known as encyclical studies (*ἐγκύκλια*) and philosophic studies.¹ By the time of Philo the term encyclical had come to refer in general to the liberal arts, such as grammar, literature, geometry, music, and rhetoric,² as distinguished from philosophy proper. Now among the Stoics there were various opinions as to the value of these encyclical studies. On the one hand, Zeno declared "the encyclical education as useless,"³ whereas Chrysippus, on the other, declared "the encyclical studies as useful."⁴ But Aristo of Chios, following Aristippus, describes the encyclical studies as handmaids (*θεράπειαι*) and philosophy as the mistress (*δέσποινα*) or queen (*βασιλισσα*).⁵ This Stoic use of the term "handmaid" as a description of the encyclical studies in their relation to philosophy is reproduced by Philo in his allegorical interpretation of Sarah and Hagar, where he takes Hagar, the handmaid (*θεραπεινίς*), to symbolize the encyclical

¹ The distinction already occurs in Aristippus (cf. below, n. 5) and Aristotle, *De Caelo* I, 9, 279a, 30, and *Eth. Nic.* I, 5, 1096a, 3-4. The term encyclical is often assumed to mean the same as exoteric studies (Bonitz, *Index*, sub 'Ἀριστοτέλης, p. 105a, lines 27 ff.; J. A. Stewart in his *Notes*, *Eth. Nic.* I, 3, 1096a, 3). Cf. above, p. 24.

² *Cher.* 30, 105; *Congr.* 26, 146-150; Stobaeus, *Eclogae* II, 67, 5 (Arnim, III, 294); cf. below, pp. 150 f.

³ Diogenes, VII, 32 (Arnim, I, 259).

⁴ Diogenes, VII, 129 (Arnim, III, 738).

⁵ Diogenes, II, 79-80; Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 4, 109 (Arnim, I, 349-350).

studies and Sarah, the mistress (*δέσποινα*), to symbolize philosophy.⁶

Then, again, philosophy, as distinguished from the encyclical studies, is divided by the Stoics into logic, physics, and ethics.⁷ Of these, logic is generally considered as the lowest. But as for the other two branches of philosophy, various opinions are expressed. Sometimes physics is said to be the highest branch of philosophy, and this is probably due to the fact that, owing to the Stoic conception of God as immanent in nature, theology was included under physics. Sometimes, however, ethics is said to be the highest branch of philosophy, inasmuch as right conduct was considered by the Stoics as the aim of all philosophy.⁸

Philo, on the whole, follows the view accepted by most of the Stoics in including logic, physics, and ethics⁹ under philosophy, considering logic as the lowest. But he departs from the Stoics with regard to the place of theology in the classification of the branches of philosophy. With his conception of God as an incorporeal being beyond the physical world, he could not agree with the Stoics in including theology under physics. He could have perhaps followed Aristotle and made of theology a special branch of philosophy. But he does not do that either. He prefers to retain the Stoic threefold division of philosophy, but within that scheme of division of philosophy he shifts theology from physics to ethics. Ethics is accordingly defined by him not only as the science "by which the character is bettered and yearns to acquire and also to make use of virtue"¹⁰ but also as the

⁶ *Congr.* 14, 71-80; cf. 4, 13-19; *Post.* 38, 130.

⁷ Diogenes, VII, 39.

⁸ Zeller, III, 14, pp. 63-65 (*Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*², pp. 67-69); Drummond, I, 266; Colson, Vol. VI, note on § 99.

⁹ *Agr.* 3, 14; cf. Drummond, I, 263.

¹⁰ *Mut.* 10, 75.

science which deals with "the knowledge of the Maker of the world" from which one gains "piety, the most splendid of possessions,"¹¹ and, in contrast with ethics in its new conception, physics is described by him as "the study of the world."¹² As a result of this new conception of ethics he could now with greater reason agree with those of the Stoics who considered ethics, which to him includes theology, as the highest branch of philosophy.

This highest branch of philosophy, which includes both theology and ethics, is to Philo that philosophy which is to be found in the revealed Law of Moses. Taking the terms wisdom (*σοφία*) and prudence (*φρόνησις*) as representing respectively theology and ethics, or, as he says, "the worship of God" and "the regulation of human life," he finds both of them embodied in the laws of Moses.¹³ An allusion to these two highest branches of philosophy is found by him in the scriptural verse, "Observe therefore and do them, for this is your wisdom (*σοφία*) and your understanding (*σύνεσις*) in the sight of all peoples, that, when they hear all these statutes, shall say: Behold this great nation is a wise (*σοφός*) and understanding (*ἐπιστήμων*) people."¹⁴ His substitution of the term prudence (*φρόνησις*) for the scriptural term understanding (*σύνεσις*) in this verse is undoubtedly due to Aristotle's definition of understanding (*σύνεσις*) as "the judgment concerning those things which come within the province of prudence (*φρόνησις*)."¹⁵ His distinction between "wisdom" and "prudence," again, reflects Aristotle's definition of wisdom as knowledge about things divine (*θεία*),¹⁶ or about "cer-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 76.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Praem.* 14, 81-84.

¹⁴ Deut. 4: 6, alluded to in *Praem.* 14, 83.

¹⁵ *Eth. Nic.* VI, 10, 1143a, 14-15.

¹⁶ *Metaph.* I, 2, 983a, 6-7.

tain causes (*αἰτίας*) and principles (*ἀρχάς*),”¹⁷ and prudence as dealing with the regulation of the life of the individual as well as that of the affairs of the household and the state.¹⁸ In his statement elsewhere, however, that wisdom is “the way which leads to God,”¹⁹ Philo seems to include under wisdom not only the knowledge of God but also the knowledge of that kind of right human conduct which leads to God. This comprehensive use of the term wisdom is also reflected in his statement that “philosophy is the practice (*ἐπιτήδευσις*) of wisdom, and wisdom is the knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) of things divine and human and their causes.”²⁰

Now, verbally, this last statement is a reproduction of a definition reported in the name of the Stoics,²¹ with the exception of the final words “and their causes,” which are evidently taken from Aristotle²² and added to the Stoic definition. Still, while verbally this definition of wisdom is taken from the Stoics, and similarly, while the definition previously quoted is based upon Aristotle, the wisdom which Philo, after Aristotle or the Stoics or both, defines as “the worship of God,” or as “the way which leads to God,” or as “the knowledge of things divine and human and their causes,” means to him something different; it means to him a worship or a way or a knowledge which is prescribed in the Law. Similarly, when after the Stoics he contrasts “philosophy” with “wisdom” as a contrast between “practice” and “knowledge,” defining the former as the practice of the latter, he uses the term philosophy here in a special sense, as

¹⁷ *Ibid.* I, 1, 982a, 2; cf. *Eth. Nic.* VI, 7, 1141a, 18.

¹⁸ *Eth. Nic.* VI, 5, 1140a, 24-1140b, 30.

¹⁹ *Immut.* 30, 142-143.

²⁰ *Congr.* 14, 79.

²¹ Cf. Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 13, and parallels in notes in ed. Fabricius, II, p. 539, Leipzig, 1841.

²² Cf. above, n. 17.

referring to that practice of wisdom which is again prescribed in the Law. Wisdom, as we have already seen, is in both Palestinian and Hellenistic Judaism identified with the Law.²³ Philo himself alludes to that identification when he refers to the Jews as "one nation alone among all the select nations of the earth which are desirous of wisdom."²⁴ Similarly, in his homily on the verse "and Moses took the tabernacle,"²⁵ interpreting the term tabernacle to mean the Law, he says of that tabernacle which is the Law that Moses received it "from God" and that it is "wisdom" and that it is called "the tabernacle of testimony,"²⁶ because it is "wisdom testified to by God."²⁷ It is because of his identification of the Law with wisdom, — wisdom, which by the Stoic definition is "the knowledge of things divine and human" — that, speaking of the story of creation in the Pentateuch, he says that therein Moses teaches us certain things concerning the existence and nature of God,²⁸ and, speaking of the ten commandments and of all the special laws, he says that they all train and encourage men to all the virtues,²⁹ and that they all "inculcate the highest standard of virtue."³⁰ Again, since philosophy by the Stoic definition is "the practice of wisdom," with his identification of wisdom with the Law he maintains that "what the disciples of the most excellent philosophy gain from its teaching, the Jews gain from their laws and customs."³¹ As a result of all this, Philo compares the relation of "philosophy," in the sense of Greek philosophy, to "wisdom," in the sense of the revealed Law, to the relation of the "encyclical studies" to "philosophy," for, he says, "just as the encyclical culture is the bondwoman

²³ Cf. above, pp. 20 ff.

²⁴ *Qu. in Gen.* II, 58.

²⁵ *Exod.* 33: 7.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Leg. All.* III, 15, 46.

²⁸ *Opif.* 61, 170; cf. below, II, 209.

²⁹ *Spec.* IV, 25, 134; cf. below, II, 201.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 34, 179.

³¹ *Virt.* 10, 65.

(δοῦλη) of philosophy, so also is philosophy the bondwoman of wisdom." ³² Later in the same passage, instead of the term "bondwoman" he uses the term "handmaid" (θεραπεινίς).³³ This subservience of philosophy to wisdom or the Law is explained by him in a passage in which he says that "philosophy teaches the control of the belly and the control of parts below the belly and the control also of the tongue," but while all these qualities are "desirable in themselves," still "they will assume a grander and loftier aspect if practised for the honor and service of God"; ³⁴ for the service and worship of God, as we have seen, constitutes wisdom, and wisdom is the revealed Law embodied in Scripture. When, therefore, Philo speaks of philosophy as being the bondwoman or handmaid of wisdom, he means thereby that it is the bondwoman or handmaid of Scripture.

His conception of what the relations should be between Scripture and philosophy and the other branches of learning is fully stated in his homily on the verse "If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, that will not hearken unto the voice of his father, or the voice of his mother." ³⁵ Taking the terms father and mother allegorically, he interprets, in one sense, father to refer to God and mother to God's wisdom, and, in another sense, father to refer to philosophy and mother to the encyclical studies as well as to rules of right conduct and just laws enacted by men.³⁶ Then taking up the terms father and mother in the latter sense, he says of them that they have four kinds of children: first, those who obey both father and mother; second, those who obey neither;

³² *Congr.* 14, 79. Cf. Seneca, *Naturales Quaestiones*, Prolog. § 1, where the Stoics are reported to have said that the difference between that part of philosophy which deals with the gods (i.e., physics) and that part which deals with men (i.e., ethics) is as great as the difference between philosophy and the other arts (*ceterae artes*), i.e., the encyclical studies.

³³ *Congr.* 14, 80.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Deut. 21: 18.

³⁶ *Ebr.* 8, 30-9, 34.

third, those who obey the father only; fourth, those who obey the mother only.³⁷ Of these four kinds of children, those who obey both father and mother, that is, those who follow philosophy and the encyclical studies and heed also "those principles which are laid down by convention and accepted everywhere," are declared by him the best.³⁸ But the encyclical studies, as we have seen, are to be subordinate to philosophy, and both encyclical studies and philosophy are to be regarded "as the pupils and disciples" of God and His wisdom, "to whom has been committed the care and guidance of such souls as are not unwilling to learn or incapable of culture,"³⁹ that is to say, philosophy, encyclical studies, and man-made laws have been assigned by God for the guidance of men who have not been favored by God with the special revelation of His Law.⁴⁰ Thus, according to Philo, there is to be a harmony between Scripture and all other kinds of useful human knowledge, whatever their source; but the latter are to be the handmaids of Scripture.

The subordination of philosophy to Scripture means to Philo the subordination of reason to faith. This is clearly expressed by him in his comment on the verses "Abraham believed (*ἐπίστευσε*) God and it was counted to him for justice"⁴¹ and "Not so my servant Moses; he is faithful (*πιστός*) in all my house."⁴² Commenting upon these verses, he says that "it is best to have faith (*πεπιστευκέναι*) in God and not in our dim reasonings (*λογισμοῖς*) and insecure conjectures,"⁴³ for "an irrational impulse issues forth and goes its rounds, both from our reasonings and from mind that corrupts the truth."⁴⁴ The term faith (*πίστις*), which is implied in the verb "believed" in the verse "Abraham be-

³⁷ *Ibid.* 9, 35. Cf. the "four sons" of the Passover Haggadah in *Mekilta, Pisha*, 18, F, p. 22b; W, p. 27b; L, I, p. 166.

³⁸ *Ibid.* 20, 80.

³⁹ Cf. above, pp. 142 f.

⁴⁰ Num. 12: 7.

⁴¹ *Leg. All.* III, 81, 228.

³⁹ *Ibid.* 9, 33.

⁴¹ Gen. 15: 6.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 229.

lieved God," is defined by Philo as meaning that "he had an unswerving and firm assumption (*ἀκλινη̅ και̅ βεβαλαν̅ ὑπόληψιν*)." ⁴⁵ This reflects the definition of faith (*πιστις*) in Aristotle as being a "vehement assumption" (*ὑπόληψις σφοδρά*),⁴⁶ and similarly its definition in the Stoics as being a "strong assumption" (*ὑπόληψις ισχυρά*).⁴⁷ But in Aristotle the term faith is used in the sense of a judgment of the truth of knowledge, whether that knowledge be an immediate kind of knowledge, such as sensation and primary premises, or a derivative kind of knowledge, such as conclusions from premises in syllogistic reasoning.⁴⁸ Now Philo adopts here the term faith as a designation of that immediate knowledge of revelation which is contained in Scripture. When he, therefore, says that "it is best to have faith in God and not in our dim reasonings and insecure conjectures," he means that it is best to have faith in the immediate knowledge given by God through revelation rather than in the result of our reason.

The reason why, according to Philo, philosophy must be subordinate to Scripture is that human knowledge is limited, and philosophy, which is based upon human knowledge, is unable to solve many problems. Again and again he tells us how iniquitous it is to rely upon our reasoning, and again and again he reminds us how philosophers among themselves squabble about certain problems which they are unable to solve. Following Scripture's own explanation of the name Cain as meaning "possession," ⁴⁹ he takes the scriptural per-

⁴⁵ *Virt.* 39, 216. Cf. below, II, 215 f.

⁴⁶ *Topica* IV, 5, 126b, 18.

⁴⁷ Stobaeus, *Eclogae* II, p. 112, l. 12.

⁴⁸ An analysis of the term "faith" in Greek philosophy and examples of its treatment in the religious philosophy of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism is given by the present writer in "The Double Faith Theory in Clement, Saadia, Averroes and St. Thomas, and Its Origin in Aristotle and the Stoics," *Jewish Quarterly Review*, N.S., 33 (1942), 213-264.

⁴⁹ Gen. 4: 1.

son Cain to symbolize the view that all things are the possession of man,⁵⁰ in the sense of the Protagorean doctrine that man is the measure of all things.⁵¹ The mind that conceived that doctrine is characterized by him as being "full of folly or rather of all impiety, for instead of thinking that all things are God's possession, it fancied that they were its own."⁵² In his refutation of this doctrine he tries to show how limited and unreliable our mind and senses are. Mind, he says, must rely for its knowledge upon the senses, but the senses, even if they are endowed with perfect organs, are liable to error, "for to free ourselves altogether from natural sources of decay and involuntary delusions is hard or rather impossible, so innumerable in ourselves and around us and outside us throughout the whole race of mortals are the causes which produce false opinion."⁵³ As evidence for the limitation and fallibility of human knowledge, he points to our ignorance about our own soul and mind, and to the contradictory views maintained by philosophers with regard to them. Is the soul made out of one of the corporeal elements or is it incorporeal? How is the soul to be defined: as limit or as form or as entelechy or as harmony? Is it at birth infused within us from without, or is it something within us which becomes a soul by the influence of the air? Is it immortal or mortal? Where is it located: in the head or in the heart?⁵⁴ As further evidence of the limitation of our knowledge, he points also to many other contradictory views held by philosophers with regard to matters which cannot be perceived by the senses.

⁵⁰ *Cher.* 20, 65.

⁵¹ Cf. *Post.* 11, 35, where Protagoras' doctrine is described as an offspring of Cain's madness.

⁵² *Cher.* 20, 65.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 66; cf. 33, 116.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 20, 65; 32, 113; *Somn.* I, 6, 30-32; *Leg. All.* I, 29, 91; *Mut.* 2, 10. As for the exponents of these various theories of the mind, see Colson on *Somn.* I, 6, 30-32.

Is the world created or uncreated? Will it be destroyed or not? Is everything in a process of becoming or in a state of being? Is man the measure of all things, or is his judgment not to be trusted at all? Is everything beyond our comprehension, or are there many things which are within our comprehension? ⁵⁵ Again, philosophers hold contradictory views with regard to the translunar part of the universe. Are the heavens made of solid ice or of fire or of a fifth substance? Has the outermost sphere any depth or not? Are the stars lumps of earth full of fire, or are they masses of ether? Are they living and rational beings or not? Are they moved by choice or by necessity? And is the light of the moon its own or borrowed or both? ⁵⁶ None of these questions concerning the heavens and the stars and the moon, he says, will ever be answered with certainty by human reason; and similarly, he seems to say by implication, none of the other questions can be answered with certainty by human reason. It is for man therefore to know that all things are God's possession,⁵⁷ that though "I seem to have mind, reason, sense, yet I find that none of them is really mine," ⁵⁸ and that our mind is only "the parent of false conjectures, the purveyor of delusion." ⁵⁹ God, however, whose possession all things are, has in His Law revealed to us the truth with regard to some of these controversial problems, namely, that the world is created,⁶⁰ that by the will of God it will not be destroyed,⁶¹ that some things can be known and some things cannot be known,⁶² and that one part of the soul is both incorporeal ⁶³ and immortal.⁶⁴

⁵⁵ *Heres* 50, 246. As for the exponents of these various opinions, see Colson *ad loc.*

⁵⁶ *Somn.* I, 4, 21-24. As for the exponents of these various opinions, see Colson and *Philos Werke, ad loc.*

⁵⁷ *Cher.* 20, 65.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 32, 113.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 33, 116.

⁶⁰ Cf. below, p. 164.

⁶¹ Cf. below, p. 348.

⁶² Cf. below, II, 118 ff., 139 ff.

⁶³ Cf. below, p. 391.

⁶⁴ Cf. below, p. 393.

V. CONCLUSION, INFLUENCE, ANTICIPATION

The belief that certain texts have a twofold meaning, an external and an internal, has grown up independently among the rabbis with reference to Scripture and among the Greek philosophers with reference to mythology, but for different reasons. To Greek philosophers myths are primitive wisdom, which contain in an inchoate form certain truths of philosophy; to the rabbis Scripture is divine wisdom, which contains in consummate form all that is true in the achievements of the human mind. Starting with this inherited Jewish belief about Scripture and following the traditional Jewish method of interpreting it with unrestrained freedom, Philo adopts the method of the philosophers in their treatment of myths — the application of which method he denies to man-made myths—and tries to find in the inner meaning of Scripture the truths of philosophy. Scripture thus to him contains revealed truths which philosophers had to search for and discover by reason; and these revealed truths of Scripture are either parallel to the rational truths of philosophers, or anticipations of them, or even the sources from which the latter have been borrowed. Because divine revelation must of necessity be conceived as absolutely infallible, whereas human reason by its very nature is subject to error, whenever philosophy is found to be at variance with what is conceived by him to be the uninterpretable position of Scripture, the former must be set aright in the light of the latter. This conception as to the relation of philosophy to Scripture is expressed by Philo in his statement that “philosophy” is the “bondswoman” or “handmaid” of “wisdom.”

The ancillary conception of philosophy in its relation to Scripture, which was introduced by Philo, continued to prevail for many centuries in European philosophy, whether

Christian or Moslem or Jewish. Three different views appeared in each of these three religious philosophies with regard to the relation between philosophy and Scripture — views which expressed themselves in the form of three distinct definitions of faith. There was a double-faith theory, according to which true faith is either assent to Scripture without the aid of philosophy or assent to Scripture with the aid of philosophy. There was a single-faith theory of the rationalist type, according to which true faith is the assent to Scripture with the aid of philosophy. There was also a single-faith theory of the authoritarian type, according to which true faith is assent to Scripture without the aid of philosophy.¹ According to all these conceptions of faith, even the double-faith theory and the single-faith theory of the rationalist type, Scripture is still the mistress and philosophy the handmaid. There will always remain certain elements in religion which will have to be assented to without the aid of philosophy.

The history of the ancillary conception of philosophy may be traced through the history of the designation of philosophy as handmaid or bondwoman.

Directly from Philo this designation passed on to the Church Fathers. The statements which we have quoted from Philo with regard to the relation of the encyclical studies to philosophy and of philosophy to wisdom or theology are paraphrased by Clement of Alexandria as follows: "But as the encyclical branches of study contribute to philosophy, which is their mistress (*δέσποινα*); so also philosophy itself co-operates for the acquisition of wisdom. For philosophy is the pursuit of wisdom, and wisdom is the knowledge of

¹ Cf. reference above p. 152, n. 48. In Philo, these fine shades of the problem are not discussed. But his treatment of traditionalists and allegorists (above, pp. 57-70) would indicate a double-faith theory.

things divine and human and their causes. Wisdom is therefore the mistress (*κυρία*) of philosophy, as philosophy is of preparatory culture."² Later on he quotes the verse in which Abraham says to Sarah: "Behold, thy maid is in thy hand; deal with her as it pleases thee,"³ and interprets it: "I embrace secular culture (*τὴν κοσμικὴν παιδείαν*) as youthful, and a handmaid (*συνθεραπαιίδα*), but thy knowledge I honor and reverence as a true wife."⁴ From the Church Fathers the conception passed on to medieval Latin scholastic philosophy. The expression is used for the first time among Latin writers, perhaps with a different emphasis but essentially in the same sense, by Peter Damian (1007-1072), who, in his assault upon the excessive use of dialectics in the discussion of theological problems, argued that philosophy in its relation to theology must "like a handmaid (*ancilla*) serve its mistress with a certain obsequiousness of servitude."⁵

In Arabic Moslem philosophy the same idea is expressed by Averroes in his statement that "philosophy is the companion or wife (*ṣāhibah*) of the Koran and its foster-sister."⁶ In Arabic Jewish philosophy, Maimonides expresses the same idea in his statement that the various branches of philosophy are to him only "strange women"⁷ as compared with the Torah which is, he says, "my loving hind⁸ and the wife of my youth"⁹ and that those "strange women" are taken by him only to be unto the Law as "confectionaries and cooks and bakers."¹⁰

² *Stromata* I, 5 (PG, 8, 721 A-724 A).

³ Gen. 16: 6.

⁴ *Stromata* I, 5 (PG, 8, 725 B); cf. Philo, *Congr.* 27, 153-154; *Cher.* 1, 3.

⁵ *De Divina Omnipotentia*, Ch. 5 (PL, 145, 603 c).

⁶ *Kitab Faṣl al-Maqāl wa-Taqrīr*, in Müller, *Philosophie und Theologie von Averroes*, Arabic text, p. 26, ll. 3-4.

⁷ Prov. 2: 16.

⁸ Prov. 5: 19.

⁹ Mal. 2: 14; Isa. 54: 6.

¹⁰ I Sam. 8: 13. *Ḳobeṣ*, I, 49, p. 12 va.

Underlying this ancillary conception of philosophy in its relation to Scripture is the belief that Scripture is not a book like all other books: it contains direct revelations from God. This belief which Philo asserted about the Hebrew Scripture was extended in Christianity to the Greek Scripture and in Islam to the Arabic Scripture. But both to Christianity and, with certain qualifications, to Islam, the Old Testament still continued to be the word of God. When in the early history of Christianity the Gnostics tried to deny the divine origin of the teachings of the Old Testament, a spokesman of their opponents among the Church Fathers declared that "both Testaments are the revelation of one and the same Householder, the Word of God, our Lord Jesus Christ," "and that "there is but one and the same God, who ordered them both for the good of those men in whose time the Testaments were given." " Similarly in Islam, at least all those parts of the Old and the New Testament which are reported in the Koran or which are ascribed by tradition to Mohammed, are recognized as divine revelations.¹³

Each of these three religious philosophies in their subsequent history continued to see in their respective Scriptures two meanings, a literal and an underlying one; and the underlying meaning was philosophy. The philosophy supposed to be hidden in Scripture changed from time to time, but whatever it happened to be, it was always sought out by the allegorical method of interpretation. This method of interpretation was learned by the Church Fathers directly from

¹¹ Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* IV, 9, 1.

¹² *Ibid.* IV, 32, 2; cf. IV, 35, 2.

¹³ Cf. D. S. Margoliouth, "Old and New Testament in Muhammadanism," *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* IX, 481; I. Goldziher, "Ueber muhammedanische Polemik gegen Ahl al-kitâb," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 32 (1878), 341-387; D. B. Macdonald, *Aspects of Islam*, 1911, pp. 210-249.

Philo;¹⁴ from them it passed on to Islam, and then also to a Judaism which had no direct contact with Philo, but in the latter it was recognized as an old native Jewish method.¹⁵ The questions touched upon by Philo as to the extent to which literal meanings of the text are to be accepted were discussed by various philosophers in all the three religions. On the whole, they followed out certain suggestions made by Philo himself. In Christianity, Origen lays down the rule that the literal sense of Scripture is to be rejected only when it is irrational and impossible, and according to this rule he rejected certain historical narratives as well as laws in both the Old and the New Testaments as not to be taken literally; among these he mentions in particular, as in Philo, the story of the creation of the world in six days, the story of the planting of a garden in Eden, and the story of the creation of Eve.¹⁶ St. Augustine, similarly, asserts that the literal sense should be rejected when it is opposed to true faith or moral propriety.¹⁷ In Islam, Averroes tells us that "all Moslems are in agreement that it is not necessary to take all the expressions of the Koran in their external sense nor is it necessary to divest them all of their external sense by means of interpretation, though they differ as to which needs interpretation and which is in no need of interpretation."¹⁸ In medieval Jewish philosophy, Saadia lays down the rule that only those texts should not be taken literally which in their literal meaning are obviously contrary to fact

¹⁴ On the question whether the Church Fathers received their allegorical method from Philo, see S. Davidson, *Sacred Hermeneutics*, 1843, p. 68; C. Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandria*, 1875, pp. 344-346; 351-358; A. D. Nock, "The Loeb Philo," *The Classical Review* 75 (1943), p. 78, n. 2.

¹⁵ Cf. above, p. 138.

¹⁶ *De Principiis* IV, 1, 16; *Contra Celsum* IV, 38.

¹⁷ *De Doctrina Christiana* III, 10, 14.

¹⁸ *Kitab Faṣl al-Maqāl wa-Taqrīr*, in Müller, *Philosophie und Theologie von Averroes*, Arabic text, p. 8, ll. 7-9.

or imply anthropomorphisms or are self-contradictory or, in the case of law, have been already interpreted in a non-literal sense by the rabbis of the Talmud.¹⁹ Maimonides particularly emphasizes that the "account given in the Pentateuch of creation is not, as generally believed by the common people, to be taken in its literal sense in all its parts."²⁰

With the general adoption in Christian, Moslem, and Jewish philosophy of the Philonic view that Scripture has an inner meaning and that that inner meaning is Greek philosophy, the question was raised, in all these three philosophies, as to where the Greeks got their philosophy. The three explanations offered by Philo reappeared in all these three philosophies.

In Christian philosophy, Justin Martyr, like Philo, sometimes speaks of Plato as having borrowed from the Prophets²¹ or from Moses,²² and sometimes he says that those truths which the prophets saw and heard "when filled with the Holy Spirit"²³ and uttered without "demonstration,"²⁴ such philosophers as Socrates became acquainted with only "by means of the investigation of reason," and this because the reason which they employed is a reflection of the Reason or the Word which is Christ, "who is in every man."²⁵ Reflecting even Philo's statement that "philosophy was showered down by heaven," he says that "the many have not divined what philosophy is and for what end it is sent down to men."²⁶ Similarly, Clement of Alexandria sometimes speaks of "the plagiarism of the Greeks from the Barbarian [i.e. Hebrew] philosophy,"²⁷ but sometimes he quotes Philo almost ver-

¹⁹ *Emunot we-De'ot* VII, 2.

²⁰ *Moreh Nebukim* II, 29.

²¹ *Apologia* I, 59.

²² *Ibid.*, 60.

²³ *Dialogus cum Tryphone*, 7.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Apologia* II, 10.

²⁶ *Dialogus cum Tryphone*, 2.

²⁷ *Stromata* V, 14.

batim by saying that Greek preparatory culture and Greek philosophy "have come down from God to men . . . in the way in which showers fall down."²⁸ Philosophy, according to him, was revealed to the Greeks as the Law was revealed to the Hebrews, and both were revealed by God for the purpose of preparing the minds of those to whom they were revealed for the advent of Christ;²⁹ and just as the old and the new revelations are called the covenants of God with the people so also philosophy is said by him to have been given by God to the Greeks "as a covenant peculiar to them."³⁰ To these two explanations Eusebius adds Philo's third explanation, namely, that philosophers discovered the same truth by their native reason. Trying to show by parallel passages from Scripture and Plato that "Plato followed the all-wise Moses and the Hebrew prophets in regard also to the teaching and speculation about things incorporeal and seen only by the mind," he says "[1] whether it were that he learned from hearsay which had reached him . . . or [2] whether of himself he hit upon the true nature of things, or, [3] in whatever way, was deemed worthy of this knowledge of God."³¹ In another place Eusebius only gives the first two explanations, saying that either [1] the Greeks have procured their knowledge from the Hebrews or [2] "they were moved to the same conclusions by innate conceptions."³² The theory of Plato's dependence upon Moses was first accepted and then rejected by St. Augustine; he himself, like Philo, advances the shower from heaven theory.³³

Repercussions of these views, probably from Christian sources, are also to be found in Arabic literature. According to the Encyclopedia of the Ikhwan al-Şafa, in the second

²⁸ *Ibid.* I, 7.

²⁹ *Ibid.* I, 5; VI, 6, 13, 17; VII, 2.

³⁰ *Ibid.* VI, 8 (PG, 9, 288 c).

³¹ *Praeparatio Evangelica* XI, 8.

³² *Ibid.* X, 1.

³³ *De Civitate Dei* VIII, 11-12.

half of the tenth century, the sciences (*al-'ulūm*) and philosophies (*al-hikam*) on which the Greeks pride themselves were borrowed partly from "the learned men of the children of Israel in the days of Ptolemy" and partly from "the sages of the Egyptians in the days of Themistius," while the children of Israel themselves had partly "inherited them from the books of their prophets," who had come by them by means of revelation, and partly — especially such arts as mechanics (*ḥiyāl*), magic (*siḥr*), conjurations (*'azā'im*), the setting up of talismans, and the enticements of the powers — borrowed them from other nations at the time of King Solomon.³⁴ According to Shahrastani, in the first half of the twelfth century, Thales borrowed his view that water was the prime element from the Hebrew Scripture,³⁵ and Empedocles, according to him, "lived at the time of David to whom he betook himself and under whom he studied."³⁶ Averroes, however, in the latter part of the twelfth century, only says that "nobody doubts that among the children of Israel there were many philosophers (*ḥukamā'*), as is evident from the books which are found among the children of Israel and which are attributed to Solomon. Philosophy has always existed among those who were divinely inspired, namely, the prophets."³⁷

Among the Jews of the Arabic period, two views are expressed with regard to the relation of philosophy to Scripture. On the one hand, Judah Ha-Levi asserts that "the roots and principles of all sciences were handed down from us [the Jews] first to the Chaldaeans, then to the Persians and

³⁴ Cf. Fr. Dieterici, *Thier und Mensch vor dem König der Genien*, Arabic text, Leipzig, 1879, p. 66, ll. 4-11.

³⁵ *Kitab al-Milal wal-Nihal*, ed. Cureton, p. 256, ll. 5-9.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 260, l. 7.

³⁷ *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* IV (XX), ed. M. Bouyges, § 6, p. 583, ll. 10-13; cf. Munk, *Guide des Égarés*, I, p. 332, n. 3.

Medians, then to Greece, and finally to the Romans";³⁸ but, on the other hand, Maimonides merely asserts that Jews had once cultivated the science of physics and metaphysics which they later neglected by reason of persecution.³⁹ In Hebrew literature of a later period, legends appeared that Aristotle became converted to Judaism or even that he was of Jewish descent.⁴⁰

This is how philosophy was made the handmaid of Scripture by Philo, and this is also how throughout the centuries of Christian, Moslem, and Jewish thought philosophy continued to be a handmaid. From this position, Spinoza sought to emancipate it in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, a philosophic work which, like the philosophic works of Philo, is written in the form of discussions of scriptural topics and verses. In his effort to emancipate philosophy from its ancillary position, he goes to the very root of the problem — the belief in revelation. By denying revelation, he reduces Scripture to the status of the works of the Greek poets, and as a result of this he revives the classical conception of Greek philosophers as to the relation between popular beliefs and philosophic thought.

³⁸ *Kuzari* II, 66.

³⁹ *Moreh Nebukim* I, 71.

⁴⁰ Cf. D. Cassel, *Das Buch Kuzari*, p. 47, n. 1.

CHAPTER III

SCRIPTURAL PRESUPPOSITIONS

THE CONCEPTION of Scripture as mistress of which philosophy is to be the handmaid means in Philo that Scripture contains certain unshakable beliefs, which are to serve as a sort of religious preamble to rational philosophy and to which every system of philosophy must accommodate itself. What these unshakable beliefs are is made clear by Philo himself in several places in his works. In one place, he enumerates five lessons which, he says, Moses meant to teach us by his account of the creation of the world. They are: (1) the existence of God; (2) the unity of God; (3) the creation of the world; (4) the unity of the world; (5) divine providence.¹ In another place, he enumerates five classes of people who, according to him, are condemned in Scripture as "impious (*ἀσεβείς*) and unholy (*ἀνόσιοι*)," that is to say, as men without religion. They are: (1) those who deny the existence of incorporeal ideas; (2) those who deny the existence of God; (3) those who believe in the existence of many gods; and (4) those who assume the existence of no god beyond the human mind or (5) the senses.² In other places he speaks (1) of the belief (*πίστις*) that "the laws [of Moses] were not inventions of a man but quite clearly the oracles of God"³ and (2) of the hope (*ἐλπὶς*) that "they will remain for all future ages as though immortal, so long as the sun and moon and the whole heaven and universe exist."⁴ Combining these passages, we find that they lay down eight principles as constituting the essential principles of the religion of Scrip-

¹ *Opif.* 61, 170-172.

² *Spec.* I, 60, 327-63, 344.

³ *Decal.* 4, 15; cf. *Mos.* II, 3, 12; *Probus* 12, 80.

⁴ *Mos.* II, 3, 14.

ture, namely: (1) the existence of God, (2) the unity of God, (3) divine providence, (4) the creation of the world,⁵ (5) the unity of the world, (6) the existence of incorporeal ideas, (7) the revelation of the Law, and (8) the eternity of the Law.⁶

Now the first six of these eight principles which he describes as being scriptural doctrines are also principles taught in Greek philosophy. It is therefore necessary for us to determine, again from Philo's own words, whether in those principles, which are stated by him in a general way as being taught in Scripture, there are certain characteristic features which distinguished them from the same principles as taught in philosophy.

The principle of the existence of God is described by Philo with sufficient detail to make it clear that he advanced it in opposition to two schools of Greek philosophy: (1) those who "have hesitated and have been of two minds about His existence," and (2) those who "have carried their audacity to the point of declaring that He does not exist at all"; and both these schools of philosophy are described by him as atheists.⁷ The first of these schools quite obviously refers to the Sceptics, though in Sextus Empiricus they are not included among the atheists but are treated as opponents of both the theists and atheists.⁸ As for the second school, it is not clear to whom it refers, and it may be asked whether

⁵ In *Probus* 12, 80, he says of the Essenes that they retain of philosophy only that part which treats philosophically of the existence of God and the creation of the universe. The denial of the existence and providence of God and of the creation of the world is condemned in *Somm.* II, 43, 283.

⁶ Neumark mentions only the five principles enumerated in *De Opificio Mundi* as constituting the principles of Judaism according to Philo (*Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters*, I, 41; *Toledot ha-Pilosofiah be-Yisra'el*, I, 40; *Toledot ha-Ikkarim be-Yisra'el*, II, 93-94); cf. also Stein, *Pilon ha-Alexanderoni*, p. 113, n. 1; Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, p. 122.

⁷ *Opif.* 61, 170.

⁸ Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 191.

among those whom he describes as denying the existence of God altogether he meant to include Epicurus. Elsewhere, in his allusions to the Epicureans, Philo criticizes them only for their hedonism and for their atomism;⁹ never for the denial of the existence of God. The attitude of Epicurus towards the existence of God, as reported by Sextus Empiricus, is as follows: "According to some, Epicurus in his popular exposition allows the existence of God, but in expounding the real nature of things he does not allow it."¹⁰ Whether Epicurus was sincere in his declaration of the existence of gods in his popular exposition had been a subject of discussion even before the time of Philo.¹¹ Philo himself, as we shall see later, attacks Epicurus' popular conception of the gods on the ground of its implication of corporeality, and he undoubtedly could have also attacked it on the ground of its polytheism.¹² Moreover, there is a passage in which Philo definitely indicates that Epicurus is not to be included among the atheists. In that passage he contrasts with the view of those who say that "the Deity does not exist" the views of those who say that "it exists but does not exert providence" and also that the world, though created, "is borne on by unsteady courses, just as chance may direct."¹³ These latter views are quite evidently those of Epicurus, and still Philo describes them as views assuming the belief in the existence of God. The question may, therefore, be legitimately raised whether he meant to include here Epicurus among those who denied the existence of God. An answer to this question may perhaps be found in his description of this sec-

⁹ Cf. *Fug.* 26, 148. See Leisegang, *Indices*, under "Epikouros."

¹⁰ Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 58.

¹¹ Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* I, 30, 85; 44, 123; III, 1, 3; *De Divinatione* II, 17, 40; cf. Zeller, III, 1^a, p. 445, n. 2 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, p. 465, n. 2); C. Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus*, p. 438.

¹² Cf. below, p. 176.

¹³ *Conf.* 23, 114.

ond school as declaring that the existence of God "is a mere assertion of men obscuring the truth with myth and fiction."¹⁴ This would seem to indicate that by his second school he does not refer to the followers of Epicurus but to the followers of some other atheist. For this description is given in fuller form in another passage, where he describes those who deny the existence of God and profess atheism as maintaining that God "is alleged to exist only for the benefit of men who, it was supposed, would abstain from wrongdoing in their fear of Him whom they believed to be present everywhere and to survey all things with ever-watchful eyes."¹⁵ Now this view, that religion was invented as a restraint upon wrongdoing, is not Epicurean, but it is the view of Critias, who is described as belonging to "the company of the atheists."¹⁶ It is expressed by him in the following lines: "Some shrewd man, a man in counsel wise, first discovered unto men the fear of Gods, thereby to frighten sinners should they sin even secretly in deed, or word, or thought. Hence was it that he brought in Deity, telling how God . . . hears with His mind and sees, and taketh thought and heeds things."¹⁷ Critias the Athenian, it may be remarked again, is mentioned together with Diogenes of Melos and Theodorus as one of the chief exponents of atheism.¹⁸

Besides these two schools of philosophers whom he describes as atheists, Philo also opposes his conception of the existence of God to the conception of those whom he describes as the "champions of mind" (*νοῦ προστάται*)¹⁹ and "champions of the senses" (*αἰσθήσεων προστάται*),²⁰ that is, those who ascribe to their own mind and their own senses powers which really belong to God. As to whom especially

¹⁴ *Opif.* 61, 170.

¹⁵ *Spec.* I, 60, 330.

¹⁶ *Sextus, Adversus Physicos* I, 54.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*; cf. Plato, *Laws* X, 889 ε.

¹⁸ *Sextus, Pyrrhoniae Institutiones* III, 218.

¹⁹ *Spec.* I, 61, 334.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 62, 337.

he means by these two classes of champions, it is a question which students of Philo have found difficult to answer.²¹ But we shall try to show that these classes of champions refer to followers of two interpretations of the Protagorean doctrine which has been transmitted to us in the form "man is the measure of all things."²²

That by "champions of mind" Philo refers to the Protagorean doctrine can be shown by the fact that elsewhere this Protagorean doctrine, correctly ascribed by him to "one of the ancient sophists named Protagoras," is reproduced by him not in the form in which it has generally been transmitted but rather in the form that "the human mind (*νοῦς*) is the measure of all things."²³ When, therefore, Philo speaks of "champions of mind," this expression could well refer to the Protagorean doctrine as reproduced by himself. Moreover, his description of the "champions of mind," as well as of the "champions of the senses," as those who "make gods" of the object which they champion and as "forgetting in their self-exaltation the God who truly exists,"²⁴ and also his statement, evidently referring to the same doctrine, that

²¹ Heinemann (*Philos Werke* II, p. 103, n. 2; *Bildung*, p. 176, n. 2) identifies "champions of mind" with Stoics and "champions of the senses" with Epicureans or with philosophically untrained persons in general or with the Cynic Diogenes. Goodenough (*By Light, Light*, pp. 124-125) similarly identifies them with Stoics and Epicureans respectively. Colson (VII, p. 622) thinks that they do not refer to any particular schools of philosophy, but to ways of thinking in general. An obvious objection to the identification of the "champions of mind" with the Stoics is that the mind spoken of here by Philo is the human mind, whereas the mind identified with God by the Stoics is the mind of the universe.

²² *Cratylus* 385 E; *Theaetetus* 152 A; *Metaph.* X, 1, 1053a, 36; see also Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, under Protagoras, Fr. 1.

²³ *Post.* 11, 35. The term "human mind" occurs also in his allusion to the Protagorean maxim in *Somn.* II, 29, 193. In *Post.* 11, 36, he quotes Protagoras literally as "man is the measure of all things," but explains it to mean that "all things are a present and gift of the mind." Cf. also *Heres* 50, 246 and comment below at n. 35.

²⁴ *Spec.* I, 63, 344.

“the mind shows itself to be without God and full of self-exaltation, when it deems itself as on a par with God,”²⁵ tally with the description he himself gives of those who follow the Protagorean doctrine in a passage wherein he challenges them: “Why, pray, are you any longer ready to deliver grave and solemn discourses about holiness and honoring God, and to listen to such discourses from others, seeing that you have with you the mind that takes the place of God?”²⁶ This passage, as may be seen, reflects both in language and in sentiment the statement in Plato that Protagoras, as a consequence of his doctrine of measure, addressed his followers thus: “Excellent boys and old men, there you sit together declaiming to the people, and you bring in the gods, the question of whose existence or non-existence I exclude from oral and written discourses.”²⁷

The “champions of mind” are thus the followers of Protagoras, whose doctrine, reproduced by Philo as “the human mind is the measure of all things,” implies, if not an outright denial of the existence of God, at least a suspension of judgment with regard to His existence and also a transference to mind of powers which really belong to God.

As for the “champions of the senses,” we shall try to show that it refers to the same doctrine of Protagoras, except that for the term “mind” in Philo’s own restatement of Protagoras’ formula is substituted the term “senses.” That these two classes of champions, despite their being described by Philo as “a fourth and a fifth class,”²⁸ are really subdivisions of one group of followers of the same doctrine is quite evident from his statements that both of them “seek the same goal,” that both of them are “votaries of the pestilence of

²⁵ *Leg. All.* I, 15, 49.

²⁶ *Post.* 11, 37.

²⁷ *Theaetetus* 162 D; cf. *Diogenes*, IX, 51.

²⁸ *Spec.* I, 61, 333.

self-exaltation,"²⁹ and that both of them are symbolically referred to in the verse "an Ammonite or a Moabite shall not enter into the assembly of the Lord."³⁰ But why he should subdivide the followers of Protagoras into "champions of mind" and "champions of the senses" may be explained on the ground of certain additional information we may gather about the Protagorean doctrine. According to Plato, Protagoras' doctrine that "man is the measure of all things" implies that "perception by the senses" (*αἴσθησις*) is "knowledge" (*ἐπιστήμη*),³¹ or, as it is restated by Diogenes Laertius, "soul is nothing apart from the senses."³² According to Aristotle, however, the "man" who in the Protagorean doctrine is the measure of all things refers either to the man who possesses "knowledge" (*ἐπιστήμη*), that is, mind, or to the man who possesses "perception by the senses" (*αἴσθησις*).³³ We may reasonably assume that Philo had knowledge of Aristotle's explanation of the Protagorean doctrine as meaning by "man" either "knowledge," that is, "mind," or "perception by the senses." In one place, therefore, reproducing this doctrine in the name of Protagoras, he allowed himself to substitute the term "human mind" for the term "man"; in other places, making use of this doctrine as an explanation of the verse about the non-admissibility of both a Moabite and an Ammonite into the assembly of the Lord, he presents it according to both its Aristotelian interpretations, one in terms of mind, symbolized by the Moabite, and one in terms of the senses, symbolized by the Ammonite.³⁴ That by the championship of mind and the senses he means

²⁹ *Ibid.*; cf. 63, 344.

³⁰ Deut. 23: 4; *Spec.* I, 61, 333; *Leg. All.* III, 25, 81; *Post.* 52, 177.

³¹ *Theaetetus* 151 E-152 A.

³² Diogenes, IX, 51.

³³ *Metaph.* X, 1, 1053a, 35-1053b, 2.

³⁴ I.e. (a) *Post* 11, 35, and (b) *Spec.* I, 61, 333; *Leg. All.* III, 25, 81.

the Protagorean doctrine is evident from a passage in which he contrasts "those who argue at length that man is the measure of all things with those who make havoc of the judgment-faculty of both sense and mind."³⁵ From this contrast it is quite evident that by the Protagorean principle that man is the measure of all things he understood man's reliance upon the sole judgment of mind and the senses.

The principle of the unity of God means to Philo four things. First, it means to him a denial of popular polytheism and idolatry, of which he gives a variety of examples.³⁶ Taken in this sense, it is derived by him from the first two of the ten commandments³⁷ and also from the verse: "The Lord thy God is alone God, in heaven above and on earth beneath, and there is none beside Him,"³⁸ though he finds support for it also in Aristotle's quotation of the Homeric saying: "The government of the many is not good; let there be one governor, one king."³⁹ Second, it means to him the uniqueness of God, denying that there is anything like unto Him. He derives it from the verse "It is not good that man should be alone,"⁴⁰ which he finds to imply the opposite, that "it is good that the Alone should be alone," for "God, being one, is alone and unique, and like God there is nothing."⁴¹ By this uniqueness of God he means especially that God alone is an uncreated creator. Thus, speaking of Moses' opposition to polytheism and idolatry, he says: "This lesson he continually repeats, sometimes saying that God is one and the Framer and Maker of all things, sometimes that He

³⁵ *Heres* 50, 246.

³⁶ *Decal.* 12, 52-16, 81; *Spec.* I, 3, 13-5, 31; 60, 331-332; *Conf.* 28, 144; *Migr.* 12, 69; cf. above, pp. 27 ff.

³⁷ *Decal.* 12, 52-16, 81; *Spec.* I, 3, 13-5, 31.

³⁸ *Deut.* 4: 39; cf. *Leg. All.* III, 26, 82.

³⁹ *Conf.* 33, 170; cf. *Metaph.* XII, 10, 1076a, 4; *Iliad* II, 204-205.

⁴⁰ *Gen.* 2: 18.

⁴¹ *Leg. All.* II, 1, 1.

is the Lord of created beings, because stability and fixity and lordship are by nature invested in Him alone." ⁴² "Stability" (τὸ βέβαιον) and "fixity" (τὸ πάγιον) are only other words for "eternity" (τὸ αἰδιον), in the comprehensive sense of uncreated, unchangeable, and indestructible. Thus he also says that God is to be considered as "the one, who alone is eternal and the Father of all things intelligible and sensible." ⁴³ God's unity in the sense of uniqueness thus makes it impossible for anything else to be regarded as uncreated and as creative. On the basis of this conception of the unity of God it would be therefore impossible for Philo to accept Plato's ideas as being uncreated and as also being creative by their own power.⁴⁴ Third, the principle of the unity of God also means to Philo the self-sufficiency of God. He derives this from the same verse, which he now interprets to mean that "neither before creation was there anything with God, nor, when the world had come into being, does anything take place with Him, for there is absolutely nothing which He needs." ⁴⁵ Fourth, the principle of the unity of God furthermore means to him the simplicity of God, which, as we shall see, is understood by him to imply not only the incorporeality of God but also His unknowability and indescribability. This, again, he derives from the same verse, to which he now

⁴² *Spec.* I, 5, 30.

⁴³ *Virt.* 39, 214.

⁴⁴ Cf. below, pp. 201, 221.

⁴⁵ *Leg. All.* II, 1, 2; *Opif.* 6, 23: "God, with no counsellor to help Him (for who was there beside Him?) by His own sole will determined"; cf. *Pirke de-Rabbi Eliezer*, ch. 3: "Before the world was created, God, in His great name, was alone," and David Luria's *Be'ur*, *ad loc.*

The conception of God as self-sufficient is found in Euripides, *Heracles* 1345; Xenophon, *Memorabilia* I, 6, 10; Menedemus in Diogenes, VI, 105; cf. J. Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, p. 38. Self-sufficiency is also regarded as an attribute of the good by Plato (*Philebus* 60 c; 67 a) and as an attribute of God by Aristotle (*Eth. Eud.* VII, 12, 1244b, 5-10); cf. A. O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Harvard University Press, 1936), pp. 42-43.

gives a third interpretation. "God is alone and one alone; not composite; a simple nature; whereas each one of us and of all other created beings is made up of many things." ⁴⁶

Still, this rigid conception of the unity of God did not lead him to such a puritanism of language as to cause him to refrain from applying the term god to beings who in the common language of non-Jews were called gods. As Scripture, which, despite its declaration that all other gods besides the God of Israel are "no gods" ⁴⁷ or "nothings," ⁴⁸ has no objection to applying to them the term "gods" ⁴⁹ or "god," ⁵⁰ and to calling God "God of gods and Lord of lords," ⁵¹ so also Philo, though he declares the God of Scripture to be the only god, still has no objection to the usage of the Greek language, common also among the Greek philosophers, of referring to the stars as visible gods ⁵² and to the heaven as the great visible god,⁵³ and to saying of God that "He is God not only of men but also of gods." ⁵⁴ This does not mean an attitude of "not denying the existence of lesser gods, but denying that they should be worshipped"; ⁵⁵ it only means that Philo did not deny the existence of the stars and the heavens and the world, and had no objection to referring to them by their popular names as gods, any more than we today have any objection to calling the days of the week by names describing them as days dedicated to ancient pagan deities.

⁴⁶ *Leg. All.* II, 1, 2. See fuller discussion of this subject below, II, 94 ff.

⁴⁷ *Isa.* 37: 19.

⁴⁸ *Ps.* 96: 5; *I Chron.* 16: 26.

⁴⁹ *Exod.* 12: 12, *et passim*.

⁵⁰ *I Kings* 11: 33.

⁵¹ *Deut.* 10: 17. Cf. above, p. 39.

⁵² *Opif.* 7. 27; *Spec.* I, 3, 19.

⁵³ *Aet.* 3, 10; 5, 20; cf. Colson's discussion in Vol. IX, pp. 172-173.

⁵⁴ *Spec.* I, 56, 307; cf. II, 29, 165: "the supreme Father of gods and men"; *Mos.* II, 38, 206: "the Lord of gods and men"; cf. above, p. 38.

⁵⁵ Goodenough, *An Introduction to Philo Judaeus*, p. 108.

This latitude in the application of the term god to objects worshiped by pagans as deities, which would include also the mentioning of the names of foreign deities, would seem at first sight to be contradictory to the scriptural verse "Make no mention of the name of other gods, neither let it be heard out of thy mouth."⁵⁶ But this prohibition, according to Jewish traditional interpretation, does not mean that the names of such gods cannot be mentioned or that the term god cannot be applied to them. It prohibits, according to this traditional interpretation, only the following three things: first, using the name of other gods as a designation of an appointed meeting-place; second, praising other gods; third, swearing by the name of other gods.⁵⁷ Now it can be shown that Philo was acquainted with these traditional interpretations of the law prohibiting mention of the name of other gods. In his discussion of the verse about swearing by the name of God falsely,⁵⁸ he says, "if he who swears a wrongful oath [by the name of God] is guilty, how great a punishment does he deserve who denies the truly existing God and honors created beings before their maker, and thinks fit to revere, not only earth or water or air or fire, the elements of the universe, or again the sun and moon and planets and fixed stars, or the whole heaven and universe, but also the works of mortal craftsmen, stocks and stones, which they have fashioned into human shape?"⁵⁹ In support of this he quotes⁶⁰ the verse: "Make no mention of the name of other gods, neither let it be heard out of thy mouth,"⁶¹ which he reproduces from the Septuagint with a few slight verbal variations. From his quotation of this verse it is quite clear that his indictment of

⁵⁶ Exod. 23: 13.

⁵⁷ *Mekilta, Kaspā* 20 [4] (F, p. 101a; W, pp. 106b-107a; H, p. 332; L, III, p. 180); *Sanhedrin* 63b; *Tos. 'Abodah Zarah* VI (VII), 11.

⁵⁸ *Spec.* II, 46, 252.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 256.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 255.

⁶¹ *Exod.* 23: 13.

him who "honors" and "thinks fit to revere" other deities constitutes Philo's own explanation of the meaning of the law about not making any mention of the name of other gods. Philo's understanding of this law, therefore, is that it prohibits not mentioning the name of other gods but only honoring and revering them, thus corresponding to the first two traditional interpretations quoted above, namely, that the law prohibits honoring other gods either by using their name as a designation of an appointed meeting-place or by praising them. Furthermore, the fact that Philo links this verse with the verse about swearing by the name of God indicates that this verse about not mentioning the name of other gods is taken by him, as it is in the third traditional interpretation, to be a prohibition of swearing by the name of other gods. But Philo not only has no objection to the mentioning of the name of other gods, but he also finds in Scripture a law against cursing and reviling the gods of other nations. Commenting upon the verses, "Whosoever curses a god shall be guilty of sin,"⁶² and "Thou shalt not revile the gods,"⁶³ he says that they refer to "the gods of the different cities who are falsely so called"⁶⁴ or to "the gods whom others acknowledge."⁶⁵

With this conception of the existence and unity and incorporeality of God, Philo specifically rejects certain forms of theism identified with certain names in Greek philosophy, namely, the theism of Aristotle, in which God is conceived as an incorporeal form which from eternity existed together with the world as the cause of its motion;⁶⁶ the theism of the Stoics, in which God was conceived as an eternal primary

⁶² Lev. 24: 15 (LXX).

⁶³ Exod. 22: 27.

⁶⁴ Mos. II, 38, 205.

⁶⁵ Spec. I, 9, 53. So also Josephus, *Apion*. II, 33, 237; *Ant.* IV, 8, 10, 207.

⁶⁶ *Metaph.* XII, 7 ff.

fire which remained within the world even after its creation;⁶⁷ and the popular theism of Epicurus, in which the gods were conceived as eternal and happy human beings of an ethereal substance inhabiting the space between the worlds.⁶⁸ With regard to Aristotle, his view is rejected by Philo, as we shall see, in a passage in which he rejects the view of those who assume the eternity of the world on the ground that they postulate in God "a vast inactivity."⁶⁹ With regard to the Stoics and the Epicureans, there is a passage in which he rejects the view of those who assign to God a space "whether inside the world or outside it in the interval between worlds,"⁷⁰ that is to say, whether the Stoic God who is the primary fire within the world or the Epicurean gods who are ethereal beings between the worlds. In this passage both the Stoic God and the Epicurean gods are rejected on the common ground of their being in place, that is, of their being part of the world and hence not incorporeal in the true sense of the term;⁷¹ but the Epicurean gods would also be rejected by him on account of their plurality. A rejection of the Stoic conception of God occurs also in many other passages. In one place, speaking of the Chaldeans, he rejects their belief that "the visible world was the only thing in existence, either being itself God or containing God in itself as the soul of the whole."⁷² This quite evidently represents the view of the Stoics, whose God, that is, the primary fire within the world, is variously described by them either as "the whole world with all its parts,"⁷³ or "the whole world and the heaven,"⁷⁴ or "the

⁶⁷ Cf. Arnim, II, 1027.

⁶⁸ Cf. Usener, *Epicurea*, 359, p. 240, ll. 33 ff.

⁶⁹ *Opif.* 2, 7-11; cf. below, p. 296.

⁷⁰ *Somn.* I, 32, 184; cf. Colson and *Philos Werke*, ad loc.

⁷¹ Cf. below, II, 96 ff.

⁷² Arnim, II, 258, p. 169, l. 14.

⁷³ *Migr.* 32, 179.

⁷⁴ Diogenes, VII, 148.

mind of the world,"⁷⁵ or "the soul of the world."⁷⁶ In other places he speaks disapprovingly of the Chaldeans, again meaning the Stoics, who "taught the creed that the world was not God's work, but was itself God,"⁷⁷ or who considered "the world itself as absolute in its power and not as the work of a God absolute in His power,"⁷⁸ or whose mind "ascribed to the world powers of action which it regarded as causes."⁷⁹ The scriptural text quoted by him in rejection of the Stoic view that God is "as the heaven or the world" is the verse "God is not as man,"⁸⁰ for that verse is taken by him to contain the general principle of the unlikeness of God to anything perceptible by the senses,⁸¹ which to Philo, as we shall see, means the principle of the incorporeality of God and, in a larger sense, the unity of God.⁸² This argument from the imperceptibility and hence also incorporeality of God is also raised by him against the gods of the Epicureans, when, in his allegorical interpretation of the scriptural expression "the face of God,"⁸³ he says: "If the Existent Being has a face . . . what ground have we for rejecting the impious doctrine of Epicurus?"⁸⁴

The existence of God as conceived by Philo on the basis of Scripture is thus of a God who is one and the creator of the world and unlike anything within the world. While he does not consider the Aristotelian and the Stoic conceptions of God as being fully compatible with that of Scripture, he condemns neither of them, either as atheistic or as constituting what Scripture terms the worship of other gods. Aristotle is described by him as having shown "a pious and holy

⁷⁵ Arnim, I, 157.

⁷⁶ Arnim, I, 532.

⁷⁷ *Heres* 20, 97.

⁷⁸ *Congr.* 9, 49.

⁷⁹ *Mut.* 3. 16.

⁸⁰ *Num.* 23: 19.

⁸¹ *Immut.* 13, 62.

⁸² Cf. below, II, 97.

⁸³ *Gen.* 4: 16.

⁸⁴ *Post.* 1, 2.

spirit.”⁸⁵ Of the Stoics he speaks as admitting that “God” is the “cause” of the creation of the world.⁸⁶ Still less would he object to the God of Plato, who, in his *Timaeus*, as paraphrased by Philo, speaks of God “as the Father and Maker and Artificer, and of this world as His work and offspring.”⁸⁷ Only the Epicurean conception of the gods is condemned by him as “impious,” and is placed by him on a par with the animal worship of the Egyptians and the anthropomorphic representation of the gods in Greek mythology,⁸⁸ and this quite obviously is because the Epicurean gods were conceived as having the form of human beings. Of the three conceptions of God which he does not denounce as impious, that of Plato would, according to him, most closely approach the scriptural conception, for the Platonic God is one and the creator of the world and unlike anything within the world. But even the other two conceptions would be looked upon by him as approximating the scriptural conception to a large extent. The God of Aristotle is one and unlike anything within the world, and, while not enough of a creator to satisfy the scriptural requirement for God, He is the cause of that motion by which the world as a whole continues to be what it is and by which also all the things within the world come into being. The God of the Stoics is both one and a creator, and, while not enough unlike things within the world to satisfy the scriptural requirement for God, still He is unlike all other beings in that He is not visible to the eye.

To Philo, then, on the basis of his conception of God, the God of these philosophers is not to be included among the gods which Scripture condemns as false. The philoso-

⁸⁵ *Act.* 3, 10.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 8. This statement is not irreconcilable with the statements quoted above at nn. 77, 78, and 79. To Philo the Stoic God is not a creator in the true sense of the term.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* 4, 15; cf. *Timaeus* 37 c.

⁸⁸ *Post.* 1, 2.

phers' God is only an imperfect conception of God, which philosophers, in the absence of divine revelation, have attained to by reason. In other passages, speaking of non-Jews who have given up polytheism and idolatry, to whom we shall refer as "spiritual proselytes,"⁸⁹ he describes them as those who "practise wisdom, either in Grecian or in barbarian lands,"⁹⁰ or as those who are "wise and just and virtuous," of whose existence "both Greece and the barbarian world are witness."⁹¹ Philo's "spiritual proselytes" are not only those who have acknowledged the Jewish God but also those who by their own reason have arrived at a philosophic conception of one God. It is with reference to philosophers like Plato and Aristotle and the Stoics, and with reference also to "spiritual proselytes" in general, that Philo declares: "All Greeks and barbarians unanimously acknowledge" the existence of a God like that in Scripture, a God who is "the supreme Father of gods and men and the Artificer (*δημιουργός*) of the whole world, whose nature, though not only invisible by the eye but also hard to guess by the mind, is yet a matter into which every student of astronomical science and other philosophy desires to make research and leaves nothing untried which would help him to discern it and do it service."⁹² Though the expression "Father of gods and men" in this passage is reminiscent of the epithet invariably applied by Homer to Zeus,⁹³ Philo uses it here, as he does in other places,⁹⁴ with reference to the God of Scripture. It does not refer to Zeus of Homer. Whatever

⁸⁹ Cf. below, II, 369 ff.

⁹⁰ *Spec.* II, 12, 44.

⁹¹ *Probus* 11, 72-74. Among them he mentions the Seven Wise Men of Greece, the Magi among the Persians, and the Gymnosophists in India.

⁹² *Spec.* II, 29, 165. Colson (*ad loc.*) and Goodenough (*Introduction to Philo Judaeus*, p. 105) take this statement to refer to all pagans in general.

⁹³ Cf. above, p. 38.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

allusion to any Greek deity there is in this expression is to Plato's Demiurge, who addresses the created gods, including Zeus, as follows: "Gods of gods, whose artificer (*δημιουργός*) I am and father of works."⁹⁵ These words of Plato, which are quoted by Philo elsewhere,⁹⁶ are interpreted by him as meaning that Plato "speaks of the moulder of deities (*θεοπλάστην*) as father and maker (*ποιητήν*) and artificer (*δημιουργόν*), and of this world as his work and offspring."⁹⁷

The principle of divine providence is quite obviously directed against the Epicureans who explicitly deny providence.⁹⁸ But in the course of our discussion we shall show that Philo's conception of the scriptural doctrine of providence means something different from the providence which Plato and the Stoics attribute to God.⁹⁹ To him it means individual providence, the power of God to change the order of nature for the benefit of certain of His favored individuals.

The principle of the creation of the world, which he insists upon, means to him that our present world came into being after it had not been, or, as he himself expresses it, "There was a time when it was not."¹⁰⁰ Like Plato, however, he takes this world of ours to have been created out of something preëxistent.¹⁰¹ But that something preëxistent, as we shall show later, was conceived by him as having been itself created by God.¹⁰²

These four principles, the existence of God, the unity of God, divine providence, and the creation of the world, are such as could be derived by Philo from Scripture even if he

⁹⁵ *Timaëus* 41 A.

⁹⁶ *Act.* 4, 13.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁹⁸ Cf. Zeller, III, 14, p. 442, n. 4 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*², p. 463, n. 2).

⁹⁹ Cf. below, II, 292-294.

¹⁰⁰ *Decal.* 12, 58.

¹⁰¹ Cf. below, p. 300.

¹⁰² Cf. below, pp. 303 ff.

had no knowledge of philosophy. Native Jewish tradition had similarly formulated them as principles of religious beliefs.¹⁰³ Not so, however, is the case of the principles of the unity of the world and the existence of ideas, which Philo similarly names as scriptural doctrines.

His insistence upon the unity of the world reflects his adherence to Plato¹⁰⁴ and Aristotle¹⁰⁵ and the Stoics¹⁰⁶ and his opposition to many of the pre-Socratic philosophers¹⁰⁷ and the Epicureans.¹⁰⁸ Though he states that this doctrine was taught by Moses in his account of the creation of the world, he quotes no scriptural verse in support of this view. In native Jewish tradition, on the contrary, the view is expressed that simultaneously with the creation of our present heavens and our present earth God created one hundred and ninety-six thousand other worlds¹⁰⁹ or that Eden, which is beyond Paradise, contains three hundred and ten worlds.¹¹⁰

Similarly his insistence upon the existence of ideas reflects his adherence to Plato and his opposition to Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Epicureans. While there is no definite statement in Scripture as to the existence of ideas, Philo quotes three verses in which he finds references to this theory: (1) the verse stating that man was made "after the image of God,"¹¹¹ in which he takes the term "image of God" to refer to the idea of man;¹¹² (2) the verse which in

¹⁰³ Cf. Neumark, *Toledot ha-'Ikkarim be-Yisra'el*, II, pp. 31-39; G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, Index, under "God," "Monotheism," "Providence," "Creation."

¹⁰⁴ Cf. *Timaeus* 32 c-33 A; cf. 31 A-B.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. *De Caelo* I, 8.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Arnim, II, 530-533.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Index, under *κόσμος* Prädikate.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Usener, *Epicurea*, 45, p. 9, l. 4.

¹⁰⁹ *Seder Rabbah di-Bereshit*, 4-5, and *Midrash Alphabetot*, 89. See Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, I, 11; V, 12, n. 30.

¹¹⁰ *Seder Gan 'Eden*, in Jellinek, *Bet ha-Midrash* II, 53; cf. Ginzberg, *op. cit.*, V, 31, n. 90, and below, pp. 196 f.

¹¹¹ Gen. 1: 27.

¹¹² *Opif.* 6, 25.

the Septuagint reads: "And thou shalt make everything for me according to what I show thee on this mount, according to the pattern (παράδειγμα) of the tabernacle and the pattern of all the vessels thereof, even so shalt thou make it,"¹¹³ in which he takes "patterns" to refer to the ideas of the tabernacle and its vessels;¹¹⁴ (3) the verse "Show me, I pray Thee, Thy glory,"¹¹⁵ in which the term "glory" is taken by him to refer to the ideas.¹¹⁶ Of these three scriptural proof-texts for the existence of ideas, the first and third may be dismissed as attempts on his part to import into scriptural texts the external theory of ideas, as he does indeed interpret many other verses in terms of ideas. Not so, however, is the second proof-text, that of the preëxistent idea of the tabernacle and its vessels. Here Philo did not import into the scriptural verse something altogether new; he only combined an old Jewish tradition with the Platonic theory of ideas.

According to this Jewish tradition there had been in existence an ideal tabernacle, or, as it is usually called, sanctuary, prior to the building of the visible tabernacle in the wilderness; and it was that ideal tabernacle which God showed to Moses as a pattern for the visible tabernacle. This tradition is expressed in two ways. Sometimes it is said that the ideal sanctuary was created by God prior to the creation of the world.¹¹⁷ But sometimes it is said that its creation was only planned by God, or, more literally, came into the thought of God, before the creation of the world.¹¹⁸ These two versions both imply that there existed an idea of the tabernacle before the latter came into actual existence, with

¹¹³ Exod. 25: 9 (8); cf. Num. 8: 4.

¹¹⁴ *Qu. in Ex.* II, 52; cf. *Mos.* II, 15, 74; *Congr.* 2, 8: the archetypal pattern of the candlestick.

¹¹⁵ Exod. 33: 18.

¹¹⁶ *Spec.* I, 8, 45-48.

¹¹⁷ *Pesahim* 54a; *Nedarim* 39b; *Tanḥuma* ed. Buber, Num. Naso, § 19.

¹¹⁸ *Genesis Rabbah* 1, 4: 'alu be-maḥashabah; cf. *Midrash Tehillim*, on Ps. 93: 2, § 3, p. 207b.

the only difference that according to the first version this idea as a real incorporeal being was created by God prior to the creation of the world, whereas according to the second version this idea, before the creation of the world, was only a thought of God and did not come into actual existence until the creation of the world. This ideal sanctuary is referred to as the "celestial sanctuary."¹¹⁹ Besides the sanctuary, there were also ideal models of all its vessels, and these, too, were shown to Moses when he was in heaven.¹²⁰ This belief in the preëxistence of the tabernacle and its vessels is part of a more general belief in the preëxistence of certain objects or persons or actions which were subsequently to play a part in scriptural history. In Talmudic literature they are usually said to be either six or seven in number, but, when all the preëxistent things mentioned in the various lists are added up, they actually amount to the following ten: the Law, the throne of glory, the tabernacle, the Patriarchs, Israel, the name of the Messiah, repentance, paradise, hell, the Holy Land. The preëxistence of some of these occurs also in the apocalyptic literature.¹²¹ Two of these preëxistent ten are also mentioned by Hellenistic Jewish writers. First, the preëxistence of the Law is affirmed by them in their identification of it with that wisdom which in Scripture is said to have existed prior to the creation of the world.¹²² Second, the preëxistence of the tabernacle is stated in the following verse: "Thou gavest command to build a sanctuary in the holy mountain, and an altar in the city of Thy habitation, a copy of the holy tabernacle which Thou preparedst

¹¹⁹ *Genesis Rabbah* 55, 7: *bet ha-miḳdash le-ma'alah*; *Jer. Berakot* IV, 5, 8c: *bet ḳodesh ha-ḳodashim she-le-ma'alah*. Cf. *Tos. Yom ha-Kippurim* III (II), 4: *ḳodesh 'elyon*.

¹²⁰ *Exodus Rabbah* 40, 2. Cf. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, VI, p. 63, n. 324.

¹²¹ Cf. M. Friedmann in his edition of *Seder Eliyahu Rabbah*, ch. 31, p. 160, n. 33; L. Blau, "Preexistence," *Jewish Encyclopedia*, X, 183.

¹²² Cf. above, p. 22.

beforehand from the beginning." ¹²³ It is now generally recognized that this belief in the preëxistence of the tabernacle was not introduced into Hellenistic Judaism under the influence of Plato's theory of ideas; it was rather an old Semitic belief, ¹²⁴ vaguely intimated in Scripture ¹²⁵ but probably preserved in a more vivid form in tradition. For the Hellenistic Jews it was quite natural to blend such beliefs in the preëxistence of things with the Platonic theory of ideas.

In Philo, besides the traditional belief in the preëxistence of the tabernacle with its vessels, there is reference also to the traditional belief in the preëxistence of wisdom, whence also of the Law, which with him, as we shall see, becomes blended with his own particular version of the Platonic theory of ideas. Wisdom is to him what he usually calls the Logos. It means both the totality of ideas which was created before the creation of the world and the Law which was revealed to Moses; and the revealed Law which is to govern the conduct of man is nothing but the Logos or wisdom which is both the pattern after which the world was created and the law by which the world is governed, for the revealed Law is in conformity with the law of the universe. ¹²⁶ There is no ground for the view that Philo did not believe in the revelation of the Law as a historical event and that to him

¹²³ Wisdom of Solomon 9: 8.

¹²⁴ Cf. note on Wisdom of Solomon 9: 8 in Charles's *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, I, p. 549. Cf. also A. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, I, pp. 318-333; D. Neumark, "Ha-Pilosofiah ha-Hadashah," *Ha-Shiloah*, 13 (1904), 553-556; *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters*, I, p. 22, n. 1; *Toledot ha-Pilosofiah be-Yisra'el*, I, p. 21, n.; and more especially in his *Toledot ha-'Ikkarim be-Yisra'el*, II, 1919, pp. 47-56. On the belief in the preëxistence of certain celestial patterns for things on earth, such as a celestial city and a celestial temple, among the Babylonians, see G. Maspero, *The Dawn of Civilization*, 1894, p. 610; A. Jeremias, *Das Alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients*, 4th ed., 1930, pp. 425 ff.; *Handbuch der altorientalischen Geisteskultur*, 2nd ed., 1929, pp. 108-116.

¹²⁵ Exod. 25: 9, 40; 26: 30; 29: 8; Num. 8: 4; cf. I Chron. 28: 12, 19.

¹²⁶ Cf. below, II, 189 ff.

the Mosaic Law was divine only in the sense that it was in conformity with the divine order of the universe.¹²⁷

But in Philo we may perhaps also discern the suggestion of another one of the ten traditional preëxistent things, and that is repentance. With regard to repentance, as with regard to the tabernacle, there are in Jewish tradition two versions. According to one version, repentance was created before the creation of the world;¹²⁸ according to another version, repentance came into the thought of God before the creation of the world,¹²⁹ that is, the existence of repentance was only decreed by God before the creation of the world. Here, too, according to both versions there had existed an idea of repentance before it came into actual existence; but according to the first version it was created as a real idea before the creation of the world, whereas according to the second version it was not created as a real idea until the creation of the world. As a particular thing and the image of that idea, repentance, according to the rabbis, came into existence with the repentance of Adam.¹³⁰ So also Philo, taking repentance to have come into existence, as a particular thing, with Enoch, says in his comment upon the verse "Enoch

¹²⁷ Cf. W. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter*, p. 509: "Jeder eigentliche Gedanke an eine Offenbarung Gottes in der Geschichte tritt hier zurück. . . . Das mosaische Gesetz ist nur ein Spiegelbild der ewigen vernunftgemässen Schöpfungsordnung Gottes." As against this, see Julius Guttman, *Die Philosophie des Judentums*, p. 38: "Der historische Offenbarungsbegriff des Judentums, der in der Tora die höchste und endgültige Verkündung der religiösen Wahrheit erblickt, wird von Philon so gut anerkannt wie von irgendeinem Talmudlehrer"; E. Schürer, *A History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, II, iii, p. 366: "The Thorah of Moses is to him, as to every Jew, the supreme, nay the sole and absolutely decisive authority: a perfect revelation of Divine wisdom. Every word written in Holy Scripture by Moses is a divine declaration." Cf. above, pp. 20 ff., and below, II, 189-190, 199-200.

¹²⁸ *Tanhuma*, Num. Naso, 11; *Pesahim* 54a; *Nedarim* 39b.

¹²⁹ *Midrash Tehillim*, on Ps. 93:2, § 3, p. 207b.

¹³⁰ *Pirke de-Rabbi Eliezer*, ch. 20; cf. Ginzberg, *Legends of the Jews*, V, p. 114, n. 106.

pleased God,"¹³¹ that "a little while before God appointed mercy and pardon to exist, now again He decrees that repentance shall exist."¹³² Now throughout the story of creation, according to Philo, everything decreed by God to be created had been preceded by an idea of it.¹³³ Consequently it must be assumed that there had been an idea of repentance prior to its coming into existence as a particular thing at the time of Enoch.

With regard to the revelation of the Law, it was Philo's belief that whatever is contained in the Pentateuch was written by Moses himself by divine inspiration, even the account of his own death at the end of Deuteronomy.¹³⁴ "I am not unaware," he says, "that all things written in the sacred books are oracles delivered through Moses,"¹³⁵ on which account they are assumed by him to contain "no superfluous word."¹³⁶ This agrees with the Tannaitic teaching that the belief in the revelation of the Law means that every verse, nay even every letter in it, was written by Moses himself by divine inspiration,¹³⁷ though there is a question as to the account of his death whether it was written by Moses himself or by Joshua.¹³⁸ But as to the manner of the process of revelation, Philo describes how, in the case of the ten commandments, in some miraculous way every word uttered by God reached the ears of the people.¹³⁹ It may be said that he felt the same with regard to all the laws that were revealed by God through Moses, though the process, according to

¹³¹ Gen. 5: 22.

¹³² *Qu. in Gen.* I, 82.

¹³⁴ *Mos.* II, 51, 291.

¹³³ Cf. below, pp. 204, 209.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.* II, 35, 188.

¹³⁶ *Fug.* 10, 54; cf. E. Schürer, *A History of the Jewish People in the Times of Jesus Christ*, II, iii, p. 366, nn. 118 and 119.

¹³⁷ *Sanhedrin* 99a; *Sifre Deut.*, § 357, F, p. 149b; HF, p. 427.

¹³⁸ *Sifre Deut.*, § 357, F, p. 149b; HF, p. 427; *Baba Batra* 15a; cf. D. Neumark, *Toledot ha-'Ikkarim be-Yisra'el*, II, pp. 44-46.

¹³⁹ Cf. below, II, 38 ff.

him, differed somewhat with different laws.¹⁴⁰ More than that Philo does not say. If he were challenged to give further information, he would undoubtedly say as did Maimonides many centuries later: "We believe that the whole Law that we now possess was given through Moses and that it is in its entirety from the mouth of God, that is to say, it has reached Moses in its entirety from God in a manner which is described in Scripture figuratively by the term 'word,' and that nobody has ever known how that took place except Moses himself to whom that word reached."¹⁴¹

With regard to his "hope" of the eternity of the law, the use of the term "hope" does not mean that it was for Philo merely the expression of a wish; it was for him a belief and a certainty, as may be gathered from his statement that ultimately in the Messianic age every nation will "turn to honoring our laws alone."¹⁴² The term hope is used here by Philo in the sense of firm faith in the fulfillment of a promise that something will happen in the future, for his belief in the eternity of the Law, as may be judged from the wording of his statement,¹⁴³ is based upon God's promise in the verses "Thus saith the Lord, who giveth the sun for a light by day and the ordinances of the moon and of the stars for a light by night . . . if these ordinances depart from before Me, saith the Lord, then the seed of Israel also shall cease from being a nation before Me for ever," in which he evidently identifies the Law with Israel.¹⁴⁴ For this use of the term hope in the

¹⁴⁰ Cf. below, II, 39 ff.

¹⁴¹ Introduction to Commentary on *M. Sanhedrin* X, Principle 8.

¹⁴² *Mos.* II, 7, 44; cf. below, II, 415.

¹⁴³ *Mos.* II, 3, 14.

¹⁴⁴ Saadia also uses these verses (Jer. 31:34-35) as proof for the eternity of the Law, similarly identifying the Law with Israel (*Emunot we-De'ot* III, 7, Arabic, p. 128, ll. 9-15). These verses are also implied in the statement about the eternity of the Law in Matt. 5: 18, and Luke 16: 17. The belief in the eternity of the Law is expressed also in the following works: The Book of Jubilees 33: 16; The Psalms of Solomon 10: 5; Josephus, *Apion.* II, 38, 277.

sense of faith, Philo had before him the sanction of Scripture. In Scripture the designation of God by the expression "the hope of Israel"¹⁴⁵ and the many verses urging man to place his hope in God¹⁴⁶ have made hope in God synonymous with firm faith in the fulfillment of His promise, for, as he says of God, "He will utter nothing at all which shall not certainly be performed, for His word is His deed."¹⁴⁷ In Greek philosophy the term hope had no such connotation. In Plato, when Socrates is made to say, with regard to a certain phase of his belief in immortality, "I hope (ἐλπίζω) to go to good men," he immediately adds, "though I should not care to assert this positively."¹⁴⁸ The belief in the eternity of the Law was already an established principle in Judaism before Philo, and it is explicitly stated in Sirach.¹⁴⁹

Again, like the Palestinian Jews, more particularly the Pharisees, Philo recognized the existence by the side of the laws of Moses of a body of traditions which was equally binding in authority. Now on this point there is a difference of opinion among scholars. Some scholars take the term unwritten law (ἄγραφος νόμος) used by Philo always to refer to what is called in Judaism the oral law.¹⁵⁰ Other scholars, however, have tried to show that Philo's unwritten law is always used in the Greek sense of the term and never refers to the Jewish oral law.¹⁵¹ Still others, while admitting

¹⁴⁵ Jer. 14: 8; 17: 13. In LXX in both these places the term for hope (ἰσως) is ὑπομονή.

¹⁴⁶ E.g. Jer. 17: 7. Here for hope (ἰσως) the term used in LXX is ἐλπίς.

¹⁴⁷ Mos. I, 51, 283.

¹⁴⁸ Phaedo 63 c.

¹⁴⁹ Sirach 24: 9; 1: 1; cf. Psalms of Solomon 10: 5. On the belief in the eternity of the Law in Judaism, see Strack-Billerbeck on Matt. 5: 18 (I, 245-247); G. F. Moore, *Judaism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927-1944), I, 269-270.

¹⁵⁰ Ritter, *Philo und die Halacha*, p. 14; H. L. Strack, *Einleitung in Talmud und Midraš*⁵, p. 9.

¹⁵¹ R. Hirzel, "Ἄγραφος νόμος," *Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen Classe*

that Philo's unwritten law is most often used in the Greek sense of the term, are of the opinion that in some instances it has reference to the Jewish oral law.¹⁵² A careful examination of the problem has led us to support the last view. We shall try to present the case as it appears to our mind, advancing arguments, some of them already known but most of them new, to show that in some passages the term unwritten law unmistakably refers to the Jewish oral law.

In Judaism, the exponents of the oral law are known by many names, among them the name of elders (*zekenim*).¹⁵³ The contents of the oral law is sometimes described by the general term custom (*halakah*), and this is subdivided into various types, among them the following two: (1) enactments (*takkanot*) and decrees (*gezerot*) introduced by various individual scholars or groups of scholars, which have no basis in the Written Law; (2) interpretations of the Written Law by the method known as *midrash*, that is, investigation into the Written Law.¹⁵⁴ We shall now try to show that in his description of what he calls unwritten law Philo uses terms which are unmistakably the same as the terms used in the description of the Jewish oral law.

First, there is a reference in Philo to "elders" as exponents of oral Jewish traditions. In his preface to his life of Moses, he says that in retelling the life and teachings of Moses he will retell them as he has learned them "both from the sacred books . . . and from some of the elders of the na-

der Königlich Sachsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, XX, i (1900), pp. 16-18, 27; I. Heinemann, *Philos Werke*, II, p. 289, n. 1; "Die Lehre vom ungeschriebenen Gesetz im jüdischen Schrifttum," *Hebrew Union College Annual*, IV (1927), 152-159; Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, p. 78.

¹⁵² Stein, *Pilon ha-Alexandroni*, p. 66, n. 1; Klausner, *Philosofim ve-Hoge De'ot*, p. 74; Ch. Tchernowitz, *Toledot ha-Halakah*, I, i, p. 68.

¹⁵³ I. H. Weiss, *Dor Dor ve-Dorshav*, I⁴, p. 159.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

tion,"¹⁵⁵ for, he adds, "I always interwove what I was told with what I read."¹⁵⁶ "Elders," as we have seen, is used as a technical term designating the exponents of the oral law in Palestine. Moreover, in the Mishnah there is a reference to "elders" who had enacted a certain law with regard to the Sabbatical year which was in vogue among the Jews in Egypt.¹⁵⁷ It is not impossible that by the "elders" in that Mishnah is meant not only the Palestinian "elders" but also the Egyptian "elders" of whom Philo speaks.¹⁵⁸

Second, there is also in Philo a reference to customs (*halakot*) which have their origin in enactments (*takkanot*) and decrees (*gezerot*). Commenting upon the verse "Thou shalt not remove thy neighbor's landmarks which thy fore-runners have set,"¹⁵⁹ he says that this injunction applies also to "the safeguarding of ancient customs (*ἐθῶν*), for customs (*ἔθνη*) are unwritten laws, the decrees (*δόγματα*) of men of old," and "children ought to inherit from their parents, besides their property, ancestral customs which they were reared in and have lived with even from the cradle, and not despise them because they have been handed down without written record"; he concludes with the statement that he who obeys the unwritten laws is "worthy of praise" more than he who obeys the written laws.¹⁶⁰ Now, in this passage, we shall try to show from internal evidence, the term "unwritten laws" refers to the Jewish oral law.

¹⁵⁵ *Mos.* I, 1, 4; cf. Ritter, *op. cit.*, p. 14, n. 2; cf. Schürer, *op. cit.*, II, iii, p. 365, n. 117.

¹⁵⁶ The term τὰ λεγόμενα may reflect the Hebrew term *Haggadot*. Gfrörer (I, p. 50) suggests that it may refer to traditions noted down on the margins of the scriptural text.

¹⁵⁷ *M. Yadayim* IV, 3.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Z. Yawitz, *Toledot Yisra'el*, IV, p. 145.

¹⁵⁹ *Deut.* 19: 14. Philo, in his quotation of this verse, has πρότεροι, which is a more literal translation of the Hebrew *rishonim* than the Septuagint πατέρες. Cf. below, p. 192.

¹⁶⁰ *Spec.* IV, 28, 149-150.

(a) As a rule, when the term "unwritten law" is used by Philo in its original Greek sense, it means laws which existed before the written laws of Moses were revealed, which laws, as he says, the "first generations" followed with perfect ease,¹⁶¹ as a "self-taught" law laid down by nature,¹⁶² and of which, he also says, the Patriarchs and others like them were living symbols.¹⁶³ In this passage, however, it is quite evident that he does not use the term in the sense of a law which existed prior to the law of Moses; he uses it rather in the sense of laws which are still in existence by the side of the laws of Moses. This corresponds exactly to the Jewish oral law.

(b) Of these "unwritten laws" he also says that they are "customs" in the sense of the "decrees of men of old." This quite evidently refers to that part of the oral law which consists of customs (*halakot*) established by the decrees of various ancient authorities, known as *takkanot* and *gezerot*, and attributed traditionally to many Biblical personages as well as to personages of the post-Biblical period prior to the time of Philo.¹⁶⁴

(c) He also says of these "unwritten laws" that they are "ancestral customs" which children ought not to "despise." This undoubtedly reflects the verse "Hear, my son, the instruction of thy father and reject not the laws of thy mother,"¹⁶⁵ the substitution of the term "not to despise" (*μη καταφρονειν*) for the term "reject not" (*μη απωση*), being due to the influence of the verse "Hearken, my son, to

¹⁶¹ *Abr.* 1, 5.

¹⁶² *Ibid.* 3, 16.

¹⁶³ *Decal.* 1, 1; cf. *Abr.* 46, 276; *Mos.* 1, 28, 162; *Virt.* 36, 194.

¹⁶⁴ Such *Takkanot*, according to Jewish tradition, were enacted by Moses, Joshua, Boaz, David, Solomon, the Prophets, Ezra, the Men of the Great Synagogue, John Hyrcanus, the court of the Hasmonians, the court of the priests, and Simeon ben Shetah, who was a contemporary of Alexander Jannaeus.

¹⁶⁵ *Prov.* 1: 8.

the father who begot thee, and despise not (μη καταφρονει) thy mother because she is old." ¹⁶⁶ So also the rabbis find in this verse an exhortation for the observance of ancestral customs which are part of the oral law.¹⁶⁷

(d) He furthermore says that the obedience of these "unwritten laws" is "worthy of praise" more than the obedience of the written laws. So also the rabbis say concerning the oral law that "The words of the Scribes are to be appreciated more than the words of the written law."¹⁶⁸

(e) His interpretation of the verse "Thou shalt not remove thy neighbor's landmarks which thy forerunners have set" ¹⁶⁹ as referring to the preservation of ancestral customs was undoubtedly made under the influence of the verse "remove not ancient landmarks which thy fathers have set."¹⁷⁰ Similarly these two verses are taken by the rabbis to refer to the observation of ancient customs.¹⁷¹

(f) In another place, evidently having in mind again the verse "Thou shalt not remove thy neighbor's landmarks which thy forerunners have set," he says that Sacred Scripture teaches us "not to do away with any of the established customs which divinely empowered men greater than those of our time have laid down."¹⁷² Note the words "greater than those of our time." Similarly the rabbis speaking of decrees and enactments of scholars of old say that "no assembly of scholars can repeal the words of another assembly of scholars unless it is greater in learning and numbers."¹⁷³

¹⁶⁶ Prov. 23: 22 (LXX); cf. Prov. 30: 17.

¹⁶⁷ *Pesahim* 50b; cf. Ritter, *op. cit.*, p. 15, n. 2. Cf. also *Shabbat* 23a, on Deut. 32: 7.

¹⁶⁸ *Jer. Sanhedrin* XI, 6, 30a; cf. Ritter, *loc. cit.* See also reference to *Rhet.* I, 14, 1375a, 15 ff. in Heinemann's and Colson's translations of *Spec.* IV, 28, 149-150. Here as elsewhere Philo is using an Aristotelian statement in support of a Jewish conception. ¹⁶⁹ Deut. 19: 14. ¹⁷⁰ Prov. 22: 28 (27).

¹⁷¹ In connection with Deut. 19: 14, see responsum of Sherira Gaon in *Ṭur Hoshen Mishpat*, § 368, which probably reflects an earlier source (cf. B. Epstein, *Torah Temimah, ad loc.*). In connection with Prov. 22: 28, see *Midrash Mishle, ad loc.*; *Yalḳut Shim'oni* II, § 960.

¹⁷² *Migr.* 16, 89, and 90.

¹⁷³ *M. Eduyot* I, 5.

Third, besides unwritten laws in the sense of "customs" based upon "decrees," Philo speaks also of unwritten laws based upon the interpretation of the written laws. Speaking of the various explanations of the law of circumcision, he says: "These are the explanations which have come to our ears from the discussions of antiquities (*ἀρχαιολογούμενα*) of divinely gifted men who have investigated (*διηρένησαν*) the writings of Moses in no cursory manner."¹⁷⁴ Here the expression "who have investigated the writings of Moses" makes it quite clear that Philo does not refer in this passage to "customs" based upon "the decrees of men of old" but rather to those interpretations of the texts by the method which in Hebrew is called *midrash*, that is, investigation into Scripture. An indirect allusion to the term *midrash* and the *midrashic* method of searching into Scripture may perhaps be discerned in his discussion of the question why Moses speaks only of the "lips" of the river of Egypt¹⁷⁵ and not of the "lips" of the Euphrates or other holy rivers.¹⁷⁶ He describes questions of this kind as "investigations" (*ζητήσεις*) to which, he says, some may object as "savoring of petty trifling" but which he himself defends on the ground that they are "like condiments set as seasoning to the Holy Scripture, for the edification of its readers."¹⁷⁷ The Greek *ζήτησις* is a literal translation of the Hebrew *midrash*, and the objection raised against this sort of investigation as well as the defense made on its behalf is exactly what may be said against and for the *midrashic* method.

¹⁷⁴ *Spec.* I, 2, 8.

¹⁷⁵ *Exod.* 7: 15. "Lip" is the literal meaning of both the Hebrew and the Greek term translated in this verse by "brink."

¹⁷⁶ Philo's observation evidently refers only to the Pentateuch. In other parts of Scripture the expression "lip of the river" in *Ezek.* 47: 6 and *Dan.* 12: 5 undoubtedly refers to the Euphrates, and "the lip of the Jordan" is explicitly mentioned in *II Kings* 2: 13.

¹⁷⁷ *Somn.* II, 45, 300-301.

Fourth, these two elements of Palestinian oral law, decisions and interpretations, are clearly indicated by Philo in a passage in which, after describing the written laws, he says that "there are countless other rules besides these, all that either rest upon (a) unwritten customs (*ἔθῶν*) and usages (*νομίμων*), or (b) are [contained] in the laws (*νόμοις*) themselves."¹⁷⁸ In this passage, the expression "unwritten customs and usages," which, in contrast to those contained in the laws themselves, are *not* contained in the laws, quite evidently refers, as in the other passages, to customs based upon decisions, that is, *takkanot* and *gezerot*; for, according to theory, such customs and usages are not derived from the written laws but are new laws introduced "for the sake of the social order," that is, to facilitate men's keeping the Law, or to serve as a "fence around the Law," that is, to guard the Law and protect it. The expression "or are [contained] in the laws themselves," from the very context, cannot refer to other written laws contained in the Pentateuch. It refers to the countless new laws that have already been derived, and that may still be derived, from the written laws by the *midrashic* method, which new laws, according to theory, are implicitly contained in the written laws themselves.

These, then, are the eight principles which, according to Philo, constitute the religion of Scripture, to which every philosophy must accommodate itself. Of these eight principles, five — namely, existence, unity, providence, creation, and revelation — have been generally accepted, though with some changes, by all religious philosophies throughout the ages, whether Jewish or Christian or Moslem. Other principles of belief, not mentioned by Philo, have been added in the course of history, such, for instance, as the belief in

¹⁷⁸ *Hypothetica* 7, 6; cf. Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VIII, 7; cf. Schürer, *op. cit.*, p. 365, n. 114.

the resurrection of the body in all the three religions and the doctrine of the Trinity in Christianity. But these five principles are considered as fundamental by all of them.

With regard to the existence of God, scepticism, atheism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism are generally rejected by all the three religions. But with regard to the Aristotelian conception of God, new interpretations of this view, as we shall see, made it possible for some religious philosophers to harmonize its Prime Mover with the scriptural conception of a Creator. Similarly Philo's conception of the unity of God, in all its four senses enumerated above — namely, the rejection of polytheism, the uniqueness of God as the sole uncreated Creator, His self-sufficiency, and His simplicity — were generally accepted. But with regard to the simplicity of God there was some discussion as to its implications. In Christianity, with the rise of the belief in the Trinity, and in Islam, with the rise of the belief in attributes, attempts were made to interpret the simplicity of God so as to reconcile it with the belief in the Trinity or attributes. Discussions, too, appeared in all three religious philosophies as to how far the knowability of God is to be excluded by His simplicity and also as to how the predicates by which God is described are to be interpreted. With regard to the belief in divine providence, it was generally accepted in its Philonic sense, though it was subjected to a variety of interpretations. But whatever interpretation came to be advanced, it was presented as one which would safeguard the individual character of divine providence. Creation, too, was accepted, though many philosophers, in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, did not follow Philo in his particular conception of creation. But whatever view about the origin of the world was advanced, it was always explained as representing a belief in the creation of the world in conformity with the teaching of the Book

of Genesis. Finally, the inspired origin of the Hebrew Scripture came to be accepted as a common principle of Jewish, Christian, and Moslem philosophy, though in Islam this belief is somewhat modified.¹⁷⁹

As for the three other principles which Philo presents as foundations of scriptural religion, namely, the eternity of the Law of Moses, the unity of the world, and the existence of ideas, they were not universally accepted by all three religions in their philosophies.

With regard to the eternity of the Law of Moses, both Christianity and Islam rejected it; they believed in the abrogation of that Law.

With regard to the unity of the world, in Christianity, Origen raised the question of the existence of many worlds. Evidently mindful of Sirach's warning "Seek not what is too wonderful for thee, and search not out that which is hid from thee,"¹⁸⁰ he declares the entire speculation on this question as an "unsuitable subject for human thought"; nevertheless, he still tries to derive an affirmative answer to it from the New Testament verse "They are not of this world, even as I am not of this world,"¹⁸¹ without quoting any Old Testament verse in opposition to it. Similarly, in medieval Jewish philosophy, Saadia opposes the theory of the plurality of worlds as it appears in Greek philosophy only on the ground that these worlds were not conceived as having been created from nothing, and he differentiates this Greek philosophical view from the view expressed in the Talmudic statement that "God rides on His swift cherub and roams over eighteen thousand worlds"¹⁸² by maintaining that in the Talmudic statement the assumption is that the many

¹⁷⁹ Cf. above, p. 158.

¹⁸⁰ Sirach 3: 21.

¹⁸¹ John 17: 16. Cf. Origen, *De Principiis* II, 3, 6.

¹⁸² 'Abodah Zarah 3b.

worlds were created from nothing.¹⁸³ Crescas, in his criticism of Aristotle, raises the same question of the existence of many worlds, and, though he quotes in discouragement of this kind of speculation Sirach's warning as it is reëchoed in the Tannaitic statement against inquiring into "what is above and what is below, what is before and what is behind,"¹⁸⁴ he also quotes in support of the plurality of worlds the same Talmudic statement with regard to God's riding on His swift cherub and roaming over eighteen thousand worlds.¹⁸⁵

With regard to the existence of ideas, Philo's view that the belief in them constitutes one of the scriptural fundamentals of religion continued indirectly in Christianity in the doctrine of the Trinity, and in Islam—with the rise, early in its history, of theological speculations known as Kalam—in the doctrine of attributes among those who maintained the existence of real attributes. But while the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is a direct development, as we shall show, of the theory of ideas as revised by Philo, and while also the belief in attributes in Islam is a direct development of the doctrine of the Trinity in Christianity and hence an indirect development of Philo's theory of ideas, these problems acquired an independent status of their own, entirely distinct from the theory of ideas. The theory of ideas in its Platonic sense, ideas in the sense of patterns of things, which to Philo

¹⁸³ *Commentaire sur le Séfer Yesira* (ed. M. Lambert), Arabic, p. 5, ll. 8 ff.; French, p. 19. Saadia gives also another explanation of this Talmudic statement, namely, it refers to eighteen thousand successive worlds. On the Jewish attitude toward the belief in successive worlds, see Judah ha-Levi, *Cuzari* I, 67, and Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* II, 30, and cf. the present writer's discussion of the subject in "The Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic Theories of Creation in Hallevi and Maimonides," *Essays in honour of the Very Rev. Dr. J. H. Hertz* [1942], pp. 427-442.

¹⁸⁴ *M. Hagigah* II, 1, and *Hagigah* 13a, where Sirach 3: 21-22 is quoted. Cf. *Or Adonai* I, ii, 1, and my *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, p. 217.

¹⁸⁵ Cf. *Or Adonai* IV, 2.

is an essential creed in scriptural religion, was not accepted as an essential creed of religion either in Christianity or in Islam or in Judaism. In all of them it was discussed as a pure problem of philosophy on which religion had no definite position.¹⁸⁶

In his assault upon traditional philosophy, Spinoza discusses these five out of the eight Philonic principles which have been acknowledged by the philosophies of the three religions. As for the existence of God, he indeed maintains that God exists and even tries to prove His existence, but his belief in the existence of God only means a belief in the principle of causality as against the Epicurean denial of it and his attempt to prove the existence of God is only an attempt to prove that the wholeness of the world, which is the source of its causality, transcends the mere aggregate of its parts. As for the unity of God, he is willing to repeat all the traditional statements to the effect that God is one and that by His unity is to be understood not only that God is one numerically but also that He is one in the sense of His being self-sufficient and simple. But he does not admit that the simplicity of God means also a denial of His knowability, in the true sense of the term knowability as he understands it, nor does he admit that it means also a denial of His materiality, again in the true sense of the term materiality as he understands it. In his refusal to deny the materiality of God, he departs not only from the medieval philosophers, but also from all the Greek philosophers, rejecting at once both the Platonic and Aristotelian conception of an immaterial God and the Stoic conception of a material God who is immanent in the world. His own conception of God, as to both His nature and His relation to the world, is like that of the Neoplatonized Aristotelian God, except that He

¹⁸⁶ Cf. below, p. 294.

has, in the terminology of Spinoza, both the attribute of thought and the attribute of extension. As for divine providence, he does speak of it indeed, but his conception of providence is radically unlike that of Philo and all the religious philosophers who followed him; it is a revival of the conception of providence as held by Greek philosophers. As for creation, he argues against the various theories of creation as conceived by medieval philosophers. In this, however, neither what he says against the views of others nor what he presents as his own view contains anything new. It is a modified form of the medieval Neoplatonized Aristotelian conception of the origin of the world. The only novelty in it is that he presents it, unlike any of the medieval philosophers, without any attempt to reconcile it with the scriptural account of creation. Finally, as for revelation, he denies it outright, and it is this initial denial of revelation that has led him to the overthrow of all those principles which as formulated by Philo became the common preamble of faith in all the religious philosophies in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

CHAPTER IV

GOD, THE WORLD OF IDEAS, AND THE LOGOS

I. GOD AND THE IDEAS

THE STARTING POINT of Philo's philosophy is the theory of ideas. This theory was with him a philosophic heritage from Plato and, according to his own belief, as we have seen, also from Judaism.¹ But by his time the theory of ideas had grown into a problem. Some, outspoken opponents of Plato — like Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Epicureans — openly denied altogether the existence of ideas as real incorporeal beings. Others, followers of Plato, while openly affirming the existence of ideas, interpreted them as thoughts of God, thereby practically denying their existence as real incorporeal beings.² Then, in the writings of Plato himself there were many vaguenesses and many inconsistencies with regard to the ideas, and these needed clearing up. Finally, many of Plato's statements about the ideas seemed to be contradictory to what Philo considered as essential principles of scriptural religion, and these, he felt, would have to be rejected or else harmonized with Scripture.

Philo will thus start his philosophy with a revision of Plato's theory of ideas. He will be at a loss to know, as will have many a student of Plato after him, whether the God of Plato was outside the ideas or whether He was one of them, and, if the former, whether He and the ideas were co-eternal or whether He was the creator of the ideas. Plato's own state-

¹ Cf. above, pp. 181 ff.

² Zeller, III, 2^d, p. 136, attributes this view to the Neopythagoreans. A. Schmekel, *Die mittlere Stoa*, pp. 430-432, attributes it to Posidonius. Cf. M. Jones, "The Ideas as Thoughts of God," *Classical Philology*, 21 (1926), pp. 317-326. All of them take Philo as being of the same view. Cf. below, p. 209.

ments on these points are either vague or inconsistent. Sometimes he speaks of one of the ideas, the idea of the good, as if it were God,³ sometimes he speaks of God as the one who "produces" ⁴ or who "made" ⁵ the idea of bed, and sometimes he speaks of the ideas in general as "ungenerated and indestructible" ⁶ or as "admitting neither generation nor destruction." ⁷ With his belief inherited from Scripture that from eternity God was alone ⁸ and hence that God alone is uncreated,⁹ Philo was unable to accept a view which would imply that by the side of God from eternity there were other uncreated beings. God from eternity was alone and anything else besides Him must have been brought into being by God, through an act of creation. In accordance with this fundamental belief, he sets out to give his own version of the philosophy of Plato, and he does so partly as an interpretation of Plato and partly as a departure from him.

Evidently having in mind the passages in Plato where the idea of the good might be taken as identical with God,¹⁰ he says that God is "superior to virtue, superior to knowledge, superior to the good itself and the beautiful itself." ¹¹ Evidently, again, having in mind Plato's analogy of the good to the sun, he substitutes God for good. In Plato the analogy reads that "the good, in the intelligible region, in its relation to mind and the objects of mind" is like "the sun, in the visible region, in its relation to vision and the objects of vision" ¹² and that the good is "the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known." ¹³ The same analogy in Philo reads: "God is the archetypal model of laws: He is the sun

³ *Republic* II, 379 B-C.

⁴ *Ibid.*, X, 597 B.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 597 C.

⁶ *Timaeus* 52 A; cf. 28 A, 29 A.

⁷ *Philebus* 15 B.

⁸ *Leg. All.* II, 1, 1-3; *Opif.* 6, 23; cf. above, p. 171.

⁹ *Virt.* 10, 65.

¹⁰ *Republic* II, 379 B-C.

¹¹ *Opif.* 2, 8.

¹² *Republic* VI, 508 C.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 508 D.

of sun, the intelligible sun of the sensible sun, and from invisible fountains He supplies visible beams to that which is beheld." ¹⁴ To Philo then it is not the good which is likened to the sun, but God; and it is not the good which is the cause of knowledge and of truth, but God. Indeed Philo sometimes calls God "the Good" ¹⁵ or "the true Good," ¹⁶ but this is not in the sense that God is the idea of good; it is only in the sense of a property of God, which, like all the other properties of God, is considered by Philo as designating the power or action of God.¹⁷

There are only two passages in which Philo would seem to use the term *idea* in connection with God. Let us examine these passages.

In one of these passages, taking as his text the verses that God "appeared" unto Abraham and that Abraham "looked, and lo, three men stood over against him," ¹⁸ he says that God "presents to the mind which has vision the appearance sometimes of one, sometimes of three: of one, when the mind is highly purified and, passing beyond not merely the multiplicity of other numbers, but even the dyad which is next to the unit, presses on to that idea (*ιδέα*) which is un-mixed and uncompounded, and by itself in need of nothing else whatever." ¹⁹ Here it would at first sight seem that God is called an *idea*. But upon a closer examination of the passage it will be found that the term *idea* is not used here in the sense of a Platonic *idea*, which, according to Philo, as we

¹⁴ *Spec.* I, 51, 279. Cf. also *Virt.* 30, 164.

¹⁵ *Leg. All.* I, 14, 47.

¹⁶ *Gig.* 11, 45.

¹⁷ Cf. below, II, 126 ff. Ritter (*The History of Ancient Philosophy*, IV, p. 430) sees here an inconsistency in Philo. Cf. on this apparent inconsistency also in Bréhier, pp. 70 and 154. According to Bréhier's interpretation, Philo considers God as "the idea of the good" but at the same time also as "beyond the ideas."

¹⁸ *Gen.* 18: 1-2.

¹⁹ *Abr.* 24, 122.

have seen, God is not. From the very use of the terms "appeared" and he "looked, and lo" in the scriptural proof text, and from Philo's restatement of these terms by the terms "presents to the mind . . . the appearance" it is quite evident that the term "idea" in this passage is used by Philo in the sense of a conception of the mind. Philo, we know, often uses the term *idea* in this sense.²⁰ Accordingly, what Philo says in this passage is that the highly purified mind has an idea of God, that is, a conception of Him, as a being who is "unmixed, uncompounded, and by itself in need of nothing else whatever." This is in accordance with Philo's view expressed by him elsewhere that God is absolutely simple and unmixed²¹ and that "He has no wants, He needs nothing, being in himself all-sufficient to himself."²² The ideas, according to him, are not self-sufficient, for they are dependent upon God for their existence, nor are they, as we shall see, of the same degree of simplicity²³ and unmixedness²⁴ as God.

In the second passage, he says that "man, the best of living creatures, through that higher part of his being, namely, the soul, is most nearly akin to heaven, the purest thing in all that exists, and, as most admit, also to the Father of the world, possessing in his mind a closer image and copy than anything else on earth of the everlasting and blessed idea."²⁵ In this passage, the expression "everlasting and blessed idea" would again at first sight seem to refer to the "Father of the world," that is, God, mentioned previously. But, in

²⁰ Cf. Leisegang, *Indices*, sub *idea* 4.

²¹ *Immut.* 11, 53-55; cf. below, II, 98.

²² *Virt.* 3, 9.

²³ Cf. below (II, 139 ff.) discussion about the knowability of the powers or the ideas, from which it may be inferred that they are less simple than God.

²⁴ Cf. below, p. 279. The fact that God does not enter matter whereas the powers or ideas do enter it shows that they are of a lesser degree of unmixedness than God.

²⁵ *Decal.* 25, 134.

our opinion, it refers to the Logos, and the meaning of the passage is as follows. Man through the irrational part of his "soul" is most nearly akin to "heaven," because they are both made of the purest element, namely, fire,²⁶ and through his "mind" he is most nearly akin to the "Father of the world," because his mind is a closer image and copy than anything else on earth of the Logos, which Logos is the totality of ideas, including the idea of mind,²⁷ and is itself called "the idea of ideas."²⁸

II. IDEAS

The superiority of God to the ideas consists, according to Philo, in the fact that He is their creator. Either as a deliberate departure from Plato's account in the *Timaeus* or as an interpretation of it, Philo restates Plato's account with a highly significant change. In the *Timaeus* the ideas are described as eternal¹ and ungenerated² and as not admitting of generation,³ so that when he comes to describe how God created the visible world as a copy of an ideal pattern, called by him "the intelligible animal,"⁴ he definitely says that the ideal pattern could not have been something created, that it had to be something eternal and that all that God had to do was to look at that ideal pattern and create a world in its likeness.⁵ Philo, however, says that when God willed to create the visible world, and to create it after a pattern, He had previously molded (*προεξέτυπον*) its ideal pattern, called by him the intelligible world.⁶ Now the term "to mold previously" (*προεκτυποῦν*) used by Philo here in connection with the intelligible world, is in itself sufficient evidence that the

²⁶ Cf. below, pp. 313, 389, n. 32. ²⁷ Cf. below, p. 213. ²⁸ Cf. below, p. 233.

¹ *Timaeus* 29 A.

² *Ibid.* 55 A; cf. 28 A; 29 A.

³ *Ibid.* 52 A.

⁴ *Ibid.* 39 E.

⁵ *Ibid.* 28 A-29 E.

⁶ *Opif.* 4, 16.

intelligible world of ideas was created by God as something real outside His mind. But, then, right after the statement quoted, Philo speaks of the intelligible world as older (*πρεσβύτερος*) in comparison with the visible world of which he speaks as younger (*νεώτερον*).⁶ This description quite obviously reflects Plato's description of the universal soul as not being younger (*νεωτέραν*) than the world but rather older (*πρεσβυτέραν*).⁷ Now in Plato the description of the soul and the world respectively as older and younger means a comparison between two things both of which were created, for the soul, according to Plato, was created.⁸ Consequently, we have reason to believe that Philo's description of the intelligible world and the visible world respectively as older and younger also means a comparison between two things each of which was created. The intelligible world, therefore, which according to Philo contains as many "intelligible objects," that is, ideas, as there are "objects of sense" contained in the visible world,⁹ was not merely formed in God's thought but was created by God and was given an existence of its own outside of God's thought. So also in his homily on the scriptural account of the first day of creation, which he takes to refer to the creation of the intelligible world as a pattern for the corporeal world, he says that on that day God made (*ἐποίησεν*) seven ideal patterns of various parts of the corporeal world that was to be created.¹⁰ Here the use of the term "made" definitely indicates that the ideas which make up the intelligible world, and hence the intelligible world itself, were created by God and given an existence outside His thoughts. In another place he says that God is "the Father of all things intelligible and sensible." " Here,

⁷ *Timaeanus* 34 c.

⁹ *Opif.* 4, 16.

⁸ *Ibid.* 34 B ff.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 7, 29.

¹¹ *Virt.* 39, 214. Cf. *Conf.* 34, 172, commented upon below, p. 223, n. 34.

again, not only the sensible world of things but also the intelligible world of ideas is said to have God as its Father, that is to say, its Maker and Creator. In still another place, in answer to the question "why the creation of animals and flying creatures is mentioned a second time, when the account of their creation had already been given in the history of the six days,"¹² he says: "Perhaps these things which were created in the six days were incorporeal beings, indicated under these symbolical expressions, being the forms (*species*) of animals and flying creatures, but now they were produced in reality, the images of the former, sensible copies of those invisible models."¹³ The implication is that the ideas were created.

¹² Gen. 2: 19 and 1: 20, 24.

¹³ *Qu. in Gen. I, 19*. This passage is a comment on the second account of the creation of fowl and animals in Gen. 2: 19. As we have seen above (p. 119), Philo, following a Jewish tradition, takes all the events contained in Gen. 2-3, which come after the account of the six days of creation in Gen. 1, to have taken place on the sixth day. Referring, therefore, now to the first account of the creation of fowl on the fifth day and of the creation of animals earlier on the sixth day, he says that those which were created earlier "in the six days were incorporeal beings," that is, ideas. I take the parenthetical term *angeli* in Aucher's Latin translation to be a misunderstanding of the text. In a passage parallel to this in *Leg. All. II, 4, 11-13*, Philo says explicitly that the first account of the creation of animals refers to the creation of genera (*γένη*) and ideas (*ιδέαι*). Angels, as we shall see (cf. below, pp. 372 ff.) belong to a class of powers to be called immanent and not to the class of powers which are identified by Philo with ideas. The parenthetical term *creata*, again in the Latin translation, is, however, what is to be expected here, for, inasmuch as the parallel statement in *Leg. All. II, 4, 13*, reads τὰ πάλαι κατασκευασθέντα, we have reason to assume that the Greek original here contained, or implied, a similar term meaning "created." On the basis of the same passage in *Leg. All.*, the Greek term underlying the Latin term *species* here should be not *εἶδη* but *ιδέαι* and, if the term here be *εἶδη*, then it should be taken in the Platonic sense as the equivalent of *ιδέαι*. In the parallel passage in *Leg. All.*, on the other hand, it is quite evident from the context that the term *εἶδη* is used in the sense of physical forms which are images of genera or ideas. The use of *εἶδος* in this sense is common in Philo (see Leisegang, *Indices*, under *εἶδος* 1). I do not think that the term *γένος* and *εἶδος* in that passage can be taken in the Aristotelian logical sense of genus and species, as it is evidently done by Leisegang who puts them in his *Indices*, under *εἶδος* 2. The Armenian term underlying the Latin *species* in the passage in

Scattered references to the creation of the ideas are to be found also in such passages, for instance, as those in which he says that "before the particular intelligible concept [of the human mind] came into being, the Creator produces (*ἀποτελεῖ*) the intelligible concept itself as a generic existence,"¹⁴ and that "before the particular objects of sense sprang up, the object of sense existed (*ἦν*) by the Maker's forethought as something generic."¹⁵ The term *ἀποτελεῖ*, "produces," used here by Philo in the first quotation, in connection with the idea of the human mind, is exactly the same term used by him in describing the creation of the visible world,¹⁶ and consequently it is to be inferred that, according to him, ideas were created in the same way as sensible objects; and consequently also the term *ἦν*, "existed," used by him in the second quotation, in connection with the generic idea, refers to an existence outside the mind of God. The same view is also implied in his description of the ideas as "myriads of rays" which God as the "archetypal light" pours forth (*ἐκβάλλει*),¹⁷ or in his description of "what we justly call idea" as a certain splendor which God caused to shine forth from himself.¹⁸ In one place, after describing "generic virtue," that is, the idea of virtue, as that which "issues forth (*ἐκπορεύεται*) out of Eden, the wisdom of God, and this is the Logos of God," he explains the term "issues forth" by the statement that 'in accordance with that [Logos or wisdom] has generic virtue been made (*πεποιήται*).'¹⁹ The term "issues forth" thus means "has been made." All this is positive evidence that the ideas in Philo were real objects created by God. Similarly when these

Qu. in Gen., I am informed by Professor Ralph Marcus, may stand either for the Greek *ἰδέαι* or for the Greek *εἰδη*. Evidently Aucher took it in the wrong sense.

¹⁴ *Leg. All.* I, 9, 23.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 10, 24.

¹⁶ *Opif.* 4, 19.

¹⁷ *Cher.* 28, 97.

¹⁸ *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 1.

¹⁹ *Leg. All.* I, 19, 65.

terms, in the subsequent history of philosophy, are used as a description of the process of emanation, that which is emanated from God is also conceived as something which exists outside of God, having been caused by God to emanate from himself. But there is also corroborative evidence of a negative kind. Never does Philo describe the ideas as ungenerated. Indeed in two passages he does use the term eternal (*ἀίδιος*) in connection with the term idea,²⁰ but the term "eternal," as we shall show later, does not necessarily mean "ungenerated"; nor can it have here the meaning of "eternal generation"; it may only mean "everlasting," that is, indestructible; or else, in the passages in question, it may refer to the eternity of the ideas in the mind of God before they were created.²¹ When we consider the fact that in Plato the ideas are described as "ungenerated"²² and as not admitting of "generation,"²³ the absence of any of such description of the ideas in Philo is to be considered as a deliberate omission, and this on account of his view that the ideas as real beings are not eternal and are not ungenerated, but are creations of God. This conception of the ideas as created may be considered, however, not as a departure from Plato but rather as an interpretation of him, for in Plato, too, as we have seen, in opposition to his own statements that the ideas are eternal and ungenerated, there is a statement that God produces (*ἐργάσασθαι*)²⁴ the idea of a bed, or that He has made (*ἐποίησε*)²⁵ that idea of the bed. In the mind of Philo, the conflicting statements of Plato must have formed themselves into a composite view, namely, that the ideas, prior to the creation of the world, had two stages of existence: first, as

²⁰ *Decal.* 25, 134 (cf. above, p. 203, n. 25) and *Mut.* 21, 122-123 (cf. below, p. 212, n. 55).

²¹ Cf. below, p. 222.

²² *Timaeus* 52 A; cf. 28 A; 29 A.

²³ *Philebus* 15 B.

²⁴ *Republic* X, 597 B.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 597 C.

thoughts in the mind of God, they existed from eternity; then, as real beings outside the mind of God, they were created by God; and it is in the sense of real beings, and hence created beings, exclusively, that he chose to use the term ideas in his writings, probably to counteract the common tendency of the philosophy of his time to regard the Platonic ideas as mere thoughts of God.²⁶ But even after their creation, according to Philo, the ideas do not cease to exist in the thought of God, inasmuch as God cannot be ignorant of their existence. Accordingly, to him, in the ideas there are not only two successive stages of existence but also two simultaneous phases of existence, one in the thought of God and the other outside the thought of God. As a designation of the ideas in their pre-created stage, when they were only thoughts of God, Philo, as we shall see, uses another term.²⁷

Thus the ideas, in the sense of patterns of the things which exist in this world of ours, have not existed from eternity as real beings. Moreover, even as mere thoughts of God, the ideas were not always patterns of the things which exist in our world; they were conceived as such by God only when He decided to create the world. "We must suppose," says Philo, "that, when He intended to found one great city, He conceived beforehand the models of its parts (*τοὺς τύπους αὐτῆς*),²⁸ and that out of these He constituted an intelligible world."²⁹ The meaning of this passage is quite clear: the ideas which are the patterns of the things within our world, and similarly also the intelligible world as a whole which

²⁶ Zeller interprets Philo as believing that the ideas are only thoughts of God (III, 24, p. 411). Cf. above, n. 2.

²⁷ Cf. below, p. 223.

²⁸ Literally: "the models thereof." But Colson rightly translates "the models of the parts," which is justified by the context.

²⁹ *Opif.* 4, 19.

consists of the ideas and is the pattern of our world as a whole, were conceived in the mind of God when He determined to create this world of ours; they did not exist in the mind of God before He decided to create the world. Still, inasmuch as the mind of God is always active, always thinking, and never devoid of objects of thought, it is to be assumed that in the mind of God from eternity there had existed an infinite variety of ideas, not patterns of things of our world, but rather patterns of things of an infinite variety of possible worlds, from among which God conceived the particular patterns of things which in His wisdom were the most suitable for this world of ours which He decided to create. That such an infinite number of ideas had existed in the mind of God from eternity, before He decided which of the ideas were to serve as the patterns of the things of this world of ours to be created, we shall see in the sequel.³⁰

With his conception of the ideas as created by God, and hence as dependent upon God for their existence, Philo departs from Plato with regard to the application of the term "that which really is" (*ὄντως ὄν*)³¹ to the ideas. That term is reserved by him for God alone. In this he derives support from the scriptural name of God, "I am,"³² which in the Septuagint is translated by "He that is" (*ὁ ὢν*), and is explained by Philo himself to mean that "God alone has veritable being."³³ Accordingly, God is invariably described by him as He that really is (*ὁ ὄντως ὢν*; *τὸ ὄντως ὄν*)³⁴ or He that truly is (*πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ὢν*).³⁵ Similarly the term *ousia* (*οὐσία*), which, with or without such adjectives as "indivisible," "eternal," "true," and "real," is used by Plato as a designation of the ideas,³⁶ loses with Philo that

³⁰ Cf. below, pp. 223, 315-316.

³¹ *Phaedrus* 247 E.

³² *Exod.* 3: 14.

³³ *Deter.* 44, 160.

³⁴ Cf. *Leisegang, Indices*, sub *εἶναι*.

³⁵ *Abr.* 28, 143.

³⁶ *Timaeus* 35 A; 37 E; *Sophist* 246 B; 248 B; *Phaedo* 78 D.

restricted meaning, and is used by him in the Aristotelian meaning of essence and substance as well as in the Stoic meaning of matter.³⁷ Since God alone is a creator, he applies to Him exclusively the Platonic terms Demiurge,³⁸ that is, Craftsman, Maker (*ποιητής*),³⁹ Planter (*φυτουργός*),⁴⁰ Parent (*γεννητής*),⁴¹ Father (*πατήρ*),⁴² and Cause (*αἴτιος*).⁴³ Some of these terms, such as Father, Maker, Parent, Planter, are also to be found in Scripture.⁴⁴ The concept of God as creator of everything is also expressed in his application to God of the terms spring (*πηγή*)⁴⁵ and light (*φῶς*).⁴⁶ The use of these two terms as a description of God, according to Philo's own statements, is based upon the scriptural verses: "Me they forsook, a spring of life" ⁴⁷ and "The Lord is my light and my saviour," ⁴⁸ though the analogy of light, or rather the sun, is also used by Plato as a description of the ideas.⁴⁹ Sometimes, instead of calling God light, Philo describes Him as lightgiving (*φωσφόρος*)⁵⁰ or the "intelligible sun," ⁵¹ the latter term evidently based upon a combination of Plato ⁵² and of the scriptural verse, which in the masoretic Hebrew text reads "For the Lord is a sun and a shield." ⁵³

Whether Philo has put any limit upon the kinds of things within the visible world for which there are to be corresponding ideas, or whether for every kind of thing within the visible world there is to be a corresponding idea, cannot be

³⁷ Cf. Leisegang, *Indices*, sub *οὐσία*.

³⁸ *Leg. All.* II, 1, 3, *et alia*.

³⁹ *Spec.* I, 5, 30.

⁴⁰ *Conf.* 38, 196.

⁴¹ Deut. 32: 6 (*πατήρ, ἐποίησέ σε*), 18 (*τὸν γενήσαντά σε*); Gen. 2: 8 (*ἐφύτευεν ὁ θεός*).

⁴² *Fug.* 36, 198.

⁴³ *Somn.* I, 13, 75.

⁴⁴ Jer. 2: 13; cf. *Fug.* 36, 197.

⁴⁵ Ps. 27: 1; cf. *Somn.* I, 13, 75.

⁴⁶ Ps. 84: 12; In the Septuagint, the reading is: "Because the Lord loveth mercy and truth."

⁴⁷ *Spec.* II, 32, 198.

⁴⁸ *Opif.* 24, 74.

⁴⁹ *Somn.* I, 11, 67.

⁵⁰ *Republic* VI, 508 B-C; 509 B.

⁵¹ *Ebr.* 11, 44.

⁵² *Virt.* 30, 164; *Spec.* I, 51, 279.

⁵³ Cf. above, p. 201.

known, as he makes no statement in which anything is explicitly excluded from having a preëxistent idea corresponding to it. All his statements bearing on this subject are couched in positive language. From the passages quoted above⁵⁴ it is evident that there are as many "intelligible objects," that is, ideas, in the ideal world as there are "sensible objects" in the corporeal world, and that these ideas are the genera of the particular objects, whether particular objects of thought or particular objects of sense. In one place, he speaks of music in contrast to the musician, and of medicine in contrast to the physician, and of art in general in contrast to the artist, as "habits" (ἔξεις) in contrast to the individual persons in whom they exist, and each of these habits is described by him as "everlasting, active, perfect," and as an "idea."⁵⁵ Now, the term "habit" in this passage is used by Philo, evidently after Aristotle, in the sense of quality (ποιόν),⁵⁶ that is, one of the categories of accident. From this it may be inferred that according to him there is an idea for every accident. In other places, he speaks of the idea of heaven, earth, air, void, water, breath, light,⁵⁷ man,⁵⁸ first numbers,⁵⁹ equality,⁶⁰ and virginity,⁶¹ and indirectly he also refers to the idea of virtue⁶² and the idea of repentance.⁶³ All these are universals and correspond to particulars which are objects of nature. But he mentions also the idea of an object which is artificial, namely, the idea of the tabernacle, which, together with its vessels, was shown to Moses before

⁵⁴ *Opif.* 4, 16; *Leg. All.* I, 9, 23; 10, 24.

⁵⁵ *Mut.* 21, 122-123.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 121, and cf. *Categ.*, 8, 8b, 25-35.

⁵⁷ *Opif.* 7, 29; cf. *Mos.* I, 22, 126 (light).

⁵⁸ *Leg. All.* I, 14, 45; implied in the expression "heavenly virtue" as contrasted with "earthly virtue"; cf. below, II, 202.

⁶³ *Qu. in Gen.* I, 82: implied in his statement that "a little while before He appointed mercy and pardon to exist, now again He decrees that penitence shall exist." Cf. above, pp. 185 f., and below, p. 257.

⁵⁸ *Opif.* 46, 134.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 34, 102.

⁶⁰ *Heres* 29, 146.

⁶¹ *Cher.* 15, 51.

it was made by Bezaleel.⁶⁴ But this would seem to have been considered by him an exceptional case, and no inference can be drawn from it as to a general belief on his part in the existence of ideas of artificial things. Finally, from the fact that he denies that God is the cause of evil,⁶⁵ it would seem that he did not believe that there were any ideas of evil and imperfection.

This conception of the kind of ideas that exist as patterns of things is based upon Plato, for in Plato's writings are to be found statements to the effect that there are ideas corresponding to every number of individuals which have "a common name,"⁶⁶ to the four elements,⁶⁷ to qualities,⁶⁸ to artificial objects,⁶⁹ to numbers,⁷⁰ to activities,⁷¹ to relations such as equality,⁷² and also that there are no ideas corresponding to vile and worthless things.⁷³ But, departing from Plato's various lists of ideas, Philo introduces two new ideas, namely, the idea of mind and the idea of soul. In Plato there is neither an idea of mind nor an idea of soul.⁷⁴ Instead, according to him, prior to the creation of the world there was a universal mind and a universal soul, and these upon the creation of the world were united to form a rational soul, which rational soul was put into the world.⁷⁵ Philo, in departure from Plato, as we shall see,⁷⁶ does not believe that there is in the world a mind or a soul or the combination of the two. Nor does he believe that prior to the creation of the world there was a universal mind and a universal soul. To him

⁶⁴ *Mos.* II, 15, 74; cf. above, p. 182.

⁶⁵ *Provid.* (Aucher) II, 82, and cf.

below, p. 273.

⁶⁶ *Republic* X, 596 A.

⁶⁷ *Timaeus* 51 B.

⁶⁸ *Parmenides* 130 C. Cf. Zeller, II, 1⁴, p. 701, n. 1 (*Plato*, p. 273, n. 126).

⁷⁴ This point is discussed fully in our introductory volume on Greek philosophy.

⁷⁵ *Timaeus* 30 B; 34 C ff.

⁷⁶ Cf. below, pp. 326, 363 ff.

⁶⁸ *Phaedo* 65 D.

⁶⁹ *Republic* X, 597 C.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* V, 479 B; *Phaedo* 101 C.

⁷¹ *Cratylus* 386 D-E.

⁷² *Republic* V, 479 B.

the minds and souls in the world are all individual minds and souls, and they were all created with the creation of the various living beings. But still, all created beings in the visible world, according to him, were preceded by the creation of ideas corresponding to them. Consequently, the created individual minds and souls in the world must have been preceded by the creation of the idea of mind and the idea of soul. We thus find that Philo speaks of the idea of mind (*ιδέα τοῦ νοῦ*) and the idea of sensation (*ιδέα τῆς αἰσθήσεως*),⁷⁷ the term sensation being used by him here as synonymous with soul, for, as he says, "by the senses (*αἰσθήσεων*) the Creator endowed the body with a soul."⁷⁸ These "ideas" of "mind" and "sensation" he also describes as having been completed, that is, created, prior to the "individual mind" (*νοῦς ἄτομος*) and "particular sensation" (*αἰσθησις ἐν μέρει*).⁷⁹

In his description of the creation of the ideas, as we have seen, Philo uses the same term that is used by Plato in his description of the creation of the universal soul, namely, that it is older than the world. Now when Plato says that soul is older than body and prior (*προτέραν*) to it, he is careful to qualify these terms by adding the phrase "in birth (*γενέσει*) and excellence (*ἀρετῇ*)."⁸⁰ By this he evidently means to emphasize the fact that the seniority and priority of soul is not in point of time, inasmuch as time according to Plato did not exist before the creation of heaven,⁸¹ and without time, as says Aristotle, there cannot be any "prior";⁸² the soul is prior and older than the body only in point of what Aristotle would call "priority in nature," in that it is "better and more honorable"⁸³ than body and is in some way the "cause"⁸⁴ of body. Philo similarly tries to explain

⁷⁷ *Leg. All.* I, 9, 21-22.

⁷⁸ *Opif.* 48, 139.

⁷⁹ *Leg. All.* I, 1, 1.

⁸⁰ *Timaeus* 34 c.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* 37 d.

⁸² *Phys.* VIII, 1, 251b, 10-12.

⁸³ *Categ.*, 12, 14b, 4-5.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

that the priority of the creation of the ideas to the creation of the world is not a temporal priority, for, following the generally accepted view that time is connected with motion,⁸⁵ and believing as he did that the world and hence also motion were created, before the creation of the world there was no time and hence no temporal priority.⁸⁶ Commenting therefore on the verse "In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth,"⁸⁷ which according to his interpretation of the first day of creation refers to the ideas of heaven and earth,⁸⁸ he says that this is not to be taken as a beginning "according to time" but rather as a beginning "according to number," so that the expression "in the beginning God made the heaven" is equivalent to "He made the heaven first."⁸⁹ By a beginning according to number and in the sense of first he further explains that he means first in order (*τάξις*),⁹⁰ for "order," he says, "involves number."⁹¹ "Order," he still further explains, "is the sequence (*ἀκολουθία*) and connection (*εἰρμός*) of things going on before and following after,"⁹² for in the creation of the world, he says in effect, there had to be such an order, inasmuch as some things are better than others, and it was reasonable that the heaven should come into existence first, inasmuch as it is "the best of created things."⁹³ Now all this is only a circuitous way of restating the distinction made by Aristotle between "prior" (*πρότερον*) in the sense of priority "according to time"⁹⁴ and other senses of the same term, of which he mentions the following four: (1) "One thing is said to be prior to another when the sequence (*ἀκολουθήσιον*) of their being cannot be reversed,"

⁸⁵ *Opif.* 7, 26; cf. below, p. 319.

⁸⁶ *Opif.* 7, 26.

⁸⁷ Gen. 1: 1.

⁸⁸ Cf. below, pp. 306-307.

⁸⁹ *Opif.* 7, 27.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* 7, 28.

⁹¹ *Ibid.* 3, 13.

⁹² *Ibid.* 7, 28.

⁹³ *Ibid.* 7, 27.

⁹⁴ *Categ.*, 12, 14a, 27.

as, for example, “‘one’ is prior to ‘two’.”⁹⁵ (2) “The term prior is used with reference to any order (*τάξις*),” as, for example, “in geometry, the elements are prior to propositions.”⁹⁶ (3) “That which is better and more honorable is said to be prior by nature” and also (4) “that which is in any way the cause of an effect.”⁹⁷ Philo’s explanation of the phrase “in the beginning” as meaning “beginning according to number” and in the sense of “first” seems to include all these four senses of “prior” which Aristotle distinguishes from “prior according to time.” What he means to say is that the world was created according to a certain order of sequence and causality which was to remain permanently as its established law.⁹⁸

Having explained that the phrase “in the beginning” does not imply a temporal priority but rather a priority in “sequence,” in “order,” and in being “better,” he says that this kind of beginning is applicable to the creation of the heaven “even if the Maker made all things simultaneously (*ἄμα*).”⁹⁹ Now the term “simultaneous,” too, is said by Aristotle to be “primarily and most appropriately” applied to things which exist according to time,¹⁰⁰ and one would therefore like to ask how, if Philo denied that the ideas were temporally prior to the world, he could say that they were simultaneous with the world. Probably he would answer that he had used the term “simultaneous” in the sense in which, according to Aristotle, species within the same genus are said to be “simultaneous in nature,”¹⁰¹ for all created things, whether incorporeal or corporeal, can be considered as various species under the common genus of created things. It will be noticed that in Aristotle’s allusion to Plato’s account of the creation of soul, the original expression “God made soul in

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 30-31.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 36, 39.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 14b, 4-5 and 12-13.

⁹⁸ Cf. below, p. 328.

⁹⁹ *Opif.* 7, 28.

¹⁰⁰ *Categ.*, c. 13, 14b, 24-27.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 33-34.

birth and excellence prior to body, and elder" ¹⁰² is changed by him to read: "The soul is simultaneous with the heaven," ¹⁰³ the term "simultaneous" being evidently used here by Aristotle only in the sense of a negation of priority in time.

As we go on in our studies, we shall see how even before the creation of the world and of time a kind of timeless priority was conceived by some philosophers to be possible by the introduction, before the creation of time, of the conception of "duration" or a "supposition of time." ¹⁰⁴

III. POWERS

Primarily the ideas are used by Philo, as they are by Plato, in the sense of patterns. The scriptural verse which he quotes as proof text for the antiquity of the theory of ideas, namely, the ideas of the tabernacle and its vessels, proves only the existence of ideas in the sense of patterns. But in Plato the ideas are conceived not only as patterns but also as causes (*αἰτίαι*),¹ in which sense he describes them as possessing power (*δύναμις*).² Philo similarly describes the ideas, in that passage in which he calls them "habits,"³ as having power (*δύναμις*) and as being active (*ἐνεργούν*).⁴ With this additional characteristic of the Platonic ideas in his mind, Philo tries to show that the conception of ideas as causes has

¹⁰² *Timaeus* 34 c.

¹⁰³ *Metaph.* XII, 6, 1072a. 2.

¹⁰⁴ The origin of the conception of "duration" and the "supposition of time" is traced by the present writer in the chapter "Duration, Time, and Eternity" in *The Philosophy of Spinoza* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), and in *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929), pp. 93-98; 651-658.

¹ *Phaedo* 95 E ff. Cf. Zeller, II, 14, p. 687, n. 1 (*Plato*, p. 263, n. 110).

² *Sophist* 247 D-E. Cf. Zeller, II, 14, p. 689, n. 3 (*Plato*, p. 262, n. 109).

³ Cf. above, p. 212.

⁴ *Mut.* 21, 122.

also been anticipated in Scripture. He does this by identifying the Platonic ideas, in so far as they are causes and have power, with what, according to him, Scripture calls the powers of God.

The passage in which Philo identifies the Platonic ideas with the scriptural powers of God is a homily on the verse in which Moses prays: "Show me, I pray Thee, Thy glory."⁵ In Philo's paraphrase, Moses' prayer assumes the following form. "I bow before Thy admonitions, that I never could have received the vision of the clearly manifested, but I beseech Thee that I may at least see the glory that surrounds Thee, and by Thy glory I understand the powers that keep guard around Thee. . . . To this He (God) answers: The powers which thou seekest to know are discerned not by sight but by mind even as I, whose they are, am discerned by mind and not by sight. . . . You men have for your use seals which when brought into contact with wax or similar material stamp on them any number of impressions which they themselves are not docked in any part thereby but remain as they were. Such you must conceive my powers to be, supplying qualities to things which have no qualities and shapes to things which have no shapes and yet changing or lessening nothing of their eternal nature. Some among you call them not inaptly ideas (*idéas*), since they bring form into everything that is."⁶

In this passage, it will be noticed, three terms are equated, glory, powers, and ideas, and of these three terms the first two are said to be scriptural and only the third one is said to be Platonic, for it is Plato and his followers to whom Philo refers in his statement that "some among you call them not inaptly ideas." No reference is made to the fact that in

⁵ Exod. 33: 18.

⁶ *Spec.* I, 8, 45-48; cf. 60, 329.

Plato, too, the ideas are called powers. But that Philo was aware of Plato's description of the ideas as having power is evident from the fact that he puts in the mouth of God a description of His powers in terms of Platonic ideas as something already known to the readers. It will also be noticed that the identification of glory with powers is introduced by Philo through his spokesman Moses as something which "I understand." No explanation is given by Philo of why Moses understood by "glory" the "powers" that stand around God. The fact that Philo saw no need of explaining why Moses understood that "glory" means the "powers" shows that in his mind the identification of these two terms needed no explanation; that it was something concerning which he had reason to believe that it was known to his readers. The reason why he believed that this identification was already known to his readers is the fact that "glory" and "powers" are explicitly identified in scriptural verses which already at that time, in the synagogues of Alexandria, must have formed part of the liturgy. In these verses, the Psalmist exclaims: "Open wide your gates, ye chiefs . . . that the King of glory may come in. Who is the King of glory? The Lord of the Powers. He is the King of glory." ⁷ The "Lord of Powers" here is that frequently occurring scriptural expression Lord of Sabaoth, which is usually translated into English by Lord of Hosts, but which in the Septuagint, in this particular verse as well as in many other verses, is translated by a term which literally means "the Lord of the powers" (*κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων*).⁸

As to who those hosts or powers are, of whom God is spoken of as the Lord, it is a matter of speculation among

⁷ Ps. 24: 9-10 (LXX).

⁸ Other translations in the Septuagint of the same Hebrew expression are: *κύριος σαβαώθ, κύριος παντοκράτωρ*.

scholars. It may sometimes mean the Lord of the hosts of Israel, for Scripture speaks of "The Lord of hosts mustereth the host of battle."⁹ It may perhaps also mean the stars, for the celestial bodies are called in Scripture "the host of heaven."¹⁰ Furthermore, it may perhaps also mean the angels, for angels are definitely called the hosts or powers of God in such verses as: "Bless the Lord, all ye his angels . . . Bless the Lord, all ye his hosts" (*δυνάμεις*).¹¹ "Praise him, all ye his angels: praise him, all ye his hosts" (*δυνάμεις*).¹² Philo, however, like any exegetist of Scripture, has assumed the right to interpret the term "powers," at least when it is identified with "glory," as meaning the ideas.¹³

The powers which are thus identified with the ideas are like the ideas spoken of by Philo as having been created by God. God is said to be the Father of the powers.¹⁴ As created by God, they are also spoken of by him as being external to God and "attending" Him as "bodyguards,"¹⁵ as coming after God,¹⁶ as being the glory which is "around" God,¹⁷ and as being "on either side of Him."¹⁸ All this reflects such scriptural statements as "I saw the God of Israel seated on his throne and all the host (*στρατιὰ*) of heaven stood around him, some on the right and some on the left,"¹⁹ and "I saw the Lord seated on a high and lofty throne, and the house was filled with His glory; and Seraphim stood around Him."²⁰ According to Philo's interpretation, we shall see, the term Seraphim has two meanings, one of them

⁹ Isa. 13: 4.

¹¹ Ps. 103: 20-21.

¹⁰ Deut. 4: 19, *et passim*.

¹² Ps. 148: 2.

¹³ For his interpretation of the "Lord of the powers" in the sense of the Lord of the angels, see below, p. 373.

¹⁴ *Cher.* 31, 106.

¹⁵ *Spec.* I, 8, 45; cf. *Sacr.* 15, 59; *Immut.* 24, 109; *Abr.* 24, 122.

¹⁶ *Post.* 48, 169.

¹⁷ *Spec.* I, 8, 45.

¹⁹ I Kings 22: 19.

¹⁸ *Abr.* 24, 121.

²⁰ Isa. 6: 1-2 (LXX).

that of "pattern" (*typos* = τύπος), that is, idea.²¹ And so, since Scripture says that "The host of heaven stood around Him, some on the right and some on the left," and that also "Seraphim stood around Him," Philo was quite justified in describing the ideas or powers as "attending" God as "body-guards," as being "around" Him, and as being "on either side of Him."²²

But this power of acting as causes which the ideas possess does not, according to Philo, belong to them by their own nature. They derive it from God. "To act," he says, "is the property of God, and this we may not ascribe to any created being; the property of the created is to suffer."²³ Since the power to act was bestowed upon the ideas by God, we must necessarily assume that before His bestowal upon them of that power at the time of their creation God had possessed it himself as a property of His own nature, and as a property of God it could not but have existed in Him from eternity. As a property of God, again, it could not be something distinct from the essence of God: it must be identical with His essence.²⁴ The powers in the sense of a property of God, unlike the powers in the sense of a property of the ideas or the ideas themselves, are thus to be spoken of as eternal. But even the powers as a property of the ideas, since they have been bestowed upon the ideas by God, may be considered as only an extension of the powers as a property of God and may therefore be treated as a part of the eternal powers of God. Philo, therefore, sometimes uses the term

²¹ *De Deo*, 6; cf. below, p. 340.

²² Goodenough (*By Light, Light*, pp. 42-43) has found the term *δορυφόροι* used in a Hermetic text (as a description of two guards one of which is the keeper and the other the guide of souls) and also in two magical papyri. But in Philo the term *doruphoros* in the general sense of a *body-guard* or an *escort* or a mere *satellite* is used in connection with all sorts of things (see Leisegang, *Indices*, s. v.).

²³ *Cher.* 24, 77.

²⁴ Cf. below, II, 33.

powers in a general sense and speaks of them as being of an "eternal nature,"²⁵ as being "eternal" in contrast to that which is "created,"²⁶ as being infinite as God himself,²⁷ or as being uncircumscribed as God himself.²⁸ All such expressions refer to the powers either in the exclusive sense of a property of God or both in the sense of a property of God and in the sense of the property of ideas, considering the latter as only an extension of the powers which are a property of God. Moreover, since the powers possessed by the ideas are derived from God, in whom they are eternal, Philo sometimes refers even to the created powers, which stand around Him, as uncreated. He thus says: "And can you think it possible that your understanding should be able to grasp in their unmixed purity those uncreated powers, which stand around Him and flash forth light of surpassing splendor?"²⁹ In this passage there is a particular reason for calling the powers uncreated: it is to emphasize that they are not created in the same sense as corporeal things are created; the latter are created out of matter, the former are created like the emanation of a ray of light from the lightgiving God.³⁰ The term "uncreated" applied to the created powers in this passage may therefore merely mean that they are not created like man; in this sense it is analogous to his statement about the Logos, that it is neither uncreated like God nor created like man.³¹

On the whole, we may therefore say that the ideas in Philo are real beings created by God. But as created beings they may be regarded as patterns, in which sense they are called ideas, or they may be regarded as causes, in which sense they are called powers. Now it happens that when Philo treats

²⁵ *Spec.* I, 8, 47.

²⁶ *Mos.* II, 12, 65.

²⁷ *Opif.* 6, 23.

²⁸ *Sacr.* 15, 59.

²⁹ *Immut.* 17, 78.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Heres* 42, 206; cf. below, p. 234.

of them as mere patterns, he calls them ideas, never applies to them the term uncreated, and describes them as having been conceived in the mind of God and also as having been created outside His mind.³² When, however, he treats of them as causes, he calls them powers, applies to them the term uncreated, and describes them as having, prior to their creation, existed in the mind of God from eternity. Furthermore, during their eternal existence in the mind of God they were as "infinite" and as "uncircumscribed" as God himself.³³ By this latter statement he means that the powers or ideas, before their creation as real beings, to serve as a finite and circumscribed number of patterns of the finite and circumscribed number of things in our finite and circumscribed world, existed in the mind of God as an infinite and uncircumscribed number of patterns of an infinite variety of possible things in an infinite number of possible worlds which God, if He only willed, could create.³⁴

The difference between powers as a property of God and powers as created beings corresponds to the difference between the two ways in which God acts upon the world, the direct and the indirect.³⁵ The term powers in the sense of a property of God merely means the power of God to do things directly in His own person; the term powers in the sense of created beings means the power of God to do things indirectly through intermediaries. According to Philo, as we shall see, primary goods come directly from God, whereas secondary goods, as well as punishments, come from God through the intermediacy of the powers,³⁶ but in certain circumstances even punishments come directly from God.³⁷ Now, in native Jewish tradition, God is said to deal with the world in two

³² Cf. above, p. 208.

³⁵ Cf. below, p. 269.

³³ *Opif.* 6, 23; *Sacr.* 15, 59.

³⁶ Cf. below, p. 382.

³⁴ Cf. above, p. 210. It is also the powers during their first stage of existence concerning which Philo says that through them the intelligible world (see below, pp. 226 ff.) was put together (*Conf.* 34, 172). ³⁷ *Ibid.*

ways, according to the quality of mercy or goodness and according to the quality of law or punishment.³⁸ These two ways of God's dealing with the world are said to be represented in Scripture by two names of God. According to an earlier Palestinian tradition, goodness is identified with the name Elohim and punishment with the name Jehovah. According to a later Palestinian tradition, it is the reverse: Jehovah is identified with mercy and Elohim with law.³⁹

Reflecting this native Jewish tradition, Philo similarly divides the powers, both in the sense of a property of God and in the sense of created beings, into two classes. One of them is described by the term goodness (*ἀγαθότης*) or propitious (*ἰλεως*) or beneficent (*εὐεργέτις*) or gracious (*χαριστική*) or creative (*ποιητική*); the other is described by the term authority (*ἐξουσία*) or sovereignty (*ἀρχή*) or governing (*ἀρχική*) or legislative (*νομοθετική*) or regal (*βασιλική*) or punitive (*κολαστήριος, κολαστική*).⁴⁰ Like the native Jewish tradition, he finds this twofold classification of the divine powers represented in Scripture by the two names for God, Lord (*κύριος*) and God (*θεός*), which in the Septuagint translate respectively the Hebrew Jehovah and Elohim; and, like the older version of the Palestinian tradition, he identifies the

³⁸ *Jer. Ta'anit* II, 1, 65b; *Genesis Rabbah* 12, 15; *Mekilta, Pisha*, 16, F., p. 19b; *W.*, p. 24a; *L.*, I, p. 137; *Berakot* 48b.

³⁹ Cf. A. Marmorstein, *The Old Rabbinic Doctrine of God*, I, 1927, pp. 43 ff.; *idem*, "Philo and the Names of God," *Jewish Quarterly Review*, N.S. 22 (1931-32), 295-306; L. Finkelstein, "Recent Progress in Jewish Theology," *Jewish Quarterly Review*, N.S. 20 (1929-30), 362-363; R. Marcus, "Recent Literature on Philo," *Jewish Studies in Memory of George A. Kohut*, 1935, pp. 477-478; M. Stein, *Pilon ha-Alexandroni*, 1937, p. 58, n. 3.

⁴⁰ Cf. *Cher.* 9, 27-28 (1): Goodness, identified with creation, and (2) authority; *Sacr.* 15, 59: (1) sovereignty and (2) goodness; *Heres* 34, 166: (1) gracious and (2) punitive; *Abr.* 25, 124-125: (1) beneficent and (2) governing or regal; *Qu. in Ex.* II, 68, Harris, *Fragments*, p. 67: (1) creative and (2) regal, from which come respectively (1) propitious or beneficent and (2) legislative or punitive; *Fug.* 18, 95: (1) creative, (2) regal, (3) propitious, (4) legislative, subdivided into (a) command and (b) prohibition. Cf. Siegfried, p. 213; Drummond, II, pp. 83-85.

power of goodness with Elohim, or God, and the punitive power with Jehovah, or the Lord.⁴¹ But inasmuch as he uses the term powers both in the sense of ideas and in the sense of a property of God, he expresses himself in his various classifications of these powers in two ways. On the one hand, referring to powers in the sense of ideas, he speaks of these two classes of powers as something distinct from God.⁴² But on the other hand, referring to the powers as a property of God, he speaks of God himself as being gracious,⁴³ or good,⁴⁴ or a creator,⁴⁵ or a king,⁴⁶ or a sovereign,⁴⁷ or a law-giver.⁴⁸

In the native Jewish original of this Philonic classification of the powers, the term "powers" is not used. The term used there instead is one which literally means "measures" and derivatively means also "rules" and "standards."⁴⁹ A reflection of this original Palestinian term may be discerned also in Philo. In one passage he gives his twofold classification of the powers in the form of a comment upon the verse "Hasten and knead three measures (μέτρα) of fine meal."⁵⁰ He then adds the explanation that each of God's powers "measures all things" and that "His goodness is the measure (μέτρον) of things good, His authority is the measure of things in subjection, and the Ruler himself is the measure of all things corporeal and incorporeal, on which account the powers assume also the functions of rules (καυόνων) and standards (παραπηγμάτων) and measure what lies within

⁴¹ *Plant.* 20, 86; *Abr.* 25, 124. The translation of Jehovah by κύριος reflects the traditional Jewish substitution of Adonai for Jehovah.

Bréhier (pp. 144-151) tries to find parallels for this distinction in Stoicism. Goodenough (*By Light, Light*, pp. 42 ff.) tries to find its parallels in the Hermetic literature.

⁴² *Cher.* 9, 27-28; *Fug.* 18, 94-96.

⁴³ *Deus.* *Leg. All.* III, 61, 174.

⁴⁴ *Αγαθός.* *Ibid.* I, 14, 47.

⁴⁵ *ποιητής.* *Spec.* I, 5, 30.

⁴⁶ *βασιλεύς.* *Cher.* 29, 99.

⁴⁷ *άρχων.* *Ibid.* 24, 83.

⁴⁸ *νομοθέτης.* *Fug.* 13, 66.

⁴⁹ *Middot.*

⁵⁰ *Gen.* 18:6.

their province.”⁵¹ One can readily admit that there is an allusion in this passage to Plato’s statement that “in our eyes God will be the measure of all things,”⁵² in opposition to Protagoras’ view that man is the measure of all things.⁵³ But still — in view of the fact that what Philo calls here “powers” and describes as “rules” and “standards” and as “measuring” is called in native Jewish tradition by a term which means “measures,” “rules,” and “standards” — it is not unreasonable to assume that the two classes of “powers” in Philo and the two classes of “measures” in native Jewish tradition are somehow connected and, if neither of them is dependent upon the other, they may reflect a common tradition.⁵⁴

IV. THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD AND THE LOGOS

We thus have in Philo two terms, ideas and powers, expressing two aspects of the Platonic ideas — one their aspect as mere patterns of things and the other their aspect as causes of things. With regard to the term ideas, Philo uses it exclusively as a description of the patterns created by God when He decided to create our world; and hence he never applies to ideas the term uncreated. With regard to the term powers, however, Philo uses it both as a description of the eternal powers which are a property of God and as a description of the powers which were created by God when He decided to create our world; and hence he speaks of powers also as uncreated. But sometimes Philo treats of the ideas, and also of the powers, as a totality, no longer as the patterns or causes of individual things in our world but as the pattern

⁵¹ *Sacr.* 15, 59.

⁵² *Laws* IV, 716 c.

⁵³ *Post.* 11, 35; *Somn.* II, 29, 193. Cf. Leisegang’s note in *Philos Werke* on *Post.* 11, 35, and Colson’s note on *Post.* 11, 36, and on *Somn.* II, 29, 193.

⁵⁴ Cf. above, p. 91.

or the cause of the world as a whole. When treated as such, they are given by Philo two new names, intelligible world and Logos. Let us, then, study these two new names.

The treatment of the ideas as a totality under one name is already found in Plato, in passages wherein he refers to the ideal pattern of the world as a whole as the intelligible animal (*νοητὸν ζῶον*)¹ or the animal that truly is (*τὸ δ' ἔστι ζῶον*),² in contrast to the physical world which he describes as a "visible animal" (*ζῶον ὄρατὸν*);³ and under this intelligible animal he includes four ideas of the four types of living beings in the world, to which he refers as the intelligible animals (*νοητὰ ζῶα*).⁴ But the expression intelligible world (*κόσμος νοητός*) which Philo gives to the totality of ideas is not known to have been used before him.⁵ Plato, indeed, uses the expressions "intelligible place" (*νοητὸς τόπος*)⁶ and "super-celestial place" (*ὑπερουράνιος τόπος*)⁷ as a description of the place of the ideas; but, whatever Plato may have meant by "intelligible place," Philo, we may assume, took it to mean the same as the "supercelestial place,"⁸ and the latter, as we shall see, was taken by him to mean an infinite void outside the world.⁹ His "intelligible world," however, is not

¹ *Timaeus* 39 E. Cf. J. Horowitz, *Untersuchungen über Philons und Platons Lehre von der Welterschöpfung*, 1900, pp. 1-103.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* 30 D.

⁴ *Ibid.* 30 C; cf. below, p. 307.

⁵ Philo is taken to be the first to have used the term intelligible world. Cf. Bréhier, *Plotin: Ennéades* II (1924), p. 58, n. 1; P. Shorey, *Plato: The Republic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, the Loeb Classical Library, 1930-1935), VII, 517 C, Vol. II (1935), p. 130, n. a. The expression *κόσμος ἀσώματος* in *Philebus* 64 B does not mean the "incorporeal world" of the ideas, but rather the "incorporeal order" which exists in living bodies in the physical world, the term *κόσμος* having there the meaning of *λόγος* (cf. R. G. Bury's note in his edition).

⁶ *Republic* VI, 509 D; VII, 517 B.

⁷ *Phaedrus* 247 C.

⁸ Cf. L. Robin, *La Théorie platonicienne de l'amour*, pp. 83-84; R. Arnou, *Le Désir de dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin*, p. 48, n. 1; P. Shorey, *loc. cit.*; J. Adam's note on *Republic* X, 614 C, 18 in his edition (Vol. II, p. 436).

⁹ Cf. below, p. 241.

that infinite void.¹⁰ The term intelligible world was probably coined by Philo himself. This intelligible world is defined by him as a "commonwealth (*πολιτεία*) of imperishable and incorporeal ideas,"¹¹ or as a world which "consists (*συνεστῶτα*) of ideas"¹² or "of invisible ideas,"¹³ or as a world which was framed (*ἐπάγη*) from "incorporeal and paradigmatic ideas."¹⁴ As the individual ideas are the patterns of the individual things in the world, so the intelligible world is the archetype of this phenomenal world¹⁵ or the pattern of this visible world.¹⁶ Again, as in the case of the ideas of which the intelligible world is constituted so also in the case of the intelligible world, it is always spoken of as something created by God. We have already quoted Philo's use of the expressions "He first fully formed" and "elder" in connection with the intelligible world as a whole.¹⁷ The intelligible world, like the ideas of which it consists, is a pattern of this world which was conceived and created by God when He willed to create this world. It had no existence prior to that. As in the case of ideas, Philo never refers to it as uncreated. Like the ideas, as a pattern of this world of ours, the intelligible world had no eternal existence even in the mind of God; it was conceived by God only when He decided to create the world.

The term "intelligible" in the expression "intelligible world" would seem to have been used by Philo in two senses.

In one sense, it would seem to have been used by him as the equivalent of the terms "incorporeal" and "invisible," which terms are used by him in the expression "incorporeal ideas" or "invisible" ideas. "Intelligible" in this sense is the opposite of "sensible," and accordingly it means something which can be conceived only by the human mind, as

¹⁰ Cf. below, p. 245.

¹¹ *Gig.* 13, 61.

¹² *Opif.* 4, 17; cf. 5, 20; *Somn.* I, 32, 186.

¹³ *Conf.* 34, 172.

¹⁴ *Mos.* II, 25, 127.

¹⁵ *Conf.* 34, 172.

¹⁶ *Opif.* 4, 16.

¹⁷ Cf. above, p. 205.

opposed to that which can also be perceived by the senses. That this is one of the meanings of the term as used by Philo is quite evident from his use of the expression "intelligible world" as the opposite of "visible world"¹⁸ or "sensible world."¹⁹ Taken in this sense only, the "intelligible world" merely means a world which, because of its incorporeality, can be apprehended only by the human mind.

But the term "intelligible world" would seem to have been used by Philo also in another sense. Not only is it something that can be apprehended only by the human mind, but it is something which, irrespective of the possibility of its being apprehended by the human mind, exists as an object of thought of some kind of mind. For the existence of the intelligible world, according to Philo, does not depend upon the fact that it can be thought of by the human mind; to him, it had existence even before the human mind was created. But still, even before the human mind was created, it had existence not only as an incorporeal world but also as an intelligible world, that is, as an object of thought of some mind. What, then, is that mind of which, even before the human mind was created, the intelligible world was an object of thought?

What that mind is and how it is related to the intelligible world may be gathered from Philo's description of the creation of the intelligible world.

When God had decided to create the world, he says, "He thought out (*ἐνεβόησε*) beforehand" the ideas, and out of these ideas "He constituted the intelligible world."²⁰ The intelligible world, like the ideas of which it consists, was thus "thought out" by God, which implies that it was an object of God's thought, His *νοητόν*, and the result of His act of

¹⁸ *Opif.* 4, 16.

¹⁹ *Mos.* II, 25, 127.

²⁰ *Opif.* 4, 19.

thinking, His *νόησις*. But when there is an "object of thought" and an "act of thinking," we know from Aristotle, there must be also a mind, a *νοῦς*, which does the thinking, though in the case of God, who in this case does the thinking, these three are all identical.²¹ The intelligible world, therefore, before its creation, was the object of thought of the act of thinking of God's mind. Now of the three terms which we should expect here — *νοῦς*, *νόησις*, and *νοητόν* — the third is directly mentioned by Philo in the expression *κόσμος νοητός*, the second is implied in the verb *ἐνενόησε*, but as for the first, *νοῦς*, he does not use that term at all, but in its stead uses the term *Logos* (*λόγος*), which occurs in his statement that "the world consisting of the ideas could have no other place (*τόπον*) than the divine *Logos* which ordered them."²² "Logos" in this passage quite clearly stands for "mind." That Philo uses here the term *Logos* as a substitute for Aristotle's term mind (*νοῦς*) is also evidenced by the fact that his statement here about the *Logos*, that it is the place of the intelligible world and ideas, is itself based upon a statement by Aristotle that the thinking (*νοητική*) soul, that is, mind, "is a place (*τόπον*) of forms (*εἰδῶν*)."²³

Logos, then, is Philo's substitute for the term *Nous*. For this use of the term *Logos* as a substitute for the term *Nous*, Philo had ample justification. In Plato it is correlated with the terms knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) and thought (*διάνοια*) and is ascribed to God as a characterization of the intelligence with which He created the sun, the moon, and the five other planets, and by which the creative processes in nature in animal and plant life and even in the formation of lifeless substances are continued.²⁴ In Aristotle, it is often used as a designa-

²¹ *Metaph.* XII, 7, 1072b, 18-22; 9, 1075a, 3-5.

²² *Opif.* 5, 20.

²³ *De Anima* III, 4, 429a, 27-28.

²⁴ *Timaeus* 37 c; *Sophist* 265 c.

tion of the rational faculty and hence as the equivalent of Nous.²⁵ In the Stoics, too, it is used as a designation of the rational faculty and hence as the equivalent of Nous,²⁶ and accordingly, just as they speak of God as the Nous of the world or the Psyche of the world, so they also speak of him as the Logos of the world.²⁷ Philo, therefore, had good justification for the use of the term Logos as the equivalent of the term Nous, though why he should have substituted it for Nous is a question which we shall try to answer later.²⁸ It is the mind of God, renamed Logos, in which the ideas and the intelligible world consisting of the ideas were conceived and of which they are an object of thought. Inasmuch as God is absolute simplicity, His mind and His thinking and the objects of His thought are all one and identical with His essence. The Logos, therefore, as the mind of God and as the place of the ideas from eternity, starts on its career as something identical with the essence of God.

The ideas, however, as we have already seen, do not remain in the mind or the Logos of God. By an act of creation they acquire an existence as created beings outside the mind of God. When they are created and sent forth to an existence outside the mind of God, according to Philo, they are not allowed to fly loose in a disorderly fashion. They are compacted into a world, and that world, again, is not allowed to exist as a bare, compacted group of ideas without something to encase it. The world compacted of ideas is an intelligible world, that is, a world which continues to be the object of thought of a mind, but no longer a mind which is in God and identical with His essence, but a mind created by God, especially created by Him to serve as an encasement of the

²⁵ Cf. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus*, sub λόγος III.

²⁶ See Index to Arnim, sub λόγος (ratio) and νοῦς.

²⁷ Cf. below, p. 253, n. 2.

²⁸ Cf. below, p. 253.

intelligible world and the ideas which constitute that intelligible world. Now, since Philo has chosen to call the mind of God in which the ideas and the intelligible world were conceived by the name of Logos, he continues to use that name also for the mind which God has created as the encasement of the created ideas and the created intelligible world. The Logos, therefore, which started its career as the mind of God or as the thinking power of God, and hence as identical with the essence of God, now enters upon a second stage of its existence, as an incorporeal mind created by God, having existence outside of God's essence, and containing within itself the intelligible world and the myriads of ideas of which the latter consists.

The Logos, then, is the mind of which the intelligible world and the ideas which constitute the intelligible world are the objects of thought. But mind and its object of thought are identical not only in the case of God but, to some degree, also whenever the knowledge of the mind is actual; for, as says Aristotle, "actual knowledge is identical with the thing known."²⁹ Accordingly, mind or the Logos, whose knowledge of the thing known by it is actual, must be identical with the intelligible world or the ideas which constitute the intelligible world, though, of course, not to the same extent to which the mind of God was identical with the ideas ere the latter were created. It is in this sense that Philo says of the Logos that it is "the rich and manifold union of myriad ideas."³⁰ In one place, he says that God "stamped the entire world with an image and idea (*ιδέα*), namely, His own Logos."³¹ Here the term idea, with which the term Logos is synonymous, is evidently used collectively in the sense of the totality of ideas. The conception of the

²⁹ *De Anima* III, 7, 431a, 1-2.

³⁰ *Sacr.* 25, 83.

³¹ *Somn.* II, 6, 45.

Logos as the totality of ideas, and hence its description by the term idea, is also brought out by him in his statement that the idea of man, which was created by God prior to the creation of the perceptible man and of which the latter is an image (*similitudo*), is itself "the form (*forma*) of the principal character," which form he describes as "the Logos of God, the first principle, the archetypal idea, the first measure of the universe."³² It is evidently in this collective sense of the totality of the ideas that the Logos is also called by him the idea of ideas (*ιδέα ιδεῶν*),³³ an expression based, as we shall show, upon Aristotle's description of mind as the form of forms (*εἶδος εἰδῶν*).³⁴ In another place, he says that "the human mind" was shaped "in conformity with the archetypal idea (*ιδέα*), namely, the most sublime Logos."³⁵ Here Logos is evidently used in the sense of the idea of mind.³⁶ It is in this sense that he speaks of the Logos in its relation to the individual human mind as the archetype (*ἀρχέτυπος*) or pattern (*παράδειγμα*) of the latter, and of the latter as the copy (*μίμημα*) of the former.³⁷ Later we shall show that he uses the term Logos also in the sense of the idea of virtue.³⁸

The created incorporeal Logos outside of God, which started on its career as an uncreated Logos in God, continues to possess one of the essential characteristics of the source from which it is derived. It is not only a mind capable of thinking; it is also a mind always in the act of thinking. Just as the uncreated Logos in God is a power like all the powers of God, the act of God's thinking, His *νόησις* no less than His

³² *Qu. in Gen.* I, 4.

³³ *Migr.* 18, 103; *Opif.* 6, 25; cf. below, p. 247.

³⁴ *De Anima* III, 8, 432a, 2.

³⁵ *Spec.* III, 36, 207.

³⁶ Cf. above, p. 213.

³⁷ *Heres* 48, 230; 233; cf. *Opif.* 23, 69; *Spec.* III, 36, 207, and below, p. 425.

³⁸ Cf. *Somn.* II, 36, 242-243, and below, p. 261; II, 202.

νοῦς, so also the created incorporeal Logos is a power, and it encases the ideas not only in the sense of patterns but also in the sense of powers. Accordingly, in his description of the created incorporeal divine Logos, Philo also says that it is that "which God himself completely filled with incorporeal powers."³⁹

It is because the Logos is conceived by Philo as both the totality of ideas and the totality of powers that sometimes, as in the case of the ideas, he describes it as created. The Logos is thus spoken of as the eldest and most generic of created things,⁴⁰ as "older than all things which were the objects of creation,"⁴¹ as not being uncreated as God, though not created as human beings,⁴² as being the first-born son of God,⁴³ the man of God,⁴⁴ the image of God,⁴⁵ second to God,⁴⁶ a second God,⁴⁷ and as being called a god by those who have an imperfect knowledge of the real God.⁴⁸ An implication that the Logos is created is contained also in a passage where he says that "being the Logos of the Eternal (αἰδιον) it is of necessity also itself incorruptible (ἀφθαρτος)." ⁴⁹ Here, we take it, he uses the term "incorruptible" as distinguished from "eternal" deliberately, in order to show that while God is "eternal," in the sense of being both ungenerated and incorruptible, the Logos is only "incorruptible" but not ungenerated. In another place, too, he deliberately describes the Logos, or as he calls it there "the right Logos," merely as "not corruptible" (οὐ φθαρτός), and from this non-corruptibility of the Logos he deduces that a statute which is law is αἰώνιον,⁵⁰ a term which should be translated here not by

³⁹ *Somn.* I, 11, 62.

⁴⁰ *Leg. All.* III, 61, 175.

⁴¹ *Migr.* 1, 6.

⁴² *Heres* 42, 206.

⁴³ *Agr.* 12, 51, *et alia.*

⁴⁴ *Conf.* 11, 41; cf. 14, 62; 28, 146.

⁴⁵ *Conf.* 28, 147, *et alia.*

⁴⁶ *Leg. All.* II, 21, 86.

⁴⁷ *Qu. in Gen.* II, 62: secundus deus.

⁴⁸ *Leg. All.* III, 73, 207; cf. *Somn.* I, 39, 229-230; 41, 238-239.

⁴⁹ *Conf.* 11, 41.

⁵⁰ *Ebr.* 35, 142.

“eternal,” as it is usually done,⁵¹ but rather by “everlasting,” for previously he has used as an equivalent of it the term “deathless” (ἀθάνατον),⁵² that is, something which has a beginning but has no end.⁵³ In all these passages, the Logos is spoken of, directly or indirectly, as being created. In two passages, however, he directly uses the expressions “the eternal Logos” (ὁ αἰδῖος λόγος)⁵⁴ and “the eternal (αἰδῖος) image, the most holy Logos.”⁵⁵ Eternal as a description of the Logos is also implied in the expression “eternal and blessed idea,”⁵⁶ which, as we have suggested, refers to the Logos.⁵⁷ In all these passages, in which the Logos is spoken of as eternal, the term eternal is not used in the sense of uncreated. It is used either in the sense of indestructible, or, as we have suggested above in the case of the powers, in the sense of its including the two stages of the existence of the Logos taken together. Whether the term eternal here is used in the sense of “eternal generation” is a question which we shall discuss later.⁵⁸ But unlike the term powers, which is sometimes used by Philo exclusively in the sense of a property of God, the term Logos is never used by him exclusively in that sense, except in those statements in which it refers figuratively to God’s activity of speaking — as, for instance, the statement that “God then speaks (λαλεῖ) in unmixed unities, for His Logos is not a sonant impact of voice upon air, or mixed with anything else at all, but it is

⁵¹ So Latin translation; Drummond, II, 193; Colson; Adler in *Philos Werke*. Yonge correctly: everlasting.

⁵² *Ebr.* 35, 141.

⁵³ One must not, however, assume that Philo uses the terms αἰδῖος and αἰώνιος rigidly in the sense of eternal and everlasting respectively. In *Plant.* 2, 8, God is described as αἰώνιος, whereas the Logos is described as αἰδῖος.

⁵⁴ *Plant.* 5, 18.

⁵⁵ *Conf.* 28, 147. In this passage the reading may be not “eternal” but rather “invisible” (ἀεδής). Cf. *Philonis Opera*, ed. Wendland, *ad. loc.*

⁵⁶ *Decal.* 25, 134.

⁵⁷ Cf. above, p. 203.

⁵⁸ Cf. below, p. 322.

unbodied and unclothed and in no way different from unity,"⁵⁹ or in the statements that "His Logos is His deed"⁶⁰ and "Whatever God says (λέγει) is not words (ρήματα) but deeds."⁶¹ In all these statements, the term Logos, whether expressed or understood, is used as a figurative way of describing the property of God to act.

With his use of the term Logos not only in the sense of the totality of ideas but also in the sense of the totality of powers, we should expect him also to say that the Logos is the totality of those contrasting powers of goodness and authority, or propitiousness and legislativeness, in which all the powers are classified by him. Now Philo does not actually say that, but he expresses himself to the same effect in different words. In his comment on the verse "And He posted the Cherubim and the flaming sword,"⁶² he explains that the Cherubim and the flaming sword symbolize respectively the powers of goodness and authority, adding that the Logos is in the midst between these two powers, for it had the effect of "reuniting" them, and through it "God is both ruler and good."⁶³ Similarly, in his comment on the verse "I will speak to thee from above the mercy seat in the midst of the two Cherubim,"⁶⁴ the two Cherubim are interpreted as symbolizing the creative and the regal powers,⁶⁵ and the expressions "from above" and "in the midst" are taken to refer to the Logos, who is described as being "above all these" or "the charioteer of the powers"⁶⁶ or "in the mid-

⁵⁹ *Immut.* 19, 83. Similar other examples are to be found in the passages in Leisegang, *Indices*, under λόγος III, 1.

⁶⁰ *Sacr.* 18, 65; *Mos.* I, 51, 283.

⁶¹ *Decal.* 11, 47.

⁶² *Gen.* 3: 24.

⁶³ *Cher.* 9, 27-28; cf. *Qu. in Gen.* I, 57, where the flaming sword is taken to symbolize the heaven or the sun; cf. below, pp. 337 ff.

⁶⁴ *Exod.* 25: 22 (21).

⁶⁵ *Fug.* 19, 100; *Qu. in Ex.* II, 68; Harris, *Fragments*, p. 66.

⁶⁶ *Fug.* 19, 101.

dle" (*μέσος, in medio*)⁶⁷ or "the source (*πηγή, fons*) from which the creative and regal powers divide themselves off."⁶⁸ All this is merely a figurative way of describing the logical relation of the Logos, as the totality of powers, to the chief two powers which are contained within it. It is only another way of restating the view which he has expressed elsewhere in his statements that the Logos is "the rich and manifold union of myriad ideas,"⁶⁹ or that it is the "idea of ideas,"⁷⁰ or that it is that "which God himself has completely filled throughout with incorporeal powers."⁷¹ Neither the statement that the Logos is the "source" of the creative and regal powers nor the statement that "from these two powers others grow out"⁷² is to be taken literally as indicating a theory of "descending emanations."⁷³ The terms "source," "divide themselves off," and "grow out" are only figurative terms expressing the logical relations of whole to part or the prior to the posterior. It is for this reason that in another place all these powers are figuratively described as "colonies" of the "mother-city" which is the Logos, and are arranged among themselves according to the order of logical priority.⁷⁴ All these various descriptions of the Logos in its relation to the powers merely mean that, as the totality of the powers, the Logos combines within itself the two opposite groups into which the powers are divided and as such acts as their harmonizer and mediator — a rôle which Philo

⁶⁷ *Qu. in Ex. II*, 68; Harris, *Fragments*, p. 66; cf. *De Deo* 5: "Desuper autem dicitur loqui, qui in medio est, quia Ens per verbum omnia exornavit." In *Heres* 34, 166, he who is said to be "standing above and in the midst of them" refers to the Logos; not to "God himself" as translated by Colson.

⁶⁸ *Qu. in Ex. II*, 68; Harris, *Fragments*, p. 67.

⁶⁹ *Sacr.* 25, 83; cf. above, p. 232.

⁷⁰ *Migr.* 18, 103; *Opif.* 6, 25; cf. above, p. 233.

⁷¹ *Somn.* I, 11, 62; cf. above, p. 234.

⁷² *Qu. in Ex. II*, 68; Harris, *Fragments*, p. 67.

⁷³ Cf. Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, p. 27.

⁷⁴ *Fug.* 18, 95.

elsewhere explicitly assigns to the Logos and which will be dealt with more fully later in our chapter on the immanent Logos.

His conception of the Logos, and of the ideas which are contained in the Logos, as created by God has led Philo to revise the meaning of the Platonic term image (*εἰκῶν*). In Plato the term image is used exclusively with reference to things in the visible world; ideas are not images, they are patterns (*παραδείγματα*).⁷⁵ In Philo, indeed, the term image is still applied to things in the visible world,⁷⁶ and ideas as well as the Logos are still described by the term pattern as well as by the term archetype (*ἀρχέτυπος*),⁷⁷ but, unlike Plato, Philo describes the ideas as well as the Logos also by the term image.⁷⁸ God alone, according to him, is to be described only by the terms pattern and archetype⁷⁹ and never by the term image. The ideas as well as the Logos are indeed patterns or archetypes with reference to things in the visible world which are modeled after them, but they are only images with reference to God who has created them. This double aspect of the ideas and Logos is clearly brought out in his homily on the meaning of the name Bezalel and on the verse about the creation of man after the image of God. The word Bezalel, he says, means "in the shadow of God"; and by "shadow" is meant the Logos which "is the archetype for further creations, for just as God is the pattern of the image, to which the title shadow has just been given, even so the image becomes the pattern of other things, as the prophet made clear at the very outset of the Law-giving by saying, 'And God made man after the image of God,'⁸⁰

⁷⁵ Cf. *Timaeus* 28 c-29 c.

⁷⁶ *Opif.* 6, 25; *Plant.* 12, 50; *Ebr.* 33, 132-133.

⁷⁷ *Ebr.* 33, 133, *et alia*. This term is not used by Plato.

⁷⁸ *Leg. All.* I, 13, 33; 13, 42; 16, 53; III, 31, 96; *Somn.* II, 6, 45.

⁷⁹ *Deter.* 24, 87; *Spec.* I, 51, 279. See Leisegang, *Indices*, s. v.

⁸⁰ Gen. 1: 27.

implying that the image had been made such as representing God, but that the man was made after the image when it had acquired the force of a pattern.”⁸¹ But in order to differentiate between the two usages of the term image, he sometimes speaks of image when applied to the ideas as the “incorporeal” image⁸² and of image when applied to corporeal objects as “visible”⁸³ or “sensible”⁸⁴ image. This double use of the term image, as we shall see, reappears in the writings of the Church Fathers, as when, for instance, Origen speaks of “certain images (*imagines*) which the Greeks call ideas (*idées*).”⁸⁵ The term “image” is used here by Origen in the sense of “invisible image” (*imago invisibilis*)⁸⁶ and in the Philonic sense.

Our interpretation of Philo that his Logos, as well as his powers, has two stages of existence prior to the creation of the sensible world, one from eternity as a property of God and the other as something created by God, differs from the interpretations hitherto advanced of Philo. The common opinion among students of Philo is that the Logos, as well as the powers and the ideas and the intelligible world, prior to the creation of the sensible world existed only in the mind of God.⁸⁷ This common interpretation seems to be based upon the assumption that, inasmuch as the prevailing interpretation of Plato at the time of Philo was that the ideas were only thoughts of God, Philo could not have believed otherwise. But it overlooks the fact that the belief in the existence of ideas as real beings does appear later in history,

⁸¹ *Leg. All.* III, 31, 96; *Heres* 48, 230-231; *Opif.* 6, 25.

⁸² *Somm.* I, 14, 79.

⁸³ *Opif.* 51, 146.

⁸⁴ *Ebr.* 33, 132; 34, 134.

⁸⁵ *De Principiis* II, 3, 6. Cf. my discussion of the entire passage in *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, I (1956), pp. 270-276. ⁸⁶ *Ibid.* I, 2, 6.

⁸⁷ Dähne, I, 208-12; 259; *Gfrörer*, I, 176; 179; Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos*, 255; Zeller, III 24, p. 411; Drummond, II, p. 174; Bréhier, p. 154.

and there is no reason, therefore, to assume that Philo could not have held such a view. That Philo did actually hold such a view has been shown by us on the basis of the texts examined. In anticipation of our discussion in a subsequent chapter, we may also add here that besides the two stages in the existence of the antemundane Logos and powers there is still a third stage, and that is their existence, after the creation of the world, as immanent in the world.

V. RELATIONS BETWEEN GOD, THE LOGOS, AND THE IDEAS

In our analysis of Philo we have found that the relation of God to the Logos is that of the Creator to the created, that the relation of the Logos to the intelligible world is that of mind, an actually thinking mind, to its object of thought, and that the relation of the intelligible world to the ideas is that of the whole to the parts of which it consists. We shall now take up a certain number of passages in which Philo discusses these relations of God to the Logos, of the Logos to the intelligible world, and of the intelligible world to the ideas, and shall try to present them in the form of a connected argument.

In such a connected argument the starting point is a passage in which Philo expresses his disapproval of the assumption that the intelligible world exists in place. "To speak of or conceive that world which consists of ideas as being in some place (*τόπω τι*) is illegitimate."¹ On the face of it, this statement would seem to be only a repercussion of Plato's complaint that because of our "dreaming state" we think that "all which exists," including the ideas, "must be in some place (*τινι τόπω*) and filling some space"² and a re-affirmation of Plato's statement with regard to the idea of beauty that it is "never anywhere (*οὐδέ που*) in anything

¹ *Opif.* 4, 17.

² *Timaeus* 52 B-C.

else,"³ a statement on the basis of which Aristotle generalizes that Plato's ideas are "nowhere" (*μηδέ που*)⁴ or that they are "not in place" (*οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ*).⁵ However, the emphatic manner of Philo's statement here has in it the decided ring of a challenge rather than the acquiescence of an agreement. Philo seems to challenge here some one who, while believing in the existence of ideas, holds that the ideas exist in some place. Now it happens that Plato himself, with all his explicit denial that the ideas exist in place, speaks of them as existing in a "supercelestial place" (*ὑπερουράνιος τόπος*).⁶ What he means by this "supercelestial place" he does not explain. Our own interpretation of it is that he means by it a supercelestial void which, according to him, as also according to some of his predecessors, surrounded the world.⁷ If this interpretation of Plato is correct, then Philo's challenge here is aimed at Plato, who believed that there was a void outside the world, which void he calls supercelestial place, and that the ideas existed in that supercelestial place.

No argument is advanced by Philo here against the view that the intelligible world of ideas exists "in some place"; he only presents his own view in opposition to it. But, if we are right in our assumption that the expression "in some place" here refers to a void outside the world, then his argument against it is to be found in his repeated rejection of the existence of such a void⁸ and in the arguments he advanced against it.⁹ Indeed in none of the four places where he discusses the void outside the world is the belief in its existence

³ *Symposium* 211 A.

⁴ *Phys.* III, 4, 203a, 9.

⁵ *Ibid.* IV, 2, 209b, 34.

⁶ *Phaedrus* 247 c.

⁷ This interpretation is discussed fully in our introductory volume on Greek philosophy.

⁸ *Plant.* 2, 7; *Heres* 47, 228; *Act.* 16, 78; 19, 102.

⁹ *Plant.* 2, 7-8. On the source of these arguments see Bréhier, p. 86.

attributed to Plato, and in three of these places it is either directly or indirectly attributed to the Stoics.¹⁰ But the attribution of the belief in a void outside the world to the Stoics, and not to Plato, does not mean that he did not understand Plato to believe in the existence of such a void any more than it means that he did not know that the Pythagoreans and the Atomists also held such a view. It only means that Philo is following his general custom of attributing to the Stoics ancient views which were only revived by them, but which by his time were associated with their name. Certain it is, however, that it is this "supercelestial place" of Plato that Philo had in mind in his reference to the illegitimacy of speaking of the ideas as existing "in some place," and, if he did not believe that Plato's supercelestial place referred to a void, he must have certainly felt that these terms lent themselves to such an interpretation; and perhaps there were some people at his time who did actually interpret them that way. It is such a possible or actual interpretation of Plato's statements that the ideas have their location in the "supercelestial place" that he had in mind when he said that "to speak of or conceive the world which consists of ideas as being in some place is illegitimate."

If the intelligible world of ideas does not exist in a void outside the physical world, where, then, and how does it exist? To answer this question Philo resorts to an analogy, which, in the extended form in which it is presented, sounds like the parables of the rabbis and Jesus. One has only to add at its beginning the words "I shall tell you a parable: what is it like unto? It is like unto a king who was about to found a city," or the words "the creation of the world is like

¹⁰ In *Aet.* 16, 78; 19, 102, it is directly attributed to the Stoics. In *Heres* 47, 228, it is identified with the belief in a general conflagration, which Philo usually treats as a Stoic belief.

unto a king who founded a city," to make it read like a parable in the Midrash or in the New Testament.

If a king founds a city, says Philo, his purpose is, as a rule, to satisfy his soaring ambition and to add fresh luster to his good fortune. Again, a king, as a rule, cannot build a city by himself; he must make use of the services of some skilled architect. The architect, on receiving the commission from the king, sets about first to devise a plan for the city to be founded. He studies the site upon which the city is to be founded and in accordance with the conditions of the climate and the terrain he sketches mentally the various parts of that city. Out of these mental sketches of the various parts of the city he then forms, again mentally, a general image of the city as a whole. This image he carries in his "soul" as the impression of a seal is carried in wax. Philo is careful not to mention that the architect makes a diagram of his plan, for that would destroy the purpose of his parable.¹¹ The architect carries his plan, Philo repeats twice, in his "soul," that is, in his rational soul or mind. Finally, "by the innate power of memory he recalls the various parts of the city . . . and like a good craftsman he begins to build the city of stones and timber."¹²

Compared with this, the creation of the intelligible as well as of the visible world by God has many similarities, but also many dissimilarities, both of which are brought out by Philo in his account of God's creation of the intelligible as well as of the visible world. Unlike the king in the parable who is

¹¹ A similar parable in the Midrash reads: "According to the custom of the world, when a mortal king builds a palace he does not build it by his own skill but with the skill of an architect, and that architect does not build it out of his own head, but employs plans and diagrams to know how to arrange the chambers and the wicket doors" (*Genesis Rabbah* I, 1). It is to be noted that in the Midrash the use of "plans and diagrams" by the architect is mentioned. Cf. Moore, *Judaism*, I, 267.

¹² *Opif.* 4, 17-18; 5, 20.

in need of a skilled architect to plan and build the city for him, God in the creation of the world was "with no counsellor to help Him."¹³ Then, again, unlike the king in the parable, God did not create the world in order to satisfy some soaring ambition of His or to add fresh luster to His good fortune. The creation of the world was a mere expression of his goodness, for "God, guided by His own sole will, determined that it was meet to confer rich and unrestricted benefits upon that nature which apart from divine bounty could obtain of itself no good thing."¹⁴ Like the architect in the parable who devises an ideal plan of the city in accordance with the requirements of the condition of the site on which the city is to be built, God plans the world for the benefit of those who are to inhabit it "in proportion to the capacities of the recipients."¹⁵ Again, like the architect in the parable, who sketches first plans of the individual parts of the city and out of these forms a plan of the city as a whole, God, in planning the creation of the world, "conceived beforehand the models of its parts out of which He constituted the intelligible world" as a whole.¹⁶ Then, also, just as the plan of the city devised by the architect in the parable "held no place in the outer world, but had been engraved in the soul of the artificer as by a seal,"¹⁷ so also the plan of the world devised by God had no other place than "the divine Logos,"¹⁸ a term which, as we have seen, is used by Philo in the sense of rational soul or mind.¹⁹ Finally, like the architect in the parable, God, "using the intelligible world as a pattern, brought to completion the world visible to the senses."²⁰ There is, however, one fundamental difference between the ideal city in the soul

¹³ *Ibid.* 6, 23.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 4, 19.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 4, 18; 5, 20.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 5, 20.

¹⁹ Cf. above, p. 230.

²⁰ *Opif.* 4, 19.

of the architect and the intelligible world in the Logos which Philo does not bring out in this analogy but is brought out by him, as we have shown, in many other passages. In the case of the architect, neither his soul nor the ideal city which is in the soul has an existence outside the body of the architect. In the case of God, however, the Logos or the mind of God, after the intelligible world is formed in it, is created by God as a real being outside the essence of God,²¹ and as a real being, a Logos or a pure mind, it contains within itself as object of its thought the intelligible world which in its turn consists of the ideas.

The upshot of this analogy is that the intelligible world consisting of ideas does not exist in "place," that is, in a void, for "the world consisting of ideas would have no other place than the divine Logos."²² In other words, the Logos is the place of the intelligible world as well as of the ideas of which the intelligible world consists. Accordingly, in his comment upon the verses "He came to the place of which God had told him"²³ and "He lighted upon the place,"²⁴ Philo takes the term "place" to refer, by way of allegorizing (*ἀλληγορῶν*),²⁵ to the Logos;²⁶ and the reason why the Logos is called place, he adds, is that the Logos is that "which God himself has completely filled throughout with incorporeal powers."²⁷

The exact meaning of the relation of the Logos to the intelligible world or the ideas, by which Philo has justified himself in speaking of the Logos figuratively as place, is to be found in Aristotle, upon whom Philo must have undoubtedly drawn for the use of this expression.²⁸ Aristotle, refer-

²¹ Cf. above, p. 232.

²² *Opif.* 5, 20.

²³ *Gen.* 22: 3.

²⁴ *Gen.* 28: 11.

²⁵ *Somn.* I, 11, 67.

²⁶ *Ibid.* I, 11, 66; 12, 68; 19, 117.

²⁷ *Ibid.* I, 11, 62.

²⁸ Cf. above, p. 233.

ring to such a Platonic expression as that the ideas may be only in our souls (*ἐν ψυχαῖς*),²⁹ says: "Therefore it has been well said that the soul," that is, the thinking (*νοητική*) soul or mind, "is a place (*τόπον*) of forms,"³⁰ which he himself subsequently explains as meaning nothing more than that "the forms are in the soul,"³¹ or that "the faculties of the soul are identical with the forms,"³² or that the mind (*νοῦς*) is the "form of forms" (*εἶδος εἰδῶν*).³³ All these statements with regard to the identity of the mind with the intelligible object are further qualified by the statements that it is only when "the objects are immaterial" that "that which thinks and that which is thought are identical,"³⁴ that it is only "actual knowledge" which "is identical with the thing known,"³⁵ and that it is only when the mind "thinks" that it is "actually" something,³⁶ that is to say, having actual knowledge and being identical with the thing thought or known.

This is exactly what Philo means by his statement that the Logos is the place of the intelligible world and with it also of the incorporeal ideas of which it is constituted. The intelligible world is the content of the Logos, just as in Aristotle the forms are the content of the mind. And just as in Aristotle the mind, when it is in the actual operation of thought, is identical with the intelligible object, so also in Philo "the intelligible world is nothing else than the Logos of God when already engaged in the act of creation."³⁷ This is also the meaning of his description of the Logos as "the rich and manifold union of myriad ideas,"³⁸ or that "which God

²⁹ *Parmenides* 132 B. See Hicks on *De Anima*, 429a, 27, in his edition.

³⁰ *De An.* III, 4, 429a, 27-28.

³¹ *Ibid.* III, 8, 431b, 29-432a, 1; cf. II, 4, 417b, 23-24.

³² *Ibid.*, 431b, 28.

³³ *Ibid.*, 19-20.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 432a, 2.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 429a, 24.

³⁶ *Ibid.* III, 4, 430a, 3-4.

³⁷ *Opif.* 6, 24.

³⁸ *Sacr.* 25, 83.

himself has completely filled throughout with incorporeal powers.”³⁹ The Aristotelian background of all this is quite clearly evident, as we have pointed out above, in his description of the Logos as the “idea of ideas” (*ιδέα ιδεῶν*),⁴⁰ which corresponds exactly to Aristotle’s description of mind as the “form of forms” (*εἶδος εἰδῶν*).⁴¹

But the Logos, as we have seen, did not remain within God, but was given by God, through an act of creation, an existence of its own. With that created Logos, God is, therefore, not identical, and cannot be said to be the place of that Logos in the same way as the Logos is said to be the place of the intelligible world. Accordingly, Philo maintains that God is “prior” (*πρὸ*) to place and Logos,⁴² using the term “prior” (*πρὸ*) here, of course, not in the temporal sense but rather in one of the senses which, according to Aristotle, the term prior (*πρότερον*) has, namely, as a description of the relation of cause to effect.⁴³

But by the time of Philo the term “place” as an appellation of God, the origin of which has been variously explained, must have already been in common usage in Palestinian Judaism. As interpreted in later Jewish sources, it meant that “God is the place of the world, but His world is not His place,” that is to say, God is everywhere in the corporeal world, thereby exercising His individual providence, but He is no part of the corporeal world and is unlike anything in it. In Greek philosophy, the use of the term “place” as an appellation of God does not occur, but a suggestion for the use of it does occur, and that suggestion may have been made perhaps before the time of Philo. According to Sextus

³⁹ *Somn.* I, 11, 62.

⁴⁰ *Migr.* 18, 103; *Opif.* 6, 25, according to some readings; cf. Cohn et Wendland, *Philonis Alexandrini Opera, ad loc.*

⁴¹ *De Anima* III, 8, 432a, 2.

⁴² *Somn.* I, 19, 117; cf. I, 11, 65. ⁴³ *Categ.* 12, 14b, 4 ff.; cf. above, p. 214.

Empiricus, the Sceptics, in their arguments against the Peripatetics, tried to force the latter to admit that God was to be considered by them as the place of the world. The argument is as follows. According to Aristotle, "the heaven" is not in any place, because "no body contains it." Again, according to Aristotle, all men agree in "allotting the highest place to the deity," that highest place being called "ether." From these two statements, the Sceptics argue, it must follow that God is "the limit of the heaven" and "since heaven's limit is the place of all things within heaven, God — according to Aristotle — will be the place of all things"; but this, they conclude, "is itself a thing contrary to sense." ⁴⁴ In view of all this, Philo could not remain satisfied with the mere statement that God is "prior to place and Logos." He wanted to reaffirm the Jewish application of the term place to God, but, in order to safeguard it against misunderstanding, he wanted also to explain what to his mind was its real meaning.

And so we shall now try to show how Philo continues to argue that, while God cannot be described as the place of the created Logos in the sense of His being identical with it, there are other senses in which God can be described as the place of the created Logos as well as the place of all other created things. "The term place," says Philo, "has a three-fold meaning: firstly, that of a space filled by a body; secondly, that of the divine Logos." ⁴⁵ In neither of these two

⁴⁴ Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* II, 31-34, referring to Aristotle, *Phys.* IV, 5, 212b, 8-9; *De Caelo* I, 3, 270b, 6-7 and 22 (cf. J. A. Fabricius, in note to his edition of Sextus Empiricus, II, 1841, pp. 681-682; J. Freudenthal, "Alexander Polyhistor" in his *Hellenistische Studien*, 1-2, 1875, p. 72, referring also to Proclus, *Timaeus* 117 D). For the Palestinian Jewish use of this divine appellation, see *M. Yoma* VIII, 9. For the native Jewish explanation of it, see *Genesis Rabbah* 68, 9. This Palestinian Jewish use of the term has been taken to have either a Philonic or a Persian origin, but it is undoubtedly of native Jewish origin (cf. A. Marmorstein, *The Old Rabbinic Doctrine of God*, I, 1927, pp. 92-93). ⁴⁵ *Somn.* I, 11, 62.

meanings, of course, can God be called place. "There is, however, a third signification in keeping with which God himself is called a place, by reason (1) of His containing things, and being contained by nothing whatever, and (2) of His being that to which all things flee for refuge, and (3) because He is himself the space of himself, for He is that which He himself has occupied."⁴⁶ The first two of these three reasons for calling God place are given by him also in his comment on the verse "I will give thee a place to which he who has slain a man [unintentionally] shall flee."⁴⁷ "For here," says Philo, "he uses the word place, not of space entirely filled by a body, but figuratively of God himself, since (1) He contains (*περιέχων*) and is not contained, and because (2) He is the refuge for the whole universe."⁴⁸ The third and first of these three reasons are given by him also in the following passage: "God is His own place, and He himself is full (*πλήρης*) of himself, and He himself is sufficient for himself, filling and containing all other things in their destitution and barrenness and emptiness, but himself contained by nothing else, seeing that He is himself one and the whole."⁴⁹

Now the three reasons given by Philo in these passages as to why God should figuratively be called place reflect three characteristic descriptions of place found in Greek philosophy. In Aristotle, three of the five essential characteristics which he assumes to belong to place read that "place is what contains (*περιέχων*) that of which it is the place and is no part of the thing . . . and is separable from it."⁵⁰ Again, in Aristotle, the goals toward which things in the world move naturally and in which they rest naturally are called the proper places (*τόποι οικείοι*) of those things,⁵¹ which

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 63.

⁴⁷ Exod. 21: 13 (LXX).

⁴⁸ *Fug.* 14, 75.

⁴⁹ *Leg. All.* I, 14, 44.

⁵⁰ *Phys.* IV, 4, 210b, 34-211a, 3.

⁵¹ *De Caelo* I, 8, 276a, 10-12; *Phys.* VIII, 3, 253b, 33-34.

view is expressed by him in the statement that each of the elements "naturally tends to be borne towards its own place (*χώραν*)." ⁵² Finally, in the Stoics, place is defined as that "which is possessed (*ἐχόμενον*) by a body" ⁵³ or that "which is occupied (*κατεχόμενον*) by an existent thing." ⁵⁴

Evidently with these characteristics of place in his mind, Philo tries to show how God can be called place figuratively. For, argues he, if with Aristotle one considers that the essential characteristic of place is that it is "what contains" (*περιέχον*) and is not "what is contained," then God is to be called place figuratively, inasmuch as He contains all things and is contained by nothing whatever. If, again, with Aristotle one says that the proper place of a thing is that toward which it is naturally moved and in which it naturally rests, then God is also to be called place figuratively, inasmuch as He is that to which all things flee for refuge. Finally, if with the Stoics one says that place is a space possessed or occupied by a body, then God is also to be called place figuratively, inasmuch as He himself occupies himself or is full of himself. The main contention of all this is that if God is to be called the place of the world in a figurative sense, it is not in the sense that God is identical with anything in the world or with the world as a whole. God can be called figuratively the place of the world only in the sense that He is that which contains and not that which is contained, that He is different from the world, that He is the cause and creator of the world. And it is in this sense that in his comment on the verse which in the Septuagint reads "Didst thou not call upon me as thy house, thy father, and the husband of thy virginity?" ⁵⁵ he says: "Thus he implies clearly that God is

⁵² *De Gen. et Corr.* II, 8, 335a, 20-21; cf. *Phys.* IV, 5, 212b, 29-30 (*τόπων*).

⁵³ Aetius, *Placita* I, 20, 1 (Arnim, II, 504).

⁵⁴ Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* II, 3 (Arnim, II, 505).

⁵⁵ Jer. 3: 4.

a house, the incorporeal space (*χώρα*) of incorporeal ideas, that He is the father of all things, for He begat them, and the husband of wisdom, dropping the seed of happiness for the race of mortals into good and virgin soil." ⁵⁶ In this passage God is called "the incorporeal space of the incorporeal ideas" not in the same sense in which the Logos is called "the place of the intelligible world," namely, in the sense of His being identical with the ideas, but rather in the sense of His not being part of them and of His being separable from them.

And so the relation of God to the Logos is described by the term "prior," that is to say, a relation of cause to effect; the relation of the Logos to the intelligible world is described by the term "place" in the same sense as soul or mind is said to be the place of forms, that is, in the sense of their being identical, and the relation of the intelligible world to the ideas is described as that of a whole to the parts of which it is composed (*συνεστώς*).⁵⁷

But in the writings of Philo we may discern another method of describing the relation of God to the Logos and the relation of the Logos to the ideas. In one passage, speaking of God and the Logos, he says that "the most generic (*γενικώτατον*) is God, and next to Him is the Logos of God, but all other things have an existence only in word, but in deed they are at times equivalent to that which has no existence." ⁵⁸ In another passage, speaking of the Logos in its relation to all other things, he says that "the Logos of God is above all the world, and is eldest and most generic (*γενικώτατος*) of created things." ⁵⁹ In a third passage, speaking of the ideas in their relation to particular things, he says that "before the particular intelligible thing comes into be-

⁵⁶ *Cher.* 14, 49.

⁵⁷ *Opif.* 4, 17; cf. also 19.

⁵⁸ *Leg. All.* II, 21, 86.

⁵⁹ *Leg. All.* III, 61, 175; *Deter.* 31, 118.

ing, the creator produces the intelligible thing itself [i.e. the idea] as a generic (*γενικόν*) being.”⁶⁰ In these three passages, then, God is the “most generic” absolutely; the Logos is the “most generic of created things”; and the idea is simply “generic.” The use of the term genus in various degrees of comparison, we take it, was advisedly chosen by Philo. He wanted to describe the relation of God to the Logos and of the Logos to the ideas as a relation of the more universal to the less universal. Each idea is only “generic”; the Logos which is the totality of ideas is “most generic” of all the ideas which constitute it; and God is “most generic” absolutely; there is nothing more generic than He. In these three passages the term generic is used by him in three distinct, though not unrelated, senses. The ideas are described by him as generic in the sense that a genus is “the comprehension in one of a number of inseparable objects of thought, as, e.g., animal, for this includes particular animals.”⁶¹ The Logos is described by him as the most generic of created beings in the sense that it is the most generic of all the generic ideas which are contained in it as parts in a whole, for the relation of these generic ideas to the Logos which contains them is like that of species to a genus, inasmuch as, according to Aristotle, the relation of species to genus is like that of parts to the whole.⁶² God is described by him as the absolutely most generic in the sense that He is the uncaused cause of all things, for, being the cause of all things, He is their genus, inasmuch as the universal or genus, according to Aristotle, reveals the cause,⁶³ and, being himself uncaused, He is the most generic of all things.

⁶⁰ *Leg. All.* I, 9, 23.

⁶¹ Diogenes, VII, 60.

⁶² *Metaph.* V, 25, 1023b, 24-25.

⁶³ *Anal. Post.* I, 31, 88a, 5-6; II, 2, 90a, 30.

VI. LOGOS AND WISDOM

We have seen, then, that the term Logos is used by Philo in the sense of Nous,¹ both as the mind of God which is identical with His essence and as a created mind which is distinct from His essence, and that its use in that sense is justifiable by certain precedents. That he should have preferred the term Logos to the term Nous as a description of this incorporeal mind is not due, as it is generally assumed, to the Stoic influence. In the first place, the Stoics never use the term Logos in the sense of an incorporeal being and as the totality of the ideas; they use it only in the sense of immanent principle in the world, like a soul or mind. In the second place, the use of the term Logos by the Stoics has been too much exaggerated; they more often use the expression "soul of the world" or "mind of the world" than the term "Logos."² If Philo had a predilection for the Stoics and wanted to follow them, he would have used the term "soul" or "mind" as the equivalent of the term "Logos," and more often than the term Logos. Mere imitation of Stoic vocabulary would thus not explain his substitution of the term Logos for mind in the sense of the divine mind or in the sense of an incorporeal mind created by God. The reason for his preference for that term is, to our view, simple enough and understandable enough. He wanted to have a special term to designate the divine mind, or the incorporeal mind created by God, in order to distinguish it from the human mind, and therefore he selected the term Logos to be used in the sense of the divine mind, leaving the term mind to be used in the sense of the human mind.³

¹ Cf. above, p. 230.

² Cf. Index to Arnim, under *λόγος, νοῦς, ψυχή*.

³ He never uses the term "mind" in the sense of God's mind. As for the designation of God as the mind of the world, see below, pp. 345 ff.

Besides this quite understandable reason, the term *Logos*, in addition to its meaning of mind and the thinking power of mind, has also in Greek philosophy the meaning of "word,"⁴ and it is used in the Septuagint⁵ as well as the Wisdom of Solomon⁶ as a translation of the term "word" in the oft-repeated expression the "word of God." Now the "word of God" in Scripture is used in the various senses in which we shall find the term *Logos* used by Philo, namely, as a means of the creation of the world, as a means of governing the world, and as a means of prophecy and revelation. In Scripture, it is by the word of God that the heavens were made;⁷ it is in fulfillment of the word of God that the forces of nature perform their functions;⁸ it is the word of God that is communicated to prophets;⁹ and it is the word of God that is revealed in the Law.¹⁰ With all this variety of usages of the term *Logos* in Scripture, it was quite natural for Philo, whose purpose was not only to interpret Scripture in terms of Greek philosophy but also to interpret philosophy in terms of Scripture, to substitute the term *Logos* for the term *Nous*. It is a matter of indifference to us whether in Judaism before the time of Philo the personification of the term *Logos* meant that the Word of God was already considered as a real being created by God or whether its personification was merely a literary figure of speech.¹¹ What is important for us is merely the fact that the term *Logos* in Scripture had such a variety of uses that it helped to recommend itself to Philo as a substitute for the term *Nous* in the sense of the divine mind.

With his substitution of the scriptural term *Logos* for the term *Nous*, it was quite natural for Philo to use also the

⁴ Cf. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus*, under *λόγος* I. ⁸ Ps. 147: 18; 148: 8.

⁵ Ps. 33 (34): 6; 147: 18; 148: 8.

⁹ Isa. 2: 1; Jer. 1: 2; Ezek. 3: 16.

⁶ Wisdom of Solomon 9: 1.

¹⁰ Exod. 34: 27, 28; Deut. 10: 4.

⁷ Ps. 33: 6.

¹¹ Cf. below, p. 287, n. 24.

term Wisdom as the equivalent of Logos.¹² For this he had the example of Scripture, where the term wisdom is used in almost all the senses that the term Word is used and, like the Word of God, Wisdom is said to be that by which God established the world;¹³ it is in Wisdom that all the works of God in the world are performed;¹⁴ it is imparted to men by God;¹⁵ it is personified;¹⁶ and by the time of Philo it is already identified with the revealed Law¹⁷ and with the Word of God.¹⁸ In the Wisdom of Solomon, wisdom is treated exactly as the Logos in Philo.¹⁹ In Greek literature, too, he could find the use of the term Wisdom in the sense of mind in such a statement of Plato as that in which he speaks of wisdom (*σοφία*) and mind (*νοῦς*) as equivalent terms.²⁰ Furthermore, personification of Wisdom is to be found also in Greek mythology.²¹ Using Wisdom, therefore, as the equivalent of Logos, which is the totality of the powers, Philo speaks of it as having, prior to the creation of the world, those two stages of existence which he attributed to the powers as well as to the Logos, namely, as a property of God and as a real being created by God. As a property of God, God's wisdom is described by him as eternal,²² a certain kind of wisdom is called by him God's own wisdom,²³ and God alone is said by him to be wise,²⁴ or God is said by him to be the only wise being.²⁵ As something created by God, wisdom is conceived by him as being intermediate between God's own wisdom and human wisdom and is described as

¹² *Leg. All.* I, 19, 65.

¹³ *Jer.* 10: 12; cf. *Prov.* 3: 19.

¹⁴ *Ps.* 104: 24.

¹⁵ *Prov.* 2: 6.

¹⁶ *Philebus* 30 c; cf. Drummond, I, p. 67.

¹⁷ Leisegang, "Logos" in Pauly-Wissowa, 25, 1070, ll. 7 ff.

¹⁸ *Immut.* 20, 92, if the reading is *ἀίδιον* and not *ιδίον*.

¹⁹ *Leg. All.* II, 22, 87.

²⁰ *Migr.* 24, 134; *Congr.* 21, 114.

¹⁶ *Prov.* 8: 1 ff.

¹⁷ *Sirach* 24: 23 ff.

¹⁸ *Wisdom of Solomon* 9: 1-2.

¹⁹ Cf. below, pp. 287 ff.

²⁵ *Sacr.* 17, 64; *Ebr.* 27, 106; *Fug.* 8, 47.

“the fountain which He drew out of His own Wisdom”²⁶ or as the “flinty rock . . . which He cut off highest and chiefest from His powers.”²⁷ As in the case of the created Logos, God is called the Father of Wisdom,²⁸ and, while Wisdom, unlike Logos, is not called the son of God, it is called the daughter of God, because both in Greek and in Hebrew the word for wisdom is of feminine gender.²⁹

This conception of Wisdom as having been created by God is directly based upon the scriptural verses in which Wisdom is made to say, according to the Septuagint version, “before the ages He founded (ἐθεμελιωσε) me . . .³⁰ and before all hills, He begets (γεννᾷ) me.”³¹ The Greek for “founded” in “He founded me,” differs from the Hebrew, which reads “I was set up,” but it has the meaning of creation, as may be judged from the verse “By wisdom God founded (ἐθεμελιωσε) the earth.”³² Though in his paraphrase of the first verse of Wisdom’s speech Philo departs from the Septuagint’s version, “The Lord created (ἔκτισε) me the beginning of His ways for His works,”³³ and puts in its mouth the words “God obtained (ἐκτήσατο) me first of all his works,”³⁴ the substitution here of the word “obtained me” for the Septuagint “created me” as a translation of the Hebrew *kanani* does not mean that he believed that Wisdom was not created by God but only obtained by Him after it had existed apart

²⁶ *Leg. All.* II, 22, 87. In *Sacr.* 17, 64, God himself is said to be “the fountain of wisdom” who “imparts each form of knowledge to the mortal race,” but that evidently means that God is the ultimate fountain of knowledge.

²⁷ *Leg. All.* II, 21, 86.

²⁸ *Ibid.* I, 19, 64.

²⁹ *Fug.* 9, 50–52. In § 52, wisdom is said to be called also father because it begets learning in souls.

³⁰ *Prov.* 8: 23.

³¹ *Prov.* 8: 25; quoted by Philo in *Ebr.* 8, 31.

³² *Prov.* 3: 19.

³³ *Prov.* 8: 22.

³⁴ *Ebr.* 8, 31; cf. *Virt.* 10, 62.

from God from eternity;³⁵ it only means that he imported into the Greek term *ἐκτήσατο*, which in the sense of "he obtained" is a literal translation of the Hebrew term *kanah*, the additional meaning of "he created," which traditionally the Hebrew term was taken here to have. We may gather this from another passage where Philo follows the Septuagint in translating the Hebrew term *kanah* by the Greek term meaning "to obtain" or "to get," but in the course of his discussion he explains it to mean "to create." In the passage in question he quotes from Scripture, through the Septuagint version, Eve's, or, according to him, Adam's, statement after the birth of Cain, namely, "I have gotten (*ἐκτησάμην*) a man through God";³⁶ and then, in his comment upon the inappropriateness of the use of the expression "through God," which implies that God is only an instrument and not a cause, he says that "that which comes into being (*γινώμενον*) is brought into being (*γίνεται*) *through* an instrument, but yet *by* a cause."³⁷ Here the Septuagint term *κτάομαι*, to acquire, is taken by him to mean *γίγνομαι*, to be born or to be created. In still another passage,³⁸ he quotes from the Septuagint Abraham's speech to Melchizedek, King of Salem: "I will stretch forth my hand to [the Lord], the most high God, who created (*ἐκτίσε*, Hebrew *koneh*) heaven and earth,"³⁹ but immediately after thus translating the Hebrew *koneh* by the Greek meaning "who created," he refers to God as He "whose *κτήματα* all things are."⁴⁰ The term *κτήματα* quite evidently is used by him not in the sense of "possessions" but rather in the sense of "creations,"

³⁵ But see D. B. Macdonald, *The Hebrew Philosophical Genius* (Princeton University Press, 1936), p. 51, who finds in this change of wording an indication of the belief in the eternity of wisdom.

³⁶ Gen. 4: 1. LXX: *διὰ θεοῦ*.

³⁷ *Cher.* 35, 125.

³⁸ *Ebr.* 27, 105.

³⁹ Gen. 14: 22.

⁴⁰ *Ebr.* 28, 107.

which conclusively shows that with Philo the Greek *κτάομαι* has acquired through the Hebrew *kanah* the meaning "to create" in addition to its original meaning "to obtain."

Wisdom, then, is only another word for Logos, and it is used in all the senses of the term Logos. Both these terms mean, in the first place, a property of God, identical with His essence, and, like His essence, eternal. In the second place, they mean a real, incorporeal being, created by God before the creation of the world. Third, as we shall show, Logos means also a Logos immanent in the world,⁴¹ and so, also wisdom, again as we shall show, is used in that sense.⁴² Fourth, both Logos and wisdom are used by him in the sense of the Law of Moses.⁴³ Finally, Logos is also used by Philo in the sense of one of its constituent ideas, such, for instance, as the idea of mind.⁴⁴ In the light of all these various uses of the terms Logos and wisdom, if we do happen to come across certain passages in which he does not seem to be treating these two terms as identical we must not at once accuse him of inconsistency.⁴⁵ We must try to find out whether in those passages in which he does not seem to treat them as identical he does not use one of these two terms in one sense and the other in another sense. Let us examine a few such typical instances.

In one place he says that the law of the cities of refuge, allegorically interpreted, means to bid man "to pass forward to the supreme divine Logos, who is the fountain of

⁴¹ Cf. below, pp. 325 ff.

⁴² Cf. below, pp. 333-334, which is in opposition to Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie*, p. 255. In the Wisdom of Solomon, wisdom is similarly used in this sense; see below, p. 288.

⁴³ Cf. *ὁ ἱερὸς λόγος* (*Spec.* I, 39, 215, and elsewhere); *σοφία* (*Leg. All.* III, 15, 46); cf. above, pp. 147, 184; below, II, 189.

⁴⁴ Cf. above, p. 233.

⁴⁵ Cf. discussion on these inconsistencies in Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos*, p. 253; Drummond, II, 207-211; Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, p. 22.

wisdom, in order that he may draw from the stream and, released from death, gain life eternal as his prize." ⁴⁶ Here, then, Logos is explicitly said to be the fountain of Wisdom and not identical with it. But the inconsistency disappears when in this passage the term Logos is taken to refer to the antemundane Logos and the term wisdom is taken to refer to the wisdom in the sense of the revealed Law of Moses. The passage lends itself to this interpretation. Taken in this sense, the Logos indeed is the fountain of wisdom. In a similar way Philo could have said that the antemundane wisdom is the fountain of the revealed wisdom, for the belief in the preëxistence of the Law means that the revealed Law has its origin in the preëxistent Law.⁴⁷

In another place, taking the high priest to symbolize the Logos and commenting upon the verse that the high priest "shall not defile himself for his father or for his mother." ⁴⁸ Philo says that this is "because, methinks, he is the child of parents incorruptible and wholly free from stain, his father being God, who is likewise Father of all, and his mother Wisdom, through whom the universe came into existence." ⁴⁹ Here, again, it would seem that Logos and Wisdom are not identical. But again the solution of the difficulty is to be found in the fact that, in this passage, wisdom, as is quite evident from the context, refers to the antemundane wisdom, whereas the Logos, symbolized here by the high priest, refers to the immanent Logos. For when we closely examine the kind of Logos which, according to Philo, the high priest symbolizes, we shall find that he symbolizes both the incorporeal Logos of the intelligible world and the immanent Logos in the visible world; about the latter we shall speak in a subsequent chapter.⁵⁰ This is definitely brought out by

⁴⁶ *Fug.* 18, 97.

⁴⁸ *Lev.* 21: 11.

⁴⁷ Cf. above, p. 184.

⁴⁹ *Fug.* 20, 109.

⁵⁰ Cf. below, p. 325.

Philo in his discussion of the symbolism of the high priest's vesture, concerning which he says that you will find "his holy vesture to have a variegated beauty derived from powers belonging some to the realm of pure intellect, some to that of sense-perception."⁵¹ Elsewhere he tells us what powers of the visible world some of the garments symbolize: they are the four elements, the upper and the lower hemispheres, and the signs of the Zodiac.⁵² Now in the passage in question Philo especially emphasizes the symbolism of the high priest as the immanent Logos of the visible world. He says: "Now the garments which the supreme Logos of Him that is put on as raiment are the world, for it arrays itself in earth and air and water and fire and all that comes forth from these."⁵³ Consequently when he says that the Logos symbolized by the high priest has Wisdom as its mother, he means thereby the immanent Logos which, as we shall see, has its source in the intelligible Logos,⁵⁴ the latter of which is identical with the Wisdom spoken of in this passage.

In still another place, in his allegorical interpretation of the verse "A river goes out of Eden to water the garden: thence it separates into four heads,"⁵⁵ he says that Eden means here "the Wisdom of the Existent," and "the divine Logos descends from the fountain of Wisdom like a river to lave and water the heaven-sent celestial shoots and plants of virtue-loving souls which are as a garden; and this holy Logos is 'separated into four heads,' which means that it is split into four virtues."⁵⁶ Now, in another place, commenting upon the same verse, he says: "'River' is generic virtue, goodness. This issues forth out of Eden, the wisdom of God, and this is the Logos of God, for in accordance with that has

⁵¹ *Migr.* 18, 102; cf. Wisdom of Solomon 18: 24.

⁵² *Mos.* II, 24, 117-126; *Spec.* I, 16, 85-87.

⁵³ *Fug.* 20, 110.

⁵⁴ Cf. below, p. 327.

⁵⁵ *Gen.* 2: 10 (LXX).

⁵⁶ *Somn.* II, 36, 242-243.

generic virtue been made. And generic virtue waters the garden, that is, it waters the particular virtues.”⁵⁷ Here, then, we have an inconsistency. In these two passages the term wisdom is taken in the same sense, undoubtedly in the sense of a property of God, but, with respect to Logos, in the first passage it is said to issue forth out of wisdom, while in the second passage it is said to be identical with wisdom. But the inconsistency disappears if the term Logos in these two passages is taken to be used in two different senses. In the first passage it is used in the sense of the idea of virtue,⁵⁸ or, as Philo calls it, generic virtue, and in the second passage it is used in the sense of a property of God.

VII. THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE LOGOS AND WISDOM

The terms which have so far come into play in our discussion of Philo's theory of ideas are five: ideas, powers, intelligible world, Logos, and wisdom. The term ideas is of Platonic origin; the terms powers and Logos are of a mixed Greek and scriptural origin; the term intelligible world is of Philo's own coining, based upon a somewhat similar combination of terms in Plato; the term wisdom is predominantly of scriptural origin. But then we find one more term which Philo uses as a description of the Logos, and, indirectly, of wisdom, and that is the term "instrument" (*ὄργανον*).¹ Let us study the origin of this term as used by Philo and also the special sense in which he uses it.

The origin of this term, we shall try to show, is Aristotelian. When Aristotle, in opposition to Plato, had brought down the ideas (*ιδέαι*) from what Plato called the "super-

⁵⁷ *Leg. All.* I, 19, 65.

⁵⁸ Cf. above, p. 233.

¹ *Cher.* 35, 125-127.

celestial place" (ὑπερουράνιος τόπος) and the "intelligible place" (νοητὸς τόπος)² beyond material things, and attached them to material things as forms (εἶδη) inseparable from them, he still retained for them some of the characteristic terms by which Plato described his ideas. His form, like the Platonic idea, is still called pattern (παράδειγμα) and cause (αἴτιον).³ But form to him is not the only cause. It is one of the two main causes, the other being matter, and form itself is subdivided into three causes, the efficient, the formal, and the final, thus making all together four causes. In his description of the relation of these four causes to each other, he says that form subsists in the "efficient cause,"⁴ the efficient cause is the cause of "form" in matter,⁵ and through "matter" form is fulfilled as the "end."⁶ Thus the four causes, according to Aristotle, make up a series, in which the efficient cause is the beginning, the final cause is the end, and form and matter are intermediaries. The efficient cause works on matter by means of form, and form becomes a final cause by means of matter. Such intermediaries between the efficient cause and the final cause are in accordance with Aristotle's own terminology to be called "instruments" (ὄργανα).⁷ We should therefore expect to find that both the material cause and the formal cause are called instruments by Aristotle, inasmuch as both these causes exist as intermediaries between the efficient cause and the final cause. And, in fact, we do find that both these causes are described by him as instruments, the material cause as the instrument of the efficient cause and the formal cause as the instrument

² *Rep.* VI, 509 D, VII, 517 B; cf. above, p. 227.

³ *Phys.* II, 3, 194b, 26; *Metaph.* V, 2, 1013a, 27.

⁴ *De Gen. Animal* II, 1, 732a, 4-5.

⁵ *Metaph.* VII, 8, 1034a, 4-5; XII, 4, 1070b, 30-34.

⁶ *Phys.* II, 7, 198a, 25-26, and see Ross's note in his edition.

⁷ *Metaph.* V, 2, 1013a, 35-1013b, 3.

of the efficient cause. With regard to the material cause, it is directly described by him as an instrument of the formal cause in a passage in which he says of it that it is "that which serves as an instrument to what is generated,"⁸ or that it is "that which is used by the end,"⁹ meaning here by the term "end" the "formal cause" which, in this passage, is identified with the final cause.¹⁰ The description of the formal cause as an instrument is suggested by him in his criticism of the materialists who, owing to their failure to distinguish between the material cause and the other causes, recognize only the material cause. As a result of their recognition of only the material cause, argues Aristotle, their explanation of the process of becoming differs from his. According to their explanation, the process of becoming is to be accounted for only by the action of the elementary qualities hot and cold, which they consider as forces inherent in matter and hence as constituting a material cause. In contradistinction to this, Aristotle's own view is that hot and cold are "form" and "privation,"¹¹ or two "contraries," which exist in matter as their common "substratum";¹² and the process of becoming, according to him, is to be explained by the action of an efficient cause which employs a formal cause in order to cause matter to attain a final cause. In his criticism of the materialists he argues, first, against their omission of the efficient cause and, second, against their omission of the formal cause. By their omission of the efficient cause, he argues in the first place, they flagrantly disregard facts observed both in art and in nature.¹³ By their omission of

⁸ *De Gen. Animal* II, 6, 742a, 24.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 23 and 32.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* I, 1, 715a, 5-6; cf. Zeller, II, 23, p. 328, n. 1 (*Aristotle*, II, p. 356, n. 1).

¹¹ *Metaph.* XII, 4, 1070b, 11-12.

¹² *De Gen. et Corr.* II, 1, 329a, 30-31.

¹³ *Ibid.* II, 9, 335b, 29-33.

the formal cause, he argues in the second place, they erroneously treat the elementary qualities hot and cold, which to them are material causes, as "too instrumental" (*λίαν ὀργανικάς*).¹⁴ From his contention, therefore, that the materialists by their omission of formal causes have erroneously treated material causes as "too instrumental" it may be inferred that this instrumental character which the materialists erroneously attribute to what they consider material causes should be attributed to what Aristotle considers formal causes. From these statements of Aristotle with regard to the use of the term instrument we thus gather that matter may be considered as the instrument of the formal cause and form may be considered as the instrument of the efficient cause.

Now Philo, in his adoption of the Platonic theory of ideas, has taken out the Aristotelian forms from within the world and made a new world out of them, the intelligible world, and this new world he placed in the Logos.¹⁵ As a result of this, the term "instrument," which Aristotle indirectly applies to form, is applied by Philo to the Logos. That it is Aristotle from whom Philo has borrowed the term instrument in its application to the Logos may be gathered from one of the passages in which the Logos is described by him as the instrument (*ὄργανον*) through which (*δι' οὗ*) the world was framed (*κατεσκευάσθη*).¹⁶ Immediately preceding this description of the Logos as an instrument, there is a passage

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 336a, 1-6. Cf. Joachim's notes in his edition (pp. 249-252). With regard to "hot and cold," he says first of Aristotle that he regarded them as forces "inherent in, and constitutive of, matter" (p. 250, ll. 4-5) and then the same of the materialists that they regarded them as forces "inherent in, and constitutive of, the matter of which bodies consist" (p. 251, ll. 35-36). This is undoubtedly an accidental error. To Aristotle, as we have seen (above n. 11) "hot and cold" are "form and privation." Cf. also Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy*, p. 228, n. 48.

¹⁵ Cf. above, p. 231.

¹⁶ *Cher.* 35, 127.

in which Philo enumerates the Aristotelian four causes.¹⁷ Three of these causes are quite obviously described by him in terms suggested by the Aristotelian vocabulary. The efficient cause is described by him vaguely by one form of the Greek term for cause (*αἴτιον*) and more specifically by the expression "that by which" (*τὸ ὑφ' οὗ*), which expression is similarly used by Aristotle as a description of the efficient cause.¹⁸ The material cause is described, exactly as in Aristotle, by the term matter (*ὑλη*) and by the expression "that from which" (*τὸ ἐξ οὗ*).¹⁹ The final cause is described again vaguely by another form of the Greek term for cause (*αἰτία*) and more specifically by the expression "that for which" (*τὸ δι' ὃ*) and goodness (*ἀγαθότης*). Similarly in Aristotle, the expression "that for which" (*τὸ διὰ τι*)²⁰ and the term "the good" (*τἀγαθόν*)²¹ are used as descriptions of the final cause. In his description of the formal cause, however, Philo departs from the vocabulary used by Aristotle in those passages in which he formally enumerates the four causes. Instead of the term "form" which is used by Aristotle, he uses the term instrument (*ὄργανον; ἐργαλεῖον*), and instead of the expression "that from which," which is used by Aristotle as a description of both the material and the formal cause,²² he uses the expression "that through which" (*τὸ δι' οὗ*). Now the expression "that through which" is used also by Aristotle in the sense of instrument,²³ and consequently he could have used it also as a description of

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 125-127.

¹⁸ *Metaph.* I, 4, 985a, 25 and 27; cf. R. Eucken, *Ueber den Sprachgebrauch des Aristoteles*, 1868, p. 73.

¹⁹ Cf. *Phys.* II, 3, 194b, 24; *Metaph.* V, 2, 1013a, 24.

²⁰ *Anal. Post.* I, 24, 85b, 27-35. This use of the expression is not brought out by Eucken, *op. cit.* pp. 38-39.

²¹ *Metaph.* I, 3, 983a, 33.

²² *Phys.* II, 3, 195a, 19; *Metaph.* V, 2, 1013b, 20-21.

²³ *Phys.* VIII, 5, 256a, 6; cf. Eucken, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

form, for, as we have seen, form is described by him as an instrument. In the light of all this, we may reasonably assume that Philo's description of the Logos as an instrument through which the world was made, resting as it does, according to his own statement, upon what he considered as a generally accepted description of form as an instrument through which something is made, is ultimately of Aristotelian origin, even though there may have been some intermediary source, as yet undiscovered, upon which Philo was directly dependent. As for the term instrument as a description of the Logos, it is used by Philo in two passages, in which passages he says of the Logos that God "used it like an instrument when He was making the world (*ἐκοσμοποιεῖ*)"²⁴ or that "when He was fashioning the world (*ἐκοσμοπλάσσει*), He used it as an instrument, so that the arrangement of all the things that He was completing might be faultless."²⁵ In three passages, however, instead of describing the Logos directly as an instrument, he describes it as such indirectly by speaking of it as that "through which" (*δι' οὗ*) the world was framed (*ἐδημιουργεῖτο*)²⁶ or "by which" (*ᾧ*) God made (*εἰργάζετο*) the world.²⁷

Just as the Logos is described by Philo as an instrument "through which" or "by which" the world was made, so also is Wisdom described by him as that "through which" (*δι' ἧς*) the world came into existence"²⁸ or "was brought to completion."²⁹ This is as should be expected, inasmuch as Wisdom is used by him as the equivalent of the Logos.³⁰ But instead of applying to Wisdom the term instrument, he applies to it the term mother.³¹ In one place he describes Wis-

²⁴ *Leg. All.* III, 31, 96.

²⁷ *Immut.* 12, 57.

²⁵ *Migr.* 1, 6.

²⁸ *Fug.* 20, 109.

²⁶ *Sacr.* 3, 8; *Spec.* I, 16, 81.

²⁹ *Deter.* 16, 54.

³⁰ Cf. above, p. 255.

³¹ *Fug.* 20, 109; *Deter.* 16, 54; *Leg. All.* II, 14, 49. The term "mother" is also implied in the statement that God is "the husband of Wisdom" (*Cher.* 14, 49).

dom as "the mother and nurse (τιθήνη) of the all."³² Now in Plato the terms mother and nurse are applied to matter,³³ and elsewhere Philo himself makes reference to this use of these two terms by Plato and adopts them as a description of matter.³⁴ How does it happen, then, that in his theory of ideas, which is based upon Plato, Philo should call Wisdom, which is the totality of ideas, by terms which Plato himself applies to that which is the opposite of the ideas?³⁵

A clue to the explanation, however, is furnished by Philo himself in the very passage in which he applies the terms mother and nurse to Wisdom. In that passage, he first quotes from Scripture the verses in which Wisdom says of herself: "God obtained me first of all his works and before the ages He founded me."³⁶ Then, commenting upon this verse, he says: "True, for it was necessary that all that came to the birth of creation should be younger than the mother and the nurse of the all."³⁷ Now it happens that a few verses below the verses quoted by Philo, Wisdom says that when God prepared the heaven and made the foundations of the earth strong, "I was with Him" —³⁸ and here follows a word which in the masoretic Hebrew text reads *amon* (אָמֵן) and in the English Authorized Version is translated by "as one brought up with him." But in the Septuagint it is translated by "as one working as a joiner" (ἀρρυθροῦσα), which shows that the underlying Hebrew reading for the Septuagint translation was *aman* (אָמַן), and the same underlying Hebrew reading is implied also in the translation of it "as an artisan"

³² *Ebr.* 8, 31.

³³ *Timaeus* 50 D; 51 A; 49 A; 52 D. Cf. also Aristotle, *Phys.* I, 9, 192a, 14.

³⁴ *Ebr.* 14, 61; *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 160; cf. below, pp. 300, 309.

³⁵ Bréhier (p. 119) explains it on the ground that in Greek mythology and mysteries the terms "wisdom" and "mother" are sometimes used as descriptions of certain deities.

³⁶ *Prov.* 8: 22-23.

³⁷ *Ebr.* 8, 31.

³⁸ *Prov.* 8: 30.

(τεχνίτης) found in the Wisdom of Solomon.³⁹ But the Hebrew letters *aleph, mem, nun*, which constitute the word *amon* or *aman*, may also read *omen* (אִמֵּן), which means a *nurse*, and whenever that word *omen* occurs in Scripture it is translated in the Septuagint by *τιθηνός*.⁴⁰ In the Midrash these two readings, *oman* and *omen*, would seem to have been regarded as of equal plausibility, for, in its speculation as to its meaning, it suggests both artisan and nurse, the latter in the sense of pedagogue or leader or trainer of boys.⁴¹ Now the same Hebrew letters, *aleph, mem, nun*, which may read either *amon*, nursling, or *aman*, artisan, or *omen*, nurse, may also be read *imman* (אִמָּן), meaning "their mother."⁴² Assuming, therefore, that Philo, after the manner of the Midrash, was speculating as to possible meanings of the word in question, we can easily see how it may have occurred to him to suggest that it might mean mother and nurse, whence he came to say that Wisdom is "the mother and nurse of the All."⁴³ The same speculation as to these two possible meanings of the term, namely, mother and nurse, the latter in the sense of leader or trainer, is also reflected in the Wisdom of Solomon. Drawing upon the scriptural verse with regard to Wisdom which says that "length of days is in her right hand; and in her left hand riches and honor,"⁴⁴ it says that "with her there came to me all good things together,

³⁹ Wisdom of Solomon 7: 22 (21). It is also possible that the reading אִמָּן was taken to mean the same as אִמֵּן.

⁴⁰ Cf. Num. 11: 12; II Sam. 4: 4; Isa. 49: 23; Ruth 4: 16.

⁴¹ *Genesis Rabbah* 1, 1.

⁴² From his explanation of the name "Benjamin" as meaning "son of days" (*Mut.* 15, 92; *Somn.* II, 5, 36), whereby Philo shows that he took אִמָּן to be the same as אִמֵּן, it may be inferred that he would also take אִמָּן here to be the same as אִמֵּן.

⁴³ In the Septuagint *τιθηνός* is used both as masculine and as feminine; cf. Num. 11: 12; II Sam. 4: 4; Isa. 49: 23; Ruth 4: 16.

⁴⁴ Prov. 3: 16.

and in her hands innumerable riches: and I rejoiced over them all because Wisdom leads (*ἡγείραι*) them; though I knew not that she was the mother (*γενέτω*) of them."⁴⁵ The term "leads them" and "mother of them" undoubtedly reflects the double meaning of the three Hebrew consonants *aleph*, *mem*, *nun* which in Philo are given the meaning of "nurse" and "mother."

The application of the term instrument to the Logos, and hence also to the ideas or powers abiding in the Logos, does not mean that God has delegated to the Logos the act of the creation of the world, so that He cannot be considered as having created the world directly. That this is not the meaning of Philo's use of the term instrument as a description of the Logos may be gathered from a passage in which he discusses the creation of the different parts of the world. The world, he says, consists of three kinds of beings. First, the "stars," that is, the heavenly bodies in general, and "unbodied souls which range through the air and sky," that is, angels, both of which partake of virtue and are immune from vice.⁴⁶ Second, plants and animals, which "partake neither of virtue nor of vice."⁴⁷ Third, man who is of "a mixed nature" and is capable of both "virtue and vice."⁴⁸ Of these three kinds of beings, the first two are declared by him to have been created by God himself, for, he says, "it was most proper to God, the universal Father, to make those excellent things by himself alone, because of their kinship to Him."⁴⁹ With regard to the third kind of being, man, God is said to have employed the "powers" as "co-workers" (*συνεργοί*) in creating him,⁵⁰ and even in the case of man the powers were used as co-workers only in the creation of his

⁴⁵ Wisdom of Solomon 7: 11-12.

⁴⁶ *Opif.* 24, 73; *Conf.* 35, 178.

⁴⁶ *Opif.* 24, 73; *Conf.* 35, 176.

⁴⁹ *Opif.* 24, 74.

⁴⁷ *Opif.* 24, 73; *Conf.* 35, 177.

⁵⁰ *Opif.* 24, 75; *Conf.* 35, 179; *Fug.* 13, 68-70.

body and his irrational soul; his rational soul was created directly by God.⁵¹

It is evident then that despite his statements that God used the Logos as an instrument through which the world was created, the creation of the world, with the exception of the body and the irrational soul of man, was considered by Philo as a direct act of God. The term instrument applied to the Logos does not therefore mean that the Logos was a "co-worker" of God in the act of the creation of the world in the same way as the powers are called by him "co-workers" of God in the act of the creation of man. The term instrument, therefore, is not used by Philo in the sense that God, who for some reason or other could not create the world by himself directly, delegated His power to the Logos, or to the ideas and powers abiding in the Logos, to act as His substitute or representative or intermediary in the creation of the world. The sense in which Philo uses the term instrument can be gathered from the main passage in which he applies it to the Logos. In that passage, as we have seen, he substitutes it for Aristotle's term form, which he has taken out from the world and restored to the position of a Platonic idea outside the world; and consequently it is in the sense that Aristotle has called his form instrument that Philo is to be expected to call his Logos instrument. Now in Aristotle the form is an instrument only in the sense that it is through the form that subsists in the mind of the artist as a pattern that the clay is molded into a statue. By the same token, the Logos is to be called instrument only in the sense that it is through the intelligible world as a pattern, with which the Logos is identical, that the visible world was created. Instrument, therefore, merely means pattern, for the tools which the architect employs in the building of a city include

⁵¹ Cf. below, p. 389.

not only axes and hammers and saws but also plans which, according to Philo's parable,⁵² he carries in his mind. His use of the Logos, and the contents of the Logos, as a pattern does not deprive God of being directly the creator of the world, a creator without any co-worker or intermediary.

But the question may now be raised: What need was there for God, prior to his creation of the world, to create ideas and an intelligible world made out of these ideas and a Logos to hold that intelligible world? Why could not God, to whom "all things are possible,"⁵³ create the world without any pattern? Was not the creation of an intelligible world prior to the creation of the visible world merely a duplication of effort? This, as will be recalled, is one of the objections raised by Aristotle to the Platonic theory of ideas.⁵⁴

Philo does not raise this question directly, but he provides an answer for it in his parable of the king who was about to found a city. "God," he says, "being God, knew beforehand that a beautiful copy would never be produced apart from a beautiful pattern, and that no object of perfection would be faultless which was not made in the likeness of an original discerned only by the mind."⁵⁵ The same explanation is also implied in his statement that "when God was fashioning the world, He employed the Logos as His instrument, so that the arrangement of all things that He was completing might be faultless."⁵⁶ This explanation quite obviously does not mean that God knew beforehand that He could not build a perfect world without a pattern, for that would be contrary to the omnipotence of God which Philo himself so often asserts. What this explanation really means is that God acted after the analogy of any intelligent human being who does

⁵² Cf. above, p. 243.

⁵³ *Opif.* 14, 46; *Jos.* 40, 244; *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 130.

⁵⁴ *Cf. Metaph.* I, 9, 990a, 34-b, 8.

⁵⁵ *Opif.* 4, 16.

⁵⁶ *Migr.* 1, 6.

not enter upon any great project of building without having planned it out beforehand in his mind. But if one should further ask why God should act like an intelligent human being rather than like an omnipotent God, Philo would answer, as would also the rabbis, that God acts in such a way as to set an example to men. It will be recalled that in his comment upon the verse "And the Lord God made for Adam and for his wife garments of skins, and clothed them,"⁵⁷ Philo says that this humble work of tailoring was quite suitable for God, inasmuch as it was intended "to teach wisdom" to mankind, showing by the example of God who made these humble but useful garments that useful labor and frugality are more honorable than a wasteful life of luxury.⁵⁸ Similarly the rabbis find in this verse an object lesson to men, teaching them to be as charitable as God and provide clothes for the naked.⁵⁹

But this question which he does not raise directly with regard to the Logos is raised by him with regard to the employment of the powers as co-workers of God in the creation of the body and the irrational soul of man. "One may not unfitly raise the question," he says, "what reason there could be for his [i.e. Moses'] ascribing the creation in the case of man only not to one Creator as in the case of the rest but, as the words ['let us make man'] would suggest, to several."⁶⁰ In answer to this question Philo offers two explanations.

First, it is "because He deemed it right (*δικαιῶν*) that by the Sovereign should be wrought the sovereign faculty in the soul, the subject part being wrought of subjects."⁶¹

Second, since among all created beings man alone is endowed with the freedom to choose evil,⁶² "God deemed it

⁵⁷ Gen. 3: 21.

⁵⁸ *Qu. in Gen.* I, 53; cf. above, p. 121.

⁵⁹ *Sofah* 14a.

⁶⁰ *Opif.* 24, 72.

⁶¹ *Fug.* 13, 69.

⁶² Cf. below, p. 431.

necessary (*ἀναγκαῖον*) to assign the creation of evil things to other makers, reserving that of good things to himself alone.”⁶³ In another place, the same answer is phrased as follows: “Very appropriately (*προσηκόντως*) therefore has God assigned a share in the creation of this being, man, to His lieutenants, saying ‘let us make man,’ so that man’s right actions might be attributable to God, but his sins to others, for it seemed to be unfitting to God, the all-ruler, that the road to wickedness within the reasonable soul should be of His making, and therefore He delegated the forming of this part to those about Him.”⁶⁴ In still another place, the phrasing of this explanation is as follows: The employment of the powers in the creation of man is to the end that, “when man orders his course aright, when his thoughts and deeds are blameless, God the universal ruler may be owned as their source, while others from the number of His subordinates are held responsible for thoughts and deeds of a contrary sort: for the Father ought (*ἔδει*) not to be cause of evil to his children, and vice and vicious activities are evil.”⁶⁵

Here, again, Philo does not say that God could not create man perfect and sinless, or that He himself could not create directly the imperfection and sinfulness in man, or that it was improper for Him, by reason of His own nature, to create directly the imperfection and sinfulness of man. All he says is that, since man was to have a sovereign faculty and a subject faculty, it seemed “right” to God to assign the creation of the subject faculty to His subordinate powers and also that, since man was to be created imperfect, God deemed it “necessary” or “appropriate” that He himself should not be directly the creator of the imperfect part in man. If, again, the question were asked why God deemed it necessary or appropriate, Philo would undoubtedly answer

⁶³ *Fug.* 13, 70.

⁶⁴ *Conf.* 35, 179.

⁶⁵ *Opif.* 24, 75.

again that it was in order "to teach wisdom" to mankind. That Philo did not mean that it was improper for God, by reason of His own nature, to be directly the cause of evil is evident from the fact that, under certain circumstances, as we shall see, God himself is considered by him as the direct cause of evil.⁶⁶

From all these passages it is quite clear that the Logos is called an instrument through which the world was created only in the sense that in it are contained the ideas which served as patterns for the creation of the world. As instruments in the mere sense of patterns they were used in the creation of the heavens, of all living and non-living beings under the heavens, of the four elements,⁶⁷ and, as we shall show, even of matter.⁶⁸ But in the case of the creation of the body and the irrational soul of man, the ideas as powers were used as instruments in more than the mere sense of patterns; they were co-workers of God, to whom He delegated the task of their creation, and the reason why God employed the ideas as patterns in the creation of the world and why also He delegated to them, as powers, the act of the creation of the body and the irrational soul in man is that God acted in a manner in which He wanted man to act.

In opposition to this argument, there is a passage in which Philo would seem to say that God delegated to the ideas or powers not only the act of creating man but in general the act of the creation of the whole world. The passage reads as follows: "When out of that [shapeless and qualityless matter] God produced all things, He did so without touching (*ἐφαπτόμενος*) it himself, since it was not lawful (*θέμις*) for His nature, happy and blessed as it was, to touch (*ψαύειν*) indefinite and confused matter, but instead He made full use of the incorporeal powers, well denoted by their name of

⁶⁶ Cf. below, p. 382.

⁶⁷ Cf. above, p. 269.

⁶⁸ Cf. below, p. 308.

ideas (*ιδέαι*), to enable each genus to take its appropriate shape." ⁶⁹ In this passage, it will be noticed, he speaks of "all things" (*πάντ'*) and of "each genus" (*γένος ἕκαστον*), and concerning "all things" and "each genus," not only concerning man, he would seem to say that God did not create them directly himself but only through the agency of the powers. This would seem to be contradictory to some of his other statements which we have quoted above; and, unless we assume that Philo did not know his own mind, or that he changed his mind, a way must be found to reconcile this statement with his other statements.

A way of reconciling this apparent contradiction is to be found, we believe, in the distinction drawn by Philo between the powers which existed as patterns prior to the creation of the world and the powers which, upon the creation of the world, entered the created things and have remained immanent in them as the principle of the preservation of the forms of the things in the world and of the world as a whole. We shall deal fully with this stage in the existence of the powers, the third stage of their existence, in a later chapter. These immanent powers, constituting in their totality an immanent Logos, are treated by Philo, as we shall see, after the manner of the powers and Logos of the Stoics which are always immanent, and are described by him in terms of the Stoic description of their immanent powers and Logos. Now the passage just quoted follows Philo's criticism of the Stoic conception of powers, and the theory of ideas or powers presented therein is offered in opposition to the Stoic conception of powers, and as an improvement thereon. But inasmuch as the Stoic conception of powers criticized by Philo is one of immanent powers, the improved substitute for that conception offered by Philo must necessarily be his own con-

⁶⁹ *Spec. I*, 60, 329.

ception of immanent powers. We shall, therefore, try to show that the powers which in the passage quoted are described as intermediaries, and not merely as patterns, refer to the powers immanent in the world and not to the powers which existed prior to the creation of the world.

Let us therefore first analyze Philo's criticism of the Stoic conception of powers, and then, in the light of that criticism, let us interpret his own conception of powers in the passage quoted.

The powers (*δυνάμεις*) of God, according to the Stoics, pervade the world throughout and do not exist as incorporeal beings outside the world, even as God himself, according to the Stoics, is immanent in the world and is not an incorporeal being outside the world.⁷⁰ God, who is immanent in the world and whose powers pervade the world throughout, is identified by them with the active (*ποιῶν*) principle in the primitive fire out of which the world came into being,⁷¹ and that active principle is called by them quality (*ποιότης*).⁷² By the same token, we assume, the powers of God may also be called qualities. This active principle or quality is inseparably connected, according to the Stoics, with a passive (*πάσχων*)⁷³ principle, which they call matter (*ὑλη*)⁷⁴ or substance without quality (*ἄποιος οὐσία*).⁷⁵ Now the powers or qualities which pervade all things are conceived by the Stoics as being themselves material things, and they are said to reside in material things in the sense of their being intermingled with them.⁷⁶ Furthermore, these material powers or qualities intermingled with material things are said by the

⁷⁰ Diogenes, VII, 147.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, VII, 134.

⁷² Cf. Zeller, III, 14, p. 100, n. 3 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*², p. 105, n. 1).

⁷³ Diogenes, VII, 134.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ Cf. Zeller, III, 14, p. 101, n. 1 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*², p. 105, n. 3).

Stoics to be active by their own nature and not by reason of some power above them, for, the Stoics hold, there is no power above the qualities.

This is the Stoic conception of powers which Philo undertakes to criticize. Accurately restating their view, he says of the Stoics, without mentioning their name, that "some aver that the incorporeal ideas are an empty name, having no participation in any real fact" and abolish "the archetypal patterns of all the qualities (*ποιότητες*) of substance (*οὐσίας*), on which the form and dimensions of each separate thing was modelled." ⁷⁷ His criticism of this view is stated by him tersely. "The creed which abolishes ideas," he argues, "confuses everything and reduces it to that formless and qualityless substance which underlies the elements." ⁷⁸ What he means to say by this terse criticism is this. With their belief that "quality" is as material as "substance," and with their denial of the existence of incorporeal ideas or powers above the qualities, the Stoics have really no reason for assuming any distinction between quality and substance. The two are alike, and consequently all things are formless and qualityless matter, and there is therefore no adequate explanation of why things in the world differ from one another according to certain definite and permanent forms, such, for instance, as we observe in the elements and in things formed out of the elements. He finds an allegorical allusion to this Stoic view in the scriptural term "crushed," ⁷⁹ for, he says, "anything crushed has lost its quality and form and, to speak the strict truth, is nothing else than shapeless matter." ⁸⁰ Briefly restated, his argument is as follows: With their denial of the existence of incorporeal ideas or powers, the Stoics also deny that the powers which are immanent in

⁷⁷ *Spec.* I, 60, 327.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 60, 328.

⁷⁹ Deut. 23: 2 (1).

⁸⁰ *Spec.* I, 60, 328.

things are not intermingled with the matter of those things. But by denying the latter, they are left with no explanation for the persistence of qualities in things. But since qualities do persist in things and since an explanation for this persistence must be found, the persistent qualities, he wishes us to conclude, are not intermingled with the matter of the things in which they persist. That the argument here is from the persistence of qualities in things for the existence of immanent powers which are not intermingled materially with those things is also evident from his concluding remark, which reads as follows: "That erroneous view introduces great disorder and confusion, for, by abolishing those [powers], by means of which the qualities [exist], it abolishes the qualities also."⁸¹ Note that no verb is given in the phrase "by which the qualities"; the verb is only understood, and naturally the verb understood here is *εἶσθαι* (*exist*) rather than *ἐγένετο* (*came into existence*). Now the expression "those powers by means of which the qualities exist" inevitably means the immanent powers by means of which the qualities persist in their existence. It does not mean the incorporeal powers or ideas by means of which as patterns or instruments the qualities come into existence.

It is this Stoic view, which, according to Philo, fails to account for the permanency of shapes and qualities in the things of the world, that he tries to replace by his view of the immanent powers. He does not deal here with origin of shapes and qualities in things; he deals only with their per-

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 329: ἀναιρούσα γὰρ ταῦτα, δι' ὧν αἱ ποιότητες, συναναίρει ποιότητος, translated in Mangey: "sublatis enim ideis unde qualitates sunt, qualitates ipsas tollit pariter"; by Yonge: "For when it takes away the things by means of which the distinctive qualities exist, it at the same time takes away the distinctive qualities themselves"; by Heinemann in *Philos Werke*: "indem er nämlich die Wesenheiten leugnet, durch welche die Eigenschaften entstehen, hebt er auch die Eigenschaften selbst auf"; by Colson: "For by abolishing the agencies which created the qualities, it abolishes the qualities also."

manency in them. He assumes that matter already exists, without telling us here that it was brought into existence by God. This he tells us elsewhere.⁸² Indeed he starts the presentation of his own theory of ideas with the words "When out of that shapeless and qualityless matter God produced all things," but it is not his object here to tell how God produced all things out of matter. This he tells us elsewhere, and, according to what he tells us elsewhere, all things, with the exception of the body and the irrational soul of man, were produced directly by God.⁸³ Here he only tries to tell us how these shapes and qualities were implanted in "all things" and in "each genus" at the time of their creation so that they would be permanent in them. This was not done directly by God, for "it was not lawful" for God to enter the matter out of which all things were created. This was done by the powers, for whom, though they are incorporeal, it was lawful to enter that matter and become immanent in it and thereby act as the principle of the preservation of the shapes and qualities. But though they enter the matter, they still retain their own distinctive character and do not become intermingled with the matter. The full meaning of Philo's statement, then, is as follows: "When out of that [shapeless and qualityless matter] God produced all things [and wished these things to remain permanently possessed of the shapes and qualities with which they were created], He did so without touching it himself [i.e., without himself entering the matter], since it was not lawful for His nature, happy and blessed as it was, to touch indefinite and confused matter, but instead He made full use of the incorporeal powers, well denoted by their name of ideas, to enable each genus to take hold of (*λαβεῖν*) its appropriate shape [i.e., to take and preserve its appropriate shape]." ⁸⁴

⁸² Cf. below, p. 308.

⁸³ Cf. above, p. 269.

⁸⁴ *Spec.* I, 60, 329.

That the reference in these passages is to the immanent powers is evident from the fact that in a parallel passage, after dealing with the powers as incorporeal beings existing apart from the world, Philo makes God address Moses as follows: "But while in their essence they are beyond apprehension, they nevertheless present to your sight a sort of impress of their active working. You men have for your use seals which, when brought into contact with wax or similar material, stamp on them any number of impressions, while they themselves are not docked in any part thereby but remain as they were. Such you must conceive the powers around Me to be, supplying qualities to things devoid of qualities and shapes to things devoid of shapes, and yet changing or lessening nothing of their eternal nature."⁸⁵ In this passage, the powers which are compared to seals which come in contact with wax and stamp impressions upon it are quite evidently the powers in the third stage of their existence, after they have already become immanent in the world.

The reason given by Philo in this passage for God's not entering matter is couched in scriptural phraseology. It reflects, in the first place, the many passages in Scripture in which it is commanded that the unclean shall not touch the clean, such, for instance, as "She shall touch no holy thing,"⁸⁶ "They shall not touch the holy things,"⁸⁷ "Whosoever touches the carcass of them shall be unclean,"⁸⁸ and "Depart ye, depart ye, go ye out from thence, touch no unclean thing; go ye out of the midst of her; be ye clean, ye that bear the vessels of the Lord,"⁸⁹ whence conversely the clean shall not touch the unclean. It also reflects many passages in Scripture in which God is described as holy, especially the

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* I, 8, 47.

⁸⁶ Lev. 12: 4.

⁸⁷ Num. 4: 15.

⁸⁸ Lev. 11: 24.

⁸⁹ Isa. 52: 11.

passages in which the people are told that, because God is holy, they should be holy and should therefore refrain from defiling themselves with unclean meat.⁹⁰ But behind this scriptural phraseology there is also a metaphysical reason. The holiness of God, which in Scripture implies greatness, majesty, exaltedness and elevation above all things earthly, has acquired with Philo the metaphysical meaning of immateriality. A clear statement of this identification of the conception of holiness with that of immateriality is found in a passage in which Philo says that the wisdom of God is called holy (*ἀγία*) because it contains "no earthly ingredient."⁹¹ Still more striking is the identification of holiness and immateriality in another passage, in which Philo says: "Separate, therefore, my soul, all that is created, mortal, mutable, profane (*βέβηλον*) from the conception of God the uncreated, the unchangeable, the immortal, the holy (*ἀγίου*) and solely blessed."⁹² This passage sounds almost like an answer to Ezekiel's complaint about the priests, that "they have not separated between the holy (*ἀγίου*) and the profane (*βεβήλου*)."⁹³ Holiness, therefore, means with Philo immateriality; and the unlawfulness of the holy to touch matter means with him, metaphysically, the impossibility that the absolutely immaterial, such as God is, should enter matter. It is the powers only that can enter matter, for, though they are immaterial, their immateriality is presumably of a lower order than that of God, and they can therefore enter matter, even as the immaterial rational soul can enter a body.

Still while the powers that enter matter are used by God as intermediaries, it does not mean that, according to Philo, God, even though He is pure immateriality, could not, by

⁹⁰ Lev. 11: 44; 20: 25-26.

⁹¹ *Fug.* 35, 196.

⁹² *Sacr.* 30, 101.

⁹³ Ezek. 22: 26.

His mere word and command, act upon the material world directly, without having to enter matter himself and without also having to employ intermediaries. In fact, there is evidence in Philo that such direct action of God upon the material world is possible. To begin with, all primary goods in the world come to deserving individuals directly by God.⁹⁴ Second, even evil things, such as punishments, which as a rule come indirectly from God through His powers,⁹⁵ have sometimes come directly from him. Of such punishments which have come directly from God Philo mentions three of the ten plagues in Egypt, namely, the swarms of flies, the murrain, and the destruction of the first-born.⁹⁶ Consequently, his statement that it was "not lawful" for God, because of His holiness, "to touch" that which is profane does not mean that it was impossible for God to do so; it only means that God has thereby intended, as Philo says in the passage quoted above, "to teach wisdom" to men; in this case it is to teach them that it is "not lawful" for them to defile themselves by anything unclean.

VIII. THE FICTION OF INTERMEDIARIES

In the history of philosophy, with the appearance of the theory of emanation in Plotinus, there appears also the view that because God is immaterial and absolutely simple the world could not emanate from Him directly. This view is expressed by Plotinus in the formula put by him in the form of a question: "How from the One, as we conceive it to be, can any multiplicity or duality or number come into existence?"¹ or, "How could all things come from the One which

⁹⁴ Cf. below, p. 382.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ *Mos. I*, 17, 97; 23, 130-24, 139; cf. below, p. 349.

¹ *Enneads V*, 1, 6.

is simple and which shows in its identity no diversity and no duality?"² In raising this question Plotinus says that it has already been discussed by ancient philosophers.³ The reference is undoubtedly to Aristotle's statement that "it is a law of nature that the same cause, provided it remains in the same condition, always produces the same effect"⁴ or "that a single motion must be produced by a single cause."⁵ But since the world does exist, and, according to Plotinus, its existence is an emanation from God, he concludes that it must have emanated from God not directly but rather indirectly, through some intermediary.⁶ As the intermediary through which multiplicity emanated from unity Plotinus takes the ideas of Plato, the totality of which he calls *Nous* as Philo calls it *Logos*.

This Plotinian principle that from one only one can proceed, which we may call the principle of the equivalence of cause and effect, can be shown to be logically based upon another principle, equally insisted upon by Plotinus and equally reflecting, at least in its essential point, the view of Aristotle, namely, that God acts without will and design. The One, according to him, who is "immovable" (*ἀκινήτου ὄντος*) is also "without consent (*οὐ προσνεύσαντος*), without volition (*οὐδὲ βουληθέντος*), and in general without any kind of movement (*οὐδὲ ὄλως κινήθέντος*)." ⁷ Now medieval philosophers were fully aware of this logical connection between these two principles, and consequently in their criticism of the theory of emanation both Maimonides and St. Thomas argue that if we assume that God acts by will and design there is no need for the assumption of intermediaries, for the principle

² *Ibid.* V, 2, 1.

³ *Ibid.* V, 1, 6.

⁴ *De Gen. et Corr.* II, 10, 336a, 27-28.

⁵ *Metaph.* XII, 8, 1073a, 28.

⁶ *Enneads* V, 4, 1. ⁷ *Ibid.* V, 1, 6.

that from one only one can proceed is not applicable to an agent who acts by design and will.⁸

Modern historians of philosophy, however, have failed to see the connection between the principle of the equivalence of cause and effect and the principle of the necessary causality of God, and consequently whenever they find the conception of a God who is immaterial and simple they see an impossibility of His acting upon the world directly without intermediaries. This kind of reasoning has been especially applied to Philo, who stresses not only the immateriality of God but also His unknowability. From the very beginning of the critical study of the philosophy of Philo it has been assumed that Philo, because of his conception of the absolute immateriality of God and the unknowability of His essence, was confronted with the problem of how to bring God into relation with the world, both as creator and as governor, and in order to solve that problem he had to resort, as did Plotinus in a later period, to intermediaries. This common assumption of historians as to the starting point of Philo's philosophic investigation has been well stated by Zeller: "The more abruptly the divine essence becomes separated from the world and the more every finite being is at the same time made unconditionally dependent upon divine causality, the more strongly does Philo find himself pressed by the necessity of resorting to intermediaries, whereby the action of an extramundane deity upon the world would become possible."⁹ Four kinds of such intermediaries, according to Zeller, were borrowed by Philo from various sources: "From the domain of philosophy, (1) the Platonic theory of ideas and (2) the Stoic theory of efficient causes [i.e., what the Stoics call the

⁸ Cf. Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* II, 22; St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles* II, 21-24.

⁹ Zeller, III, 24, p. 407.

Logos or the mind or soul of the world], with which the Platonic world-soul was easily combined; from the domain of religion, (3) the angels of Jewish-Persian origin and (4) the demons of Greek mythology.”¹⁰ In this combination of intermediaries Zeller sees an attempt on the part of Philo to combine two contradictory “assertions,” the religious and the philosophical, “without noticing their contradiction”¹¹ and without attempting to build up a “firm theory” or to reduce the various elements to a “system like that of Plotinus.”¹² As a result of this, Zeller concludes, the philosophy of Philo, beginning as it did with two contradictory elements, “could not come to any unity of doctrine free from contradictions.”¹³ This view with regard to the need of the Logos as an intermediary expresses the common view of historians up to the time of Zeller, and it has not been changed essentially since that time.¹⁴

In our analysis of Philo’s conception of the instrumentality of the Logos and wisdom, we have already shown that Philo was not troubled by the problem of how his immaterial God could create a material world nor did he resort to any intermediaries as a solution for the problem. The Logos and, indirectly, also wisdom are described by him as instruments only in the sense of patterns;¹⁵ the need of patterns is explained by him only on the analogy of intelligent human action;¹⁶ and the world as a whole and all that is therein,

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 407-408; cf. Gfrörer, I, p. 134; Dähne, I, p. 155; Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos*, p. 204; Drummond, II, pp. 63-64.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 413.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 418.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 466.

¹⁴ Cf., e.g., J. Freudenthal, “Alexander Polyhistor,” in his *Hellenistische Studien*, 1875, p. 73; P. Heinisch, *Die griechische Philosophie im Buche der Weisheit*, 1908, pp. 122-123; 126; Julius Guttman, *Die Philosophie des Judentums*, 1933, pp. 34-35; J. Klausner, *From Jesus to Paul*, 1943 (1939), pp. 181-183.

¹⁵ Cf. above, p. 270.

¹⁶ Cf. above, p. 272.

with the exception only of the human body and irrational soul of man, were created by God directly without any intermediaries.¹⁷ The only passage in which Philo would seem to speak of the powers as intermediaries, intervening between the holiness of God and the confusion of matter, refers, as we have shown, to the powers which are immanent in the world and are the principle of its preservation, and not to the powers which existed prior to the world and were the patterns of its creation.¹⁸ Moreover, even these immanent powers are employed by God not by the necessity of His aloofness from the world, but by reason of His choice and will, for, as we have shown, according to Philo himself, sometimes God dispenses with the intermediacy of these immanent powers and acts upon the world directly without any of these intermediaries.¹⁹ This disposes of those intermediaries which Zeller finds Philo to have borrowed from the Platonic theory of ideas and the Stoic theory of efficient causes or the Logos. With what he calls the Jewish-Persian angels and the Greek mythological demons we shall deal in a subsequent chapter.²⁰

Nor is there any justification for the assumption that the need of intermediaries in Philo is a Jewish heritage. The three verses which Philo quotes as proof text for the scriptural belief in the existence of ideas²¹ conceive of the ideas only as patterns and not as intermediaries to whom God has delegated the power of creation. As for use of Wisdom and the Word of God in Scripture in connection with the creation of the world, it does not by any stretch of the imagination mean that they were intermediaries. In Sirach, Wisdom, which is identified with the Law,²² is said to have been created before

¹⁷ Cf. above, p. 269.

¹⁸ Cf. above, p. 276.

¹⁹ Cf. above, p. 282.

²⁰ Cf. below, pp. 375 f.

²¹ Cf. above, p. 181.

²² Sirach 24: 23.

the world,²³ but it is nowhere said to have been used as an intermediary in the creation of the world. As for the *memra* of the Targum, no scholar nowadays will entertain the view that it is either a real being or an intermediary.²⁴ In the Holy Spirit (*ruah ha-ḳodesh*) and Shekinah of the Talmud there is indeed sometimes the undoubted implication that they are real beings created by God, but their function is confined to the inspiration of prophecy; they are not used as intermediaries in the creation of the world.²⁵ Even the angels, who as messengers of God are His intermediaries in the world, act as intermediaries not because God's nature would not allow Him to act directly, but because God by His own will decides what actions in the world should be performed by him directly and what actions should be performed by the intermediacy of angels. This is evidenced by the fact that in native Jewish tradition, as in Philo, God occasionally acts directly without the intermediacy of angels.²⁶

Wisdom in the Wisdom of Solomon is sometimes assumed to be different from the Logos of Philo²⁷ but, like the Logos, it has given rise among students to a variety of conflicting interpretations. To our mind, however, Wisdom is dealt with in that book as the Logos, according to our interpretation, is dealt with in Philo. As the Logos in Philo, so Wisdom in the Wisdom of Solomon has three stages of existence: (1) as a property of God, (2) as a real being created by God prior to the creation of the world, and (3) as a being im-

²³ Sirach 1: 4.

²⁴ Cf. G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, I, p. 417. *Idem*, "Intermediaries in Jewish Theology," *Harvard Theological Review*, 15 (1922), 41-85. Cf. also Strack-Billerbeck, "Exkurs über den Memra Jahves" in their *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch*, II, pp. 302-333; J. Abelson, *The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature*, pp. 146-173; K. Kohler, "Memra," *Jew. Enc.*, s. v.

²⁵ Cf. G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, I, p. 437; Abelson, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-145; 174-277.

²⁶ Cf. above, pp. 269, 282.

²⁷ Cf. Heinisch, *op. cit.*, pp. 126 ff.

manent in the world. Starting with the last, we find (3) that as an immanent being it is described as that which "pervades and penetrates all things,"²⁸ and as that which "extends mightily from end to end and administers all things well,"²⁹ and as that which "though but one, has power to do all things, and, remaining in herself, renews all things."³⁰ It is with reference to this immanent Wisdom also that Solomon is made to say, "For she that is the artificer (τεχνίτης) of all things taught me, even wisdom";³¹ for the immanent Wisdom, in penetrating all things, penetrates also the human soul, being "all-powerful, all-surveying and penetrating through all intelligent, pure, most rare spirits,"³² and thus becoming the source of human knowledge and wisdom. Then, (2) prior to the creation of the world, Wisdom, like Philo's Logos, existed as a real being who was created by God, described as "alone in kind" (μονογενής)³³ and of "noble birth" (εὐγένεια),³⁴ as "sitting beside" (πάρεδρον) God on the throne,³⁵ as "initiated into the knowledge of God and a chooser (αἰρέτης) of His works,"³⁶ and as being "with" God (μετὰ σοῦ) and "present" (παροῦσα) when He created the world.³⁷ But (1) all these powers of Wisdom and Wisdom itself were at first properties of God identical with His essence, possessed by Him even before He created Wisdom and endowed it with these various powers; for, ultimately, it is God who made the world,³⁸ who is the

²⁸ Wisdom of Solomon 7: 24.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 8: 1.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 7: 27. I take this to refer to the immanent wisdom, emphasizing that even in its immanent stage it is not corporeal and intermingled with the corporeal things. Cf. above, p. 279, and below, p. 327.

³¹ *Ibid.* 7: 22.

³² *Ibid.* 7: 23.

³³ *Ibid.* 7: 22.

³⁴ *Ibid.* 8: 3.

³⁵ *Ibid.* 9: 4. Cf. above, p. 220.

³⁶ *Ibid.* 8: 4.

³⁷ *Ibid.* 9: 9.

³⁸ *Ibid.* 9: 9; 11: 24.

“artificer” (τεχνίτης)³⁹ of the world, and who “administers”⁴⁰ (διοικῶν) all things. But it will be noticed that, speaking of Wisdom during its second stage of existence, he refers to it only as having been “with” God and as having been “present” when the world was created and as having also been a “chooser” of God’s works — that is to say, a sort of consultant, after the analogy of the angels in the Midrash and Talmud with whom God consulted at the creation of man; ⁴¹ but it is nowhere described as an intermediary in the act of creation.

The conclusion we are forced to reach is that Philo had neither a logical nor a historical reason to look for intermediaries, and if his Logos and powers and ideas are in some respects employed by God as intermediaries they are selected by Him for that task not because of the need to bridge some imaginary gulf between Him and the world, but rather, as Philo himself suggests, for the purpose of setting various examples of right conduct to men.

IX. CONCLUSION, INFLUENCE, ANTICIPATION

The starting point of Philo’s philosophy is Plato’s theory of ideas. By his time there were three conceptions of the ideas: first, that they existed as real incorporeal beings from eternity; second, that they have existence only as thoughts of God; third, that they have no existence at all except through their immanence in things. Philo combines these

³⁹ *Ibid.* 13: 1.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 15: 1. By this assumption of three stages in the existence of Wisdom, all the apparent contradictions in the Wisdom of Solomon with regard to Wisdom (cf. Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos*, pp. 197–201; Drummond, *Philo Judaeus*, I, 219–225; Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, I, 528) are solved.

⁴¹ *Genesis Rabbah* 8, 3–9; *Sanhedrin* 38b.

three conceptions of ideas by endowing them with three stages or three kinds of existence. First, from eternity they had existed as thoughts of God; second, prior to the creation of the world they were created by God as real incorporeal beings; third, with the creation of the world they were implanted by God in the world and thereby became immanent in the world. These three stages of existence are not successive stages; they are three kinds of existence which the ideas have, corresponding to three classes of ideas; so that even after the creation of the world one class of ideas are still thoughts of God, another class of ideas are still real incorporeal beings, and a third class of ideas are immanent in the world. In this chapter we have dealt only with the first two stages of their existence. In a subsequent chapter we shall deal with their third stage of existence.

During their first stage of existence, when they were only thoughts of God, the ideas were patterns not only of things which subsequently came into existence with the creation of our world, but they were patterns also of all kinds of possible things in all kinds of possible worlds which God, had He chosen, could have created. But when God in His wisdom decided to create this our world, He first conceived in His thought and then created as real incorporeal beings those ideas which were to serve Him as patterns of things in our world to be created by Him. Various kinds of ideas are mentioned by Philo, and on the whole they are such as can be found in the various dialogues of Plato. But in departure from Plato he introduces two new ideas, the idea of mind and the idea of soul.

Through a suggestion in Plato that the ideas are not only patterns but also causes endowed with power, Philo identifies the ideas with the term "powers" which is used in Scripture in the expression "the Lord of the powers," or, as the ex-

pression runs in English, "the Lord of hosts." Accordingly, he calls the ideas also by the term powers.

Through another suggestion in Plato that the ideas in their totality constitute what he calls an "intelligible animal," corresponding to our world which he calls a "visible animal," Philo calls the totality of ideas by the name of "intelligible world."

Then also, through the general philosophic view that thoughts must be the object of a thinking mind, Philo considered the ideas, while they were yet thoughts of God, as having been conceived by the mind of God, which mind, of course, was identical with God's essence. This mind of God is called by him, for various reasons, the Logos of God and sometimes also the Wisdom of God. Moreover, when God compacted these ideas and created them as an intelligible world, He also created a mind in which the intelligible world and hence also the ideas were to be contained. This mind, created by God as the container of the intelligible world, is similarly called by him Logos and sometimes also Wisdom. In the Logos and Wisdom, just as in the ideas which are contained in them, there are thus also three stages of existence: first, a Logos or Wisdom which is eternal and is identical with God's essence; second, a Logos or Wisdom which is created as an incorporeal real being and is distinct from God's essence; third, an immanent Logos or Wisdom.

Five terms altogether are used by Philo in connection with the ideas, namely, (1) ideas, (2) intelligible world, (3) powers, (4) Logos, (5) Wisdom. These five terms fall into two groups: first, the terms ideas and intelligible world, which are used by him only with reference to the second stage of the existence of ideas; second, the terms powers, Logos, and Wisdom, which are used by him either with reference to the combination of the first and the second stage of existence

or with reference only to the second stage. In the case of powers and Wisdom, they sometimes refer only to the first stage. Logos, Powers, and Wisdom, as we shall see later, are also used with reference to the third stage. Again, the term intelligible world is used by Philo as a description only of the totality of ideas, that is, of ideas in their restricted sense of patterns; the term Logos is used by him as a description of both the totality of ideas and the totality of powers, that is, of ideas in the sense of both patterns and causes. Finally, according to a native Jewish tradition adopted by Philo, the powers of God are divided into two main classes, beneficial and punitive. The Logos, therefore, as the totality of powers as well as of ideas, is represented by him as the totality of both these types of powers which, expressed by him in figurative language, is said to be "in the middle" of the powers or is the "source" of the powers.

The relation of God to the created Logos is conceived by Philo as that of cause to effect; the relation of the Logos to the intelligible world is conceived by him as that of the mind to its object of knowledge; the relation of the intelligible world to the ideas is conceived by him as that of the whole to its constituent parts. The interrelations of these terms are sometimes described by him as interrelations between the more universal and the less universal. God is thus described by him as "the most generic" without any qualification; the Logos is described by him as "the most generic of created things"; the ideas are described by him simply as "generic." Sometimes, drawing upon the Aristotelian terminology, he describes the Logos — in its capacity as the mind of the intelligible world — as the place of the intelligible world, by which he means that the two are identical and are distinguishable only in thought as the mind is distinguishable from its object of knowledge. Similarly God, in His relation to the ideas

in their first stage of existence, when they are only thoughts of God, is described by him as "the incorporeal space of the incorporeal ideas." But in His relation to the ideas as well as to the intelligible world and the Logos in their second stage of existence, when they are already created and real incorporeal beings distinct from God's essence, God, according to Philo, cannot be described as their place; He can only be described as being "prior" to them, prior in the sense of being their cause. In one sense, however, God can be called the "place" of everything, and that is in the Aristotelian sense that "place" is that which contains, without being identical with that which is contained. For since God contains everything and is not identical with anything in the world, He may be called the place of the world as well as of everything within it.

Finally, the Aristotelian forms, which have grown out of the Platonic ideas, are by implication described by Aristotle as "instruments," in which description the term instrument is used in the sense of a form or pattern in the mind of the agent or artist or efficient cause. Similarly Philo, on restoring the forms of Aristotle to the status of the ideas of Plato, still retains for them the title instrument in the sense of pattern. And so the ideas and powers and the Logos and Wisdom are all in various ways called by him instruments. But in the case of all of them, they are called by him instruments only in the sense of patterns; they are not called by him instruments in the sense of intermediaries.

Historically, one of the most important features of Philo's revision of the Platonic theory of ideas is his application of the term Logos to the totality of ideas and his description of it as the place of the intelligible world, which in its turn consists of the ideas.

In the subsequent history of philosophy, the Logos be-

came separated from the intelligible world and the ideas, and came to be treated as something apart from them. As such it entered upon a new career in the history of the Christian doctrine of the trinity. From Christianity it passed on into Islam under the form of its orthodox theory of divine attributes. As integrally implicated in the problem of divine attributes, the Logos thus indirectly continued to exist as a problem also throughout medieval Moslem and Jewish philosophy.

With the separation of the Logos from the ideas and its emergence as a new problem of its own, the theory of ideas, too, emerged as a problem distinct from that of the Logos and came to be treated as such throughout the history of philosophy, though later it became better known as the problem of universals. Throughout the subsequent history of the theory of ideas the influence of Philo has been felt. If their existence is admitted, they have had to depend for their existence upon God. Oftentimes, as in Philo, three stages in their existence are distinguished.

In his grand assault upon philosophy, Spinoza, by doing away with the entire conception of the existence of incorporeal beings, does away also with ideas and an intelligible world and a Logos. Directly, Spinoza does not deal with any of these problems, except in so far as he mentions Plato's theory of ideas,¹ in so far also as he refers to Jesus as the eternal son of God² or as "the idea of God,"³ and finally in so far as he uses the same term, eternal son of God, as a designation of each of his two immediate infinite modes.⁴ Indirectly, however, all these problems are involved in his discussion of the problems of creation and divine attributes.

¹ *Short Treatise* I, 6, § 7.

² *Cogitata Metaphysica* II, 10; *Epistola* 73.

³ *Ethics* IV, Prop. 68, Schol.

⁴ *Short Treatise* I, 9, §§ 2-3.

CHAPTER V

CREATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD

IN HIS DISCUSSION of the problem of the origin of the world Philo enumerates three views which were current in his time: the Aristotelian view that the world is eternal in the sense of its being both uncreated and indestructible,¹ the Stoic view that this world of ours is one in a succession of worlds each of which is both created and destructible,² and the Platonic view that the world is created but not destructible.³ Of these three views, the Aristotelian view is rejected in so far as it affirms the uncreatedness of the world⁴ but it is praised for its pious and religious spirit in so far as it affirms its indestructibility;⁵ the Stoic view is completely rejected;⁶ the Platonic view is declared to have been anticipated by Moses.⁷

(a) *Criticism of Aristotle and the Stoics*

The rejection of the Aristotelian view of the uncreatedness of the world is on the ground that it "impiously" postulates in God "a vast inactivity."⁸ This Philo declares to be contrary to the Mosaic teaching that "in existing things there must be an active cause and a passive object," the latter of which is "in itself incapable of life and motion, but, when set

¹ *Aet.* 3, 7 and 10-12; *Opif.* 2, 7; *Conf.* 23, 114; *Somn.* II, 43, 283.

² *Aet.* 3, 8-9.

³ *Ibid.* 4, 13-16.

⁴ *Opif.* 2, 7-11; cf. *Somn.* II, 43, 283.

⁵ *Aet.* 3, 10. In *Opif.* 2, 7, where Aristotle is criticized, his view is described as that which believes that the world is "uncreated and eternal" and similarly in *Aet.* 3, 10, where he is praised, his view is described as that which believes that the world is "uncreated and indestructible." But evidently the criticism in the former place is meant only for the "uncreated" part of his view and the praise in the latter place is meant only for the "indestructible" part of his view.

⁶ *Aet.* 5, 20-9, 51.

⁷ *Ibid.* 5, 19.

⁸ *Opif.* 2, 7.

in motion and shaped and endowed with life by mind, changes into the most perfect masterpiece, namely, this world." ⁹ Now, it will have been noticed, the view which Philo ascribes to Moses and on account of which he rejects the Aristotelian theory of the uncreatedness of the world is only a restatement of Aristotle's own view, and is even couched in Aristotle's own terms. The distinction within existing things between active and passive is Aristotelian; ¹⁰ the description of the passive as that which in itself is incapable of motion and hence of life is also Aristotelian; ¹¹ and equally Aristotelian is the description of God as the one who sets the world in motion, and who sets it in motion as a mind and is its life. ¹² Since Philo, therefore, uses the very words of Aristotle as a refutation of Aristotle's own theory of the uncreatedness of the world, we have reason to believe that the main point of his argument is that Aristotle's theory of the uncreatedness of the world is somehow inconsistent with his own conception of God as a Prime Mover. But inasmuch as Philo only implies that there is such an inconsistency, without telling us what it is, we shall try to work out this implication ourselves.

Philo would seem to be arguing as follows: Aristotle himself, despite his belief in the uncreatedness of the world, is compelled to admit the existence of a God, on the ground of the impossibility of an infinite series of movers and things moved. This God, according to him, is the cause of all the motions in the world. Now, being the cause of all the motions in the world, God must certainly be more active than any of the other motive causes in the world. But among the

⁹ *Ibid.* 2, 8-9.

¹⁰ *Phys.* VIII, 4, 255a, 12-15. The terms used, however, are not Aristotelian.

¹¹ *Phys.* VIII, 4, 254b, 27-33; *De Gen. et Corr.* II, 9, 335b, 29-31.

¹² *Metaph.* XII, 7, 1072a, 25 ff.

motive causes in the world there are those which bring things into existence from non-existence, that is, those which produce motion in the category of substance.¹³ When Aristotle maintains, therefore, that the world is eternal and that God did not bring it into existence from non-existence, he makes of his God, whom he calls the Prime Mover, less of a cause than some of the other motive causes in the world, for, in comparison with those motive causes in the world which are capable of bringing things into existence from non-existence, his God is to be characterized by "a vast inactivity." It is by such reasoning that St. Thomas tries to show that Aristotle's immovable mover must be the cause of existence (*causa essendi*) to other things.¹⁴ This argument, while proving creation, would, of course, not prove creation *ex nihilo*, for the motive causes in the world which bring things into existence do not bring them into existence *ex nihilo*, but rather out of something which serves as a sort of matter. But that is all that Philo wishes to prove by this argument, namely, that this world of ours did not exist from eternity.

If our interpretation of this argument is right, then it can be shown that it is modeled after an argument for providence reproduced probably from the Stoics. The argument in question is as follows: "Those who grant that the gods exist must acknowledge that they perform some action (*aliquid agere*), and that action an exalted one. But there is nothing more exalted than the administration of the world. Conse-

¹³ *Categ.*, 14, 15a, 13-14.

¹⁴ *Contra Gentiles* II, 6 (2): Item, Ostendum est (l. I, c. 13), per rationem ejusdem, esse aliquod primum movens immobile, quod Deum dicimus. Primum autem movens, in quolibet ordine motuum, est causa omnium motuum qui sunt illius ordinis. Quum igitur multa ex motibus caeli producantur in esse, in quorum ordine Deum esse primum movens ostendum est (ubi sup.), oportet quod Deus sit multis rebus causa essendi. It may be remarked that Aristotle, too, sometimes speaks of God as a "maker" rather than a "mover." Cf., for instance, *De Caelo* I, 4, 271a, 33. This question is discussed in our introductory volume on Greek philosophy.

quently the world is administered by the divine forethought." ¹⁵ All that Philo had to do to change this argument for providence into an argument for creation was to start with the same major premise and then change the minor premise and conclusion to read as follows: "But there is nothing more exalted than the creation of the world. Consequently this world was created by God."

That Philo in his preceding argument has transformed an argument for providence into an argument for creation becomes all the more evident when we consider that his next argument for creation in the same passage is based upon providence. "Those who assert that the world is uncreated," he argues, "unconsciously eliminate that which of all incentives to piety is the most beneficial and the most indispensable, namely, providence, for it stands to reason that what has been brought into existence should be cared for by its Father and Maker. . . . But between that which has never been brought into being and one who is not its Maker no such tie is formed." ¹⁶ The argument as phrased reads as if the belief in creation were with Philo a religious fiction necessary for the promotion of piety and of the belief in divine providence. But it is more than that. To Philo, the belief in providence ultimately rests upon creation, for the belief in providence is part of the belief in the possibility of miracles, and creation is the greatest miracle recorded in Scripture. Providence to him means individual providence, and individual providence is based upon the belief that God, by His sheer will, can miraculously change the order of nature which He himself has implanted in the world.¹⁷ Now the creation of the world, as we shall see, is considered by

¹⁵ Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* II, 30, 76.

¹⁶ *Opif.* 2, 9-10.

¹⁷ Cf. below, p. 348.

Philo as the strongest proof for the possibility of miracles¹⁸ and hence also for individual providence. In one place he combines those who deny the existence of God, those who deny the creation of the world, and those who deny divine providence into one group, characterizing them all as giving themselves to studies "directed against nature or rather against their own soul" and also as declaring "that nothing exists beyond the world of our sight and senses, that it neither was created nor will perish, but is uncreated, imperishable, without guardian, helmsman or protector."¹⁹ And so Philo, following his own view, transformed a Stoic argument for providence into an argument for creation.

In another passage, evidently also referring to the theory of the uncreatedness of the world, Philo rejects this theory on the ground that it "combines as joint causes God and that which is created, two opposite natures like two different colors, whereas there is really one single cause, and that an efficient one (*δρῶν*)." ²⁰ The point of this argument seems to be that, if we assume that God is only a cause of the motion of the world, then the world is independent of God for its existence and may therefore be considered as a joint cause with God for everything within the world, and God is therefore not to be considered as the only efficient cause.

The Stoic view he rejects by several arguments. One of these arguments, concerning which he says that it is hailed by countless people as "very exact and absolutely irrefutable," ²¹ reappears subsequently in the history of philosophy. It tries to show that no adequate motive could be found in God for the successive destructions and constructions of worlds. If it were merely out of a desire to destroy worlds, then this is incompatible with the goodness and

¹⁸ *Mos.* I, 38, 212; II, 48, 267; cf. below, p. 354.

¹⁹ *Somm.* II, 43, 283.

²⁰ *Leg. All.* III, 3, 7.

²¹ *Act.* 8, 39.

immutability of the nature of God. If it were out of a desire to construct another world, then that other world would have to be either worse than the world destroyed, or similar to it, or better than it; but of these three possible assumptions the first is incompatible with the goodness of God's actions, the second with the usefulness of God's actions, and the third with the perfection of God's actions.²² The argument is somewhat similar to that employed by Plato in showing that God could not change himself on the ground that He would have to change himself either into something better or into something worse, neither of which is conceivable with reference to God.²³

(b) *Plato's Timaeus and the Book of Genesis*

In adopting Plato's view of the creation of the world on account of its agreement with the story of creation in the Book of Genesis, Philo also interprets the scriptural story of creation in Genesis in the light of Plato's story of creation in the *Timaeus*. The creation of the world was out of what he calls by the Aristotelian term matter (ὑλη)²⁴ or by the Stoic term substance (οὐσία),²⁵ and describes by the Platonic term mother (μήτηρ) or foster-mother (τροφός) or nurse (τιθήνη).²⁶ But with regard to that matter, it is not clear whether he considers it as created by God, or whether he considers it as coeternal with God. Interpreters of Philo differ on that point. Those who say that he considered matter as created

²² *Ibid.*, 39-44; cf. a similar argument in Sallustius, *Concerning the Gods and the Universe*, VII, by A. D. Nock (Cambridge University Press, 1926), pp. 12-15 and lx-lxiii.

²³ *Republic* II, 381 B-C.

²⁴ *Plant.* 2, 5; *Heres* 32, 160.

²⁵ *Opif.* 5, 21; *Plant.* 1, 3; *Heres* 27, 134; *Somn.* II, 6, 45. Cf. Leisegang, *Indices*, sub οὐσία, 3.

²⁶ *Ebr.* 14, 61; *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 160; cf. above, p. 267.

find support for their interpretation in such passages as those in which God is said to have brought into being "things that were non-existent" (τὰ μὴ ὄντα)²⁷ or in which He is said to be "not only a Demiurge, but also a Creator (κτίστης)"²⁸ and in which to create (*create*) matter is said to be a property of Providence²⁹ or in which matter is spoken of as having been created (γέγονε).³⁰ Those who say that Philo considered matter as eternal argue that the term "non-existent" is used by Philo in a relative and not an absolute sense; that the statement that God is not only a Demiurge but also a Creator means that God is not only a Demiurge of the perceptible world but also the Creator of the intelligible world; that the passages in which the term creation is used in connection with matter are not statements of Philo's own belief; that the terms which he most often applies to God are Craftsman (δημιουργός), World-molder (κοσμοπλάστης), and Artificer (τεχνίτης), all of which imply the making of the world out of something.³¹ On the basis of all these considerations and from "his failure to speak of matter as created,"³² Drummond concludes his survey of the problem with the following words: "On a survey, then, of the whole evidence, I think we must conclude that Philo believed in the eternity of matter."³³ The same conclusion is also arrived at by Neumark³⁴ and Bréhier.³⁵

²⁷ *Opif.* 26, 81; *Mut.* 5, 46; *Mos.* II, 20, 100; cf. *Somn.* I, 13, 76.

²⁸ *Somn.* I, 13, 76; *Spec.* I, 5, 30.

²⁹ C. G. L. Grossmann, *Quaestiones Philonae*, Lipsiae, 1829, I, p. 19, n. 70.

³⁰ Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VII, 21, 336b.

³¹ Drummond, I, 297-307.

³² *Idem*, I, 300.

³³ *Idem*, I, 307.

³⁴ Cf. D. Neumark, *Toledot ha-Philosofiah be-Yisra'el*, I, 1921, p. 61. In his earlier German work, *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters*, I, 1907, pp. 71-72, he has left the matter in doubt.

³⁵ Bréhier, pp. 80-82. So also J. Klausner in his *From Jesus to Paul*, p. 188.

From our own survey of the whole evidence, however, we have come to the conclusion that no light can be thrown on Philo's position on this question from his use of such terms as "non-existent" or "creator" or "create" on the one hand, and "craftsman" or "world-molder" or "artificer" on the other. Nor can one determine his position on this question with the help of Scripture or post-scriptural Jewish tradition. With regard to the scriptural story of creation, one need not refer to the findings of modern critical scholarship that the creation story in Genesis reflects a view similar to that of Plato and that there is no suggestion in it of creation out of nothing.³⁶ One has only to refer to the fact that in medieval Jewish philosophy some philosophers have found the scriptural story of creation quite compatible with the belief in a preëxistent eternal and uncreated matter,³⁷ and, what is more important, support for such an interpretation was thought to be found in a Midrashic work.³⁸ Those medieval philosophers evidently felt themselves much freer in their interpretation of the story of Genesis than Philo is assumed by Caird to have felt himself, for he solves the entire problem as to Philo's view on the origin of the preëxistent matter by stating that "in accomodation to Jewish notions, God must be supposed to create matter in which his ideas are realized."³⁹ Nor, again, can an answer to this question be found in post-scriptural Jewish literature already in existence by the time of Philo. In this literature, two conflicting statements are to be found. In the Wisdom of Solomon, on the

³⁶ Cf. J. Skinner's *Genesis* in *The International Critical Commentary*, pp. 41-50.

³⁷ Cf. for instance, Judah ha-Levi, *Cuzari* I, 67; Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* II, 25; Gersonides, *Milhamot Adonai* VI, 2, 1. The treatment of this view in Jewish philosophy has been discussed by the present writer in "The Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic Theories of Creation in Hallevis and Maimonides," *Essays in Honour of the Very Rev. Dr. J. H. Hertz* [1942], 427-442.

³⁸ Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* II, 26, quoting *Pirke de-Rabbi Eli'ezer*, Ch. 3.

³⁹ E. Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, II, 191.

one hand, it is said that God "created the world out of formless matter";⁴⁰ in The Second Book of Maccabees, on the other hand, it is said that God made heaven and earth and all that is therein "out of things non-existent" (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων).⁴¹ But here, again, the question may be raised whether the "formless matter" was itself created or not, and also whether the "things non-existent" are absolutely or relatively non-existent. Similarly inconclusive is the position of Aristeas on this question. His argument that the deified heroes are not true gods because the useful things which they invented are only combinations of things already created but "they themselves did not make the apparatus (κατασκευήν) of the things"⁴² does not necessarily imply that God's creation of the world was *ex nihilo*;⁴³ it means no more than what it says, namely, that the heroes merely took things which were already a constructed apparatus and made new useful combinations of them, whereas the Jewish God, being a true God, made each apparatus itself, but each apparatus itself may have been made out of a formless matter and not necessarily *ex nihilo*. If, therefore, an answer is to be found to the question of Philo's position on the subject, it will have to be found in some passage in which he definitely and unmistakably states that the preëxistent matter out of which the world was created was itself created by God.

Such a passage, we believe, is to be found in his revision of the creation story of the *Timaeus*. In that passage, either

⁴⁰ Wisdom of Solomon 11: 17.

⁴¹ II Macc. 7: 28.

⁴² Aristeas, 136.

⁴³ D. Neumark, taking the term *κατασκευή* in the sense of "matter," derives from this passage in Aristeas a belief in creation *ex nihilo* (*Toledot ha-Pilosophiah be-Yisra'el*, I, p. 61). H. Andrews in Charles's *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament* translates the term similarly by "substance" and so does also H. St. J. Thackeray in his translation of the Letter of Aristeas in *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, 15 (1903), p. 366.

as an interpretation of Plato or as a departure from him, Philo, we shall try to show, has explicitly stated his view of the creation of matter. If students of Philo have failed to see it, it is because they have failed to see Plato through the eyes of Philo. Let us then start with Plato.

Of Plato's conception of the preëxistent matter, as of everything Plato has said, there are a variety of interpretations. The interpretation which we have arrived at and which we believe was the interpretation given to Plato by Philo may be outlined as follows. First, there is an unlimited void which is the abode of the ideas. We have already referred to this and have shown how Philo criticizes and rejects this view.⁴⁴ Second, within that unlimited void, there is a limited void. It is this limited void that Plato calls receptacle (*ὑποδοχή*) or space (*χώρα*) and "mother" (*μήτηρ*)⁴⁵ or nurse (*τιθήνη*)⁴⁶ or fosteress (*τροφός*),⁴⁷ and it is that *in which* (*ἐν ᾧ*)⁴⁸ the world is to be created. Third, in that limited void there are copies (*μιμήματα*)⁴⁹ or shapes (*μορφαι*)⁵⁰ or traces (*ἴχνη*)⁵¹ of the ideal four elements, which copies are "devoid of reason and measure."⁵² It is *from these* copies of the ideal four elements (*ἐξ αὐτῶν*)⁵³ that, according to Plato, the world was to be created. Fourth, the Demiurge transforms these copies of the ideal four elements into the four elements, and then out of these four elements⁵⁴ he creates the world.⁵⁵ The principal feature in this interpretation of Plato is that the limited void called "receptacle" or "space"

⁴⁴ Cf. above, p. 241.

⁴⁵ *Timaeus* 50 D; 51 A; cf. also Aristotle, *Phys.* I, 9, 192a, 14.

⁴⁶ *Timaeus* 49 A; 52 D.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 88 D.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 49 E; 50 C.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 50 C.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 52 D.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* 40 A-40 C. More fully on this interpretation of Plato in our introductory volume on Greek philosophy.

⁵² *Ibid.* 53 B.

⁵³ *Ibid.* 53 A.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 53 C-56 C.

and the copies of the four elements within that limited void called "mother" or "fosteress" or "nurse" have both come to be regarded as preëxistent matter, the one the matter *in which* the world was created and the other the matter *from which* the world was created.

This is the general outline of Plato's preëxistent matter as it must have shaped itself in the mind of Philo. In that outline, based on the *Timaeus*, Plato is clear on one point. (1) He describes the ideas as eternal, from which it is quite evident that the unlimited void in which the ideas exist is also eternal. (2) But he does not make it clear whether the limited void, that is, the matter *in which* the world was created, was created by God or existed from eternity. (3) Nor does he make it clear whether the copies of the four ideal elements within the limited void, that is, the matter *from which* the world was created, was created by God or existed from eternity: all he says about them is that they were stamped from the ideal elements "in a fashion marvellous and hard to describe."⁵⁶

In our presentation of Philo's version of Plato's theory of ideas we have shown how Philo, in direct opposition to Plato, abolished the unlimited void in which the ideas were supposed to exist and how, as an interpretation of Plato, he declared the ideas to have been created by God after they had been His thoughts from eternity.⁵⁷ Here, in our presentation of Philo's version of Plato's story of creation, we shall try to show how Philo, again, as an interpretation of Plato, declared that the matter *in which* the world was created and the matter *from which* the world was created were both themselves created by God.

The passage in which we find Philo's version of Plato's

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 50 c.

⁵⁷ Cf. above, pp. 241 f. and 204 f.

account of creation is his interpretation of the scriptural account of the things created on the first day of creation, which he takes to refer to the creation of the intelligible world or the world of ideas.⁵⁸ As text for his interpretation he takes the three verses in the first chapter of Genesis: "In the beginning God made the *heaven* and the *earth*. And the earth was invisible and without form, and *darkness* was above the *abyss*; and the *spirit of God* was borne above the *water*. And God said: 'Let there be *light*.'" ⁵⁹ The *seven italicized words* are taken by him to refer to seven ideal patterns of things constituting the corporeal world which was to be created in the subsequent five days.⁶⁰ "Heaven" is explained by him as "incorporeal heaven," by which he means the idea of fire, for elsewhere we find that in his enumeration of the four elements he uses the term heaven for the term fire.⁶¹

⁵⁸ *Opif.* 7, 29; cf. 44, 129-130.

⁵⁹ Gen. 1: 1-3.

⁶⁰ The seven things which according to Jewish tradition were created prior to the creation of the world (cf. above, p. 183) are not the same as those enumerated here by Philo. The similarity is only in the number seven. Nor is there any evidence that *Midrash Tadshe*, ch. 6, has used Philo's statement here (cf. A. Epstein, "Le Livre des Jubilés, Philon et le Midrasch Tadsché," *Revue des Études Juives*, 21 (1890), p. 83, and L. Cohn, *Philos Werke*, I, 36, n. 3). The main point in Philo's statement here is that the seven terms in question mentioned on the first day of creation stand for the ideas of seven things which were to be created on the subsequent days of creation. *Midrash Tadshe*, on the basis of the scriptural narrative, enumerates twenty-two kinds of things that were created during the seven days of creation and among them, again on the basis of the scriptural narrative, it mentions the seven things that were created on the first day.

A much closer analogy is to be found in the following statement in *Exodus Rabbah* 15, 22: "Three things were created prior to the creation of the world — water, air, and fire. Water conceived and gave birth to darkness; fire conceived and gave birth to light; air conceived and gave birth to wisdom." By taking the first three in this list to refer to ideas and the second three to refer to their corresponding objects, we have here a statement which is analogous to that of Philo in its main contention. Furthermore, by taking in this statement fire to mean heaven, and light to mean luminaries, and by taking also air to mean spirit, and wisdom to mean mind, we have here a still further analogy to two of the ideas and their corresponding objects mentioned by Philo.

⁶¹ *Somm.* I, 3, 16; *Mos.* I, 20, 113; *Spec.* III, 20, 111; *Conf.* 27, 136. But see interpretation of "heaven" and "earth" in *Leg. All.* I, 1, 1, 9, 21.

“Earth” is explained as “invisible earth,” that is, the idea of the element earth. “Darkness” is explained as the “idea of air,” and “water” is explained as “the incorporeal essence of water,” that is, the idea of water. “Spirit of God” is explained as “the incorporeal essence of spirit,” by which he means the ideas of mind and soul. “Light” is explained as “the incorporeal essence of light” and as “an incorporeal pattern, discernible only to the mind, of the sun and of all the luminaries which were to come into existence throughout heaven.” This corresponds to the idea of the celestial bodies.

Thus six of the seven ideas created by God, according to Philo, on the first day of creation are the ideas of the four elements, the ideas of mind and soul, and the idea of the celestial bodies. This is indeed an interpretation of Genesis in terms of the *Timaeus* — not in terms of the *Timaeus* as it is written, but rather in terms of the *Timaeus* as it was understood by Philo. In the *Timaeus* as it is written there is no mention of an idea of mind and soul:⁶² there is reference there only to the ideas of the four elements, of which the idea of fire is mentioned explicitly,⁶³ and also to the idea of the celestial bodies.⁶⁴ Here Philo adds the ideas of mind and soul.⁶⁵ Again, in the *Timaeus*, the ideas are definitely described as “eternal”⁶⁶ and as “uncreated,”⁶⁷ and, with regard to the copies of the ideal four elements in the limited void, there is no statement whether, like the ideas, they are

⁶² Cf. above, p. 213.

⁶³ *Timaeus* 51 B.

⁶⁴ Cf. *ibid.* 30 C and 39 E-40 A. In these passages of the *Timaeus* there is reference not only to the idea of the celestial bodies but also to the ideas of birds, fishes, and land-animals. The idea of man was created according to Philo on the sixth day. Cf. *Opif.* 46, 134; *Leg. All.* I, 12, 31, in connection with Gen. 1: 26.

⁶⁵ Cf. above, p. 214.

⁶⁶ *Timaeus* 29 A.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* 52 A.

uncreated or, unlike the ideas, they are created. Philo, however, definitely says that the ideas of the four elements are created and consequently the copies of the ideal four elements in the limited void are also created. Thus Philo has cleared up the ambiguity in Plato with regard to the copies of the ideal four forms, concerning which Plato only says that they were stamped "in a fashion marvellous and hard to describe." ⁶⁸

But then, we shall now try to show, in his comment on the term "abyss" he clears up the ambiguity in Plato with regard to the origin of the limited void. The term "abyss" is explained by him as the "idea of void," for "void," he says, "is very deep and yawning" (*ἀχανές*).⁶⁹ Now this "void," identified as it is with an "abyss" which is "yawning," is reminiscent of Hesiod's "chaos," which literally means "gape," "yawn,"⁷⁰ and with which Plato's "receptacle" or "space" is undoubtedly connected.⁷¹ Consequently when Philo speaks of the creation of the idea of void, he means that the idea of Plato's "receptacle" or "space" was created and hence Plato's receptacle or space itself was also created.

We thus have in Philo a clear, though indirect, statement that the Platonic "receptacle" or "space," that is, the matter *in which* the world was created, was itself created by God. When that "receptacle" or "space" was created, God also created in it what Plato calls "copies" or "shapes" or "traces" of the ideal four elements, that is, the matter *from which* the elements and hence the world were created. Again, Philo does not mention directly the creation of the matter

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* 50 c.

⁶⁹ *Opif.* 7, 29.

⁷⁰ See Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (London: A. & C. Black, 1920), p. 7, n. 1.

⁷¹ Cf. Zeller, II, 14, pp. 729-30 (*Plato*, p. 303); cf. also *Act.* 5, 18: "Chaos in Aristotle's opinion is space." For this identification of Hesiod's "chaos" with "space," see *Phys.* IV, 1, 208b, 30-33.

from which the elements were created, but he alludes to it in his statement that God "created space (*χώρα*) and place (*τόπος*) simultaneously with bodies (*σώματα*)."⁷² By the term "bodies," we take it, he means here both extended bodies — that is, the elements — and the copies or shapes or traces of the four ideal elements — that is, the matter from which the elements were created — for the term "body" has also the meaning of matter in the sense of its not being an idea.⁷³ It is because of the double meaning of the term "bodies" used by him here that he uses the two terms "space" and "place," meaning thereby that "space" was created simultaneously with the "matter from which," whereas "place" was created simultaneously with extended bodies or the elements, for "place," by its Aristotelian definition, implies the existence of extended bodies.⁷⁴ It is this "matter in which," together with the "matter from which" contained therein, that Philo calls by the Aristotelian term matter,⁷⁵ by the Stoic term substance,⁷⁶ and by the Platonic terms mother, fosteress, and nurse.⁷⁷ It is also this twofold matter that he describes as shapeless (*ἄμορφος*),⁷⁸ formless (*ἀνείδεος*),⁷⁹ figureless (*ἀσχημάτιστος*),⁸⁰ indefinite (*ἄπειρος*),⁸¹ without quality (*ἄποιος*),⁸² and the like — terms which are the same as, or similar to, the terms used by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics as the description of matter.

Having thus departed from Plato, or given a new interpretation of Plato, by making his receptacle as well as the copies of the ideal four elements contained therein created by God, he follows Plato faithfully in his description of the process of

⁷² *Conf.* 27, 136.

⁷³ Cf. Leisegang, *Indices*, sub *σῶμα*, 2.

⁷⁴ Cf. *Phys.* IV, 4, 212a, 5-6.

⁷⁵ Cf. above, p. 300.

⁷⁶ Cf. above, p. 300.

⁸² *Opif.* 5, 22; *Heres* 27, 140; *Mut.* 23, 135; *Somn.* II, 6, 45; *Spec.* I, 60, 328.

⁷⁷ Cf. above, p. 300.

⁷⁸ *Heres* 27, 140; *Spec.* I, 60, 328.

⁷⁹ *Mut.* 23, 135.

⁸⁰ *Somn.* II, 6, 45.

⁸¹ *Spec.* I, 60, 329.

the creation of the world. Out of these copies of the four ideal elements within the receptacle, both of which together he calls "matter" or "the substance of the world," God formed the four elements.⁸³ These four elements "He laid down as first foundations, to be the sensible elements of the sensible world."⁸⁴ As in Plato, the elements are described by him as having certain geometrical figures.⁸⁵ From these elements, again as in Plato, God constructed the world.⁸⁶

Philo's interpretation of the story of the six days of creation is thus as follows. On the first day, God created the intelligible world of ideas, of which Scripture mentions specifically seven ideas, namely, the idea of what Plato calls the "receptacle," the ideas of the four elements, the idea of the celestial bodies, and the idea of mind and soul. Then He created a copy of the idea of the "receptacle" and, within it, copies of the ideal four elements, both of which together constituted what is known as formless matter, out of which He created the four elements. Out of one or all of these elements He created, on the second day, the corporeal heaven;⁸⁷ on the third day, land and sea and trees and plants;⁸⁸ on the fourth day, the sun and moon and stars;⁸⁹ and on the fifth day, aquatic animals and birds of the air.⁹⁰ Finally, on the sixth day, He created land animals,⁹¹ the mind of man⁹² or the ideal man,⁹³ which is referred to in the first account of the creation of man,⁹⁴ and the corporeal or individual man, which is referred to in the second account of the creation of man.⁹⁵ This interpretation in his *De Opificio Mundi* differs only in slight details from that in his other works.

⁸³ *Heres* 27, 133-135.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* 27, 134.

⁸⁵ *Qu. in Gen.* III, 49.

⁸⁶ *Cher.* 35, 127.

⁸⁷ *Opif.* 10, 36-37.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* 11, 38-13, 44.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* 14, 45-19, 61.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* 20, 62-63. But see above, p. 206, n. 13.

⁹¹ *Ibid.* 21, 64-66. But see above, p. 206, n. 13.

⁹² *Ibid.* 23, 69-71.

⁹³ *Ibid.* 46, 134.

⁹⁴ *Gen.* 1: 27.

⁹⁵ *Gen.* 2: 7; cf. *Opif.* 46, 134 ff.

As in the case of the intelligible world — whose priority to the perceptible world was said by Philo to be not temporal, on the ground that time did not exist before the creation of the world ⁹⁶ — so also in the creation of the perceptible world he declares that it was not created “in time.” ⁹⁷ Though occasionally Philo loosely uses such expressions as “there was a time when it was not,” ⁹⁸ or “God . . . made things which before (*πρότερον*) were not,” ⁹⁹ all such expressions merely mean to convey the idea that God brought the world “out of non-existence into existence.” ¹⁰⁰ In subsequent discussions of this problem among medieval philosophers, as we shall see, this difficulty of language was overcome by the introduction of a sort of pseudo-time, independent of motion, before the creation of the world, ¹⁰¹ so that one could be justified in using temporal expressions with reference to the world even before its creation. So also the succession of the six days of creation in Scripture is not to be taken as implying a sequence of time, for “all things took shape simultaneously (*ἅμα*)” or “at once” (*δμοῦ*). ¹⁰² The term six means “not a quantity of days, but a perfect number,” ¹⁰³ and that perfect number is used in the sense of

⁹⁶ Philo uses the following expressions in connection with time: “Time began either simultaneously with the world or after it” (*Opif.* 7, 26). “Time is more recent than the world” (*Leg. All.* I, 2, 2). “Time itself came into being with the world” (*Sacr.* 18, 68). “God is the maker of time also, for He is the Father of time’s father, that is, of the universe, and has caused the movements of the one to be the source of the generation of the other” (*Immut.* 6, 31). The movements of the world, according to Philo, “could not be prior to the objects moving, but must of necessity arise either simultaneously with the world or later than it” (*Opif.* 7, 26).

⁹⁷ *Leg. All.* I, 2, 2.

⁹⁸ *Decal.* 12, 58.

⁹⁹ *Somn.* I, 13, 76.

¹⁰⁰ *Mos.* II, 48, 267.

¹⁰¹ Cf. above, p. 217.

¹⁰² *Opif.* 22, 67; cf. 3, 13. On the use of the temporal term “simultaneously” here see above, p. 216.

¹⁰³ *Leg. All.* I, 2, 3.

“order,” to show thereby that the world was created according to a certain perfect order¹⁰⁴ and that it is to follow that order.¹⁰⁵

His conception of the structure of the world is like that common at his time. With Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics he holds that there was only one world;¹⁰⁶ but in his argument for its oneness he disregards the elaborate arguments of Aristotle and draws upon the simple argument of Plato that there must be only one world because there is only one ideal model of the world,¹⁰⁷ changing only the Platonic argument from one ideal model to an argument from one Demiurge “who made His work like himself in its uniqueness.”¹⁰⁸ Perhaps this change is also due to the influence of Aristotle’s argument for one heaven on the ground that if there were many heavens the moving principles would be many in number.¹⁰⁹ With Aristotle he holds that outside the finite world there is no void, and he argues directly against the Stoics on this point.¹¹⁰ Whether he has also understood Plato’s “super-celestial place” to refer to a void outside the world is a question which we have raised above.¹¹¹ Again with the generally accepted view, he holds that this one world is spherical in shape and hence presumably finite, though he loosely describes the size of the spherical outermost heaven as being “of infinite magnitude” (*ἀπειρομεγέθης*).¹¹² At the center of the universe, like all his contemporaries, he places

¹⁰⁴ *Opif.* 3, 13.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* 22, 67.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 61, 171; *Migr.* 32, 180.

¹⁰⁹ *Metaph.* XII, 8, 1074a, 31–33.

¹¹⁰ *Heres* 47, 228; *Aet.* 16, 78; 19, 102; *Plant.* 2, 7; cf. above, p. 241.

¹¹¹ Cf. above, p. 241.

¹¹² *Heres* 47, 227–229. That the term *ἀπειρομεγέθης* is used by Philo in the loose sense of immeasurably great, and not necessarily infinite, is evident from the expression *τὰ ἀπειρομεγέθη διαστήματα* (*Mut.* 33, 179). “Distances” within the world are even according to *Heres* §§ 227–229 finite in length.

¹⁰⁷ *Timaeus* 31 A–B; cf. above, p. 181.

¹⁰⁸ *Opif.* 61, 171.

the earth.¹¹³ He does not, however, happen to say anything directly about its shape — it was still a question among the Stoics whether it was conical or spherical¹¹⁴ — nor does he say anything about the question as to its being at rest or in motion, which was an issue raised by Aristotle against Plato.¹¹⁵ There is equally no definite statement by him with regard to the question whether the heavens consisted of a fifth element; but from his use of the term heaven instead of fire in his enumeration of the four elements¹¹⁶ it may be inferred that he followed Plato and the Stoics, as against Aristotle, in making the heaven consist of fire, but, following the Stoics, he occasionally calls that fire ether.¹¹⁷ He follows the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon in adopting the Chaldean system of the order of the planets rather than that of Philolaus and Plato,¹¹⁸ thus giving the order of the lower four planets, Sun, Venus, Mercury, [Moon],¹¹⁹ instead of Venus, Mercury, Sun, Moon. In one passage he gives the order of these lower four planets as Sun, Mercury, Venus, Moon,¹²⁰ in which passage the transposition of Mercury and Venus may be taken as purely accidental, for his main purpose in giving the order of the planets in that passage is, as he himself says, to give his approval to the “conjecture” of those “who assign the middle place to the sun and hold that there are three above him and the same number below him.”¹²¹ In his description of the motions of the various

¹¹³ *Plant.* I, 3; *Conf.* 30, 156.

¹¹⁴ Diogenes, VII, 144–145.

¹¹⁵ Cf. *Timaeus* 40 B; *De Caelo* II, 13, 293b, 30–32. Cf. E. Frank, *Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer*, pp. 205 ff.

¹¹⁶ *Somn.* I, 3, 16; *Mos.* I, 20, 113, and cf. 26, 143; II, 43, 238; *Spec.* III, 20, 111.

¹¹⁷ *Praem.* 6, 36; *Mos.* II, 50, 285. But see below, p. 369, at n. 32. Cf. Drummond, I, 276, and full discussion of the problem on pp. 273–279.

¹¹⁸ Cf. T. [L.] Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos*, pp. 106–107.

¹¹⁹ *Cher.* 7, 22.

¹²⁰ *Heres* 45, 224.

¹²¹ A similar statement that the sun occupies the middle place is to be found in *Mos.* II, 21, 103.

spheres, which on the whole follows the commonly accepted view, he describes that revolution of the planetary spheres which is from east to west and in which they share in common with the same kind of revolution of the sphere of the fixed stars, as being "under a compelling force" (*βεβιασμένη*) and "involuntary" (*ἀκούσιος*).¹²² This evidently refers to the theory of "counteracting" spheres by which Aristotle explains the participation of the internal spheres in the diurnal motion of the outermost sphere.¹²³

As for the composition of the world, he denies the atomism of the Epicureans, believing in the infinite divisibility of matter. In one place, in a homily on the verse "He smote the Egyptian and hid him in sand,"¹²⁴ he takes the Egyptian whom Moses smote to symbolize the two Epicurean doctrines, "the doctrine that pleasure is the prime and greatest good, and the doctrine that atoms are the elementary principles of the universe."¹²⁵ In another place, in a homily on the verse "he divided them in the midst,"¹²⁶ he interprets it to refer to the Logos which in its capacity as Cutter (*τομείς*) "never ceases to divide, for when it has gone through all sensible objects down to the atoms and what are called indivisibles, it begins from them again to divide those things contemplated by reason into inexpressible and indescribable parts."¹²⁷ The meaning of this passage, we take it, is that those so-called atoms and indivisibles of the Epicureans, which according to them are discernible only by the mind, are really not indivisibles, for they can be further and infinitely divided by the mind. In view of this, then, when in still another passage the vagueness of the text makes it doubtful whether Philo means to say that atoms exist or

¹²² *Cher.* 7, 22.

¹²³ *Metaph.* XII, 8, 1074a, 1 ff.

¹²⁴ *Exod.* 2: 12.

¹²⁵ *Fug.* 26, 148.

¹²⁶ *Gen.* 15: 10.

¹²⁷ *Heres* 26, 130-131.

that they do not exist,¹²⁸ that passage is to be interpreted so as to mean that atoms do not exist.

Following Scripture and Plato, he conceives the act of creation as an act of will and design. The scriptural method of emphasizing the existence of will and purpose in the act of creation by saying that God created by His word or by His wisdom is followed also by Philo in his use of such expressions as that the universe was made by the word (*λογος*)¹²⁹ or by the wisdom (*σοφία*)¹³⁰ of God. Sometimes he describes the creation of the world more explicitly as an act which God willed (*βουληθεῖς*).¹³¹ He quotes with approval, and also restates in his own words, Plato's statement that the final cause of the creation of the world was God's desire to bestow His goodness upon the world¹³² and to make it most perfect.¹³³ But this perfection of the world, being only an act of God's good will and not a necessary result of the perfection of His nature, is relative only to the beings for whom it was created, but it is not relative to the power of God who created it. If God willed, it was in His power to create a different world and a more perfect world. "Not in proportion to the greatest of His own bounties does He confer benefits — for these are without end or limit — but in proportion to the capacities of the recipients."¹³⁴ Our present world is so ordered that various living beings live in the various elements — in the water, in the air, in the earth, and even in fire¹³⁵ — and, in the case of the amphibious creature, in more than one element. No living being lives in all the four elements. Still, "if the existent One had willed to employ His skill, by which

¹²⁸ *Agr.* 30, 134. See Colson's note *ad loc.* (III, 491-492), where two possible interpretations of this passage are given.

¹²⁹ *Sacr.* 3, 8.

¹³⁰ *Heres* 41, 199.

¹³¹ *Opif.* 6, 23.

¹³² *Opif.* 5, 21; *Cher.* 35, 125-127.

¹³³ *Deter.* 42, 154; cf. *Timaeus* 29 D-E.

¹³⁴ *Opif.* 6, 23.

¹³⁵ *Plant.* 3, 12.

He made amphibious creatures," He could have changed the order of nature and created an animal capable of living in all the elements.¹³⁶ This is evidently in criticism of the philosophic view that "it is fixed and settled where each thing can grow and have its place," so that "fishes cannot live in the fields."¹³⁷ And, just as the world was created by the will of God, so also will it be saved from destruction by the will of God. Evidently reflecting Aristotle's statement that "whatever is generated must be destructible"¹³⁸ and Plato's statement that the world, though generated, is indissoluble by the "consent" or "will" of God,¹³⁹ he says with regard to the world that "it has been generated, and generation is the beginning of destruction, even though by the providence of the Creator it may be made immortal."¹⁴⁰ Unlike Plato, however, according to whom the "will" and "consent" of God by which the world is to be indestructible can never be changed even by God himself, Philo, as we shall see, assumes, as part of his belief in miracles, that God can always change His will for some good reason. With all his insistence upon the indestructibility of the world, he does not mean that God could not destroy the world if He had the will to destroy it. He only means that we can rely upon God's promise that He would not destroy it. His vehement criticism of the Stoics for their belief in the destructibility of the world is primarily directed at their belief that the destructibility of this world of ours as well as of all the other successive worlds must come about by the necessity of an inexorable fate.

¹³⁶ *Deter.* 42, 154.

¹³⁷ Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura* III, 784-787; cf. V, 128-131.

¹³⁸ *De Caelo* I, 12, 282b, 4.

¹³⁹ *Timaeus* 41 A-B.

¹⁴⁰ *Decal.* 12, 58.

(c) *Place, Time, Eternity*

In the course of his discussion of the creation and structure of the universe Philo touches occasionally upon the staple philosophic problems of space (*χώρα*) and place (*τόπος*) and time (*χρόνος*) and eternity (*αίων*). Let us see what definite views he had on these topics.

Philo does not deal directly with the problems of place and time, but whenever he happens to touch upon them he operates with material drawn indiscriminately from Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Thus in one passage there is a disguised allusion to the use of space in the Platonic sense of the matter *in which* the world was created.¹⁴¹ Similarly several allusions are to be found in other passages to Aristotle's definition of place as "the boundary of the containing body."¹⁴² So also does he make several allusions to the Stoic definition of place as that which is possessed (*ἐχόμενον*) or occupied (*κατεχόμενον*) by a body,¹⁴³ which he reproduces as being "a space filled (*πεπληρωμένη*) by a body."¹⁴⁴ As for the view with which he himself would agree, one thing is quite certain that he could not accept the Stoic definition of place. The Stoic definition implies that there is an infinite void outside the world and that part of that void is completely filled by the world, and it is that part of the completely filled void that is the place of the world, and similarly it is every part of that place of the world that is the place of every part of the world corresponding to it. But Philo does

¹⁴¹ *Conf.* 27, 136, and cf. our discussion of this passage above, p. 309.

¹⁴² *Phys.* IV, 4, 212a, 5-6; cf. *Somn.* I, 11, 63; *Fug.* 14, 75; *Leg. All.* I, 14, 44, and our discussion of this passage above (p. 249); also *Conf.* 27, 136, and our discussion above on p. 309. Cf. H. Leisegang, *Die Raumlehre im spätern Platonismus*, pp. 44-45.

¹⁴³ *Arnim*, II, 504 and 505.

¹⁴⁴ *Somn.* I, 11, 62; *Fug.* 14, 75 (*ἐκπεπληρωμένη*); cf. Colson on *Fug.* 14, 75; cf. also above, pp. 245, 248 ff.

not believe in the existence of a void outside the world ¹⁴⁵ and consequently he could not accept the Stoic definition of place. In one passage, which seems to express his own approved view on place, Philo says that "place was conceived (*ἐνοήθη*) when bodies were at rest (*ἡρεμούντων*)." ¹⁴⁶ Now, at first sight, this statement would seem to be the opposite of the statement made by Aristotle that "the existence of place is held to be obvious from the fact of mutual replacement" ¹⁴⁷ and also from "the typical locomotions of the elementary natural bodies" ¹⁴⁸ and especially his concluding statement that "place would not have been inquired into, if there had not been a special kind of motion, namely, that with respect to place." ¹⁴⁹ But on a closer investigation it will be found that in the evidence for the existence of place from the "typical locomotions of the elementary natural bodies" Aristotle emphasizes not only the fact of their being moved to the appropriate places but also the fact that they are at rest in those places. In one passage, referring to these "typical locomotions of the elementary natural bodies," he says that "each of the bodies is naturally carried to its appropriate place and rests (*μένειν*) there." ¹⁵⁰ In another passage he says that "it is reasonable that each kind of body should be carried to its own place" ¹⁵¹ and "should rest (*μένει*) naturally in its proper place." ¹⁵² In general, his own explanation of his definition of place as meaning that, "if a body has another body outside it and containing it, it is in place," ¹⁵³ clearly shows that, while he considered motion as a factor in our becoming aware of the existence of place, it is the mere fact of the enclosure of bodies within

¹⁴⁵ *Plant.* 2, 7; *Heres* 47, 228; *Act.* 16, 78; 19, 102; cf. above, p. 241.

¹⁴⁶ *Somn.* I, 32, 187.

¹⁴⁷ *Phys.* IV, 1, 208b, 1-2.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 8-9.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.* IV, 4, 211a, 12-13.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.* IV, 4, 211a, 4-5.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* IV, 5, 212b, 29-30.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.* IV, 5, 212a, 31-32.

other bodies, without their being necessarily in motion, that enters into the definition of place and into the formation of our conception of what place is. And this is exactly what Philo means by his statement that "place was conceived when bodies were at rest."

In the passage just quoted Philo continues to say that "time was conceived when bodies were in motion."¹⁵⁴ In another passage he similarly says that "the world of our senses, when set in motion, has caused the nature of time to shine forth and to become conspicuous."¹⁵⁵ This reflects the view common to Plato¹⁵⁶ and Aristotle¹⁵⁷ and the Stoics¹⁵⁸ that time is connected with motion. Formally, however, whenever he reproduces a definition of time, it is usually that of the Stoics that he reproduces, namely, "time is the interval (*διάστημα*) of the motion of the world."¹⁵⁹ But this Stoic definition, it would seem, was considered by Philo as being merely a restatement in formal language of the Platonic conception of time. Thus, in one passage, after quoting Plato to the effect that "time is indicated by days and nights and months and successions of years, and none of these can subsist without the movement of the sun and the revolution of the whole heaven,"¹⁶⁰ he concludes, by referring to the Stoics, that "thus people who are accustomed to define things have correctly explained time as the interval of the movement of the world."¹⁶¹ He similarly follows

¹⁵⁴ *Somn.* I, 32, 187.

¹⁵⁵ *Imm.* 6, 32.

¹⁵⁶ *Timaeus* 37 c-39 E.

¹⁵⁷ *Phys.* IV, 11, 219a, 1-220a, 26.

¹⁵⁸ Arnim, II, 509-521.

¹⁵⁹ *Opif.* 7, 26; *Act.* 2, 4; 10, 52; Arnim, II, 509, p. 164, l. 33; 510, p. 165, l. 1; cf. Colson on *Opif.* 7, 26; H. Leisegang, *Die Begriffe der Zeit und Ewigkeit im späteren Platonismus*, p. 12.

¹⁶⁰ *Act.* 10, 52; cf. *Timaeus* 37 E.

¹⁶¹ *Act.* 10, 52.

Plato when, in his comment on the verse that the lights in the firmament of the heaven were created by God in order that they should be "for days, and years,"¹⁶² he says that one of the purposes for which the heavenly bodies were created was to distinguish "days and months and years, which are the measures of time, and which have given rise to the nature of number."¹⁶³ The particular passage in Plato reflected in this statement is that in which Plato says that "the sun and the moon and five other stars which have the name of planets have been created for defining and preserving the numbers of time"¹⁶⁴ and that "all living creatures for whom it was meet might possess number."¹⁶⁵ Again like Plato, with whom the linkage of time with motion has led to the conclusion that "days and nights and months and years were not before the heaven was created,"¹⁶⁶ Philo also says that "time was not before the world,"¹⁶⁷ and if Scripture says "In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth,"¹⁶⁸ the expression in the beginning is to be taken not in a chronological sense but rather in the sense of its being first in the order of importance.¹⁶⁹

Time is thus inseparable from the motion of the world and like the world itself it was created. But to Philo as to Plato everything in the world is a copy of some ideal pattern and, therefore, since time is in the world, it must be a copy of some ideal pattern. What then is the ideal pattern of time to be called? Naturally one would expect it to be called the idea of time. But Plato has already selected the term *aeon* (*αἰών*), which literally means a space of time or a lifetime or an age, but which is commonly translated by the

¹⁶² Gen. 1: 14.

¹⁶³ *Opif.* 18, 55; cf. *Leg. All.* III, 8, 25; *Fug.* 10, 57; *Mut.* 47, 267.

¹⁶⁴ *Timaeus* 38 c.

¹⁶⁷ *Opif.* 7, 26.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.* 39 B.

¹⁶⁸ Gen. 1: 1.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 37 D.

¹⁶⁹ *Opif.* 7, 26-27; cf. above, p. 215.

term eternity, as a designation for what he should have called the idea of time.¹⁷⁰ Philo has retained that term in the sense of the idea of time, though he still continues to use it quite often in the sense of time or lifetime or age or any space of time.¹⁷¹ In its specific sense of the idea of time he says of "eternity" that it is "the archetype and paradigm of time"¹⁷² and of "time" that it is "a copy (*μίμημα*) of eternity,"¹⁷³ which sayings reflect Plato's statement that "the nature of the ideal was eternal" and that time is "a moving image of eternity."¹⁷⁴ In further explanation of eternity in the sense of the idea of time, Philo says that "the word eternity signifies the life of the intelligible world, as time is the life of the perceptible world,"¹⁷⁵ with the understanding, of course, that while the life of the perceptible world is motion, the life of the intelligible world is free of motion. Playing upon the name Father which is applied to God by both Scripture and Plato¹⁷⁶ and conceiving of the intelligible world as the elder son of God and of the perceptible world as the younger son of God, he calls time, which arises only through the life or the motion of the perceptible world, the grandson of God.¹⁷⁷ The term eternal, in its strictly technical sense, can thus apply only to motionless things, namely, God, the Logos, and the powers or ideas

¹⁷⁰ *Timaeus* 37 D ff.

¹⁷¹ For some examples of Philo's use of the term *αἰών*, not in the technical sense of "eternity" as opposed to "time" but rather in the common sense of time or some space of time, see *Leg. All.* III, 8, 25; III, 70, 199; *Sacr.* 11, 47; 21, 76; *Plaut.* 27, 116; *Ebr.* 5, 24; 47, 195; *Migr.* 22, 125; *Fug.* 10, 57; *Mut.* 34, 185; *Somn.* II, 5, 36; *Mos.* I, 37, 206.

¹⁷² *Immut.* 6, 32; cf. *Mut.* 47, 267.

¹⁷³ *Heres* 34, 165.

¹⁷⁴ *Timaeus* 37 D; cf. J. G. Müller, *Des Juden Philo Buch von der Welterschöpfung*, p. 168.

¹⁷⁵ *Mut.* 47, 267.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. above, p. 211.

¹⁷⁷ *Immut.* 6, 31.

which constitute the Logos. But the term eternal, as we have tried to show above, does not always mean with Philo ungenerated. Even the Logos and its constituent powers or ideas in their second stage of existence, which is a created existence, are sometimes described by him as eternal, which we have explained to be used by him in the limited sense of everlasting.¹⁷⁸ Whether the Logos, and with it also the powers or ideas, all of which are described by Philo both as eternal and as generated, were conceived by him as having been eternally generated is a question which, if raised, could not be answered with certainty. To us, however, it seems that Philo could have no conception of "eternal generation," for such a conception would be contrary to his view of the "aloneness" of God before creation,¹⁷⁹ a view which implies that there was a time — to make use of this term here figuratively — when God was alone and there was with Him, or by the side of Him, or coming into being outside of Him, no Logos or powers or ideas, though all of these were in His mind from eternity. The concept of "eternal generation" appears only later in Plotinus and in Christianity, and its appearance then is due to the fact that both Plotinus and those in Christianity who held this doctrine wanted to indicate thereby that there was no time when God was alone. We shall have occasion to deal with this problem more fully in our other volumes in this series of studies.

(d) *Conclusion, Influence, Anticipation*

In his discussion of the theory of creation, as presented in this chapter, Philo has added five new elements to his general statement, quoted in a previous chapter, that the creation of the world is a cardinal principle of scriptural religion: first, his statement that the indestructibility of the world is

¹⁷⁸ Cf. above, p. 235.

¹⁷⁹ Cf. above, p. 172.

an essential creed of scriptural religion; second, his arguments against Aristotle's belief in the uncreatedness of the world; third, his arguments against the Stoic theory of the successive creations and destructions of worlds; fourth, his view that the preëxistent matter out of which the world was created was itself created by God; fifth, his view that if God willed He could have created a world different from ours.

In the subsequent history of philosophy some of these five points were rejected while others were accepted. First, the belief in the indestructibility of the world was not generally considered as an essential element in religion.¹ Second, though in later history the arguments against the uncreatedness of the world became more elaborate, the essential criticisms raised by Philo are discernible as the basis of some of the subsequent more elaborate arguments. Third, the Stoic view of the successive creations and destructions of worlds, which is rejected by Philo, was with certain modifications, either accepted or regarded as compatible with Scripture by some Christian,² Moslem,³ and Jewish⁴ philosophers, but some of his arguments against it were repeated by those who, like St. Augustine, rejected it.⁵ Fourth, his revision of Plato's view of the preëxistent matter by making it created was followed by many of those in Christianity who, like Tatian,⁶ Theophilus,⁷ and St. Augustine,⁸ adopted the

¹ Cf. Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* II, 27.

² Origen, *De Principiis* II, 2, 4-5.

³ Cf. reference to Muhammad al-Baqir and Ibn al-Arabi in Muhammad Ali's *Translation of the Holy Quran*, Lahore, 1928, p. lxxv.

⁴ Judah ha-Levi, *Cuzari* I, 67. The treatment of the theory of the creation of successive worlds in Jewish and Moslem philosophy as well as in Origen and St. Augustine is discussed by the present writer in "The Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic Theories of Creation in Hallevi and Maimonides," *Essays in Honour of the Very Rev. Dr. J. H. Hertz*, [1942], 427-442.

⁵ *De Civitate Dei* XII, 17.

⁶ *Oratio adversus Graecos*, ch. 5.

⁷ *Ad Autolyicum* II, 4.

⁸ *Confessiones* XII, 8.

Platonic theory of a formless matter out of which the world was created. However, there were some who found that creation out of an eternal preëxistent matter was compatible with Scripture⁹ and many others who insisted upon creation directly *ex nihilo*.¹⁰ Fifth, his view that if God willed he could have created a different world is discussed in the works of many subsequent philosophers, Moslem,¹¹ Jewish,¹² and Christian.¹³

Spinoza in his assault upon traditional philosophy rejects all theories of creation, including creation out of a preëxistent matter,¹⁴ and returns to the Aristotelian conception of the eternity of the world. He also comes out directly against the view, first expressed by Philo, that the world could have been ordered to be otherwise than it now is.¹⁵

⁹ Cf. above, n. 37.

¹⁰ As, e.g., Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* II, 13; St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, 45, 1.

¹¹ Cf. discussion of the Ash'arite view on this point in Algazali, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* I, § 28 (ed. Bouyges); Averroes, *Kitāb Kashf 'an-Manāhij* in Müller's *Philosophie und Theologie von Averroes*, p. 84; Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* I, 73 (10), 74 (5); II, 19.

¹² Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* II, 19; cf. II, 17.

¹³ Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* V (PL, 178, 1321A), St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, 25, 6.

¹⁴ Spinoza's criticism of traditional theories of creation is discussed by the present writer in the chapter on "Unity of Substance" in *The Philosophy of Spinoza*.

¹⁵ *Ethics*, I, Prop. 33; *Short Treatise*, I, 4, § 3 and § 7; cf. *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, *ad loc.*

CHAPTER VI

THE IMMANENT LOGOS, LAWS OF NATURE, MIRACLES

I. IMMANENT LOGOS

FOLLOWING the view generally held by Greek philosophers, with the exception of the Epicureans, Philo maintains that the order of the world is determined by certain immutable laws of causality. Now these laws of causality were generally explained by all those who admitted their existence as being due to what they all called God, but their conception of that God differed on certain essential points. To Plato, God is an immaterial being who, prior to His creation of the world, had existed from eternity without a world and, when He willed to create the world, implanted in it a soul which contained a mind to govern it according to certain immutable laws. It is God, therefore, who has implanted these laws in nature and it is a universal soul which administers these laws.¹ To Aristotle, too, God is immaterial, but He has existed from eternity together with the world, being therefore not the creator of the world but only the cause of its motion; and, as the cause of its motion, He is also the cause of the immutability of these laws of motion which proceed from Him.² To the Stoics, in opposition to both of them, God is something material, who from eternity has existed as an active principle in the eternal primary fire, out of which He himself created this world of ours. Within this world even after its creation, according to them, God has remained as an active material principle, whom they describe as the Logos³ or the

¹ Cf. below, p. 427.

² Cf. *Metaph.* XII, cc. 7 and 10.

³ Diogenes, VII, 134. Cf. also Arnim, Index, under *λόγος*, p. 70, col. 2.

seminal Logos (λόγος σπερματικός) of the world,⁴ or the mind (νοῦς) of the world,⁵ or the soul (ψυχή) of the world,⁶ and whose extension throughout the various parts of the world they describe again as the Logoi or the seminal Logoi,⁷ or as the Powers (δυνάμεις)⁸ of God. It is this internal material principle that they regard as the cause of the immutable laws of nature. Philo, as we have seen, rejects the Aristotelian conception of God on the ground of its incompatibility with the scriptural conception of God as a creative, and not merely as a motive, cause of the world.⁹ He rejects also the Stoic conception of God on the ground of its incompatibility with the scriptural conception of God as an incorporeal being.¹⁰ His conception of God is like that of Plato, a being who is both incorporeal and creative. But, as we shall see, he does not follow Plato in ascribing a soul to the world as a whole,¹¹ and consequently he does not use the Platonic vocabulary of ascribing the immutable laws of nature to a world-soul. He does follow, however, Plato's description of the ideas as being not only patterns (παραδείγματα) apart from the world, of which things in the world are only imitations (μιμήσεις),¹² but as being also in the world through their presence (παρουσία) in it, through their communion (κοινωνία) with it, and through the participation (μέθεξις) of things in them.¹³ Accordingly, to Philo the ideas or powers or, as he describes them in their totality, the Logos, after

⁴ *Idem.*, VII, 136 (Arnim, I, 102).

⁵ Aetius, I, 7, 23 (Diels, p. 303, l. 11; Arnim, I, 157).

⁶ Aetius, I, 7, 17 (Diels, p. 302b, l. 15; Arnim, I, 532; III, 31).

⁷ Arnim, I, 497; II, 1027.

⁸ Diogenes, VII, 147.

⁹ Cf. above, pp. 295 ff.

¹⁰ Cf. above, p. 176.

¹¹ Cf. below, pp. 360-361.

¹² So in the *Philebus*, *Parmenides*, *Theatetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus* and *Timaeus*; cf. J. A. Stewart, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, p. 8, and cf. above, p. 233.

¹³ So in the *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo* and *Republic*; cf. Stewart, *loc. cit.*

having served as patterns on which God modeled the world, were introduced by God into the world to act within it as the immutable laws of nature.

Here then we have in Philo a third stage in the existence of the Logos, as well as of the powers, no longer a Logos in the sense of a property of God nor a Logos in the sense of the totality of the created incorporeal powers, but a Logos in the sense of the totality of the powers of God existing within the world itself. This Logos or powers within the world itself, being so much like the Logos or powers of the Stoics which are only within the world, is as a rule described by Philo in terms borrowed from the Stoic vocabulary. Still, it is not the same as the Stoic Logos. The Stoic Logos is something material; its residence in things is conceived as an intermingling with matter; ¹⁴ it is identified with what they call God, and beyond it there is nothing superior. The immanent Logos of Philo, however, is conceived as something immaterial, being only an extension of the preëxistent incorporeal Logos; it resides in things after the analogy of the residence of Plato's rational soul in body and somewhat also after the analogy of the residence of Aristotle's form in matter. But beyond it there is God. In order that it may not be confused with the Stoic Logos, which is material and always in the world and is identified with God, Philo takes great pains to emphasize, whenever he happens to speak of this immanent Logos, that it is merely another stage of the existence of the same incorporeal Logos which is apart from the world and that beyond it there is a God who is not immanent in the world. While the residence of the Logos in the corporeal world is conceived by him, as we have said, after the analogy of the residence of Plato's preëxistent mind or soul in the body

¹⁴ Cf. Zeller, III, 14, p. 101, n. 1 (*The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*², p. 105, n. 3).

of the world, still Philo never describes the immanent Logos as the mind or the soul of the world. His immanent Logos, while performing the same functions as Plato's or the Stoics' world-soul, is not a world-soul. The expressions mind of the world and soul of the world, taken from the Stoics, are indeed used by him, but they are used by him not in the Stoic sense as a description of the immanent Logos but rather as a description of God above the Logos, and therefore, as we shall see, they are used by him only as a figure of speech and not in their original Stoic sense.¹⁵

Let us now examine the texts in Philo upon which the preceding observations are based. We shall try to knit together his scattered statements into a connected story.

To begin with, he says, "the natures of the heavenly bodies and movements of the stars" as well as "the vast number of other operations in nature" to which they extend "are invariably carried out under ordinances and laws laid down in the universe as unalterable."¹⁶ Using the Pythagorean term equality (*ισότης*)¹⁷ as a description of the perfect order (*κόσμος*) of the universe, corresponding to democracy in states, health in the bodies, and virtuous conduct in souls,¹⁸ he says that "all things in heaven and earth have been ordered aright by equality under immovable laws and ordinances."¹⁹ Again, using the Stoic analogy of the universe to a state, or, as he calls it, "a great city," he says that "it has a single constitution and a single law."²⁰ But, just as in agreement with the Stoics he emphasizes the existence of immutable laws in the universe, so also in opposition to them he emphasizes his disagreement with their view that these laws are to be attributed to a God who is within the universe

¹⁵ Cf. below, p. 345.

¹⁶ *Opif.* 19, 61.

¹⁷ *Spec.* IV, 42, 231. See Colson and Heinemann (*Philos Werke*) *ad loc.*

¹⁸ *Spec.* IV, 42, 237.

¹⁹ *Spec.* IV, 42, 232.

²⁰ *Jos.* 6, 29.

and part of it. He is especially opposed to their description of God as fate (*εἰμαρμένη*).²¹ Criticizing the Stoics, as is his wont, under the guise of Chaldeans, the people among whom Abraham was born and from whose influence he later freed himself, he is opposed to them on the ground that "they made fate and necessity into gods," imagining "that this visible universe was the only thing in existence, either being itself God or containing God in itself as the soul of the whole" and "teaching that apart from the things in the visible world there is no originating cause of anything whatever."²² He similarly maintains that while, like the Stoics, Moses taught that "causes have their sequence, connexion and interplay,"²³ unlike them, he did not represent "fate and necessity as the cause of all events."²⁴

Still, following his general method of making use of popular terms and expressions in some changed meaning, he does not hesitate to use the word "fate," in the sense of the unalterable laws of nature, provided it is understood that these laws depend upon God as their ultimate cause. Thus in his homily on the verse "Discern, I pray thee, whose are these, the seal-ring, the cord, and the staff,"²⁵ he takes the term "cord" to refer to "the world-order, fate, the correspondence and sequence of all things, with their ever-unbroken chain," but makes them all belong to God alone.²⁶ So also does he not hesitate to speak of a journey "appointed by fate,"²⁷ or awaiting "the end of one's fate,"²⁸ or of a man dying as being "carried off by fate."²⁹ So also does he speak of the length of the life of men as being "according to the fixed rule

²¹ Aetius, I, 27, 6 (Diels, p. 322b, ll. 13-14; Arnim, III, 35).

²² *Migr.* 32, 179.

²³ *Heres* 60, 301.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 300.

²⁵ *Gen.* 38: 25.

²⁶ *Mut.* 23, 135.

²⁷ *Probus* 17, 111

²⁸ *Flac.* 21, 180.

²⁹ *Legat.* 4, 25.

of fate,"³⁰ even though according to his own belief it is God who fixes the limit of human life.³¹ The "fixed rule of fate" evidently reflects Aristotle's order (*τάξις*) which determines the length of life of living beings.³² As with the term fate so also with the term fortune (*τύχη*), he has no objection to using it, provided one means by it divine providence. Speaking of the rise and fall of nations which, of course, he attributes to a divine law in nature or the immanent Logos, he says "circlewise moves the revolution of the divine Logos which most people call fortune."³³ So also does he say that "opportunity (*καιρός*) is looked upon by the wickedest of men as a god" or "as the cause of things in the world, but by wise men and virtuous men opportunity is not looked upon in this light, but God only, from whom all opportunities and seasons proceed."³⁴ In another place he says of "opportunity" that it is "the minister (*δπαδός*) of God."³⁵ It is in this sense that we are to understand any such statement of his as that in which he says that "the man of worth who surveys not only human life but all the phenomena of the world knows how mightily blow the winds of necessity, fortune, opportunity, violence and authority."³⁶ Plato went only so far as to say that "fortune and opportunity cooperate with God in the government of human affairs."³⁷

Then, as the immediate cause of these immutable laws of nature Philo has decided to use the term Logos, probably for the mixed reason that in Scripture the forces of nature are said to operate at the bidding of the word or the Logos of God³⁸ and also that that is one of the terms used by the Stoics.³⁹ But inasmuch as he has already used the term

³⁰ *Qu. in Gen.* I, 100.

³¹ *Ibid.* I, 91; cf. *Shabbat* 30a on Ps. 39: 5-6.

³² *De Gen. et Corr.* II, 10, 336b, 10-13.

³³ *Immut.* 36, 176.

³⁴ *Qu. in Gen.* I, 100; Harris, *Fragments*, p. 19.

³⁵ *Migr.* 22, 126.

³⁶ *Somn.* II, 12, 81.

³⁷ *Laws* IV, 709 B.

³⁸ Ps. 147: 18; 148: 8.

³⁹ Cf. above, p. 231.

Logos as a description of the totality of the ideas or powers, it is necessary for him to point out the difference between the term Logos used in that sense and the term Logos which he is now to use as a description of the immediate cause of the laws of nature in the created visible world. This distinction is made by him in a passage in which he says that "The Logos is twofold as well in the universe as in human nature; in the universe there is (a) that Logos which deals with the incorporeal and archetypal ideas from which the intelligible world was framed, and also (b) another Logos which deals with the visible objects which are the copies and likenesses of those ideas and out of which this sensible world was produced."⁴⁰ The difference between these two types of Logos is then this: Logos in the first sense refers to what, according to our interpretation, is the second stage in the existence of the Logos, that is, the antemundane Logos after it had emerged from God and become, through an act of creation, an incorporeal being with an existence of its own. Logos in the second sense refers to a third stage in the existence of the Logos, when, with the creation of the world, it became incarnate in the body of the world, in the same way as a soul or a mind becomes incarnate in the body of an individual living being.⁴¹ In its second stage, the Logos is the instrument of the creation of the world;⁴² in its third stage, it is the instrument of divine providence or of the preservation of the world, for "without toil He made this vast universe long ages ago, and now without toil He holds it in perpetual existence";⁴³ and it is through the immanent Logos, which

⁴⁰ *Mos.* II, 25, 127.

⁴¹ Cf. above, p. 327. For various other interpretations of this twofold Logos, see Dähne, I, pp. 208-212; Gfrörer, I, pp. 176-179; Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos*, pp. 231-234; Zeller, III, 2^a, pp. 423-424; Drummond, II, pp. 171-182.

⁴² Cf. above, pp. 261 ff.

⁴³ *Sacr.* 7, 40.

is "the indissoluble bond of the universe,"⁴⁴ that the world is held in perpetual existence.⁴⁵ Then, again, with reference to the Logos in its second stage, the world is said to be an imitation (*μιμημα*) of it; ⁴⁶ with reference to its third stage, the world is said to be its raiment (*εσθής*). Thus, in his homily on the verse concerning the high priest, in which it is stated that he is consecrated "to put on the garments,"⁴⁷ he says that "the garments which the most ancient Logos of the existent puts on as a raiment is the world, for it arrays itself in earth and air and water and fire and all that comes forth from these."⁴⁸ He compares the Logos as clothed with the world to soul as clothed with the body and to the intellect of the wise man as clothed with the virtues.⁴⁹ Let us keep this phraseology in mind. When we come to our discussion of Christianity, we shall see the significance of this comparison of the world as the clothing of the Logos to the body as the clothing of the soul.

II. LAWS OF NATURE

With his recognition of the existence of laws of nature and his decision to describe the cause of these laws of nature by the term Logos, Philo undertakes to tell us what these laws of nature are, and in accordance with these laws of nature to classify various types of their cause, the immanent Logos. In various passages he touches upon various laws of nature drawn from various sources in Greek philosophy, but taken together they show that Philo conceived of three definite laws of nature.

The first law of nature is the law of opposites. As described

⁴⁴ *Plant.* 2, 9; cf. below, p. 339.

⁴⁶ *Opif.* 6, 25.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 2, 10.

⁴⁷ *Lev.* 21: 10.

⁴⁸ *Fug.* 20, 110. That he deals here with the immanent Logos is evident from § 112, where he speaks of the Logos as the bond of existence.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

by Philo it means that all things in the world are divided into two parts which are equal though opposite.¹ The characteristic expressions used by him are that, in the creation of the world, God divided all things equally "according to all forms of equality,"² so that "no section is greater or less than another by even an infinitesimal difference, and each can partake of the equality which is absolute and plenary,"³ but these equal parts are opposites, for "everything in the world is by nature opposite to something else."⁴ "The subject of division into equal parts and of opposites," he says, "is a wide one";⁵ and he goes into a full description of such divisions, starting with the infinite divisibility of matter and going through all the realms of nature, of man, of mind, and of society.⁶ That which causes the division is the immanent Logos, who "never ceases to divide," on which account he calls it "the cutter" (*τομέυς*).⁷ Since Philo uses the terms Logos and Wisdom as equivalents,⁸ he also distinguishes within Wisdom an incorporeal Wisdom and an immanent Wisdom, and therefore he sometimes attributes the function of dividing things into opposites also to the immanent Wisdom. Thus, in his homily on the verse "And they returned and came to the spring of judgment (*'en-mishpat*, *πηγήν τῆς κλάσεως*) which is Kadesh,"⁹ he says: "One might think that it cries aloud that the Wisdom of God is both (1) holy, containing no earthly ingredient, and (2) a sifting of all the universe, whereby all opposites are separated from each other."¹⁰ The implication of this is that Wisdom which, like the Logos,

¹ *Heres* 27, 133-48, 236.

² *Ibid.* 29, 146.

³ *Ibid.* 28, 143.

⁴ *Ibid.* 43, 207.

⁵ *Ibid.* 27, 133.

⁶ A study of the sources of these detailed divisions is to be found in Goodenough, "A Neo-Pythagorean Source in Philo Judaeus," *Yale Classical Review*, 3 (1932), 115-164.

⁷ *Heres* 26, 130.

⁸ *Gen.* 14: 7.

⁹ Cf. above, p. 255.

¹⁰ *Fug.* 35, 196.

is the totality of the ideas in the intelligible world,¹¹ is, in its sense of "judgment," again like the immanent Logos, also the principle of the division of things in the world into opposites. The significance of his identification of Wisdom in the sense of "judgment" (*κρίσις*) with the immanent Logos as the principle of division of things into opposites and equals is his statement elsewhere in the name of "the masters of natural philosophy" that "equality is the mother of justice" (*δικαιοσύνης*),¹² for judgment (*κρίσις*) and justice (*δική*) are considered by Philo as identical.¹³

This theory of the divisibility of things into opposites is ascribed by Philo to Heraclitus,¹⁴ and he refers to it as Heraclitus' "opinions concerning opposites" (*sententiae de contrariis*).¹⁵ Now in the extant sources in which Heraclitus' theory of the opposites is stated,¹⁶ no mention is made that the division of things into opposites is done by the Logos. In fact, modern scholars have raised the question whether the term Logos which is used by Heraclitus means a universal principle or whether it only means the discourse of Heraclitus himself.¹⁷ Similarly, the Stoics who happen to speak of the division of things into opposites, like those mentioned by Philo,¹⁸ do not definitely say that it is the Logos which does the dividing. As an explanation of the origin of Philo's description of the Logos as the principle of the division of things into opposites, several possibilities suggest themselves. First, it is possible that only the theory of opposites

¹¹ Cf. above, p. 255.

¹² *Spec.* IV, 42, 231; cf. *Plant.* 28, 122; *Heres* 33, 163, and below, II, 391.

¹³ *Mut.* 36, 194.

¹⁴ *Heres* 43, 214; *Qu. in Gen.* III, 5.

¹⁵ *Qu. in Gen.* III, 5.

¹⁶ Cf. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, "Wortindex," under *ἑναντίος*, *ἑναντιότης*.

¹⁷ Cf. J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*³, p. 133, n. 1.

¹⁸ Cf. examples in Bréhier, p. 87, n. 2.

is attributed by Philo to Heraclitus, whereas the theory that the Logos is that which does the dividing is the application of his own view of the Logos to Heraclitus' theory of the opposites. Second, it is possible that Philo had before him certain writings of Heraclitus, to which he refers as "Books on Nature" (*Libri de Natura*),¹⁹ in which there was a statement to the effect that the Logos was the principle of the division of things into opposites. Third, it is also possible that Philo, like other ancient authors, understood Heraclitus to have used the term Logos in the same sense as it is used by the Stoics, namely, as the active principle within the world, and that then, out of various other statements in both Heraclitus and the Stoics about the division of things into opposites and about the primitive fire, he has drawn his own inference that it must be the Logos which does the division. For, according to both Heraclitus and the Stoics, fire is the primitive matter out of which all things arise.²⁰ Out of fire, then, all the opposite things in the world arise. Now within fire there are, according to the Stoics, an active and a passive principle, and the active principle, among the other names by which it is called, is also called by the name of Logos.²¹ Therefore, Philo must have concluded, the active principle or Logos is that which causes the division of things into opposites.²²

The term "cutter," however, which he applies to the immanent Logos acting in its capacity of a divider of things into opposites, does not seem to have been derived from Heraclitus or from the Stoics. It would seem to be of scriptural origin,

¹⁹ *Qu. in Gen.* III, 5 end, and cf. *Heres* 27, 133.

²⁰ Diogenes, IX, 7-9; VII, 142.

²¹ *Ibid.*, VII, 134.

²² With this compare discussions on this subject in Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos* (1872), pp. 226-229; Bousset, *Jüdisch-Christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom* (1915), pp. 23-30; Bréhier, pp. 86-89; Goodenough, "A Neo-Pythagorean Source in Philo Judaeus," *Yale Classical Studies*, 3 (1932), 116-164.

derived from certain verses in Scripture which Philo interpreted as anticipations of Heraclitus' theory of opposites. One of these verses, which in the Septuagint reads: "The plates of gold being cut (*ἐτμήθη*) into hairs,"²³ is quoted by Philo as "the plates of gold he cuts (*τέμνει*) into hairs,"²⁴ taking the subject "he" to refer to the Logos. Another verse which in the Septuagint reads "he divided (*διεἶλεν*) them (*αὐτὰ*) in the middle and placed them (*αὐτὰ*) facing opposite each other,"²⁵ is paraphrased by Philo, evidently under the influence of the original Hebrew text, by "and the parts cut off (*τὰ τμήματα*) he placed facing opposite each other."²⁶

But as in the case of his use of the term Logos in the sense of an immanent principle in general, so also now, in the case of his use of it in the special Heraclitean sense, he makes it clear that he is conscious of the fact that Heraclitus does not believe in the existence of an immaterial God outside the world and above the Logos, and accordingly he openly repudiates Heraclitus, declaring a "bad man" him "who derives every thing from the world and makes it return to the world, who imagines that nothing has been created by God, who is a follower of the opinion of Heraclitus, advocating such tenets as 'fullness and want,' the 'universe one,' and 'all things interchange.'" ²⁷ While the Logos to Philo may indeed be described as the divider, it is a divider only by virtue of its being used by the unshowable God;²⁸ in reality it is the Creator who does the dividing,²⁹ and "God alone is exact in

²³ Exod. 39: 3 (LXX 36:10).

²⁴ *Heres* 26, 131.

²⁵ Gen. 15: 10.

²⁶ See Philo's quotation of the last part of Gen. 15: 10 in *Heres* 43, 207. The substitution of *τὰ τμήματα* for *αὐτὰ* would represent the Hebrew בחרו בא. The verse is quoted by him as in the Septuagint in *Qu. in Gen.* III, 5, but, as in *Heres* 43, 207, the second *αὐτὰ* is omitted.

²⁷ *Leg. All.* III, 3, 7.

²⁸ *Heres* 26, 130.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 27, 133: *ὁ τεχνίτης*; *Qu. in Gen.* III, 5: *Creator*.

judgment and alone is able to 'divide in the middle' bodies and things,"³⁰ and it is God himself who divides the powers into beneficent and punitive,³¹ and it is God himself who, "in His perfect knowledge of their mutual contrariety and natural conflict," divided the light from the darkness.³²

The second law of nature which Philo attributes to the immanent Logos is the law of the harmony of the opposites. Not only are things divided into opposites, but the opposites are also equal, and, because they are equal, an equilibrium is established between them and they become harmonized. As in the case of the opposites, Philo goes into a minute analysis of the various types of equality and into a detailed description of how these various types of equality exist throughout the universe.³³ The act of harmonizing the opposites is attributed by him also to the immanent Logos. "Good reason, then," he says, "have we to be sure that all the earth shall not be dissolved by all the water which has gathered within its hollows, nor fire be quenched by air, nor, on the other hand, air be ignited by fire, since the divine Logos stations itself between the elements, like a vocal between the voiceless elements of speech, so that the universe may send forth a harmony like that of a masterpiece of literature, for it mediates between the opponents amid their threatenings and reconciles them by winning ways to peace and concord."³⁴ In Aristobulus this harmonization of the opposites is attributed directly to God. "The constitution of the world," he says, "may well be called for its majesty God's standing (*στάσις*);³⁵ for God is over all, and all things are

³⁰ *Ibid.* 28, 143.

³¹ *Ibid.* 34, 166.

³² *Opif.* 9, 33; cf. Gen. 1: 4.

³³ *Heres.* 28, 141-42, 204.

³⁴ *Plant.* 2, 10.

³⁵ This probably refers to the expression "the standing (*στάσις*, Hebrew: *hadom*) for the feet of our Lord" in I Chron. 28: 2; in Isa. 66: 1, the Hebrew *hadom* is translated by *ὑποπόδιον*.

subject unto Him, and have received from Him their station (*στάσις*), so that men may comprehend that they are immovable. Now my meaning is like this, that heaven has never become earth, nor earth heaven, nor the sun become the shining moon, nor again the moon become the sun, nor rivers seas, nor seas rivers.”³⁶ The law of the harmony of the opposites is also brought out in Philo’s statement that the Logos, — that is, the immanent Logos — acts as a “mediator” and as one who “arbitrates between the things which seem in opposition to each other, thus creating love and unanimity, for the Logos is always the cause and creator of fellowship.”³⁷ Again, all things are said by him to be held together “in accordance with the divine Logos which binds them by the most skillful art and by the most perfect harmony.”³⁸

In his statements of the law of the harmony of the opposites no reference is made by Philo to Heraclitus. Nor is there in Heraclitus any explicit statement that it is the Logos which brings about that harmony. In later restatements of Heraclitus’ views, God himself is said to be the opposites of “day, night; winter, summer; war, peace; surfeit, famine,”³⁹ or the opposites themselves are said to be the cause of their own harmony, for “junctions are: wholes and not wholes, that which agrees and that which differs, that which produces harmony and that which produces discord; from all you get one and from one you get all.”⁴⁰ Among the Stoics, however, the unity of the world and the universal sympathy which pre-

³⁶ Quoted in Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VIII, 11, 377a-b.

³⁷ *Qu. in Ex.* II, 68, and Harris, *Fragments*, p. 66. Cf. Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, pp. 26-27.

³⁸ *Qu. in Ex.* II, 90; cf. also II, 118. Cf. Bréhier, p. 88, n. 2.

³⁹ Hippolytus, *Refutatio Omnium Haeresium* IX, 10 (ed. Duncker et Schneidewin, p. 448, ll. 33-34). Cf. Zeller, I, 25, p. 664, n. 1; (*The Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, II, p. 38, n. 1).

⁴⁰ *De Mundo*, 5, 396b, 20-22; cf. Bréhier, p. 88, n. 2.

vails among all its parts is said to be due to God,⁴¹ who to them is the active principle within the primary fire called, among other things, also Logos. It is probably the Stoics, with whose view he may have also identified that of Heraclitus, that are the source of Philo's theory that the Logos is the harmonizer of the opposites.⁴²

Sometimes Philo describes this principle of the harmony of the opposites in terms used by Plato in connection with his world-soul and by the Stoics in connection with what they call both world-soul and Logos. Plato uses the term bond (*δεσμός*)⁴³ in connection with his world-soul, and says concerning it that God "caused it to extend throughout the whole"⁴⁴ and that its function was "to guide the greatest part of created things to the best end."⁴⁵ The Stoics similarly describe their world-soul or Logos as a principle of cohesion (*ἕξις*),⁴⁶ which is defined as a bond (*δεσμός*)⁴⁷ and is represented as pervading every part of the world⁴⁸ and as being the ruling principle (*ἡγεμονικόν*) in it.⁴⁹ With all this in the back of his mind, Philo says of the immanent Logos that it is "the bond (*δεσμός*) of all existence, and holds and knits together all the parts";⁵⁰ it is "a glue and bond" by which all things are held tight;⁵¹ it "holds together and administers (*διοικούντος*) all things";⁵² it is "the ruler (*δολπος*) and steersman (*κυβερνήτης*) of all";⁵³ it extends throughout nature, "combining and compacting all its parts, for the Father the Begetter made it the indissoluble bond of the universe."⁵⁴

⁴¹ Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 78-85.

⁴² Cf. Bréhier, p. 88, n. 2.

⁴³ *Timaeus* 38 E; 41 B.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 34 B.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 48 A.

⁴⁶ Diogenes, VII, 139.

⁴⁷ *Mos.* II, 26, 133. So also in Wisdom of Solomon 8: 1; cf. above, p. 288.

⁴⁸ *Cher.* II, 36; *Migr.* I, 6.

⁴⁹ *Immut.* 7, 35; Arnim, II, 458.

⁵⁰ Diogenes, VII, 138.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 139.

⁵² *Fug.* 20, 112.

⁵³ *Heres* 38, 188.

⁵⁴ *Plant.* 2, 9.

But here again, in order not to be misunderstood, Philo tries to make it clear, whenever the occasion arises, that his immanent Logos, unlike that of the Stoics, is not itself God, but has a God above it. Indeed the Logos may be called the bond which holds the world together, but in reality it derives that power from God, for ultimately it is God who "without toil made this vast universe long ages ago, and now without toil holds it in perpetual existence."⁵⁵ The Logos may, after a fashion, be described as administering all things and as ruler and steersman, but in reality it is God who administers (*διοικεῖν*) all things⁵⁶ and who is the ruler (*δλοπος*)⁵⁷ and the steersman (*κυβερνήτης*).⁵⁸

The description of the immanent Logos as both divider and combiner, but with a closer resemblance to its original use in Heraclitus and the Stoics, is reflected in Philo's interpretation of the Seraphim in the vision of Isaiah. "I saw the Lord seated on a high and lofty throne and the house was filled with His glory and Seraphim stood around Him, each having six wings, and with two they covered the face, and with two they covered the feet, and two they used in flying."⁵⁹ The term Seraphim, he says, may be taken to mean either a pattern (*typus*) or fire (*incendium*).⁶⁰ By this he means that the term Seraphim may be taken to refer either to the incorporeal Logos in the intelligible world of ideas, which is a "pattern," or to the immanent Logos in the physical world, which the Stoics call "fire." Taking up the latter meaning of the term, he says that literally the Seraphim — as indicated by the etymology of the Hebrew word, which, as taken

⁵⁵ *Sacr.* 7, 40.

⁵⁶ *Conf.* 33, 170.

⁵⁷ *Spec.* IV, 38, 200.

⁵⁸ *Decal.* 12, 53.

⁵⁹ *Isa.* 6: 1-2.

⁶⁰ *De Deo* 6. In the Latin text, the reading is Cherubim, which is obviously an error. Cf. M. Adler, "Das philonische Fragment *De Deo*," *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 80 (1936), 167.

by Philo, means "the burning ones" — are made of fire, — not the destructive kind of fire but the kind of fire "by which all things are skillfully made." He then adds: "Wherefore, as it seems to me, some philosophers also declared that a craftsmanlike fire proceeds by a regular road to the production of seeds in generation."⁶¹ This additional statement is almost a literal quotation of Zeno's definition of nature or the Logos as "A craftsmanlike fire proceeding by a regular road to generation."⁶² This craftsmanlike fire, he continues, divides matter into the four elements,⁶³ of which earth and water are symbolized by the two lower wings which cover the feet of the Seraphim and air and fire are symbolized by the two upper wings which cover the face of the Seraphim.⁶⁴ But since, according to "certain natural philosophers" (*Physici quidam*), by which he means Heraclitus and Empedocles, "love and opposition" (*dilectio et oppositio*) are also elements, which elements initiate movement in the other four elements,⁶⁵ love and opposition are symbolized by the two wings by which the Seraphim fly and raise themselves to the Prime Leader (*dux princeps*) who is the sole harmonizer.⁶⁶ Here then God, who is above the Logos, is the true harmonizer, and by the same token also the true divider; and the immanent Logos, represented by the Seraphim, which means fire, is the principle of both opposition — that is, the law of opposites — and love — that is, the law of the harmony of

⁶¹ *De Deo*, 6: "Quare, ut mihi videtur, etiam nonnulli philosophorum, ignem artificialem asseruere in viam cadere ad semina in generationem producenda."

⁶² Diogenes, VII, 156; Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* II, 22, 57: "Zeno igitur naturam ita definit, ut eam dicit ignem esse artificiosum ad gignendum progredientem via."

⁶³ *De Deo*, 8.

⁶⁴ *De Deo*, 9.

⁶⁵ Cf. Aristotle, *De Gen. et Corr.* I, 1, 314a, 16-17; and 315a, 17.

⁶⁶ *De Deo*, 10. With this interpretation, compare the interpretation of this passage in Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, pp. 30-31.

the opposites. The terms love (*dilectio*) and opposition (*oppositio*) used by Philo in this passage reflect the terms love (*φιλα*) and strife (*νεῖκος*) used by Empedocles,⁶⁷ combined with the term opposites (*ἐναντία*) used in Heraclitus' theory of the opposites.⁶⁸

A third law of nature which Philo attributes to the immanent Logos is the law of the perpetuity of the species. "God willed," he says, "that nature should run a course that brings it back to its starting point, endowing the species with immortality, and making them sharers of eternal existence," so that the fruit comes out of the plant, the fruit contains a seed, and out of the seed comes a plant again.⁶⁹ This reflects Aristotle's generalization that men and animals and plants can be eternal only as species and not as individuals.⁷⁰ In describing this principle of the perpetuity of the species, however, Philo does not use the Aristotelian vocabulary. In Aristotle the perpetuity of the species is described as being due directly to the nutritive power (*τὸ θρεπτικόν*), for "this nutritive power exists in all alike, whether animals or plants, and this is the same as the power that enables an animal or plant to generate another like itself, that being the function of them all if naturally perfect."⁷¹ In Philo the perpetuity of the species is described as being due directly to the presence of "seminal essences" (*σπερματικαὶ οὐσῆαι*) within plants, which endow them with the power of reproducing their species, for "hidden and imperceptible within these seminal substances are the Logoi of all things."⁷² Elsewhere the Logos is similarly described by him as the "seminal es-

⁶⁷ Cf. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, "Wortindex" s.v.

⁶⁸ Cf. above, p. 334.

⁶⁹ *Opif.* 13, 44.

⁷⁰ *De Gen. Animal.* II, 1, 731b, 31-732a, 1; *De Anima* II, 4, 415b, 3-7.

⁷¹ *De Gen. Animal* II, 1, 735a, 16-19.

⁷² *Opif.* 13, 43.

sence" (σπερματική ούσια) of things,⁷³ as the "seminal and craftsmanlike Logos" (σπερματικός και τεχνικός λόγος)⁷⁴ and as the "seminal Logoi" (σπερματικοὶ λόγοι).⁷⁵ All these reflect various terms of the Stoics, such as, "craftsmanlike fire,"⁷⁶ "seminal Logos"⁷⁷ and "seminal Logoi,"⁷⁸ which are used by them to describe their God, identified by them with the active principle in the primary fire, as the creative principle in the world, after the analogy of the seed in the generation of animals.⁷⁹ But here, too, after having ascribed to his immanent Logos powers like those ascribed to it by the Stoics, Philo tries to make it clear that his immanent Logos, unlike the Stoic Logos, is not the ultimate cause of the generation of plants or animals in the world nor of the creation of the world itself. Above it there is God. "So Moses," he says, "beyond all other, had most accurately learned that God, by setting the seeds (σπέρματα) and roots of all things, is the cause of the greatest of all plants springing up, namely, this universe."⁸⁰ In this, at least in so far as the generation of plants and animals is concerned, Philo aligns himself with Aristotle as against the Stoics, for to Aristotle, too, while the "nutritive power" within plants and animals is the immediate cause of the perpetuity of their species, the ultimate cause of that perpetuity is the prime mover or God.⁸¹

Sometimes, instead of Logos, which is the totality of God's powers, he makes use of the term powers as a description of the immediate cause of the immutable laws of nature. As in the case of the immanent Logos, he describes these immanent powers as "bonds." In his homily on the verse "the Lord

⁷³ *Qu. in Ex.* II, 68; Harris, *Fragments*, p. 67.

⁷⁴ *Heres* 24, 119; cf. *Act.* 17, 85.

⁷⁵ *Legat.* 8, 55.

⁷⁶ Cf. above, n 62.

⁷⁷ Cf. above, n. 4.

⁸¹ *De Gen. et Corr.* II, 10, 336b, 30-337a, 1.

⁷⁸ Cf. above, n. 7.

⁷⁹ Diogenes, VII, 136.

⁸⁰ *Plant.* 12, 48.

came down to see the city and the tower”⁸² and on the scriptural expression “God in heaven above and upon the earth beneath,”⁸³ he says that these should not be taken to refer to God himself but rather to His powers, for “He has made His powers extend through earth and water, air and heaven, and left no part of the universe destitute, and uniting all with all has bound them fast with invisible bonds (*δεσμοῖς*), that they should never be loosed,”⁸⁴ for “the powers of the universe are bonds (*δεσμοί*) that cannot be broken.”⁸⁵ These powers within the universe by which the world is held together are the same as, but have a different kind of existence than, those powers outside the universe which make up the intelligible world and the antemundane Logos and “according to which God established and ordered and arranged the universe.”⁸⁶ Again, as in the case of the immanent Logos, he describes these immanent powers in terms of Heraclitus’ principle of the harmony of the opposites, for “though transcending and being beyond what He has made, none the less has He filled the universe with himself; for He has caused His powers to extend themselves throughout the universe to its utmost bounds and in accordance with the laws of harmony has knit each part of each.”⁸⁷ The use of the term power in this sense is also found in the Letter of Aristeeas, where the high priest is made to say that “there is only one God” and that “His power (*δύναμις*) is manifested throughout the universe, since every place is filled with His might.”⁸⁸ It is similarly found in Aristobolus, in his statement that “the power of God is through

⁸² Gen. 11: 5; cf. *Conf.* 27, 134.

⁸³ Deut. 4: 39; cf. *Migr.* 32, 182.

⁸⁴ *Conf.* 27, 136.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 182.

⁸⁵ *Migr.* 32, 181.

⁸⁷ *Post.* 5, 14.

⁸⁸ Aristeeas, 132; cf. discussion on the meaning of this statement in Gfrörer, II, p. 63; Drummond, I, p. 241.

all things.”⁸⁹ But in opposition to the Stoics, to whom these powers are powers of a God who is the active principle in the primary fire which resides within the universe,⁹⁰ Philo emphasizes that these immanent powers are the powers of a God “who contains but is not contained”⁹¹ and who is “neither the universe nor its soul.”⁹² A complete statement of these immanent powers in their relation to the immanent Logos and to God, who is not immanent in the world, is to be found in a passage where he describes the Logos, that is, the immanent Logos, as “the charioteer of the powers,” in relation to which God is described as “He who is seated in the chariot, giving directions to the charioteer for the right wielding of the reins of the universe.”⁹³ On the whole, to Philo’s mind, the immanent Logos is the totality of the immanent powers in the visible world, just as the incorporeal Logos is the totality of the incorporeal powers in the intelligible world.⁹⁴

Though in his criticism of the Stoics Philo explicitly rejects their description of God as the soul of the universe, because of the implication in the Stoic use of it that God is a corporeal being and part of the universe,⁹⁵ still he does not hesitate to apply to God this expression, or the expression mind of the universe, in the loose sense of ruler of the universe without the implication that He is corporeal and part of the universe. He thus says: “There are two minds, that of the world, which is God, and the individual mind.”⁹⁶ But in opposition to the Stoics, who maintain that both the soul of the world, which is God, and the soul of man are fire, he argues that God is indeed the soul of the world but we have no

⁸⁹ Eusebius, *Præparatio Evangelica* VIII, 12, 666 d.

⁹⁰ Diogenes, VII, 147.

⁹¹ *Conf.* 27, 136; *Migr.* 32, 182.

⁹² *Migr.* 32, 181.

⁹³ *Fug.* 19, 101.

⁹⁴ Cf. above, p. 227.

⁹⁵ *Migr.* 32, 181.

⁹⁶ *Leg. All.* III, 9, 29.

knowledge about the substance of either soul or God, except that it is incorporeal.⁹⁷ That God is described by him as mind only in the loose sense of His being the ruler of the world is brought out in a passage in which he argues that "just as sense is the servitor of mind, so all the beings perceived by sense are the ministers of Him who is perceived by the mind," and that, consequently, "if the mind in us, so exceedingly small and invisible, is yet the ruler of the organs of sense," God, whom on the basis of his previous analogy he now describes as "the mind of the universe," and who is "so transcendently great and perfect," must *a fortiori* be "the King of Kings, who are seen by Him though He is not seen by them."⁹⁸ In another place, he argues from the existence of a mind (*νοῦς*) in man, which is the ruler of the body, to the existence of a God who is the ruler of the world.⁹⁹ In still another place, he explains that "the wise man is the first of the human race, as a pilot in a ship or a ruler in a city or a general in war, or again as a soul in a body and a mind (*νοῦς*) in a soul, or once more heaven in the world or God in heaven."¹⁰⁰ The difference in the relation of God to the universe and that of our mind to the body is directly stated by him in a passage in which he says that, in contradistinction to our mind which dwells in our body and is contained by it, God "dwells outside all material nature and contains everything without being contained by anything."¹⁰¹ By the same token, just as he speaks of God as being the mind of the universe, he also speaks of the individual human mind as being a sort of god (*τρόπον τινα θεός*) of the individual human body, and the reason he gives for his

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* I, 29, 91; cf. *Mut.* 2, 10. Our knowledge of the incorporeality of the rational soul, according to Philo, is based upon Scripture (cf. below, p. 394).

⁹⁸ *Spec.* I, 3, 17-18.

⁹⁹ *Abr.* 16, 74.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* 46, 272.

¹⁰¹ *Migr.* 35, 192.

application of the term god to the human mind is the comparison of the rulership of God in the universe and the rulership of the individual human mind in man.¹⁰² In a similar sense he speaks also of the mind as being a god to the irrational soul.¹⁰³ In all these passages, as will have been noticed, God is said to be the mind or the soul of the universe only in the sense that God is the ruler of the universe, after the analogy of the human mind in its relation to the human body or in its relation to the human soul or in its relation to some parts of the human soul.

III. MIRACLES

When Philo described the immutable laws of nature as having been implanted in the world by God at the time He created it, he was following not only Plato but also Scripture. Like Plato, Scripture assumes that there are certain immutable laws in nature and that these laws were implanted by God. It is God "who giveth the sun for a light by day, and the ordinances of the moon and of the stars for a light by night,"¹ ordinances which will not depart from before Him.² Like Plato, too, Scripture conceives the immutability of these laws of nature as being due to an assurance of its permanency given by God, a covenant, as it were, made at the end of the deluge between Him and "every living creature of all flesh," an everlasting covenant, by which God gave assurance that "while the earth remaineth, seed time and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease and that neither will He again smite any more everything living, as He has done."³

¹⁰² *Opif.* 23, 69.

¹⁰³ *Leg. All.* I, 13, 40.

¹ Jer. 31: 34.

² Jer. 31: 35.

³ Gen. 8: 21-22; 9: 16-17; cf. Jer. 33: 20-21.

There is, however, one difference between Plato and Scripture as to these laws which according to both of them God implanted in the world. When the God of Plato assured the celestial bodies and the deities of popular religion that "in my will (*βούλησις*) ye possess a bond greater and more sovereign than the bonds wherewith, at your birth, ye were bound together,"⁴ that will is subsequently referred to as "fated laws" (41 E) — inexorable laws which preserve the world from being destroyed and its order from being changed. Though the God of Plato is said to have created the world by His will,⁵ that will of God means not His free choice between two alternatives but rather the unalterable expression of His nature. In the world which He created, the God of Plato acts by the necessity of His own nature just as the God of Aristotle in the world which He did not create, and in neither of these worlds is there room for miracles. The God of Scripture, however, despite the covenant, has still reserved for himself, mentally, the right to upset the order of nature, at least temporarily, whenever there should be a need for it; and, while it is a matter of doubt whether the God of Scripture ever will bring about the destruction of this world, He did, as a matter of record, perform miracles by temporary changes in the order of nature.

Philo follows Scripture. According to his interpretation of Scripture, the world created by God will never be destroyed. His proof-text is God's promise to Noah, quoted above, which he takes to mean the indestructibility of the world.⁶ Referring evidently to Plato, he approves of those "who declare that though by nature destructible the world will never be destroyed, being held together by a bond of superior strength, namely, the will of its Maker,"⁷ and this

⁴ *Timaeus* 41 B.

⁵ *Ibid.* 29 D-E; 41 A-B.

⁶ *Act.* 5, 19.

⁷ *Heres* 50, 246; cf. 30, 152; cf. *Timaeus* 41 A-B.

view he also attributes to Moses, saying that even though the world, by its having come into existence, must by its own nature be destructible, "by the providence of God it was made immortal."⁸ But with Scripture, either in conscious opposition to Plato or as an interpretation of him, he believes in the possibility of God's changing the order of nature. While admitting that earth, rain, air, husbandry, medicine, and marriage in the ordinary course of nature are productive of certain effects, yet he maintains that "all these things, through the power of God, admit of change and transition, so as often to produce effects quite the reverse of the ordinary."⁹ He particularly calls upon the miracles recorded in Scripture as evidence of God's power to change the order of nature. In great detail he describes as historical events the miracles wrought by Moses in Egypt before the exodus of the children of Israel and in the wilderness after their exodus.¹⁰ Of these miracles, some were performed through intermediary agents, either by Aaron or by Moses or by both, while others, namely, swarms of flies, murrain, and the destruction of the first-born, were performed, according to him, directly by God himself without any intermediary agency.¹¹ What miracles are and for what purpose they are wrought may be gathered from the words he puts in the mouth of Moses when addressing the people before their miraculous crossing of the Red Sea: "Do not lose heart. God's way of defence is not as that of men. Why are you quick to trust in the probable and the likely and that only? When God gives help He needs no armament. It is His

⁸ *Decal.* 12, 58; cf. above, p. 316.

⁹ *Immut.* 19, 87-88.

¹⁰ *Mos.* I, 12, 65 ff.; *Migr.* 15, 83 ff.

¹¹ *Mos.* I, 17, 97; 23, 130-24, 139. The same fourfold classification occurs also in *Tanḥuma, Exodus, va-Era*, 14; *Exodus Rabbah* 12, 4, and 15, 27 (cf. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, II, p. 341, and V, p. 426, n. 170).

special property to find a way where no way is. What is impossible to all created being is possible to Him only, ready to His hand.”¹² Miracles accordingly are something wrought by God, either indirectly or directly, which would not have taken place by the ordinary processes of nature. They are “impossibilities no doubt as judged by what to outward appearance is credible and reasonable but easily accomplished by the dispensations of God’s providence.”¹³ The scope of miracles includes such performances as the transference of the function of one element to another, as, for instance, for air, instead of earth, to bring forth food,¹⁴ or the changing of the property of an element, as, for instance, for fire to move in a direction contrary to its nature,¹⁵ or even the changing of the nature of a composite object, as, for instance, for the serpent to speak with a human voice.¹⁶ The belief that God can upset the laws which He himself has implanted in nature¹⁷ is explained by Aristobulus in his comment on the verse “Mount Sinai was altogether on a smoke, because the Lord descended upon it in fire.”¹⁸ The descent here, he says, is not local. It only means that God in a miraculous way imparted to fire the efficacy (*τὸ δυναμικόν*) to blaze without consuming.¹⁹

Sometimes indeed he attempts to explain some miracle recorded in Scripture by natural causes. Thus the story of how Moses had made sweet the bitter water of Marah by throwing a tree into the spring²⁰ may, according to Philo, be ex-

¹² *Mos.* I, 31, 174.

¹³ *Ibid.* II, 47, 261.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* I, 36, 202; II, 48, 267. Cf. Exod. 16: 4 ff.

¹⁵ *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 51; Harris, *Fragments*, p. 34. Cf. Gen. 19: 24.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* I, 32. Cf. Gen. 3: 1.

¹⁷ Cf. above, p. 347.

¹⁸ Exod. 19: 18.

¹⁹ Quoted in Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VIII, 11, 377c-d.

²⁰ Exod. 15: 22-26.

plained as an outright miracle, in which case the tree "was created on this occasion for the service which it was destined to perform," or it may be explained by natural causes, in which case the tree "was formed by nature to exercise a virtue which had hitherto remained unknown."²¹ So also in the story of how Moses brought water out of the rock by smiting it with his staff,²² it may be explained as an outright miracle, in which case "then for the first time a body of water was collected in it through hidden channels and was forced out by impact," or it may be explained by natural causes, in which case "the rock contained originally a spring and now had its artery clean severed."²³ But such attempts at a natural explanation of miracles are not meant by Philo to be a denial of the miraculous nature of the occurrence. They are meant only to show that God sometimes employs the powers of nature to perform His miracles. The fact that the hidden sweetening virtue of the tree and the hidden spring of the rock were discovered by Moses just at the time when they were needed was due to the miraculous intervention of God.²⁴ Often, indeed, he tries to give allegorical

²¹ *Mos. I*, 33, 185.

²² *Exod.* 17: 1-7; *Num.* 20: 1-13; *Deut.* 8: 15.

²³ *Mos. I*, 38, 210-211.

²⁴ An explanation of this miracle of bringing forth water out of the rock analogous to that given thereof by Philo occurs in the Mishnaic statement that "the mouth of the well," i.e., the miracle here under consideration, is one of the ten things which were created at twilight on the sixth day of creation (*M. Abot V*, 6, and see Hebrew commentaries *ad loc.* and Rashi on *Pesahim* 54a). According to the Midrash, furthermore, not only this miracle and the other nine miracles which are mentioned in the Mishnah as having been created at twilight on the sixth day, but also all the other miracles recorded in Scripture, were created during the six days of creation by a stipulation which God made with every natural object at the time He brought it into existence (*Genesis Rabbah* 5, 5, and see Maimonides on *M. Abot V*, 6). The motive underlying this rational explanation of miracles in the Midrash was a desire to reconcile the possibility of miracles with God's expressed promise to observe the laws which He has established in the universe (cf. *Exodus Rabbah* 21, 6, and cf. above n. 3). Miracles, according to this Midrashic explanation, are thus not alto-

interpretations to Scriptural miracles. But in such cases, again, the attempt at an allegorical interpretation of miracles should not be taken as a denial of their historicity as actual facts. Thus in the story of how Moses smote the rock and brought forth water, besides explaining it as an outright miracle or as a miracle by natural causes, he also explains it allegorically, taking the "rock" and the "water" as referring to the immutable God from whom flows forth the stream of

gether contrary to nature, but still the events in question are not thereby deprived completely of their miraculous character. They are still to be considered as acts due to the direct intervention of God, first by His implanting them in nature as exceptions to their established order and then by His making them occur exactly at the time they were needed and by His announcing their occurrence beforehand.

This Midrashic explanation of miracles by a sort of preëstablished disharmony is analogous to a similar explanation of divination by the Stoics. "They maintain that from the beginning of the world it has been ordained that certain signs must needs precede certain events, some of which are drawn from the entrails of animals, some from the note and flight of birds, some from the sight of lightning, some from prodigies, some from stars, some from visions of dreams, and some from exclamations of men in frenzy: and those who have a clear perception of these things are not often deceived" (Cicero, *De Divinatione* I, 52, 118). But in this Stoic conception of divination there is nothing miraculous. The harmony was established, according to them, by necessity and not by will, and the process of divination is to them, again, a necessary process without any element of divine grace in it (cf. below, II, 47).

In medieval Jewish philosophy, on the basis of this Midrash, Judah ha-Levi offers the following explanation of miracles: "The changes in the ordinary processes of nature were in accordance with nature, for they have been arranged for and determined upon by the eternal will ever since the six days of creation" (*Cuzari* III, 73 end). This, too, was not meant by ha-Levi to be a denial of the miraculous nature of the events that happened. In Maimonides this Midrashic view is restated as follows: "The rabbis consider these miracles as being to some extent also natural, for they say that when God created the universe and endowed it with these natural properties, He made it part of these properties that they should produce certain miracles at certain times. The sign of a prophet consists accordingly in the fact that God made known to him the time he should announce the event that is to take place and informed him that the event would take place in accordance with what has been implanted in nature from the beginning of its creation" (*Moreh Nebukim* II, 29; cf. *Shemoneh Perašim*, ch. 8; Commentary on *M. Abot* V, 6). In the light of all this, I do not think that Bréhier (p. 182) is quite right in taking Philo's attempts at a rational explanation of some miracles as an indication of his disbelief in

wisdom.²⁵ This allegorical interpretation certainly does not mean a denial of the historicity of the event, the veracity of which, as we have seen, is accepted by him elsewhere; it only means that the event, true historically though it is, has also an allegorical meaning and that it points to a moral in addition to its recording a fact. Only in the story of creation, with reference to which his allegorical interpretation may be taken to be a denial of the literalness of the narrative, does he declare such a miracle as the creation of Eve out of one of the ribs of Adam²⁶ to be of the nature of a myth.²⁷ The story of creation is treated as in a class by itself throughout the history of the philosophic interpretation of Scripture, and many a theologian, whether Jewish or Christian, about whose belief in the possibility of miracles and in the historicity of the miracles recorded in Scripture there can be no doubt, allowed himself to interpret the story of creation as purely allegorical.²⁸ But even in connection with the story

miracles. Examples of miracles rationally explained by Philo are given also in Goodenough (*By Light, Light*, pp. 187-188), but the author quite properly draws no inference therefrom as to Philo's disbelief in miracles. Siegfried (p. 210) sees in these attempts at a rational explanation of miracles evidence of the existence of some lingering doubt in the mind of Philo as to the logical reconcilability of miracles with his conception of God — which, as we have seen, is exactly the motive underlying the Midrashic attempt at a rational explanation of miracles.

²⁵ *Somn.* II, 32, 221-222; *Leg. All.* II, 21, 84-86; *Deter.* 31, 115.

²⁶ *Gen.* 2: 21. "Sides" instead of "ribs" in the Septuagint and Philo.

²⁷ *Leg. All.* II, 7, 19.

²⁸ As, e.g., Origen, who believed in the historicity of the miraculous events recorded in Scripture (cf. *Contra Celsum* II, 48-53) and yet takes the stories of creation in a purely allegorical sense (*De Principiis* IV, 1, 16), explicitly mentioning the story of the creation of Eve as being a mere allegory (*Contra Celsum* IV, 38). Similarly Maimonides affirms his belief in the historicity of scriptural narratives, including those of the miracles (*Moreh Nebukim* III, 50), and yet he declares that "the account given in the Pentateuch of creation is not, as generally believed by the common people, to be taken in its literal sense in all its parts" (*ibid.*, II, 29). Here again Bréhier (p. 184) takes Philo's statement with regard to the story of the creation of Eve as an indication of his rejection of the historicity of all the miraculous stories recorded in Scripture.

of creation, this particular story of the creation of Eve is elsewhere taken by Philo as a historical event.²⁹

The allegorical explanation of miracles by Philo is thus no denial of their historicity as events which actually took place, just as his occasional attempt at a rational explanation of them is no denial of the miraculous nature of those events. It is therefore quite literally and without any equivocation of language that he could proclaim that "if anyone disbelieves these things, he neither knows God nor has ever sought to know Him; for if he did he would at once have perceived — aye, perceived with a firm apprehension — that these extraordinary and seemingly incredible events are but child's-play to God."³⁰ If one should doubt the power of God to work miracles, he throws out the challenge, let him look at the world which was created and ordered by God. In comparison with the wonders of the universe, all of which are the work of God, all these recorded "extraordinary and seemingly incredible events are but child's-play to God."³¹ The act of creation itself is to him one of the greatest of miracles, and, if God could do that, nothing is impossible for Him, for "as God called up His most perfect work, the world, out of not being into being, so He called up plenty in the desert, changing round the elements to meet the pressing need of the occasion."³² The act of creation as an argument for the possibility of miracles comes up again and again in later religious philosophy.³³

²⁹ According to Bréhier (*loc. cit.*), all of Philo's declarations as to his belief in the historicity of the scriptural miracles which are to be found in his *De Vita Mosis* and the *Quaestiones* should be taken allegorically, whereas his allegorical interpretations of scriptural miracles which are to be found in his *Legum Allegoria* should be taken literally.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Mos.* I, 38, 212.

³² *Ibid.* II, 48, 267.

³³ So Tertullian uses the act of creation as an argument for the possibility of the miracle of resurrection (cf. *De resur. carn.* c. XI). St. Augustine uses it as an argument for resurrection as well as for miracles in general (*De Civitate Dei* XXI, 7).

His conception of miracles as a certain element of freedom reserved by God for himself even after He has implanted the laws of nature in the world is clearly expressed by him in his statement that while God has implanted certain unalterable laws in the universe by bestowing upon it "powers (*δυνάμεις*)," He did not bestow upon it "independent (*αὐτοκρατεῖς*) powers," so that, "like a charioteer grasping the reins or a pilot the tiller, He guides all things in what direction He pleases as law (*νόμον*) and right (*δικην*) demand, standing in need of no one besides: for all things are possible to God."³⁴ The "law and right" in this passage refer to God's own law and right and not to the order of nature which He has established; the implication is that God does in the world and with the order which He has established in it whatever to His inscrutable wisdom is just and right in a given particular instance, even when by doing so He has to upset the laws of nature which He has established for the general good of the world as a whole which He has created. A similar type of reasoning appears later in medieval philosophy in connection with the problem of miracles. There arises the question that the assumption that God does occasionally change the order of nature must inevitably mean also the assumption that God acts unjustly, inasmuch as the order of nature is the same as the order of justice. St. Thomas' answer to this is that for God to do something against the order of nature or justice as established by Him in the world does not mean that He does something against the order of His own nature and His own justice.³⁵ The world is thus conceived by Philo as a world which is run according to a certain preëstablished law

Similarly Maimonides uses creation as an argument for the possibility of miracles in general (*Moreh Nebukim* II, 25) and for the possibility of resurrection in particular (*Ma'amar Tehiyyat ha-Metim*, c. 42, p. 30, ed. Joshua Finkel; *Ḳobetz*, II, p. 10vb).

³⁴ *Opif.* 14, 46; cf. *Conf.* 34, 175.

³⁵ *Sum. Theol.* I, 105, 6.

on a scheduled timetable, and man can make his plans in the world with a reasonable expectancy that that which has been is that which shall be and that the order of nature will remain constant. But still he is to know that God can change this order and this schedule without previous notice, though not without some good reason known only to himself.

IV. CONCLUSION, INFLUENCE, ANTICIPATION

Students of Philo generally assume that Philo's Logos has two stages of existence, before the creation of the world as a thought of God and after the creation of the world as immanent in the world. We have shown that before the creation of the world it had already had a second stage of existence as an incorporeal being created by God. The immanent Logos is a third stage of its existence. Unlike the Stoic Logos, which is material and intermingled with matter, the immanent Logos of Philo is conceived by him as something immaterial, an extension of the preëxistent immaterial Logos, and it resides in the world after the analogy of the preëxistent mind or soul which Plato conceives as residing in the world. Still, while it is unlike the Stoic Logos, the immanent Logos is described by Philo in terms of the Stoic Logos, except that he does not call it the mind of the world or the soul of the world. These two expressions are reserved by him for God, who is outside the world and to whom he applies them figuratively, merely as a description of His being the ruler of the world.

In his treatment of the immanent Logos, Philo endeavors to answer two questions.

The first question is whether the world is governed by certain immutable laws of nature. In opposition to the Epicureans and in agreement with Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, he answers this question in the affirmative. For this

he finds support in Scripture, which, according to him, affirms not only the indestructibility of the world but also the immutability of its natural order. But these laws of nature were implanted in the world by God from above and they are administered by the immanent Logos through the power which it has received from God. His scattered statements on the laws of nature when brought together and analyzed and classified show that in the administration of the world by the immanent Logos Philo has discovered three general laws of nature, namely, the law of the opposites, the law of the harmony of the opposites, and the law of the perpetuity of the species.

The second question raised by Philo is whether these laws of nature, once implanted by God in the world, can be upset by God. In opposition to the generally accepted view in Greek philosophy, even to that of Plato, he answers this question in the affirmative. Evidence for this he finds in the many miracles recorded in Scripture.

In this view of Philo we have an adumbration of the view with regard to the laws of nature which we find subsequently in Christian, Moslem, and Jewish philosophy. The common element in all these three philosophies is that there are laws of nature, that these laws of nature were implanted by God in the world, but that God by a miraculous intervention can upset these laws of nature. We may quote St. Augustine as representing this Philonic view among the Church Fathers. "What is there so arranged by the Author of the nature of heaven and earth as the exactly ordered course of the stars? What is there established by laws so sure and inflexible? And yet, when it pleased Him who with sovereignty and supreme power regulates all He has created, a star conspicuous among the rest by its size and splendor changed its color, size, form, and most wonderful of all the order and law

of its course.”¹ The reference here is to an event recorded in Marcus Varro’s *De Gente Populi Romani*, and later in the same chapter he refers also to the miracles of the sun’s standing still and its moving backward which are recorded in Scripture.² The occurrence of events, he says, which some people attribute to what they please to call fate, that is, the inflexible laws of nature, should be really attributed to the will and power of God himself.³ This view is also represented by St. Thomas in his statements that “God established the order of nature,”⁴ and that “this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by the necessity of His nature, but by the choice of His own will, for He could have created another order of things; wherefore God can do something outside this order created by Him, when He chooses,”⁵ and that “those things which God does outside those causes which we know are called miracles.”⁶ The laws of nature are said by him to be due to divine providence (*divina providentia*),⁷ which he describes as divine reason (*ratio divina*)⁸ or eternal reason (*ratio aeterna*)⁹ or divine wisdom (*divina sapientia*),¹⁰ terms which reflect Philo’s “divine Logos,” “eternal Logos,” and “divine Wisdom.”¹¹ Similarly in Arabic philosophy, both Moslem and Jewish, this view is represented by those who argued against the orthodox Kalam’s denial of causality and laws of nature as well as against the Aristotelian conception that God acts by the necessity of His nature and without free will. All of these

¹ *De Civitate Dei* XXI, 8.

² Josh. 10:13; Isa. 38:8.

³ *De Civitate Dei* V, 1.

⁴ *Sum. Theol.* I, 105, 6, obj. 3: *Ordinem naturae Deus instituit.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, c.; cf. *Cont. Gent.* III, 99.

⁶ *Sum. Theol.* I, 105, 7, c.; cf. *Cont. Gent.* III, 101.

⁷ *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 91, 1, c.

⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 3, ad 1.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 2, c.

¹¹ Cf., e.g., *Opif.* 5, 20; *Plant.* 2, 8; *Heres* 25, 126.

acknowledged the historicity of the miraculous events as recorded in Scripture and the Koran. Indeed, not all the miracles recorded in Scripture are of the type that upset the laws of nature, that is, *contra naturam*; some of them are according to nature, though besides nature, that is, *praeter naturam*,¹² and the miraculous element in them consists in the acceleration of the natural process or in its timing. Moreover, some philosophers, especially among the Jews, explained even those miracles which seem to be contrary to nature as events for which God had made provision at the time of the creation of the world and hence as being to some extent part of the order of nature.¹³ But however God is conceived by the medieval philosophers in His relation to the physical world, whether as acting contrary to nature, or whether as accelerating or timing the processes of nature, or whether as carrying into effect at an opportune time the exception to the processes of nature which He had made provisions for at the creation of the world, He has retained His character as a free agent and as exercising His freedom of will in His relation to the affairs of mankind.

It is this traditional conception of the possibility of miracles that was made the subject of attack by those who began to assail some of the fundamental conceptions of traditional philosophy which were formulated by Philo. In the case of Spinoza, after his direct attack on the possibility of miracles, he reaffirmed the classical conception of the immutability of the laws of nature, especially as it was conceived by Aristotle.¹⁴

¹² Cf. Maimonides, *Ma'amar Teḥiyyat ha-Metim* c. 49, p. 34, ed. Joshua Finkel; *Kobeṣ* II, 11rb, where miracles are divided into those which are (1) "impossible by nature" and those which are (2) "possible by nature," corresponding to St. Thomas' (1) *contra naturam* and (2) *praeter naturam* (*De Potentia* VI, 2, ad 3; *II Sent.*, XVIII, 1, 3c).

¹³ Cf. above, n. 24.

¹⁴ Cf. *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, ch. 6.

CHAPTER VII

SOULS, ANGELS, IMMORTALITY

I. LIVING BEINGS

IT IS SIGNIFICANT that the immanent Logos, which pervades the world throughout, is never called by Philo the soul or mind of the world. Whenever he happens to use the expressions soul of the world and mind of the world, he uses them in an analogical sense as a description of God's governance of the world.¹ His avoidance of the use of these expressions in their literal sense and as a description of the immanent Logos was deliberate. He wanted to avoid the inconsistency in the use of these expressions by both Plato and the Stoics in that they first affirm that there is a soul or a mind which extends throughout or permeates the world and then distinguish within the world between animate and inanimate beings.² By not applying to the all-pervading immanent Logos the expression soul or mind of the world Philo can with greater verbal consistency affirm that within the world there is a distinction between things that have a soul or mind and things that have no soul or mind.

Soul and mind, like all other things in the world, are to Philo, as they are not to Plato, images of ideas; in this case images of the ideas of soul and mind.³ The ideas of soul and mind, as will be recalled, were created by God on the day which Scripture calls the first day of creation.⁴ After the model of the soul, the powers, at the behest of God, created irrational souls together with bodies,⁵ and God himself

¹ Cf. above, p. 346.

² Cf. above, p. 214.

³ Cf. below, p. 361.

⁴ Cf. above, p. 307.

⁵ *Fug.* 13, 69; cf. *Opif.* 24, 74-75; *Conf.* 35, 179; cf. below, p. 386.

created rational souls without bodies.⁶ In this, Philo follows Plato in the *Timaeus*.⁷ All these souls are individual souls; besides these individual souls there is not, as assumed in Plato's *Timaeus*,⁸ a universal soul. Instead of a universal soul, there is to him an immanent Logos, by which he means the totality of immanent ideas. Again, unlike Plato in the *Timaeus*, who has his unbodied rational souls, immediately after their creation, placed in the stars,⁹ Philo has them placed in the air.¹⁰ But, like Plato in the *Phaedrus*,¹¹ he distinguishes within these unbodied souls between those which are to be embodied and those which are to remain without bodies.¹² As for the cause of this distinction, we shall discuss that later.¹³ Unbodied souls as well as bodies with souls are described by Philo as having the nature of living beings (*ἡ φύσις τῶν ζώων*)¹⁴ as distinguished from beings which neither are souls nor possess souls.

Things in the world are thus to Philo, as they are to Plato and Aristotle and the Stoics, divided into animate and inanimate. But, like the Stoics¹⁵ and unlike Plato¹⁶ and Aristotle,¹⁷ he does not place plants among the animate beings, even though like all the philosophers he distinguishes them, by virtue of their having growth, from growthless beings. Growthless beings, as in the Stoics, have only a cohesive principle described by the term habit (*ἔξις*); plants have an inner principle of growth described as nature (*φύσις*);

⁶ *Plant.* 4, 14; *Somn.* I, 22, 137; *Fug.* 13, 69; *Conf.* 35, 179; cf. below, p. 389.

⁷ *Timaeus* 69 c; cf. below, pp. 387, 397.

⁸ *Ibid.* 41 d.

¹⁰ *Somn.* I, 22, 135, and 138.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Phaedrus* 246 c.

¹² *Gig.* 3, 12; *Plant.* 4, 14; *Somn.* I, 22, 140.

¹³ Cf. below, p. 367.

¹⁴ *Conf.* 35, 176.

¹⁵ Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 81; cf. Zeller, III, 14, p. 196, n. 1 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*², p. 208, n. 3).

¹⁶ *Timaeus* 77 a-b.

¹⁷ *De Anima* I, 5, 410b, 22-23; II, 2, 413b, 7-8.

and animals and men have an inner principle of life called soul (*ψυχή*).¹⁸ The term "soul," when applied to man, is used either in a general sense so as to include both the irrational and rational souls¹⁹ or in a special sense with reference to the rational soul.²⁰ For the latter, the more specific term is mind (*νοῦς*)²¹ or common equivalents of the term mind.²² But the term "mind" is sometimes also used by him loosely in the sense of the irrational soul.²³ In one place he says that "the mind . . . has many powers, namely, the power of habit, the power of nature, the power of soul, the power of thought, and countless other powers."²⁴ Here the term "mind" would seem to be used not only as including the rational and the irrational soul but also as including "habit" and "nature." However, the term "mind" in this passage is qualified by the statement "when as yet unclothed and unconfined by the body."²⁵ By this qualifying statement, we take it, he wishes to indicate that by the term "mind" in this passage he means the incorporeal, antemundane Logos, which is elsewhere described by him as "the mind above us,"²⁶ that is, what is described by him here as "the mind when as yet unclothed and unconfined by the body." Now the Logos, as we have seen, is the totality of powers,²⁷ that is, the totality of all the ideal patterns of all the particular powers in the world, and so Philo is justified in saying that it includes not only the power of "soul" and the power

¹⁸ *Imm.* 7, 35-9, 45.

¹⁹ *Leg. All.* II, 24, 95; *Agr.* 7, 30-31; *Spec.* I, 37, 201.

²⁰ *Heres* 11, 55.

²¹ *Imm.* 10, 45.

²² Such, e.g., as *διάνοια* (*Opif.* 46, 135); *λόγος* (*Deter.* 23, 83); *πνεῦμα* (*ibid.*); *λογικὸν πνεῦμα* (*Spec.* I, 35, 171).

²³ *Leg. All.* I, 12, 32. Cf. Drummond, I, pp. 218-223.

²⁴ *Leg. All.* II, 7, 22.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Heres* 48, 236; cf. 234.

²⁷ Cf. above, p. 234.

of "mind" but also the power of "habit" and the power of "nature."

While departing from Plato and Aristotle and following the Stoics in his exclusion of plants from among living beings, Philo is in doubt whether he should equally follow the Stoics,²⁸ and in this case also Plato²⁹ and certain statements of Aristotle,³⁰ by including the celestial bodies among living beings. In one place he raises the following questions: "Are the stars living and intelligent, or devoid of mind and soul? Are their motions determined by choice or simply by necessity?"³¹ And in answer to these questions he says: "All these and suchlike points pertaining to heaven, that fourth and best cosmic substance, are obscure and beyond our apprehension, based on guess-work and conjecture."³² Indeed, in several places in his writings he does speak of the stars as having life and intelligence. But, when these passages are closely examined, it will be noticed that in all of them he speaks in the name of somebody else, without committing himself to the view he presents. In one place he says: "Those who have made philosophy their study tell us that the stars too are living creatures and entirely endowed with mind, of which some, the planets, move by a power inherent in themselves."³³ In another passage he says that the stars "are said to be not only living creatures but living creatures endowed with mind, or rather each of them a mind in itself, excellent through and through and unsusceptible of any evil."³⁴ In still another passage he says that "each of the stars is said to be not a living creature only but mind of

²⁸ Diogenes, VII, 145; Cicero, *Academica Priora* II, 37, 119.

²⁹ *Timaeus* 39 E-40 A.

³⁰ *De Caelo* II, 2, 285a, 29; II, 12, 292a, 11 and 20-21; 292b, 29.

³¹ *Somn.* I, 4, 22.

³² *Ibid.*, 23.

³³ *Plant.* 3, 12.

³⁴ *Opif.* 24, 73.

the purest kind through and through.”³⁵ In all these passages, it will be noticed, Philo is careful to attribute the statement about the animality and rationality of the stars to somebody else.³⁶

In one passage, however, he would seem to speak in his own name. He says: “The stars are souls divine and unmixed through and through . . . for each of them is mind in its purest form.”³⁷ But the statement in this passage, it will be noticed, is an exact parallel of the statement in the last passage quoted above, where it repeats something said by others; and consequently we are justified in assuming that his failure to quote it as the view of somebody else in this passage is only an accidental omission. Moreover, the statement in both these passages that each star is a pure and unmixed mind in itself, that is, a mind existing without a body, cannot be an expression of his own view, for elsewhere, speaking of “rational and divine natures,” he divides them into two classes, “some incorporeal and perceptible only by mind, but others not without bodies, such as are the stars,”³⁸ which quite clearly indicates that stars are not, according to his own view, without bodies. That this statement does not express his own view may be still further shown by a study of the meaning and origin of it. The view that stars themselves are minds cannot be traced to any source. But a source for it can be found if we take Philo’s statement to mean only that both stars and minds are constituted of the same element, for in that case it reflects the Stoic view that

³⁵ *Somn.* I, 22, 135.

³⁶ Drummond (I, 282–283) presents Philo as believing that the celestial bodies are living and rational beings.

³⁷ *Gig.* 2, 8.

³⁸ *Opif.* 50, 144. Cohn (*Philos Werke*) makes the statement “such as are the stars” refer to “the incorporeal and perceptible only by mind,” which seems to be an attempt to remove the apparent contradiction with the other passages.

both stars and minds are constituted of the element fire, or the purest kind of fire called ether,³⁹ and also that minds ultimately resolve into ether.⁴⁰ Now, we know that Philo is opposed to the view that mind consists of any of the elements.⁴¹ Consequently the statement that each star is a pure and unmixed mind in itself cannot represent his own view. Indeed in that passage in which he expresses his own view that the stars are "not without bodies" he also describes them as "rational (λογικαί) and divine (θεϊαί)." But the term "rational" here in its application to the stars does not mean possessing reason any more than the term "divine" means possessing a God or being a God. The term "rational" here as a description of the stars merely means that the stars are moved according to a certain fixed order which can be calculated by reason. Similarly the term "divine" as a description of the stars merely means that they are imperishable, for in that special sense is the term "divine" used by Philo himself elsewhere, as, for example, in the statement that "the soul bears two kinds of offspring, one divine (θεϊόν), the other perishable."⁴²

That Philo did not consider the stars as living beings may be still further inferred from his formal classification of the various types of living beings in the following passage: "Living nature was primarily divided into two opposite parts, the irrational and the rational, this last again into the mortal and immortal species, the mortal being that of man, the immortal that of incorporeal souls which range through air and heaven."⁴³ It will be noticed that the stars and the celestial bodies in general are omitted in this enumeration of living

³⁹ Cf. Zeller, III, 14, p. 192, n. 2; p. 198, n. 5 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, p. 204, n. 3; p. 211, n. 5).

⁴⁰ *Heres* 57, 283, and cf. below, p. 400.

⁴¹ Cf. below, p. 391.

⁴² *Leg. All.* II, 23, 95.

⁴³ *Conf.* 35, 176.

beings. This denial of the existence of a soul in the celestial bodies and the hesitancy of definitely saying that such a soul does not exist reflects a similar attitude on the part of Aristotle, who, while he sometimes speaks of the celestial bodies as being moved by a soul,⁴⁴ at other times speaks of the heaven as being moved naturally (*πέφυκε*) and in virtue of its own nature (*κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν*),⁴⁵ that is, without a soul. Perhaps also it reflects the influence of the Epicureans, who explicitly deny that "earth and sun and sky, sea, stars and moon" possess vital motion and sense (*vitalis motus sensusque*).⁴⁶

Thus, according to Philo, there are three classes of living beings, namely, animals, men, and incorporeal souls. Let us now see what he says about these three classes of living beings.

II. UNBODIED SOULS OR ANGELS

Of the rational incorporeal and immortal souls created by God and stored away in the air ¹ not all descend into bodies. These incorporeal souls, says Philo, "are arranged in companies that differ in rank."² The difference between these companies of incorporeal souls is that some of them are "endowed with a diviner constitution"³ or "are of a perfect purity and excellence,"⁴ and hence "have never deigned to be brought into union with any of the parts of earth,"⁵ or "have no regard for any earthly quarter,"⁶ or "have never felt any craving after the things of the earth."⁷ This reflects

⁴⁴ Cf. *De Caelo* II, 2, 285a, 29; 12, 292b, 29.

⁴⁵ *De Caelo* I, 2, 269a, 5-7. On the development of this view in Aristotle, see Jaeger, *Aristotle*, pp. 153 ff.; 346 ff.

⁴⁶ Lucretius, V, 125.

¹ *Somn.* I, 22, 137.

² *Plant.* 4, 14.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Somn.* I, 22, 140.

⁵ *Gig.* 3, 12.

⁶ *Plant.* 4, 14.

⁷ *Somn.* I, 22, 140.

Plato's statements in the *Phaedrus* with regard to the incorporeal souls, which he compares to pairs of winged horses and charioteers,⁸ that when any of them is "perfect and fully winged, it mounts upward," whereas that "which has lost its wings is borne along until it gets hold of something solid, when it settles down, taking upon itself an earthly body."⁹ But as to what is the cause of the difference between these two groups of incorporeal souls so as to make one descend into bodies and the other abstain from descending into them there seems to be a difference between Plato and Philo. To Plato, in the *Phaedrus*, where the souls are said to be uncreated,¹⁰ the difference must have existed in them from eternity, and in the *Timaeus*, where the souls are said to be created,¹¹ their descent into bodies is ascribed to the law of fate.¹² To Philo, however, the souls were created by God and God acts by absolute freedom of the will,¹³ bound by no law of fate;¹⁴ consequently we may assume that the differences between these two groups of souls were determined by an act of God's free will. God's free will is Philo's universal explanation — and to him a satisfactory explanation — for anything that cannot be explained by the natural order of causality.¹⁵

These incorporeal rational and immortal souls which do not descend into bodies, he adds, are what the philosophers call demons but what Scripture is accustomed to call angels.¹⁶ Though in Greek the term *angelos* in the sense of a heavenly messenger is sometimes applied to certain deities, such as Hermes,¹⁷ Iris,¹⁸ and Nemesis,¹⁹ still it is not used as a tech-

⁸ *Phaedrus* 246 A. ⁹ *Ibid.* 246 C. ¹⁰ *Ibid.* 246 A. ¹¹ *Timaeus* 41 D.

¹² *Ibid.* 41 E.

¹³ Cf. below, p. 431.

¹⁴ Cf. above, p. 329.

¹⁵ Cf. Drummond, I, 337: "No satisfactory explanation is given of their descent into the body."

¹⁶ *Gig.* 2, 6; *Somn.* I, 22, 141; cf. also *Sacr.* 2, 5; *Conf.* 34, 174.

¹⁷ *Odyssey* V, 29; *Cratylus* 407 E.

¹⁸ *Iliad* II, 786; III, 121.

¹⁹ *Laws* IV, 717 D. Cf. G. Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch*, s.v., I, 73.

nical term in the sense of a special class of beings whose sole function is to act as messengers of God. The identification of demons with souls which are like all other souls but which, because of their greater perfection, do not descend into bodies must have been indirectly inferred by Philo from Plato's *Phaedrus*. In that dialogue, where the incorporeal souls are compared to pairs of winged horses and charioteers²⁰ which soar upwards toward the outer surface of the heaven from which they behold the ideas which are outside of the heaven,²¹ Plato says that "Zeus, driving a winged chariot, goes first" and that "he is followed by an army of gods and demons,"²² and then, after describing the life of the "gods," he says: "such is the life of the gods (*θεῶν*); but of the other souls (*αἱ ἄλλαι ψυχαι*), that which best follows after God and is most like him, raises the head of the charioteer up into the outer region."²³ The expression "the other souls" must have been taken by Philo to refer to the "demons" mentioned previously as distinguished from the "gods," and consequently he inferred that the demons are souls.²⁴ In one place, however, souls which do not descend into bodies are said by him to be called "heroes" by Greek philosophers and "angels" by Moses.²⁵ The use of the term "hero" here by Philo in the sense of "demon" reflects Plato's *Cratylus* where the two words refer to the same thing,²⁶ though they are not

²⁰ *Phaedrus* 246 A.

²¹ *Ibid.* 246 D.

²² *Ibid.* 246 E f.

²³ *Ibid.* 247 E f.

²⁴ Plotinus (*Enneads* V, 8, 10) seems to take the expression "the other souls" to refer to something distinguished from the "demons"; cf. W. H. Thompson's note in his edition of the *Phaedrus*, p. 47, on 246 E.

There is no other more explicit statement in Plato which could serve as source to Philo's statement that demons are incorporeal souls which do not descend into bodies.

²⁵ *Plant.* 4, 14.

²⁶ *Cratylus* 397 E, 389 C-D.

used there to mean souls which do not descend into bodies. Conscious, however, of the view of Aristotle and some Stoics that demons do not exist, Philo warns his readers, with regard to what he says about demons and angels, "and let no one suppose that what is here said is a myth."²⁷

As to the permanent abode of these incorporeal souls or demons or angels, Philo has three statements. First, they "hover in the air,"²⁸ they were made "in the air" and "exist on high nigh to the ethereal region itself."²⁹ Second, they "range through the air and heaven."³⁰ Third, they are "inhabiters of the divine world,"³¹ by which he means the heavens, for elsewhere he says that the heaven consists of a "fifth element" which partakes "of a wonderful and divine essence."³² From all these passages we gather that the angels have their original abode in the air, or rather the upper part of the air near the heaven, but in their ascent upward they traverse the air and reach the heaven, where they establish their permanent abode. Now, that the angels are in the heaven is not only to be derived from many passages in Scripture³³ but also from the *Phaedrus* of Plato, where the demons as well as the gods in their ascent upwards are said ultimately to reach "the outer surface of the heaven."³⁴ But as for his view that air is the original abode of the angels or the demons, it must be based upon the *Epinomis*. In the *Epinomis*, the demons are said to be made of ether.³⁵ Now "ether" in the *Epinomis*, while called a fifth element,³⁶ is placed between air and fire,³⁷ the latter of which is the element out of which the heavens are made. Accordingly the

²⁷ *Gig.* 2, 7.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁹ *Plant.* 4, 14; cf. *Conf.* 34, 174.

³⁰ *Conf.* 35, 176.

³¹ *Qu. in Gen.* III, 11.

³² *Ibid.* IV, 8. Cf. above, p. 313, at n. 117.

³³ Cf., e.g., *Gen.* 22: 11.

³⁴ *Phaedrus* 247 c.

³⁵ *Epinomis* 984 e.

³⁶ *Ibid.* 981 c.

³⁷ *Ibid.* 984 b.

term ether is used in the *Epinomis* not in the Aristotelian sense as something different from any of the four elements,³⁸ nor in the Stoic sense as a purer kind of fire,³⁹ but rather in the Platonic sense as the purest of the many kinds of air.⁴⁰ The demons, furthermore, though made of ether which is under the heaven, are said in the *Epinomis* to move "to the whole of heaven with a lightly rushing motion."⁴¹ Philo undoubtedly correctly understood the ether of the *Epinomis* to mean the upper and purer part of air, and consequently he says of demons or angels that their abode is the air near the heaven and that they "range through the air and heaven." Moreover, in his description of the angels Philo dwells upon the fact that "they are invisible to us"⁴² or that they are "wholly beyond apprehension by sense"⁴³ or that "they are not apprehended by sense."⁴⁴ So also the *Epinomis* says of the demon that "it is not entirely plain to sight: when it is near by, it is not made manifest to us."⁴⁵ But though he follows the *Epinomis* in making air the abode of the demons, he does not follow it in making air or rather ether their constituent element. He describes the demons or angels as incorporeal (*ἀσώματοι*),⁴⁶ by which he means not only that they are without bodies but also that they do not consist of any of the corporeal elements. They are, according to him, of the same nature as the mind, for, he says, "they must be apprehended by the mind, in order that like may be discerned by like,"⁴⁷ and of mind Philo explicitly says that it does not consist of any of the elements.⁴⁸

The functions of angels as described in Scripture are found

³⁸ *De Caelo* I, 3, 27ob, 17-25.

³⁹ Cf. above, p. 313.

⁴⁰ *Timaeus* 58 D; *Phaedo* 111 A.

⁴¹ *Epinomis* 985 B.

⁴² *Gig.* 2, 8.

⁴³ *Plant.* 4, 14.

⁴⁴ *Somn.* I, 22, 135.

⁴⁵ *Epinomis* 984 E.

⁴⁶ *Plant.* 4, 14; *Conf.* 35, 176.

⁴⁷ *Gig.* 2, 9.

⁴⁸ Cf. below, p. 391.

by Philo to be the same as the functions of demons as described by Plato. In Plato the functions of demons are described in the statements that they are "interpreting and transporting human things to the gods and divine things to men; entreaties and sacrifices from below, and ordinances and requitals from above,"⁴⁹ and that also through them "are conveyed all divination . . . and all sooth-sayings,"⁵⁰ for "the whole of the demoniac is between divine and mortal."⁵¹ So also Philo finds that the functions of angels as described in Scripture are that "they both convey the biddings of the Father to His children and report the children's need to their Father"⁵² and that they also are employed by God "as ambassadors to announce the predictions which He wills to make to our race."⁵³ One function, however, which Plato ascribes to demons is not mentioned by Philo. According to Plato, each man's individual demon guides him after death to the place of judgment and from there to the other world.⁵⁴ A similar view occurs also in the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs, in which the angel of peace is said to meet the departed soul and to lead it into eternal life.⁵⁵ Similarly, in the Talmud the ministering angels are said to announce to God the arrival of the righteous man after his departure from the world, and God is said to tell them to go out to meet the newcomer and to let him enter into peace.⁵⁶ In Philo, however, there is no specific mention of this as one of the functions of angels. But inasmuch as he speaks, as we shall

⁴⁹ *Symposium* 202 E; *Epinomis* 985 B.

⁵⁰ *Symposium* 202 E.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Somn.* I, 22, 141; cf. *Gig.* 3, 12; *Plant.* 4, 14.

⁵³ *Abr.* 23, 115.

⁵⁴ *Phaedo* 107 D.

⁵⁵ Testament of Asher 6: 6; cf. Testament of Benjamin 6: 1.

⁵⁶ *Ketubot* 104a. Cf. A. D. Nock, "Postscript," *Harvard Theological Review* 34 (1941), 101-109, where this belief is fully discussed.

see,⁵⁷ of the return of the immortal souls to the divine world to dwell among the angels, it is not impossible that he also believed, though he does not mention it, that the returning souls were escorted or welcomed by angels.

On the whole, Philo considers the angels as merely a special kind of immanent powers in the world. Just as the immanent powers in the world are the instruments of divine providence, so also the angels are instruments of divine providence; but whereas the immanent powers are employed by God in the exercise of His care over the world as a whole, the angels are employed by him in the exercise of His care only over mankind. "They are consecrated and devoted to the service of the Father and Creator whose wont is to employ them as ministers and helpers, to have charge and care of mortal man."⁵⁸ Inasmuch as both demons, according to philosophers, and angels, according to Scripture, are only intermediaries between God and men, Philo maintains that the Hebrew term *mal'ak*, angel, which means messenger, is an apter designation for these intermediating incorporeal souls than the Greek term demon,⁵⁹ probably having in mind Plato's etymological explanation of "demon" as meaning he who is knowing (*δαήμων*).⁶⁰ Philo finds in Jacob's dream of the ladder, in which Jacob saw that "the angels of God were ascending and descending on it,"⁶¹ a proof-text for this function of angels as intermediaries. A striking parallel to this is Plato's statement with regard to demons that "the middle creatures move both to earth and to the whole heaven with a lightly

⁵⁷ Cf. below, pp. 401 f.

⁵⁸ *Gig.* 3, 12; cf. *Qu. in Exod.* II, 13: "An angel is an intellectual spirit, nay more, an intellect pure and simple, altogether incorporeal, created as a servant of God for a certain purpose and appointed for the performance of services of which our mortal race is in need."

⁵⁹ *Somn.* I, 22, 141; *Plant.* 4, 14.

⁶⁰ *Cratylus* 398 B.

⁶¹ *Gen.* 28: 12; cf. *Somn.* I, 22, 133, and 142.

rushing motion.”⁶² Because of their function as intermediaries, Philo calls them “the lieutenants (*ὑπαρχοὶ*) of the Ruler of the universe,”⁶³ or His servants (*ὑπηρέται*),⁶⁴ or, in their totality, “the servant (*ὑπηρέτης*) and minister (*θεραπευτής*) of the Ruler who has marshaled them.”⁶⁵ In their capacity as the lieutenants and ministers of God in the visible world, wherein they are employed by God as the instruments of His providence in connection with the affairs of men, they are thus like the immanent powers, which are employed by God as the instruments of His providence in the physical world at large. The term “powers” is therefore sometimes used by him to include both the immanent powers and the angels, as in his statement that “as pillars support whole houses, so also do the divine powers support (1) the whole world and (2) that most excellent and God-loving race of mankind.”⁶⁶ Of the two phrases which we have set off by numbers, the first undoubtedly refers to the immanent powers in general and the second to angels in particular. Moreover, sometimes angels themselves are described by Philo as the “powers”⁶⁷ of God, reflecting, as in the case of the ideas, the scriptural expression the “Lord of Sabaoth,” that is, the “Lord of the powers” (*κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων*), which sometimes means the Lord of the angels.⁶⁸ But inasmuch as the Hebrew “Sabaoth” means also “armies,” and in the expression “the host of heaven,” which refers to the stars, the Septuagint translates the term “saba” by “army” (*στρατιά*),⁶⁹ Philo calls the angels in their total-

⁶² *Epinomis* 985 B.

⁶³ *Somn.* I, 22, 140.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 143.

⁶⁵ *Conf.* 34, 174.

⁶⁶ *Fragmenta*, Richter, VI, 222 (M, II, 662).

⁶⁷ See term “angels” in *Abr.* 23, 115, for which term “powers” is used in 28, 143-145.

⁶⁸ Cf. above, p. 220; cf. also *The Prayer of Manasses* 15.

⁶⁹ *Jer.* 8: 2; 19: 13; *II Chron.* 33: 3, 5.

ity also "army" (στρατός) or "divine army" (θεῖον στρατεύμα).⁷⁰ For this description of the angels by the term "army" he also had before him Plato's expression "an army (στρατιὰ) of gods and demons."⁷¹ It is also due to Plato's description of this "army of gods and demons" as a "divine company" (θεῖος χορός)⁷² that Philo describes the angels also as a "most sacred company" (ιερώτατος χορός).⁷³ Sometimes, instead of calling the angels powers, he describes them only as "the subordinate servants (ὑποδιάκονοι) of His powers,"⁷⁴ that is, of the powers which are identified with the ideas constituting the intelligible world. The same description occurs also in his statement that the company of angels which exists in the air is "an attendant (ὀπαδός) upon the heavenly [powers]," that is, of the powers through which he has previously said that "the incorporeal and intelligible world was framed."⁷⁵ The term "heavenly" is used by him here in the sense of "incorporeal" or "ideal." So also is the expression "heavenly virtue" used by him in the sense of the "idea of virtue."⁷⁶

Philo's treatment of angels, we have thus seen, is as systematically coherent as his treatment of the Logos and powers and ideas. In the case of the latter three, we have distinguished three stages of existence. In the first stage, they are all in God and are all identical with God, the Logos being the mind of God and the powers the content of that mind. The term ideas does not happen to be used by Philo explicitly as a description of the powers in this first stage of their existence. In the second stage, the Logos is a created incorporeal mind and the powers and ideas are the content

⁷⁰ *Conf.* 34, 174; cf. *Sacr.* 2, 5.

⁷¹ *Phaedrus* 246 E f.

⁷² *Ibid.* 247 A.

⁷³ *Conf.* 34, 174.

⁷⁴ *Spec.* I, 12, 66.

⁷⁵ *Conf.* 34, 174 and 172.

⁷⁶ *Leg. All.* I, 14, 45; cf. below, II, 202.

of that mind, the former describing that content in its aspect as cause and the latter describing it in its aspect as pattern. During this second stage of their existence, all these three are distinct from God but identical with each other. In the third stage, with the world already created, the Logos is a mind immanent in the world and the powers are its content. The term ideas, again, does not happen to be used by Philo as a description of the powers in this their third stage of existence. By this interpretation of Philo, we have been able to remove all the apparent inconsistencies in his treatment of the Logos and powers and ideas. By the identification now of angels with a special kind of these immanent powers, all the apparent contradictions in his treatment of angels are similarly removed. Angels, according to Philo, are not ideas. Nor are they powers in the sense of ideas. Nor, again, are they called Logoi in the sense in which the Logos is called the totality of ideas. If they are called powers, they are called so only in the sense of the immanent powers. Similarly, if they are called Logoi, they are called so, as we shall presently show, only in the sense of the immanent Logoi.⁷⁷

Both Plato and Philo discuss the question of why such intermediaries are necessary. Plato says: "God with man does not mingle, but the demon is the means of all intercourse and converse of men with gods and of gods with men, whether waking or asleep."⁷⁸ Again, the demons as intermediaries between God and men "understand the whole of our

⁷⁷ On the alleged inconsistencies in Philo's treatment of angels, see Zeller, III, 24, pp. 409-414; 430-431. Drummond (II, pp. 147-148) removes these inconsistencies on the basis of his own interpretation of Philo's powers as having two aspects and by identifying angels with the second aspect. On the identification of angels with ideas, see Ch. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists*, pp. 11-12; H. Leisegang, *Die Raumtheorie im späteren Platonismus*, pp. 38-39; cf. also comment on Aucher's Latin translation of *Qu. in Gen. I*, 19, above, p. 206, n. 13.

⁷⁸ *Symposium* 203 A.

thoughts, and show extraordinary kindness to any one of us who is good and true and hate him who is utterly evil, as one who already partakes of suffering, for we know that God, who has the privilege of the divine portion, is remote from these affections of pain and pleasure, but has a share of intelligence and knowledge in every sphere.”⁷⁹ So also Philo, explaining the role of angels as intermediaries, with evident reference to Plato’s statement about demons, says: “not that God, who is already present in all directions, needs informants, but that it was a boon to us to avail ourselves of the services of Logoi, acting on our behalf as mediators, so great is our awe and shuddering dread of the universal Monarch and the exceeding might of His sovereignty.”⁸⁰ As proof-text for this he quotes the people’s plea to Moses at the revelation on Mount Sinai: “Speak thou to us, and let not God speak to us, lest we die,”⁸¹ and concludes: “For should He, without employing ministers, hold out to us with His own hand, I do not say chastisement, but even benefits unmixed and exceeding great, we are incapable of receiving them.”⁸² But, as we have tried to show, to Philo the employment of intermediaries is part of God’s plan in governing the world; He did not employ them because it was impossible for Him to act directly.⁸³ The functions which are performed by the angels are sometimes performed by God himself. This is evident from the fact that even in speaking to the people God does not always employ an angel as an intermediary. At the revelation on Mount Sinai, according to Philo himself, God himself spoke to the entire people directly.⁸⁴

Following his custom of applying the term Logos to mind, whether mind in the sense of the place of the intelligible

⁷⁹ *Epinomis* 985 A.

⁸⁰ *Somn.* I, 22, 142.

⁸¹ *Exod.* 20: 19.

⁸² *Somn.* I, 22, 123.

⁸³ Cf. above, pp. 271 ff.

⁸⁴ Cf. below, II, 38 f.

world or mind in the sense of the rational soul of man, he also applies that term to those minds or incorporeal souls which constitute the angels. The angels are called by him *Logoi*,⁸⁵ and each angel which appeared to individual persons according to the scriptural narrative is called by him *Logos*.⁸⁶ Now the demons, with whom the angels are identified by Philo, are according to Plato arrayed in twelve companies.⁸⁷ Similarly, beginning with the Book of Daniel and continuing throughout post-Biblical Judaism the angels gradually become grouped in certain orders.⁸⁸ So also Philo considers the angels as being arrayed in certain companies,⁸⁹ each of them having certain special tasks to perform. Among the tasks assigned by Plato to the demons, or perhaps to certain classes of demons, is to act as guardians of cities and districts.⁹⁰ So also in Scripture as well as in post-scriptural Judaism angels are considered as guardians of nations.⁹¹ Among these angels who are guardians of nations, the guardian of the Jewish nation is especially mentioned by name. It is Michael.⁹² This guardian angel of Israel is called in Scripture "one of the chiefs" (*ἀρχόντων*)⁹³ and "the great chief" (*ἄρχων*),⁹⁴ whence we get in post-scriptural Judaism the Greek term archangel,⁹⁵ that is to say, chief-angel. Philo similarly speaks of an archangel,⁹⁶ whom he describes

⁸⁵ *Somn.* I, 22, 142; 23, 147; *Post.* 26, 91; *Leg. All.* III, 62, 177.

⁸⁶ See Leisegang, *Indices*, under *λόγος*, IV.

⁸⁷ *Phaedrus* 247 A.

⁸⁸ Cf. *Dan.* 10: 13; *Enoch* 61: 10-11, 71: 7-13.

⁸⁹ *Conf.* 34, 174.

⁹⁰ *Laws* IV, 713 c ff.; V, 738 D.

⁹¹ *Dan.* 10: 13, 20-21; *Canticles Rabbah* to 8:14.

⁹² *Dan.* 10: 21.

⁹³ *Dan.* 10: 13.

⁹⁴ *Dan.* 12: 1.

⁹⁵ I *Thes.* 4: 16; *Jude* 9; cf. *Testament of Levi* 3: 5; *Apocalypse of Moses* 3: 2; 22: 1; 38: 1; *Secrets of Enoch* 20: 1; 21: 3; 22: 11.

⁹⁶ *Heres* 42, 205; *Conf.* 28, 146; *Somn.* I, 25, 157.

as "the eldest Logos" ⁹⁷ or as standing "above Logoi" and "above angels" like "the charioteer of a chariot." ⁹⁸ Now when we examine the three passages in which the term archangel occurs in Philo we find that it is always used in connection with Israel. In one passage, it is symbolically called Israel; ⁹⁹ in another, it refers to the angel who was enclosed within the cloud which "came between the camp of the Egyptians and the camp of Israel" ¹⁰⁰ for the protection of the latter; in the third, it refers to the angel called the Lord, who appeared to Jacob in his dream and promised him that the land upon which he lay would be given to him and his seed. ¹⁰¹ Philo must have found an additional source for the belief in guardian angels of nations and of a special guardian angel of Israel in the verse which in the Septuagint translation reads: "When the Most High distributed nations, when He dispersed the sons of Adam, He set boundaries of nations according to the number of the angels of God, and Jacob His people became the Lord's portion, Israel became the lot of His inheritance." ¹⁰² Though this verse is interpreted by Philo allegorically, wherein the term "nations" is taken by him to refer to the "nations of the soul" and the term "angels" is taken by him to refer to "forms or nations of virtue," ¹⁰³ still, in this case as in all other cases where he interprets Scripture allegorically, the literal meaning of the text is not discarded by him. Thus while indeed the name of the angel Michael is not mentioned by Philo, it was the

⁹⁷ *Heres* 42, 205.

⁹⁸ *Somn.* I, 25, 157.

⁹⁹ *Conf.* 28, 146.

¹⁰⁰ *Heres* 42, 205; cf. *Exod.* 24: 19-20; cf. *Mos.* I, 29, 166, and Drummond, II, 267-268.

¹⁰¹ *Somn.* I, 25, 157; cf. *Gen.* 28: 13.

¹⁰² *Deut.* 32: 8-9. Cf. *Sirach* 17: 17; cf. Drummond, I, 148-149.

¹⁰³ *Post.* 26, 91-92.

angel Michael, the guardian angel of Israel, whom he had in mind when he spoke of the archangel.¹⁰⁴

These angels, who, being incorporeal souls, are invisible,¹⁰⁵ sometimes become visible and appear to men. Philo discusses nine instances in Scripture where angels are said to have made their appearance to persons either in their waking hours or in their sleep, namely, (1) in the case of Hagar,¹⁰⁶ (2) in the case of the three visitors of Abraham,¹⁰⁷ (3) in the case of the attempted sacrifice of Isaac,¹⁰⁸ (4) in the case of Lot,¹⁰⁹ (5) in the case of Jacob in his sleep,¹¹⁰ (6) in the case of Jacob at the ford of Jabok,¹¹¹ (7) in the case of Moses in the burning bush,¹¹² (8) in the case of the camp of Israel at the Red Sea,¹¹³ and (9) in the case of Balaam.¹¹⁴ As in the case of many of the persons and the events in Scripture in whose historicity Philo had no doubt, so also in the case of angels in whose existence as real beings he had no doubt, Philo sometimes interprets their appearance to certain persons in an allegorical sense. Thus in the case of the three visitors of Abraham, two of the visitors are interpreted by him in a literal sense as angels,¹¹⁵ and in an allegorical sense

¹⁰⁴ Goodenough (*By Light, Light*, pp. 79-80) makes the general statement: "He could not possibly have made room for a literal Gabriel or Michael in his thinking."

¹⁰⁵ Cf. above, p. 370.

¹⁰⁶ Gen. 16: 7-12; 21: 17-18; *Qu. in Gen.* III, 27-34.

¹⁰⁷ Gen. 18: 2-16; cf. Gen. 19: 1; *Abr.* 22, 107 ff., especially 22, 113; 23, 115.

¹⁰⁸ Gen. 22: 15-18; *Leg. All.* III, 72, 203; *Abr.* 46, 273.

¹⁰⁹ Gen. 19: 1-22; *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 30.

¹¹⁰ Gen. 28: 12; *Somn.* I, 22, 123 ff.

¹¹¹ Gen. 32: 25-31. *Mut.* 2, 14; 14, 88.

¹¹² Exod. 3: 2.

¹¹³ Exod. 14: 19. *Heres* 42, 205-206.

¹¹⁴ Num. 22: 22-35.

¹¹⁵ *Abr.* 22, 113; 23, 115; and cf. 28, 142-143.

Concerning the third, who was in the middle, Philo explicitly says: "In my opinion that one was the truly Existent, who held it fitting that He should be present" (*ibid.*, 143; cf. also references in next note, where the one in the middle is definitely said to be God). Still it is not impossible that by "The truly Existent"

as the powers which constitute the intelligible world.¹¹⁶ Similarly in his homily on the verse "and he saw the angel of God standing in his way"¹¹⁷ in the story of Balaam, he says that the "angel of God" allegorically means "conviction (ἐλεγχος), the divine Logos, the angel who guides our feet and removes the obstacles before them, that we may walk without stumbling along the high road."¹¹⁸ Thus also in his allegorical interpretation of the angel who addressed Hagar as she was seated by a fountain of water in the wilderness,¹¹⁹ of the two angels who stayed in Lot's house in Sodom,¹²⁰ of the angels which Jacob saw in his dream,¹²¹ and of the angels whom he met in Mahanaim¹²² prior to his wrestling with a man at the ford of Jabok¹²³ — in all these instances he takes angel, which term he identifies with Logos, to refer allegorically to conviction, virtue, and the power of human reason. But these allegorical interpretations, as said before, do not exclude the historical veracity of these narratives as recording events when angels who are real beings, called philosophically demons, made their appearance before certain persons.¹²⁴ In his interpretation of the three angels who appeared to Abraham as men,¹²⁵ he explicitly says

here, just as by "Lord" in *Somn.* I, 25, 157, he refers to the Logos or archangel (cf. above, p. 378). Gfrörer (I, 158) argues that the middle figure could not have been God himself and tries to prove it from *Abr.* 23, 116, where Abraham is called a fellow-servant (δμώδουλον) of all the three.

¹¹⁶ *Abr.* 24, 119-122. Cf. *Sacr.* 15, 59; *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 2; *De Deo* 2-3, in all of which only the allegorical explanation is given.

¹¹⁷ Num. 22: 31.

¹¹⁸ *Immut.* 37, 182.

¹¹⁹ Gen. 16: 11; cf. *Fug.* I, 5-6. 1.

¹²⁰ Gen. 19: 4; cf. *Conf.* 8, 28.

¹²¹ Gen. 28: 11-12. *Somn.* I, 19, 115-119.

¹²² Gen. 32: 2-3.

¹²³ Gen. 32: 23 ff. *Sobr.* 13, 65.

¹²⁴ Cf. discussion in Gfrörer, I, pp. 290, 291, 293; Drummond, II, 243.

¹²⁵ Gen. 18: 2.

that the story has both a literal or open meaning and a hidden meaning,¹²⁶ and though he adds that the open meaning is "suited for the multitude," whereas the hidden meaning "appeals to the few,"¹²⁷ he does not mean that the open meaning is not true.

The angels in the visible world, as we have said, are, according to Philo, the instruments by which God exercises His providence over man, just as the powers which constitute the Logos are the instruments by which God created the intelligible world.¹²⁸ It is for this reason, as we have seen, that he sometimes calls the angels powers¹²⁹ or the servants of the powers.¹³⁰ Accordingly, just as the powers are divided into beneficial and punitive,¹³¹ so also the angels are divided by him into beneficial and punitive. Thus two of the three visitors of Abraham, in their literal sense of angels, correspond to the two powers which they allegorically symbolize, one being beneficial and the other punitive.¹³² This, on the whole, corresponds to the division of angels into beneficial and destructive which occurs in post-scriptural Jewish literature.¹³³ The beneficial angels, according to Philo, are employed by God to give to men what he calls "secondary boons"; and "secondary," he explains, "are such as involve riddance from ills."¹³⁴ Thus when the angel who has preserved the city of Zoar from destruction¹³⁵ is called by Philo beneficial,¹³⁶ it is only in the sense that he brought what he calls elsewhere a "secondary boon," that is, the preservation

¹²⁶ *Abr.* 24, 119; 29, 147.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.* 29, 147.

¹²⁸ *Conf.* 34, 171-172 and 174.

¹²⁹ Cf. above, p. 373.

¹³⁰ Cf. "good angels" (II Macc. 11: 6; 15: 23; Tobit 5: 21); "angels of punishment" (Enoch 53: 3; 56: 1; 62: 11; 63: 1), "angels of destruction" (*Kiddushin* 72a).

¹³⁴ *Leg. All.* III, 62, 177.

¹³⁵ Gen. 19: 21-22.

¹³⁶ *Abr.* 28, 145.

¹³⁰ Cf. above, p. 374.

¹³¹ Cf. above, p. 224.

¹³² *Abr.* 28, 145; cf. 24, 119-121.

of the city from the evil that might have befallen it. The punitive angels, according to him, are employed by God to inflict punishment upon all those who deserve it,¹³⁷ as, for instance, the case of the angels who destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah.¹³⁸ God himself, however, according to him, gives what he calls the "principal boons,"¹³⁹ such, for instance, as "health in the simplest sense, preceded by no illness in our bodies."¹⁴⁰ It is "principal boons" that Philo refers to whenever he says unqualifiedly that "God is the cause of good things"¹⁴¹ or that "it is fitting that He himself should extend boons and gifts and benefits."¹⁴² "Secondary boons," as we have seen, are given by God through angels. Similarly, when Philo says that punishment is administered by God through angels,¹⁴³ he does not mean to exclude "boons" in the sense of "secondary boons" from being also administered by God through angels. Thus also we know that his statement with regard to punishment does not mean that God may never administer punishment himself. Some of the plagues of Egypt, according to Philo, were administered directly by God himself.¹⁴⁴ There are no inconsistencies in Philo on this point; there are only incomplete statements which have to be completed by a comparison with other statements.

Both these kinds of angels, the beneficial and the punitive, are considered by Philo as "having no participation in wickedness,"¹⁴⁵ as being "worthy of the name" angel, and as being "sacred and inviolate by reason of that glorious and blameless ministry,"¹⁴⁶ for even the punitive angels, in per-

¹³⁷ *Conf.* 36, 180; *Fug.* 13, 66.

¹³⁸ *Abr.* 28, 145.

¹³⁹ *Leg. All.* III, 62, 177.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 178.

¹⁴¹ *Conf.* 36, 180.

¹⁴² *Fug.* 13, 66.

¹⁴³ *Conf.* 36, 180; *Fug.* 13, 66.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. above, pp. 282, 349.

¹⁴⁵ *Conf.* 35, 177; cf. *Genesis Rabbah* 48, 11.

¹⁴⁶ *Gig.* 4, 16.

forming their services, carry out the command of God.¹⁴⁷ In fact, "punishment is not a thing of harm or mischief, but a preventive and corrective of sin."¹⁴⁸ It is for this reason that in one place he includes even the punitive angels under the general description of angels as "God's beneficent and merciful and bountiful powers."¹⁴⁹ But Philo speaks also of another class of angels whom he calls "evil angels," first referring to them as if they were real beings and then treating them allegorically,¹⁵⁰ without any formal transition from one of these methods of treatment to the other. But here one is inclined to take his allegorical explanation to mean a denial of their actual existence. As proof-text for this class of angels he quotes the verse: "He sent out upon them the anger of His wrath, wrath and anger and affliction, a mission by evil angels."¹⁵¹ From the context of Philo's discussion it is evident that by these "evil angels" he does not mean punitive angels or angels who, as messengers of God, inflict evil upon sinners, but rather morally evil angels, who are not messengers of God. He describes them as being "unholy and unworthy of their title," and as "slipping (*ὑποδύμενοι*) into the name of angel,"¹⁵² referring in the course of his discussion to the fact that "men in general speak of good and evil demons, and in like manner of good and evil souls."¹⁵³ The purpose of this reference is evidently to justify the application of the term "angel" to the morally evil beings, and he does this by referring to the analogy of the use of the Greek terms "demon" and "soul." The reference is undoubtedly here to Plato's explanation of the term "demon" as wise and knowing¹⁵⁴ and to his explanation of

¹⁴⁷ *Fug.* 13, 66.

¹⁴⁸ *Conf.* 34, 171.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 36, 182.

¹⁵⁰ *Gig.* 4, 17-18.

¹⁵¹ *Ps.* 78: 49.

¹⁵² *Gig.* 4, 17.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁵⁴ *Cratylus* 398 B.

the term "soul" in Greek as the "power which supports and holds nature,"¹⁵⁵ and also to Plato's distinction between a good and a bad soul¹⁵⁶ and to the Stoic distinction between good and bad demons.¹⁵⁷ Now, argues Philo, just as the terms "soul" and "demon" may apply to the bad soul and the bad demon, even though the bad soul does not support and hold nature and the bad demon is not wise and knowing, so also the morally evil angels may be called angels, even if they are not messengers of God.

Who these morally evil angels are he does not say. But one may gather whom he means from his explanation of them allegorically as those who "know not the daughters of right reason, i.e., the sciences and virtue, but count the mortal descendants of mortal men, i.e., pleasures mortal as their parents."¹⁵⁸ From this interpretation it may be inferred that he means by the evil angels those "sons of God" who, according to the story in Scripture, "saw the daughters of men; and they took them wives of all which they chose."¹⁵⁹ By the time of Philo these "sons of God" were taken to refer to a class of fallen angels¹⁶⁰ who had revolted under the leadership of Satan¹⁶¹ and who were each individually called Satan.¹⁶² Now what Philo wants to say here is that these "sons of God," which is only another term for angels,¹⁶³ after their fall have forfeited their right to be called angels: they should be called Satans; and, if they are still called angels, though qualified by the term "evil," in that verse

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 400 B.

¹⁵⁶ Laws X, 896 E ff. Plato does not speak of bad demons.

¹⁵⁷ Plutarch. *Quaestiones Romanae* 51; *De Defectu Oraculorum* 17; cf. Zeller, III, 14, p. 329, n.3 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*², p. 353, n. 3).

¹⁵⁸ *Gig.* 4, 17.

¹⁵⁹ Gen. 6: 2.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.* 54: 6; 69: 5.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Enoch 6-16.

¹⁶² *Ibid.* 40: 7.

¹⁶³ Philo has here the reading "angels" (*Gig.* 2, 6). So also in Job 1: 6 and 2: 1, the "sons of God" of the Hebrew reads in the Septuagint "angels."

which he has quoted as his proof-text, it is only in the same way as the Greeks speak of bad demons and bad souls. The expression "slipping into the name of angel" seems to reflect the scriptural verse "The sons (Septuagint: angels) of God came to present themselves before the Lord, and also Satan came among them."¹⁶⁴ The expression "and also Satan came among them" is evidently behind Philo's expression "slipping into the name of angel." What he means to say is that these "evil ones" who in Scripture are called "evil angels" should properly be called "Satans," but they are "slipping into the name of angel" in the same way as when, in the Book of Job, "the angels of God came to present themselves before the Lord," it is said that "also Satan came among them."

III. ANIMALS AND THE IRRATIONAL SOUL OF MAN

Unlike Plato, to whom the lower animals are degraded types of human beings,¹ Philo, following the scriptural account of creation, considers all the lower animals as having been created.² But, like Plato,³ supported by the story of creation in Scripture,⁴ he divides living beings into three classes — fishes, birds, and land-animals⁵ — declaring that "of creatures that have a soul (*ἐμψύχων*), fishes were the first which He created" and then "after the fishes He created the birds and land-animals."⁶ In accordance with the scriptural sentence "Let the waters produce reptiles having living souls,"⁷ we may assume that Philo believes that the souls

¹⁶⁴ Job. 1: 6; 2: 1.

¹ *Timaeus* 91 D-92 C; 42 C.

² *Opif.* 20, 62.

³ *Timaeus* 39 E; 91 D-92 C.

⁴ Gen. 1: 20-25.

⁵ *Opif.* 20, 62-21, 64.

⁶ *Ibid.* 21, 66.

⁷ Gen. 1: 20 (LXX).

of these lower animals were created together with their bodies; and, in accordance with his own general theory of ideas, we may also assume that he believed that just as the bodies of these living beings were created after the pattern of certain ideas of living beings so also were their souls created after the pattern of the idea of their souls.⁸ The difference between creatures which have souls and those which have no souls is stated by him in several installments. In one passage he says that the difference between them is that besouled creatures have sensation; ⁹ in another passage he says that the difference between them is that besouled creatures have imagination (*φαντασία*) and impulse (*δρμή*), adding that imagination is dependent upon sensation; ¹⁰ and in the third passage he says that the difference between them is that besouled creatures have sensation, imagination, and impulse.¹¹ All this reflects Aristotle's statements that sensation is that which differentiates animal from plant,¹² that imagination is never found by itself apart from sensation,¹³ and that animal cannot be appetitive (*δρεκτικόν*), that is, cannot have what Philo calls impulse (*δρμή*), without imagination.¹⁴ According to Plato, plants have both sensation and desire (*ἐπιθυμία*).¹⁵

This kind of soul, called irrational (*ἄλογος*),¹⁶ is possessed also by man. But in connection with man Philo gives us a fuller account of the creation as well as the nature of his irrational soul. This irrational soul of man was created by God when He formed man "out of the matter scattered here and

⁸ Cf. above, pp. 213-214.

⁹ *Opif.* 20, 62.

¹⁰ *Leg. All.* I, 11, 30.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* III, 10, 433b, 28-29. Philo uses *δρεξις* and *δρμή* as equivalents; cf. e.g., *Leg. All.* III, 38, 115, and 39, 118.

¹⁵ *Timaeus* 77 B.

¹⁶ See Leisegang, *Indices*, under *τὸ ἄλογον*.

¹¹ *Immut.* 9, 41.

¹² *De Anima* II, 2, 413b, 2.

¹³ *Ibid.* III, 3, 427b, 15-16.

there, which Moses calls clay.”¹⁷ The irrational soul together with the body was, however, created not by God himself but rather by His powers, who did it by “imitating” (*μιμουμένας*) the skill shown by God in forming the rational soul.¹⁸ In this he follows Plato who likewise says that the irrational soul together with its body was created by the secondary deities by “imitating” (*μιμούμενοι*) the Demiurge,¹⁹ but he finds a scriptural proof-text for it in the use of the plural in the verse “Let us make man.”²⁰

Though Philo refers to this irrational soul as earthlike (*γρώδης*),²¹ he does not mean that it is made of the element earth, for we have Aristotle’s testimony to the fact that while the elements air, water, and fire were considered by various philosophers as being each a constituent of the soul, none of them considered the soul as being made of earth except those who have described it as being derived from, or as being identical with, all the four elements, which included earth.²² It is hardly conceivable that Philo should depart on this point from the generally accepted philosophic view. What he means by the term “earthlike” is simply that the soul is corporeal. As to what it was actually made of, Philo seems to be undecided. Sometimes he suggests that the irrational soul is blood, as when he says that “in many passages the Law of Moses pronounces the blood to be the essence of the soul,”²³ but this statement is sometimes qualified by him by the statement that “in real truth the breath (*πνεῦμα*) is the essence of the soul, but it has not any place of itself independently of the blood, but is carried in and

¹⁷ *Leg. All.* I, 12, 31; *Gen.* 2: 7; for the expression “scattered here and there,” see *Tanhumah, Pekude*, § 3, and Ginzberg, *Legends of the Jews*, I, pp. 54-55; V, pp. 71-72, nn. 14 and 15.

¹⁸ *Fug.* 13, 69; cf. *Opif.* 24, 74-75; *Conf.* 35, 179.

¹⁹ *Timaeus* 69 c.

²⁰ *Gen.* 1: 26.

²¹ *De Anima* I, 2, 405b, 8-10.

²² *Leg. All.* I, 12, 32.

²³ *Deter.* 22, 80; *Heres* 11, 55; *Spec.* IV, 23, 122.

mingled with the blood.”²⁴ Sometimes he seems to suggest that the soul is the seed (*σπέρμα*), which he also calls the moist substance (*ὕγρα οὐσία*), as when he says that “seed is the principle of the generation of animals,”²⁵ that is to say, it is that with which animal life begins and by which animals are differentiated from plants. But here, too, he qualifies his statement by adding that “nature, like an artificer, or, to speak more correctly, like a consummate art, forms living creatures, by distributing the moist substance to the limbs and different parts of the body, the breathlike (*πνευματική*) substance to the faculties of the soul, namely, the nutritive and the sensitive.”²⁶ Sometimes he suggests that breath, which he calls air (*ἀήρ*), without blood or seed, is the soul, as when he says that “the Artificer made air as habit (*ἔξιπ*) in motionless bodies and as nature (*φύσιν*) in bodies which move but without a faculty of imagination, while in bodies that are susceptible of impulse and imagination He made it as soul (*ψυχὴν*).”²⁷

Though Philo names no authorities for the different views as to the substance of the soul which he happens to mention, except for the scriptural verses in connection with the identification of soul with blood,²⁸ the three views which he happens to mention can be identified with three views known in Greek philosophy. The view that soul is blood is attributed to Critias;²⁹ the view that it is the seed or the moist substance is implied in the view attributed to Hippon that the soul is water because “in all animals the seed is moist”;³⁰ the view that it is air is attributed to Diogenes.³¹ Like the

²⁴ *Fragmenta* on Gen. 9: 4, Richter, VI, p. 230 (M, II, 668); Harris, *Fragments*, p. 26; cf. Drummond, I, pp. 320-321.

²⁵ *Opif.* 22, 67.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Somn.* I, 22, 136.

²⁸ Lev. 17: 11. Cf. above, n. 23.

²⁹ *De Anima* I, 2, 405b, 5-8.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 405b, 1-5.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 405a, 21-25. For “breath,” see Arnim, II, 777 ff.

Stoics, he also speaks of it as fire.³² Following Plato, he divides this irrational soul into two parts, the irascible (*θυμικόν*) and the concupiscent (*ἐπιθυμητικόν*), locating the former in the chest and the latter in the abdomen.³³ But, drawing also upon other conventional classifications of the faculties of the soul which were common in his time, like Aristotle, he divides this irrational soul into the nutritive (*θρεπτικόν*) or vital (*ζωτικόν*) faculty and the sensitive (*αἰσθητικόν*) faculty,³⁴ or, like the Stoics, he divides it into seven faculties, namely the five senses, speech, and generation.³⁵

IV. THE RATIONAL SOUL OF MAN

Animals have only an irrational soul.¹ But man, in addition to his irrational soul, has also a rational soul or mind.² "I," says Philo, "am many things, soul and body, and of soul there is a rational part and an irrational part."³ Unlike Plato in the *Phaedrus*⁴ but like Plato in the *Timaeus*, he holds that this rational soul was created, and just as in the *Timaeus* of Plato the rational was created by God himself,⁵ so also in Philo that which is rational in us was formed by God himself.⁶ But then he departs from Plato. According to Plato, there was no idea of mind nor any idea of soul; but

³² Cf. *Decal.* 25, 134; above, pp. 203-204; Arnim, II, 773 ff.

³³ *Leg. All.* III, 38, 114; *Spec.* I, 29, 146-148; *Spec.* IV, 15, 93. Cf. *Timaeus* 69 E-70 E.

³⁴ *Fragments*, on Gen. 9: 4, Richter VI, 230 (M, II, 668); Harris, *Fragments*, p. 25; cf. *De Anima* II, 3, 414a, 32-414b, 1; 4, 415a, 23-25, and see also Drummond, I, 319.

³⁵ *Opif.* 40, 117; *Leg. All.* I, 4, 11; *Deter.* 46, 168; *Agr.* 7, 30; *Heres* 48, 232. In *Abr.* 5, 29, generation is omitted. Cf. Arnim, II, 823-833.

¹ There is a special treatise by Philo on this subject, entitled: *Alexander, sive de eo quod rationem habeant bruta animalia* (Richter, VIII, 101-148).

² Cf. above, p. 362.

³ *Leg. All.* III, 1, 2.

⁴ *Phaedrus* 246 A.

⁵ *Timaeus* 69 C.

⁶ *Conf.* 35, 179; *Fug.* 13, 69.

instead there was a universal mind existing probably from eternity, and a universal soul which was created by God prior to the creation of the world out of three ingredients — the same stuff as the ideas, the stuff of matter, and a mixture of the stuff of ideas and the stuff of matter.⁷ According to Philo, there are ideas of mind and soul, both of them created by God when he formed the intelligible world on what the Pentateuch calls the first day of creation.⁸ He therefore speaks of the human mind as “the mind created after the image and idea,”⁹ or as being “a closer likeness and copy than anything else on earth of the eternal and blessed idea,”¹⁰ or as a “divine image” and as “being shaped after the archetypal idea, the most sublime Logos.”¹¹ In the same sense, in another passage, after having described the idea of soul as the “image of God”¹² and a “pattern,”¹³ he speaks of the “human mind” as a “fragment of that divine and blessed soul from which it cannot be separated,”¹⁴ that is, an image of the idea of rational soul, which is as immaterial as its pattern.

Following Plato in the *Timaeus*, according to whom, after God compounded the human rational soul, “He divided it into souls equal in number to the stars,”¹⁵ Philo says that the rational souls created by God in the image of the idea of mind were “equal in number to the stars.”¹⁶ But then he departs again from the *Timaeus*. Whereas according to the *Timaeus* these souls prior to their descent into bodies were placed in the stars,¹⁷ according to Philo, prior to their descent into bodies they had their abode in the air.¹⁸ Then, again, follow-

⁷ *Timaeus* 34 B ff.

⁸ *Opif.* 7, 29; cf. above, p. 307.

⁹ *Leg. All.* I, 13, 42.

¹⁰ *Decal.* 25, 134.

¹¹ *Spec.* III, 36, 207; *Heres* 48, 230, 234; cf. *Opif.* 23, 69.

¹² *Deter.* 24, 86.

¹³ *Somn.* I, 22, 135, and 138. But see above, p. 369, about the abode of angels.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 87.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 90.

¹⁶ *Timaeus* 41 D.

¹⁷ *Somn.* I, 22, 137.

¹⁸ *Timaeus* 41 D.

ing Plato, he applies what Plato says about his preëxistent universal mind and soul to his individual mind and soul. Just as Plato says of his preëxistent universal mind and soul that the Demiurge "constructed mind within soul and soul within body because without soul mind cannot dwell in anything,"¹⁹ so also Philo says of the individual mind and soul that "by the senses the Demiurge endowed the body with a soul" and placed over them mind as a dominant part to be served by them, because "without the perception of the senses, mind by itself alone was unable to apprehend" colors, sounds, flavors, scents, and the like.²⁰

Though only images created after the pattern of an idea, these rational souls are not corporeal. Unlike the soul of Plato, they have no admixture of matter: they are made of the same stuff as the ideas after which they are modeled. "This branch of the soul," he says of mind, "was not formed of the same elements out of which the other branches were brought to completion, but it was allotted something better and purer, the substance in fact out of which divine natures were wrought."²¹ By the term "divine natures" here he means the incorporeal intelligible beings or ideas.²² Denying that mind is "breath" or "blood" or "body in general," he declares that it is "no body but incorporeal."²³ In another place he speaks of Abraham as having mounted up into the "incorporeal soul of this body of ours."²⁴ Consequently, with all his departure from Plato in details, Philo considered himself essentially a follower of Plato and his school, to whom

¹⁹ *Timaeus* 30 B.

²⁰ *Opif.* 48, 139.

²¹ *Immut.* 10, 46.

²² *Leisegang (Philos Werke)* and *Colson, ad loc.*, take the "divine natures" here to refer to the stars. But see discussion of this passage in *Drummond, I, 332*. Cf. also in *Drummond, I, 325-335*, his discussion of all the passages on the basis of which the conclusion was drawn that Philo was not altogether free from a materialistic conception of the rational soul.

²³ *Somn.* I, 6, 30.

²⁴ *Deter.* 44, 159.

he refers as "those who maintain that the faculty of reasoning comes in from without, being divine and eternal."²⁵ Also, following Plato, he assigns to the rational soul a location in the body different from the locations he assigned to the irrational parts of the soul,²⁶ that location being, as in Plato, the head,²⁷ though it might also be, according to Philo, the heart.²⁸ The heart is the place where the Stoics²⁹ locate the entire soul with all its faculties, for to them the rational faculties of the soul do not differ in their origin from the irrational faculties. When Philo, however, assigns the heart as the seat of the rational soul, he still retains the chest and the abdomen as the two seats respectively of the irascible and concupiscent faculties of the irrational soul.³⁰ Unlike the irrational soul, therefore, of which the faculties are parts located in different parts of the body and operating through various organs of the body, "our mind is indivisible in its nature."³¹ Faculties indeed it has, such as intelligence (*σύνεσις*), sagacity (*ἀγχινοια*), apprehension (*κατάληψις*), prudence (*φρόνησις*), "and other powers."³² But these faculties are not parts of the rational soul in the sense in which the faculties of the irrational soul are parts; they are rather only functions of the soul which are not located in different parts of the body and do not operate through different organs of the body.

Between the rational and the irrational soul there is, according to Philo, somewhat of a reciprocal relation. On the one hand, as we shall see,³³ the irrational soul is dependent

²⁵ *Opif.* 22, 67.

²⁶ Cf. above, p. 389.

²⁷ *Spec.* IV, 15, 92; cf. *Timaeus* 69 E; 90 A.

²⁸ *Deter.* 24, 90; *Somn.* I, 6, 32.

²⁹ Diogenes, VII, 159.

³⁰ Cf. above, p. 389.

³¹ *Heres* 48, 232.

³² *Congr.* 18, 98. A list of powers of the rational soul mentioned by Philo in various places, without an attempt to classify them, is given in Drummond, I, 343.

³³ Cf. below, II, 4.

for the proper functioning of its faculties upon the rational soul. On the other hand, as we shall also see,³⁴ the rational soul makes use of the data of sensation furnished by the irrational soul to form rational concepts. Then, also, the rational soul, as again we shall see,³⁵ is graced by God with the power of free will by which it can control the desires and emotions of the irrational soul.

Just as Philo has used the term Logos as the equivalent of the term mind in the case of the mind which is the place of the intelligible world,³⁶ so he now also uses the term Logos as the equivalent of the mind which is in man. He thus uses the term Logos as a description of that part of the soul which is the opposite of both the irascible and the concupiscent parts of the soul.³⁷ In Plato the opposite of these two irrational parts of the soul is similarly described by the term Logos³⁸ or mind,³⁹ or by such equivalent terms as "the immortal soul,"⁴⁰ "the supreme form of soul within us,"⁴¹ and the "rational part."⁴² But just as the immanent Logos in the world so also this Logos in man has its source in the pre-existent Logos which is the totality of all the ideas constituting the intelligible world. Accordingly, in one passage, after having referred to the preëxistent Logos and the Logos in man as two Logoi, "one the archetypal Logos above us, the other the copy of it which we possess,"⁴³ he refers to them afterwards as "the mind within us and the mind above us."⁴⁴

Another term used by Philo as the equivalent of mind is "breath" or "spirit." Now this term "breath" or "spirit" is applied by the Stoics to the rational and the irrational

³⁴ Cf. below, II, 3.

³⁵ Cf. below, p. 431.

³⁶ Cf. above, p. 230.

³⁷ *Spec.* IV, 15, 92; *Virt.* 3, 13; cf. *Leg. All.* I, 22, 70 (λογικόν); III, 38, 115 (λογιστικόν).

⁴¹ *Ibid.* 90 A.

⁴² *Republic* IV, 439 D (λογιστικόν).

³⁸ *Timaeus* 46 D.

⁴³ *Heres* 48, 230; cf. also 233.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 236.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 69 D-E.

soul alike; in Philo, however, the term "breath" which he applies to mind differs, both in origin and in meaning, from the term "breath" (*πνεῦμα*) or "air" (*ἀήρ*) which, as we have seen, he applies also to the irrational soul.⁴⁵ In its application to the irrational soul the term "breath" is of Stoic origin and it means something corporeal; in its application to mind it is of scriptural origin and it means something incorporeal. The scriptural proof-text for the latter use of the term, quoted by Philo, is the verse "and God breathed into his face a breath of life."⁴⁶ The difference between these two meanings of the term "breath" is brought out by Philo himself in his explanation that the "breath of life" which God breathed into Adam was "not air in motion, but a certain impression and character of divine power, which divine power Moses calls by an appropriate name image,"⁴⁷ that is to say, it is an image of the idea of mind which is itself called image.⁴⁸

Still, in his desire to state his philosophic views in terms current among philosophers of his time, even though these terms do not literally express the exact meaning of his views, he does not hesitate to make use of a Stoic statement that "the soul is of ether, a divine fragment."⁴⁹ But to show that

⁴⁵ Cf. above, p. 388. "Breath" is also used by Philo for the element "air" (*Sacr.* 29, 97).

⁴⁶ Gen. 2: 7. The term used in the Septuagint for "breath" here is *πνοή*. In five places (*Opif.* 46, 134; *Leg. All.* I, 12, 31; *Plant.* 5, 19; *Heres.* 11, 56; *Somn.* I, 6, 34), Philo, in quoting this verse, uses the same term. In two places (*Leg. All.* III, 55, 161; *Deter.* 22, 80), he uses the term *πνεῦμα*. In one place (*Spec.* IV, 24, 123), he uses first the former term and then substitutes for it the latter term. The two terms are thus used by him interchangeably. Still in another place (*Leg. All.* I, 13, 42) he distinguishes between these two terms. The term *πνεῦμα*, he says, applies to the rational mind when conceived as something created "after the image and idea," i.e., after the idea of mind, without reference to its connection with the irrational soul; the term *πνοή*, on the other hand, refers to the rational mind when conceived as connected with the irrational soul created of matter.

⁴⁷ *Deter.* 23, 83.

⁴⁸ Cf. above, p. 238.

⁴⁹ *Leg. All.* III, 55, 161; *Somn.* I, 6, 34; cf. Diogenes, VII, 143; cf. 156.

he does not mean this statement to be taken literally, he says that while "others, by asserting that our mind is a portion of the ethereal nature, have claimed for man a kinship with ether," Moses by his statement that God "breathed into his face a breath of life" did not mean to liken "the species of the rational soul to any created thing, but averred it to be a genuine coinage of that divine and invisible breath" ⁵⁰ which God breathed into Adam. The term "fragment" is also used by him elsewhere figuratively, as when he says that "every man, in respect to his mind (*διάνοια*), is allied to the divine Logos, having come into being as an impression or fragment or ray of that blessed nature," ⁵¹ or as when he says that the rational faculty (*λογισμός*) is "a fragment of the universal soul, or as it might be put more reverently, following the philosophy of Moses, a faithful impression of the divine image," ⁵² that is, an image of the idea of mind which is itself called image.⁵³ "Impression," "fragment," and "ray" are thus the terms by which he figuratively describes the essence of the mind as an incorporeal image of the idea of mind. It is in this sense that he also explains the "divine spirit" which God breathed into Adam as "an effulgence of the blessed and thrice-blessed nature of God." ⁵⁴ Here as elsewhere, use is made by Philo of the Stoic vocabulary, but there is a departure from the Stoic doctrine.

V. IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

Besides irrationality and rationality, corporeality and incorporeality, these two souls in man are also distinguished from one another by mortality and immortality. The irrational soul is corruptible (*φθαρτή*)¹ and mortal (*θνητή*),²

⁵⁰ *Plant.* 5, 18.

⁵¹ *Opif.* 51, 146.

⁵² *Mut.* 39, 223.

⁵³ Cf. above, p. 238.

⁵⁴ *Spec.* IV, 24, 123.

¹ *Leg. All.* I, 12, 32.

² *Fug.* 13, 69.

whereas the rational soul or mind is incorruptible (*ἀφθαρτος*)³ and immortal (*ἀθάνατος*).⁴ This reflects again the view of Plato, to whom the irrational soul is the corruptible and mortal soul whereas the rational soul is the incorruptible and immortal soul.⁵ Following Plato's statement, in his comparison of the soul to "a pair of winged horses and a charioteer,"⁶ that "the natural function of the wing is to soar upward"⁷ and that "each soul returns to the place whence it came,"⁸ he says that the souls which are immortal "soar back to the place whence they came."⁹ But unlike Plato, who, in those passages upon which Philo has drawn in his discussion of immortality, speaks of the soul not only as immortal but also as ungenerated,¹⁰ Philo considers the soul which is immortal as generated.¹¹ Again, unlike Plato, with regard to whose view on immortality there is doubt as to whether the individual human soul is itself immortal as a distinct entity or is immortal only through the universal soul with which it becomes united,¹² in Philo, because of his denial of a universal soul,¹³ immortality means the eternal persistence of the individual soul as a distinct entity.

But by the time of Philo, in Judaism, partly as an internal development and partly through foreign influences, certain definite beliefs about the hereafter of the individual had come to the fore. Resurrection of the body and immortality of the soul are the two forms which that belief took, the former primarily among Palestinian Jews, the latter primarily among Hellenistic Jews. As in the case of all beliefs or customs

³ *Immut.* 10, 46.

⁴ *Probus* 7, 46; *Congr.* 18, 97; *Spec.* I, 16, 81.

⁵ *Timaeus* 69 c.

⁶ *Phaedrus* 246 A.

⁷ *Ibid.* 246 D

⁸ *Ibid.* 248 E.

¹² Discussed in our introductory volume on Greek philosophy.

¹³ Cf. above, pp. 360, 389-390.

⁹ *Gig.* 3, 13.

¹⁰ *Phaedrus* 246 A.

¹¹ Cf. above, p. 389.

which appeared in Judaism after the Biblical period, attempts were made to find the origin of these beliefs in scriptural texts. The Palestinian rabbis directly raised the question: "Whence is it proven that resurrection is a belief based upon Scripture?" and in answer to this question they quoted all sorts of proof-texts.¹⁴ Jesus, in answer to the Sadducees who denied resurrection, found a scriptural proof-text for that belief in the verse "I am the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob,"¹⁵ on which he comments that "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living."¹⁶ Hellenistic Jews undoubtedly must have also been engaged in a similar search for proof-texts. A repercussion of such a search is to be noticed in the Wisdom of Solomon where the author says: "Better than this is childlessness with virtue, for in the memory of virtue is immortality."¹⁷ What the author is really trying to do in this verse is to quote as proof-text for the belief in the immortality of the soul a verse from Isaiah with regard to childless persons who keep justice and do righteousness. Concerning such childless persons God says: "I will give them, in my house and within my walls, a memorable place, better than sons and daughters; I will give them an everlasting name which shall not cease."¹⁸ We can almost hear the voice of the author asking himself, after the manner of Palestinian rabbis: "What does the expression 'an everlasting name which shall not cease' mean?" And his answer is, again after the manner of Palestinian rabbis: "You must admit, it cannot mean anything else but immortality." It is not surprising therefore that Philo should also look for a scriptural proof-text in support of the belief in

¹⁴ *Sanhedrin* 91b.

¹⁵ Exod. 3: 6, 16.

¹⁶ Matt. 22: 32; Mark 12: 26-27; Luke 20: 37-38.

¹⁷ Wisdom of Solomon 4: 1.

¹⁸ Isa. 56: 5 (LXX).

the immortality of the soul. The proof-text which he produces is the verse in which God says to Abraham, "But thou shalt go to thy fathers nourished with peace, in a goodly old age."¹⁹ Commenting on this verse, Philo says: "He here clearly indicates the incorruptibility of the soul, when it transfers itself out of the abode of the mortal body and returns as it were to the metropolis of its fatherland, from which it originally migrated into the body," for "what else is this but to propose to him and set before him another life apart from the body?"²⁰

But what is that "fatherland" intimated by the term "thy fathers" in Scripture to which the soul returns? Besides his own view on the subject, Philo discusses elsewhere three other views, which, from the manner in which they are introduced by him, would seem to have been current among Hellenistic Jews who had adopted them from Greek philosophy. We shall take up these other views first.

"Some affirm," he says, that the term "thy fathers" refers to "the sun, moon and other stars."²¹ This evidently reflects the view of Chrysippus, according to whom immortality, which to him is confined to the wise, means that the soul, which consists of an element similar to that of the stars, will upon the death of the body mount to heaven and there as-

¹⁹ Gen. 15: 15 (LXX).

²⁰ *Qu. in Gen.* III, 11. A similar interpretation of Gen. 15: 15 as referring to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is implied in the following verse in IV Macc. 18: 23: "But the sons of Abraham, with their victorious mother, are gathered together unto the place of their fathers, having received pure and immortal souls from God." The expression "gathered together unto the place of their fathers" is undoubtedly an interpretation of the expression "thou shalt go to thy fathers" in Gen. 15: 15. Furthermore, the interpretation of the scriptural words "thy fathers" as meaning "the place of their fathers (*πατέρων χώρον*)" is analogous to Philo's interpretation of the same words as meaning "the metropolis of its fatherland (*metropolin patriae*)."
Incidentally, this analogy would seem to indicate the reading *χώρον* of Codex Alexandrinus rather than the reading *χωρὸν* of Codex Sinaiticus.

²¹ *Heres* 57, 280.

sume the spherical shape of stars,²² and it will continue to exist in that condition for as long as the world continues to exist, that is, until the general conflagration. For this view of immortality, these anonymous interpreters of the words "thy fathers" must have found support in the scriptural verse, "And they that are wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn the many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever."²³ It must have been a combination of these two sources that is also behind such statements about the immortal souls in the Apocalypses as "And they shall be made equal to the stars"²⁴ or "It is shown unto them how their face is destined to shine as the sun, and how they are destined to be made like the light of the stars"²⁵ or "Now ye shall shine as the lights of heaven."²⁶

"Others think," he continues, that the term "thy fathers" refers to "the ideas in which, as they say, the mind of the sage finds its new home."²⁷ This view is evidently based upon two statements in Plato: first, his statement that the souls of the righteous dead go "upwards through the heaven";²⁸ second, his statement that, while the souls of the gods ascend to the "supercelestial place," wherein abide the ideas, the souls of men during their lifetime, even if they are righteous, ascend only to the top of the outermost celestial sphere.²⁹ Combining these two statements, those anonymous "others" of Philo must have taken the statement that the souls of the righteous dead go "upwards through the heaven" to mean that they only *pass through* the heaven in order to reach the "supercelestial place,"³⁰

²² Zeller, III, 14, p. 205, n. 4 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*², p. 218, n. 1).

²³ Dan. 12: 3.

²⁴ II Baruch 51: 10.

²⁵ IV Ezra 7: 97.

²⁶ Enoch 104: 2.

²⁷ Cf. J. Adam's note on *Republic X*, 614 c, 18 in his edition (Vol. II, p. 436).

²⁸ *Heres* 57, 280.

²⁹ *Republic X*, 614 c.

³⁰ *Phaedrus* 247 B-248 A. Cf. below, p. 402.

there to abide among the ideas. This is how they must have come to attribute to Plato the view that the immortal souls abide among the ideas, and hence to interpret "thy fathers" to mean the ideas.

"Others again have surmised that by 'fathers' are meant the four first principles and potentialities of which the world is composed, earth, water, air, and fire,"³¹ and into which all things in the world "are resolved."³² To this general statement, he adds that, in the final resolution of all things into their elements, the soul will resolve into ether, of which the soul is a fragment and which some ancients considered as a fifth substance.³³ With the exception of the reference to ether as a fifth substance, which is an Aristotelian view,³⁴ this interpretation of the term "thy fathers" reflects the view of those Stoics who believe that the soul of each individual upon the death of the body is reabsorbed into the universal soul, that is, the primary fire or ether, of which it is only a part.³⁵

None of these three views could be acceptable to Philo. He could not accept the view that the souls become stars, for to him the stars are made of the element fire,³⁶ whereas the immortal souls are immaterial.³⁷ For the same reason he could not accept the view that the souls are resolved into the primary fire or ether. Nor could he accept the view that the immortal souls go up to what Plato calls the supercelestial place to abide there among the ideas, for, to him, there is no supercelestial place such as conceived by Plato.³⁸ His own view is that the souls, on departing from the bodies, do indeed go back to heaven, but there they rejoin that

³¹ *Heres* 57, 281.

³² *Qu. in Gen.* III, 11; cf. *Heres* 57, 281.

³³ *Heres* 57, 283.

³⁴ *De Caelo* I, 3, 27ob, 17-25.

³⁵ Diogenes, VII, 156.

³⁶ Cf. above, p. 313.

³⁷ Cf. above, p. 391.

³⁸ Cf. above, pp. 227, 245.

company of souls which have never descended into bodies, namely, angels. This view is expressed by him in a variety of ways in several passages.

In one passage, dealing with that verse about Abraham's going to his fathers, he says: "But to me he appears to intend to indicate the incorporeal substances and inhabitants of the divine world, whom in other passages he is accustomed to call angels."³⁹ Now by the "divine world" he means here the heavens, for in another place he says that the heavens consist of a fifth element which partakes "of a wonderful and divine essence,"⁴⁰ and by "angels," of course, he means here what he elsewhere identifies with incorporeal souls or demons.⁴¹ Accordingly, the native home of the soul to which it returns after death is the heavens, where it joins the angels or demons, who are pure souls which have never entered into bodies.

This view is expressed more explicitly by him in his comment upon the scriptural euphemism for death, "he was added to his people," used with reference to Abraham.⁴² Taking the expression "to his people" to mean "to the people of God,"⁴³ he interprets "the people of God" to refer to angels, and therefrom he concludes that upon his death Abraham became "equal to the angels."⁴⁴ It is, therefore, in the sense of angels that he uses the term "the unbodied," when in a description of the immortality of the soul he says that "we who are here joined to the body, creatures of composition

³⁹ *Qu. in Gen.* III, 11.

⁴¹ Cf. above, p. 367.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* IV, 8.

⁴² *Gen.* 25: 8.

⁴³ This interpretation of the words "to thy people" is described in *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 153, as being allegorical.

⁴⁴ *Sacr.* 2, 5. In IV Macc. 13: 17, the statement that "when we shall have suffered thus, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob will receive us, and the fathers will praise us" would similarly seem to imply that the fathers, including Abraham, who are immortal souls and whose place is evidently the heaven (cf. above, n. 20), have become equal to angels.

and quality, shall be no more, but shall go forward to our rebirth, to be among the unbodied (*μετὰ ἀσωμάτων*) without composition and without quality." ⁴⁵

This view, that the immortal souls find their final abode in the heavens by the side of the angels or demons, reflects the view of Plato in the *Phaedrus*. According to Plato in that dialogue, the place to which the soul by its natural function soars is "the place where dwells the race of the gods," ⁴⁶ and that place is "the outer surface of the heaven," ⁴⁷ that is, the outer surface of the outermost or eighth sphere, and from that position these immortal souls behold the ideas which reside "outside the heaven" or in the "supercelestial place," ⁴⁸ which, as understood by Philo, Plato uses in the sense of an infinite void outside the world.⁴⁹ By the "race of gods" in this passage Plato means demons, whom Philo here calls angels. The same view is expressed also in the Apocalyptic literature in such statements as "They shall be made like unto angels" ⁵⁰ and "Ye shall become companions of the hosts of heaven." ⁵¹ In the Talmud and Midrash, too, the imperishable souls of the righteous are said to be welcomed by angels or to abide in the seventh heaven alongside the various orders of angels or to minister before their Creator like the ministering angels.⁵²

The heaven, which is the home of the angels, is thus the place of the immortal souls. But it is by no means the place of all the immortal souls. When Abraham was going back to his "fathers" to be "added to the people of God" he was indeed going back to heaven to be among the angels;⁵³ not to the intelligible world to be among the ideas. And similarly

⁴⁵ *Cher.* 32, 114.

⁴⁶ *Phaedrus* 246 D.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 247 c.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 247 c. Cf. above, p. 399.

⁴⁹ Cf. above, pp. 227, 241.

⁵⁰ II Baruch 51: 10.

⁵¹ Enoch 104: 6.

⁵² *Ketubot* 104a; *Hagigah* 12b; *Midrash ha-Gadol* on Gen. 50: 26.

⁵³ *Sacr.* 2, 5.

Jacob, when he was "added to the people of God," went back to heaven to be among the angels.⁵⁴ So also Elijah, who did not die but was "carried up with a whirlwind as it were into heaven,"⁵⁵ went up there to be among the angels.⁵⁶ And probably so also all the righteous whose souls are immortal find their abode in heaven among the angels. But there are a few exceptions among scriptural personages. When Isaac died, the Septuagint does not translate the Hebrew by "he was added to his people" but rather by "he was added to his race or genus (*γένος*)."⁵⁷ Now the term "genus," as we have seen, is used by Philo as a description of the ideas.⁵⁸ Hence he infers that Isaac did not go to be among the angels who are in heaven but rather among the ideas which are in the intelligible world, which is not the same as heaven.⁵⁹ So also Enoch, of whom Scripture says that, while yet alive, "he was not found, because God translated him,"⁶⁰ did not go to heaven to be among the angels, "but it is here suggested that he was translated from a sensible and visible place into an incorporeal and intelligible idea,"⁶¹ that is, into the intelligible world of ideas, which is not the same as heaven. Following a certain widespread Jewish tradition, Philo includes Moses among those who, like Enoch and Elijah, did not die but were translated to heaven during their lifetime.⁶² But "when he had to make his pilgrimage from earth to heaven and leave the mortal life to become immortal,"⁶³ he did not take up his abode, as did Elijah, among the angels in heaven, nor did he take up his abode, as did Enoch, among the ideas

⁵⁴ Cf. *Sacr.* 2, 5.

⁵⁵ II Kings 2: 11 (LXX).

⁵⁶ *Qu. in Gen.* I, 86.

⁵⁷ *Gen.* 35: 29.

⁵⁸ *Sifre Deut.*, § 357, on 34:5; *Sotah* 13b; *Sacr.* 3. 8; cf. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, VI, p. 161, n. 951.

⁵⁹ *Mos.* II, 51, 288; cf. 291.

⁶⁰ Cf. above, p. 252.

⁶¹ *Sacr.* 2, 6.

⁶² *Gen.* 5: 24.

⁶³ *Qu. in Gen.* I, 86.

in the intelligible world, but he is among those "whom God has advanced even higher, and has enabled them to soar above all species and genera and stationed them beside himself,"⁶⁴ and in proof of this he quotes the verse, "But as for thee, stand thou here with Me."⁶⁵

Thus, according to Philo, there are three places to which immortal souls may go. First, to heaven to be among the angels, which is the place for all the immortal souls. Second, to the intelligible world to be among the ideas, which is the place to which Isaac and Enoch went. Third, to the presence of God, above the intelligible world, which is the place to which Moses went.

Throughout his writings Philo speaks of the immortality of the soul rather than of the resurrection of the body. No direct or indirect reference to resurrection as distinguished from immortality is ever made by him,⁶⁶ though the belief in resurrection was common among the Egyptians of his own native country and though also it is mentioned in the Sibylline Oracles.⁶⁷ But it is quite evident that all the references to resurrection found in the traditional literature of his time were understood by him as being only a figurative way of referring to immortality. It is on account of this, we imagine, that he constantly draws upon the traditional vocabulary of resurrection to express his view of immortality. The belief in resurrection is expressed in Scripture in the following verses: "Thy dead shall live, my dead bodies shall arise,"⁶⁸ or as it is rendered in the Septuagint: "The dead shall be

⁶⁴ *Sacr.* 3, 8.

⁶⁵ *Deut.* 5: 28 (31).

⁶⁶ The question "Where was my body before birth, and whither will it go when I have departed?" (*Cher.* 32, 114) has no reference to the problem of resurrection. It only expresses a general state of wonderment, just as the subsequent question "Where is the babe that I once was?"

⁶⁷ Sibylline Oracles III, 66; IV, 187-191; cf. Josephus, *Bell. Jud.* II, 8, 11, 154.

⁶⁸ *Isa.* 26: 19.

raised up again, even they in the tombs shall be raised up." "And many of them who sleep in mounds of earth shall be raised up, some for everlasting life, and some for disgrace and everlasting shame." ⁶⁹ In the Second Book of Maccabees it is expressed in the following verses: "The King of the world shall raise us up, who have died for His laws, unto everlasting recovery of life" (*ἀναβλωσις ζωῆς*).⁷⁰ "But doubtless the Creator of the world, who formed the generation of man, and found out the beginning of all things, will also of His own mercy give you breath and life again (*πάλιν*)." ⁷¹ "So he died, calling on Him who is Lord of life and breath to restore them to him again (*πάλιν*)," ⁷² the pronoun "them" referring to certain parts of his body. The distinctive mark of all these descriptions of resurrection is that it is conceived as a new life. In the Second Book of Maccabees the expressions used are "recovery of life" and to "give breath and life again." Philo applies these expressions to immortality and describes it as a new birth (*παλιγγενεσία*).⁷³ Elsewhere, in connection with the vocation of Moses,⁷⁴ he uses in the same sense the expression "second birth" (*δευτέρα γένεσις*),⁷⁵ that is, a new or second birth to a life in which the soul is free from the body. Such a restatement of the immortality of the soul in scriptural terms of the resurrection of the body is common in all the writings which consciously turned corporeal resurrection into something incorporeal. Thus the Ethiopic Enoch expresses itself in the language of bodily resurrection when it says that "the righteous shall arise

⁶⁹ Dan. 12: 2 (LXX).

⁷¹ *Ibid.* 7: 23.

⁷⁰ II Macc. 7: 9.

⁷² *Ibid.* 14: 46.

⁷³ *Cher.* 32, 114. Cf. the expression "another life (*altera vita*)" in *Qu. in Gen.* III, 11, quoted above, p. 398, n. 20.

⁷⁴ *Exod.* 24: 16.

⁷⁵ *Qu. in Exod.* II, 46; Harris, *Fragments*, p. 61. The Latin translation adds after *secunda nativitas*, within parentheses, *sive regeneratio*. On the "second birth" in this passage, see Bréhier, p. 242; Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, pp. 226-227, and A. D. Nock's review, in *Gnomon*, 13 (1937), p. 159.

from their sleep,"⁷⁶ for what it really means is a new incorporeal life, since it is only "the spirits of you who have died in righteousness" that "shall live and rejoice."⁷⁷ The term "palingenesis" is indeed used by the Stoics,⁷⁸ and Philo himself uses it in their name in his restatement of their theory of the destruction and renewal of the world.⁷⁹ But, as is his custom, in his adoption of this term, he used it as a description of a view which he considered as being of scriptural origin.⁸⁰

In Plato, though all the souls return to the place whence they came, their journey back to that place varies in length of time. The quickest journey back is that of the soul "which best follows after God and is most like him,"⁸¹ that is, "the soul of him who has been a guileless philosopher or a philosophical lover."⁸² Among the Stoics, Chrysippus is reported to have said that only the souls of the wise continue to exist until the general conflagration.⁸³ In Judaism, the two forms of the hereafter of the individual, resurrection and immortality, were considered as rewards for righteous conduct during one's lifetime. "For to know Thee is perfect righteousness; yea, to know Thy dominion is the root of immortality."⁸⁴ So also Philo, reëchoing the words of Plato, says that those which "soar upwards back to the place

⁷⁶ Enoch 91: 10; cf. 92: 3.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* 103: 4. Cf. *Berakot* 17a.

⁷⁸ Cf. Arnim, II, 627 and 593.

⁷⁹ *Act.* 17, 85; 18, 93; 19, 99; 19, 103.

⁸⁰ L. Cohn (*Philos Werke on Cher.* 114) and Goodenough (*By Light, Light*, p. 376) maintain that Philo has borrowed this term from the mysteries. Colson and Whitaker (Appendix to *Cher.* 114) maintain that he has borrowed it from the Stoics. From whomever Philo has directly borrowed this term, he must have come to use it by the process of reasoning we have tried to describe.

⁸¹ *Phaedrus* 248 A.

⁸² *Ibid.* 249 A; cf. *Phaedo* 82 B.

⁸³ Diogenes, VII, 157.

⁸⁴ Wisdom of Solomon 15: 3.

whence they came" are "the souls of those who have given themselves to genuine philosophy"⁸⁵ and that "immortal life" awaits "pious men."⁸⁶

But what happens to the unrighteous and the sinners? According to Plato, the soul by its very nature is indestructible and cannot therefore be destroyed by the wickedness of the body.⁸⁷ Whether this refers to the individual soul or to the universal soul is a question which is of no concern to us here at present.⁸⁸ The main point is that the soul of the wicked, according to him, is indestructible in the same sense as the soul of the righteous. All that the wickedness of the body can do to the soul is to cause it to have to go through certain stages of reincarnation in beasts⁸⁹ or a certain period of purification in a purgatory.⁹⁰ Whether of the righteous or of the unrighteous, "each soul," he says, "returns to the place whence it came in ten thousand years."⁹¹ Among the Stoics there was a question whether the soul is individually indestructible, at least before this our world is destroyed by the general conflagration, and also whether there is a distinction in this respect between the soul of the righteous and the soul of the wicked. According to some, the individual soul ceases to exist immediately upon the death of the body and is at once absorbed in the universal soul.⁹² As against this view, Cleanthes is reported to have said that "all souls continue to exist until the general conflagration."⁹³ Others, however, are reported to have said that "the souls of the

⁸⁵ *Gig.* 3, 13-14.

⁸⁶ *Post.* 11, 39.

⁸⁷ *Rep.* X, 610 A.

⁸⁸ Discussed in our introductory volume on Greek philosophy.

⁸⁹ *Timaeus* 42 B ff.; 91 D ff.; *Phaedrus* 249 B.

⁹⁰ *Phaedrus* 249 A; *Laws* X, 905 A ff.

⁹¹ *Phaedrus* 248 E.

⁹² Diogenes, VII, 156; cf. above, p. 400.

⁹³ Diogenes, VII, 157.

foolish and of irrational animals perish together with their bodies,"⁹⁴ and still others are reported to have said that the soul of the foolish does not perish immediately when freed from the body but continues to abide by itself "for certain periods of time."⁹⁵ Philo himself refers, in a general way, to these various views of the Stoics in a passage in which he reproduces the following question concerning the soul: "When we die, is it extinguished and destroyed together with our bodies, or does it continue to live a long time?"⁹⁶ Neither the Platonic view with regard to the reincarnation of the souls of the wicked nor the Stoic view with regard to either the immediate or the retarded destruction of the souls of the wicked implies a belief in individual providence and individual reward and punishment. According to Plato, reincarnation follows wickedness by the necessity of a pre-determined law of fate.⁹⁷ As for the Stoics, the immortality of the individual soul of the wise, according to those of them who hold this view, is due only to the fact that the soul, constituted as it is of a different element than the body, is stronger than the body and does therefore survive it; and the destructibility of the soul of the wicked, according to them, is similarly due only to the fact that such a soul has been weakened by the action of the body and has thereby lost its power of survival.⁹⁸

In Judaism, however, with the firmly established belief in individual providence and individual reward and punishment, both resurrection and immortality are considered as acts of individual providence, coming to each individual as a reward or a punishment for his actions. With regard to

⁹⁴ Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*² p. 471, ll. 23-24, Arnim, II, 809, p. 223, l. 24.

⁹⁵ Diels, *op. cit.*, p. 471, ll. 20-21; Arnim, II, 808, p. 223, l. 21.

⁹⁶ *Somn.* I, 6, 31.

⁹⁷ *Timaeus* 41 E-42 D.

⁹⁸ Discussed in our introductory volume on Greek philosophy.

resurrection, it is definitely stated that certain types of wicked persons will not be resurrected.⁹⁹ With regard to immortality, those in Judaism who have adopted this belief similarly speak of it as a reward reserved only for the righteous but denied to the wicked. Thus in the Wisdom of Solomon, in contrast to the righteous, of whom the author says that their "hope is full of immortality,"¹⁰⁰ he says of the wicked that "void is their hope,"¹⁰¹ and in contrast to virtue the "memory" of which, he says, "is immortality,"¹⁰² he says again of the wicked that "their memory shall perish," though he figuratively speaks also of their being "in grief."¹⁰³ So also the Palestinian author of the Psalms of Solomon, quite evidently speaking only of immortality, says that "the inheritance of sinners is destruction and darkness,"¹⁰⁴ "the sinner shall perish forever,"¹⁰⁵ and "when I was far from God, my soul had been wellnigh poured out into death."¹⁰⁶ Similarly Philo says that "awaiting those who live in the way of the impious will be eternal death."¹⁰⁷ All these statements by themselves, it must be admitted, are not conclusive, for the "eternal death" spoken of by Philo may be taken in a figurative sense. It is in such a figurative sense, in fact, that students of Hellenistic Jewish literature usually take all the references to the death or perdition of the soul of the wicked that are to be found both in Philo and in the Wisdom of Solomon,¹⁰⁸ the assumption

⁹⁹ *M. Sanhedrin* X, 1-4.

¹⁰⁰ Wisdom of Solomon 3: 4.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* 3: 11.

¹⁰² *Ibid.* 4: 1.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* 4: 19.

¹⁰⁴ Psalms of Solomon 15: 11 (10); cf. 14: 6 (9).

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* 15: 15 (13); cf. 15: 13 (12).

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* 16: 1-2.

¹⁰⁷ *Post.* 11, 39.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Dähne, I, 331, n. 402: "Philo entscheidet sich also für eine *immortalitas animi naturâ* nicht *gratiâ*." Drummond, speaking of the allusions to the hopelessness and perishability of the wicked in the Wisdom of Solomon, says (I, 213): "But

evidently being that, inasmuch as the belief in the immortality of the soul must have come to them from Plato, like Plato, they must also believe in its indestructibility. But in view of Philo's repetition of the Aristotelian principle that nothing created can be immortal, and in view also of his own explanation of the immortality of the created world as being due to the providence of God,¹⁰⁹ it logically follows that the soul, by virtue of its having been created, must by its own nature be mortal, and that, if the soul of the righteous is immortal at all, it is so only by the providence of God as a reward for righteous conduct. Consequently, since it is only by the providence of God that the soul of the righteous ceases to be mortal, it is quite reasonable to assume that the soul of the wicked never ceases to be mortal and never acquires immortality. The mere fact that Philo is in agreement with Plato as to the immortality of the soul does not necessarily mean that he must also be in agreement with him as to its indestructibility. Throughout his philosophy, as we have seen so far and as we shall see again, Philo constantly modifies Plato's philosophy by introducing into it some new element. The new element which he has introduced into the Platonic doctrine of the immortality of the soul is the possibility of its destruction in the case of the wicked, a possibility which logically follows from his belief that its immortality in the case of the righteous is due only to an act of divine providence.

But Philo, as we have seen,¹¹⁰ departs from Plato in that he believes there is an idea of mind. Accordingly, to him the

even if we had not the example of Philo to support us, we might fairly speak of the soul's death when we refer, not to its extinction, but to the forfeiture, through sin, of its highest and truest life." Again, speaking directly of Philo, he says (I, 339): "Accordingly Philo treats it (the soul) as in its very nature immortal."

¹⁰⁹ Cf. above, p. 316.

¹¹⁰ Cf. above, p. 213.

individual mind in each man is only an image of the idea of mind. The mind, concerning which he says that it may be either immortal or perishable, depending upon the kind of life it has lived during its existence in the body, refers therefore only to the individual mind in man, which is one of the many individual minds created by God as images of the idea of mind. The idea of mind itself, the prototype of all the individual minds, though also created, is like all other ideas imperishable, and with the imperishable idea of mind there is also an imperishable idea of humanity, the idea of an uninterrupted continuity of an animal species which is endowed with a mind. Individual men are indeed all perishable, and individual souls of certain men, the wicked men, are also perishable, but mind-endowed mankind, with all its righteous and wicked men, is imperishable. Accordingly, Philo feels that, despite his denial of the universal immortality of individual souls, he can still speak of some kind of universal immortality — the immortality of the universal idea of mind as well as the immortality of the image of that universal idea in the human species as a whole. For such a kind of universal immortality he had before him the precedent of Aristotle. When Aristotle was forced by his conception of the soul to deny the immortality of the individual human soul, he held out as a consolation the immortality of the human race. "Since, then, individual things are incapable of sharing continuously in the eternal and the divine, because nothing in the world of the perishable can abide numerically one and the same, they partake in the eternal and divine, each in the only way it can, some more, some less; that is to say, each persists, though not in itself, yet in a representative which is specifically, not numerically, one with it."¹¹¹ Evidently with this statement

¹¹¹ *De Anima* II, 4, 415b, 6-7.

of Aristotle in the back of his mind, Philo argues that nothing in the world is really perishable, inasmuch as the species to which every individual thing belongs is eternal.¹¹² The individual musician or scholar or the individual prudent and temperate and courageous and just and wise man indeed dies, but music and scholarship and all the various virtues never perish. It must be so, he argues, "unless we are to say that the death of some individual man has wrought destruction on mankind."¹¹³ Knowing, however, that at his own time there were philosophic speculations as to what the concept of "mankind" was, he dismisses such speculations as irrelevant to the problem at hand. "What 'mankind' is, whether a genus (*γένος*) or an idea (*ιδέα*) or a conception of the mind (*ἐννόημα*), or whatever we may call it, is a matter for the decision of those who make exactness in the use of terms their study."¹¹⁴ The three terms he uses here as possible descriptions of the universal term "mankind" refer respectively to the views of Aristotle, Plato, and the Stoics with regard to universals. This emphasis upon the immortality of the human race, however, is not used by him, as it is by Aristotle, as a substitute for the immortality of the human soul; it is used by him, as we have been trying to show, as supplementary to it. Similarly, following certain statements of Greek philosophy, he sometimes speaks of "the true Hades," Hades being the Septuagint translation of the Hebrew Sheol, as "the life of the bad, a life of damnation and blood-guiltiness, the victim of every curse,"¹¹⁵ by which he means that the punishment of sin consists in the torture of conscience in this world.¹¹⁶ But by this, too, he

¹¹² Cf. above, p. 208.

¹¹³ *Deter.* 21, 75-77; cf. *Agr.* 38, 166-168; *Abr.* 11, 55.

¹¹⁴ *Deter.* 21, 76.

¹¹⁵ *Congr.* 11, 57; cf. *Heres* 9, 45; *Somn.* I, 23, 151.

¹¹⁶ Cf. above, p. 42.

does not mean to deny the punishment of sin after death; it is again used by him only as supplementary to it.

VI. CONCLUSION, INFLUENCE, ANTICIPATION

Incorporeal things, to Philo, are not necessarily generic things, and particular things are not necessarily corporeal things. The paradigmatic ideas are both generic and incorporeal. But the images modeled after the ideas, which are particular things, may be either corporeal or incorporeal. Thus, for instance, according to Philo in departure from Plato, there is an idea of soul and an idea of mind, and yet, as for the particular images of these ideas, there is a difference between them. The particular images of the idea of soul are corporeal; the particular images of the idea of mind are incorporeal. The images of the idea of soul, according to Philo, are particular irrational souls which were created by the powers at the behest of God out of the elements water, air, or fire, and they were created together with the bodies in which they exist and from which they remain inseparable. But as for the images of the idea of mind, they are particular minds or rational souls which were created by God himself as pure incorporeal beings, free of the admixture of any of the elements, and, as pure incorporeal beings, immediately upon their creation, they were stored away by God in the air for future disposition.

Though all these rational souls were created by God as pure incorporeal beings, they were created by Him with certain differences in the purity and excellence of their constitution. These differences, created in them by the inscrutable will of God, account for the main difference in the subsequent history of the two principal classes of them.

One class of these rational souls, those which by the will of God were created of greater purity and excellence of con-

stitution, never descend into bodies. They always remain unbodied souls. From their original abode in the air, where all rational souls have been stored away upon their creation, they move upward to the heavens, where their permanent abode is. Philo calls these unbodied rational souls by the scriptural name "angels" and identifies them with the demons in Plato. The function of the angels, on the whole, is like that of the immanent Logos or powers in the world, which is to act as agencies of divine providence. But, as distinguished from the immanent Logos or powers, angels are the agencies of divine providence only in connection with men. Philo therefore describes them as messengers who "both convey the biddings of the Father to His children and report the children's need to their father." Because they are like the immanent powers or Logos, they are also called powers — that is, immanent powers — or servants of the powers — that is, servants of the incorporeal powers in the intelligible world — or Logoi — that is, immanent Logoi — and each individual angel who appears to man is sometimes similarly called Logos, that is, an immanent Logos. Though invisible, these angels in their appearance to men sometimes assume visible forms. Among the various specific functions of the angels is their function of acting as the guardians of nations, including the Jewish nation. The guardian angel of the Jewish nation is referred to by Philo as the archangel or the eldest Logos, meaning thereby undoubtedly the angel Michael.

Since angels are a special class of immanent powers in the world, like the powers, they are divided into beneficial and punitive. Both these classes of angels act by the command of God as intermediaries between Him and men. But both punitive angels and beneficial angels perform functions which are sometimes performed by God himself. Angels are

used as intermediaries, thus, not because the actions performed by them cannot be performed by God or are not suitable to be performed by God, but only because God in His wisdom decided that it was the best way, in certain instances, to deal with men for their own good. Both beneficial and punitive angels, as messengers of God, are therefore God's sacred and blameless powers in the world. As distinguished from these angels, who are angels in the true sense of the term, Philo finds that Scripture speaks of "evil angels," by which is not meant punitive angels but rather morally evil beings, loosely called angels, who do not act as messengers of God. Though Philo is vague in his description of this class of angels, his reference undoubtedly is to those evil beings which by his time were already known as the fallen angels.

Another class of the rational souls, those which by the will of God were created of inferior purity and excellence of constitution, descend into bodies. There is only one class of bodies into which these rational souls descend, and that is human bodies. They do not descend into the bodies of animals below man nor into the bodies of the celestial spheres or planets or stars, though Philo refers to some philosophers who held that the celestial bodies are living and rational animals. While encased in the human body, the rational soul affects the life of the body and is affected by it. On the one hand, it helps the process of sensation induced into the body by the irrational soul within it, and, on the other hand, it utilizes the data of sensation for the formation of intellectual concepts. More especially does it exercise control over the body by its power of free will, with which it was endowed by God. But still, even while in the body, it never loses its character as a distinct entity, so that when the body with its inseparable irrational soul dies, the rational soul departs and enters upon its bodiless eternal and immortal life. The place

where rational souls abide during their immortal life varies. Some of them go up to heaven, by which is meant the astronomical heaven, to abide among the angels; some of them go up to the intelligible world, to abide among the ideas; some of them go up even higher, to abide in the presence of God. Immortality, however, is not due to rational souls by their own nature; it is a gift from God, and God who created them can also destroy them; consequently only the souls of the righteous who have earned the gift of immortality survive, while those of the wicked may be destroyed.

In the subsequent history of philosophy, whether Christian or Moslem or Jewish, various views appeared, drawn from various Greek philosophers, with regard to the nature of the soul, its definition, and its faculties, but in all of them stress was laid on certain fundamental principles which, as in Philo, were considered as essential to what was considered true religion. As in Philo, the soul was considered as something created, though there were differences of opinion, corresponding to the same differences of opinion with regard to the creation of the world, as to what is meant by the term creation when used with regard to the soul, and there were also differences of opinion as to whether the soul is preëxistent or not. As in Philo, the soul was considered as something separable from the body and as existing as a distinct individual entity within each human body, though there were differences of opinion as to what is meant by the individuality of the soul as a distinct entity. Some thought that each soul enters the human body as a distinct individual entity; others, like Avicenna, and, in a somewhat different sense, Averroes, contended that the soul enters the body not as a distinct individual entity but rather as a part of the Active Intellect, a sort of universal soul, and that only subsequently, through the acquisition of knowledge during its existence in

the body, does it acquire distinctness and individuality. As in Philo, immortality was taken to mean the continuance of the existence of the soul as an individual and distinct entity, though the question was discussed whether in its state of immortality it will stand as a distinct individuality quite apart from all other similarly individual souls, or whether, again as contended by Avicenna and, in a different sense, by Averroes and their respective followers, during that state of immortality it will be absorbed in the Active Intellect whence it originally came, but somehow, in some inexplicable manner, will retain its acquired individuality. Finally, as in Philo, immortality was considered not as something due to the soul by its own nature, but rather as a gift from God, which can be taken away, and hence the soul was considered as something destructible, though there were various explanations as to what is meant by the destructibility of the soul.

Philo's refusal to commit himself on the question of whether the celestial bodies have souls and minds and his denial of the possibility of arriving at any positive solution of this question¹ are reflected in subsequent philosophy. Among the Church Fathers, Origen says: "Regarding the sun, moon, and stars, whether they are living beings or without life, there is no distinct deliverance,"² though he himself believes that they are "living and rational beings."³ Such also is the belief of Tatian⁴ and Jerome.⁵ John of Damascus, on the other hand, denies that the heavens or the celestial bodies are living beings.⁶ St. Augustine is undecided and leaves the

¹ *Somn.* I, 4, 23; cf. above, p. 363.

² *De Principiis* I, Praefatio, 10.

³ *Ibid.* I, 7, 2-3.

⁴ *Oratio ad Graecos*, Cap. 12.

⁵ *In Ecclesiasten*, on 1: 6 (PL, 23, 1068).

⁶ *De Fide Orthodoxa* II, 6 (PG, 94, 885 A-B).

matter in doubt.⁷ Later the problem was reopened by St. Thomas.⁸ In Arabic Moslem philosophy the view that the celestial bodies are living beings is challenged by Algazali,⁹ and in Arabic Jewish, as well as in Hebrew, philosophy the view that the celestial bodies are not living beings is either directly or indirectly expressed by Saadia,¹⁰ Judah ha-Levi,¹¹ Crescas,¹² and Isaac Arama.¹³

Similarly in the treatment of angels, subsequent philosophies, whether Christian, Moslem, or Jewish, continued to dwell upon certain elements which Philo treated as essential to the scriptural doctrine of angels. As in Philo, angels were considered as real beings, though it was maintained that not every term "angel" in Scripture is to be taken to refer to a real angel,¹⁴ and though also there was a difference of opinion as to whether the term "angel" in Scripture does ever refer to the powers of irrational beings. Maimonides affirmed that it does,¹⁵ whereas St. Thomas objected to Maimonides and maintained that it does not.¹⁶ As in Philo, angels were considered as created beings, though among the Church Fathers the question was raised as to whether they were created before the creation of the world or with its creation. Origen, followed by others, maintained that they were created be-

⁷ *De Genesi ad Litteram* II, 18, 38 (PL, 34, 279); *Enchiridion*, Cap. 58 (PL, 40, 260).

⁸ *Summ. Theol.* I, 70, 3.

⁹ *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* XIV (ed. M. Bouyges, pp. 239-246).

¹⁰ *Emunot we-De'ot* I, 3 (8); VI, 3.

¹¹ *Cuzari* IV, 1.

¹² *Or Adonai* I, 1, 6.

¹³ *Aḥdat Yisḥaḥ* II, ed. Pressburg, pp. 16a-17b.

The discussion of this question in Algazali and in Jewish authors is dealt with by the present writer in his *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, 1929, pp. 535-538.

¹⁴ Thus the term "angel" in Scripture is said sometimes to mean a prophet (cf. Justin Martyr, *Dialogus cum Tryphone*, Cap. 75; Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* II, 6) or any godly man (cf. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XV, 23, PL, 41, 408). Cf. below, II, 45.

¹⁵ *Moreh Nebukim* II, 6.

¹⁶ *Sum. Theol.* I, 50, 3 c.

fore the corporeal world,¹⁷ whereas others maintained that they were not created before the world. According to St. Augustine,¹⁸ with whose view St. Thomas agrees,¹⁹ they were created on the first day of creation. In a Midrash, it is definitely denied that the angels were created on the first day of creation, and while according to one rabbi they were created on the second day, according to another they were created on the fifth day.²⁰ As in Philo, they were considered as incorporeal beings, though there were differences of opinion as to the nature of their incorporeality. Thus, to take but one example, St. Thomas argued against Avicbron, denying the latter's assertion that angels, though incorporeal, are composed of matter and form.²¹ As in Philo, attempts were made to identify angels with some incorporeal beings provided by philosophers in their scheme of the universe, though not always, as in Philo, with the demons of Plato. In the Middle Ages they were sometimes identified with the Intelligences of Aristotle.

Spinoza, in his grand assault upon traditional philosophy, by his denial of the existence of incorporeal beings, denies the existence of angels and also the existence of a soul as something separable from body. Among the heresies of which he was accused in his youth are said to have been the denial that God is incorporeal and with it the denial also that angels exist and that the soul is something different from the principle of life.²² Later in his correspondence he writes to a friend: "I see that you are not so much philosophizing as, if I may say so, theologizing; for you are writing down your thoughts about angels, prophecy and miracles. But perhaps

¹⁷ *De Principiis* III, 5, 3.

¹⁸ *De Civitate Dei* XI, 9.

¹⁹ *Sum. Theol.* I, 61, 3 c.

²⁰ *Genesis Rabbah* 1, 3.

²¹ *Sum. Theol.* I, 50, 2 c.

²² Lucas, *La Vie de feu Monsieur de Spinoza*, in A. Wolf, *The Oldest Biography of Spinoza* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. [1927]), pp. 45-46 and 97-98.

you are doing this in a philosophical manner.”²³ Judging by his own philosophizing about prophecy and miracles,²⁴ we have reason to believe that by philosophizing about angels he means the denial of their existence. His own philosophizing about the soul, however, is not a denial of its existence as something distinct from the body; it is only a denial of its separability from the body. As in most of his criticism of traditional philosophy, he returns to classical Greek philosophy as it had been before it became Hebraized by Philo. In this case, he returns to the philosophy of Aristotle in its Neoplatonized medieval form, restating its views in his own terms and in his own geometrical method.

Now in Aristotle, the view that soul is distinct from body while at the same time it is also inseparable from it is expressed in his conception of the soul as being the form of the body. Being form, it is distinct from body, which is its matter; being the form of the body, it must be inseparable from body, as form must inevitably be inseparable from its matter. But in Spinoza, Aristotle's matter and form become respectively the attributes of extension and thought in God and the immediate infinite modes of these attributes, called respectively “motion” and “the absolutely infinite intellect,”²⁵ and of these two the human body and the human mind are respectively finite modes. He therefore says of the human mind that it is a “part of the infinite intellect of God”²⁶ or that it is the idea²⁷ of the human body, that is to say, the form of the human body, and as a result of this conception of the human mind he quite naturally concludes

²³ *Epistola* 29 to Oldenburg; A. Wolf's translation.

²⁴ Cf. below, II, 68, and above, p. 359.

²⁵ Cf. chapter on “Extension and Thought” in the present writer's *The Philosophy of Spinoza*.

²⁶ *Ethics* II, Prop. 11, Corol.

²⁷ *Ibid.* II, Prop. 11.

that "the human mind is united to the body,"²⁸ that is to say, it is inseparable from it.

With such a definition of mind, it would seem that Spinoza would line himself up with those who believed that celestial bodies, like stars and planets, have also a mind, for all things in the world, according to him, are finite modes of God's attributes of extension and thought, just as, according to Aristotle, all things in the world are composed of matter and form. And in fact Spinoza himself definitely says that "all things are besouled (*omnia . . . animata*), although in different degrees (*diversis gradibus*)." ²⁹ But this, in our opinion, does not mean that he believed that everything in the world, including stars and planets, had a soul like that of man, endowed with consciousness, any more than it means that he believed that a stone had a soul like that of man by which it would be conscious of its falling. The latter is explicitly denied by him.³⁰ What he means is exactly what St. Thomas says of Aristotle, that while all things have forms (*species = εἶδη*), the different degrees (*diversi gradus*) in the perfection of nature constitute a diversity of species or forms (*specierum*),³¹ so that, while the forms of some things are souls, the forms of other things are not souls. Similarly here, Spinoza, using the term "soul" loosely for the finite mode of the attribute of thought in each thing, the equivalent of Aristotle's "form," says that all things are "besouled," but "in different degrees," some of them having souls in the strict sense of the term, being endowed with consciousness, others having no souls in this strict sense of the term.

Since the human mind, according to Spinoza, is inseparable

²⁸ *Ibid.* II, Prop. 13, Corol.

²⁹ *Ibid.* II, Prop. 13, Schol. (*Opera*, ed. Gebhardt, II, l. 28).

³⁰ Epistola 58 (*Opera*, IV, p. 266, ll. 13-15).

³¹ *Quaestiones Disputatae: De Anima*, Art. 7, Resp.

from the body, it cannot survive the death of the body as an individual entity. Spinoza could have argued thus against the traditional view of immortality just as he argues against the traditional views on incorporeality, free will, creation, prophecy, and miracles. But the purpose of his philosophy was not only metaphysical but also moral, and the plan of the *Ethics* was, first, to reject all the main premises of traditional religious philosophy which had been held valid since the time of Philo and, then, to show how his own new philosophy, without a personal Deity and without miracles and revelation and free will, may not only be as good a guide in life as the old philosophy but may also offer as good a consolation for the after-life as the old philosophy. It is for this reason that he presents his views on immortality not in opposition to those who maintain it in its traditional form but rather in opposition to those who in his own time and in his own city denied it altogether. To begin with, on the basis of his own philosophy, he could quite logically maintain that on the death of man neither his body nor his soul is absolutely destroyed, but as finite modes they both become reabsorbed into the infinite modes, namely, "motion" and "the absolutely infinite intellect," of which they are respectively parts. Then, like Avicenna and Averroes and their followers in the past, he tries to show that the human mind, though in its origin it is only a part of the absolutely infinite intellect, becomes individualized during the lifetime of man by its acquisition of knowledge of the type which he describes as the second and third of his three types of knowledge.³² Then this individualized human mind, on its reunion with the absolutely infinite intellect whence it originally came, somehow, in some inexplicable manner, retains its acquired indi-

³² *Ethics* V, Prop. 38, Demonstr.

viduality. The human soul is thus immortal, or eternal, as he usually calls it, and its immortality is in a certain sense personal and individual.³³

³³ Spinoza's definition of mind as well as his conception of immortality is discussed by the present writer more fully in the chapters "Body and Mind" and "Love, Immortality, and Blessedness" in *The Philosophy of Spinoza* (1934), and in *Religious Philosophy: A Group of Essays* (1961), pp. 263-268.

CHAPTER VIII

FREE WILL *

I. MIRACLES AND FREEDOM

IN PHILO, as in any other philosopher, the problem of the freedom of the will in man is but a special phase of the more general problems of the existence of immutable laws in nature and the relation of mind to body. Now with regard to laws of nature Philo's view is clear. There are, according to him, certain unalterable laws by which the universe is governed, but these laws were established in the universe by God at the time of its creation. This view is expressed by him in a variety of ways in such statements as that there are "ordinances and laws which God laid down in the universe as unalterable" ¹ and that "this world is the Megalopolis and it has a single polity and a single law." ² These laws of nature are sometimes designated by him in their totality by the general term Logos, by which he means an immanent Logos in the created physical universe, conceiving of it as part of that incorporeal Logos which existed prior to the creation of the universe. It is this immanent Logos which is described by him as "the bond of all existence," which "holds and knits together all the parts," ³ and which also "administers all things." ⁴

Equally clear is his view with regard to the relation of mind to body. Man is a miniature world ⁵ and, like the great

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¹ *Opif.* 19, 61.

³ *Fug.* 20, 112.

² *Jos.* 6, 29.

⁴ *Heres* 38, 188.

⁵ The analogy of man to the world as a microcosm to a macrocosm is attributed by Philo to some anonymous philosophers of whom he says that "they declare that

world which consists of a body and a Logos within it, man consists of body and mind, and this mind within the body is, according to Philo, like the immanent Logos in the world, a part of the incorporeal Logos which existed prior to the creation of the world. Thus in one passage, after having referred to the preëxistent Logos and the Logos in man as two Logoi, "one the archetypal Logos above us, the other the copy of it which we possess,"⁶ he describes these two Logoi as "the mind within us and the mind above us."⁷ Like the immanent Logos in the world, this immanent Logos in man is that which constitutes the principle of order and harmony and purposive rational action in man. In its relation to the powers of the irrational soul the mind is like a king in a state; it governs and unifies all these powers, which form its body-guard, as it were, and accompany it as an escort.⁸

Throughout the philosophy of Philo, however, there is the implicit assumption of a fundamental difference between the rule of the immanent Logos in the world and its rule in man. In the world there is only a body which the Logos encounters, a body whose basis is a chaotic, discordant, and errant matter, and no sooner is that Logos placed in the world than it subdues that matter, controls its errancy, and establishes its governance of law and reason and orderly processes in the world. In the human body, however, it is not only an errant matter which the Logos encounters but also another soul which was created by God when He formed man "out of the matter scattered here and there, which Moses calls clay"⁹

man is a small world and alternatively the world a great man" (*Heres* 31, 155). It is also implied in his reference to the world as the "greatest and most perfect man" (*Migr.* 39, 220) and to man as a "small heaven" (*Opif.* 27, 82). Cf. Drummond, I, 288-289. On this analogy, see Plato, *Timaeus* 30 D; 44 D; Aristotle, *Phys.* VIII, 2, 252b, 26-27.

⁶ *Heres* 48, 230 and cf. 233.

⁸ *Migr.* 31, 170.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 236.

⁹ *Leg. All.* I, 12, 31; cf. above, p. 387, n. 17.

and that soul, too, which he calls earthlike (*γρώδης*),¹⁰ is made of matter. Being made of matter, it is errant, disorderly, and irrational; but more than mere body, it is a force; it is active in its errancy and not merely passive; it is not easily overcome by the immanent reason; it offers resistance to it, with the result that in man throughout his lifetime there is a struggle between the rational and irrational souls.

This struggle of the rational soul with the body under the dominance of the irrational soul is described by Philo with striking clearness in many characteristic passages. "In so far as the soul of the wise man," he says, "descending from the ether above, comes down upon and enters a mortal and is sown in the field of the body, it is truly sojourning in a land which is not its own."¹¹ The body under the dominance of the irrational soul not only fails to cooperate with the rational soul but is an "actual hindrance" to it¹² and is "a plotter" against it.¹³ The passions which arise in the body, though when mastered by reason they may become our helpers, are in reality "our actual foes,"¹⁴ so that we are constantly afflicted from within by "pleasures and desires and sorrows and fears."¹⁵ The outcome of that conflict is uncertain. Sometimes it is the victory of reason, in which case the resulting action is described by such terms, borrowed from both philosophy and Scripture, as goodness, virtue, wisdom, and righteousness¹⁶ and the agent is described as good, wise, and righteous.¹⁷ Sometimes, however, the outcome of the conflict is a victory for the passions, in which case the resulting action is described as wickedness or im-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹¹ *Qu. in Gen.* III, 10; cf. *Heres* 54, 267.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* II, 4, 10.

¹⁵ *Qu. in Gen.* III, 10.

¹⁶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ σφόδρον, σοφία, δικαιοσύνη. See Leisegang, *Indices* s.v.

¹⁷ ἀγαθός, σοφός, δίκαιος. See *ibid.*, s.v.

¹² *Leg. All.* I, 32, 103.

¹³ *Ibid.* III, 22, 69.

piety or sin¹⁸ and the agent is described as foolish or wicked or sinful.¹⁹

So far Philo's position with regard to the action of the immanent Logos in the world and in man is like that of Plato as portrayed in the *Timaeus*. For though Philo's immanent Logos, which God implanted in the world at the time of its creation to serve as its governing law, is not made of the mixed stuff of the Platonic universal soul but it rather shares the pure immateriality of the ideas, still in function the universal soul and the immanent Logos are alike. The universal soul of Plato, exactly like the immanent Logos of Philo, was made by God "earlier and elder than the body."²⁰ It was set by God "in the midst" of the world and was spread "through all its body."²¹ Its purpose was to act as the "mistress and governor" of the world²² and that purpose was actually attained, for when the world was created out of matter, called also necessity, and within that world the universal soul or mind was placed, "mind overruled necessity" and "this universe was fashioned in the beginning by the victory of reasonable persuasion over necessity"²³ and the soul of the universe, which contained mind and was rational, "began a divine beginning of unceasing and intelligent life lasting throughout all time."²⁴ Similarly Philo's description of the two souls in man, the rational and the irrational, and the conflict between them, though containing elements from other dialogues of Plato as well as from other non-Platonic sources, is essentially based upon Plato's description in the *Timaeus* of the rational and irrational souls,²⁵ of the conflict between them²⁶ and of the possible victory of the rational

¹⁸ τὸ κακόν, ἡ κακία, ἀσέβεια, ἀμάρτημα. See *ibid.*, s.v.

¹⁹ φαῦλος, κακός, ἀσεβής, ὑπαίτιος. See *ibid.*, s.v.

²⁰ *Timaeus* 34 c.

²¹ *Ibid.* 34 b. Cf. above, p. 339.

²² *Ibid.* 34 c.

²³ *Ibid.* 48 A.

²⁴ *Ibid.* 36 E.

²⁵ *Ibid.* 42 E ff.; 69 c.

²⁶ *Ibid.* 42 E-44 D.

soul over the irrational soul by the strength which it may gain through knowledge acquired by means of training.²⁷

But as we go on to scrutinize further their respective statements with regard to the causality of God and His power over the laws which He has implanted in nature, we discover a vast difference between their views, and out of this difference, we shall try to show, there arises also a difference between their views as to the freedom of man. Both of them, as we have seen, believe that there are unalterable laws of nature, and both of them also believe that these laws of nature were implanted by God in the universe as an act of good will. But there is a difference between them as to the power of God over these laws of nature. To Plato, once the laws of nature were implanted by God in the world, by His implanting in it the universal soul, these laws can never be upset. Indeed God, who has created the universe and has implanted the laws of nature within it, should logically be able also to dissolve them; still, to dissolve that which He has perfectly constructed, argues Plato, would indicate "the will of an evil one," and since the Demiurge is not an evil one, he assures the created gods, i.e., the celestial bodies and the deities of popular religion, that "in my will (*βούλησις*) ye possess a bond greater and more sovereign than the bonds wherewith, at your birth, ye were bound together."²⁸ What he really means to say is that on the creation of the world and the implantation of the laws of nature within it God abdicated His power to upset these laws and gave His assurance, as it were, that He would let the world run according to its established laws without any interference on His part. It is like the covenant which the God of the Hebrew Bible established between himself and "every living creature of all flesh" that is upon the earth, at the cessation of

²⁷ *Ibid.* 86 B-87 B.

²⁸ *Ibid.* 41 A-C.

the deluge, an everlasting covenant, by which God gave assurance that "while the earth remaineth, seedtime and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease and that neither will He again smite any more everything living, as He has done."²⁹ But while the God of the Hebrew Scripture, despite the covenant, has still reserved for himself, mentally, the right to upset the order of nature temporarily for the sake of performing miracles whenever there should be a need for them, the Demiurge of Plato had made no such mental reservation. There is no room for miracles in the philosophy of Plato. His God, though He has started as a free agent and created the world by will,³⁰ by His own voluntary abdication of His power to change the laws which He himself has implanted in the world, has deprived himself of freedom and thereafter acted by the necessity of His own nature no less than the God of Aristotle who never created a world by his will.

In the philosophy of Philo, however, there is room for miracles, for while his God is philosophically the Demiurge of Plato, He has still retained the essential characteristics of the miracle-working Jehovah of the Hebrew Scripture. Believing as he did in the historicity of the miracles recorded in Scripture, even though occasionally he tried to read into them some allegorical meaning or to explain them as normal events, he modified, or perhaps he thought that he only interpreted, Plato's conception of the unalterability of the laws of nature in accordance with his belief in the miraculous intervention of God in the established order of the universe. While agreeing with Plato that God has implanted universal laws in nature and that these laws can be relied upon, for all practical purposes, to operate with uniformity and with a

²⁹ Gen. 8: 21-22; 9: 16-17. Cf. also Jer. 31: 34-35; 33: 20-21.

³⁰ *Timaeus* 29 D-E; 41 A-B.

certain scheduled regularity, still he insists that God can upset these laws, and in fact He did upset them on many occasions in the past as an act of goodness to men in time of their need. God to Philo is thus not altogether indifferent to the vicissitudes of human beings, or at least to those of such human beings as are especially favored by Him, in their unequal struggle against the inexorable forces of nature, and He does on certain occasions interfere on their behalf and help them to come victorious out of that struggle.

Corresponding to this difference between them with respect to God's power over nature there is a difference between them also with respect to the power of the human mind over the body. In Plato, the victory of reason over the passions, or its defeat by them, depends entirely upon the relative strength or weakness of these two contestants. Given a mind which for some reason or other has failed to reëducate itself in the knowledge of true being which it had forgotten on its entrance into the body, and given at the same time a body of which for some reason or other the passions are strong and powerful, the victory of body over mind is definitely assured and nothing in the world could change it, unless it were some external causes which happened to weaken the power of the passions or to strengthen the power of the mind. If, therefore, we had a gauge by which we could measure the relative strength or weakness of mind and body, we could at any given moment predict the outcome of the conflict between them. Hence it is the possession of knowledge or the lack of it that automatically will lead to the victory of the rational or the irrational soul. There is no such third factor as a will, conceived as something autonomous and as something which is free and independent of both the rational and irrational faculties of the soul and which by some arbitrary action tips the scale on the side of the one or the other. Whenever the

rational and irrational souls meet in conflict, the victory of the one or the other will be decided on the basis of their respective strengths and weaknesses. For man there is no choice in the matter.

In Philo, however, the victory of the rational or the irrational soul is not decided mechanically by the strength of one in relation to the strength of the other. There is to him a will in man which by some unaccountable manner may decide in favor of the one or the other, even when by all the laws of causality the outcome should have been otherwise. For just as he considered God as working miracles in nature to help those whom He favored in their struggle against the forces of nature, so did he also consider God as being not altogether indifferent to the struggle in man of mind against the forces of the body. God, according to Philo, would not let man be a passive object in the struggle of mind and body. He would not allow the struggle between mind and body to be determined, like the struggle between two bodies, by the ordinary laws of nature. Mind was therefore endowed by God with part of that power which He himself possesses of upsetting the laws of nature. As a divine grace man was given that freedom of action by which God himself in a miraculous way comes to the help of His chosen ones in their struggle against the odds of nature. The determination of the mind to do or not to do is thus not the result of natural causes which are "of God" or "according to God" and by which the unalterable laws of nature established by God in the world are operated. Such a determination by the mind is a break in the nexus of these natural laws and in the established laws of the universe even as miracles are. This power with which the human mind was endowed to choose or not to choose refers not only to the choice of good, but also to the choice of evil, even though the mind is by its very nature

rational, for, as says Philo, there are in our mind "voluntary inclinations (*ἐκουσίους τροπὰς*) to what is wrong."³¹ The essential rationality of the mind does not preclude the possibility of its acting, by the mere power of its free will, against the dictates of reason.

II. THE CHOICE OF GOOD AND EVIL

The difference between Plato and Philo on the question of human freedom is clearly brought out in their respective treatments of the question of human responsibility for the choice of evil and of the justifiability of punishment meted out to wrongdoers by both God and the state.

Plato does not raise this question directly, but from the answers which he provides against such a question we may judge that he was conscious of it. The question as it must have appeared to him was of a double nature. In the first place, he wanted to justify the punishment which according to his eschatology is meted out to the souls of those who live in unrighteousness by their being reincarnated successively in the bodies of various creatures until they turn from the evil of their ways.¹ In the second place, he wanted to justify the penalty meted out by the state to wrongdoers for various offenses.²

In answer to the first question, he simply states that divine justice is vindicated by the fact that at the very beginning, when the individual souls were about to be put for the first time in human bodies, they were all given an equal start and were all equally warned of the consequences of their future behavior, for, as they were distributed among the stars prior

³¹ *Deter.* 32, 122.

¹ *Timaeus* 42 B-D.

² *Laws* IX, 860 B; cf. IV, 718 B.

to their being put in human bodies, "He shewed to them the nature of the universe and declared unto them the laws of destiny, — namely, how that the first incarnation should be ordained to be the same for all, in order that none might suffer disadvantage at His hands; and how it was needful that they, when sown each into his own proper organ of time (i.e., star), should be born as the most God-fearing of living creatures (i.e., mankind)." ³ This equality of start and this equality of warning, according to Plato, was given by God to men "to the end that He might be blameless of the future wickedness of any one of them." ⁴ By this Plato exculpates God from any moral responsibility for the evil of human conduct. "The blame is his who chooses: God is blameless." ⁵ Then, too, God to him is not the cause of evil,⁶ nor is the soul as such the cause thereof. Evil arises out of the fact that the soul placed in the body happens to be overridden by the body, when man by his irrational desires allows it to become thus overridden.⁷ It is our duty, therefore, says Plato, "to try to escape from earth to the dwelling place of the Gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise." ⁸ This is as far as Plato goes in exculpating God of the evil man does. But the fundamental question whether man's own irrational desires by which his rational soul is overridden are themselves predetermined by causes outside of man's will, and whether also man by a will absolutely free and undetermined could at any moment arbitrarily change the course of his action — that is not dealt with by Plato. God's responsibility, according to him, ends with the creation of the

³ *Timaeus* 41 E.

⁴ *Ibid.* 42 D.

⁵ *Republic* X, 617 E

⁶ *Ibid.* II, 379 c.

⁷ *Timaeus* 42 E; cf. *Laws* X, 900 E, 904 A.

⁸ *Theaetetus* 176 A.

world, which was the best possible world which could be created and within which the souls of all men had an equal start. Once the world was created and the souls for all future men planted in it, God retired, as it were, from the world, letting it run according to the laws which He had established in it. There is no individual providence in the philosophy of Plato.

In answer to the second question, Plato seems to admit that inasmuch as man's actions are to a large extent predetermined and are not entirely his free choice, the only justification for the punishment of criminals by the state is that such punishments are either curative or deterrent, for the wrongdoer is to pay the penalty for his misdeed, says Plato, only "in order that for the future both he himself and those who behold his punishment may either utterly loathe his sin or at least renounce to a great extent such lamentable conduct."⁹ Even the punishment of death inflicted upon incurable criminals is justified by him on the ground that "not only is it better for the sinners themselves to live no longer, but also they will prove of a double benefit to others by quitting life — since they will both serve as a warning to the rest not to act unjustly, and also rid the state of wicked men."¹⁰ Indeed Plato speaks of a distinction between voluntary (ἐκούσια) wrongdoings and involuntary (ἀκούσια) wrongdoings¹¹ as well as of a distinction between a voluntary lie and an involuntary lie.¹² But when we examine the sense in which Plato uses the term "voluntary," we shall find that there is no indication that he meant thereby the existence of a will which is free and independent of reason and concupis-

⁹ *Laws* XI, 934 A.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* IX, 862 E; cf. XII, 958 A. Cf. R. D. Archer-Hind, *The Timaeus of Plato*, p. 325, ad 86 E.

¹¹ *Laws* IX, 861 B.

¹² *Ibid.* V, 730 C; *Republic* VI, 533 E.

cence. The term "voluntary," we shall find, is used by him here in two senses: (1) in the sense of not being compelled by some external agent,¹³ and (2) in the sense of knowing what one does, for in the case of a lie he explicitly says that an involuntary lie is one that is told through ignorance (*ἀμαθία*).¹⁴ Accordingly voluntary lying and voluntary wrongdoing mean only lying and doing wrong without external compulsion and with full knowledge of the act. It is in this sense of "knowingly" that Plato uses the term "voluntarily" in his statement that "no one is voluntarily (*ἐκῶν*) wicked."¹⁵ By knowledge, according to him, the mind is strengthened in its struggle with the passions of the body and automatically overcomes them.

In Philo this question of human responsibility and of the justification of punishment is touched upon in many places, though it is never treated in a complete and systematic manner. But in all the passages wherein the problem is treated, though at first sight the sentiments expressed in them seem to be so much like those of Plato, we discern certain expressions which, taken in connection with his views we have found elsewhere, seem to emphasize his belief in the absolute freedom of the human mind. Thus in one passage wherein he discusses the superiority of man to brute animals he says that man is "blamed for what he does wrong with intent and praised when he acts rightly of his own will" on account of his possession of "a volitional and self-determining mind, whose activities for the most part rest on

¹³ *Statesman* 293 A.

¹⁴ *Republic* VII, 535 E. It is interesting to note that the Hebrew *shegagah*, which, according to rabbinic interpretation, means the commission of a sin through ignorance, is translated in the Septuagint by *ἀκοροίον* (Lev. 4: 2; Num. 35: 11, *et passim*).

¹⁵ *Timaeus* 86 E. Cf. discussion in commentaries of R. D. Archer-Hind, A. E. Taylor, and F. M. Cornford, *ad loc.*

deliberate choice (*προαιρετικαῖς*).¹⁶ This by itself may perhaps not mean more than Aristotle's statement that men are praised or blamed only for voluntary actions¹⁷ and that they are praised or blamed for virtues or vices¹⁸ because virtues and vices are actions which involve deliberate choice (*προαιρετική*).¹⁹ By itself, then, Philo's statement may perhaps mean only, as does Aristotle's statement, that a voluntary action is an action without external compulsion and without ignorance.²⁰ But when Philo says that God gave to the human mind a portion "of that free will which is His most peculiar possession and most worthy of His majesty"²¹ and that by this gift of free will the human mind "in this respect has been made to resemble Him,"²² it is quite evident that by man's free will Philo means an absolutely undetermined freedom like that enjoyed by God, who by his power to work miracles can upset the laws of nature and the laws of causality which He himself has established. It is because of this undetermined freedom possessed by man that Philo frees God of blame for the sins committed by man and justifies the punishment meted out to man for his sin, for the human soul thus "being liberated, as far as might be, from the hard and ruthless mistress, necessity, may justly be charged with guilt, in that it does not honor its Liberator and therefore it will rightly pay the inexorable penalty which is meted to ungrateful freedmen."²³

That a voluntary act to Philo does not mean, as it does to Plato and Aristotle, an action done with knowledge is made clear by him in his homily on the scriptural verses: "Behold I have set before thy face life and death, good and evil;

¹⁶ *Immut.* 10, 47.

¹⁷ *Eth. Nic.* III, 1, 1109b, 31.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* II, 5, 1105b, 31-1106a, 2.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* II, 6, 1106b, 36; cf. II, 5, 1106a, 3-4.

²⁰ *Ibid.* III, 1, 1109b, 35 ff.

²¹ *Immut.* 10, 47.

²² *Ibid.*, 48.

²³ *Ibid.*, 48.

choose life,"²⁴ which verse is drawn upon also subsequently by the Church Fathers for proof of their view as to the freedom of the will.²⁵ "By this," he says, "He puts before us both doctrines: first, that men have been made with a knowledge of good and of its opposite, evil; second, that it is their duty to choose the better rather than the worse, because they have, as it were, within them an incorruptible judge in the reasoning faculty, which will accept all that right reason suggests and reject the promptings of its opposite."²⁶ It will be noticed that the knowledge of good and evil does not in itself constitute a voluntary act; knowledge is merely a condition under which one exercises the power of the freedom of choice. "He had made him free and unfettered, to employ his powers of action with voluntary and deliberate choice for this purpose, that, knowing good and ill . . . , he might practice to choose the better and avoid the opposite."²⁷ In fact, according to Philo, all men have a knowledge of the good, but some, notwithstanding that knowledge, choose by their own free will to follow the base, and it is because they had that knowledge of the good that they are convicted for the choice they have made. "Who indeed is so lacking in reason or soul that he never either with or without his will receives a conception of the best? Nay, even over the reprobate hovers often of a sudden the vision of the excellent, but to grasp it and to keep it among them they are unable. . . . Nay, never would it have come to them save to convict those who choose the base instead of the noble."²⁸ This statement, too, on the face of it, may be merely a reflection of Plato's view that all men by their very nature have the capacity to

²⁴ Deut. 30: 15 and 19.

²⁵ Justin Martyr, *Apologia* I, 44; Origen, *De Principiis* III, 1, § 6.

²⁶ *Immut.* 10, 50.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 49.

²⁸ *Gig.* 5, 20-21.

regain the vision of the ideas for fleeting moments during their lifetime, though it is only philosophers who by their special training and preparation can be in continuous communication with them.²⁹ But Philo, as will have been noticed, in restating this view, says that those reprobates, who have a sudden vision of the excellent and get some knowledge of it, out of their own free will choose the base instead of the noble and that it is for this reason that they are held responsible for their deeds and are convicted.

The choice of evil is thus in man's own hand. But what about evil which one commits involuntarily? The answer to this question may be gathered from several passages in Philo's writings.

Sin, says Philo, may be committed either voluntarily (*ἐκούσως*) or involuntarily (*ἀκούσῳ*).³⁰ Now with regard to voluntary sin, he explicitly says that the sinner in question cannot say that the sin he has committed was "according to God's will (*κατὰ θεόν*)." ³¹ Voluntary sins, according to him, have their sole source in the sinner himself, or, to use his own words, "they are acts of our own will (*γνώμης*)." ³² With regard to involuntary sin, however, he distinguishes within it two kinds. One kind of involuntary sin, just like voluntary sin in general, cannot be said to have come about by the will of God. It can be explained only as being due to the fact that man is part of nature and subject to the laws by which it is governed. According to these laws of nature, it may sometimes happen that, without any intention on the part of man, ignorance and carelessness and weakness will inevitably result in mishaps as well as in sins. Such involuntary sin can be said to proceed from God only indirectly, that is to say, only in so far as it is God who implanted in the

²⁹ *Phaedrus* 249 B-D; cf. Grote, *Plato*, II, 219.

³⁰ *Fug.* 14, 76; *Post.* 3, 10-11; *Agr.* 40, 176.

³¹ *Fug.* 14, 76.

³² *Ibid.* 13, 65.

universe these laws of nature. Another kind of involuntary sin is described by Philo as coming about directly by the will of God, and this for a certain definite purpose, namely, for the purpose of administering justice in the universe. As a typical example of this kind of involuntary sin he takes the case of the unintentional slayer mentioned in Scripture. This particular kind of involuntary sinner, according to his interpretation, is one whose past life is not altogether stainless but who somewhere in his past must have committed certain sins, though sins which are few in number and which can be easily remedied.³³ A man with such a past is chosen by God as an instrument of His judgment in inflicting punishment upon some more grievously guilty person,³⁴ who somehow has escaped from the justice of men,³⁵ and whom God, after His manner of not inflicting evil directly, wishes to punish through the instrumentality of some intermediary agent.³⁶ In being chosen, on his past record, by God as an instrument of carrying out His divine judgment, man thus happens to commit what is known as involuntary sin, for which, incidentally, he receives a light punishment and thus expiates the few and remediable sins of his past.³⁷ The act

³³ *Spec.* III, 21, 122.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 121.

³⁶ *Fug.* 13, 66.

³⁷ This analysis of Philo's view as to the cause of involuntary sin is based upon passages in *Spec.* III, 21, 120-123, and *Fug.* 13, 65-14, 76. In both these places Philo discusses Exod. 21: 13, which in the Septuagint reads: "If he did not do it voluntarily, but God delivered into his hands, I will appoint thee a place whither he who hath killed shall flee." Evidently following what in his time must have already been a Jewish tradition, which we shall quote at the end of this note, Philo takes this verse to refer to a case where A, who was a guilty person deserving of punishment (*Spec.* III, 21, 120-121), was killed unintentionally by B, who in the past had committed a few remediable sins (*ibid.*, 122). His comment on this verse is as follows: "The writer feels that intentional acts are acts of our own will, and that unintentional acts are acts of God's will (*θεοῦ*): I mean not sins, but, on the contrary, all acts that are a punishment for sin" (*Fug.* 13, 65). What he means to say is this: Involuntary

committed by the involuntary sinner is therefore an act of God's will, its purpose being to carry out His divine judgment in punishing sinners. The reasoning may perhaps sound somewhat casuistical, but casuistry is bound to ap-

sins which serve no purpose of punishment are not acts of God's will but rather those of natural causes; involuntary sins which serve the purpose of punishment are acts of God's will, because, as he says subsequently, God has chosen B as the minister of His judgment and the instrument of His vengeance upon A, in view of the fact that God does not inflict punishment directly (*Fug.* 13, 66; *Spec.* III, 21, 121-122). When later in *Fug.* 14, 76, Philo says that "it is lawful, therefore, for one who feels that he has been involuntarily changed, to say that this change has come upon him according to God's will (*κατὰ θεόν*), a statement which the voluntary sinner may not make," the reference is only to that kind of involuntary sinner whose involuntary sin serves the purpose of punishment. Though this discussion of Philo deals primarily with the particular case of murder, his introductory statement in *Fug.* 13, 65, "The writer feels that intentional acts are acts of our own will, and that unintentional acts are God's acts," as well as his succeeding discussion, quite clearly shows that he tries to draw from it a generalization with regard to all human actions.

The Jewish traditional interpretation of Lev. 21: 13, referred to above (quoted by Ritter, *Philo und die Halacha: Eine vergleichende Studie*, p. 30, n. 3, and referred to by Heinemann, *Bildung*, pp. 400 f.), is reported in the name of Simeon b. Laqish, a Palestinian Amora of the third century. It reads as follows: "What case does the verse deal with? It deals with the case of two persons who killed human beings, one of them unintentionally and the other intentionally, but neither of them committed his act in the presence of witnesses who could come and testify against him. The Holy One, blessed be He, therefore, causes them to meet at the same inn. The one who has killed intentionally seats himself under a ladder and the other who has killed unintentionally begins to climb that ladder and falls down upon the one who sits underneath it and kills him. The result is that he who has killed intentionally suffers punishment by death and he who has killed unintentionally suffers punishment by exile" (*Makkot* 10b).

Though the homily quoted is Amoraic, it is based on an older Tannaitic homily in *Mekilta*, *Neziḥin* 4, Exod. 21: 13, (W, p. 86a; F, p. 80a; HR, p. 262; L, III, 35). The sentiment expressed in it is also found in another Tannaitic homily on Deut. 22: 8: "When thou buildest a new house, then thou shalt make a parapet for thy roof, that thou bring not blood upon thine house, if any man fall from thence." Upon the last statement, which literally reads "if any *one falling* fall from thence," the school of Ishmael comment as follows: "that man was destined to fall since the six days of creation, seeing that he has not yet fallen and yet Scripture describes him as '*falling*'; this in truth is in accordance with the principle that reward is brought about through the agency of a worthy person and punishment is brought about through the agency of a guilty person" (*Sifre* on Deut. 22: 8, § 229, F, p. 116a; HF, p. 262; *Shabbat* 32a). The same interpretation of the verse is also implied in pseudo-Jonathan Targum *ad loc.*

pear in any kind of theodicy no less than in any kind of ethics.

His view on the doing of evil is thus quite clear. He explicitly distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary evil. Voluntary evil is done by man alone; God is neither directly nor indirectly the cause of it. Involuntary evil may be said in certain instances to have been directly caused by God.

Not so clear is his view on the doing of good. He does not speak of an involuntary good deed or virtue or righteousness, and this for the very good reason that, like Aristotle,³⁸ he defines virtue, or rather righteousness (*δικαιοσύνη*), as an act performed by voluntary choice (*ἐκουσίῳ γνώμῃ*),³⁹ and consequently no virtue can be described as involuntary. By this definition of righteousness he makes it quite evident that the choice of good is a voluntary act. The same view is expressed by him also elsewhere: "And mark, the words in which thy Father urges thee to go put no compulsion (*ἀνάγκην οὐδεμίαν*) on thee, in order that thou mayest follow the better course at thine own volition (*ἑθελουργός*) and by thine own self-determination (*αὐτοκέλευστος*)." ⁴⁰ Still, these statements are not as explicit as his statements about the choice of evil. He does not state negatively, as he does about both voluntary and involuntary evil, that in the choice of good God is not a cause either directly or indirectly in any sense whatsoever. His only statement about it is that the doing of good is by our "voluntary choice," without "compulsion," and by our own "volition" and "self-determination." The question may therefore be raised whether by this omission of any negative statement Philo meant to indicate

³⁸ *Eth. Nic.* II, 6, 1106b, 36, where virtue is defined *ἐξῆς προαιρετική*, and III, 2, 1111b, 7, where *προαιρεσις* is said to be *ἐκούσιων*.

³⁹ *Somn.* II, 26, 174.

⁴⁰ *Deter.* 4, 11.

that in the choice of good, though it is always voluntary, God has a part, and, if so, what that part is.

An answer to this question is to be found in a fragment from the lost fourth book of his *Legum Allegoria*, which contains another homily on the verses: "Behold I have set before thy face life and death, good and evil; choose life, that thou mayest live."⁴¹ The homily reads as follows:

It is a happy thing for the soul to be able to choose the better of the two choices put forward by the Creator, but it is happier for it not to choose, but for the Creator to bring it over to himself and improve it. For, strictly speaking, the human mind does not choose the good through itself, but in accordance with the thoughtfulness of God, since He bestows the fairest things upon the worthy. For two main principles are with the Lawgiver, namely, that on the one hand God does not govern all things as a man and that on the other hand He trains and educates us as a man.⁴² Accordingly, when he affirms the second principle, namely, that God acts as man, he represents our mind as capable of knowing something, and willing, and choosing, and avoiding. But when he affirms the first and better principle, namely, that God acts not as man, he ascribes the powers and causes of all things to God, leaving no work for a created being but declaring it to be inactive and passive. He explains this when he says in other words that "God has known those who are His and those who are (His) holy [and] He has brought [them] near [to himself]." (Num. 16: 5.) But if selections and rejections are in strictness made by the one cause, why do you advise me, legislator, to choose life or death, as though we were autocrats of our choice? But he would answer: Of such things hear thou a rather elementary explanation, namely, such things are said to those who have not yet been initiated in the great mysteries about the sovereignty and authority of the Uncreated and the exceeding nothingness of the created.⁴³

The view expressed in this fragment has been characterized by Drummond as one which "in effect reduces the belief

⁴¹ Deut. 30: 15 and 19.

⁴² The reference here is to the scriptural statements "God is not as a man" (Num. 23: 19) and "as a man would chasten his son, so the Lord thy God will chasten thee" (Deut. 8: 5) discussed by Philo in *Immut.* 11, 53 ff. and elsewhere.

⁴³ Harris, *Fragments*, p. 8. Parts of the translation of this fragment are from Drummond's *Philo Judaeus*, I, 347, n. Cf. also Latin version of parts of this passage in Franciscus Turrianus, *Adversus Magdeburgenses Centuriatores pro Canonibus Apostolorum, & Epistolis Decretalibus Pontificum Apostolicorum*, IV, Florence, 1572, p. 361.

in free-will to a useful delusion of the less educated,"⁴⁴ and it would seem to be contradictory to Philo's statements elsewhere as to the existence of free will in man. We shall attempt, however, to show that this fragment does not teach a denial of free will, but rather that it stresses a certain fundamental detail supplementary to Philo's conception of freedom.

If we examine the fragment carefully we shall note in it two curious facts.

In the first place, the fragment deals only with man's choice of the good but makes no mention at all of man's choice of evil. It only says that "the human mind does not choose the good through itself"; it does not say that it does not choose the evil through itself. Indeed it speaks of the mind as being unable through itself to avoid as well as to choose, to reject as well as to select, but the terms "avoid (*φυγεῖν*)" and "rejections (*ἀπεκδογαί*)," judging from his use elsewhere of the expression "he might practice to choose the better and avoid (*φυγῆ*) the opposite,"⁴⁵ mean here to avoid and reject evil, which is a form of choosing good. Now this omission of any reference to the cause of the choice of evil cannot be accidental and merely due to the fact that in the verse quoted (Deut. 30: 19) there is only the statement "choose life," for previous to that verse there is also mention of the possibility of the choice of evil and death (Deut. 30: 17-18). The omission of any reference to the choice of evil in this fragment can be accounted for only by the fact that the point which Philo was going to make in this homily was that only the choice of good was caused by God, but not choice of evil. No evil, as he repeats in a variety of ways, can come directly from God, and this includes the evil-doing of man as well as evil done to man.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Drummond, *loc. cit.*

⁴⁵ *Immut.* 10, 49.

⁴⁶ Cf. above, n. 37.

In the second place, with regard to the choice of good, we may say at the very outset that such sweeping statements in this passage about the "exceeding nothingness of the created" and the "sovereignty and authority of the uncreated" and about the fact that "the powers and causes of all things are attached to God" and about the unreality of the presentation of the human mind as being "capable of knowing something, and willing, and choosing, and avoiding" do not in themselves indicate that Philo denied of man the freedom to choose good. Even with his belief in absolute human freedom he could make these statements, in view of the fact that that freedom, as he has said in his extant works, is a gift bestowed upon man by God, a portion of his own power of freedom, whereby he is made to resemble God.⁴⁷ These general statements by themselves do not therefore conclusively prove anything with regard to the exact belief of Philo as to the question of man's power to choose good. What he exactly meant to say on this question in this fragment of his lost work must be determined by a careful examination of some of the other statements contained in this fragment as well as of some of the implications of what he leaves unsaid in it.

Now it will have been noticed that in contradistinction to his statement in his extant works with regard to the choice of evil, that it is of our own will,⁴⁸ he says here about the choice of good that "selections and rejections are in strictness made by the one Cause," that is to say, directly by God. Furthermore, God's direct causation of man's choice of good, it will also be noticed, is described as "the thoughtfulness of God, since He bestows the fairest things upon the worthy." This quite obviously implies that man must first do something to render himself worthy of the bestowal upon

⁴⁷ Cf. above, nn. 21, 22.

⁴⁸ Cf. above, n. 32.

him by God of the power to choose good. Now that doing of something by which man renders himself worthy in the eyes of God to receive the still greater power of choosing good must inevitably refer to some act of free will. This, however, could certainly not refer to some act of free will exercised in the choice of evil, as that would hardly render man worthy of the gracious gift of the choice of good. It must therefore inevitably refer to some act of free will in the avoidance of evil or in the choice of good. Thus this fragment, in trying to attribute man's choice of good to God, assumes that man himself already possesses some part of freedom to make such a choice. Furthermore, in the very opening statement of this fragment Philo says that "it is a happy thing for the soul to be able to choose (*ισχύειν λαβεῖν*), but it is happier for it not to choose (*μη αὐτὴν ἐλέσθαι*), but for the Creator to bring it over to himself and improve it." Note the difference in wording between "to be able to choose" and "not to choose." If the wording of these two statements was chosen with care, and we have no reason to doubt that it was so chosen, then the evident meaning of this statement is not to deny the soul's ability to choose the better but rather to assert that, while the soul is able of itself to choose the better, it actually does not make that choice by itself but God brings it to himself and improves it.

The cumulative impression of all these statements then is that, while a man is able to choose the better, he will not have to rely upon his own power, that is to say, that power of free will with which God has endowed all men, for, if he proves himself worthy, God, through His thoughtfulness, will aid him in making that choice by bringing him to himself. The direct intervention of God in man's choice of good dealt with in this fragment must therefore be assumed to refer only to some help lent by God to man in the choice of good, when

man proves himself worthy of such a help by trying by his own power of free will with which God has endowed all men to avoid evil and to choose good. When therefore in this fragment God is spoken of as the cause of man's choice of the good, this statement is to be understood in two senses: (1) as the ultimate cause of the free will with which all men are endowed and (2) as the auxiliary cause of certain particular acts of the choice of good where man has proved himself worthy by exercising his free will in the avoidance of evil and in the pursuit of good.

This conception of divine aid or grace in the choice of good to those who have already by their general power of free will taken the initial steps towards the attainment of the good is expressed by Philo in several passages in his extant writings. In one of these passages, comparing the righteous mind in the soul of the individual to the righteous man in the race, he declares that, when a man has not completely succumbed to temptation and his rational soul or mind has not been completely effaced by sin and wickedness induced by the passions of his irrational soul, he will be helped by God to save himself by the choice of good. "Let us pray then," he says, "that, like a central pillar in a house, there may constantly remain for the healing of our maladies the righteous mind in the soul and in the human race the righteous man; for while he is sound and well, there is no cause to despair of the prospect of complete salvation, for our Saviour God holds out, we may be sure, the most all-healing remedy, His gracious power, and commits it to His suppliant and worshipper to use for the deliverance of those who are sickly, that He may apply it as an embrocation to those soul-wounds which were left gaping by the sword-edge of follies and injustices and all the rest of the horde of vices."⁴⁹ The implication of this

⁴⁹ *Migr.* 22, 124.

passage is quite clear: if man by his own free choice has kept himself from being completely sunk in evil and sin, even though he has not been able to resist temptation altogether, God by His power of graciousness will come to his assistance and will help him to choose the way to salvation.

The same view is also implied in another passage.⁵⁰ In that passage Philo speaks of the ordinary run of men who are constantly tossed about between reason and passion. He describes them as those who "set out to wage war on the passions on an insignificant, not on a grand, scale, but seek to come to terms and arrange a truce with them, putting forward the word of pacification."⁵¹ Such men, he says, can acquire virtue only by toil (*πόνω*).⁵² But, he adds, toil itself cannot achieve virtue without the help of God and consequently "it is necessary that the soul should not ascribe to itself its toil for virtue, but that it should take it away from itself and refer it to God, confessing that not its own strength or power acquired nobility, but He who freely bestowed also the love of it,"⁵³ for, he concludes, "only then does the soul begin to be saved, when the seat of anger has received reason as its charioteer, and toil has come to create in it, not self-satisfaction, but a readiness to yield the honor to God, the Bestower of the boon."⁵⁴ From the entire context of the passage it is clear that what Philo means to say is that man by his mind, which is endowed with freedom implanted in it by God, can of himself through toil take the initial steps in the attainment of virtue. He cannot, however, through himself and by his own toil achieve virtue. Mere toil will not lead him to the desired end, if not accompanied by a realization that his ability to take the initial steps in the attain-

⁵⁰ *Leg. All.* III, 46, 133-137.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* III, 46, 134.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 135.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 136.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 137.

ment of virtue and to toil for it is in itself a gift of God. Once he realizes that, God will help him to attain virtue.

In still another passage, speaking of the two natures in man, the irrational and the rational, he says, "Let us offer a noble and suitable prayer, which Moses offered before us, that 'God may open to us His own treasury' (Deut. 28: 12) and that sublime reason pregnant with divine illumination to which He has given the title of 'heaven'; and that He may close up the treasuries of evil things,"⁵⁵ concluding that God indeed "opens the treasury of good things but closes the treasuries of evil things."⁵⁶ Here, again, the implication is that sin is closed up by God and man chooses it entirely by his own free will, whereas virtue is left open by God so that if man makes an effort by his own free will to reach it, he can easily find it with the help of God. Prayer for divine help in guarding oneself against the choice of evil is also recommended by Philo in the following passage: "Pray then to God that thou mayest never become a leader in the wine song, never, that is, voluntarily take the first steps on the path which leads to indiscipline and folly."⁵⁷

The concept of grace is explicitly mentioned by him in his etymological explanation of the name Hannah. After explaining that Samuel stands as a symbol for "a mind which rejoices in the service and worship of God,"⁵⁸ he says: "His mother is Hannah, whose name means 'grace' (*χάρις*), for without divine grace (*θελας χάριτος*) it is impossible either to leave the ranks of mortality or to stay forever among the immortal."⁵⁹ By the mortal and the immortal here he

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 34, 104.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 105. In § 104 Philo uses definitely good in the sense of virtue and evil in the sense of sin, whereas in § 105 good and evil are used by him respectively in the sense of reward and punishment. Here as elsewhere the two meanings of good and evil are used by Philo indiscriminately. Cf. above, n. 37.

⁵⁷ *Ebr.* 32, 125.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 36, 144.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 145.

means those who deserve to be mortal or immortal as a result of their actions, namely, the wicked and the righteous. Elsewhere he explains "grace" here as "the gift of the wisdom of God" ⁶⁰ or the gift of "an inspired temper possessed by a God-sent frenzy." ⁶¹

What is required of man to be worthy of grace is discussed by him in another passage. Speaking of the mind that has been initiated into "the holy mysteries," that is, the mind that has learned to gain control over the passions and has also acquired a knowledge of God,⁶² he says that "it has been honored with the gift of quietude by God, who willed that it should be undistracted, never affected by any of the troublesome passions which necessities of the body engender, laying upon it through greed the domination of such passions." ⁶³

This conception of a divine grace or help in the attainment of virtue to those who of themselves with the power given to them by God make an effort to attain it was evidently common among the Jews, both Hellenistic and Palestinian, at the time of Philo. In the Wisdom of Solomon man is represented as having the power to love righteousness and the Lord and Wisdom and to be able to seek them ⁶⁴ and also as being able by his own power to keep the Law which constitutes the love of Wisdom.⁶⁵ But still man is said not to be able to obtain Wisdom without the help of God and one of the conditions of obtaining the help of God, it is further said, is to know that Wisdom is a gift of God for which one has to pray ⁶⁶ and, if one prays for it, it will be given to him.⁶⁷ In the Letter of

⁶⁰ *Immut.* 2, 5.

⁶¹ *Somm.* I, 43, 254.

⁶² Cf. above, p. 49.

⁶³ *Praem.* 20, 121.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* 7: 7. On the doctrine of grace in Hellenistic Judaism see also A. D.

Nock, *St. Paul* (Home University Library, 1938), p. 75.

⁶⁴ Wisdom of Solomon 1: 1; 6: 12.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* 6: 18.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 8: 21.

Aristeas the same view is expressed in the statements that "it is a gift of God to be able to do good actions and not the contrary,"⁶⁸ that "the soul is so constituted that it is able by the divine power to receive all the good and reject the contrary"⁶⁹ and that it is not possible to acquire the virtue of temperance "unless God creates a disposition towards it."⁷⁰ A suggestion of this view of divine grace as supplementary to free will may perhaps be also discerned in one of the descriptions of the Pharisaic doctrine given by Josephus.⁷¹ More definitely is this combination of the element of divine grace with absolute free will expressed by the rabbis in many statements, of which the following ones are characteristic. Commenting on the verse, "Surely he scorneth the scorners, but he giveth grace unto the lowly,"⁷² they say: "To him who desires to contaminate himself doors are open (to go out and act according to his free choice); to one who desires to purify himself assistance will be given (from heaven),"⁷³ for as they say elsewhere: "The evil impulse of man gains strength against him every day . . . and were it not for the help of the Holy One he could not prevail against it."⁷⁴

While the ordinary run of men, according to Philo, could acquire virtue only by toil with the assistance of divine grace, there were certain persons, he maintains, to whom virtue was natural and they needed not to toil in order to attain it. Of such a nature, according to him, was Moses, "because he, being perfect, has no small or petty aims, nor any desire to moderate his passions, but goes so far as to cut off all passions everywhere,"⁷⁵ and consequently he "received virtue easily

⁶⁸ Aristeas, 231.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 236.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 237; cf. 238 and 226.

⁷¹ Cf. below, nn. 99 and 100.

⁷² Prov. 3: 34.

⁷³ *Shabbat* 104a and parallels.

⁷⁴ *Sukkah* 52b; *Kiddushin* 20b.

⁷⁵ *Leg. All.* III, 46, 134.

and without toil from the hands of God.”⁷⁶ Of such a nature was also Noah. “For should anyone ask why the prophet says that Noah found grace in the sight of the Lord God⁷⁷ when as yet he had, so far as our knowledge goes, done no fair deed, we shall give a suitable answer to the effect that he is shown to be of an excellent nature from his birth.”⁷⁸ So also were Melchizedek,⁷⁹ Abraham,⁸⁰ Isaac,⁸¹ and Jacob.⁸² But this perfect nature with which all these perfect persons were endowed from their birth was itself a gift by divine grace, for, as he says in his discussion of Isaac: “Some even before their birth God endows with a goodly form and equipment, and has determined that they shall have a most excellent portion.”⁸³ Whether this view that certain scriptural personages were endowed from birth with a disposition to virtue meant also that the personages so endowed were absolutely sinless during their lifetime is not stated by Philo. All he says about them, as will have been noticed, is that by a certain natural endowment they could receive virtue easily and without toil. Elsewhere he makes the general statement that “sin is congenital to every created being, even the best, just because it is created.”⁸⁴ Whether this statement includes also those whom he describes as having been favored by God with a most excellent portion is not clear. In rabbinic literature, conflicting opinions are expressed as to the sinlessness of the Patriarchs.⁸⁵ Similarly with regard to

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 135.

⁷⁷ Gen. 6: 8.

⁷⁸ *Leg. All.* III, 24, 77.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* 25, 79-81.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* 27, 83-84.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* 28, 85-87.

⁸² *Ibid.* 29, 88-89.

⁸³ *Ibid.* 28, 85.

⁸⁴ *Mos.* II, 29, 147.

⁸⁵ (1) That they did sin: 'Arakin 17a; *Midrash Tehillim* on Ps. 16: 2; *Ecclesiastes Rabbah* on Eccles. 4: 3; *Nedarim* 32a and parallels. (2) That they did not sin: *Mekilta, Vayassa*, 3 (W, p. 56b; F, p. 48a; HR, p. 163; ed. L, II, 106). Cf. S. Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, 173; G. F. Moore, *Judaism* I, 468 L. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, V, 220, n. 66; 228, n. 110.

Moses, sometimes he is spoken of as having committed certain sins,⁸⁶ whereas sometimes he is spoken of as if he were sinless.⁸⁷ Noah is represented as having sinned immediately after he had found grace in the sight of the Lord God.⁸⁸ Whether those scriptural personages, such as the Patriarchs and Moses, who in rabbinic literature are represented either as being predominantly virtuous or as being absolutely free of sin, were also considered by the rabbis, as they were by Philo, as being endowed by God from birth with an excellent nature which made it easy for them to acquire virtue is not clear. Such a rabbinic statement as that the Patriarchs were three exceptional men "over whom the Evil Impulse had no power"⁸⁹ may perhaps mean, as is the opinion of Philo, that they were endowed from birth with a special gift to resist evil; but it may also be only a description of the fact that by their own free will and toil they subdued the Evil Impulse.

It is in the light of this analysis of his conception of free will that a great many of the vague statements in which the homilies of Philo abound are to be understood. As an example I shall take his homily on the verse: "God cast a trance upon Adam and he went to sleep."⁹⁰ He takes this verse allegorically as referring to "mind" which "falls into a trance when it ceases to be engaged with objects appropriate to it," and from the words "God cast a trance" he infers that "this change and turning which he undergoes is not by himself but by God who 'casts it on him,' that is, brings and sends it on him." He then tries to prove this empirically. "For if the change were in our hands I should

⁸⁶ *Yoma* 86b and parallels. Cf. Ginzberg, *op. cit.*, VI, 109, n. 616; 148, n. 889.

⁸⁷ *Shabbat* 55b; *Sifre* on Deut. 32: 50, § 339, F, p. 141a; HF, p. 388.

⁸⁸ *Petirat Mosheh* in Jellinek, *Bet ha-Midrash*, I, 118. Cf. Ginzberg, *op. cit.*, III, 427; V, 186, n. 49.

⁸⁹ *Baba Batra* 17a.

⁹⁰ Gen. 2: 21.

have recourse to it, when I wished, and when it was not my deliberate choice I should then continue unturned. But as it is, the change is actually repugnant to me, and many a time when wishing to entertain some fitting thought, I am drenched by a flood of unfitting matters pouring over me; and conversely when on the point of admitting a conception of something vile, I have washed the vile thing away with wholesome thoughts, God having by His grace poured upon my soul a sweet draught in place of the bitter one.”⁹¹ At first sight it would seem that contrary to what we have shown from Philo’s other statements, that according to him evil is never caused directly by God and that in the choice of good God is only an auxiliary cause, he says here that the choice of evil is not of our own free will but is caused by God and that similarly God forces upon us the good contrary to our free choice. But upon a closer examination of this passage we shall find that it falls in with Philo’s views as we have found them elsewhere.

To begin with, the statement here that unfitting matters pour over man even when he wishes to entertain some fitting thought is to be taken to refer to involuntary sins, which, according to Philo, as we have seen,⁹² are committed by man as a result of the fact that owing to his past record he has been chosen by God’s will as an instrument of His judgment. Accordingly the other statement here that “this change and turning which he undergoes is not by himself but by God” is to be understood as referring not to sins directly caused by God but rather to those brought about incidentally as a result of his having been chosen by God as the instrument of His judgment. Then the statement here about wholesome thoughts with which God in His grace washes away the conception of something vile which man is on the point of ad-

⁹¹ *Leg. All.* II, 9, 31-32.

⁹² Cf. above, n. 37.

mitting is to be taken to refer to a case where the man in question has merited in the eyes of God that special assistance in the attainment of good which, according to the other passages we have discussed, God extends to those who are worthy of it.

That this is the meaning of the passage is shown in the sequel. "Now every created thing must necessarily undergo change, for this is its property, even as unchangeableness is the property of God. But, while some, after being changed, remain so until they are entirely destroyed, others continue so only so far as to experience that to which all flesh is liable, and these forthwith. This is why Moses says, 'He will not permit the destroyer to come into your houses to smite you' (Exod. 12: 23): for He does indeed permit the destroyer — ('destruction' being the change or turning of the soul) — to enter into the soul, that He may make it evident that what is peculiar to created things is there; but God will not let the offspring of the 'seeing' Israel be in such wise changed as to receive his death-blow by the change, but will force him to rise and emerge as though from deep water and recover."⁹³ The meaning of this passage is quite clear. That man should change from fitting thoughts to unfitting is necessary by the general scheme of God which made man's soul consist of a rational and an irrational part. That some men should remain in their changed condition and lead a life of wickedness until they are destroyed is also in accordance with the divine scheme which endowed man with freedom of choice. That God should not allow the Israelites to go to utter destruction by their wrongdoing is also in accordance with his view that God extends His grace and help to those who are worthy of salvation and that to Him the Israelites are worthy of such salvation, if not by their merit,

⁹³ *Leg. All.* II, 9, 33-34.

then by the merit of their ancestors, who were especially elected by God, and whose merit is inherited by their offspring. This last view refers to the principle of the "merit of the Fathers" which is dwelt so much upon in rabbinic theology,⁹⁴ and which goes back to the scriptural verse: "Only the Lord had a delight in thy Fathers to love them, and He chose their seed after them."⁹⁵

His view that God has reserved for himself the power to upset the laws of nature by working miracles has provided Philo, as we have seen, with a logical explanation for human freedom. Free will in man is nothing but a part of God's own freedom, with which man is endowed by God. But the question inevitably arises how such freedom can be reconciled with the knowledge which God is said to possess of all things even before they happen. Philo does not raise this question directly, nor does he discuss it, but without much ado he asserts his belief both in the foreknowledge of God and in the free will of man, "for," he says, "God the maker of living beings knoweth well the different pieces of His own handiwork, even before He has thoroughly chiselled and consummated them, and the faculties which they are to display in a later time, in a word their deeds and experiences."⁹⁶ Again: "So Moses says that God brought all the animals to Adam, wishing to see what appellations he would assign to them severally. Not that He was in any doubt — for to God nothing is unknown — but because He knew that He had formed in mortal man the natural ability to reason of his own motion, that so He himself might have no share in faulty action."⁹⁷ The same combination of divine foreknowledge and human free will is also to be found in one of

⁹⁴ Cf. Schechter, *op. cit.*, 170-198; Moore, *op. cit.*, I, 536-545.

⁹⁵ Deut. 10: 15; cf. 4: 37; 7: 6-8.

⁹⁶ *Leg. All.* III, 29, 88; cf. *Opif.* 52, 149.

⁹⁷ *Opif.* 52, 149.

the descriptions of the Pharisaic doctrine given by Josephus, in which he says: "They hold that to act rightly or otherwise rests, indeed, for the most part with man, but that in each action Fate (*εἰμαρμένη*) assists."⁹⁸ The term Fate, it has been shown, is used here by Josephus in the sense of Providence⁹⁹ and consequently the statement here means that despite man's free will God has a knowledge as well as a foreknowledge of his actions.¹⁰⁰ The Pharisees, or rather the rabbis, speaking for themselves, say similarly that "everything is in the power of God except the fear of God"¹⁰¹ and that "everything is foreseen, yet freedom of choice is given."¹⁰²

III. CONCLUSION, INFLUENCE, ANTICIPATION

Let us now summarize the result of our discussion of Philo's theory of free will. Man as a part of nature, a microcosm of the macrocosm, is composed of a rational element which

⁹⁸ *Bell. Jud.* II, 8, 14, 163. In *Antt.* XIII, 5, 9, 172, the wording of the statement is different.

⁹⁹ Cf. note in Thackeray's translation *ad loc.*, referring to Reinach; G. F. Moore, "Fate and Free Will in Jewish Philosophies according to Josephus," *Harvard Theological Review*, 22 (1929), 379 ff.; I. N. Simhoni, notes to his Hebrew translation of *Bell. Jud.*, *ad loc.*; J. Klausner, *Historiyyah Yisre'elit*, II, 102.

Goodenough, in his *By Light, Light*, p. 79, takes "Fate" in this passage of Josephus in its literal sense and makes Josephus attribute to the Pharisees the "doctrine of predestination," concluding: "It is . . . in harmony with the Sadducees that Philo consistently, in its Stoic form, repudiates determinism, to make man a free moral agent." This is not a happy presentation of the case. The point at issue between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, even on the basis of the statements by Josephus, was not on the question of free will; the point at issue between them was on the question of divine providence.

¹⁰⁰ It is not impossible that in his use of the term "assists (*βοηθεῖν*)" there is a suggestion of the doctrine of divine grace as supplementary to free will, which we have discussed above, nn. 68-74. Moore (*op. cit.*, p. 384) hesitatingly suggests a possible origin of this term in the distinction found in Chrysippus between principal and adjuvant causes. The term *gratia adjuvans* occurs later in Christian theology (see Loofs, *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte, Register*, s.v., and cf. below, pp. 459 f., nn. 2-9).

¹⁰¹ *Berakot* 33b and parallels.

¹⁰² *M. Abot* III, 15.

comes from the intelligible world and of a body which is created of matter. As in the world as a whole, these two elements in man are opposed to each other. But whereas in the world reason did by divine decree at the very beginning of the creation of the world gain dominance over the errant and discordant matter, in man reason did not gain undisputed dominance, for it is not only body that reason has to contend with in man but also a bodily soul, which was itself created by God and endowed by Him with certain powers which are irrational and opposed to the powers of reason. The conflict between these two sets of powers, the rational and irrational, therefore, continues in man throughout his lifetime. When man is left to himself, the outcome of the conflict would depend upon the relative strength which these powers would happen to possess or would have developed in the course of man's life.

But God, who in His own case has reserved for himself the power of freedom to upset the laws of nature which He established in the world at the time of its creation, has endowed man with a similar power of freedom to upset the laws of nature to which he is subject. This is a sort of miracle which man can work in the economy of his own life analogous to the miracles which God can work and does work in the economy of the world as a whole. This miraculous power of free will with which the human mind is endowed extends both to the choice of evil and to the choice of good. But there is the following difference between these two kinds of choices. The choice of evil is left wholly to the power of man. The choice of good, however, is not left wholly to man's power. Once man makes an effort to utilize the power granted to him in overcoming evil and in pursuing good, and once he recognizes that that power of his is a gift from God and that without that gift of God he would be helpless in his effort, and

once he prays for further help from God, God will come to his assistance in his effort to overcome the evil and to attain the good. This is merited grace, which applies to all men. But in the case of some men, God endowed them even before their birth with free grace, and such free grace was even inherited by their descendants. In such cases of inherited free grace, while those who are blessed with it are not wholly immune from sin, they will never be allowed by God to sink completely in sin. This freedom of action which man enjoys as a gift of God does not in any way, according to Philo, contravene the prescience of God. Despite the freedom of man to act as he chooses, God may still be said to have foreknowledge of what man will do.

In Philo's conception of human freedom we have an adumbration of all the elements of the problem as it presented itself to the minds of religious philosophers, whether Christian, Moslem, or Jewish, throughout the ages. Like Philo, they all as a rule start out with the assumption that there are laws of nature but that these laws were established in the world by God and that God has reserved for himself the freedom to upset these laws on certain occasions and for good reasons in the form of miracles. We have already quoted the views of some representative religious philosophers on this point.¹

It is this freedom of the will of God in His relations to man, which is assumed by all medieval philosophers, that has provided them, as in Philo, with a rationale for their common belief in the free will of man. When God created Adam and implanted in him a mind, He implanted in him therewithal the freedom of choice whereby out of his own free will he disobeyed God and fell. But in Christianity there appeared

¹ Cf. above, pp. 357 ff.

the belief, given expression to by St. Augustine, that with his fall Adam was deprived of that freedom and that this lack of freedom was inherited by his descendants. If man was still spoken of as having free will, that freedom of the will had to come to him as a grace from God. In other words, the divine grace which according to Philo was only auxiliary to the initial freedom which man possessed became in the case of the descendants of Adam the sole basis of their freedom, a sort of freedom which in reality amounted to a theological determinism. Still the Philonic view has found expression in Christianity. St. Augustine himself, earlier in his life, before he adopted the view with which his name is associated, believed that the descendants of Adam have retained to some extent that freedom of choice with which Adam was endowed by God and that, if they make an effort to exercise that freedom in the right direction, God will further their effort by His adjuvant grace (*gratia adjuvans*).² "When anyone perceives that by himself he is not strong enough to rise up, let him pray for the help of the Liberator. Grace then will come, and it will forgive past sins, and help him who exerts himself, and bestow the love of justice."³ . . . Grace indeed brings about that we shall not only *will* to do rightly but also *be able* to do so, not by our own powers, but by the help of the Liberator.⁴ . . . For will is not enough, unless God also shows His mercy; but God, who calls to peace, does not show His mercy, unless will has preceded, forasmuch as 'peace on

² Cf. F. Loofs, *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte*, 4th ed., pp. 360-361, 378.

³ *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos*, 13-18 (PL 35, 2065): *cum se quisque cognoverit per seipsum surgere non valere, imploret Liberatoris auxilium. Venit ergo gratia quae donet peccata praeterita, et conantem adjuvet, et tribuat charitatem justitiae.*

⁴ *Ibid.* (2066): *Gratia vero efficit ut non tantum velimus recte facere, sed etiam possumus; non viribus nostris, sed Liberatoris auxilio.*

earth is to men of good will.'”⁵ Thus Jerome, commenting on the verse, “Her sins, which are many, are forgiven, for she loved much,”⁶ says: “From this we understand that it is not by our own power only that we do what we wish but also by the mercy of God, if only He gives assistance to our will.”⁷ Similarly Cassianus sums up his discussion of free will in the statements that “there always remains in man free will which may either neglect or love the grace of God”⁸ and that “the grace of God coöperates with our will favorably and in all things assists it, protects it and defends it.”⁹

In connection with free will and grace there appear in Christianity also the other problems which we have found in Philo and the rabbis. As in Philo and the rabbis, in whom we have found either vague or contradictory statements as to the sinlessness of various scriptural personages, so also in Christianity there appeared the question whether there were men before the appearance of Christ who did not commit sin.¹⁰ Of a similar nature is the problem in Islam as to whether the prophets were sinless.¹¹ Again as Philo, who held that the special grace of the Patriarchs was inherited by their descendants with the result that Israel would not be allowed by God to go to utter destruction by sin, so also in Chris-

⁵ *De diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII*, 68, 5 (PL 40, 73): *Parum est enim velle, nisi Deus misereatur: sed Deus non miseretur, qui ad pacem vocat, nisi voluntas praecesserit; quia in terra pax hominibus bonae voluntatis.* Cf. Luke 2: 14. ⁶ Luke 7:47.

⁷ *Dialogus adversus Pelagianos* (PL 23, 542 B): *Ex qua intelligimus non nostras solum esse potestatis facere quod velimus, sed et Dei clementiae, si nostram adjuvat voluntatem.*

⁸ *Joannis Cassiani Collationes XII* (PL 49, 929 A): *Et idcirco manet in homine semper liberum arbitrium, quod gratiam Dei possit vel negligere vel amare.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, XIII (932 A): *Et ita semper gratia Dei nostro in bonam partem cooperatur arbitrio, atque in omnibus illud adjuvat, protegit et defendit.*

¹⁰ Not only Pelagius but also Athanasius took the positive view on this question, Cf. Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines*, §§ 108, n. 3; 110, n. 2.

¹¹ E. Sell, *The Faith of Islam*, 3d ed., 1907, p. 244; F. A. Klein, *The Religion of Islam*, 1906, p. 73; M. Muhammad Ali, *The Religion of Islam*, 1936, p. 233.

tianity Paul declares that "all Israel shall be saved" in the end because "as touching the election, they are beloved for the fathers' sake."¹² Then also as in Philo and the rabbis, simultaneously with the free will of man medieval philosophers affirmed the foreknowledge of God. But more than Philo and the rabbis they saw the difficulties involved in the assertion of these two propositions. It is this phase of the problem which led in Islam to the denial of freedom on the part of the orthodox Kalam and in Christianity, and to a lesser degree in Judaism, to a restriction of the meaning of freedom. The common tendency, however, was to maintain the two and to find a way of reconciling them. A formula which appears constantly in philosophy is that God's knowledge is not causative. In Christianity among the Church Fathers this formula, as restated by John of Damascus, reads: "God foreknows all things but does not pre-determine them."¹³ In Arabic philosophy, the same formula, as quoted in the name of the Mutazilites, reads: "The knowledge of what is to come into existence is not the cause of its coming into existence, just as the knowledge of that which has come into existence is not the cause of its having come into existence."¹⁴ The explanation offered in medieval philosophy in support of this principle is rather subtle, but it ultimately amounts to nothing more than the simple assertion of Philo and the rabbis that both God has foreknowledge and man is free.

It is this traditional conception of God's, as well as man's, freedom of the will, which originated in the philosophy of Philo and was maintained throughout medieval philosophy, though occasionally somewhat modified, that was made the subject of attack by those who before Spinoza began to nib-

¹² Rom. 11: 26-29.

¹³ *De Fide Orthodoxa* II, 30 (PG 94, 969 B f.): πάντα μὲν προγινώσκει ὁ θεός, οὐ πάντα δὲ προορίζει.

¹⁴ Judah ha-Levi, *Cuzari* V, 20; cf. Saadia, *Emunot we-De'ot* IV, 4.

ble at traditional philosophy, and by Spinoza himself in his grand assault on it. The result, in the case of Spinoza, was a return to the classical conception of the immutability of the laws of nature, especially as it was conceived by Aristotle, ere it was modified by Philo's introduction of the principle of the changeability of these laws through the miraculous intervention of God. The God of Spinoza, like the God of Aristotle, acts by what traditional philosophy would call the necessity of His own nature but which Spinoza himself defines as true freedom. Man also, according to him, has not that power to overcome his passions which traditional philosophy would call the power of one's free will; but still he himself, like Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, speaks of man's ability to overcome his passions by knowledge and thereby become free. It is not until the entire conception of immutable laws of nature was called into doubt that absolute undetermined freedom of the human will, like that asserted by Philo, makes its reappearance in philosophy. But the ground for the questioning of the immutability of the laws of nature is not the rediscovery of a God who like the God of Philo and his followers is endowed with a miracle-working power. The historical background of this new view is to be found in the ancient Epicurean denial of causality.

**STRUCTURE AND GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHIC SYSTEMS
FROM PLATO TO SPINOZA
II**

**PHILO
VOLUME II**

PHILO

FOUNDATIONS OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY
IN JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY, AND ISLAM

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PHILO

**FOUNDATIONS OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY IN
JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY, AND ISLAM**

VOLUME II

CHAPTER IX

KNOWLEDGE AND PROPHECY

I. SENSATION, REASON, AND PROPHECY

THE PSYCHOLOGY of Philo is essentially Platonic, though in his description of the faculties of the soul he uses Stoic vocabulary and occasionally also Aristotelian vocabulary.¹ The soul, or to be more exact the rational soul, has an existence prior to the body and when placed in the body it continues to exist as something distinct from the body. But unlike Plato's soul, as we shall see, it did not possess a knowledge of its own which it forgot upon its entrance into the body and to regain which it had to reëducate itself by the instrumentality of the body. Its knowledge begins upon its entrance into the body. Through the instrumentality of the body it acquires the knowledge of sensation and from that lowest form of knowledge it rises to higher forms.

There is in Philo no formal classification of the various types of knowledge. In the places in which he happens to touch upon the subject he mentions only two types of knowledge, sensation and mind (*νοῦς*),² or sensation and thought (*διάνοια*),³ or sensation and reason (*λογισμός*).⁴ These two types of knowledge are considered by him as being dependent upon each other. With regard to the dependence of reason upon sensation, he says that it is impossible to apprehend the intelligible world or any other existing being which is incorporeal "except by making corporeal objects our starting-

¹ Cf. above, I, 389.

² *Leg. All.* I, 11, 29; cf. Leisegang, *Indices*, under *αἰσθησις*, 4.

³ *Conf.* 26, 133; cf. Leisegang, *loc. cit.*, 3; cf. also "sensation and the power of thinking (*διανοητικὴ δύναμις*)" (*Leg. All.* II, 7, 23, and II, 8, 24).

⁴ *Praem.* 5, 28; cf. Leisegang, *loc. cit.*, 5.

point,"⁵ for the visible world is "a kind of gate (*πύλη τις*)" to the intelligible world.⁶ Similarly, with regard to the dependence of sensation upon reason, referring to the Stoic eightfold classification of the faculties or parts of the soul, he says that "were a man to do away with the eighth, mind, which is the ruler of these . . . he will paralyze the seven also; for they are all strong by sharing the strength and vigor of the mind."⁷ In this he is merely reëchoing the view common to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. All of them, in different ways, believed in the existence of a reciprocal relation between sensation and reason.

But, just as to him God is above the Logos immanent in the world,⁸ so he also argues that God is above the mind immanent in man, and God it is who directs the activities of that mind. Just as God, on implanting in the world a Logos, did not abdicate His power to govern the world,⁹ so also, on implanting a mind in the human body, He did not abdicate His power to govern the processes of human knowledge. And he constantly reminds the reader that it is God who is directly the cause of the processes of sensation and reason. "He is a shallow thinker," says Philo, "who supposes that in strict truth anything whatever derives its birth from the mind or from himself,"¹⁰ meaning thereby Protagoras, to whom all the functions of the soul are due to the soul itself which resides in the body or to the body which houses the soul.¹¹ Nay, "it is God who brings about birth,"¹² that is to say, it is God who, having created a soul with various potentialities, brings them out into actuality.¹³ "The mind," he says in another place, "imparts to the portion of the soul that is devoid

⁵ *Somn.* I, 32, 187.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 188.

⁷ *Deter.* 46, 168.

⁸ Cf. above, I, 327 ff.

⁹ Cf. above, I, 349, 429.

¹⁰ *Leg. All.* II, 13, 46.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 45. Cf. above, I, 167 ff.

¹² *Ibid.*, 47.

¹³ Cf. *ibid.*, 44-45.

of reason a share of that which it had received by God, so that the mind was besouled by God, but the unreasoning part by mind.”¹⁴ But lest one think that God’s direct share is only in the rational processes of the soul and not in its irrational processes, he explains in another passage that God has a direct share even in the process of sensation. “But neither has the mind power to work, that is, to put forth its energies by way of sense-perception, unless God send the object of sense as rain upon it.”¹⁵

Not all the knowledge of reason or of the mind, however, is dependent upon sensation. In several passages Philo quite clearly indicates that there is another kind of knowledge of reason or of the mind which is not dependent upon the senses. In one place he says that nature bestows “on mind, as on a mighty king, (a) through the senses as its bodyguards, all the things which are perceptible by the senses; (b) without them, all those things which are apprehensible by reason.”¹⁶ In another place he says that while sense-perception observes only “the surface of things visible,” the mind (*διάνοια*) “(a) penetrates through the depths of corporeal things, accurately observing their whole contents and their several parts, (b) surveying also the nature of things incorporeal, which sense is unable to descry.”¹⁷ Combining these two passages we get the view that the knowledge of the mind, as distinguished from the knowledge of sensation, is subdivided into two parts, namely, (a) the knowledge of the mind through the senses, and this consists in the knowledge of the constitution of corporeal things and all their parts in their relation to each other, and (b) the knowledge of the mind without the agency of the senses, and this consists of the knowledge of “things incorporeal,” that

¹⁴ *Ibid.* I, 13, 40.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* I, 11, 29.

¹⁶ *Spec.* III, 20, 111.

¹⁷ *Virt.* 3, 12.

is, the ideas. These two types of the knowledge of the mind are also suggested in a passage in which he describes two kinds of mind, one which gains its knowledge of God "from created things" and another which, rising itself above creation, "obtains a clear vision of the uncreated One."¹⁸ The latter kind of knowledge of God is called by him "the great mysteries,"¹⁹ in contradistinction to the former kind of knowledge of God which he calls the "lesser mysteries."²⁰

This distinction between two kinds of knowledge of the mind is to be discerned also in a passage in which he enumerates the following three types of knowledge: (1) knowledge of things seen "by the eyes of the body"; (2) knowledge of things which "the soul beholds by its own agency without the assistance of any other," that is, without any assistance from sensation, and this is the knowledge of the "intelligible things" (*τὰ νοούμενα*) which are "a light to themselves"; (3) knowledge of "the sciences" (*ἐπιστήμαι*) which we learn when "the mind applies its eyes which never close or sleep to the doctrines (*δόγμασι*) and propositions (*θεωρήμασι*) set before it and sees them by no borrowed but a genuine light which shines forth from itself."²¹ In this passage, it will be noticed, the last two types of knowledge are contrasted with the first type in that they are both knowledge of the mind, but the difference between them, though not clearly stated, would seem to be that in the case of the second type the object of knowledge is the "intelligible things," that is, the ideas, whereas in the case of the third type the object of knowledge is the "doctrines and [geometrical] propositions" which are ultimately derived from sensation. In another passage, Philo mentions again two main types of knowledge, that of reason (*λογισμός*) and that of sensation (*αἰσθησις*), describing

¹⁸ *Leg. All.* III, 33, 100; cf. *Abr.* 24, 122. ²⁰ *Abr.* 24, 122. Cf. above, I, 47 ff.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Mut.* I, 4-5.

the former as dealing with intelligible things (*νοητά*) the end of which is truth (*ἀλήθεια*) and the latter as dealing with visible things (*δρατά*) the end of which is opinion (*δόξα*).²² In this passage, in the light of a classification we shall quote from Plato, it is not impossible that under the knowledge of "reason" which deals with "intelligible things" Philo means to include the two types of knowledge of the mind mentioned in the other passages, namely, the knowledge of the ideas and the knowledge of the sciences which is ultimately based upon sensation.

We thus have in Philo a general twofold division of knowledge subdivided into three. (*A*) Knowledge of the senses, consisting of (1) sensation and opinion. (*B*) Knowledge of the mind, consisting of (2) rational knowledge, such as a knowledge of the various sciences which ultimately rests on sensation, and of (3) the knowledge of the ideas which does not rest on sensation at all.

Now, on the whole, this classification of the various types of knowledge reflects a composite view of many statements of Plato, which may be reduced to the following scheme of classification. Knowledge is either of the (*A*) visible (*δρατόν*) order or of the (*B*) intelligible (*νοητόν*) order.²³ The former consists of (1) sensation (*αἰσθησις*) and opinion (*δόξα*).²⁴ The latter consists of (2) science (*ἐπιστήμη*),²⁵ whereby he means the mathematical sciences, including geometry, astronomy, acoustics, and harmonics, as well as, in fact, all the other sciences which must begin with certain visible images,²⁶ and of (3) the knowledge of the ideas.²⁷ But, in Plato, the high-

²² *Praem.* 5, 28.

²³ *Republic* VI, 509 D.

²⁴ Aristotle, *De Anima* I, 2, 404b, 23-24; Plato, *Timaeus* 52 A.

²⁵ *De Anima*, loc. cit., 22; *Timaeus* 37 C.

²⁶ *Republic* VI, 510 B-511 A; VII, 526-527.

²⁷ *Ibid.* VI, 511 B-C.

est kind of knowledge, the knowledge of the ideas, comes, according to the *Republic*, through dialectics²⁸ and, according to other dialogues, through recollection.²⁹ In Philo, however, dialectics as a method of arriving at a knowledge of the ideas is never suggested.³⁰ Nor is there in his writings any suggestion of recollection in the Platonic sense of the recollection of the ideas. There are only three references to recollection in his writings, and none of them, as may be gathered from the context, is used in that Platonic sense. In one place he says: "The advance from forgetfulness necessarily involves recollection, and recollection (*ἀνάμνησις*) is akin to learning (*μαθήσεως*). For what he has acquired often floats away from the learner's mind, because in his weakness he is unable to retain it, and then emerges and starts again. When it flows away we say he is in a state of forgetfulness, and when it returns we call it a state of recollection. Surely then memory (*μνήμη*) closely corresponds to natural excellence and recollection to learning."³¹ This statement, indeed, contains references to Plato's statements about learning being recollection³² and about the difference between memory and recollection,³³ but it does not deal with the recollection of the ideas which were forgotten at the time the soul entered into the body; it deals rather with the recalling to memory of something we have acquired and then forgotten during our lifetime. In another place he refers to "the saying that learning is recollection."³⁴ This again is a reference to Plato,³⁵ but from the context it is quite evident that it

²⁸ *Ibid.* VI, 511 B ff.

²⁹ *Phaedo* 72 E-76; *Phaedrus* 249 C; *Meno* 80 D ff.

³⁰ Cf. *Agr.* 3, 13; 31, 140; *Plant.* 27, 115; *Congr.* 4, 18; *Mos.* II, 7, 39, where he uses the term "dialectic" in its strictly Aristotelian and Stoic sense.

³¹ *Mut.* 16, 100-101.

³² *Phaedo* 72 E; *Meno* 81 D.

³⁴ *Praem.* 2, 9.

³³ *Philebus* 34 A-C.

³⁵ Cf. above, n. 32.

does not refer to the Platonic theory of the recollection of the ideas but rather to his own view that none of the human achievements is a discovery by man's own power but that all of them were implanted by God in nature at the time of creation for men later to discover. In a third place, describing the gifted nature of Moses and how he anticipated all the instruction of his teachers, he says that "his seemed (*δοκεῖν*) to be a case rather of recollection (*ἀνάμνησις*) than of learning (*μάθησις*)."³⁶ Though the contrast between "recollection" and "learning" in this passage reflects again Plato's statement that "our learning (*μάθησις*) is nothing else than recollection (*ἀνάμνησις*),"³⁷ still from the very statement that only the learning of Moses seemed to be recollection, and even that learning only *seemed* to be recollection, it is quite evident that he does not share Plato's view that all learning is recollection and that the highest kind of knowledge, the knowledge of the ideas, is attained through recollection (*μνήμη*).³⁸ Philo's highest kind of knowledge, the knowledge of the ideas, is therefore neither the dialectics nor the recollection of Plato. What he means by that kind of knowledge must be determined by what he says about it in various places.

A suggestion as to what he means by his third class of knowledge may be found in an implied threefold classification of knowledge in a passage in which he gives an allegorical interpretation of the verse "Now the giants were on the earth in those days."³⁹ In this story, he says, Moses wishes to show that "some men are earth-born, some heaven-born, and some God-born."⁴⁰ The earth-born are defined by him

³⁶ *Mos.* I, 5, 21.

³⁷ *Phaedo* 72 E.

³⁸ *Phaedrus* 249 c.

³⁹ Gen. 6: 4.

⁴⁰ *Gig.* 13, 60. For the expression "earth-born" and "heaven-born," see *Republic X*, 619 c-D: τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἠκόντων τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς.

as those "who are hunters after the pleasures of the body." Pleasure is elsewhere connected by Philo with sensation.⁴¹ The heaven-born are defined by him as those "who are men of art and scientific knowledge and devoted to learning; for the heavenly portion of us is our mind." This quite obviously refers to the second type of knowledge. The God-born, or, as he also calls them, the men of God, are defined by him as those who "have risen wholly above the sphere of sense-perception and have been translated into the world of the intelligible and dwell there registered as freemen of the commonwealth of ideas, which are imperishable and incorporeal." This, again, quite obviously refers to what we have called his third type of knowledge. Now these God-born men, or men of God, who have attained the third stage of knowledge are said by him to be "priests and prophets," with the implication that the third type of knowledge is what Scripture calls prophecy. Here, then, Philo identifies his third and highest kind of knowledge, the knowledge of the ideas, with prophecy, thus substituting the term prophecy for the Platonic term recollection. For Plato never describes recollection by the term prophecy. He calls it philosophic frenzy,⁴² but never prophecy. The term prophecy is reserved by him as description for that kind of frenzy which inspires divination or the prediction of the future.⁴³ Prophecy as a substitute for Plato's highest type of knowledge is also implied in Philo's statement that "the holy books of the Lord are not monuments of knowledge (*scientiae*) or of vision (*videndi*), but are the divine command and the divine Logos,"⁴⁴ that is to say, they are not based upon scientific knowledge or sensation but rather upon prophetic revelation. When Philo, therefore, describes that which Plato would call recollection

⁴¹ *Leg. All.* II, 18, 73-74.

⁴² *Phaedrus* 249 D; *Symposium* 218 B.

⁴³ Cf. below, p. 14.

⁴⁴ *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 140; cf. below, p. 189.

or philosophic frenzy as prophecy, there must be some reason for it. What that reason is we shall now try to discover.

II. THE FOUR FUNCTIONS OF PROPHECY

We have reason to believe that Philo had learned about prophecy from Scripture before he became acquainted with it in his reading of Homer and Plato and the Stoics, and that his own ultimate views on prophecy, like all his religious views, were formed from certain basic conceptions derived from Scripture and reshaped and restated in terms borrowed from philosophy. We must therefore first try to find out what basic conceptions of prophecy he may have gathered from Scripture.

To begin with, prophecy as depicted in Scripture must have appeared to him as the power to predict the future. Jacob, in his prophetic spirit, is pictured in Scripture as telling his children that which shall befall them in the end of days.¹ Moses, in his prophetic capacity, is depicted in Scripture as making predictions about the successful outcome of the crossing of the Red Sea,² about the coming down of manna from heaven,³ and about the future of each tribe.⁴ Samuel, in his capacity as a prophet, is represented as a seer who can foretell the future.⁵ The prophets in the early history of Judah and Israel are pictured as diviners who foretell the outcome of sickness or rebellion or war.⁶ All the later prophets prophesy about the future of nations and the world.⁷ Divination is thus the first characteristic of prophecy which Philo could have gathered from Scripture.

Second, prophecy as depicted in Scripture must have also

¹ Gen. 49: 1.

² Exod. 14: 13-14.

³ Exod. 16: 4-7.

⁴ Deut. 33.

⁵ I Sam. 9: 6-9.

⁶ Cf. I Kings 5: 1-14; 22: 7-28.

⁷ Cf., e.g., Isa. 15; 17; 19; Jer. 46-51; Ezek. 25-32.

appeared to him as the power to know what rites are to be performed and what prayers are to be offered in order to propitiate God and to avert some evil which God has inflicted upon people. Abimelech is told by God in a dream concerning Abraham: "For he is a prophet, and he shall pray for thee, and thou shalt live."⁸ In the wilderness, when a plague began among the people of Israel, Moses as prophet told Aaron as priest to take the fire-pan and lay incense thereon and make atonement for the people and, when that was done, the plague was stayed.⁹ Later, at the time of David, when the Lord sent a pestilence upon Israel, Gad, who is described as a prophet,¹⁰ came to David and told him to rear an altar unto the Lord in a certain specified place¹¹ and, when that was done, "the Lord was entreated for the land, and the plague was stayed from Israel."¹² Again, when Jeroboam's hand was "dried up," a certain "man of God,"¹³ who is described as a "prophet,"¹⁴ prayed for him "and the King's hand was restored him, and became as it was before."¹⁵ And so prophecy, as portrayed in Scripture, meant the power to know by what prayer or sacred rites one can propitiate God.

Third, prophecy as depicted in Scripture must have appeared to Philo as the power to receive from God certain communications by which men were to be guided in their life. This is the main burden of all the prophets from Adam to Malachi. Adam was told what to eat and what not to eat;¹⁶ Noah was similarly told what to do and what not to do;¹⁷ Abraham received a communication from God ordering him to establish a certain custom which was to be fol-

⁸ Gen. 20: 7.

⁹ Num. 17: 11-13.

¹⁰ II Sam. 24: 11.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 24: 18.

¹² *Ibid.* 24: 25.

¹³ I Kings 13: 6.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 13: 18.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 13: 6.

¹⁶ Gen. 2: 17-18.

¹⁷ Gen. 9: 1-7.

lowed by his descendants.¹⁸ But the outstanding example of this type of prophecy is the revelation of a complete and comprehensive system of law through Moses, who is proclaimed as the greatest of prophets. And not only the laws but also the poetry found in Scripture are divinely inspired. Miriam, when she took a timbrel and sang a song unto the women who went out after her with timbrels and with dances, is described as "the prophetess."¹⁹ Deborah, the authoress of a song,²⁰ is also described as a "prophetess."²¹ David, in his last words as psalmist, says of himself: "The spirit of the Lord spoke by me, and His word was upon my tongue."²² And so prophecy as portrayed in Scripture meant to Philo the revelation of the laws and poetry contained in Scripture.

Fourth, prophecy as depicted in Scripture must have also appeared to him as the power to know things which cannot be perceived by the senses. That there are things unperceived by the senses which a prophet may see or may aspire to see is clearly maintained throughout Scripture. God and angels make their appearance to certain persons. Moses prays to be shown the "glory" of God,²³ which evidently refers to something which cannot be seen by the ordinary senses. God is said to have shown to Moses "the pattern of the tabernacle, and the pattern of the instruments thereof" in the likeness of which he was to build a tabernacle and to make its instruments.²⁴ The pattern was evidently something that could not be seen by the ordinary senses. Then also Isaiah²⁵ and Ezekiel,²⁶ by virtue of their being prophets, see visions which men who are not prophets cannot see. And so prophecy as portrayed in Scripture meant to him the

¹⁸ Gen. 17: 10.

¹⁹ Ezek. 15: 20-21.

²⁰ Judges 5.

²¹ Judges 4: 4.

²² II Sam. 23: 2; cf. also I Sam. 16: 13.

²³ Exod. 33: 18.

²⁴ Exod. 25: 9; Num. 8: 4.

²⁵ Isa. 6: 1 ff.

²⁶ Ezek. 1: 1 ff.

power to see things which were imperceptible to the ordinary senses.

On his becoming acquainted with Greek philosophy, Philo could not help noticing that these four powers which in Scripture are ascribed to prophecy correspond exactly to the four kinds of inspiration which Plato calls frenzy (*μανία*). According to Plato, there is first the frenzy of the diviner, which produces the art of divination (*μαντική*), whereby the Pythia and others have foretold future events.²⁷ Second, there is the frenzy of the priest, which by some oracular power finds a way — through prayers, the service of God, purifications, and sacred rites — to release men from disease and other ills.²⁸ Third, there is the frenzy of the Muses, which is the source of the songs of poets and the laws of statesmen and kings.²⁹ Fourth, there is the frenzy of the philosopher, which consists in the recollection of the ideas that cannot be perceived by the senses.³⁰

But Philo could not have failed to see an important terminological difference between the four kinds of prophecy in Scripture and the four kinds of frenzy in Plato. In Scripture, the Greek term "prophet" used in the Septuagint as a translation of the Hebrew term *nabi* applies to all the four powers alike; in Plato, as well as in Greek literature in general, the term prophet is used only in connection with the frenzy of divination. None of the other three kinds of frenzy are described as prophecy.³¹ With regard to the enactment of

²⁷ *Phaedrus* 244 B.

²⁸ *Ibid.* 244 D-E. This kind of frenzy is not definitely described by him as that of a priest. But priests are generally taken by him to have charge of the service of God. (Cf. *Statesman* 290 c.) Hence this may be described as the priestly frenzy. Chrysippus, however, includes this kind of ritual function under divination (cf. Cicero, *De Divinatione* II, 63, 130).

²⁹ *Ibid.* 245 A; *Meno* 99 D.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 249 D ff.

³¹ In early Greek history prophets or soothsayers were not priests, though in

laws, which is of special interest to us in our present study, Xenophon in his reports of the conversations of Socrates says definitely that it does not come within the sphere of divination or prophecy, or of any oracle revealed by the gods. The gods, he says, have implanted in us the faculty of reasoning and the power of speech whereby we are enabled "to enact laws and to administer states," and that it is only "in so far as we are powerless of ourselves to see what is expedient for the future" that "the gods lend us their aid, revealing the issues by divination to inquiries, and teaching us how to obtain the best results."³² "What the gods have granted us to do by help of learning, we must learn; what is hidden from mortals we should try to find out from the gods by divination,"³³ and that which is hidden from mortals and must be found out by divination is that which has reference to consequences which cannot be foreseen.³⁴ Similarly Cicero, in his analysis of the Greek conception of prophecy or rather divination, says explicitly that moral philosophy, duties to parents, and the management of the state — in short, all those teachings which constitute the Mosaic law and which according to Philo were revealed by God through a prophet — are not within the province of divination or prophecy.³⁵ Indeed there were popular beliefs among the Greeks that certain laws came from God — Plato refers to Minos, the founder of the Cretan laws, as having been guided by the oracles (*φῆμαι*) of Zeus, and to the Lacedaemonian laws as having come from Apollo³⁶ — but still the term prophet is

later times Greek priests gained control of soothsaying by having their subordinates practice it (cf. P. Gardner and F. B. Jevons, *A Manual of Greek Antiquities*, 2nd ed., 1898, pp. 253-254). In Egypt, however, during the Roman period, prophets were also priests (cf. G. A. Deissmann, *Bible Studies*, pp. 235-237). Cf. below, p. 342.

³² *Memorabilia* IV, 3, 11-12.

³³ *Ibid.* I, 1, 9.

³⁴ *Ibid.* I, 1, 6-8.

³⁵ *De Divinatione* II, 4, 10-11.

³⁶ *Laws* I, 624 A-B; cf. *Minos* 320 B.

not applied to those who have received the laws from the gods. Similarly, the expression νόμοι πύθόχρηστοι does not mean that these laws were revealed by God through a prophet; it only means that the god gave his approval to laws made by men.³⁷

Thus the term prophet as used in the Greek translation of Scripture has a wider meaning than the same term used in Greek philosophy. It includes all the four types of frenzy or inspiration enumerated by Plato, the divinatory or prophetic frenzy, the ritualistic or priestly frenzy, the poetical and legislative frenzy, and the philosophical frenzy. It is in this wider scriptural sense of the term, as including these four functions, that Philo uses the term prophet.

This use of the term prophet as including four distinct functions, though not formally stated by Philo, is clearly brought out by him in his description of the achievements of Moses.

In Scripture, Moses is described not only as prophet,³⁸ but also as one who commanded a law to the people³⁹ and as king⁴⁰ and as priest.⁴¹ The description of Moses as king and as priest is dwelt upon also in post-Biblical Palestinian literature.⁴² With these native Jewish views in mind, fortified undoubtedly also by Greek conceptions as to the relation of priesthood to kingship,⁴³ Philo describes Moses as king, law-giver, priest, and prophet.⁴⁴ Of these four titles, the first two,

³⁷ Cf. Xenophon, *Lacedaemoniorum Respublica* VIII, 5.

³⁸ Deut. 34: 10.

³⁹ Deut. 33: 4.

⁴⁰ Deut. 33: 5: "And he was King in Jeshurun." The Hebrew commentators differ as to whether "he" refers to God or to Moses (cf. Rashi, Ibn Ezra and Nahmanides). *Midrash Tehillim*, on Ps. 1: 1, § 2, p. 2a, however, takes it to refer to Moses.

⁴¹ Ps. 99: 6.

⁴² Cf. below, pp. 326, 337.

⁴³ Cf. Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, pp. 181-182, 190.

⁴⁴ *Mos.* II, 1, 2-7; *Praem.* 9, 53-56; also philosopher in the sense of king (*Mos.* II, 1, 2), following therein Plato, *Republic* V, 473 D (cf. Badt in *Philos Werke* and Colson, *ad loc.*).

lawgiver and king, are only two phases of the same function, both having to do with law, one enacting it and the other enforcing it. That the titles lawgiver and king here are considered by Philo as only two phases of the same function may be indirectly gathered from a passage in which he compares the inseparability of the "union of these four faculties" in Moses to the inseparable union of the Graces.⁴⁵ Now of the Graces he says elsewhere that they are three in number.⁴⁶ There are, therefore, only three titles, lawgiver, priest, and prophet. As for these three titles, it can be shown that the term "prophet" is used by Philo not as something distinct from lawgiver and priest but rather as a general term under which lawgiver and priest are to be included. This may be gathered from certain passages in which he discusses the functions of Moses as prophet and as priest. In one passage, after having completed his discussion of Moses as king and lawgiver and priest, and announcing his intention of dealing with Moses as prophet,⁴⁷ he divides his treatment of Moses as prophet into three parts, two of which describe Moses' activities as lawgiver,⁴⁸ thus indicating clearly that under prophet he includes lawgiver as one of its subdivisions. The legislative function of the prophet is also to be found in his statement concerning Moses that to enact fresh laws "is the task of one . . . who has received from God a great gift — the power of expressing (*ἐρμηνεῖαν*) and of revealing in a prophetic manner (*προφητεῖαν*) the sacred laws."⁴⁹ In another passage, in which he deals with Moses as priest, he still continues to call him prophet⁵⁰ and describes him as being "armed with prophetic knowledge,"⁵¹ thus indicating clearly that under

⁴⁵ *Mos.* II, 1, 7.

⁴⁶ *Abr.* 11, 52-54.

⁴⁹ *Mut.* 22, 126. On the meaning of the two Greek terms, *ἐρμηνεῖα* and *προφητεῖα*, cf. below, pp. 41-43.

⁵⁰ *Mos.* II, 16, 76.

⁴⁷ *Mos.* II, 35, 187.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 188-191.

⁵¹ *Praem.* 9, 56.

prophet he includes priest as another one of its subdivisions. This inclusion of priest under prophet may be also discerned in his statement that "the true priest is at once also a prophet,"⁵² and still more so in his description of matters relating to the high priesthood of Moses as matters "of the high priesthood of the prophet."⁵³

From all these passages we gather that in his description of Moses as lawgiver and priest and prophet he does not mean that Moses performed three functions which were distinct from each other; he rather means that Moses whose chief description in Scripture is that of prophet was not a prophet in the ordinary sense of the term prophet as used in Greek, namely, a diviner, but he was a prophet according to the wider sense which that term has in Scripture, namely, a prophet who by virtue of his being a prophet is also priest and lawgiver.

But besides priest and lawgiver, the prophet in Scripture, as we have seen, is also one who possesses the power of divination and the power of perceiving incorporeal things which are beyond sense-perception. Accordingly we should expect that Philo, in his description of Moses as prophet, should mention not only his powers as priest and lawgiver but also his powers as diviner and as one who perceives incorporeal things. This is exactly what he does. In two passages, where he ostensibly describes Moses as priest or as prophet, we shall try to show that he is really describing the four functions of Moses as a prophet in the scriptural sense of the term, corresponding, as we have said, to the four kinds of frenzy enumerated by Plato.

In one passage, ostensibly dealing with Moses as prophet in the sense of priest, Philo ascribes to him two functions.

⁵² *Spec.* IV, 36, 192.

⁵³ *Mos.* II, 50, 275.

First, as a prophetic priest, Moses was to know the sacred rites (*ιερά*) and divine service (*θεοῦ θεραπεία*) by means of which he was to avert evil from the people and to attain good for them,⁵⁴ and by means of which also he was to bring the thanksgivings of the people when they did well and their prayers and supplications when they were sinful.⁵⁵ This quite obviously corresponds exactly to the propitiatory function of the prophet as described in Scripture, and to the second type of frenzy as described by Plato. Second, as a priest, says Philo, one of Moses' duties was to build and furnish a sanctuary.⁵⁶ But, being not merely a priest but a prophetic priest,⁵⁷ he had a direct vision of the idea of that sanctuary and its furniture as it existed in the intelligible world of ideas, for "he saw with the soul's eye the immaterial forms of the material objects about to be made"⁵⁸ with the result that "the shape of the model was stamped upon the mind of the prophet [i.e., priest], a secretly painted or molded prototype, produced by immaterial and invisible forms."⁵⁹ In this passage, then, Moses as prophet is described as having the propitiatory power and the power to know things not perceived by the senses. In another passage, ostensibly dealing with Moses purely as a prophet, Philo ascribes to him again two functions. First, as a prophet, Moses was the vehicle through whom the Law was revealed, having come to him from God either at God's own initiative or as answers to questions asked by Moses.⁶⁰ Second, as a prophet, Moses possessed "the power of foreknowledge, by means of which he was able to reveal future events."⁶¹

From these two passages, then, we gather that under his

⁵⁴ *Mos.* II, 1, 5.

⁵⁵ *Praem.* 9, 56.

⁵⁶ *Mos.* II, 15, 75.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁶⁰ *Mos.* II, 35, 188-189; cf. below, p. 39.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 190.

treatment of Moses as priest Philo has included two distinct functions of prophecy, the propitiatory and the visionary, and that similarly under his treatment of Moses as prophet he has included two other functions of prophecy, the legislative and the predictive. The prophecy of Moses is thus described by Philo as including all the four functions of scriptural prophecy, which in Plato are treated as four distinct types of frenzy.

Evidently in an effort to show that these four functions of scriptural prophecy are unlike the four distinct types of frenzy in Plato, he tries to show the inseparability of these four functions of prophecy from each other and their dependence upon each other. Speaking of Moses as king and lawgiver and priest and prophet, under which, as we have seen, he includes the four functions of prophecy, he says: "Beautiful and all-harmonious is the union of these four faculties; for, intertwined and clinging to each other, they move in rhythmic concord, mutually receiving and repaying benefits, and thus imitate the virgin graces whom an immutable law of nature forbids to be separated. And of them it may be justly said, what is often said of virtue, that to have one is to have all."⁶² In Plato, there is no such mutual dependence between the four types of frenzy. The philosophic frenzy, for him, is quite distinct from the poetic frenzy: the former is above reason, the latter is below reason.⁶³ It is because of this mutual dependence between these four functions of prophecy that a knowledge of the propitiatory rites and of divine service, which primarily belongs to the prophet as priest, is treated by Philo as belonging also to the prophet as lawgiver, and all the sacred rites and divine services are treated by him as part of the laws revealed through Moses

⁶² *Ibid.*, II, 1, 7.

⁶³ Cf. *Phaedrus* 249 B-D and *Ion* 534 A-E.

by virtue of his being a prophet in the sense of lawgiver.⁶⁴ It is also because of this mutual dependence between these four functions of prophecy and their inseparability from each other that the general definition of prophecy given by Philo is that which primarily applies to the prophet in the sense of one who has the power to know things beyond sense-perception. He thus says that by his prophetic gift the prophet "might discover what by reasoning he could not grasp,"⁶⁵ or that "the wise man [i.e., the prophet] sees God and His powers,"⁶⁶ or that "priests and prophets" are those who "have risen wholly above the sphere of sense-perception and have been translated into the world of the intelligible and dwell there registered as freemen of the commonwealth of ideas, which are imperishable and incorporeal,"⁶⁷ or that "to a prophet nothing is unknown, since he has within him a spiritual sun and unclouded rays to give him a full and clear apprehension of things unseen by sense but apprehended by the understanding."⁶⁸ Still, knowing as he does that the characteristic difference between prophecy as used in Scripture and prophecy as used in Greek literature is that in the former it means also the revelation of a law, whereas in the latter it has not that meaning, he constantly emphasizes that point. In one place, after describing prophecy as that which "divines" (*divinat*), he adds "by which oracles and laws are given from God."⁶⁹ In another place, wishing to prove that Abraham was a prophet, he says: "Indeed I see that he is a prophet and lays down law, prophesying what things are to be and to be done, for law

⁶⁴ Cf. *Decal.* 30, 158-161; *Spec.* I, 12, 66-47, 256.

⁶⁵ *Mos.* II, 1, 6.

⁶⁶ *Immut.* 1, 3; cf. below, p. 32, on use of the term "wise man" in the sense of prophet.

⁶⁷ *Gig.* 13, 61. Cf. above, p. 10.

⁶⁸ *Spec.* IV, 36, 192.

⁶⁹ *Qu. in Gen.* III, 9.

is an invention of nature and not of men. Since the mind beloved of God [in us] migrates and translates itself in another land outside all the land of sense, there it becomes possessed and prophesies." ⁷⁰ The surnames by which he usually refers to Moses are (1) prophet and (2) lawgiver.⁷¹

It is as a result of this wider conception of the scope of prophecy that Philo departs from Plato in his classification of the types of knowledge. To Plato the highest type of knowledge, that which is superior to reason based upon sense-perception, is only philosophic frenzy, that frenzy during which the mind through recollection has a vision of the incorporeal ideas. The three other kinds of frenzy, even the frenzy of the statesman in enacting law, are to him of a lower grade of knowledge.⁷² To Philo, however, prophecy in all its four functions constitutes what he considers the third and highest kind of knowledge. What to Plato and to other Greek philosophers is to be attained by philosophy is to Philo to be attained by prophecy. "For what the disciples of the most approved philosophy gain from its teaching, the Jews gain from their law and customs, that is, to know the highest and the most ancient cause of all things." ⁷³

III. THE THREE TYPES OF PROPHECY

We have thus seen how the four distinct types of frenzy enumerated by Plato are combined by Philo into four interdependent functions of prophecy, and prophecy in all its functions is placed by him as the highest grade of knowledge. Now knowledge must have a source whence it comes. In the case of his two lower grades of knowledge, Philo tells

⁷⁰ *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 90.

⁷¹ See Leisegang, *Indices*, under *προφήτης* and *νομοθέτης*.

⁷² Cf. Zeller, II, 14, p. 594, n. 4 (*Plato*, p. 176, n. 20).

⁷³ *Virt.* 10, 65.

us directly that their source is sense-perception.¹ In the case of the highest and third grade of knowledge, in those very same passages in which the lower grades of knowledge are said to have their source in sense-perception, this grade of knowledge is merely said to be independent of sense-perception. But if sense-perception is not its source and if recollection, too, is not its source,² what, then, is its source? The answer to this question is furnished by Philo in several other passages. In one group of passages he tells us rather vaguely that "a prophet has no utterance of his own, but his utterance comes from somewhere else, the echoes of another voice,"³ or that "nothing of what he says will be his own" for "he serves as the channel for the insistent words of another's promptings,"⁴ or that "he is not pronouncing any command of his own, but is only the interpreter of another."⁵ This vagueness, however, is removed in another passage where that "other" who prompts the prophet is identified with God. "For the prophet is the interpreter of God who prompts from within what he should say."⁶ This on the whole reflects the conception of prophecy in Scripture as well as the conception of the various kinds of frenzy in Plato. In Scripture the prophet always speaks in the name of God,⁷ and in Plato the various kinds of frenzy are described as a divine gift (*θεία δόσις*)⁸ or as a divine dispensation (*θεία μοίρα*).⁹

However, to say that the prophet is prompted by God from within as to what he should say does not explain fully the process of prophetic knowledge, any more than to say that everything that happens in the world is caused by God would

¹ Cf. above, p. 3.

² Cf. above, p. 8.

³ *Heres* 52, 259.

⁴ *Spec.* I, 11, 65.

⁵ *Qu. in Gen.* III, 10.

⁶ *Praem.* 9, 55.

⁷ Cf. *Deut.* 18:18-22.

⁸ *Phaedrus* 244 A.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 244 c.

explain the processes of God's activity in the world. For in man, no less than in the world, according to Philo, God acts in a variety of ways. Sometimes he acts through agents, His powers which are immanent in the world, and sometimes He also acts directly in His own person.¹⁰ We shall therefore have to find out whether the process of prophecy, which to be sure, like everything else in the world comes from God, does also, like everything else in the world, come either indirectly from God or directly from God, or whether it comes both indirectly and directly from God. On the whole, we shall try to show that Philo enumerates three sources of prophecy, namely, (1) the divine spirit, (2) God himself, or, as it is also described by Philo, the voice of God, and (3) angels, the first two of these being, according to Philo, the sources of the prophecies of Moses, which are divided by him into three groups.

(a) *Prophecy through the Divine Spirit*

Throughout Scripture, prophetic communications are said to have their source in what is described as the "spirit of God" or the "spirit of the Lord." It is this spirit of God which "comes upon" the prophet,¹¹ or "comes mightily upon" ¹² him, or "falls upon" ¹³ him, or "descends and rests on" ¹⁴ him, or "clothes" ¹⁵ him, or "fills" him,¹⁶ or "speaks" ¹⁷ by him. The prophet is also described, according to the Septuagint version, as one driven out of his senses (*ἡ παρεξέστηκώς*), and as inspired (*ὁ πνευματοφόρος*).¹⁸ Now, in Plato, the various states of frenzy are said to be brought about by divine inspiration (*ἐνθουσιασμός*)¹⁹ or possession

¹⁰ Cf. above, I, 349, 376.

¹¹ I Sam. 19: 20.

¹² I Sam. 10: 6.

¹³ Ezek. 11: 5.

¹⁴ Num. 11: 25; Isa. 11: 2.

¹⁵ Judges 6: 34; II Chron. 24: 20.

¹⁶ Micah 3: 8.

¹⁷ II Sam. 23: 2.

¹⁸ Hos. 9: 7.

¹⁹ *Phaedrus* 249 A.

(κατοκωχή),²⁰ and divination in particular is described by him as a gift of God to "human thoughtlessness (ἀφροσύνη)" which no man achieves "when in his rational mind, but only when the power of his understanding is fettered in sleep or when it is distraught by disease or by some divine inspiration."²¹ Following his general method, Philo will combine the "divine spirit," which according to Scripture is the cause of prophecy, with the process of "divine inspiration" or "possession" which, according to Plato, is the cause of his various kinds of frenzy, and especially the frenzy of divination. Thus the process of prophesying through the divine spirit will become with him identical with the process of divine inspiration or divine possession in Greek philosophy.

The manner in which he combines the scriptural divine spirit with the Platonic divine inspiration may be gathered from several of his homilies.

First, he uses those Greek terms which describe the state of frenzy as a description of prophetic visions in Scripture. In his comment upon the verse "and it came to pass, that, when the sun was going down, a deep sleep fell upon Abram,"²² he takes the term ecstasy (ἔκστασις), which in the Septuagint is used for the term "deep sleep," and explains it as having four meanings. The fourth of these meanings, that which Scripture uses in connection with Abraham's prophetic vision, is described by him as "the divine possession (ἐνθεος κατοκωχή) and frenzy (μανία) to which prophets as a class are subject,"²³ or as "the experience of the God-inspired (ἐνθουσιῶντος) and the God-possessed (θεοφορήτου)," which, he says, "proves him to be a prophet."²⁴ In many other passages other Greek terms are similarly applied by

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 245 A.

²¹ *Timaeus* 71 E.

²² *Ibid.* 52, 258; cf. *Qu. in Gen.* III, 9; *Spec.* I, 11, 65.

²³ *Gen.* 15: 12.

²⁴ *Heres* 51, 249; 53, 264.

him to scriptural prophecy. Scriptural prophecy thus becomes with him a frenzy, an ecstasy, a divine possession²⁵ and an enthusiasm (*ἐνθουσιασμός*),²⁶ and the scriptural prophet becomes with him one who is thrown into a state of enthusiasm or inspired by God (*ἐνθουσιῶν*), or one who is possessed by God (*θεοφόρητος*).²⁷

Then, just as he uses the Greek terms describing the state of frenzy as a description of scriptural prophecy, so he also uses the scriptural term "divine spirit" as a description of the Greek conception of frenzy. The Greek terms ecstasy, God-inspired, and God-possessed, all of which are used as descriptions of that which produces the state of frenzy, are explained by him as meaning the same as when Scripture says that the spirit of God came upon the prophet, or rested upon him, or fell upon him, or clothed him, or filled him, or spoke by him. Thus, in dealing with the prophetic experience of Abraham, while on the one hand he describes it after the Greek manner as a state of being possessed (*κατασχεθελή*), on the other hand he describes that state of being possessed, after the scriptural manner, as being due to "the divine spirit which was breathed upon him from on high."²⁸ Again, "when the intellect is inspired (*imbuitur*) with divine things," he says, "it receives the divine spirit" (*divinum spiritum*).²⁹ Thus the Greek expression "to be God-possessed" or "to be God-inspired" came to mean with him to have the divine spirit come upon one, or rest upon one, or fall upon one, or speak by one. It must, however, be remarked that the term "divine spirit" used by Philo in those passages where prophecy is the subject of discussion is to be distinguished from the term "divine spirit" used by him in other passages where the sub-

²⁵ Cf. above, n. 23.

²⁶ *Mos. II*, 45, 246; cf. above, n. 24.

²⁷ *Heres* 52, 258.

²⁸ *Virt.* 39, 217.

²⁹ *Qu. in Gen.* III, 9.

ject of discussion is the rational soul of man. The former is sometimes described by him more specifically as "the divine and prophetic spirit" (τὸ θεῖον καὶ προφητικὸν πνεῦμα)³⁰ or simply as the "prophetic spirit" (προφητικὸν πνεῦμα),³¹ whereas the latter is used by him as the equivalent of that incorporeal and rational soul which God breathed into Adam as a breath of life.³² Since, as we have seen, Philo does not believe in Plato's theory of recollection,³³ man's rational soul is not conceived by him as having any knowledge of its own; it has only a capacity for knowledge, and that capacity becomes actualized in either one of two ways: first, by data of the external world received through the senses which are transformed by its native power into rational concepts; second, by communications received from God through the divine spirit.

Finally, the scriptural resting of the divine spirit upon the prophet, which is now identified by him with what the Greeks call ecstasy, is described by him as a psychological process like that used in the description of ecstasy, but with the admixture of certain scriptural terms which he has already introduced into his own revision of Platonic psychology. There is in man, to begin with, an incorporeal soul, that divine spirit breathed by God into Adam, which incorporeal soul has a capacity for knowledge. Through the instrumentality of the body and the corporeal soul, that incorporeal soul acquires the data of the external world furnished to it by the senses, and by its native power it transforms these data of sense-perception into rational concepts. This constitutes what may be called the natural order of rational knowledge. It is the second of Philo's three stages of knowledge; it is a knowledge of rational concepts formed by the mind out of

³⁰ *Fug.* 33, 186.

³¹ *Mos.* I, 50, 277.

³² Cf. above, I, 394.

³³ Cf. above, p. 8.

the data of sensation. But when that incorporeal soul frees itself from the bodily influence, as well as from its own rational concepts which are based upon the impressions of bodily sensation, it becomes filled with the divine or prophetic spirit and through that spirit it receives a new kind of knowledge from God, a knowledge of things incorporeal. This constitutes what may be called the supernatural order of rational knowledge. Because prophetic knowledge, unlike the rational concepts, is entirely free from sensation, it is described by Philo also as unmixed knowledge (*ἄκρητος ἐπιστήμη*).³⁴ In other words, prophecy yields a new kind of knowledge, entirely independent of sensation, a knowledge imported from another region by the divine spirit and instilled into the rational soul of man, and therein it takes the place of those rational concepts formed by the rational soul out of the data of sensation.

This general theory is expressed by him in a variety of ways and with his usual loose use of terminology in many passages. In one passage, using the term "soul" for the rational soul and the term "reason" for the rational concepts which were formed by the rational soul out of the data of sensation, he says: "For no pronouncement of a prophet is ever his own; he is an interpreter prompted by another in all his utterances, when knowing not what he does he is filled with inspiration (*ἐνθουσιᾷ*), as the reason (*λογισμός*) withdraws and surrenders the citadel of the soul (*ψυχή*) to a new visitor and tenant, the divine spirit, which plays upon the vocal organism and dictates words which clearly express its prophetic message."³⁵ Similarly in another passage, dealing with the prophetic gift of Abraham, he uses the term "soul" for the rational soul, saying that when he prophesied "the divine spirit which was breathed upon him from on high made

³⁴ *Gig.* 5, 22.

³⁵ *Spec.* IV, 8, 49.

its lodging in his soul (*ψυχή*), and invested his body with singular beauty, his voice with persuasiveness, and his hearing with understanding.”³⁶ In still another passage, using the term “mind” in the sense of that “reason” which consists of rational concepts derived from sensation and omitting the term “soul,” that is, the rational soul, in which, according to the two preceding quotations, that “reason” gives place to the divine spirit, he says: “This is what regularly happens to the fellowship of the prophets. The mind (*νοῦς*) that is in us is evicted [from the rational soul] at the arrival of the divine spirit, but, when that departs, the mind returns to its tenancy, for mortal and immortal may not share the same home. And therefore the setting of reason (*λογισμός*) and the darkness which surrounds it produce ecstasy and inspired frenzy.”³⁷ In this passage, we take it, the description of “reason” as mortal does not mean the same as when the irrational soul is described as mortal.³⁸ It is described as mortal only by comparison with the divine spirit, inasmuch as in contradistinction to the latter it is ultimately based upon sensation and the mortal part of man. In two other passages, using the term “mind” in the sense of the rational soul, he describes the process of prophesying as that in which the rational soul departs from all bodily associations and in its new state of bodiless existence becomes possessed by the divine spirit. He thus says: “Ecstasy, as the word itself evidently points out, is nothing else than a departure of the mind (*mens = νοῦς*) wandering beyond itself,” for “when the intellect (*intellectus = διάνοια*) is inspired with divine things, it no longer exists in itself, since it receives the divine spirit within and permits it to dwell with itself.”³⁹ In this passage the “itself” (*se*) be-

³⁶ *Virt.* 39, 217.

³⁷ *Heres* 53, 265.

³⁸ Cf. above, I, 395.

³⁹ *Qu. in Gen.* III, 9.

yond which the rational soul wanders and in which it no longer exists is that "self" of it which it becomes through its association with the body.⁴⁰ Again, "since the mind (*mens* = *νοῦς*) beloved of God [in us] migrates and transfers itself into another land outside all the land of sense, there it becomes possessed and prophesies."⁴¹ In all these passages he is restating in a mixture of scriptural and philosophic terms Plato's statement, repeated also by later Greek philosophers, that "no man achieves true and inspired divination when in his rational mind."⁴²

The "divine spirit" is thus that "other" which prompts the prophet to prophesy, corresponding to the traditional Jewish view that it is through the resting of the Holy Spirit upon them that the prophets receive the gift of prophecy,⁴³ the term "Holy Spirit" being used in post-Biblical Hebrew literature for the Biblical "spirit of God"⁴⁴ which Philo usually, though not always, refers to as the "divine spirit."⁴⁵

But what is that divine spirit in the sense of prophetic spirit which is treated of by Philo as a sort of intermediary through which God communicates His message to prophets? No definite explanation of it is to be found in his writings. But inasmuch as the same term divine spirit is used by Philo as a designation of both the prophetic spirit and the incorporeal soul in man, there is no reason why we should not assume that the divine spirit in the sense of prophetic

⁴⁰ Cf. Plato *Ion* 534 B: "For a poet is a light and winged and sacred thing, and is unable ever to indite until he has been inspired (*ἐνθεός*) and put out of his senses (*ἐκφρων*), and his mind (*νοῦς*) is no longer in him."

⁴¹ *Qu.* in *Gen.* IV, 90.

⁴² *Timaeus* 71 E.

⁴³ Cf. *Sifre Deut.*, § 176, on 18.18, F, p. 1076; HF, p. 221; *Leviticus Rabbah* 15, 2.

⁴⁴ The term "holy spirit" occurs in Isa. 63: 10, 11; Ps. 51: 13(11).

⁴⁵ Besides "divine spirit" (*πνεῦμα θεῖον*) he uses also the expression "spirit of God" (*πνεῦμα θεοῦ*), both these forms being a translation of the Hebrew *ru'ah Elohim*.

spirit is of the same essential nature and of the same order of existence as the divine spirit in the sense of the incorporeal soul of man. The divine spirit in the latter sense, as we have seen, is a real incorporeal being created by God as an image of the idea of mind, which is one of the ideas constituting the intelligible world.⁴⁶ So also the divine spirit in the sense of the prophetic spirit, we may assume, is conceived by Philo as a real being created by God as an image of the idea of mind. The divine spirit in this sense is thus an incorporeal soul or mind. Being an incorporeal soul or mind, it is also like the angels who are similarly described as incorporeal souls or mind. But unlike the incorporeal souls in men and the angelic incorporeal souls, both of which are many, the incorporeal soul which is the prophetic spirit is only one, and it is one and the same divine spirit which rests upon all the prophets and through which God communicates His message to them. It is as a real being created by God after the order of angels such as Philo's "divine spirit" that the prophetic divine spirit is also conceived in native Jewish tradition, where it is better known as the Holy Spirit and Shekinah,⁴⁷ and it is also as such a being that the Holy Spirit started on his career in the history of Christian theology.⁴⁸ The divine spirit is thus a sort of angel. In Philo, therefore, there are three kinds of incorporeal souls or minds created by God as images of the idea of mind. First, the incorporeal souls which become incarnated in the bodies of men. Second, the incorporeal souls which never become incarnated in bodies, and as pure un-bodied souls are known by the name of angels. Third, one

⁴⁶ Cf. above, I, 390.

⁴⁷ Cf. L. Blau, "Holy Spirit," *Jewish Encyclopedia*, VI, 448; "Shekinah," *ibid.*, XI, 259; G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, I, 437-438.

⁴⁸ Cf. H. B. Swete, "Holy Spirit," *Dictionary of the Bible*, II, 408, 411a.

unique incorporeal soul known as the divine spirit *par excellence* which has the sole function of acting as an intermediary of divine communications to men. And just as the incorporeal souls in man and the incorporeal souls which are angels are each called by Philo "Logos,"⁴⁹ so also the incorporeal soul which is the divine spirit of prophecy could be called "Logos." While indeed Philo does not directly designate the divine prophetic spirit by the term "Logos," he identifies it with the scriptural term "wisdom,"⁵⁰ which is the same as Logos.⁵¹ He similarly uses the term "wise" (*σοφός*) as synonymous with prophet,⁵² and the expression "divine Logos" (*λόγος θεῖος*) as a description of the prophetic revelations contained in Scripture.⁵³

The divine spirit in the sense of the prophetic spirit is thus an incorporeal being which "comes upon" a man, or "falls upon" him, or "descends and rests on" him or "clothes" him, or "fills" him, or "speaks" by him.⁵⁴ But man must be prepared for this visit of the divine prophetic spirit, and he becomes prepared for it when that other "divine spirit" within him, his incorporeal soul or mind, detaches itself from all bodily influences and empties itself out of all bodily kinds of knowledge, whether sensations or rational concepts based upon sensations, with which it has become charged through its existence in the body. When that liberation from the body is achieved, the divine prophetic spirit comes and infuses into that other divine spirit in man a new kind of knowledge, prophetic knowledge, unmixed knowledge, a knowledge of things incorporeal. But such a state of com-

⁴⁹ Cf. above, I, 377, 393.

⁵¹ Cf. above, I, 255.

⁵⁰ *Gig.* 5, 23; cf. Drummond, II, 216.

⁵² *Gig.* 5, 22; *Immut.* 1, 3.

⁵³ *Mut.* 31, 169; *Somn.* I, 33, 190. This usage of Logos is based upon such expressions as "The word of God came upon the prophet" (I Kings 13: 20), in which the term "word" is often translated by *λόγος* without the article. Cf. below, p. 189.

⁵⁴ Cf. above, p. 24.

plete liberation from bodily influences can be attained by the ordinary run of man only on certain occasions and under special conditions. Therefore, the divine prophetic spirit is described by Philo as visiting man only periodically (*ἐπιτεφοιτηκότος*)⁵⁵ and as abiding with him only for a while. "Though the divine spirit may stay a while in the soul, it cannot abide there,"⁵⁶ for "nothing is harder than that it should abide for ever in the soul with its manifold forms and divisions — the soul which has fastened on it the grievous burden of this fleshy coil."⁵⁷ Only in the case of exceptional men may the divine prophetic spirit abide forever in their souls, and such an exceptional man was Moses. With him it abided a very long time, and this for the reason that his virtuous nature was constant and was free from change and mutability.⁵⁸

Prophecy through the divine spirit is thus one type of prophecy.

This type of prophecy through the divine spirit, which is characteristic of the prophecy of all the prophets, is also characteristic, according to Philo, of the "third" of the three groups of prophetic utterances into which he divides the prophecies of Moses.⁵⁹ What he calls the "first" group belongs to a different type of prophecy, and we shall deal with it in our discussion of prophecy by the divine voice. What he calls the "second" group does not constitute a new type of prophecy; it belongs to a combination of prophecy through the divine spirit and prophecy by the divine voice, and with this group, too, we shall deal in our discussion of prophecy by the divine voice.

The third group of prophecies of Moses are described

⁵⁵ *Spec.* IV, 8, 49; cf. above, p. 28.

⁵⁶ *Gig.* 7, 28; cf. 5, 19.

⁵⁷ *Immut.* 1, 2.

⁵⁸ *Gig.* 11, 47-49.

⁵⁹ *Mos.* II, 35, 189-190.

by Philo as those "spoken by Moses in his own person, when possessed (*κατασχεθέντος*) and carried away out of himself." ⁶⁰ "Possessed by God" (*ἐνθουσιῶδες*)⁶¹ and "possessed" (*κατεχόμενος*; ⁶² *κατασχεθείς*)⁶³ are the terms used by Philo in characterizing the source of this group of the Mosaic prophecies. These terms, as we have already seen, mean to Philo the same as the scriptural expressions of the coming or falling or descending or resting of the divine spirit upon the prophet or its filling the prophet. This becomes still more evident in his description of Moses' predictive prophecy concerning his own death, which quite obviously belongs to the third group of Moses' prophecies. In this description Philo uses the term *καταπνευσθείς*,⁶⁴ which undoubtedly was meant by him to be a reproduction of the scriptural expressions about the divine spirit coming down upon the prophet. The third group of the Mosaic prophecies, therefore, have the same source as the prophecies of all the other prophets, except for the following difference. In the case of all the other prophets, the divine spirit visits them only periodically, whereas in the case of Moses it abided, as Philo says, for a very long time.⁶⁵ Moses, therefore, could prophesy always, for the divine spirit was always upon him, and he did not have to wait for sudden flashes of prophetic inspiration. The Mosaic prophecies of this group are accordingly described by Philo as those which are "spoken by Moses in his own person,"⁶⁶ or as those which "are assigned to the lawgiver himself: God has given to him of His own power (*δύναμις*), by means of which He is able to reveal future events."⁶⁷ Eight instances of this type of prophecy are cited by him: (1) At the

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 188.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 191.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 49, 270.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 50, 275; 51, 288.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 51, 291.

⁶⁵ *Gig.* 11, 47; cf. above, p. 33.

⁶⁶ *Mos.* II, 35, 188.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 190; cf. above, p. 19.

Red Sea, Moses predicted the destruction of the Egyptians.⁶⁸ (2) He told the people not to leave any of the manna till the morning.⁶⁹ (3) He conjectured correctly that the seventh day of the falling of the manna was the Sabbath.⁷⁰ (4) He predicted that there would be no manna on the Sabbath.⁷¹ (5) In the story of the golden calf, Moses called out: "Whoso is on the Lord's side, let him come unto me."⁷² (6) He predicted what would happen to Korah and his followers.⁷³ (7) He predicted what was to happen to each tribe.⁷⁴ (8) He prophesied the story of his own death.⁷⁵ It will be noticed that in all these instances there is no mention of God having spoken unto Moses to say those things which he is recorded to have said.⁷⁶ It is evidently because of this omission that Philo characterizes all these utterances as having been spoken by Moses "in his own person." It will also be noticed that all these instances deal with predictive prophecy or with prophecy which implies prediction.⁷⁷

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 46, 251-252; cf. Exod. 14: 13-14.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 47, 259; cf. Exod. 16: 19.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 48, 263-265; cf. Exod. 16: 23. In Exod. 16: 5, God had only told him that the people should gather on the sixth day a double portion. According to Philo, while the people knew that the seventh day of the creation of the world was the Sabbath, they did not know, before this utterance of Moses, when that seventh day was. Cf. *Mos.* I, 37, 207.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 48, 268; cf. Exod. 16: 25.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 49, 272; cf. Exod. 32: 26. Cf. 270: "though perhaps they may be thought to resemble exhortations rather than oracular sayings."

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 50, 280; cf. Num. 16: 5.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 51, 288; cf. Deut. 33: 1 ff.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 51, 291; cf. Deut. 34: 5-8.

⁷⁶ The only possible exception would seem to be Exod. 16: 23, which in the Hebrew text reads: "This is that which the Lord hath spoken: Tomorrow is a solemn rest, a holy Sabbath unto the Lord." But in the Septuagint this verse reads: "Is not this which the Lord spoke, Sabbaths are a rest holy to the Lord?" According to the Septuagint reading, then, the people were only told that Sabbaths are a rest, but they were not told that the seventh day of the manna was Sabbath.

⁷⁷ Five of the eight examples cited by Philo are quite obviously predictions. The following three examples require explanation. (1) Moses' ordering that the manna

Hence he describes this type of prophecy as that by which Moses "is able to reveal future events."⁷⁸

(b) *Prophecy by the Divine Voice*

As a close student of Scripture, however, Philo must have known that the divine spirit is not the only means by which God communicates His message to the prophets. In the case of Moses, for instance, the common expression by which the divine communications to him are described is not that the divine spirit came upon him, but rather that God spoke unto him. That this speaking unto him is to be taken as something different from the prophetic inspiration of other prophets is quite clearly stated in Scripture when it says that to him, unlike other prophets, God has spoken "mouth to mouth"⁷⁹ or "face to face."⁸⁰ Such prophetic utterances of Moses, which in the Pentateuch are said to have been spoken by God unto Moses, constitute that which Philo designates as the first group of Mosaic prophecies and which are described by him as belonging to a different type of prophecy.

In his description of what he calls the first group of the prophecies of Moses, Philo says that they are those which are "*spoken by God in His own person*" (ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ).⁸¹ This reflects the combined scriptural statements

not be left till the morning implies the prediction that it would breed worms (Exod. 16: 20). (2) His conjecture that the seventh day of the manna was Sabbath implies also a prediction, for it was later corroborated by God (Exod. 16: 28-29). Philo himself calls it "conjecture" (εἰκασία) and says that without the guidance of the "divine spirit" the mind could not have guessed right (*Mos. II, 48, 265*). (3) With regard to his summons to the people at the time of the Golden Calf, Philo himself says that "perhaps they may be thought to resemble exhortations rather than oracular sayings" (*ibid.*, 49, 270).

⁷⁸ *Mos. II, 35, 190.*

⁷⁹ *Num. 12: 8.*

⁸⁰ *Exod. 33: 11; cf. Deut. 34: 10; cf. Sifre Deuteronomy, § 176, on 18. 18, F, p. 107b; HF, p. 221.*

⁸¹ *Mos. II, 35, 188.*

“and the Lord *spoke* unto Moses *face to face* (ἐνώπιος ἐνωπίω), as a man *speaketh* unto his friend”⁸² and “whom the Lord knew *face to face*” (πρόσωπον κατὰ πρόσωπον),⁸³ the Greek word for “face” in the second statement meaning also “person.” This type of prophecy undoubtedly refers to all the utterances of Moses which are said to have been spoken by God unto Moses before they were delivered by Moses unto the people. In all these instances Moses receives the communication directly from God and the people receive it through Moses who is the prophet of God. How these utterances were “spoken by God in His own person” is not explained here by Philo.’ But the explanation for it is to be found in his description of the revelation of the ten commandments on Mount Sinai. The ten commandments, according to him, were revealed to the entire people directly by God “in His own person,” in the same way as, also according to him, all the other commandments delivered to Moses were revealed. “For it was in accordance with His nature that the pronouncements in which the special laws were summed up should be given by Him in His own person (αὐτοπροσώπως), but the particular laws by the mouth of the most perfect of His prophets.”⁸⁴ Now elsewhere he says of these ten commandments that they were delivered by God “not through a prophet but by a voice (διὰ φωνῆς) which, strange paradox, was visible.”⁸⁵ From this we may infer that to have been spoken by God “in His own person” means to have been delivered by God “not

⁸² Exod. 33: 11.

⁸³ Deut. 34: 10.

⁸⁴ *Decal.* 33, 175.

⁸⁵ *Mos.* II, 39, 213. The description of “voice” as “visible” is based, of course, on Exod. 20: 18: “And all the people saw the voices.” In *Decal.* 9, 33, however, Philo speaks of an “invisible sound,” by which, of course, he means an “incorporeal sound.” But the “visible” voice here he explains, in *Decal.* 11, 46, to mean an “articulate voice,” to which he also refers in *Decal.* 9, 33; cf. below, p. 38.

through a prophet but by a voice." By a voice, then, we may assume, were delivered also to Moses those communications which according to Philo's description, were "spoken by God in His own person." What the nature of that voice was, as well as the condition of the people who heard that voice, is described by Philo in some detail.

Taking for his text the scriptural statement that at the revelation on Mount Sinai God answered Moses "by a voice" ⁸⁶ and "spoke" ⁸⁷ all the commandments, Philo raises the rhetorical question: "Did He do so by His own utterance in the form of a voice?" ⁸⁸ Of course, God did not speak with a physical voice which needs "mouth and tongue and windpipe." ⁸⁹ But still the story of the revelation on Mount Sinai is a historical event which is not to be denied and is not to be explained away. It did really happen; God really spoke to the people; the people really heard the ten commandments; but it was not physical speech by means of a physical voice and physical hearing. A special miracle, "of a truly holy kind," was wrought by God on that occasion. He bid an "invisible sound" (*ἤχον ἀόρατον*) to be created. That invisible sound was something incorporeal, something living, something rational, in fact, "a rational soul (*ψυχή λογική*) full of clearness and distinctness," and that "invisible sound" sounded forth an "articulate voice" (*φωνή ἐναρθρος*) also incorporeal but described as "visible." ⁹⁰ This "new miraculous voice" was set in action by the power of God which "breathed" upon it, and as a result thereof it created in the "soul" of each of those present a miraculous sort of "hearing," and this miraculous hearing of "the God-possessed mind" went forth to meet the "spoken words." ⁹¹

⁸⁶ Exod. 19: 19.

⁸⁷ Exod. 20: 1.

⁸⁸ *Decal.* 9, 32.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Cf. above, n. 85.

⁹¹ *Decal.* 9, 32-35.

The same, we may assume, was also true in the case of Moses, whenever God, according to Philo's description, spoke to him "in His own person."

According to this description, then, the process of receiving a revelation directly from God "in His own person," and not through the "divine spirit," falls into three stages. First, God creates a miraculous voice, which is a rational soul. Second, that voice, on being set in action by the power of God breathed upon it, creates in the soul of the prophet a miraculous hearing, whereby that soul of the prophet becomes a God-inspired mind. Third, through that miraculous hearing the prophet hears the spoken words of God. Especially significant is his description of the miraculous voice as a "rational soul." The "divine spirit," as we have tried to show, is also a rational soul.⁹² It is undoubtedly this miraculous hearing created in Moses to receive the voice of God that Philo describes as a "new birth" or a "divine birth" in his statement that the "vocation of the prophet," that is, Moses,⁹³ was a second birth (*δευτέρα γένεσις*) or a divine birth (*divina nativitas*), which, in its miraculous character, is compared by him to the act of the creation of the world.⁹⁴ The expression "divine birth" means evidently the same as "God-born," which, as we have shown, refers to prophecy.⁹⁵

Prophecy by the divine voice is what Philo calls the first group of Mosaic prophecies, in contrast to prophecy through the divine spirit, which he calls the third group.

A combination of these two groups of prophecy is characteristic of what Philo calls the second group of Mosaic prophecies. In all the prophecies of this group, Moses in his own person asks questions; God in His own person

⁹² Cf. above, p. 31.

⁹³ Exod. 24: 16.

⁹⁴ *Qu. in Exod.* II, 46; Harris, *Fragments*, pp. 60-61.

⁹⁵ Cf. above, p. 10.

answers him. Philo describes the prophecies of this group as those which "have a mixed character; for, on the one hand, the prophet asks a question under divine possession (*ἐνθουσιᾷ*), and on the other hand the Father, in giving the word of revelation, answers him and talks with him as with a partner."⁹⁶ The main point in this statement is that the questions were asked by Moses "under divine possession," that is, with the abiding of the divine spirit upon him, as in the third group of Moses' prophecies; and that the answers were given by God by His own spoken words or voice, as in the first group of Moses' prophecies. Thus in this group of the Mosaic prophecies the two groups of prophecy are combined. Four cases of this group of prophecy occur in the Pentateuch, and Philo mentions all of them. They are (1) the case of the blasphemer,⁹⁷ (2) the case of the Sabbath breaker,⁹⁸ (3) the case of the second Passover,⁹⁹ and (4) the case of the daughters of Zelophehad.¹⁰⁰

The first and the second groups of Mosaic prophecies are contrasted by Philo according to two other distinctions. Prophecies of the first group are not only spoken by God "in His own person" but they are also spoken by Him "through an interpreter (*ἐρμηνεύς*), the divine prophet."¹⁰¹ They are furthermore "too great to be lauded by human lips," for, in addition to their other inexpressible merits, "they are delivered through an interpreter, and interpretation and prophecy are not the same thing."¹⁰² The second group of Mosaic prophecies, on the other hand, is that "in which the speaker appears under that divine possession in virtue of which he is chiefly and in the strict sense considered a prophet."¹⁰³ In these passages Philo quite ob-

⁹⁶ *Mos.* II, 36, 192.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 36, 193-38, 208; cf. *Lev.* 24: 10-16.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 39, 213-40, 220; cf. *Num.* 15: 32-36.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 41, 222-42, 232; cf. *Num.* 11: 1-14.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 43, 234-44, 245; cf. *Num.* 27: 1-11.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 35, 188.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 191.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

viously makes four statements. First, prophecy and interpretation are two different things. Second, in the second group of his prophecies, when he speaks under divine possession — that is, when he delivers to the people words communicated to him by the divine spirit and not those spoken to him directly by God in His own person — Moses is to be called prophet in the strict sense of the term. Third, in the first group of his prophecies, when he delivers to the people words spoken to him directly by God in his own person, Moses is not a prophet in the strict sense of the term but only an interpreter. Fourth, the words spoken by God to Moses in His own person and delivered to the people by Moses only in his capacity as an interpreter are too great to be lauded by human lips. These references to prophecy and interpretation have puzzled students of Philo.¹⁰⁴ We shall try to explain them.

In Plato, reference is made to a distinction between a man who in a state of frenzy (*μανέντος*) sees visions (*τὰ φανέντα*) and utters words (*τὰ φωνηθέντα*) and a man who in his right mind (*ἐμφρονος*) is the interpreter (*ὑποκριτής*) of these visions and voices.¹⁰⁵ Plato himself applies to the former the term “diviner” (*μάντις*) and to the latter the term “prophet” (*προφήτης*). There is, however, no rigidity about the use of these terms. In Greek, the term “prophet” is also used of persons who believed themselves to possess oracular power, and as such it is used in contrast to the term “interpreter” (*ἐξηγητής*), which means a person who interprets oracles.¹⁰⁶ Even Plato himself uses the term “prophet” in that sense, when he speaks of the Pythia as a prophetess.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Gfrörer, I, 54–56; Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, p. 193, n. 70.

¹⁰⁵ *Timaeus* 71 E–72 B.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Liddell and Scott, s.v.

¹⁰⁷ *Phaedrus* 244 B. Cf. Archer-Hind's note in his edition of the *Timaeus*, p. 267, on l. 16.

Philo, as is evident from his statement that "interpretation (*ἐρμηνεία*) and prophecy (*προφητεία*) are not the same thing,"¹⁰⁸ uses the term "prophet" in the sense of one who possesses oracular power, in contrast to one who only interprets oracles. Now in Scripture no distinction is made between the office of prophet, in the sense in which Philo uses it, and the office of interpreter. The same person who receives the message from God under divine inspiration also delivers it to the people in clear and understandable language. Every prophet in Scripture is therefore his own interpreter. He does not employ another person to interpret his message. Accordingly, when Philo, on many occasions, happens to deal with prophets, and these prophets are scriptural prophets, he takes care to tell his Greek readers, who are accustomed to the Greek usages of language, that "prophets are interpreters of God,"¹⁰⁹ meaning thereby that in Scripture there is no distinction between prophet and interpreter, for all prophets are interpreters of God, and not of oracles delivered by other prophets. And so also, in the passages here under consideration, he calls attention to the distinction in Greek between interpretation and prophecy, but at the same time he tries also to point out that no actual distinction between these two exists in scriptural prophecy.

In his description of the first group of Mosaic prophecies, he thus quite properly begins by saying that "God spoke in His own person through His interpreter, the divine prophet,"¹¹⁰ that is, Moses, who was the prophet of God and heard directly the "voice" of God, and was himself also the interpreter of that voice. Then, wishing to show how difficult it is to praise with human lips the words "spoken

¹⁰⁸ *Mos.* II, 35, 191.

¹⁰⁹ *Spec.* I, 11, 65; cf. *Deter.* 12, 39; *Immut.* 29, 138; *Mut.* 22, 126; *Spec.* III, 2, 7; IV, 8, 49; *Legat.* 13, 99.

¹¹⁰ *Mos.* II, 35, 188.

by God in His own person," that is, directly by the "voice" of God, he says that "they are delivered through an interpreter, and interpretation and prophecy are not the same thing,"¹¹¹ that is, what we have in Scripture of this first group of prophecies is only that which has been transmitted to us in understandable language through Moses in his capacity as interpreter; it does not represent the original "voice" spoken by God "in His own person" and heard by Moses in his capacity as a prophet. God's own words, he says, "are too great to be lauded by human lips,"¹¹² that is, they are inexpressible in human language.

Similarly, in his description of the second group of Mosaic prophecies, he says that it is that "in which the speaker appears under that divine possession in virtue of which he is chiefly and in the strict sense considered a prophet."¹¹³ What he means is that it is chiefly and strictly in the sense of being under divine possession that the term "prophet," as distinguished from the term "interpreter," is used in Greek divination. When we recall that in his description of this second group of Mosaic prophecies he dwells upon the terms "foreknowledge" and the revelation of "future events"¹¹⁴ and also that all his instances of this group of prophecies deal with predictions of the future,¹¹⁵ the significance of this last statement as a reference to Greek divination and to the use of the term "prophetess" in connection with the Pythia¹¹⁶ becomes all the more evident.

(c) *Prophecy through Angels*

We have so far discussed two types of prophecy which are mentioned by Philo, one which comes indirectly through the

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 191.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 190.

¹¹⁵ Cf. above, p. 35.

¹¹⁶ Cf. above, p. 14.

divine spirit and another which comes directly by the voice of God. In his threefold classification of the prophetic utterances of Moses, we have also shown, Philo is really trying to classify the prophetic utterances of Moses, in accordance with their sources, into two classes: one coming directly from God and the other coming indirectly through the divine spirit. But, besides these two methods by which God communicates His message to prophets, there is, in Scripture, reference to a third method, and that is divine communications through the intermediacy of angels. Thus an angel is said to have appeared to Hagar,¹¹⁷ to Abraham,¹¹⁸ to Balaam,¹¹⁹ to Gideon,¹²⁰ and to many other persons, and in each case the angel predicted the future, which is one of the functions of prophecy.

Now angels, according to Philo, are real beings, incorporeal souls, hovering in the air and in the heavens, identical with what the Greeks call demons, and from his description of the functions of angels in general and of the actual tasks they are said to have performed in particular we may gather that they are considered by him as intermediaries of what he calls prophetic communications. To begin with, among the functions he ascribes to them is that of ambassadors of God through whom "He announces whatever predictions he wills to make to our race."¹²¹ Prediction, according to Philo, is one of the four functions of prophecy. Furthermore, when Sarah began to realize that the three strangers who had predicted to her the birth of a son were not ordinary human beings, she began to suspect that they were, as Philo says, "prophets or angels."¹²² Angels, then, perform the same function as prophets, that of prophesy-

¹¹⁷ Gen. 16: 7-12; 21: 17-18.

¹¹⁸ Gen. 18: 2-16; 22: 15-18.

¹¹⁹ Num. 22: 22-35.

¹²⁰ Judges 6: 12-24.

¹²¹ *Abr.* 23, 115.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 113.

ing. Still further, the angel in his address to Balaam is made by Philo to utter the following words: "I shall direct your speech, prophesying (*θεσπιζων*) through your tongue all that shall happen, though you yourself understand nothing of it."¹²³ An angel is thus here explicitly said to be a source of prophecy. And so prophecy through an angel is, according to Philo, a third type of prophecy. If the question should be raised why in his enumeration of the groups of prophecies of Moses no mention is made by him of prophecy through an angel, the answer is quite obvious. There is no reference in Scripture of this type of prophetic revelation in the case of Moses. There is indeed a reference to an angel who appeared to Moses at the burning bush.¹²⁴ But that angel did not speak to Moses. The speech which followed after the appearance of that angel is ascribed to God himself,¹²⁵ and hence it belongs to those communications which are described by Philo as spoken by God "in His own person." Inasmuch as to Philo the angel acts as an agent of prophecy and performs the same function as a prophet, the term angel is sometimes taken by him to mean prophet, for, referring to the verse "Behold I send an angel before thee,"¹²⁶ he says: "One must suppose that the angel mentioned a little before communicated the voice of God, for the prophet is the angel or messenger of the Lord, who is the real speaker."¹²⁷

(d) *Differences between the Three Types of Prophecy*

If we now compare these three types of prophecy, we find that they have one element in common. They all come about by means of something like a rational soul. The "voice" of God is directly described by Philo as a rational

¹²³ *Mos.* I, 49, 274.

¹²⁴ *Exod.* 3: 2.

¹²⁵ *Exod.* 3: 4; cf. *Mos.* I, 12, 63 f.; *Fug.* 25, 141; *Mut.* 23, 134.

¹²⁶ *Exod.* 23: 20. ¹²⁷ *Fragmenta*, Richter, VI, 243 (M, II, 678). Cf. above, I, 418.

soul.¹²⁸ Angels are also directly described by him as rational souls.¹²⁹ As for the divine spirit, we have tried to show that like the divine spirit which God breathed into Adam it is also a rational soul. And still, despite the common element in these three types of prophecy, Philo distinguishes between prophecy by the "voice" of God and prophecy through the "divine spirit," and consequently, it may be inferred, also from prophecy through "angels," calling prophecy by the "voice" of God a direct kind of divine communication in which God speaks to the prophet "in His own person."¹³⁰ The "voice" of God must therefore have been conceived by Philo as a rational soul which carries the very words of God to that new kind of "hearing" which it created in the soul of Moses as well as in the souls of those who stood witness at the revelation of the ten commandments on Mount Sinai,¹³¹ whereas the "divine spirit" and "angels" are rational souls which communicate God's message in their own words. Between the "divine spirit" and "angels" there is still another difference. Angels are many, and each angel is a messenger of God not only in imparting to men prophetic communications but also in performing other tasks, such, for instance, as bringing secondary goods or punishments.¹³² The divine spirit, on the other hand, is one unique being whose only office is that of imparting prophetic knowledge to men.

His differentiation between the three types of prophecy has led Philo to lay down different sets of qualifications for the prophetic gifts of the various types of prophecy. That prophecy required certain qualifications is assumed in native Jewish tradition. In the Talmudic literature, according to

¹²⁸ *Decal.* 9, 33; cf. above, p. 38.

¹²⁹ *Conf.* 35, 176; cf. above, I, 367.

¹³⁰ *Mos.* II, 35, 188; cf. above, p. 37

¹³¹ Cf. above, p. 38.

¹³² Cf. above, I, 381-382.

one list, the qualifications for prophecy are wisdom, strength, riches, and high stature;¹³³ according to another list, they are study, strictness, zeal, integrity, abstinence, purity, holiness, humility, fear of sin, and piety.¹³⁴ To be of Jewish descent, however, is not considered a required qualification. Seven gentiles mentioned in Scripture, including Balaam, are said to have been prophets,¹³⁵ though certain distinctions are drawn between the prophecy of Israel and the prophets of other nations.¹³⁶ The Stoics are similarly reported as having said that only the upright man (*σπουδαῖος*)¹³⁷ or the wise man (*sapiens*)¹³⁸ can be a diviner. However, there is a difference between the Jewish and the Stoic view. According to the Jewish view, prophecy, like any act of individual providence, has in it an element of divine grace and selection, and the qualifications required are those which render men fit to be selected by God for the divine gift of prophecy. According to the Stoics, prophecy is a natural and necessary process,¹³⁹ and the qualifications required are those which render men naturally fit for the power of divination.

In accordance with these prevailing views, Philo also discusses the qualifications for prophecy. The wicked (*φᾶυλος*) and iniquitous (*μοχθηρός*) man, he maintains, can never be a prophet.¹⁴⁰ Prophecy is reserved only for the refined man (*ἀστειός*),¹⁴¹ the wise man (*σοφός*),¹⁴² the just man (*δίκαιος*),¹⁴³

¹³³ *Shabbat* 92a; *Nedarim* 38a.

¹³⁴ *'Abodah Zarah* 20b and *M. Soṭah* IX, 15, combined.

¹³⁵ *Baba Batra* 15b.

¹³⁶ *Genesis Rabbah* 52, 5; *Leviticus Rabbah* 1, 13.

¹³⁷ Stobaeus, *Eclogae* II, p. 114, l. 16 (Arnim, III, 605). The term *σπουδαῖος* literally means the same as the Hebrew term *zerizut* ("quickness," "zeal," "eagerness"), quoted above.

¹³⁸ Cicero, *De Divinatione* II, 63, 129. Cf. Pease's note in his edition.

¹³⁹ Cf. above, I, 352 n.

¹⁴⁰ *Heres* 52, 259.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² *Ibid.*; *Immut.* 1, 3; *Gig.* 5, 23.

¹⁴³ *Heres* 52, 260.

and the genuine lover of wisdom (*φιλόσοφος ἀνοθος*).¹⁴⁴ With these qualifications of refinement, wisdom and justice any man is capable of attaining prophecy.¹⁴⁵ Still, while he does not say so explicitly, there is no doubt that with his belief in individual divine providence the attainment of prophecy by those who are worthy of it is through an act of divine grace and selection. No qualification of descent is specified by him. Referring to prophetic knowledge as "pure knowledge," he says that "it is the pure knowledge in which every wise man in all likelihood (*εἰκότως*) shares."¹⁴⁶ Here again the sharing in this "pure knowledge" by "every wise man" is through an act of divine grace and selection. Furthermore, inasmuch as every man possesses an incorporeal rational soul and inasmuch also as in no man is the rational soul always completely submerged in bodily sensations, there is no man who does not occasionally get a flash of the divine prophetic spirit. "Who indeed is so lacking in reason (*ἄλογος*) and soul (*ἄψυχος*) that he never either with or without his will receives a conception of the best? Nay, even over the reprobate hovers often of a sudden the vision of the excellent, but to grasp it and keep it for their own they have not the strength. In a moment it is gone and passed away to some other place, and from the habitation of those who have come into its presence after wandering from the life of law and justice it turns away its steps. Nay, never would it have come to them save to convict those who choose the base instead of the noble."¹⁴⁷ The phrase "vision of the excellent" in this passage refers to the "spirit of God" mentioned previously,¹⁴⁸ and that spirit of God, as may be judged from the context, refers to the spirit of

¹⁴⁴ *Plant.* 6, 24.

¹⁴⁵ *Heres* 52, 260.

¹⁴⁶ *Gig.* 5, 22.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 20-21.

¹⁴⁸ *Cf. ibid.*, 19.

prophecy.¹⁴⁹ In some respect this passage reflects Plato's statements that all men by their very nature have the capacity to regain the vision of the ideas for fleeting moments during their lifetime,¹⁵⁰ and that the soul by its very nature has the capacity of divination (*μαντικόν τι*).¹⁵¹ But there is an additional element in it. These brief visitations of the divine prophetic spirit to the reprobates are not always altogether a natural act of necessity, they have an element of divine grace in them. They are the work of divine providence for the purpose of convicting the reprobates, of making them conscious of their wrong-doings and thereby causing them by their own free will to abandon the base and choose the noble.¹⁵²

Scriptural prophecy through the divine spirit thus differs from the various kinds of frenzy or ecstasy or divine possession known among Greeks in that it has an element of divine grace in it. Commenting upon the name Hannah, which in Hebrew means "grace," Philo says that "without grace it is impossible to leave the ranks of mortal things or to stay forever among things imperishable."¹⁵³ What he means is that it is only by the grace of God that one can rise from the knowledge of things sensible to prophetic knowledge of things intelligible. He then goes on to say: "When grace fills the soul, that soul thereby rejoices and smiles and dances, for it is possessed with a frenzy (*βεβάκχεται*), so that to many of the unenlightened it may seem to be drunken, crazy and beside itself,"¹⁵⁴ for "with the God-possessed (*θεοφορήτοις*) not only is the soul wont to be stirred and goaded as it were into ecstasy but the body also is flushed and fiery . . . and thus many of the foolish are

¹⁴⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, 23 ff.

¹⁵⁰ *Phaedrus* 249 B-D.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* 242 c.

¹⁵² Cf. above, I, 437-438.

¹⁵³ *Ebr.* 36, 145.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 146.

deceived and suppose that the sober are drunk.”¹⁵⁵ The Greek term used here by Philo for “possessed with a frenzy,” it will be noticed, is *βεβάκχεται*, which literally means “possessed with a Bacchic frenzy.” Elsewhere Philo uses this term in the sense of a frenzy which has been brought on by one’s own will (*ἐκουσῶ*)¹⁵⁶ or which has been induced by “unmixed wine” (*ἀκράτῳ*).¹⁵⁷ The reference quite evidently is to the festivals of Bacchus or Dionysus, at which ecstasy or frenzy or divine possession was brought on voluntarily by the drinking of wine. Philo indirectly alludes to this practice when he mentions “drunkenness” (*μέθη*) and “drunken frolic” (*παροῦλα*) in his description of the manner in which heathen festivals are celebrated.¹⁵⁸ The purpose of his comment on the name Hannah, therefore, is to show that the ecstasy which comes by the grace of God through the divine spirit is not the same as that which is induced voluntarily by strong wine in the cult of Dionysus. Though resembling intoxication, it is really a sober ecstasy. It is for this reason that elsewhere he describes this kind of ecstasy as “a divine intoxication (*θελα μέθη*), more sober than sobriety itself,”¹⁵⁹ or as “sober intoxication” (*μέθη νηφάλιος*).¹⁶⁰

Every man and woman by virtue of their being endowed with a rational soul may thus be chosen by divine grace for the gift of that type of prophecy which comes through the divine spirit. No qualification of descent is required, though moral and intellectual qualifications may be required for the permanency of the prophetic gift of this type. Similarly, prophecy through an angel may come by divine grace to

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 147.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 31, 123.

¹⁵⁷ *Somm.* II, 31, 205.

¹⁶⁰ *Probus* 2, 13.

¹⁵⁸ *Cher.* 27, 92.

¹⁵⁹ *Leg. All.* III, 26, 82.

For other implications of this expression, cf. H. Lewy, *Sobria Ebrietas*, 1929.

any human being of whatever descent; and, inasmuch as this type of prophecy is always only of a temporary nature, even the qualification of moral and intellectual perfection is not required, as is evidenced by the instances of Hagar and Lot and Balaam. God may send an angel to any human being He chooses.

Not so, however, is that type of prophecy which comes directly from God, by the voice of God. In this there must be a certain qualification of descent. Commenting upon the verse in which Hagar says to the angel who has appeared to her, "Thou art the God that didst look upon me?"¹⁶¹ he says: "for being Egyptian by descent she was not qualified to see the Supreme Cause."¹⁶² Here then Egyptian descent disqualified one from attaining that kind of prophecy which comes directly from God. Complementary to this passage there is another passage in which, though he does not say that non-Jewish descent disqualifies one for this type of prophecy, he does say that Jewish descent especially qualifies one for it. Of the prophecies which were spoken to Moses by God "in His own person" he says that they "are absolutely and entirely evidences of the divine excellences, namely, of His graciousness and beneficence, by which He incites all men to noble conduct, and particularly the people which is dedicated to His service, for whom He opens up the road which leads to happiness."¹⁶³ By the "people which is dedicated to His service" he means here Israel, for Israel, Philo says elsewhere, is the best of races and is capable of seeing God,¹⁶⁴ and this capability of seeing God is based upon the habit of its service to God.¹⁶⁵ In this type of prophecy, then, the divine grace of prophecy is not given to

¹⁶¹ Gen. 16: 13.

¹⁶² *Somm.* I, 41, 240.

¹⁶³ *Mos.* II, 35, 189.

¹⁶⁴ *Congr.* 10, 51; *Post.* 26, 92.

¹⁶⁵ *Sarr.* 36, 120.

man by the mere fact of his being morally and intellectually qualified for it; the qualification of Jewish descent is required. Elsewhere he tells us, as we have seen, that this divine grace in the case of Moses is a free grace¹⁶⁶ and in the case of the people of Israel it was due to the merit of the Patriarchs.¹⁶⁷ This view, that the revelation of the Law was a special gift to Israel, was by the time of Philo a common belief among the Jews, as is evidenced from Sirach.¹⁶⁸

This variety of meaning of the term prophecy as used by Philo will throw light also upon the question whether Philo differed or did not differ from Palestinian Judaism with regard to the doctrine of the cessation of prophecy. The emphasis laid by students of Philo upon his conception of the universality of the gift of prophecy and upon his account of his own personal experience of prophetic inspiration¹⁶⁹ has created the impression that Philo did not believe in the cessation of prophecy.¹⁷⁰ But prophecy is a complex term, both as used in Palestinian Judaism and as used by Philo, and when we speak of the cessation of prophecy we must first determine what type of prophecy is meant by such a cessation.

The cessation of prophecy which according to Palestinian tradition took place upon the death of the last of the prophets, Haggai, Zechariah and Malachi,¹⁷¹ means that the kind of prophecy which inspired the teachings contained in the Hebrew Scripture came to an end, so that henceforth no other teachings will have been inspired by the same kind of

¹⁶⁶ *Leg. All.* III, 46, 134-135.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.* II, 9, 33-34; cf. above, I, 450-455.

¹⁶⁸ Sirach 24: 8, 12.

¹⁶⁹ *Migr.* 7, 34-35; *Cher.* 9, 27; *Somn.* II, 38, 252.

¹⁷⁰ Cf. R. H. Pfeiffer, *Introduction to the Old Testament*, p. 67, referring to Gfrörer, I, 46-68.

¹⁷¹ *Yoma* 9b.

prophecy. This may be gathered from the distinction which Talmudic sources constantly make between Scripture and extra-scriptural writings¹⁷² and the fact that every book included in Scripture was believed to have been inspired by the Holy Spirit.¹⁷³ We may also gather this from Josephus' statement that "from Artaxerxes (i.e., the Book of Esther) to our own time the complete history has been written but has not been deemed worthy of equal credit with the earlier records, because of the failure of the exact succession of the prophets."¹⁷⁴ Other forms of prophecy, however, did not disappear. Both in Talmudic literature and in Josephus there are references to predictive prophecy, attributed to an echo of a heavenly voice (*bat kol*, φωνή),¹⁷⁵ which in Josephus is loosely referred to as prophecy.¹⁷⁶ In Talmudic literature it is told how Hillel said that the people would know how to act on a certain occasion by the Holy Spirit,¹⁷⁷ how Gamaliel guessed by the Holy Spirit the name of a gentile whom he had never seen before,¹⁷⁸ and how, after three years of debate between the schools of Shammai and Hillel, a heavenly voice called out that the views of the school of Hillel should be accepted as law against those of the school of Shammai.¹⁷⁹ Thus according to Palestinian tradition, prophecy in the sense of prediction and in the sense of knowing things beyond sense perception and reason never ceased to exist. Moreover, the fact that, despite the cessation of prophecy, Maimonides claims to have discovered the hidden meaning of certain verses in the Book of Job by a

¹⁷² *M. Shabbat* XVI, 1; *M. Sanhedrin* X, 1; *Tos. Yom-Ṭob* IV, 4.

¹⁷³ *BabaBatra* 14b-15a; *Magillah* 7a.

¹⁷⁴ *Apion*, I, 8, 41.

¹⁷⁵ *Soḥa* 33a; *Tos. Soḥa* XIII, 5; *Antt.* XIII, 10, 3, 282.

¹⁷⁶ *Antt.* XIII, 10, 7. 299-300; *Bell. Jud.* I, 2, 8, 68-69.

¹⁷⁷ *Tos. Pesahim* IV, 2.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.* I (II), 27.

¹⁷⁹ *'Erubin* 13b; *Yer. Berakot* I, 7, 3b below.

sort of prophecy¹⁸⁰ shows that the prophecy which ceased was a special kind of prophecy, that kind of prophecy which inspired the teachings contained in Scripture.

This is exactly the view of Philo. The accounts of his own personal experience of prophetic inspiration¹⁸¹ relate only to the attainment of a knowledge of things by inspiration when ordinary reasoning processes failed him. This is exactly what Palestinian rabbis still continued to claim for themselves. But there is no evidence that unlike Palestinian Jews he believed that that type of prophecy which gave Scripture its special character continued to exist. His assertion that all things written in the Pentateuch are divine revelations¹⁸² and his references to the inspired nature of the other books of Scripture which he happens to mention¹⁸³ indicate that he assigned no such distinction to any other books written after the Scripture. With regard to the laws of Moses, his expression of hope, that is, of belief, that they are eternal,¹⁸⁴ clearly indicates that the prophetic inspiration which produced them came to an end. Indeed, he speaks of the Septuagint translation as having been done by its translators "as if they were divinely inspired" (*καθάπερ ἐνθουσιῶντες*) and he describes their work of translation by the term "prophesied" (*προεφήτεον*),¹⁸⁵ but so also the Palestinian rabbis sometimes did not hesitate to say that the Aramaic version of the prophets¹⁸⁶ and even the Septuagint¹⁸⁷ were done under divine inspiration.

¹⁸⁰ *Moreh Nebukim* III, 22.

¹⁸¹ *Migr.* 7, 34-35; *Cher.* 9, 27; *Somn.* II, 38, 252.

¹⁸² *Mos.* II, 35, 188.

¹⁸³ Cf. Gfrörer, I, 46-48.

¹⁸⁴ *Mos.* II, 3, 14; cf. above, I, 187.

¹⁸⁵ *Mos.* II, 7, 37; cf. *Wisdom of Solomon* 7: 27.

¹⁸⁶ *Megillah* 3a.

¹⁸⁷ *Megillah* 9a; *Masseket Soferim* I, 8 (ed. M. Higger, p. 82).

IV. PROPHETIC DREAMS

There are thus, according to Philo, three sources of prophecy, God, the divine spirit, and angels. The first two sources are explicitly distinguished by him in his analysis of the prophecies of Moses; the third may be discerned in his discussion of angels. Now in Greek philosophy similar views are expressed as to the sources of divination. Corresponding to two of Philo's sources, namely, God and angels, there is the statement attributed to the Stoics that divination comes either from the gods or from demons.¹ Corresponding to the remaining one of Philo's three sources of prophecy, namely, the divine spirit, which, in the case of Moses, is described by him as the power (*δύναμις*) of foreknowledge imparted by God to him through the permanent abiding upon him of the divine spirit, whereby he is able to reveal future events,² there is the view ascribed to Chrysippus that divination is "the power (*vim*) to see, understand, and explain premonitory signs given to men by the gods."³ But there is no evidence that Philo was influenced, in his enumeration of these three types of prophecy, by these non-Jewish sources. The only formal enumeration of the sources of divination in Greek philosophy is that in which, as quoted above, gods and demons are mentioned. No such formal enumeration is found in Philo, though, as we have shown, angels, which correspond to demons, are undoubtedly considered by him a source of prophecy. The only formal enumeration given by him is his analysis of the prophecies of Moses into those

¹ Stobaeus, *Eclogae* II, p. 67, ll. 16-19; cf. Zeller, III, 14, p. 352, n. 6 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*², p. 378, n. 2).

² *Mos.* II, 35, 190; cf. above, p. 34.

³ Cicero, *De Divinatione* II, 63, 130; cf. also I, 32, 70; I, 49, 110; II, 11, 26. See A. S. Pease's notes in his edition.

“spoken by God in His own person” and those “spoken by Moses in his own person when possessed by God,” that is, through the divine spirit.⁴ And such a classification of the sources of divination or prophecy is not found in Greek literature.

There is, however, evidence that his formal threefold classification of the sources of dreams, corresponding to the implied threefold classification of sources we have found in his discussion of prophecy, is directly based upon a Greek text, but that still, while the formal classification is based upon a Greek text, his entire treatment of the subject of dreams is again a combination of scriptural and Greek texts.

In Scripture not only prophecy but also dreams are said to come from God, and the prophet and the dreamer of dreams are both considered as receiving divine communications.⁵ In Scripture, furthermore, are recorded many true dreams. As a close student of Scripture Philo must have observed that with regard to these dreams, sometimes it is God himself who is said to appear to men in dreams, as in the case of the dream of Abimelech,⁶ in the dream of Laban,⁷ and in the dream of Solomon;⁸ sometimes it is an angel who is said to appear in dreams, as in the case of the dreams of Jacob;⁹ but sometimes men are said to dream without any mention of God or angels, as in the case of the dreams of Joseph,¹⁰ Pharaoh’s chief baker and chief butler in prison¹¹ and Pharaoh himself,¹² of the dream overheard by Gideon,¹³

⁴ Cf. above, p. 34.

⁵ Num. 12: 6; Deut. 13: 2, 4; I Sam. 28: 6, 15; Jer. 23: 25; 27: 9; 29: 8.

⁶ Gen. 20: 3.

⁷ Gen. 31: 24.

⁸ I Kings 3: 5.

⁹ Gen. 28: 12, 13; cf. below, p. 58; Gen. 31: 11.

¹⁰ Gen. 37: 5, 9.

¹¹ Gen. 40: 8, 9, 16.

¹² Gen. 41: 1, 5.

¹³ Judges 7: 13.

and of the dream of Nebuchadnezzar.¹⁴ Similarly in Greek philosophy frenzy and dreams are considered as two natural modes of divination, approved of by both Peripatetics and Stoics, and are contrasted with those artificial modes of divination, which, like the various forms of witchery in Scripture,¹⁵ were disapproved of by the Peripatetics.¹⁶ Moreover, corresponding to the three kinds of dreams recorded in Scripture, there is the view of Posidonius that "there are three ways in which men dream as the result of divine impulse: first, the soul is clairvoyant of itself because of its kinship with the gods; second, the air is full of immortal souls (i.e., demons), already clearly stamped, as it were, with the marks of truth; and third, the gods in person converse with men when they are asleep."¹⁷ Following his general method of casting scriptural material in a philosophic framework, Philo combines the various classes of dreams recorded in Scripture with the classification of dreams as found in Posidonius. This he does in his work "On Dreams, That They Are God-Sent," of which only two of the original three or five parts are now extant.¹⁸

The part of the work which is not extant is said by Philo to have dealt with dreams in which "the Deity of His own motion sends to us the visions which are presented to us in sleep"¹⁹ and in which the dreams are clear and distinct after the nature of plain oracles.²⁰ In this lost part of the

¹⁴ Dan. 2: 1 ff.

¹⁵ Deut. 18: 10-11.

¹⁶ Cicero, *De Divinatione* I, 3, 5; I, 6, 11-12; I, 33, 72. See Pease's notes in his edition.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* I, 30, 64. Cf. Colson, V, 593, §§ 1-2; *Philos Werke*, VI, 173, n. 2.

¹⁸ Cf. L. Massebieau, "Le Classement des Oeuvres de Philon," *Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études . . . Sciences Religieuses*, 1 (1889), 30; L. Cohn, "Einteilung und Chronologie der Schriften Philo's," *Philologus*, Supplementband VII, iii (1899), 402; M. Adler, "Das philonische Fragment *De Deo*," *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums* 80 (1936), 168.

¹⁹ *Somn.* I, 1, 1; cf. II, 1, 2.

²⁰ *Ibid.* II, 1, 3.

work, Philo, who confines himself in this book to the Pentateuch, must have undoubtedly dealt with the dreams of Abimelech²¹ and Laban,²² for in both these dreams God speaks in His own person and His message is clear and distinct.

The first extant part of the work deals with the two dreams of Jacob, (1) the dream of the ladder at Bethel²³ and (2) the dream of the flock with varied markings.²⁴ Now in the second of these two dreams it is explicitly said that it was an angel who spoke to Jacob. But in the first dream, while angels are said to have appeared to Jacob, it is the Lord who is said to have spoken to him. But in Philo's interpretation, the term Lord stands there' not for God himself but for the archangel (ἀρχάγγελος),²⁵ the eldest Logos (πρεσβυτατος λόγος),²⁶ the one who appeared "in the place of God," that is, as a substitute of God, "with a view to the profit of him who was not yet capable of seeing the true God."²⁷ Consequently, in describing this class of dreams in his own words and by the use of scriptural vocabulary, he says: "You see that the sacred Scripture proclaims as dreams sent from God not only those which appear before the mind under the direct action of the Highest of Causes, but those also which are revealed through the agency of His interpreters and attendant angels who have been held meet to receive from the Father to whom they owe their being a divine and happy portion."²⁸ But the angels, as we have seen, are to Philo powers of God immanent in the world,

²¹ Gen. 20: 3-7.

²² Gen. 31: 24.

²³ Gen. 28: 12-15.

²⁴ Gen. 31: 11-13.

²⁵ *Somm.* I, 25, 157.

²⁶ *Ibid.* I, 39, 230.

²⁷ *Ibid.* I, 41, 238; cf. I, 33, 189-190; I, 39, 229. This is Philo's interpretation of the Septuagint rendering of the verse "I am the God of Beth-el" (Gen. 31: 13) by "I am the God who appeared to thee in the place of God."

²⁸ *Ibid.* I, 33, 190.

analogous not only to the demons inherited by Greek philosophy from popular religion but also to those immanent powers or souls or minds in the world which in the Stoic philosophic vocabulary are considered fragments of that active power in the primary fire of the world which they call the mind of the universe. Consequently, in trying to describe this type of dream in strictly philosophical terms of the Stoics, he says that it is "that in which our mind, moving out of itself together with the mind of the universe, seems to be possessed and God-inspired, and so capable of receiving some foretaste and foreknowledge of things to come." ²⁹

The second extant part of the work deals with the dreams of Joseph,³⁰ the dreams of Pharaoh's chief baker and chief butler,³¹ and the dreams of Pharaoh.³² In none of these dreams does either God or an angel make his appearance. Consequently, in describing this class of dreams, Philo says that they arise "whenever the soul in sleep, setting itself in motion and agitation of its own accord, becomes frenzied, and with the prescient power due to such inspiration foretells the future." ³³

V. CONCLUSION, INFLUENCE, ANTICIPATION

In the mind of Philo, we assume, the various classifications of the types of knowledge in Plato's writings shaped themselves into a threefold classification: (1) sensation and opinion; (2) knowledge of scientific concepts formed by the mind on the basis of data ultimately furnished by sensation; (3) knowledge of the incorporeal ideas attained through recollection. Now the knowledge of the incorporeal ideas

²⁹ *Ibid.* I, 1, 2; cf. II, 1, 2.

³⁰ Gen. 37: 5, 9.

³¹ Gen. 40: 8, 9, 16.

³² Gen 41: 1, 5.

³³ *Somn.* II, 1, 1.

attained through recollection is called by Plato philosophic frenzy, which is the highest among the four kinds of frenzy enumerated by him, the lower three kinds being (1) the frenzy of divination, called prophecy, (2) the frenzy of priests, and (3) the frenzy of legislators and poets, which is inspired by the Muses. But in the Greek translation of the Hebrew Scripture the term prophecy is used as a description not only of the power of divination but also of the power to see things incorporeal which are not perceived by the senses, thus corresponding to Plato's philosophic frenzy. Accordingly, Philo, in his threefold classification of the types of knowledge, substitutes for Plato's third type, that of recollection or of philosophic frenzy, the scriptural term prophecy. Moreover, in Scripture the term prophecy is used to include also powers corresponding to the remaining two kinds of frenzy enumerated by Plato. Consequently with Philo the term prophecy comes to be used in the sense of all the four kinds of frenzy enumerated by Plato, and all of them, because they are an immediate sort of knowledge inspired by God, become with him the highest kind of knowledge. The prophet to Philo, therefore, is not only a diviner but he is also one who, like a priest, expiates the sins of the people, like a philosopher, has a direct vision of things incorporeal, and especially, like a legislator, through divine revelation, becomes the author of laws.

Prophecy in this its fourfold function comes from God. But it may come from God in three different ways. First, it may come through the divine spirit. Now the term divine spirit in one sense means the incorporeal rational soul in man, through which, out of data of sensation, man forms scientific concepts, which is the second of Philo's threefold division of knowledge. But the divine spirit which is the instrument of prophecy means an incorporeal rational being or soul which

is not in man; its contact with man is only through man's rational soul, which, on freeing itself of the rational concepts formed out of the data of sensation, becomes filled with a new knowledge communicated to it by that divine prophetic spirit. Second, prophecy may come through angels. Angels, too, like the divine prophetic spirit, are incorporeal beings, but, unlike the divine prophetic spirit, there are many of them; and, again, unlike the divine prophetic spirit, they perform other tasks besides inspiring men with prophecy. Third, prophecy may come by the voice of God. This voice of God, like the divine prophetic spirit or angels, is an incorporeal rational being. But, unlike the divine prophetic spirit or angels, which are permanent, though created, beings through which prophecy is communicated, the voice of God is created especially for each occasion of prophetic revelation. Then also, unlike the divine prophetic spirit and angels, which do not communicate directly the words of God, the voice of God communicates directly God's very words. Consequently prophecy by the voice of God is described as a form of direct communication in which God speaks "in His own person." All these three types of prophecy come by divine grace, but there is the following difference between them. Prophecy through an angel may come even to a non-Jew and even to one who had neither moral nor intellectual distinction. Prophecy through the divine spirit may also come to a non-Jew, but the recipient must have certain moral and intellectual qualifications. Prophecy by the voice of God is that by which laws are revealed and it comes only to Jews. Such prophecies by the voice of God were received by the entire people of Israel at the revelation on Mount Sinai and by Moses in the revelation of all the other laws to him, except those laws which were communicated to him in answer to certain questions addressed by him

to God. This latter group of laws was communicated to him by a combination of the divine spirit and the voice of God. The predictive prophecies of Moses, however, were communicated to him by the divine spirit. But unlike most of the other prophets, who are visited by the divine spirit only periodically, Moses was permanently under the influence of the divine spirit. Besides prophecy, there are also prophetic dreams, and such prophetic dreams, like prophecy, come either through the divine spirit or through an angel or directly from God.

From now on, in the history of philosophy, whether Christian, Moslem, or Jewish, revelation or prophecy is considered as a source of knowledge by the side of the other sources of knowledge derived from philosophic writings. Clement of Alexandria¹ and St. Augustine,² to mention but two outstanding examples, consider faith as a source of knowledge, and faith is assent to the revealed knowledge of Scripture. St. Thomas discusses the question "whether prophecy pertains to knowledge"³ and his answer is that it "pertains to a knowledge that is above natural reason."⁴ In Arabic philosophy, the Ikhwān al-Safā, in their formal classification of the sources of knowledge, mention also "prophecy" (*al-wahy*) and "divine inspiration" (*al-ilhām*)⁵ as sources of knowledge. Alfarabi places prophecy at the top of the various stages of knowledge to which man may attain.⁶ In Arabic Jewish philosophy, Saadia includes among the sources of knowledge which he enumerates also "true tradi-

¹ *Stromata* VII, 16 (PG, 9, 532 c).

² *In Joannis Evangelium*, Tractatus CX, Caput XVII, § 4 (PL, 35, 1922).

³ *Sum. Theol.* II, II, 171, 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 2 c.

⁵ F. Dieterici, Arabic, *Die Abhandlungen der Ichwān Es-Safā in Auswahl*, p. 521, l. 5; German, *Die Lehre von der Weltseele*, p. 99.

⁶ *Al-Siyūsūt al-Madaniyyah*, Hyderabad, 1346 A. H., p. 49, l. 15-p. 50, l. 2.

tion,"⁷ by which he means knowledge based upon revelation as recorded in Scripture, and both Judah ha-Levi and Abraham Ibn Daud explain the Aristotelian immediately known primary premises as coming by divine inspiration.⁸

Prophecy in both Christianity and Islam, as in Philo's analysis of the prophecy of the Pentateuch, means more than mere divination. In both the New Testament and the Koran, while prophecy means also prediction, it means primarily the revelation of certain knowledge for the guidance of men both in their intellectual and moral life. In Christian philosophy, St. Thomas raises the question "whether prophecy is only about future contingencies," that is to say, whether prophecy is only divination as among the Greeks and Romans, and his answer is that by prophetic knowledge it is also possible to know "all things both divine and human, both spiritual and corporeal" and that "it also contains matters relating to human conduct."⁹ In Moslem philosophy, prophecy is considered as the source of religious legislation¹⁰ and also as the source of man's knowledge of intelligible things or concepts.¹¹ Ibn Khaldun states that the function of prophecy is to "make known to men what is most advantageous for them" and that it is also "the power to predict the occurrence of events which are hidden from mankind."¹²

⁷ *Emunot we-De'ot, Haqdamah*, ed. Josefov, § 4, p. 44 (Arabic, p. 14, ll. 2 ff.).

⁸ *Cuzari V*, 12 (Arabic, p. 314, l. 28); *Emunah Ramah II*, iv, 1, p. 58.

⁹ *Sum. Theol.* II, II, 171, 3 c.

¹⁰ Avicenna, *Najāt*, ed. Cairo, 1331 A. H., p. 499, ll. 5 ff.; Latin, N. Caramè, *Avicennae Metaphysices Compendium*, 1926, p. 254.

¹¹ Alfarabi, *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, § 40, ed. F. Dieterici, in *Alfārābī's philosophische Abhandlungen*, 1890, p. 75; German, 1892, p. 123.

¹² *Muqaddimah I*, i, 6. Arabic text in *Prolégomènes d'Eben-Khaldoun*, ed. M. Quatremère, Paris, 1858, I, p. 165, ll. 8 and 10-11. M. de Slane's French translation, Paris, 1863, I, 184; cf. D. B. Macdonald, *The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*, 1909, p. 43.

In the New Testament two modes of prophecy are mentioned, that by the Holy Spirit,¹³ corresponding to Philo's divine spirit, and that by angels.¹⁴ But, as in Philo, on the basis of the statements in the Old Testament, the ten commandments are taken in Christianity to be direct prophetic revelation from God, that is, what Scripture describes as being by the voice of God or what Philo describes as having been given by God "in His own person."¹⁵ Thus St. Thomas who, unlike Philo, maintains that the Mosaic Law, because of its imperfection, was given through angels,¹⁶ still admits, with regard to the ten commandments, that "God himself is said to have given the precepts of the ten commandments to the people" and that the knowledge of them "man has from God himself."¹⁷ In the Koran, too, only two modes of prophecy are mentioned, one by the Holy Spirit and the other by the angel Gabriel. These two, moreover, are identified by the commentators on the Koran,¹⁸ as well as by Moslem philosophers.¹⁹ But later Moslem tradition holds that "at the time of the Mi'rāj, or night ascent into heaven, God spoke to the prophet without the intervention of an angel,"²⁰ thus corresponding to the manner of the revelation of God to the entire people on Mount Sinai or to Moses also on other occasions, which kind of prophecy is described by Philo as having been communicated by God "in His own person." Sometimes it is said that not only Mohammed on the night of the ascension to heaven but

¹³ I Cor. 12: 10-11; Eph. 3: 5.

¹⁴ Matt. 1: 20; Luke 1: 11, 13; Acts 10: 3 ff.; 27: 23; Rev. 1: 1.

¹⁵ *Decal.* 33, 175; cf. above, p. 36.

¹⁶ *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 98, 3 c.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 100, 3 c.

¹⁸ See notes on Surah 2:81 and 17:87, in Rodwell's translation of the Koran.

¹⁹ Cf. Alfarabi, *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, § 28; Avicenna, *Najāṭ*, p. 500, ll. 4 and 9.

²⁰ E. Sell, *The Faith of Islam*, 3d ed., 1907, p. 60, referring to the *Mudarij al-Nabūwah*; cf. also F. A. Klein, *The Religion of Islam*, 1906, p. 6, referring to Suyūṭi.

also to Moses God spoke directly without an intermediary.²¹ In mediaeval Jewish philosophy, Judah ha-Levi mentions the voice of God and the Holy Spirit and angels as descriptions of various modes of prophecy²² and so does also Maimonides.²³

As to what in these three groups of religious philosophies was meant by angels, it differed according to the different conceptions of angels maintained by the individual philosophers in each of these three groups of philosophy.²⁴ As for the Holy Spirit, in Christianity it is generally taken to be a real incorporeal being; in Islam, with its identification with Angel Gabriel, it is part of the problem of angels; in Judaism, there is a difference of opinion about it. Judah ha-Levi, for instance, considers it as a real incorporeal being;²⁵ Maimonides, on the other hand, seems to take it either as a description of the gift of prophecy in general²⁶ or as a description of the first two of his eleven stages of prophecy.²⁷ Directly under the influence of Philo, through a condensed Arabic translation of his *De Decalogo*, is the explanation in Arabic Jewish philosophy of the voice of God which was heard at the revelation on Mount Sinai as a voice created by God in some miraculous way, called the created voice or sound (*al-ṣaut al-makhlūq*).²⁸ An echo of this conception of the voice, though it is a question whether it was eternal or created, is to be found in Arabic philosophy when that kind of prophecy (*al-wahy*) which is said to come directly from the angel without any intermediary (*wāsiṭah*) is described as being in

²¹ Cf. E. Sell, *op. cit.*, p. 187, quoting Muhammad al-Birkawī.

²² *Cuzari*, II, 4; IV, 3; I, 89.

²³ *Moreh Nebukim* I, 65; II, 33, 34, 45 (1) and (11).

²⁴ Cf. above, I, 418-419.

²⁵ *Cuzari* II, 4.

²⁶ *Moreh Nebukim* I, 40.

²⁷ *Ibid.* II, 45 (1 and 2).

²⁸ *Moreh Nebukim* I, 65; II, 33; cf. *Cuzari* I, 89.

the strict sense of the term "word" or "speech" (*kalām*) and this "word" or "speech" is described as being conceived by the prophet as "audible voices or sounds" (*aṣwāt masmū'ah*).²⁹

As in Philo, so also in Christian, Moslem, and Jewish philosophy there is mention of certain qualifications which are required for prophecy. Whether natural and intellectual perfection is required is a matter of controversy, but it is generally agreed that moral conduct is a required condition. In Christianity, the question is formally raised by St. Thomas "whether a good life is requisite for prophecy" and, while he does not consider a disposition to goodness as a necessary requisite, he maintains that an evil life and the practice of evil are an obstacle to prophecy.³⁰ In Islam, Ibn Khaldun says that "even before inspiration prophets have a good and pure disposition and turn away from blameworthy things and uncleanness generally."³¹ In Judaism, Maimonides insists upon moral perfection as one of the requirements of prophecy.³² But whatever requirements are set up for prophecy, it is generally assumed, as in Philo, that prophecy ultimately comes to man as a divine gift. In the New Testament, prophecy is enumerated among the gifts (*χαρίσματα*) of the Spirit,³³ and St. Thomas argues to prove that "prophecy strictly so called cannot be from nature, but only from divine revelation"³⁴ or "through the gift (*ex dono*) of the Holy Spirit."³⁵ In Islam, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā speak of prophecy and inspiration as "a gift (*muhabah*) from God"³⁶

²⁹ Alfarabi, *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, § 46.

³⁰ *Sum. Theol.* II, II, 172, 4.

³¹ *Muqaddimah, l.c.*, Arabic, p. 146, ll. 14-16; French, p. 186; Macdonald, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

³² *Moreh Nebukim* II, 32 (3).

³⁴ *Sum. Theol.* II, II, 172, 1 c.

³³ I Cor. 12: 4 and 10.

³⁵ *Ibid., Contra.*

³⁶ Cf. Dieterici, *op. cit.*, Arabic, p. 521, l. 6; German, p. 99.

and Ibn Khaldun says of prophecy that "God has chosen (*iṣṭafa*) from mankind certain individuals whom He has favored with the privilege (*faddalahum*) of conversing with Him." ³⁷ In Jewish philosophy, Maimonides insists that prophecy depends on the "divine will." ³⁸ The question whether prophecy is confined to Jews, concerning which, as we have seen, Philo believed that some types of prophecy are open to non-Jews and one type, that of the revelation of the Law, is open only to Jews, is answered in Christian, Moslem, and Jewish philosophy in different ways. Among the Church Fathers, Justin Martyr takes prophecy to have been confined to Jews and then transferred to Christians. ³⁹ St. Augustine, however, maintains that before Christian times there had been also non-Jewish prophets. ⁴⁰ In Islam, among the names of the twenty-eight prophets which are said to occur in the Koran some are those of non-Jews. ⁴¹ In mediaeval Jewish philosophy, Maimonides refers to Scripture and tradition as to the existence of prophets before Moses, mentioning "Shem, Eber, Noah, Methuselah, and Enoch," though he qualifies the function of these prophets by the statement that "of these none said to any portion of mankind that God sent him to them and commanded him to convey to them a certain message or to prohibit or to command a certain thing." ⁴² In another place he mentions other non-Jewish prophets, such as Job and Balaam, ⁴³ though, again, he places them, together with some Jewish

³⁷ *Muqaddimah*, l.c., Arabic, p. 165, ll. 6-7; French, p. 184; Macdonald, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

³⁸ *Moreh Nebukim* II, 32 (3).

³⁹ *Dialogus cum Tryphone*, 82.

⁴⁰ *De Civitate Dei* XVIII, 47.

⁴¹ Such as Jethro, Job, Balaam or Aesop, and Alexander the Great. Cf. T. P. Hughes, *A Dictionary of Islam*, under "Prophet."

⁴² *Moreh Nebukim* II, 39.

⁴³ *Ibid.* II, 45.

prophets, in the second of his eleven stages of prophecy. Even Judah ha-Levi, who is generally taken to confine prophecy to Jews, may mean, according to our interpretation, as does Philo, that only a certain special higher type of prophecy is confined to Jews, whereas other types of prophecy are open also to non-Jews.⁴⁴

In his grand assault upon traditional philosophy Spinoza, in disagreement with all religious philosophers in the past ever since Philo, denies that the prophets of the Old Testament attained a knowledge of what were usually called intellectual virtues. "Thus," he says, "he who supposes to gain wisdom and a knowledge of natural and spiritual things from the prophetic books completely mistakes his way,"⁴⁵ for the Bible "has nothing in common with philosophy."⁴⁶ The prophets, according to him, taught only what used to be called moral and practical virtues, for "the mind of the prophet was disposed only to what was right and good."⁴⁷

Like all his predecessors ever since Philo, he finds in Scripture three modes of prophecy: (1) by the "words" (*verba*)⁴⁸ or the "voice" (*vox*) of God;⁴⁹ (2) through "images" (*imagines*) or "angel" (*angelus*);⁵⁰ (3) by the "spirit of God" (*spiritus Dei*).⁵¹ Of these three terms, the first and second are taken by him, as they were by his predecessors, to have sometimes meant in Scripture a "voice" and an

⁴⁴ This question as well as the question of the meaning of the Holy Spirit, angels and the voice of God and also the question of the qualifications for prophecy are discussed by the present writer in "Hallevi and Maimonides on Prophecy," *Jewish Quarterly Review*, N.S., 32 (1942), 345-370; 33 (1942), 49-82.

⁴⁵ *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, ch. 2 (*Opera*, ed. Gebhardt), p. 29, ll. 29-31.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, *Praefatio* (p. 10, l. 17).

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, ch. 2 (p. 31, ll. 30-31).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, ch. 1 (p. 17, l. 10).

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* (p. 17, l. 16); cf. p. 21, l. 9: *vox Dei*.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* (p. 19, ll. 24-25); cf. p. 17, l. 11: *figura = imago*.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* (p. 21, ll. 27-28).

“angel,” or rather “words” and “appearances,” which were “real (*verae*) to the imagination of the prophet who heard or saw them.”⁵² The third of these terms, however, the spirit of God, is taken by him, as it is by Maimonides, never to have meant anything real.⁵³ Again, unlike Philo and the other religious philosophers, and especially Maimonides, who considered prophecy by the voice of God, which was peculiar to the prophecy of Moses, as an immediate form of communication from God, he considers that form of communication also as being through an intermediary, and hence, according to him, even Moses had no immediate communication with God.⁵⁴

In opposition to those of his predecessors, especially Maimonides,⁵⁵ who required intellectual perfection as a condition of prophecy, he maintains that “in order to prophesy there is no need of a peculiarly perfect mind but rather of a peculiarly vivid imagination.”⁵⁶ This, on the whole, is a restatement in his own terms, with some essential modifications, of the view of Maimonides.⁵⁷ But unlike Maimonides, who says that in the case of Moses “he did not receive prophetic inspiration through the medium of the imaginative faculty, but directly through the intellect,⁵⁸ he maintains that even the prophecy of Moses was not without the aid of the imagination.⁵⁹ While admitting that the prophets “could indisputably perceive much that is beyond the boundary of the intellect, for many more ideas can be constructed from words and images than from the principles and

⁵² *Ibid.* (p. 17, ll. 12-13).

⁵³ *Ibid.* (p. 27, ll. 24-27).

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* (p. 20, l. 12-p. 21, l. 12).

⁵⁵ *Moreh Nebukim* II, 32 (3).

⁵⁶ *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, ch. 1 (p. 21, ll. 25-26).

⁵⁷ *Moreh Nebukim* II, 36.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, ch. 1 (p. 21, ll. 23-24).

notions on which the whole fabric of reasoned knowledge is reared,"⁶⁰ still he maintains, in opposition to all the religious philosophers who preceded him, that "prophetic knowledge is inferior (*cedit*) to natural knowledge."⁶¹ This is in direct opposition to the statement of St. Thomas that "prophecy pertains to a knowledge that is above (*supra . . . existit*) natural reason."⁶² Reflecting the view of Maimonides that all the other prophets differed from Moses in that they prophesied only periodically,⁶³ which in its turn is analogous to a view expressed by Philo,⁶⁴ he says of all the prophets, including Moses, that "inasmuch as imagination is fleeting and inconstant, we find that the power of prophecy did not remain with a prophet for long."⁶⁵

The question whether prophecy was confined to Jews or was open also to non-Jews, on which religious philosophers ever since Philo expressed an opinion, is discussed also by Spinoza in its wider aspect as part of the problem of the "vocation of the Hebrews."⁶⁶ Trying to show that the doctrine of the selection of Israel has no basis in Scripture, he argues, evidently with an eye to the passage quoted above from Maimonides,⁶⁷ that "although from the sacred histories of the Old Testament it is not evident that . . . any gentile prophet was expressly sent by God to the nations . . . it suffices . . . that we find in the Old Testament gentiles, and uncircumcised, as Noah, Enoch, Abimelech, Balaam, etc.,

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* (p. 28, ll. 22-25).

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, ch. 2 (p. 30, ll. 32-33).

⁶² *Sum. Theol.* II, II, 171, 2 c.

⁶³ *Mishneh Torah: Yesode ha-Torah* VII, 6; Introduction to Commentary on *Mishnah, Sanhedrin* X, Principle 7.

⁶⁴ *Spec.* IV, 8, 49; *Gig.* 7, 28; cf. 5, 19; *Immut.* 1, 2; *Gig.* 11, 47-49; cf. above, p. 33.

⁶⁵ *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, ch. 1 (p. 29, ll. 2-4).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, ch. 3.

⁶⁷ *Moreh Nebukim* II, 39; cf. above, p. 67.

exercising prophetic gifts.”⁶⁸ But as against this, Spinoza says, “that the Pharisees, however, vehemently contend for the contrary view, maintaining that the divine gift was peculiar to their nation” and that “the principal passage in Scripture which they cite, by way of conforming their theory with authority, is Exodus 33: 16, where Moses says, ‘For wherein now shall it be known that I have found grace in Thy sight, I and Thy people? is it not in that Thou goest with us, so that we are distinguished, I and Thy people, from all the people that are upon the face of the earth?’ from which verse they would infer that Moses asked God that He should be present to the Jews and should reveal himself to them prophetically; further, that He should grant this favor to no other nation.”⁶⁹ The “Pharisees” to whom he contributes this interpretation of the verse is Johanan bar Nappaha, a Palestinian Amora of the third century after the Christian era, who reports it in the name of Jose [ben Zimra], another Palestinian Amora of the second century.⁷⁰ This homily, however, does not deny prophecy to gentiles; it merely states that Moses prayed for the withdrawal of prophecy from gentiles. Elsewhere the withdrawal of prophecy is assumed by the rabbis, but it is explained by them to have been caused by the evil conduct of the greatest of the gentile prophets, Balaam.⁷¹ This particular homily which attributes the withdrawal of prophecy from gentiles to a prayer of Moses may have originated as a polemic against Christians who at the time of the author of this homily still claimed the gift of prophecy for themselves, and even for those who were of gentile birth.

⁶⁸ *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, ch. 2 (p. 50, l. 35-p. 51, l. 6).

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, ch. 3 (p. 53, ll. 9-22).

⁷⁰ *Berakot* 7a.

⁷¹ *Numbers Rabbah*, 20, 1; *Tanḥuma, Balaḳ*, § 1; cf. L. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, III, 355; VI, 124, n. 726.

The fundamental departure of Spinoza from traditional philosophy is his denial of the view held ever since Philo that the prophecy of the Old Testament was of divine origin. "All natural knowledge," he says, "may be called prophecy."⁷² Prophecy indeed may be called "divine," but only in the same sense that any natural phenomenon can be called divine.⁷³ But prophets have no "superhuman minds" and their "sensations and consciousness" are not different from ours.⁷⁴ Indeed, he admits that the prophets of the past may have, with their vivid imagination, perceived "much that is beyond the boundary of the intellect"⁷⁵ and he confesses that he does not know how to explain that by "laws of nature,"⁷⁶ but he is quite certain that prophecy does not come in a miraculous way from God. Inasmuch, therefore, as he considers prophetic knowledge as being knowledge based upon imagination, in his classification of the sources of knowledge⁷⁷ he would not put it as the highest kind of knowledge but rather as the lowest, though in restating what he believed to be the genuine New Testament teaching,⁷⁸ he maintains that the prophecy of Jesus, unlike that of Moses, was without the aid of the imagination; it was a revelation "truly and adequately" and "immediately" perceived,⁷⁹ thus corresponding to what Spinoza himself calls the third class of knowledge, or intuitive knowledge.

⁷² *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, ch. 1 (p. 15, ll. 18-19).

⁷³ *Ibid.* (p. 15, ll. 25-31).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* (p. 16, ll. 2-5).

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* (p. 28, l. 22); cf. above, p. 69.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* (p. 28, ll. 7-8).

⁷⁷ *Ethics* II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2; *Short Treatise* II, 1; II, 4, § 9; *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 19.

⁷⁸ *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, ch. 1 (p. 21, ll. 15-16).

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, ch. 1 (p. 21, ll. 23-24), ch. 4 (pp. 64, l. 16-65, l. 2).

CHAPTER X

PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

IN OUR SEARCH for God, says Philo, two principal questions arise, "one is whether the Deity exists . . . the other is what the Deity is in essence," and while the second question, he says, is "perhaps impossible to solve," "to answer the first question does not need much labor."¹ Why not much labor is required to establish the existence of God is explained by Philo himself in the words which he makes Moses say to God: "That Thou art and dost subsist, of this the world has been my teacher and guide."² Elsewhere, however, Philo qualifies this statement by saying that God in so far as His existence is taught by the world is "more easily conceived by the mind than made known by verbal demonstration."³ This probably reflects Plato's statement that "the Maker and Father of this all it is a hard task to find and, having found Him, it is impossible to declare Him to all men,"⁴ which statement Philo evidently takes to refer to the existence of God rather than to His essence,⁵ and, in opposition to it, maintains that to declare the existence of God to others by verbal demonstration is not impossible but only less easy a task than merely to find it for oneself, that is, merely to conceive it in one's own mind. But still, while to prove the existence of God to the satisfaction of others by verbal demonstration is less easy a task than one would like it to be, Philo does not shrink from undertaking that task. The manner in which the existence of God may be demonstrated from the con-

¹ *Spec.* I, 6, 32.

² *Ibid.* I, 8, 41.

³ *Post.* 48, 167.

⁴ *Timaeus* 28 c.

⁵ Cf. below, p. 113, for various interpretations of this passage by Church Fathers, who take it to refer to the essence of God.

temptation of the world is either fully stated or briefly alluded to by Philo in several places in his writings. Four such arguments are advanced by him, three cosmological and one teleological. To these, as we shall see, he adds also what may be called a nascent ontological argument.

One of Philo's arguments is based upon the premise that the world came into being, supplemented by the principle that nothing comes into being without a cause. It is modeled after Plato's argument in the *Timaeus*, which reads: "All that comes to be must needs be brought into being by some cause, for without a cause it is impossible for anything to come to be." ⁶ As restated by Philo, this argument reads that "the world has come into being and assuredly it has derived its existence from some cause." ⁷ The principle of causality upon which this Platonic argument is based is alluded to by Philo in his explanation that the scriptural description of the "earth," by which is meant the "world of our senses," as God's "footstool" in the verse "the heaven is my throne and the earth is my footstool" ⁸ is "to show that not in that which comes into existence is to be found the cause which brought it into existence." ⁹ The implication of this statement is that if anything has come into existence there must be a cause that has brought it into existence and that that cause must be distinct from its effect.

A second argument for the existence of God is alluded to by him in his refutation of Aristotle's view that the world is eternal and that God is only the cause of the motion of the world. In that refutation of Aristotle, Philo says that Moses, because he "had been divinely instructed in the greater and most essential things of nature, could not fail to recognize that in existing things there must be an active

⁶ *Timaeus* 28 A.

⁷ *Fug.* 2, 12.

⁸ *Isa.* 66: 1.

⁹ *Conf.* 21, 98.

cause and a passive object and that the active cause is the thoroughly unmixed and thoroughly unadulterated mind of the universe.”¹⁰ In our discussion of this passage in the chapter on Philo’s theory of the creation of the world, we have shown that it contains an argument from Aristotle’s own proof for the existence of God from the eternity of motion against his view that God is only the cause of the motion of the world and not of its existence.¹¹ The inference to be drawn from this passage then is that even on the Aristotelian assumption of the eternity of the world there is proof for the existence of a god who as the immovable mover of the world is also the cause of its existence. Allusions to the Aristotelian proof from motion are also to be found in his description of God as the “moving cause” (*κινουῦν αἰτιῶν*)¹² and more especially as the immovable mover, which is expressed by him in such statements as that God “who moves and turns all else is himself immovable and unalterable,”¹³ or that “the strangest thing of all is that, whereas the stars as they go past moving objects are themselves in motion, God who outstrips them all, remains standing still”¹⁴ or that God “moves the whole composition of the world, not by means of his legs, for He is not of the form of a man, but by showing His unalterable and unchangeable nature.”¹⁵

A third argument, described by him as an argument “from the world and its constituent parts and the powers subsisting in these” and ascribed by him to “those whose philosophy is reputed the best”¹⁶ is what came to be known as the teleological argument. By the time of Philo this argu-

¹⁰ *Opif.* 2, 8.

¹¹ Cf. above, I, 295-297.

¹² *Fug.* 2, 8.

¹³ *Mut.* 7, 54.

Cf. discussion of reading of text in Wendland and in Colson *ad loc.* But whatever the reading, the meaning is quite clear that God is an immovable mover.

¹³ *Post.* 9, 28.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 6, 19.

¹⁶ *Leg. All.* III, 32, 97.

ment already had a long tradition dating back to Plato, the early writings of Aristotle, and the Stoics. In Plato this argument is described as an argument from "the earth and the sun and the stars and the universe and the fair order of the seasons and the division of them into years and months."¹⁷ Aristotle is reported to have said in one of his early writings that men derived their conception of God "from celestial phenomena also, for when they beheld the sun circling round in the day-time, and by night the orderly motions of the other stars, they supposed some God to be the cause of such motion and orderliness."¹⁸ Among the Stoics, Cleanthes is reported to have said that one of the causes which led men to the idea of God is "the uniformity of motion, the revolutions of the heavens, the grouping of the sun, and moon, and all the stars, their serviceableness, beauty and order, the mere appearance of which things would be sufficient indication that they were not the result of chance."¹⁹ This argument, like the Platonic argument from creation, is also based upon the principle of causality, the contention being that without a cause such an order could not have come to be. In support of this contention, the analogy of the products of human art is introduced. "Just as a man going into a house, or gymnasium, or market-place, would find it impossible, when he saw the plan, and scale, and arrangements of everything, to suppose that those things came into being uncaused," so in the case of the world "it is much more inevitable that he should conclude that such great operations of nature are directed by some intelligence."²⁰ In Philo's restatements of this argument, the

¹⁷ *Laws* X, 886 A; cf. XII, 966 E.

¹⁸ Fragment of his *De Philosophia* (Bekker, 1476a, 5-9) from Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 22; cf. also 1476a, 34-b, 11, from Cicero's *De Natura Deorum* II, 37, 95.

¹⁹ Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* II, 5, 15 (Arnim, I, 528).

²⁰ *Ibid.*

description of the orderly processes of nature, in which one is to find evidence for the existence of God, refers similarly to the spheres and planets and stars, but also to the elements and animal beings and plants underneath the spheres.²¹ Like the Stoics he brings into his argument the analogy of artificial things: "Should a man see a house carefully constructed with a gateway, colonnades, men's quarters, women's quarters, and the other buildings, he will get the idea of the artificer, for he will be of the opinion that the house never reached that completeness without the skill of the craftsman; and in like manner in the case of a city and a ship and every smaller or greater construction."²²

Of these three arguments, the second, the Aristotelian argument, as we have seen, is used by Philo to prove not only the existence of a God but the existence of a God of a special kind. Like Aristotle, he finds that argument to prove that God is "the thoroughly unmixed and thoroughly unadulterated mind of the universe," that is to say, He is a purely incorporeal being, but, unlike Aristotle, he finds it to prove that God is not only a cause of motion but also a cause of existence. Similarly the first argument, the Platonic, is used by him in its strictly Platonic sense as a proof for the existence of a creator who is incorporeal and exists outside the things created by him. This may be inferred from his restatement of the principle of causality upon which this argument is based, wherein he emphasizes that the

²¹ *Leg. All.* III, 32, 99; *Spec.* I, 6, 34.

²² *Leg. All.* III, 32, 98; *Spec.* I, 6, 33. Cf. *Genesis Rabbah* 39, 1: "It is like unto a man who was traveling from place to place when he saw a mansion all lighted up. He wondered: Is it conceivable that the mansion is without a caretaker? Thereupon the master of the mansion looked out and said to him: I am the master of the mansion and its caretaker. Similarly, because Abraham our father wondered: Is it conceivable that the world is without a caretaker? Thereupon the Holy One, blessed be He, looked at him and said: I am the master of the universe and its caretaker."

cause which brings a thing into existence is not to be found in that which comes into existence.²³ But as for the third argument, the teleological, in the restatement of which, as we have seen, Philo follows Stoic sources, there is nothing to show that he does not use it in its original Stoic limited sense to prove the existence of a God against those who denied His existence, irrespective of the problem whether that God is immanent in the world, as is maintained by the Stoics, or not, as is maintained by Philo himself.

But then Philo has a fourth argument, which, according to his own statement, is directed against those whom he describes as Chaldeans and who are presented by him as believing that the physical universe "either is itself God or contains God in itself as the soul of the whole."²⁴ This, as we have seen, is a restatement of the Stoic conception of God in its two common versions.²⁵ But this argument which by his own statement is directed against the Stoics is made up, as we shall try to show, of two Stoic arguments which, combined by him so as to form two parts of one argument, were turned by him into an argument against the Stoics themselves.

In the first part, Philo begins with an appeal to the so-called Chaldeans not to look for evidence for the existence of God in the order of the heaven nor even in the order of things underneath heaven, such as earth and sea and rivers and plants and animals, but to explore themselves and their own nature. By observing conditions prevailing in their own nature, he says, they will discover that within the body there is a mind which is distinguished from the latter as master from subject, as the animate from the inanimate, as the rational from the irrational, as the immortal from the mortal and as the better from the worse. From this, he

²³ Cf. above, n. 9.

²⁴ *Migr.* 32, 179.

²⁵ Cf. above, I, 176 f.

argues, they will gain a knowledge of God and His works, for reason will show that as there is a mind in man so is there in the universe and that as man's mind governs the body so the universal mind or God governs the universe.²⁶

Now this first part of the argument is nothing but a vague restatement of a Stoic argument for the existence of God in the world from the existence of mind in man. This argument from the mind occurs in a variety of forms, all but one of them based upon the principle of causality, contending that there could be no mind in man unless there was a mind in the world to cause its coming into existence.²⁷ Three characteristic forms of this argument, one based upon mere analogy and two upon causality and all of them attributed to Zeno, may be quoted here. They read as follows: (1) "The rational is better than the non-rational . . . the intelligent is better than the non-intelligent and the animate than the non-animate. But nothing is better than the universe. Therefore the universe is intelligent and animate."²⁸ (2) "Nothing that is inanimate and without reason can generate from itself a being that is animate and possessed of reason. The universe generates beings that are animate and possessed of reason. Therefore the universe is animate and possessed of reason."²⁹ (3) "No part can be sentient where the whole is not sentient. But parts of the universe are sentient. Therefore the universe is sentient."³⁰ In Philo's reproduction of this argument here the expressions "the animate and the inanimate, the rational and the irrational, . . . the bet-

²⁶ *Migr.* 33, 185-186.

²⁷ Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 77, 85, 95-104; Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* II, 6, 18; 8, 21-22; 9, 23-30; 12, 32; 14, 37.

²⁸ Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 104; cf. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II, 8, 21; III, 9, 22-23 (Arnim, I, 111); refutation of this argument in III, 8, 21 (cf. J. B. Mayor's note in his edition on II, 8, 21).

²⁹ Cicero, *op. cit.*, II, 8, 22; Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 101 (Arnim, I, 113).

³⁰ Cicero, *loc. cit.*; Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 85 (Arnim, I, 114).

ter and the worse”³¹ would seem to reflect the first of the three versions of Zeno’s argument we have reproduced, the argument based upon analogy. But when in the conclusion of his argument he says that “your reason will show you that, as there is mind in you, so is there in the universe,”³² his statement does not make it clear whether the inference is to be based upon analogy or upon the principle of causality. But however that may be, there is nothing in Philo’s reproduction of this Stoic argument to prove the existence of a God who, unlike the Stoic God, is not to be immanent in the world. The argument so far merely proves, as is contended by the Stoics, that as there is a mind within man so there must be a mind within the world.

Philo was evidently aware of this limitation of the Stoic argument which he has so far reproduced, and therefore he does not stop with it. After he has shown, on the basis of the Stoic argument, that there must be a mind in the universe, he proceeds to show, in opposition to the Stoics, but, again, as we shall show, on the basis of another Stoic argument, that that mind of the universe, unlike the mind of man, is not immanent in the body of the universe. This new supplementary argument reasons again from the mind of man, and is based upon two kinds of experience of the human mind: first, that of divination respecting future events which may take place in dreams, and, second, that of philosophic inspiration which may take place in waking hours.³³ Now the experience of divination, whether in dreams or in waking hours, is used both in the early writings of Aristotle³⁴ and by the Stoic Cleanthes³⁵ either as an explanation of how

³¹ *Migr.* 33, 185.

³² *Ibid.*, 186.

³³ *Migr.* 34, 190-191.

³⁴ Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 20-21. The reference is to Aristotle’s *De Philosophia* (Bekker, 1475b, 37).

³⁵ Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* II, 5, 13.

men arrived at a belief in the existence of God or as a proof for the existence of God. Similarly the experience of philosophic inspiration is used by Plato as a description of the state of mind during which man becomes aware of the existence of the ideas.³⁶ Combining these two kinds of experience, Philo uses them as an argument against the Stoics to prove that the mind of the universe, whose existence has already been established from the existence of a mind in man must, unlike the mind of man, abide always outside the body of the universe.

This argument, which forms the second part of Philo's fourth argument, is based upon the contention that even the human mind occasionally exists apart from the human body and consequently, it concludes, whatever is true of the human body occasionally must be true of God all the time. The argument may be restated as follows.

In the case of divination experienced in dreams, argues Philo, "the mind quits its place and, withdrawing from the perceptions and all other bodily faculties,³⁷ begins to turn itself about and to consider the object of its thought (*νοήματα*) clearly by itself, then, looking into the liver as into a mirror, it sees clearly every one of the intelligible objects (*νοητῶν*) . . . and, being content with all its visions, it prophesies future events by dreams."³⁸ Similarly in the case of philosophic possession, "when the mind, possessed by some philosophic speculation, is drawn by it, then it follows this, and necessarily forgets all other things which concern its corporeal abode . . . so that no object of sense-perception may bedim the eye of the soul, to which God has given the power to see things intelligible (*νοητά*)."³⁹ By the intelligible things (*νοητά*) in both these passages, I take it,

³⁶ *Phaedrus* 249 B-D.

³⁷ *Migr.* 34, 190.

³⁸ *Spec.* I, 39, 219. Cf. *Arnim*, II, 1196-1206.

³⁹ *Migr.* 34, 191. Cf. *Phaedrus* 249 B-D.

Philo means not merely concepts of thought but rather real incorporeal beings, the ideas or, as he calls them also, powers. Thus the human mind in our experiences of true dreams and philosophic inspiration divests itself from our body and from sense-perception and, divorced from these, sees the intelligible beings in their nakedness⁴⁰ as they exist apart from matter.⁴¹ Now, concludes Philo in his argument, if our mind can on certain occasions have an existence apart from our body, how much more so is it reasonable to assume that God, who is the mind of the universe, dwells outside of all material nature, that He contains everything and is not contained by anything, and that He goes forth beyond things not only by His thought alone, as man does, but also by His essential nature, as befits God.⁴² Thus by the analogy of the human mind Philo has established, in opposition to the Stoics, that God is immaterial and is not immanent in the world. But this analogy, he wants to show, is not perfect. The mind is only on certain extraordinary occasions divested of the body; in its normal state it exists within the body; but God is always outside the world; He penetrates the world only through His powers.⁴³ To point out this difference, and to give a reason for it, he adds the following statement. "For our mind has not created the body, but is the workmanship of Another, and it is therefore contained in the body as in a vessel; but the Mind of the universe has brought the universe into existence, and the maker of a thing is superior to the thing made, so that it could not be included in its inferior; nor indeed would it be fitting that a father should be contained in a son, but rather that a son should attain full growth under the father's care."⁴⁴ In this last statement, then, with the help of an analogy of artificial

⁴⁰ Following the reading *γυμνά* as in Colson.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 193.

⁴³ Cf. above, I, 326 ff.

⁴¹ *Migr.* 35, 192.

⁴⁴ *Migr.* 35, 193.

craftsmanship and natural procreation, he turns the Platonic argument for the existence of God from creation into an argument against the Stoics, showing that the latter are wrong in assuming that God is immanent in the world.

All these four arguments are arguments from causality intermingled with analogies of artificial things. The arguments from creation and from the perfection of the universe are expressly described by him as being based upon the principle of causality. The Aristotelian argument, we know, is in its original form based upon the principle of causality. As for the argument from the mind, we have shown, it is based either upon the analogy of the universe to man or upon the principle of causality, in the latter case arguing that there could be no mind in man unless there was a mind in the world conceived as the cause of the mind in man. All these arguments, therefore, are derived from things in the world, reasoning from effect to cause or from analogy.

As distinguished from this method of proving the existence of God from the world, Philo mentions another method. This other method as well as its difference from the first method is described by him in a passage which immediately follows his description of the teleological argument. In that passage he distinguishes between two types of mind: first, a mind which gains its knowledge of God "from created things, as one may learn the substance from the shadow," and second, a mind which, "having risen above and beyond creation, obtains a clear vision (*ἐμφασιν ἐναργῆ*) of the uncreated One, so as from Him to apprehend himself and also His shadow, that is to say, to apprehend also the Logos and this world."⁴⁵ As exponents of these two types of mind

⁴⁵ *Leg. All.* III, 33, 100. The term "shadow," it will be noticed, is used in the first part of this passage as referring to this world and in the latter part as referring both to this world and the Logos. Previously (31, § 96) Philo uses it only with reference to the Logos.

he takes Moses and Bezalel. "The former," he says, "receives the clear vision of God directly from the first cause himself, whereas the latter discerns the Artificer, as it were from a shadow, from created things, by virtue of a process of reasoning" ⁴⁶ and, again, "Moses has God for instructor . . . but Bezalel is instructed by Moses." ⁴⁷ The scriptural proof-text in the case of Moses is the verse which in Hebrew reads "Make known to me Thy way, that I may know Thee" but which in the Septuagint reads "Reveal thyself to me, that I may see Thee with knowledge." ⁴⁸ Quoting this verse from the Septuagint, Philo paraphrases it as follows: "For I would not that Thou shouldst be manifested to me by means of heaven or earth or water or air or any created thing at all, nor would I find Thy way (*ιδέαν*)⁴⁹ reflected in aught else than in Thee who art God, for the reflections in created things are dissolved, but those in the Uncreated will continue abiding and sure and eternal." ⁵⁰ This gift of having a clear vision of God is, however, not confined to Moses; it is open to all Israel. The name "Israel," according to Philo, means "seeing God" ⁵¹ and the people of Israel are described by him as "those who are members of that race endowed with vision (*δρατικόν*)" ⁵² or as those to whose lot it has fallen "to see the best, that is the Truly Existing." ⁵³ And not only Israel but all virtuous men may be seeing God. "What among all the blessings which the virtues give can be more perfect than the sight (*ιδεῖν*) of the Absolutely Existing?" ⁵⁴ And "What

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 102.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Exod. 33: 13.

⁴⁹ I take the term *ιδέα* here as a translation of the original Hebrew word "thy way."

⁵⁰ *Leg. All.* III, 33, 101.

⁵¹ *Fug.* 38, 208; *Conf.* 20, 92; *Heres* 15, 78; *Mut.* 12, 82; *Somn.* II, 26, 173; *Abr.* 12, 57.

⁵² *Immut.* 30, 144.

⁵³ *Congr.* 10, 51.

⁵⁴ *Ebr.* 20, 83.

garland more fitting for its purpose or of richer flowers could be woven for the victorious soul than the power which will enable him to behold the Existent with clear vision (δέυδερκῶς)?”⁵⁵

On the whole, this distinction between the two methods of knowing God and with God also the Logos reflects the distinction made by Philo himself between the two kinds of knowledge of the mind, one that is indirectly derived from sense-perception and another which is directly derived from God by revelation and prophecy. These two kinds of knowledge, as we have shown, correspond to two similar kinds of knowledge of mind which is found in Plato, with the only difference that, in the case of the direct kind of knowledge, Philo substitutes prophecy for Plato's dialectic and recollection.⁵⁶ The vocabulary in which this distinction between these two kinds of knowledge is couched here by Philo reflects the vocabulary used by Plato in his parable of the cave. His statement that one type of mind arrives at a knowledge of God “as one may learn the abiding thing (τὸ μένον) from the shadow (σκιᾶς)”⁵⁷ reflects Plato's view that the indirect kind of knowledge of the mind, by which one may develop the arts and sciences, ultimately rests upon the shadows (σκιαί) which one may perceive by the senses while yet in the cave.⁵⁸ His description of the other type of mind as that which “rising above creation obtains a clear vision of the uncreated one”⁵⁹ reflects Plato's description of direct cognition or *nous* as a power in the soul which enables it, in its ascent (ἐπάνωδος) above the subterranean cave, to rise to the vision (θέαν) of the ideas.⁶⁰

The verse from which, in the passage quoted, Philo infers

⁵⁵ *Mut.* 12, 82.

⁵⁶ Cf. above, pp. 7-11.

⁵⁷ *Leg. All.* III, 33, 100.

⁵⁸ *Republic* VII, 514 A ff.; 532 B; cf. above, p. 7.

⁵⁹ *Leg. All.* III, 33, 100.

⁶⁰ *Republic* VII, 532 A-C.

that Moses' knowledge of God was direct and not from the world, is verse 13 in Exodus, Chapter 33, which, as quoted by him from the Septuagint, reads, as we have seen, "Reveal thyself to me, that I may see Thee with knowledge." Supplementing this prayer, Moses says: "If Thou thyself goest not with me, lead me not up hence."⁶¹ This supplementary statement is interpreted by Philo to mean that "Moses prays that he may have God himself as guide to the road which leads to Him."⁶² This prayer of Moses is granted by God in His answer to Moses, "Thou hast found grace in My sight,"⁶³ which is interpreted by Philo to mean that "by His own agency alone does the Existent think the exceeding wisdom which is found in Moses to be worthy of grace."⁶⁴ In all these three passages, both in his discussion of the prayer of Moses and in his discussion of God's answer to Moses' prayer, Philo tries to show that what Moses prayed for was that God should reveal himself to him directly and not through the created beings in the world, so that God himself would be "the guide to the road which leads to Him," and similarly that God's answer to him was that Moses was worthy of grace by the direct agency of God himself. But as to what kind of knowledge of God did Moses pray for, whether it was for a knowledge of God's existence or for a knowledge of God's essence, Philo does not specify it in any of these passages.

But then in verse 18 of the same chapter, according to one reading of the Septuagint text, the same prayer of verse 13, "Reveal thyself to me," occurs again, but without the words "that I may see Thee with knowledge." God's answer to

⁶¹ Exod. 33: 15.

⁶² *Migr.* 31, 171.

⁶³ Exod. 33: 17, quoted by Philo as "Thou hast found grace with me" (*Immut.* 24, 109).

⁶⁴ *Immut.* 24, 110.

that second prayer, in verses 19 — 23, is discussed by Philo in several places in his works. In all of them he says that Moses prayed for a knowledge of God's essence and that God answered him that only His existence could be known, and it could be known only from the world, but that His essence could not be known by any created being.⁶⁵

Thus, according to Philo, Moses made two successive prayers, one in verse 13 and the other in verse 18. The first prayer was for a direct knowledge of God, without specifying whether that was a prayer for a direct knowledge of God's existence or for a direct knowledge of God's essence. God granted this prayer of Moses for a direct knowledge of Him, again without specifying whether that knowledge was to be of His existence or of His essence. The second prayer was for a knowledge of God's essence. This prayer was refused by God. From this refusal of a knowledge of the essence of God it may be inferred that the granting of the first prayer, namely, that of having a direct knowledge of God, refers to a direct knowledge of God's existence and not of His essence. Hence, it may be further inferred that, according to Philo, there are two modes of arriving at a knowledge of God's existence, a direct and indirect one, and that Moses was granted the distinction of having a direct knowledge of God's existence.

But here a question may arise. What does it mean to have

⁶⁵ *Post.* 5, 15; 48, 169; *Fug.* 29, 165; *Mut.* 2, 9; *Spec.* I, 8, 41-44. Consequently when Philo quotes the words "Reveal thyself to me" (*Post.* 5, 16, cf. 4, 13; *Spec.* I, 8, 41) and takes them to be a prayer for the knowledge of God's essence, the quotation is not from v. 13 of Exod. 33, as is given in Cohn-Wendland's and Colson's editions, but rather from v. 18. The quotation "Reveal thyself to me, that I may know Thee with knowledge," in *Mut.* 2, 8, is, as it stands, from v. 13. But inasmuch as it is explained to be a prayer for a knowledge of God's essence, it must undoubtedly be a quotation from v. 18, and the words "that I may know Thee by knowledge" are undoubtedly a careless addition either by Philo himself or by some copyist.

a direct knowledge of God's existence, and how does such a knowledge differ from the indirect kind of knowledge?

An answer to this question, we shall now try to show, is furnished by Philo in two passages.

First, in one passage Philo tries to explain how Moses has arrived at a knowledge of the existence of an active cause or God by two methods, " [1] because he had early attained the very summit of philosophy and [2] because he had been instructed by divine revelation in the most numerous and most important things of nature." ⁶⁶ In this passage, it is quite evident, as it is in that passage in which he distinguishes between two types of mind, that Philo enumerates two ways by which Moses has arrived at the existence of God: first, in his early life, in Egypt, before God revealed himself to him, through philosophy, and then, later, after God revealed himself to him, through prophecy. The latter way is described by him as that in which "he had been instructed (*ἀναδιδάχθεις*) by divine revelation," ⁶⁷ which corresponds exactly to his description of the direct knowledge of God in the other passage as that in which "Moses has God for instructor (*ὀφηγητῆ*)." ⁶⁸ The difference then in this passage between Moses' earlier knowledge of God's existence and his later knowledge is that the former was indirect and the latter was direct. Now the later direct knowledge is described by Philo as that in which Moses "had been divinely instructed in the greater and most essential part of nature's lore," ⁶⁹ from which it may be inferred that the direct knowledge of the existence of God is a knowledge derived from a knowledge of nature imparted in him by divine revelation. The conclusion to be drawn from this passage, therefore, is that both methods by which Moses arrived at a knowledge

⁶⁶ *Opif.* 2, 8.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Leg. All.* III, 33, 102.

⁶⁹ *Opif.* 2, 8.

of the existence of God, the indirect and the direct, were based upon a knowledge of the world, but that in the indirect method the knowledge of the world was attained by philosophy, whereas in the direct method it was attained by prophecy.

The implication of this passage is that the knowledge of the existence of God is always based upon the contemplation of the world but that such a knowledge, though based upon the contemplation of the world, may still be either indirect or direct. It is indirect when the knowledge of the world is gained by observation and the proof for the existence of God is derived therefrom by reasoning; it is direct when the knowledge of the world as well as the proof for the existence of God derived therefrom come to man by prophecy or revelation. In the former case, the knowledge of nature is gathered slowly and painstakingly by observation and experience, and the proof for the existence of God is derived, again, slowly, syllogistically, from premise through premise to conclusion. In the latter case, however, the knowledge of nature is showered upon a person suddenly by divine revelation, and similarly the proof of the existence of God derived therefrom is flashed upon a person's mind suddenly, again by divine revelation. In the former case, it is what in Philo's classification of knowledge would be called reason, which is ultimately based upon sensation; in the latter case, it is what would be called prophecy, which is independent of sensation: it is a direct knowledge of God's existence manifesting itself in the world when that knowledge of the world is revealed to man by God.

Then, in another passage, which deals with the second prayer of Moses, Philo makes Moses say, in explanation of this second prayer, and evidently with reference to God's answer to his first prayer that He himself would lead him to

a knowledge of His existence, that with regard to the existence of God, "the world has been my teacher," but that what he wished to pray for is to understand "what Thou art in Thy essence,"⁷⁰ In His answer, God tells him that His essence cannot be known to any created being.⁷¹ But then God adds: "But I readily and with right good will will admit you to a share of what is attainable. That means that I bid you come and contemplate the world and its contents."⁷² From the wording of this statement it is quite evident that it is meant to be an answer to Philo's own statement: "That Thou art and dost exist, of this the world has been my teacher and guide, instructing me as a son might of his father and a work of its contriver."⁷³ God seems to say to Moses: Indeed, like all other men, you can arrive at a knowledge of my existence, indirectly, by means of reason, and after a long and laborious process of the study of the world. But in your case, because you are deserving of special grace, I will myself lead you directly to a knowledge of my existence, by revealing to you a knowledge of the most numerous and the most important things of nature and by causing you to see by means of your prophetic insight clear evidence and a clear vision of my existence everywhere in the world.

It is in this sense, then, that in the passage quoted Philo distinguishes between the direct and indirect knowledge of the existence of God, the former of which is described by him as a "clear vision (*ἐμφασις ἐναργής*) of the uncreated One."⁷⁴ This "clear vision" of God means, as we have tried to show, a direct perception of the evidence in nature for the existence of God which one may acquire with the help of God by means of prophecy and revelation.

⁷⁰ *Spec.* I, 8, 41.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 44 and 49.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 49.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁷⁴ *Leg. All.* III, 33, 100; cf. above, p. 83.

It is in this sense also that the expression "to see God" or "the vision of God" is used by him in other passages. In one place he says that "it well befits those who have entered into comradeship of knowledge to see (*ιδεῖν*) the Existent if they may, but, if they cannot, to see at any rate His image, the most holy Logos, and next to that, the most perfect work of all that our senses know, namely, the world. For to philosophize is nothing else but to desire to see things exactly as they are."⁷⁵ In another place, he says that "the central Being with each of His powers as His body-guard presents to the mind which has vision (*ὀρατικῆ*) the vision (*φαντασίαν*) sometimes of one, sometimes of three."⁷⁶ Then, speaking of the Therapeutae, he says that because they are "a people always taught from the first to use their sight," they "may well desire the vision (*θέας*) of the Existent and soar above the sun of our senses and never leave their place in this company which carries them on to perfect happiness . . . until they see (*ἰδῶσι*) the object of their yearning."⁷⁷ Then, also, the name "Israel," whether referring to an individual or to the nation, is interpreted by him to mean "seeing God."⁷⁸ Students of Philo usually take all those passages which speak of the vision of God as referring to a knowledge of God's essence and hence they find these passages contradictory to Philo's explicit statements, in his interpretation of God's answer to the second prayer of Moses, that God's essence cannot be known.⁷⁹ But, as we have been trying to show, in none of these passages does the seeing of God mean having a knowledge of God's essence, and hence they are not contradictory to those passages in which a knowledge of the essence of God is said by him to be un-

⁷⁵ *Conf.* 20, 97.

⁷⁶ *Abr.* 24, 122.

⁷⁷ *Cont.* 2, 11-12.

⁷⁸ *Post.* 18, 63; *Immut.* 30, 144.

⁷⁹ Cf. Gfrörer, I, 136-137; Zeller, III, 24, 463-464.

attainable. Still less is a knowledge of the essence of God implied in the passage in which he says concerning the mind that "amid its longing to see (*ιδεῖν*) Him, pure and untempered rays of concentrated light stream forth like a torrent, so that by its gleams the eye of the understanding is dazzled."⁸⁰ This quite evidently refers to an indirect knowledge of God's existence.

The distinction between a direct and indirect knowledge of the existence of God is not new with Philo. Before him the Stoics speak of the innateness of the idea of God as a direct method of knowing the existence of God as distinguished from all the other methods which are based upon arguments reasoning from effects to cause.⁸¹ The direct method of knowing God may still further be traced, as we have already suggested, to Plato's theory of the recollection of the ideas.⁸² But the new element introduced by Philo into his discussion of the proofs of the existence of God, no less than into his discussion of the sources of knowledge, is his substitution, under the influence of Scripture, of divine revelation or prophecy for Plato's theory of the recollection of ideas or for the Stoic theory of the innateness of the idea of God.

The arguments for the existence of God used by Philo, as we have seen, are not new, though one of them, that from divination, has been given by him a new turn. The only new element introduced by him into these arguments is his substitution of revelation for Plato's recollection of the ideas and the Stoics' innateness of the idea of God. From now on, revelation as a proof of the existence of God is continued to be used by all religious philosophers, whether Christian, Moslem, or Jewish, even when, under the influence of Stoic

⁸⁰ *Opif.* 23, 71.

⁸¹ Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* I, 17, 44; II, 4, 12.

⁸² Cf. above, p. 85.

writings, the innateness of the idea of God is reinstated as another direct proof. Thus John of Damascus, summarizing the views of the Greek Church Fathers, divides all the proofs of the existence of God into three types: "[1] The knowledge that there is a God has been implanted by Him as something innate in all men. [2] Then also the creation itself, as well as the conservation and government thereof, proclaims the majesty of the divine nature. [3] Finally, at first through the Law and prophets and then through His only begotten Son, our Lord and God and Saviour, Jesus Christ, He revealed the knowledge of himself to us in accordance with our power of comprehension."⁸³ Of these three types of proof, the first and third may be considered as direct proofs of the existence of God, the first being the Stoic proof in its original form, except for the attribution of the innateness of the idea of God in us to an act of God himself, and the third being the Philonic version of the direct proof of the existence of God. Out of these direct proofs there developed, in Christian philosophy, what came to be known as the ontological proof. It is this ontological proof, based upon the premise that God can be directly and immediately known, that is used by Spinoza in a variety of forms as proof for the existence of God. But the immediate knowledge of God, which constitutes the basis of that proof, whatever it may mean in the case of Spinoza, is with him not a knowledge based upon revelation.⁸⁴

⁸³ *De Fide Orthodoxa* I, 1 (PG, 94, 789 B-792 A); cf. I, 3 (793 B-797 A).

⁸⁴ Cf. H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, chapter on "Proofs of the Existence of God."

CHAPTER XI

THE UNKNOWABILITY OF GOD AND DIVINE PREDICATES

I. UNITY, INCORPOREALITY, SIMPLICITY

AMONG the scriptural presuppositions with which he started his philosophy Philo mentions explicitly the existence and unity of God. He does not include among them the incorporeality of God. Still throughout his writings the incorporeality of God is assumed. He directly describes God as incorporeal (*ἀσώματος*).¹ He criticizes those who assign to God a "space" (*χώρα*),² that is to say, those who consider God as a corporeal being. He includes among his scriptural presuppositions the belief in the existence of "incorporeal ideas" (*ἀσώματοι ἰδέαι*),³ with the implication that the God who created the ideas is likewise incorporeal.

This difference in Philo's treatment of the principles of the unity and incorporeality of God reflects a similar difference in the treatment of these two principles in Scripture. The principle of the unity of God is explicitly stated in Scripture in a variety of passages, ranging from the assertion that no other god is like God⁴ to the assertion that there is none else beside the Lord who is God⁵ or that all other acclaimed deities are no gods or vanities.⁶ Whatever difference in the conception of the unity of God may be indicated by these two types of assertion, there can be no doubt that by the time of Philo, in both Palestinian and Hellenistic Judaism, the conception of the absolute unity of God was already

¹ *Spec.* II, 30, 176.

² *Somm.* I, 32, 184; cf. above, I, 176.

³ *Spec.* I, 60, 327.

⁴ Deut. 3: 24, *et passim*.

⁵ Deut. 4: 35; I Kings 8: 60.

⁶ Deut. 32: 21.

firmly established.⁷ Philo dwells on it in his explanation of the first two of the ten commandments⁸ and when he once happens to quote from Scripture the expression "the most high God" (*θεὸς ὑψίστος*),⁹ which expression is used in Greek with the implication of polytheism,¹⁰ he hastens to quote the verse "there is none beside Him,"¹¹ in order to show that in Scripture that expression does not mean that "there is any other God not most high."¹² In Palestine this belief in the unity of God constituted a principle of faith which was twice daily confessed by the recitation of the verse "Hear, O Israel; the Lord our God, the Lord is one."¹³ Undoubtedly the same confession of the belief in the unity of God was also followed twice daily by Hellenistic Jews. It is probably because this principle was so commonly well known among those of his contemporaries to whom he addressed himself in his works that Philo never directly quotes in support of it that classical scriptural proof-text. The principle of the incorporeality of God, however, with its implication of a distinction between things corporeal and things incorporeal does not directly occur in Scripture. It is doubtful whether in Scripture there is any conception of a distinction between corporeality and incorporeality with all its philosophic implications of a distinction between matter and form, potentiality and actuality, divisibility and simplicity, and mutability and immutability. Indeed there is in Scripture an indication of some contrast between flesh and spirit¹⁴ or between flesh and soul,¹⁵ but there is no indication that by spirit and soul were meant any such principles as form or immateriality.

⁷ Cf. above, I, 9 f., 13 f.

⁸ *Decal.* 12, 52-16, 81; *Spec.* I, 3, 12-5, 31.

⁹ *Gen.* 14: 18.

¹⁰ Cf. above, I, 12, 40.

¹¹ *Deut.* 4: 39.

¹² *Leg. All.* III, 26, 82.

¹³ *Deut.* 6: 4.

¹⁴ *Isa.* 31: 3.

¹⁵ *Ps.* 84: 3; *Job* 14: 22.

Still that which later came to be known as the principle of the incorporeality of God is a fundamental scriptural belief. "Incorporeality" is merely the expression in philosophic terminology of what is implied in the scriptural doctrine of the unlikeness of God to other beings. This doctrine is repeatedly stated in Scripture in a variety of ways. It is to be found in the reminder of the historical fact that "ye saw no manner of form on the day that the Lord spoke unto you in Horeb out of the midst of the fire";¹⁶ it is similarly to be found in the legal injunction not to represent God by "a graven image, even any manner of likeness, of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth";¹⁷ and it is also to be found in the rhetorical question "To whom will ye liken Me, and make Me equal, and compare Me, that we may be like."¹⁸ One can readily see the great philosophical potentialities contained in this scriptural doctrine of the unlikeness of God. All that was necessary for its transformation into the philosophic principle of the incorporeality of God was an acquaintance with philosophical speculations about the world and its constituent parts. Once one had learned that the world consists of elements and that elements consist of matter and form at once the doctrine of the unlikeness of God to other beings could come to mean exactly what Plato and Aristotle meant when they speak of the ideas or of God as being incorporeal.

Philo had learned that the world and all things therein consist of elements and of matter and form, and in the light of this new knowledge which he had learned from Greek

¹⁶ Deut. 4: 15.

¹⁷ Deut. 4: 15; Exod. 20: 4.

¹⁸ Isa. 46: 5; cf. 40: 18; 40: 25. In Greek philosophy the unlikeness of God to other beings is asserted by Xenophanes (cf. above, I, 17) and by Antisthenes (cf. below, p. 125).

philosophy he raised the scriptural principle of the unlikeness of God to the philosophic principle of the incorporeality of God.

As a scriptural proof-text for the principle of the unlikeness of God Philo quotes the verse which in the Septuagint reads "God is not like a man,"¹⁹ and, though Scripture elsewhere compares God to man,²⁰ it is the former statement which he declares to be "leading to the truth,"²¹ or to be "confirmed by the most certain truth,"²² or to be the one which "pertains to the truth, for, in reality, God is not as man, nor again, as the sun, nor as the heaven, nor as the perceptible universe, but as God, if it is justifiable to assert that also."²³ Retaining the original scriptural vocabulary he restates this principle in his statements that God "will not admit of similitude (*ὁμοιότητα*) or comparison (*σύγκρισιν*) or analogy (*παραβολήν*)." ²⁴ But as one trained in philosophy he saw that the underlying reason for the unlikeness of God to other beings is the incorporeality of His nature and thus restating that scriptural principle in philosophic language he says that "the friends of the soul" or "the companions of the soul, who can hold converse with intelligible incorporeal natures, do not compare the Existent to any form of created things."²⁵ The expression "friends of the soul" (*ψυχῆς φίλοι*) reflects Plato's expression "friends of ideas" (*εἰδῶν φίλοι*)²⁶ as a description of those philosophers who believe in the existence of incorporeal natures, and what Philo therefore means to say here is that the scriptural doctrine of the unlikeness of God rests upon the philosophic doctrine of the incorporeality of God. "Unlikeness" thus with

¹⁹ Num. 23: 19.

²⁰ Deut. 1: 31.

²¹ *Somn.* I, 40, 237.

²² *Immut.* 11, 54.

²³ *Qu. in Gen.* II, 54 (Harris, *Fragments*, p. 24).

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Immut.* 11, 55.

²⁶ *Sophist* 248 A.

him becomes "incorporeality" and the denial of the likeness of God to any other being comes to mean with him the exclusion from God's nature of anything that may, however indirectly, imply corporeality, so that God, he says, not only has no body or bodily organs or sense-perception²⁷ but also no such human emotions as jealousy, wrath, and anger.²⁸ Moreover, since the philosophic principle of incorporeality implies also simplicity and uncompoundedness, the scriptural doctrine of the unlikeness of God comes also to mean with him that God is simple and uncompounded. He thus says, by implication, of those friends of the soul who do not compare God to any form of created things that they believe also that He is a simple nature (*ἀπλῆ φύσις*) and unmixed (*ἀμυγῆ*) and that He is also *ἀσύγκριτον*, a term which means both "incomparable" and "not compounded."²⁹ The scriptural principle of the unlikeness of God is thus raised to the philosophic principle of the incorporeality and hence also simplicity of God.

Having thus raised scriptural "unlikeness" to philosophic "incorporeality" and hence "simplicity," Philo then undertakes to raise also scriptural "unity" to its philosophic implication of "simplicity," thus ultimately making the principles of "unity," "incorporeality," and "simplicity" mutually implicative.

In Scripture, the term one, when applied to God, means only numerical unity. It is merely a denial of external plurality: in this case a denial of polytheism. There are not many gods; there is only one God. In the Aristotelian philosophic vocabulary by the time of Philo, this kind of unity of God would be described by the term one (*τὸ ἓν*) as distinguished from the term simple (*τὸ ἀπλοῦν*). As stated by Aristotle,

²⁷ *Immut.* 12, 57-13, 60.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 60.

²⁹ *Ibid.* 11, 56.

“one means a measure” and it may apply to things which in themselves are constituted of many parts, whereas “simple means that the thing itself has a certain nature,” that is to say, it is indivisible and without parts.³⁰ But in the philosophy of Aristotle, owing to the principle of the incorporeality of God, God is not only one but He is also simple,³¹ for He is indivisible and without parts.³² Moreover, while the one and the simple are different, still the term one is, according to Aristotle, always relative to the term indivisible, for, as he says, “in general those things that do not admit of division are one in so far as they do not admit of it,”³³ and “that which is one is indivisible, either absolutely or *qua* one,”³⁴ so that the more indivisible a thing is the more one it is. The term one, according to Aristotle, therefore, has two meanings. On the one hand, in so far as it may apply also to things which are divisible, it is to be distinguished from the term simple; but, on the other hand, in so far as, in its application to those things divisible, it applies to them only with reference to that aspect of them which does not admit of division, it is to be understood as having the same meaning as the term simple. Since God is absolutely indivisible, the term one applied to Him must include, according to Aristotle, also His simplicity.

Evidently with all this in the back of his mind Philo tries to show that the scriptural conception of the unity of God means not only numerical unity but also indivisibility and hence simplicity. The numerical unity of God has already been established in his mind by the first two of the ten commandments³⁵ and also by the verse “the Lord thy God is

³⁰ *Metaph.* XII, 7, 1072a, 32-34; cf. *Phys.* VIII, 10, 267b, 25-26.

³¹ *Metaph.* XII, 7, 1072a, 32-33.

³² *Phys.* VIII, 10, 267b, 25-26.

³³ *Metaph.* V, 6, 1016b, 3-5.

³⁴ *Ibid.* X, 1, 1053b, 7-8.

³⁵ *Decal.* 12, 52-16, 81; *Spec.* I, 3, 13-5, 31.

alone God, in heaven above and on earth beneath, and there is none beside Him.”³⁶ Taking now the verse “It is not good that man should be alone (*μόνον*),”³⁷ he tries to show, by playing upon the word “alone” — *μόνον* — that this verse contains, as we have shown above,³⁸ three other meanings of the principle of the unity of God: first, the uniqueness of God; second, the self-sufficiency of God; third, the simplicity of God. The third of these meanings, which is characterized by him as a “better” interpretation of the verse, is stated as follows: “God is alone and one alone; not composite; a simple (*ἀπλῆ*) nature,” that is to say, not composite as we are “of soul and body,” nor composite as soul is “of a rational part and an irrational part”; nor, again, composite as body is of different contrarities, such as “hot — cold, heavy — light, dry — moist.”³⁹

Of these three examples of composition which he excludes from God’s nature, the first one, that of body and soul, is a general philosophic commonplace; the last one, that of “warm — cold, heavy — light, dry — moist,” reflects Aristotle’s description of the four elements out of which all bodies are composed as the contrarities of “hot — cold, dry — moist, heavy — light”;⁴⁰ but, with regard to the second one, that of “a rational part and irrational part” in the soul, it is to be assumed that he refers to Plato’s and his own conception of the rational and irrational parts of the soul as constituting real parts, differing from each other in their essential nature, one being material and the other immaterial.⁴¹ In itself this statement probably does not exclude

³⁶ Deut. 4: 39; *Leg. All.* III, 26, 82: cf. above, I, 171.

³⁷ Gen. 2: 18.

³⁸ Cf. above, I, 171–173.

³⁹ *Leg. All.* II, 1, 2.

⁴⁰ *De Gen. et Corr.* II, 2, 329b, 18–19.

⁴¹ Cf. above, I, 385 ff., 389 ff.

from God a purely logical distinction such as Aristotle conceives between the rational and irrational parts of the soul. In all these statements, therefore, the exclusion of divisibility from God's nature refers only to such divisibility as is incompatible with His incorporeality.

II. "WITHOUT QUALITY" — ἀποιος

But in a number of passages in Philo there occurs the statement that God is "without quality" (ἀποιος). This statement has been taken to mean that God "does not belong to a class, but is *sui generis*," for the term "quality" is said to be used by Philo in "its proper logical meaning" as "that the possession of which makes you a member of a class; and when any quality is ascribed to you, you are to that extent placed on a level with a number of other individuals." ¹ By this interpretation it is meant that the term "quality" is used by Philo in the sense of "genus" or "species" or "specific difference," and therefore whenever he says of God that He is "without quality" he means thereby that God has no genus and no species and no specific difference.

True though it is, as we shall see later, that God to Philo cannot be described by genus and species and specific difference, it is still doubtful whether the denial of this manner of describing God may be derived directly from his statements that God is without quality. For the term quality, by the time of Philo, had three distinct meanings, though not altogether unrelated to each other. In the first place, it meant, in Aristotle, one of his ten categories, and as such it was used by him in the sense of an accident inherent in a

¹ Drummond, II, 24. It is also in this sense that the term ἀποιος is usually translated in Colson.

corporeal object.² In the second place, it meant, again in Aristotle, "genus" or "species" ³ or "differentia," ⁴ the last of which is also described by him as "the differentia of the substance" ⁵ or a "differentia according to substance." ⁶ In the third place, it meant, among the Stoics, one of their own four categories, in which sense it was the equivalent of the Aristotelian "form" as contrasted with "matter." ⁷ When, therefore, Philo repeatedly says that God is "without quality," we must make a thorough examination of all the passages in which he uses the term quality, as well as of all the passages in which he says that God is without quality, before we can decide with certainty in which of these three senses he uses the terms quality and without quality.

An examination of all such passages will prove that nowhere does Philo definitely use the term quality or without quality in the second of its Aristotelian senses, namely, as that of genus or species or specific difference.

With regard to passages in which the term "quality" occurs, it can be determined from its various contexts that, with the exception of only one passage, in all of them the term is used by Philo in its first Aristotelian sense, namely, as that which expresses an accident in some corporeal object. He thus speaks of the stars shining with their own true quality,⁸ the sweet quality of water,⁹ the qualities of body and soul,¹⁰ the created man partaking of qualities,¹¹ virtues as qualities,¹² the material out of which God created every

² *Categ. c.* 8, 8b, 25 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, 5, 3b, 19-21. In this sense, on the whole, is the term quality also used by Plato.

⁴ *Topica* IV, 6, 128a, 26-27.

⁵ *Metaph.* V, 14, 1020a, 33.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 35-36.

⁷ Cf. A. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 222.

⁸ *Opif.* 18, 57.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 49, 141.

⁹ *Ibid.* 45, 131.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 46, 134.

¹² *Leg. All.* I, 26, 79; cf. Aristotle's use of quality as an accident in the sense of virtue and vice and good and evil in general (*Metaph.* V, 14, 1020b, 18-25).

particular quality,¹³ the quality of a brazen serpent,¹⁴ the heaven and the world are forms endowed with qualities perceptible by the senses,¹⁵ the qualities of things,¹⁶ the qualities as the handiwork of passion,¹⁷ qualities as distinguished from properties and hence in the sense of accidents,¹⁸ qualities of colors and figures,¹⁹ passion and vice as a substance devoid of form and quality,²⁰ the qualities of mixtures,²¹ the qualities of the elements,²² the quality of living creatures,²³ the qualities of material substances,²⁴ the quality of scents,²⁵ bodily qualities,²⁶ quality as one of the ten Aristotelian categories and hence in the sense of accident,²⁷ qualities in sculpture and painting,²⁸ qualities in things patterned after the ideas,²⁹ qualities of bodily things perceived by the senses,³⁰ the loss of quality in anything crushed,³¹ qualities created by God in things,³² virtues judged not by quantity but by quality,³³ matter as the substratum for every kind of shape and quality,³⁴ and the quality of the physical world.³⁵

The one exception which we have referred to is to be found in a passage in which Philo seems to use the term quality in the sense of specific difference. In that passage he speaks of the right-angled triangle as "the starting-point

¹³ *Ibid.* II, 7, 19.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* II, 20, 80.

¹⁵ *Immut.* 13, 62.

¹⁶ *Deter.* 6, 15.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 6, 16; cf. above, n. 12.

¹⁸ *Agr.* 3, 13; cf. below, p. 132.

¹⁹ *Plant.* 32, 133.

²⁷ *Decal.* 8, 31. In the statement here "I have quality in so far as I am a man," the term "quality," we take it refers to the accident quality, as in the statement that the created man partakes of quality (*Opif.* 46, 134). Drummond (II, 24), however, takes the term "quality" in the sense of species.

²⁸ *Spec.* I, 5, 29.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 8, 47; 60, 327, 329.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 16, 90.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 60, 328.

²⁰ *Conf.* 18, 85.

²¹ *Ibid.* 37, 185, 186, 187.

²² *Heres* 50, 247.

²³ *Fug.* 2, 13.

²⁴ *Somn.* I, 5, 27.

²⁵ *Jos.* 23, 142.

²⁶ *Mos.* I, 27, 97.

³² *Ibid.* IV, 35, 187.

³³ *Praem.* 19, 112; cf. above, n. 12.

³⁴ *Cont.* I, 4.

³⁵ *Act.* 16, 79, 81.

of all qualities (ποιότητων)" or as "the source of every figure (σχήματος) and every quality (ποιότητος)." ³⁶ By this he undoubtedly means that the different "species" of figures are to be known as the different "qualities" of the generic "figure," and consequently the right-angled triangle, which is the generic figure, is the starting-point or the source of all those different qualities, or different species, of that generic figure. Thus also Aristotle, wishing to illustrate his use of the term "quality" in the sense of "specific difference," says that "a circle is a figure of a particular quality because it is without angles," ³⁷ that is to say, "figure" is the genus and "without angles" is its quality or specific difference.

Similarly with regard to passages in which Philo says that God is "without quality," it can also be determined from the various contexts that, with the exception of only three passages, in all of them the quality denied of God is quality in the sense of an accident existing in a body, and the denial of such a quality of God is either said or assumed by Philo to follow from the incorporeality of God or from His being unlike any corporeal creature. Thus in one passage he asks: "For why, O mind, dost thou hoard and treasure in thyself those wrong opinions, that God is as graven images are, of this or that quality (ποιός), God the being that is without quality (ἄποιος), and that He, the incorruptible, is, as molten images are, corruptible." ³⁸ From the context of this passage it is quite evident that just as by the qualities of graven images he means accidents in a corporeal object, so also by the qualities which he denies of God he means accidental qualities. Similarly in another passage he says that "God is without quality (ἄποιος) and not only without the shape of man (ἀνθρωπόμορφος)." ³⁹ In this passage the contrast be-

³⁶ *Opif.* 32, 97.

³⁷ *Metaph.* V, 14, 1020a, 35.

³⁸ *Leg. All.* III, 11, 36.

³⁹ *Ibid.* I, 13, 36.

tween "shape of man" and "quality" probably has reference to Aristotle's enumeration of four kinds of "quality" (*ποιότης*), one of which he calls "shape" (*μορφή*),⁴⁰ and the meaning of this statement therefore is that God is not only without the quality of "shape" but also without any of the other three kinds of "quality." Anyhow, there is no conclusive evidence that the term "without quality" here is used in the sense of without genus and species. Still less reason have we to assume that Philo denies genus and species of God in the passage in which he says that "the companions of the soul, who can converse with intelligible incorporeal natures, do not compare the Existent to any form (*ιδέα*) of created things, but dissociate Him from every quality (*ποιότητος*)," apprehending God as "bare existence (*ὑπαρξιν*) without any figure (*χαρακτῆρος*)" and admitting to their minds "the conception of existence (*τὸ εἶναι*) only, without investing it with any shape (*μορφώσαντες*)," in contrast to those who "are unable to cast off from them the garment of flesh and to descry a nature which is alone, self-sufficient, simple, unmixed, and uncompounded."⁴¹ In this passage, it will be noticed, the term "quality" is contrasted with the "form" and "shape" of "created things" and also with "the garment of flesh." From this it may be inferred that it is used in the sense of accidental quality. This is quite evidently also the meaning of the denial of qualities of God in his statement that Laban, as his name which means "white," implies, relied on "qualities" (*ποιότητων*), whereas Jacob discerned "the nature which is without quality (*ἄποιον*),"⁴² for the association of the term "qualities" with "white" quite evidently implies that the term "qualities" here is used in the sense of accidental qualities. Finally this meaning of the denial of qualities of God is quite obviously

⁴⁰ *Categ.* c. 8, 10a, 12.⁴¹ *Immut.* 11, 55-56.⁴² *Cher.* 21, 67.

also implied in his passage wherein from the verse "Ye shall not make together with Me gods of silver, and gods of gold ye shall not make to yourselves" ⁴³ he derives the principle that God is "without quality (*ἄποιον*) and one [and unoriginate] and incorruptible and unchangeable." ⁴⁴

The three exceptions which we have referred to are to be found in three passages in which the qualities denied of God refer, as we shall try to show, to qualities in the Stoic sense of the term. In one of these passages, after stating that God has shown his "nature" (*φύσιν*) to no human being but has rendered it "invisible" (*ἀόρατον*) to our whole race, he exclaims: "Who can assert of the First Cause either that it is without body or that it is a body, that it is with quality (*ποιόν*) or that it is without quality (*ἄποιον*)? In a word who can make any positive assertion concerning His substance (*οὐσίας*) or quality (*ποιότητος*) or state (*σχέσεως*) or motion (*κινήσεως*)?" ⁴⁵ In this passage, it will be noticed, Philo uses four terms, namely, substance, quality, state, and motion. These four terms, it can be shown, represent three of the four Stoic categories. The Stoic categories are usually given as (1) substratum (*ὑποκείμενον*) or substance (*οὐσία*), (2) quality (*ποιόν*), (3) changing states (*πὼς ἔχον*), (4) varied relations (*πρὸς τι πὼς ἔχον*).⁴⁶ Now, of the four terms used by Philo, the first two, substance and quality, are exactly the terms used by the Stoics for the first two of their four categories. As for the other two terms used by Philo, the term "state" (*σχέσις*) is used by the Stoics themselves as synonymous with their third category "changing states" ⁴⁷ and the term "motion" is included by them under the same

⁴³ Exod. 22: 23.

⁴⁴ *Leg. All.* I, 15, 51.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* III, 73, 206.

⁴⁶ Cf. Arnim, II, 369-375.

⁴⁷ Cf. Arnim, II, 376, p. 126, ll. 14-15.

third category "changing states."⁴⁸ Thus the four terms used in the passage quoted from Philo represent three of the four categories of the Stoics. That by the terms "substance" and "quality" in the passage quoted Philo means the two Stoic categories may be inferred also from the fact that by the term substance here, as may be judged from his previous use of the term body in the same passage, he means body or matter, which corresponds exactly to the Stoic use of the term substance. As in this passage it is quite evident that the terms substance and quality are used by Philo in the sense of the Stoic categories, we may infer further that it is in the same sense that he also uses these two terms in two other passages. Thus when he says, in one passage, that "to inquire about substance (*οὐσίας*) or quality (*ποιότητος*) in God is a folly fit for the world's childhood"⁴⁹ or when he asks, in another passage, "Who the Creator is as to His substance or quality,"⁵⁰ the terms substance and quality are used in the Stoic sense. Inasmuch, however, as the Stoic "substance" and "quality" correspond to the Aristotelian "matter" and "form,"⁵¹ the statements in all these three passages to the effect that God has no qualities merely mean that in God there is no distinction of "matter" and "form."

From all this, then, we may gather that as a corollary of the principles of the incorporeality, simplicity, and indivisibility of God Philo excluded from God any composition (a) of body and soul, or (b) of the four elements, or (c) of substance and accidental quality, or (d) of matter and form.

⁴⁸ Cf. Arnim, II, 399-400, where *τὸ πῶς ἔχον* is said to include "time," "place," and "number," and hence also by inference "motion," for "time," according to the Stoic definition, reproduced also by Philo, "is the interval of the motion of the world" (cf. above, I, 319).

⁴⁹ *Post.* 48, 168.

⁵⁰ *Abr.* 31, 163.

⁵¹ Cf. Trendelenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

But so far we have not yet found any definite evidence that he excluded from God also any distinction of genus and species.

Still, logically, it can be shown, Philo's statement in the three passages quoted above that in God there is no distinction of what the Stoics call "substance" and "quality" may imply also that, according to him, there is in God no distinction of genus and species. For with regard to the Stoic "substance" and "quality," while on the one hand they correspond to Aristotle's "matter" and "form," on the other hand they also correspond to "genus" and "species."⁵² In fact, in Aristotle himself, the distinction between genus and species is often conceived after the analogy of the distinction between matter and form.⁵³ In those passages, therefore, in which Philo states that there is no distinction of substance and quality in God, while he undoubtedly, as we have shown, draws upon the vocabulary of the Stoic enumeration of the four categories, he may also use these terms in the sense of genus and species, meaning thereby also that there is no distinction of genus and species in God, for logically, it may be maintained, that which does not consist of matter and form has no genus and species.

Having once established that logically Philo would be justified in denying that in God there is any distinction of genus and species, we may now discern the implication of such a denial in several places in his writings.

In one place, after explaining that the essence of God cannot be apprehended by any direct or immediate approach, he adds that by such a mode of approach, had it been possible, "His quality (*οἶος*) would have been made known."⁵⁴ Here quite evidently the relative pronominal adjective *οἶος* is

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Cf. *Metaph.* V, 28, 1024b, 8-9; VII, 12, 1038a, 6-8.

⁵⁴ *Post.* 48, 169.

used by him in the sense of genus and species or genus and specific difference. By the same token, we have reason to believe, the indefinite pronominal adjective *ποιός* could also be used by him in the same sense. Consequently, his many statements quoted above about God being "without quality" (*ἄποιος*), which in themselves, as we have shown from their context, mean only that God is without accidental quality, may now be taken to imply also indirectly that He is without genus and species.

In another place he says that "the contemplation of God by the soul alone without speech . . . is based on the indivisible unity (*κατὰ τὴν ἀδιαίρετον μονάδα*)." ⁵⁵ It is quite evident that what he means here is that God cannot be described by spoken words because He is in His essence an indivisible unity. Now the indivisible unity of His essence means not only that He is not composed of matter and form but also that in Him there is no distinction of genus and species, for it is the absence of the latter that makes it impossible for us to describe Him in words.

In still another place he says that God is "the most generic" (*τὸ γενικώτατον*).⁵⁶ In a previous discussion of this statement we have already explained the general meaning of this designation of God.⁵⁷ But in its present connection we want to show that it has an additional meaning. It means that God, being the highest genus, has within Him no distinction of genus and species, for only that which is between the highest genus and the ultimate species has within it the distinction of genus and species, being the genus of that which is below it and the species of that which is above it. But since God is the highest genus He has no distinction of genus and species, that is, He belongs to no

⁵⁵ *Gig.* 11, 52.

⁵⁶ *Leg. All.* 11, 21, 86.

⁵⁷ Cf. above, I, 251-252.

class and hence we do not know what He is. That this is the meaning of his description of God as "the most generic" may be inferred from the proof-text upon which he bases his view and from his discussion of that proof-text. The proof-text is the verse in which it is said that when the children of Israel saw the manna, "they said to one another, what is this (*τι ἐστι τοῦτο*)? — for they knew not what it was."⁵⁸ Drawing upon this explanation, he says that manna is "the most generic (*τὸ γενικώτατον*)," for the manna is called "what (*τι*), and that suggests the primary genus of all things."⁵⁹ Elsewhere the term manna is more fully explained by him as meaning "what is this (*τι ἐστι τοῦτο*)."⁶⁰ Undoubtedly this statement reflects the Stoic teaching that "the something" (*τὸ τι*) is "the most generic (*τὸ γενικώτατον*) of all,"⁶¹ the interrogative and the indefinite pronouns meaning to him the same, both of them implying that it is something which belongs to no class. What he therefore means to say is that God is a highest genus because one may ask of Him, as one does of the manna, what is this (*τι ἐστι τοῦτο*)? — that is to say, we do not know its *τι ἐστι*, its essence, its whatness. Now to say of God that we do not know His essence means that He has no genus and species.

III. THE UNNAMABILITY AND UNKNOWABILITY OF GOD

Philo's denial of a distinction of genus and species in God must have led him to a denial of the possibility of defining God, for a definition, as may be gathered from Philo's definition of man as being either a "rational mortal animal" or a "hopeful animal,"¹ consists, according to him, as it does

⁵⁸ Exod. 16: 15.

⁵⁹ *Leg. All.* II, 21, 86.

⁶⁰ *Leg. All.* III, 49, 169.

⁶¹ Sextus, *Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes* II, 86.

¹ *Deter.* 38, 139.

according to Aristotle, of the combination of genus and species. And since God cannot be defined, no concept can be formed of His essence, for the concept of the essence of a thing is formed by its definition.² Philo therefore maintains that "it is wholly impossible that God according to His essence should be known (κατανοηθῆναι) by any creature,"³ for God is "incomprehensible."⁴ Together with the incomprehensibility of God he speaks also of the unnamability and ineffability of God, for God, he says, "is unnamable (ἀκατονομάστου) and ineffable (ἀρρήτου) and in every way incomprehensible (ἀκαταλήπτου)."⁵ By "incomprehensible" he does not mean that God is not comprehended by the senses but rather, as he explicitly says elsewhere, that "He is not comprehended by the mind."⁶

Now neither Plato nor Aristotle definitely says that God according to His essence cannot be known or is incomprehensible or cannot be envisaged even in mind. In Plato indeed the ideas are like the God of Philo "incorporeal,"⁷ "invisible and imperceptible by the sense,"⁸ "immovable"⁹ and "immutable"¹⁰ and similarly of God, whether He is the idea of the good or something distinct from the ideas, he says that He is simple (ἀπλοῦν) and is unchangeable,¹¹ and still the ideas as well as God are considered by him as knowable. With regard to the ideas he says that "being" (οὐσία), that is, the totality of the ideas, is known by the intelligence (γνώσις) and that after proper preparation we can ultimately arrive at a knowledge of "what the essence of beauty is" (ὅ ἐστι καλόν),¹² and with regard to that which is

² *Topica* I, 5, 101b, 39; *Anal. Post.* II, 10, 93b, 29.

³ *Post.* 48, 167.

⁴ *Ibid.* 169.

⁵ *Somn.* I, 11, 67.

⁶ *Immut.* 13, 62.

⁷ *Sophist* 246 b.

⁸ *Timaeus* 52 a.

⁹ *Ibid.* 38 a.

¹⁰ *Phaedo* 78 d.

¹¹ *Republic* II, 382 e.

¹² *Symposium* 211 c.

“ever unchangeably real,” evidently including both God and the ideas, he says that it is “comprehensible (*περιληπτόν*) by the mind with the aid of reason.”¹³ He admits, of course, that “we do not sufficiently know the good”¹⁴ and that “in the world of knowledge the idea of the good appears last of all and is seen only with an effort,”¹⁵ but this does not mean that it is unknowable.

Similarly in Aristotle, God is described as one and incorporeal and simple and indivisible.¹⁶ If that simplicity and indivisibility excluded the distinction of genus and species in God, then, of course, God could not be defined and hence God could not be known. But Aristotle never says explicitly that the simplicity of God excludes the distinction of genus and species and that God cannot be defined and cannot be known. Quite to the contrary, on the basis of an analysis of his own statements, it can be shown that, according to him, God’s simplicity does not exclude from His essence the distinction of genus and species.

And just as Plato and Aristotle do not definitely say that God is unknowable so do they not definitely say that God cannot be named or spoken of. Indeed Plato says that “the Maker and Father of this All it is a hard task to find and having found Him it is impossible to declare Him to all men.”¹⁷ The meaning of this passage, however, is not that God cannot be *declared*, that is, described, but rather that He cannot be declared to *all men*, because, according to Plato, it requires certain specific preparations to arrive at a knowledge of the ideas,¹⁸ and by the same token also at a

¹³ *Timaeus* 28 A.

¹⁴ *Republic* VI, 505 A.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* VII, 517 B.

¹⁶ *Phys.* VIII, 10, 267b, 25-26; *Metaph.* XII, 7, 1072a, 32-33.

¹⁷ *Timaeus* 28 C.

¹⁸ *Phaedrus* 249 B f.

knowledge of God, which preparations are not common to all men. It was not until later, on their becoming acquainted with Philo's view of the unknowability and ineffability of God, that the Church Fathers raised the question whether Plato meant by his statement that God was ineffable or not. Clement of Alexandria takes this passage as meaning that God is ineffable, "for," he asks, "how can that be effable (*ῥητόν*) which is neither genus, nor difference, nor species, nor individual, nor number?"¹⁹ So was also the interpretation of this passage of Plato by Celsus.²⁰ In opposition to Celsus, however, Origen argues that from the wording of Plato's statement it is to be inferred that "he does not speak of God as ineffable (*ἄρητον*) and unnamable (*ἀκατονόμαστον*); on the contrary, he implies that He is effable and that there are a few to whom he may be declared."²¹

Nor is the conception of the ineffability or unnamability of God found in any other Greek philosopher before Philo. The statement that the view "that God has no name was likewise known to the Greeks"²² is ill-founded. The sources quoted in corroboration of this statement are the pseudo-Aristotelian *De Mundo*,²³ Dio Chrysostom,²⁴ Seneca,²⁵ Maxi-

¹⁹ *Stromata* V, 12 (PG, 9, 121 A); cf. quotation from Plato on p. 116 B.

²⁰ Origen, *Contra Celsum* VII, 42 (PG, 11, 1481 c-1484 A). So also Numenius is of the belief that the Gnostic doctrine of an "unknowable God" is based upon Plato. Cf. Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* XI, 18, 539b-c.

²¹ *Ibid.* VII, 43 (PG, 11, 1481 c). Cf. H. A. Wolfson, "The Knowability and Describability of God in Plato and Aristotle," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, LVI-LVII (1945-46), pp. 233-249.

²² J. Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten* (1907), p. 38, followed by A. Marmorstein, *The Old Rabbinic Doctrine of God*, I (Oxford University Press, 1927), p. 17. On the basis of this statement, Marmorstein (p. 18) says of the magic tablet of the Necropolis of Adrumetum that its reference to "the sacred name which is not to be uttered . . . was very old and reflects the conditions on which the LXX is based." This magic tablet belongs to the second and third centuries A.D. (cf. G. A. Deissmann, *Bible Studies*, p. 279

²³ *De Mundo*, c. 7, 401a, 12 ff.

²⁴ *Orationes*, XII, 75-78.

²⁵ *Naturales Quaestiones*, II, 45.

mus of Tyre,²⁶ Celsus,²⁷ and Hermes Trismegistus.²⁸ Now, with the exception of Seneca, who was a contemporary of Philo, all these sources are later than Philo. Besides, not all these sources state that God is unnamable. The pseudo-Aristotelian *De Mundo* and Seneca only state that God has many names, which is only a repetition of the Stoic view that God is called by many names.²⁹ This is quite different from saying that God has no name. Nor does Dio Chrysostom say that God has no name. All he says is that either Zeus is called by certain names (*ἐπωνομάζονται*) or his attributes are represented without the help of words in art, concluding that, with regard to the latter, "I have presented them as far as it was possible to do so, since I was not able to name them."³⁰ This does not mean that Zeus is unnamable. Indeed, among the Greeks, the appellation "the God" was used at Delphi for Apollo and at Eleusis for Pluto, and also the appellation "the Goddess" was used at Athens for Athena and at Eleusis for Persephone, but this does not mean that the proper names of these deities were not allowed to be uttered; it only means that their proper names were so well known that there was no need to mention them.³¹ Nor is evidence for the conception of the ineffability of God among the Greeks prior to Philo to be derived from Stobaeus' attribution to the Neopythagorean pseudo-Archytas the view that the principle which is above mind, namely, God, "pertains to an unutterable (*ἄλογον*) and in-

²⁶ *Dissertationes*, VIII, 10.

²⁷ Origen, *Contra Celsum* I, 24.

²⁸ *Hermetica* (ed. W. Scott) V, 1a; V, 10. Reference to *Hermetica* as the source of Philo's conception of the ineffability of God is given also by Azariah dei Rossi, *Me'or 'Enayim: Imre Binah*, ch. 4, ed. Wilnah, 1866, p. 111.

²⁹ Diogenes, VII, 147; cf. VII, 135.

³⁰ *Op. cit.*, XII, 78.

³¹ Cf. M. P. Nilsson, *Greek Popular Religion* (Columbia University Press, 1940),

effable (ἄρρητον) nature,"³² for it is not impossible that this view as reported and phrased by Stobaeus was formed under the influence of Philo.³³ From a period long before Philo, quite to the contrary, we have the explicit statement of the Stoic poet Aratus that Zeus is he "whom we human beings never allow to remain ineffable (ἄρρητον.)"³⁴

The conclusion we have reached with regard to the absence of any evidence that in Greek philosophy before Philo there existed a conception of God as a being unknowable in His essence and unnamable and ineffable cannot be refuted by the findings of Norden in his study on the *agnostos theos*.³⁵ Norden proceeds in his study as follows. He starts out with the verse in Acts 17: 23, in which Paul says to the people of Athens: "For as I passed by, and beheld your devotions, I found an altar with this inscription, 'To the unknown God' (Ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ)." Usually the expression "the unknown God" here is taken by students of the New Testament to mean a God whose name happened to have been unknown to those who had set up the altar. Norden, however, takes it in the sense of an "unknowable God," that is to say, a God that by His nature cannot be known. He then

³² Stobaeus, *Eclogae* I, p. 281, ll. 1-2.

³³ Cf. O. F. Gruppe, *Ueber die Fragmente des Archytas und der alteren Pythagoreer*, 1840, pp. 125 ff.; Zeller, III, 24, p. 123, n. 5, with regard to the general question as to the dependence of the Neopythagoreans upon Hellenistic Judaism.

³⁴ *Phaenomena*, ll. 1-2.

³⁵ Cf. E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, 1913, pp. 1-124.

Nor is our conclusion to be refuted by the occurrence of the expression *agnostos theos* in other sources. In the Egyptian papyrus published by E. Kornemann in *Klio*, 7 (1907), 278, the expression *ὄχι ἀγνωστος Φοῖβος θεός*, does not mean "not unknowable God Phoebus" but rather "not unfamiliar God Phoebus" (cf. R. Reitzenstein, "Die Areopagrede des Paulus," *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum*, 31 (1913), 415, n. 2). So also is undoubtedly the meaning of the expression *θεός ἀγνώστος*, assuming that this is how the expression is to be completed, in the Pergamum inscription published by H. Hepding in *Athenische Mitteilungen*, 35 (1910), 455. Cf. A. Wikenhauser, *Die Apostelgeschichte und ihr Geschichtswert*, 1921, pp. 371, 387-390.

goes on to show that Paul's reference to such an unknowable God reflects a widely spread Greek philosophic view, and in support of this he quotes passages (pages 24-30) in which God is spoken of as "invisible" (*ἀόρατος, ἀθεώρητος, ἀφανής*) and "incomprehensible" (*ἀκατάληπτος*). The term *agnostos* used by Paul, he admits, is not found in the passages quoted by him, but, as for that, he finds it in the Gnostic literature (pages 65-73). The Gnostic literature, again he admits, comes from a later period, but, as for that, he refers to the view of certain scholars that there must have been a Gnosticism even before the Christian era (pages 65 and 70), and this pre-Christian Gnosticism, he tries to show, had derived its conception of the unknowable God from Greek philosophy (page 83). In support of his view, however, he admits that he can produce only one passage — a passage in which Heraclitus is reported to have said that "they pray to these images, as if one were to talk with a man's house, knowing not what gods or heroes are," taking the last phrase to have the technical meaning of "knowing not the essence of either gods or heroes" (pages 87-89).

Thus, apart from the conjectural assumption that the Gnostic conception of the "unknowable God" dates from pre-Christian times, Norden advances only two arguments in support of the Greek origin of such a conception of God: first, the passages in which God is spoken of as "invisible" and "incomprehensible"; second, the fragment of Heraclitus. Now, with regard to the first, all the terms for the invisibility and the incomprehensibility of God in the passages quoted, as may be judged from the contexts, deny only that God can be seen or comprehended by the senses; they do not say that God's essence cannot be comprehended by the mind. With regard to the second, there is no definite proof that in the vague words of Heraclitus there is anything be-

yond the mere assertion that those who worship the images of gods and heroes know nothing about those gods and heroes except what they have heard about them from hearsay, inasmuch as they have never seen them with their own eyes. In Philo, as we have seen, there is a formal distinction between the knowability of God's existence and the unknowability of His essence, and, in connection with the latter, expressing himself in terms not used by others before him about God, he says of God that He is "unnamable" and "ineffable" and "not comprehended by the mind."

In view of all this, when Philo derives from the principle of the simplicity of God the principle of the unknowability and unnamability of God, he has given expression to a view which must have been meant by him to be either a new interpretation of Plato and Aristotle or in opposition to them. Indirectly, from the fact that Plato's statement with regard to the difficulty of finding God and the impossibility of declaring Him to others is taken by Philo, as we have shown, to refer to the existence of God,³⁶ it may perhaps be inferred that he believed Plato to have held that as for the essence of God it is even impossible to find it and not merely to declare it to others. But, as against this, there is the passage in which he tries to show how "all Greeks and barbarians," that is, all Greek and barbarian philosophers, acknowledge the existence of a God "whose nature is not only invisible by the eye but also hard to guess by the mind."³⁷ It will be noticed that with reference to the eye he says here that God's nature is "invisible" (*ἀόρατος*) and not merely "hard to see" (*δυσόρατος*), whereas with reference to the mind he says that it is only "hard to guess" (*δυστόπαστος*) but not "unguessable" (*ἀτόπαστος*) or "incomprehensible" (*ἀκατά-*

³⁶ Cf. above, p. 73.

³⁷ *Spec.* II, 29, 165.

ληπτος).³⁸ Is it not possible that his choice of words here was deliberate, because, to him, while philosophers have indeed the conception of a God whose nature is "invisible" and "hard to guess," they have no conception of a God whose nature is absolutely "incomprehensible"? But, however that may be, Philo was either giving new emphasis to a view which he considered as being implicit in the views of philosophers or else he was giving utterance to an entirely new view. In either case, we must probe for the reason of his new view, or of his new emphasis upon a view of which he thought to have found corroboration in the teachings of the philosophers.

The explanation, we shall now try to show, is suggested by Philo himself in two passages.

In one of these passages Philo shows how, starting with the philosophic principle of the incorporeality of God, which to him was also a scriptural principle, he arrives by the aid of scriptural verses at the principles of the unknowability and unnamability of God. The passage is a homily on the verse "And the Lord was seen by Abraham and said to him, 'I am thy God.'" ³⁹ Commenting upon this versē, he first tries to disabuse the reader of the thought that God was seen by Abraham in the literal sense of the term. "Do not suppose," he says, "that the vision was presented to the eyes of the body, for they see only the objects of sense and those are composite, brimful of corruptibility, while the divine is uncompounded and incorruptible."⁴⁰ The vision of God here means, he argues, a mental vision, for "it is natural that an intelligible object can be apprehended only

³⁸ Philo sometimes applies to God the terms *δυστόκαστος* και *δυσκατάληπτος* (*Spec.* I, 6, 32) and also the terms *δυσόρατος* και *δυστόκαστος* (*Præm.* 6, 38). But, strictly speaking, God is to him both *άόρατος* and *άκατάληπτος*.

³⁹ Gen. 17: 1.

⁴⁰ *Mut.* 1, 3.

by the mind.⁴¹ Up to this point, it will be noticed, his interpretation of the verses contains nothing which is not in complete harmony with philosophic reasoning. For given a God who is incorporeal and uncompounded, He cannot be perceived by the senses. Whatever conception one forms of Him must be only in the mind. Plato and Aristotle and others have said that much.

But then Philo goes further and maintains that God cannot be apprehended by any man, not only as an object of sense but even as an object of intelligence, "for we have in us no organ by which we can envisage it, neither in sense, for it is not perceptible by sense, nor yet in mind."⁴² This is quite evidently going beyond what is warranted by purely logical reasoning from the philosophic principle of the incorporeality of God. No philosopher, as we have seen, ever said so explicitly. Philo himself seems to have been conscious of the fact that he was going here beyond philosophy or, at least, beyond the explicit statements of philosophers, and so he hastens to support his view by scriptural verses. The scriptural verses which he quotes are "Moses went into the thick darkness, where God was"⁴³ and "Thou shalt see what is behind Me, but My face thou shalt not see."⁴⁴ From these verses he infers that God "by His very nature cannot be seen,"⁴⁵ by which he means that God cannot be comprehended by the mind. Once he has established the incomprehensibility of God by these verses, he derives therefrom the impossibility of naming God, for "it is a logical consequence that no proper name even can be appropriately assigned to the truly existent,"⁴⁶ and in proof of

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴² *Ibid.* 2, 7.

⁴³ Exod. 20: 21; *Mut.* 2, 7; cf. *Post.* 5, 14.

⁴⁴ Exod. 33: 23; *Mut.* 2, 9; cf. *Spec.* I, 8, 41-49; *Post.* 5, 16.

⁴⁵ *Mut.* 2, 9.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 2, 11.

this he says: "Note that when the prophet desires to know what he must answer to those who ask about His name He says 'I am He that is,'⁴⁷ which is equivalent to 'My nature is to be, not to be spoken.'" ⁴⁸ Another proof-text quoted by him is the verse "I appeared to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob as their God, but my name Lord I did not reveal to them."⁴⁹ And once he has established the unnamability of God by these verses, he derives therefrom the incomprehensibility of God, arguing that "indeed, if He is unnamable, He is also inconceivable and incomprehensible."⁵⁰ One may perhaps find a sort of circle in his reasoning here. Starting first with scriptural verses which he interprets to mean that God is incomprehensible, he derives therefrom that God is also unnamable. Then, supporting his logical conclusion that God is unnamable by a verse which explicitly says that the name of God was not revealed to those to whom He appeared, he derives therefrom that God is also incomprehensible. Probably what Philo means to say is that the incomprehensibility and the unnamability of God are logically implied in one another and that both of them rest primarily upon scriptural verses. As for these scriptural verses, it will be noticed, the ones which serve him as a proof-text for the unnamability of God are more explicit than the one which serves him as a proof-text for the incomprehensibility of God, and, consequently, even though the latter verse is quoted by him first, it is the former verse, that about the unnamability of God, which may be considered as the primary basis of his view about the incomprehensibility of God.

The verse "but my name Lord I did not reveal to them" is thus the basis of Philo's view that God is unnamable,

⁴⁷ Exod. 3: 14.

⁴⁸ *Mut.* 2, 11.

⁴⁹ Exod. 6: 3; *Mut.* 2, 13.

⁵⁰ *Mut.* 3, 15.

whence also his view, stated more generally, that God is incomprehensible and ineffable.

But besides this verse, which is quoted by him for that purpose, Philo must have found support for his view in several legal prohibitions in the Pentateuch.

First, there is the law which is described by Philo as a prohibition against naming (*τὸ ὀνομάζειν*) God.⁵¹ The law, as it reads in Hebrew, is usually translated: "And he that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, he shall surely be put to death."⁵² Now the Hebrew word *nakab* which is translated here "blaspheme" means both "to name" and "to curse." While in the Mishnah it is taken in the sense of "to curse,"⁵³ in the Aramaic version, called Targum Onkelos, it is taken in the sense of "to name." In the Septuagint, just as in Targum Onkelos, the law reads: "Whoever names the name of the Lord shall die." Drawing upon this translation of the verse,⁵⁴ Philo interprets the law to apply to those "who out of volubility of tongue have spoken unseasonably and being too free of words have repeated carelessly the most holy and divine name of God."⁵⁵ By "the most holy and divine name of God" he means the name YHVH, commonly pronounced Jehovah, which in Jewish traditional literature is described as the quadrilateral name⁵⁶ or the proper name⁵⁷ or the distinctive name.⁵⁸ Philo similarly refers to that name as the quadrilateral (*τετραγράμματος*) name⁵⁹ or the proper name (*κύριον ὄνομα*),⁶⁰ dis-

⁵¹ *Mos.* II, 37, 204.

⁵² *Lev.* 24: 16.

⁵³ *M. Sanhedrin* VII, 5; *Targum pseudo-Jonathan*, *Lev.* 24: 16.

⁵⁴ *Mos.* II, 37, 203.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 208.

⁵⁶ *Ḳiddushin* 71a: *shem ben arba' otiiyyot*.

⁵⁷ *Sanhedrin* 60a: *shem ha-meyuhad*.

⁵⁸ *Sifre Num.* § 39, F, p. 12a; H, p. 43: *shem ha-meforash*.

⁵⁹ *Mos.* II, 23, 115; 26, 132.

⁶⁰ *Mut.* 2, 11, 13, 14; *Somn.* I, 39, 230; but in *Abr.* 24, 121, the name "He that is" (*ὁ ὢν*) of *Exod.* 3: 14 is described by him as the *κύριον ὄνομα* of God, probably mean-

tinguishing it from the many other forms of the name (*πολυώνυμον ὄνομα*) of God.⁶¹ Following again Jewish tradition, according to which this quadriliteral name was not to be pronounced except by the high priest in the temple,⁶² Philo also refers to that name as that "which only those whose ears and tongues are purified may hear or speak in the holy place, and no other person, nor in any other place at all."⁶³

Second, any name of God, which, as distinguished from the proper name of God, is described by Philo as a title (*κλήσις*),⁶⁴ cannot, according to him, be taken in vain, when there is no need for it, as, for instance, in the case of an oath which, though true, is superfluous. Philo derives this from the third of the ten commandments, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain,"⁶⁵ which, as a purely legal prohibition, is taken by him to refer to the taking of the name of God in a false oath.⁶⁶ The same disapproval of the purposeless use of the name of God is reflected also among the Talmudic rabbis, when on the basis of the third commandment they prohibit the purposeless pronouncement of benedictions which contain the name of God.⁶⁷

Third, there is the law against blasphemy,⁶⁸ which, ac-

ing thereby that that name is to be taken as though it were God's proper name (cf. *Mut.* 2, 12). I do not think Siegfried (p. 203) is right in inferring from this passage that Philo takes the name Jehovah to mean the same as the name "He that is." On the contrary, he always distinguishes between these two names.

⁶¹ *Decal.* 19, 94.

⁶² *Sifre Num.* § 39, F, p. 12a; H, p. 43; *M. Soṭah* VII, 6; *M. Tamid* VII, 2.

⁶³ *Mos.* II, 23, 114; *Decal.* 19, 93-94.

⁶⁴ *Decal.* 17, 83.

⁶⁵ *Exod.* 20: 7; *Deut.* 5: 11; cf. *Decal.* 19, 92-93.

⁶⁶ *Decal.* 17, 82-18, 91; cf. Belkin, *Philo and the Oral Law* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), pp. 140 ff.

⁶⁷ *Berakot* 33a; *Jer. Berakot* VI, 1, 10a. Among post-Talmudic authorities the question was raised whether this prohibition is meant to be Biblical or only rabbinical (cf. *Magen Abraham* on *Shulḥan 'Aruk Oraḥ Ḥayyim*, § 215).

⁶⁸ *Lev.* 24: 15; *Exod.* 33: 27.

ording to Philo, is a law prohibiting the cursing or reviling even of the deities of other nations.⁶⁹ This law against blasphemy means, according to him, as may be gathered from his discussion of the subject, not only that one is not to curse and revile a god or other gods, but also, at least morally, that one is not "to treat lightly or disregardfully (*ἀλογεῖν*) the name 'god' in general"⁷⁰ or to apply to God descriptions which other nations are in the habit of applying to their gods.⁷¹

From all this Philo must have gathered that it was highly difficult, and well-nigh impossible, to speak of God or to describe Him in words. To describe Him by His proper name is not allowed outside the temple. To describe Him by any of the other of His generally accepted titles is not allowed except in the case of some special occasion, when it serves some useful purpose. To describe Him by any other terms may always raise the question whether thereby one does not treat the name of God lightly and disregardfully and hence, morally at least, commit the sin of blasphemy. To Philo, with his belief in the absolute incorporeality and simplicity and unlikeness of God, the description of God in terms by which one does usually describe corporeal and compound beings would mean, at least in a moral sense, the treatment of the name of God lightly, disregardfully, and blasphemously. It is exactly this kind of reasoning that is employed later by Maimonides in rejecting the application to God of any predicates which are inappropriate descriptions of His nature. The application of such predicates to God, he says, "is not an ordinary sin, but the sin of reviling and blaspheming committed unwittingly."⁷²

It is thus the restrictions as to the naming of God, ex-

⁶⁹ *Mos.* II, 38, 205; *Spec.* I, 9, 53.

⁷⁰ *Mos.* II, 38, 205.

⁷¹ *Spec.* I, 9, 53.

⁷² *Moreh Nebukim* I, 59

pressed in Scripture in a variety of ways, that was taken by Philo to imply that God is incomprehensible. But once he has found the implication of the principle of the incomprehensibility of God in the scriptural restrictions as to the naming of God, he comes to find the same implication also in the scriptural teaching as to the unlikeness of God, though in its primary sense, as we have seen, it implies only that God is incorporeal. Thus, commenting upon the verse "How dreadful is this place,"⁷³ he says that the verse refers to the question of the whereabouts of God, and he mentions two views on the subject. "Some say that everything that subsists occupies some space, and of these one allots to the Existent One this space, another that, whether inside the world or a space outside it in the interval between worlds. Others maintain that the Uncreated resembles nothing among created things, but so completely transcends them that even the swiftest understanding falls far short of apprehending Him and acknowledges its failure."⁷⁴ Here then the principle of the unlikeness of God, which is a scriptural principle, is taken as the basis of the principle of the incomprehensibility of God. But there is more than that to this passage. The exponents of the first view which he mentions are the Stoics and Epicureans.⁷⁵ Consequently the exponents of the view which he opposes to that of the Stoics and Epicureans must also be some Greek philosophers. Now, as we have seen, no Greek philosopher before Philo has ever said explicitly that God is incomprehensible. But it is possible, as we have suggested,⁷⁶ that Philo has read into those philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, who believed in the incorporeality and simplicity of God, his own belief, derived by him from Scripture, as to the unlikeness

⁷³ Gen. 28: 17.

⁷⁴ *Somn.* I, 32, 184.

⁷⁵ Cf. above, I, 176.

⁷⁶ Cf. above, p. 118.

and the incomprehensibility of God. Or, it is possible that in his reference here to philosophers who maintain that "The Uncreated is like nothing among created things" Philo had in mind specifically the statement reported in the name of Antisthenes to the effect that "God does not become known from an image, nor is He seen with eyes; He is like no one. Wherefore no man can come to the knowledge of Him from an image."⁷⁷ But it will be noticed that this statement of Antisthenes by itself does not say that, because of His unlikeness to anything corporeal, God cannot be comprehended even by the mind. All he says is that "no man can come to the knowledge of Him from an image," which may merely mean that God cannot be adequately described in terms borrowed from corporeal objects. Philo's additional inference, in the statement quoted, that, because of His unlikeness to any created being, God is incomprehensible even to the mind is a view at which he has arrived, as we have been trying to show, by reasoning from his own combination of the scriptural principle of the unlikeness of God with the scriptural restrictions on the naming of God.

In the light of all that we have said, we can reconstruct the mental processes by which Philo must have arrived at the view of the unnamability and unknowability of God. From philosophic sources he derived the belief that God is incorporeal and hence indivisible and simple. With this philosophic belief he identified the scriptural teaching of the unlikeness of God. Now this principle of incorporeality would on purely philosophic grounds explicitly exclude only such compositions in the divine nature as what philosophers would call (a) body and soul, (b) the four elements, (c) substance and accident, and (d) matter and form. It would not of itself exclude the distinction of genus and

⁷⁷ F. W. A. Mullach, *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum* II, p. 277, no. 24.

species, and hence it would not exclude definition and hence also it would not of itself lead to the indescribability and unknowability of God. But in Scripture Philo has found (a) statements to the effect that God has not revealed His name to those to whom He appeared and also (b) laws prohibiting (1) to mention the proper name of God, (2) to take in vain any other name of God and (3) to treat lightly the word "God" in general. Scripture thus teaches the doctrine of the unnamability of God. This scriptural doctrine of the unnamability of God logically led him to the doctrine of the indefinability of God and the indefinability of God logically led him to the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God, and once he arrived at the incomprehensibility of God, he found corroboration for it, by means of interpretation, in the verse "Moses went into the thick darkness, where God was." Then, having arrived at the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God, he is led to extend the meaning of the scriptural doctrine of the unlikeness of God to include also His incomprehensibility; but, inasmuch as the scriptural doctrine of unlikeness has already been identified by him with the philosophic principle of incorporeality and simplicity, he is thus also led to ascribe the principle of the incomprehensibility of God to all those Greek philosophers who believed in God's incorporeality and simplicity.

IV. DIVINE PROPERTIES

The principles of the unnamability and the unlikeness of God would inevitably lead to the conclusion that God could be described only by terms which state directly His unlikeness to other beings, such, for instance, as unborn (*ἀγένητος*),¹ unbribable (*ἀδέκαστος*),² incomprehensible (*ἀκατάληπτος*),³

¹ *Mos. II, 32, 171.*

² *Cher. 5, 17.*

³ *Deter. 24, 89.*

unnamable (ἀκατονόμαστος),⁴ invisible (ἀόρατος),⁵ uncircumscribable (ἀπερίγραφος),⁶ ineffable (ἄρρητος),⁷ and incomparable (ἀσύγκριτος),⁸ all of which are used by Philo himself. In Scripture, however, and following Scripture also in Philo, God is described also by many positive terms, such as good and great and merciful and their like, each of which by the very nature of language names God and affirms something about God and thereby implies a likeness between God and other beings. Philo himself refers to all these terms applied to God as the "multiform name of God" (τοῦ θεοῦ πολυώνυμον ὄνομα).⁹ What then is the meaning of all these terms or names by which God is described? In other words what is the meaning of the anthropomorphisms in Scripture?

The problem of anthropomorphisms was not new with Philo. It appeared in Greek religion prior to Philo and in Palestinian Judaism prior to, and also independently of, Philo. The origin of the problem, however, differed in each of these religions. In Greek religion the rise of the problem of anthropomorphisms was due to the impact of philosophy upon popular conceptions of the gods; there was nothing in the teachings of popular religion itself which would impel its adherents to raise any objections to the use of anthropomorphic descriptions of the gods. In Judaism, however, the rise of the problem was not due to the impact of any external system of thought; it arose out of an inner contradiction which native Jewish speculation could not help noticing in Scripture between its doctrine of the unlikeness of God on the one hand and its use of anthropomorphic descriptions of God on the other. An echo of the dilemma confronted by those who first began to speculate about the

⁴ *Somn.* I, 11, 67.

⁵ *Cher.* 30, 101.

⁶ *Sacr.* 15, 59.

⁷ *Somn.* I, 11, 67.

⁸ *Fug.* 25, 141.

⁹ *Decal.* 19, 94.

tenets of Judaism is resounded by later rabbis who on meeting in the Book of Ezekiel ¹⁰ with an anthropomorphic expression exclaimed: "Great is the boldness of the prophets who describe God by the likeness of the creature." ¹¹ The boldness which they found in the use of anthropomorphism was that it seemed to infringe upon the prohibition to liken God to any other being. Then, again, in Greek religion, the objections to anthropomorphisms on philosophic grounds led either to a rejection of the popular deities altogether or to a transformation, by the allegorical method, of the popular deities into philosophic entities or concepts. In native Judaism, the objection to anthropomorphisms on the ground of the scriptural doctrine of the unlikeness of God merely led to the general explanation that anthropomorphic expressions are not to be taken literally, and that they are used in Scripture only as a practical pedagogical device to instruct the people in the knowledge of the ways of God in the world. "We describe God by terms borrowed from His creations in order to cause them to sink into the ear." ¹² More particularly, the various anthropomorphic descriptions of God are said to have as their purpose the teaching of moral lessons to men. ¹³

Philo, on the whole, starts out on the problem of the predications of God, as in native Jewish tradition, with a discussion of its relation to the principle of the unlikeness of God and, again, as in native Jewish tradition, he justifies the use of anthropomorphic descriptions of God on the ground of their pedagogical value.

Throughout Scripture, says Philo, two conflicting tend-

¹⁰ Ezek. 1: 26.

¹¹ *Genesis Rabbah* 27, 1; cf. above, I, 135.

¹² *Mekilta, Bahodesh*, 4, F, p. 65a; W, p. 73b; HR, p. 215; L, II, 221; cf. above, I, 135.

¹³ Cf. above, I, 272.

encies are to be discerned. One of these insists upon the unlikeness of God to anything else, the chief expression of which Philo finds in the statement that "God is not man" ¹⁴ which in the Septuagint version from which Philo quotes reads: "God is not as man." The other assumes a likeness between God and other beings, which is evidenced by the numerous anthropomorphic terms predicated of God in Scripture and of which the chief example quoted by Philo is the statement, which reads: "The Lord thy God bore thee, as a man doth bear his son." ¹⁵ Of these two statements, he says, the former "is warranted by grounds of surest truth, whereas the latter is introduced for the instruction of the many," for all such anthropomorphical expressions are said "for the sake of instruction and admonition, and not because God is really such by nature." ¹⁶

Thus on purely scriptural grounds the problem of the divine predicates presents itself to Philo merely as a problem of the apparent contradiction between a God who is said to be unlike any of His creatures and descriptions of that God which liken Him to His creatures. By declaring that these predicates are not meant to be taken literally and that they are used only for the purpose of instruction, the problem, in its scriptural aspect, is solved for him. But Philo is also a philosopher, and as a philosopher he has already presented all the teachings of Scripture concerning God and the world and man in the language of philosophy. Now in dealing with the terms which Scripture predicates of God he is also going to present the matter in the language of philosophy. In this new presentation of the problem he will aim to establish two things. To begin with, the terms predicated of God are to be interpreted in such a way as not

¹⁴ *Num.* 23: 19.

¹⁵ *Deut.* 1: 31.

¹⁶ *Immut.* 11, 53-54; cf. *Sacr.* 30, 101.

to infringe upon the scriptural doctrine of the unlikeness of God, with all the philosophic implications he has read into it — the implications of incorporeality and simplicity and unknowability. Then, also, however these terms may be interpreted, their new interpretation must not deny of God any of those elements of knowledge, freedom, and power by which his conception of God is distinguished from the God of the philosophers with whom, in a general way, he is willing to identify the God of Scripture.

In dealing with the problem of anthropomorphisms philosophically, Philo will start with the assumption that all the terms which are predicated of God must be regarded in their relation to God after the manner of what philosophers at his time, following Aristotle, regarded as relations which are to obtain between the predicate and the subject in a logical proposition. The problem of the divine predicates, as it presents itself to him as a philosopher, is therefore a problem of the relation of the terms applied to God as predicables to God who is their subject. Now in Aristotle predicables in their relation to the subject may be one of the following four: property or definition or genus or accident.¹⁷ While Philo does not formally investigate the question whether any of the terms predicated of God can be any of these four Aristotelian predicables, he has said enough on this subject to indicate that the problem was in his mind. That they cannot be accidents is quite clear from his denial of the corporeality of God and from his assertion that God is without human shape and without human passions.¹⁸ Human shape and human passions are what Aristotle would classify under accidents.¹⁹ That they are not genera or species is also quite clear from his denial that God can be

¹⁷ *Topica* I, 4, 101b, 25.

¹⁸ Cf. above, pp. 98, 104-106.

¹⁹ *Categ.* 8, 9b, 33-10a, 16.

described by generic or specific terms.²⁰ By the process of elimination, then, the predicates of God logically can be nothing but what Aristotle calls property. And so we find that Philo repeatedly uses the term property (*ιδιον*) as a description of the terms predicated of God in their relation to their subject.²¹

With the aid of what we know about the philosophic implications of the term property we may now try to reconstruct what was in the mind of Philo when he spoke of the terms predicated of God as properties of God.

The term "property," in the fixed Aristotelian terminology which was already known to Philo, was used in contrast to such universal terms as genus, specific difference, and definition. A term predicated of a thing as a "property," says Aristotle, "belongs to that thing alone,"²² for "no one calls anything a property which may possibly belong to something else."²³ A property is therefore also said by Aristotle to distinguish the thing of which it is predicated from everything else.²⁴ Hence he maintains that when the predicate is a property it must not contain "any such term as is a universal attribute (*δνομα δ πασιw υπάρχει*)."²⁵ Consequently Aristotle lays down the rule that a property is not a definition inasmuch as definition shows the essence of a thing (*τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνων*),²⁶ but "the property of a thing ought not to show its essence" (*οὐ δεῖ δηλοῦν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*).²⁷ Nor can a property be a differentia (*διαφορά*), for a differentia is predicated of a thing according to participation (*κατὰ μέθεξιν*), that is to say, the subject is conceived as partaking of that predicate, and that "which is predicated of a sub-

²⁰ Cf. above, pp. 108-110.

²¹ *Leg. All.* II, 9, 33; *Cher.* 24, 77.

²² *Topica* I, 5, 102a, 18-19.

²³ *Ibid.*, 22-23.

²⁴ *Ibid.* V, 1, 128b, 35.

²⁵ *Ibid.* V, 2, 130b, 11-12.

²⁶ *Ibid.* I, 5, 101b, 39.

²⁷ *Ibid.* V, 3, 131b, 38-132a, 1.

ject according to participation is a constituent part of its essence,"²⁸ but a property is predicated of a subject neither according to participation nor as showing the essence.²⁹ Reflecting all this, Philo says that the properties (*ιδιότητες*) of a thing are distinguished from its qualities (*ποιότητες*), inasmuch as qualities are shared by it in common with others,³⁰ whereas properties, by implication, are not shared by it with others. When Philo therefore speaks of the terms predicated of God as properties of God he means to emphasize that they are not universal terms — genus or difference or definition.

In its relation to accident, though property is sometimes described by Aristotle as a sort of accident, it differs from accident in that it belongs to the subject in virtue of its own self (*καθ' αὐτό*).³¹ This belonging to the subject in virtue of its own self, however, does not make property a definition, for the latter not only belongs to the subject in virtue of its own self but also is in its essence (*ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ*).³² Thus, for instance, it is a property of a triangle that its angles are equal to two right angles, but this equation is not included in the definition of a triangle.³³ Again, unlike accident, which can never be eternal, property can be eternal, provided the subject to which it belongs is eternal.³⁴ As an illustration of an eternal property Aristotle mentions the terms "immortal living being" in their application to God.³⁵ When Philo therefore speaks of the terms predicated of God as properties of God he means, again, to emphasize that they are not accidents.

This is exactly what Philo means when he says that in philosophic terminology all the predicates of God are

²⁸ *Ibid.* V, 4, 132b, 36-133a, 1.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 133a, 5-6.

³⁰ *Agr.* 3, 13.

³¹ *Metaph.* V, 30, 1025a, 30-34.

³² *Ibid.*, 31-32.

³³ *Ibid.*, 32.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 32-33; cf. *Topica* V, 1, 128b, 16-17.

³⁵ *Topica* V, 1, 128b, 19-20.

properties. They are properties in the sense that, while they must necessarily be assumed to belong to the essence of God, they do not tell us anything about the essence of God, for this, according to him, must remain unknown. They are properties also in the sense that they are not accidents, for these God, as an incorporeal being, cannot possess. For the conception of divine predicates as properties Philo may have found for himself support in Aristotle's statement that "life also belongs (*ὑπάρχει*) to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; for the actuality of God in virtue of itself (*καθ' αὐτήν*) is most good and eternal."³⁶ The expression "in virtue of itself," as we have seen, is used by Aristotle as a designation of property.³⁷ But another question must have arisen in the mind of Philo. The essence of God is one and simple and consequently whatever belongs to it as a property must be one and simple, for, if you assume that He has many properties, then you will have to say either that His essence is not one or simple or that some of these properties do not belong to Him in virtue of His essence; in the latter case they would be not properties but accidents. How could one therefore explain the multiplicity of properties which Scripture predicates of God? In answer to this Philo reduces all the properties predicated of God to only a single property, that of acting. Whatever property Scripture predicates of God it is only a different phase of one single property, and that one single property is the property of God to act. For action is in the true sense of the term a property only of God, no other being possesses such a property. "It is the property of God to act (*τὸ ποιεῖν*)," he says, "which property," he adds, "we do not ascribe to any created being, for the

³⁶ *Metaph.* XII, 7, 1072b, 26-28.

³⁷ Cf. above, n. 31.

property of the created is to suffer action (τὸ πάσχειν).”³⁸ To act is thus a property of God in the sense that it is not a universal, inasmuch as nothing shares with Him in it. Moreover it is a property of God also in the sense that it is not an accident, for “God never pauses in His activity,”³⁹ but He is “ever active,”⁴⁰ and an accident, as we have seen, as distinguished from a property, cannot last forever.⁴¹ The ever-activity of God is also expressed by him in his statement that “unchangeableness is the property of God.”⁴²

As a further description of this property of God to act Philo says of it that it is the source of all action in the world. “Even as it is the property of fire to burn and of snow to chill, so it is the property of God to act; nay more by far, inasmuch as He is to all besides the source of action.”⁴³ Now, in Aristotle, to be the source of movement or change in another thing is described by the term “power” (δύναμις), for “power,” he says, “means a source of movement or change which is in another thing than the thing moved.”⁴⁴ What Aristotle says of the source of movement or change in another thing, Philo could reasonably argue, would also be true of the source of action in another thing and consequently since the property of God to act is the source of action in other things that property to act may be called power. Plato, too, as we have seen, uses the term power as a description of the causative aspect of the ideas.⁴⁵ Philo accordingly calls the properties of God, which are His properties to act and to be the source of action in others, by the term “powers.” “It is impious and false,” he says, to conceive of God as being in a state of “complete inactivity,” when “we ought on the contrary to be astounded at His

³⁸ *Cher.* 24, 77.

³⁹ *Leg. All.* I, 3, 5.

⁴⁰ *Gig.* 10, 42.

⁴¹ Cf. above, n. 34.

⁴² *Leg. All.* II, 9, 33.

⁴³ *Leg. All.* I, 3, 5.

⁴⁴ *Metaph.* V, 12, 1019a, 15-16.

⁴⁵ Cf. above, I, 217.

powers (*δυνάμεις*) as Maker and Father.”⁴⁶ These powers of God, as they manifest themselves in certain actions in the world, are many, and Philo, on several occasions, attempts to enumerate them and to classify them. Sometimes he divides them into four: (1) creative, (2) regal, (3) propitious, and (4) legislative, subdividing the last one into preceptive and prohibitive,⁴⁷ sometimes he reduces these four powers to two, either goodness and authority,⁴⁸ or beneficent and regal,⁴⁹ or beneficent and punitive;⁵⁰ but in all these classifications all the powers are reduced to one, which he calls the power of God, or the property of God, to act with goodness as well as with authority, with beneficence as well as with regality, with graciousness as well as with punishment.

The properties of God are thus the powers of God, and the names by which God is called are nothing but designations of these properties or powers of God. Thus in one place, taking the term “peace” in the expression the “vision of peace,” by which he translates the word “Jerusalem,” as referring to God, he says that the “vision of peace” means the same as the “vision of God,” for peace is the chief of the “many-named powers” (*πολυωνύμων δυνάμεων*) of God.⁵¹ A similar use of the terms “powers,” “names,” and “properties” is to be found also in the Stoics. The God of the Stoics, who is the primary fire which is immanent in the world and pervades all the parts thereof, is said by them to be called by “many names (*πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις*) according to his various powers (*δυνάμεις*),” which names are given to him by men with reference to some of his “peculiar prop-

⁴⁶ *Opif.* 2, 7.

⁴⁷ *Fug.* 18, 94-95.

⁴⁸ *Cher.* 9, 27-28; *Sacr.* 15, 59.

⁴⁹ *Abr.* 25, 124-125; *Qu. in Exod.* II, 68 (Harris, *Fragments*, p. 67).

⁵⁰ *Heres* 34, 166; cf. above, I, 224-225.

⁵¹ *Somn.* II, 38, 254.

erties" (οικειότητος).⁵² Here then we have all the three characteristic terms used by Philo, "names," "powers," "property."⁵³ More directly is the term power applied by Philo to the names of God, and hence to the properties of God, in his discussion of the two names by which God is called in the Septuagint, namely, *Theos*, God, corresponding to the Hebrew Elohim, and *Kyrios*, Lord, corresponding to the Hebrew Jehovah. The term *Theos* is taken by him as a designation of the "creative power" (ποιητική δύναμις), so that "'I am thy God' is equivalent to 'I am thy maker and creator.'" ⁵⁴ This etymologizing on the Greek term *θεός* reflects Herodotus,⁵⁵ who derives it from *τιθημι*, *to put, to make*. Plato derives it from *θέω*, *to run*.⁵⁶ But inasmuch as God's creative power is identified with His goodness, he also says that "God is the name of goodness."⁵⁷ The term *Kyrios*, on the other hand, which in the Septuagint translates the Hebrew Adonai, the spoken substitute for the Tetragrammaton Jehovah, is taken by him to indicate "authority" (ἐξουσία)⁵⁸ or the royal power (δύναμις βασιλική).⁵⁹ This on the whole represents a Jewish tradition on these two names of God, and especially one version, the older one, of that tradition. According to this tradition, in its old version, the name Elohim means the measure of goodness and the name Jehovah means the measure of punishment.⁶⁰ But as in native Jewish tradition, where the name Jehovah, despite its being taken as designating a divine "measure" or property, is also taken as the distinctive, ineffable name of God, so also in Philo, despite its being taken, in its translated

⁵² Diogenes, VII, 147.

⁵³ οικειότηης = ιδιότηης.

⁵⁴ *Mut.* 4, 29; *Abr.* 24, 121; cf. *Conf.* 27, 137.

⁵⁵ Herodotus, II, 52; cf. J. Cohn, *Philos Werke* I, 122, n. 1, on *Abr.* 24, 121.

⁵⁶ *Cratylus* 397 D.

⁵⁷ *Leg. All.* III, 23, 73.

⁵⁹ *Abr.* 24, 121.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Cf. above, I, 224.

Greek form, as designating the divine property of authority, it is also taken by him, in its original Hebrew form, as we have seen above,⁶¹ in the sense of the proper ineffable name of God.⁶²

The view arrived at by Philo that all the terms predicated of God are properties and that they are properties which express the one and all-comprehensive property of God, that of His power to act, removes from them the stigma of their being generic terms or accidental terms, or of their implying a multiplicity in God. But another question arises. Every action of an agent upon a patient establishes a relation between them, a relation which in Aristotle is designated as the relation between active and passive⁶³ or of active to passive.⁶⁴ Every such relation, however, according to Aristotle, establishes also a reciprocal dependence between the correlatives, for relative terms of this kind are, according to him, called relative "because each derives that which it is from reference to another,"⁶⁵ so that "the servant is said to be servant of the master, and the master, master of the servant."⁶⁶ Consequently, in predicating of God terms which establish a relation between Him as active and other objects as passive, it would mean that God's activity is dependent upon something else. But this is contradictory to the principle of the self-sufficiency of God, "for the Existent considered as existent is not relative; He is full of himself and He is sufficient for himself. It was so before the creation of the world, and is equally so after the creation of all that is. He cannot

⁶¹ Cf. above, pp. 121-122.

⁶² There is no ground for Siegfried's inference (p. 203) that Philo had no knowledge of the fact that the Hebrew Jehovah, of which he speaks as the proper name of God, is the same as the Greek "Lord" which he takes to be a "power" of God. The same two uses of the term, as we have seen, are to be found also in rabbinic literature.

⁶³ *Phys.* III, 1, 200b, 30.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 1021a, 26-28.

⁶⁴ *Metaph.* V, 15, 1020b, 28-30.

⁶⁶ *Categ.* 7, 6b, 28-30.

change nor alter and needs nothing else at all, so that all things are His but He himself in the proper sense belongs to none." ⁶⁷ In answer to this difficulty Philo maintains that all those properties which indicate action, while they establish a relation, the relation is not to be understood to be a reciprocal relation: the suffering action by the patient indeed depends upon the agent, but the activity of the agent does not depend upon the patient. In the strictly logical sense, therefore, such a non-reciprocal relation is not a true relation; Philo consequently describes it as a *quasi*-relation (ὡσανεὶ πρὸς τι).⁶⁸ It is called a relation only because in ordinary speech the activity of an agent upon a patient, analogous to that of God, who is the "Father" (πατήρ), "Maker" (ποιητής), and "Artificer" (δημιουργός)⁶⁹ of the world, upon the world, is called relation and such a relation is reciprocal in the same way as "a king is king of someone and a benefactor is the benefactor of someone." ⁷⁰ In reality, however, the activity of God is not dependent upon anything outside of God. Like the essence of God it is self-sufficient; it is an activity which is absolute and in the real sense not relative; it is an activity peculiar to God, a property of God in which nothing else shares.

V. THE ESSENCE OF THE CREATED POWERS

The powers of God in the sense of the property of God to act, as we have seen, are not distinct from the essence of God, and if the essence of God, as it is assumed by Philo, is unknowable, then the powers of God are also unknowable in their essence. They are known to us only through the

⁶⁷ *Mut.* 4, 27-28; cf. above, I, 172.

⁶⁸ *Mut.* 4, 28. Cf. Drummond, II, 48-49; Colson, *ad loc.*

⁶⁹ *Mut.* 4, 29.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 28.

effect which they produce in the world, for the world itself in its totality came into being as a result of God's power or property to act. But, according to Philo, when God, by the determination of His will, decided to create the world, He created prior to it an intelligible world consisting of intelligible beings called ideas. These ideas have been endowed by God with some part of that power to act which had existed in Him as a property from eternity. The ideas are therefore called also powers; they are, however, only created powers and, unlike the powers in the sense of eternal properties, they are distinct from God.¹ Of these created powers there are, according to Philo, two kinds: first, incorporeal powers or ideas, and, second, powers immanent in the physical world.² The question may therefore arise, with regard to these created powers, whether, like God, they are unknown in their essence or, unlike God, they are known in their essence.

The question is dealt with by Philo in his homily on the second prayer of Moses. In that second prayer, as will be recalled, Moses asks God, according to the Septuagint version used by Philo, "Reveal thyself (*σεαυτόν*) to me."³ To this God answers, "Thou shalt see what are behind Me, but My face shall not be beheld by thee."⁴ The meaning of these verses is discussed by Philo in five places in his writings. We shall examine them one by one.

In one passage, he starts with the statement that God, to whom he refers as "He who exists in truth" (*τὸ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ὄν*), is perceived and known "with the eyes of the understanding, from the cosmic powers and from the constant and ceaseless motion of His innumerable works."⁵ Then, quot-

¹ Cf. above, I, 220-222.

² Cf. above, I, 327, 343-345.

³ Exod. 33: 18.

⁴ Exod. 33: 23.

⁵ *Post.* 48, 167.

ing the verse "See, see that I am," ⁶ he argues from the fact that God did not say "See Me" that God's statement means "Behold My existence, for it is quite enough for a man's reasoning faculty to advance as far as to learn that the cause of the universe is and exists." ⁷ Then, also, quoting God's answer to Moses' second prayer, he says: "This meant, that all that follows in the wake of God is within the good man's apprehension, while He himself alone is incomprehensible — but He may become perceived and known ⁸ by the powers that follow and attend Him, for these make evident not His essence but His existence from the things which He accomplishes." ⁹ Here in this passage he quite clearly distinguishes between God who is incomprehensible and the powers who are comprehensible, from which it may be inferred that the powers, unlike God, are comprehensible in their essence.

In a second passage, in the same treatise, Philo mentions the powers but says nothing about the question of the comprehensibility of their essence. In that passage the second prayer of Moses is explained as meaning that "he implored Him to reveal clearly His own nature," ¹⁰ and God's answer is explained as meaning that "when therefore the God-loving soul probes the question of the essence (*τὸ τί ἐστὶ*) of the Existent Being, he enters on an obscure and dark subject of investigation from which the greatest benefit that accrues to him is to comprehend that God, as to His essence (*τὸ εἶναι*), is utterly incomprehensible to any being." ¹¹

⁶ Deut. 32: 39 (LXX).

⁷ *Post.* 48, 168.

⁸ Wendland, followed by Colson, adds here the word *καταληπτός*. But if the word *ἀκατάληπτος* used previously by Philo refers to essence, then the word to be supplied here should be one that refers to existence and not to essence. Such a word should be a participle of *κατανοεῖσθαι* or *γνωρίζεσθαι* mentioned previously in § 167.

⁹ *Post.* 48, 169, or "they accomplish," if the reading is *αὐτοῖς* instead of *αὐτῶ*.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 4, 13.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 5, 15.

But with regard to the powers, he merely says that "though He is superior to that which He has created and external to it, none the less He filled the universe with himself, for He has caused His powers to extend themselves throughout the universe to its utmost bounds." ¹² He does not say, however, whether they are known or unknown as to their essence.

In a third passage, God's answer to the second prayer of Moses is explained by Philo as follows: "He did not succeed in finding anything by search respecting the essence of Him that is," for God told him that "it amply suffices the wise man to come to a knowledge of all the things that attend upon God, follow Him and are behind Him, but he who wishes to see the Supreme Essence, will be blinded by the rays that beam forth all around Him before he sees Him." ¹³ In this passage, too, there is a contrast between a knowledge of the essence of God and a knowledge of "all the things that attend upon God, follow Him and are behind Him," that is, His powers, with the implication that the powers are known in their essence.

The same implication is to be found in a fourth discussion of God's answer to the second prayer of Moses. It is interpreted by him there to mean that "all below the Existent, things corporeal and incorporeal alike, are available to the apprehension, even if they are not actually apprehended as yet, but He alone by His very nature cannot be seen." ¹⁴ Here again there is a contrast with regard to the comprehensibility of their essence between God and "things corporeal and incorporeal," that is, the immanent powers in the visible world and the incorporeal powers in the intelligible world, with the implication that the powers of either kind can be apprehended in their essence, "even if they are

¹² *Ibid.*, 14; cf. above, I, 344.

¹³ *Fug.* 29, 165.

¹⁴ *Mut.* 2, 9.

not actually apprehended as yet." It is because the powers are as yet not actually apprehended that later in the same passage he says that "not even the powers who serve Him tell us their proper name."¹⁵ Not to tell us their proper name means not to reveal to us their essence, and this refusal to reveal to us their essence is to be taken not as implying that their essence cannot be known but rather as implying that the knowledge of their essence is to be acquired by us only through study and research.

As against at least three of these four passages there is a fifth passage in which he definitely says that the powers, like God, are unknown in their essence. In that passage, he starts with the verse "Reveal thyself to me." From the words quoted here by Philo from the Septuagint it is not clear whether they are from verse 13 of chapter 33 in Exodus or from verse 18, but we take them to be a quotation from verse 18, in which the Hebrew reads, "Show me Thy glory," and not from verse 13, in which the Hebrew reads, "Show me Thy ways," that is to say, they are from the second prayer of Moses and not from the first.¹⁶ Commenting upon these words, Philo says: "In these words we may almost hear plainly the inspired cry 'That Thou art and dost exist, of this the world has been my teacher and guide. . . . But what Thou art in Thy essence I desire to understand, yet find in no part of the All any to guide me to this knowledge.'" ¹⁷ In view of the fact that God's answer to Moses' first prayer is interpreted by Philo to mean that God has offered Moses to be himself his guide to a knowledge of His

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹⁶ Colson (note on *Spec.* I, 8, 41) takes this to be a quotation of the first prayer of Moses contained in verse 13, but, as he himself has noted, the answer of God to this prayer as paraphrased by Philo is based upon verses 19-23, which follow the second prayer in verse 18. Cf. our analysis of Philo's treatment of these two prayers of Moses above, pp. 86-87.

¹⁷ *Spec.* I, 8, 41.

existence,¹⁸ Philo's interpretation here of Moses' second prayer makes Moses reject God's offer, causing him to say to God that, as for a knowledge of His existence, he has already learned it by himself from the world, but that what he would like to have the direct help of God for is to attain to a knowledge of His essence. To this God's answer, given by Philo without proof-text, is that "the apprehension of Me is something more than human nature, yea even the whole heaven and universe, will be able to contain."¹⁹ The proof-text for this is, of course, the verse quoted in the other passages, "My face shall not be beheld by thee"²⁰ or the verse, "Thou canst not see My face."²¹ Then Philo makes Moses say: But I beseech Thee that I may at least see the glory (*δόξα*) that surrounds Thee, and by Thy glory I understand the powers that keep guard around Thee."²² No proof-text is quoted here by Philo. God's answer to this is given by Philo again without proof-text. It contains the following statements: (1) "The powers which thou seekest to know are discerned not by sight but by mind even as I, whose they are, am discerned by mind and not by sight."²³ (2) "When I say 'they are discerned by mind' I speak not of those which are now actually apprehended by mind but mean that if these other powers could be apprehended it would not be by sense but by mind at its purest."²⁴ (3) "Do not, then, hope to be ever able to apprehend Me or any of My powers in our essence."²⁵ (4) "But while in their essence they are beyond your apprehension, they nevertheless present to your sight a sort of impress and copy of their active working."²⁶ Here, then, Philo definitely states that the powers, like God, are not comprehensible in their essence.

¹⁸ Cf. above, p. 86.

¹⁹ *Spec.* I, 8, 44.

²⁰ *Exod.* 33: 23.

²¹ *Exod.* 33: 20.

²² *Spec.* I, 8, 45.

²³ *Ibid.*, 46.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 49.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 47.

There is thus a change of view between at least three of the first four passages and the fifth passage. In the former, the powers are said to be knowable in their essence; in the latter, they are said to be unknowable in their essence. Without attempting to reconcile passages which obviously indicate a change of view,²⁷ we shall try to find out what was it that has brought about that change of view. This change of view must have undoubtedly come about as a result of a change in his interpretation of God's answer to the second prayer of Moses. But what is it that has caused that change of interpretation?

Let us first examine the text of this second prayer. In the original Hebrew it reads: "Show us Thy glory." Now the expression "glory of God" or "glory of the Lord" in Scripture may mean two things. It may mean God himself and it may also mean something produced by God and distinct from Him.²⁸ These two meanings of the term glory in the verse in question are to be found in the two Greek translations of that verse. One translation of this verse reads "Reveal thyself to me." It is this verse and in this translation that Philo, as we have tried to show, always quotes when he interprets it to be a prayer for God's essence. The other translation of the verse reads, literally, as in the Hebrew, "show me Thy glory."²⁹

Let us now assume that in those three of the first four passages in which the powers are explicitly said by him to be knowable in their essence, Philo took the second prayer of Moses to read "Reveal thyself to me." When therefore God in His answer said to him, again according to the Greek

²⁷ *Post.*, *Fug.* and *Mut.* were all written before *Spec.*, according to Cohn, or after *Spec.*, according to Massebieau and Bréhier (cf. references above, I, 87, n. 1).

²⁸ Cf. G. B. Gray, "Glory," *Dictionary of the Bible*, II, pp. 184-186.

²⁹ See critical apparatus to Septuagint.

reading, "I will go before thee with My glory and I will call by My name the Lord before thee, and I will have mercy upon whom I please to have mercy . . . but, said He, thou canst not see My face . . . and when My glory is passing by, I will place thee in a cleft of the rock and cover thee with My hand over thee, until I pass by, then I will withdraw My hand and then thou shalt see what are behind Me but My face cannot be seen by thee,"³⁰ he took this answer to mean that while My "face," that is, my essence, cannot be known, My "glory" and "what are behind Me," that is, My powers, can be known in their essence.

Then let us assume that in the fifth passage, where the powers are said to be unknown in their essence, Philo had before him the two Greek readings of this second prayer of Moses, one "Reveal thyself to me" and the other "show me Thy glory." Let us also assume that he knew that these two Greek translations represented the two possible meanings of the underlying Hebrew word "glory." Assuming all this, we can readily see how Philo, having before him a verse which in the original Hebrew lends itself to two interpretations, interpreted the verse actually to contain two distinct prayers, one for a knowledge of God's essence and the other for a knowledge of God's glory, that is, His powers. This is an exegetical method which is quite common in traditional Jewish interpretation of Scripture.³¹ Since, therefore, Philo took the second prayer of Moses in verse 18 to contain two distinct prayers, God's answer to this double prayer was also taken by him to contain two distinct answers to the two prayers. The answer to the first prayer was taken by him to be contained in the verses "I will go before

³⁰ Exod. 33: 19-23.

³¹ As, for instance, the exegetical uses made in many places of the differences between the *qere* and the *ketib* or of the *al tiḡre*; cf., e.g., *Baba Ḳamma* 10b.

thee with My glory and I will call by My name the Lord before thee, and I will have mercy upon whom I please to have mercy . . . but, said He, thou canst not see My face.”³² This part of the answer was interpreted by Philo to mean: “To him that is worthy of My grace³³ I extend all the boons which he is capable of receiving; but the apprehension of Me is something more than human nature, yea even the whole heaven and universe, will be able to contain.”³⁴ The answer to the second prayer was taken by him to be contained in the verses, “When My glory is passing by, I will place thee in a cleft of the rock and cover thee with My hand over thee, until I pass by, then I will withdraw My hand and then thou shalt see what are behind Me but My face cannot be seen by thee.”³⁵ This part of the answer was interpreted by Philo to mean: “The powers which thou seekest to know are discerned not by sight but by mind even as I . . . but while in their essence they are beyond your comprehension, they nevertheless present to your sight a sort of impress and copy of their active working.”³⁶ According to this interpretation, the expression “thou shalt see what are behind Me but My face cannot be seen by thee” is taken by Philo to mean that the powers themselves cannot be known; only their copies can be known.

The double meaning of the term glory of God in Scripture is reflected also in Philo’s interpretation of the verse “And the glory of God descended on Mount Sinai.”³⁷ Commenting upon this verse, he says that the term glory (*δόξα*), has two meanings: (1) “the presence of His powers (*παρουσίαν . . . τῶν δυνάμεων*), since the power of an army is spoken of

³² Exod. 33: 19-20.

³³ The term *χάρις* used here by Philo and the term *ἐλεησῶ* used in the Septuagint are translations of the same Hebrew word.

³⁴ *Spec.* I, 8, 43-44.

³⁶ *Spec.* I, 8, 45-46.

³⁵ Exod. 33: 21-23.

³⁷ Exod. 24: 16.

as the glory of a king"; (2) "a mental image (*δόκησις*) of Him alone and a notion (*ὑπόληψις*) of His divine glory,"³⁸ that is to say, the term glory refers to God himself, of which the people thought to have caught a glimpse. In this passage he quite obviously plays upon the two meanings of the Greek term *δόξα*, that of "glory" and that of "notion." But undoubtedly behind this discussion there is the knowledge of the double meaning of the expression glory of God in Scripture, which must have been known to every intelligent reader of the Septuagint no less than to that of the original Hebrew text.

The view that the powers are unknown in their essence is also stated by Philo in his comment on the verse in which Jacob exclaimed: "This is none other but the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven."³⁹ What is meant by "house" and "gate" and "heaven"? Philo asks, and in answer to this question he says that by "house" and "gate" is meant this visible world of ours, and by "heaven" is meant the intelligible world of the ideas or the powers. He then proceeds to say that the intelligible world, and hence also the powers or ideas of which it consists, "cannot be apprehended otherwise than by passing on to it from this world which we see and perceive by our senses, for neither indeed is it possible to get an idea of any other incorporeal thing among existences except by making material objects our starting-point."⁴⁰ The implication of this statement is quite evident: purely incorporeal beings, which include the powers, cannot be known in their essence; only their existence can be known, seeing that nothing can be known of them except through the corporeal world.

Thus, according to the fifth passage in Philo, Moses made

³⁸ *Qu. in Exod.* II, 45 (Harris, *Fragments*, p. 60).

³⁹ *Gen.* 28: 17.

⁴⁰ *Somn.* I, 32, 185-187.

three prayers. First, in verse 13, he prayed for a direct knowledge of God. In verses 14 to 17, God granted him a direct knowledge of His existence.⁴¹ Second, in verse 18, in accordance with that Greek version which translated the Hebrew term "glory" by "thyself," he prayed for a knowledge of God's essence. This is refused by God in verses 19 and 20. Third, again in verse 18, in accordance with that Greek version which translated the Hebrew term "glory" literally, he prayed for a knowledge of the essence of the powers. This is also refused by God in verses 21 to 23.

But though God, and, according to one of Philo's statements, also the powers, cannot be known in their essence, that lack of knowledge is not of the same degree. Some people may have a greater knowledge of the essence of God than others, for the more one knows of God's works in the world the more one knows of God's existence, and the more one knows of His existence the more may also one know of His essence, even though no complete knowledge of the divine essence is possible. When therefore God denied Moses to have a knowledge of His own essence, and of the essence also of His powers, and allowed him only to have a knowledge of the existence of both Himself and His powers, as much as could be gained through a knowledge of the world, He advised him to continue to have "a constant and profound longing for wisdom, which fills its scholars and disciples with glorious and most beautiful doctrines."⁴² The implication of this advice is that though the knowledge of the essence of God, and of the essence also of His powers, can never be fully attained, by a continuous desire for that kind of knowledge one will continuously learn more about the world, whereby one will grow in the knowledge of the existence of God and thereby also in the knowledge of His

⁴¹ Cf. above, p. 86.

⁴² *Spec.* I, 8, 50.

essence. Consequently, according to Philo, "when Moses heard this, he did not cease from his desire but still kept the yearning for the invisible things aflame in his heart,"⁴³ for although a complete knowledge of their essence was unattainable, it was still possible for him to grow in the knowledge thereof. When therefore in several places Philo speaks of a desire to have a vision of God he only means to have a desire for a direct and greater knowledge of the existence of God, which may lead to a greater knowledge of the essence of God, even though never to a complete knowledge of it.⁴⁴

VI. CONCLUSION, INFLUENCE, ANTICIPATION

Philo starts on his discussion of the nature of God with two fundamental scriptural principles: first, the unlikeness of God to other beings; second, the unity of God. Under the influence of philosophy, the scriptural principle of unlikeness comes to mean with him incorporeality, and incorporeality implies simplicity. Similarly, under the influence of philosophy, the scriptural principle of unity also comes to mean with him simplicity. The simplicity of God thus becomes with him the outstanding characteristic of God's nature. Now, on purely philosophic grounds, simplicity would exclude from God's nature only such composition as

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Zeller (III, 24, 463-464) takes Philo's references to a desire for a vision of God to mean a desire to have a knowledge of God's essence, which desire may also be fulfilled, and consequently he finds Philo to contradict himself. Cf. above, p. 91. The other passages to which Zeller refers as evidence of Philo's belief in the possibility of a vision of God's essence (p. 463, n. 2) do not prove his point. They merely state that "in the understanding of those who have been purified to the utmost the Ruler of the universe walks noiselessly, alone, invisibly" (*Somn.* I, 23, 148), or that, when man has arrived at full knowledge, he will follow God himself as his leader (*Migr.* 31, 175), or that "they who live in knowledge of the One are rightly called 'sons of God'" (*Conf.* 28, 145). All these statements might mean almost anything; they do not necessarily mean that man can have a knowledge of God's essence.

is inconsistent with His incorporeality, namely, body and soul, substance and accident, the four elements, and matter and form. No philosopher before Philo is known to have stated that God, in His essence, is unknowable and indescribable. But Scripture teaches also that God is not to be named, and this scriptural principle of the unnamability of God, again under the influence of philosophic reasoning, comes to mean with Philo that God cannot be described by any accidental predicates nor can He be defined in terms of genus and species or difference. Being indescribable and undefinable, God thus becomes with Philo unknowable in His essence, which is a new principle introduced by him into the history of philosophy.

All this has led Philo to raise the question as to what is meant by all those terms which in Scripture are predicated of God. To this he offers two answers. On purely Jewish traditional grounds, his answer is that all these terms are not to be taken literally and that they are used in Scripture only for the purpose of instruction. But, on philosophic grounds, he tries to find some meaning for all these terms, by explaining that they are what philosophers call properties. Having once suggested that explanation, he then tries to show how properties differ from genus and specific difference and accident, how all these properties are in reality one property, how that one property is a property of action, and how that property of action, when predicated of God, does not vitiate His self-sufficiency. This God's property of action is furthermore also called by Philo the power of God; but, inasmuch as any property or power of God must be identical with His essence, the power of God must of necessity be unknowable in the same way as God's essence is unknowable. But the term powers, besides its sense as God's property to act, which is identical with His essence, means to Philo also the

ideas created by God both as incorporeal beings and as immanent in the world. The question therefore arises whether these latter two kinds of power, which are creations of God and are distinct from His essence, are knowable or unknowable. In his answer to this question, Philo sometimes says that they are knowable and sometimes he says that they are unknowable. The questions with regard to the knowability of the essence of God as well as that of His powers is found by Philo to be the subject of Moses' prayer to God and God's answer to that prayer.

From now on in the history of philosophy, whether Christian, Moslem, or Jewish, all the philosophers, in their discussion of the nature of God, will take up those problems raised by Philo and will proceed in their solution after the manner of Philo.

Like Philo, the Christian Church Fathers feel that the principle of the incorporeality of God is not explicitly stated in Scripture and it has to be indirectly derived therefrom. Origen gives utterance to this view in his statement that "the term *ἀσώματος*, that is, incorporeal, is unused and unknown, not only in many other writings, but also in our own Scriptures,"¹ but "we shall inquire, however, whether the thing which Greek philosophers call *ἀσώματος*, or incorporeal, is found in holy Scripture under another name."² Origen himself finds it implied in such verses of the New Testament as "No man hath seen God at any time,"³ "The image of the invisible God,"⁴ and "God is a Spirit."⁵ But Clement of Alexandria derives it also from the Old Testament principle of the unlikeness of God, quoting as proof-text the verses

¹ *De Principiis* I, *Praefatio*, 8.

² *Ibid.*, 9.

³ John 1: 18.

⁴ Col. 1: 15.

⁵ John 4: 24; cf. *Contra Celsum* VII, 27; *De Principiis* I, 1, §§ 1-4.

“To whom have you likened me?”⁶ and “To whom have you likened the Lord? or to what likeness have you likened Him?”⁷

In the Koran, as in the Hebrew Bible, there is no explicit statement of the incorporeality of God, but there are these statements denying any likeness between God and other beings: “Nought is there like Him”⁸ and “And there is none like Him.”⁹ The unlikeness of God becomes in Arabic Moslem philosophy the basis for the rejection of the corporeality and also of the attributes of God. One of the earliest recorded Moslem philosophers who rejected divine attributes, Jahm Ibn Şafwān, is reported to have said: “It is not permissible that the creator should be described by terms by which His creatures are described, for this would lead to likeness.”¹⁰ So also the extreme attributists or anthropomorphists are said to have lapsed into likeness (*tashbih*).¹¹ Similarly in Arabic Jewish philosophy, the doctrine of the unlikeness of God as taught in the Hebrew Scripture is made the basis of the rejection of the corporeality as well as the anthropomorphisms of God. This is clearly brought out in the writings of such philosophers as Saadia,¹² Bahya,¹³ Joseph Ibn Şaddīq,¹⁴ Abraham Ibn Daud,¹⁵ and Maimonides.¹⁶

As in Philo, with whom the principle of the unity of God

⁶ Isa. 40: 25; cf. *Stromata* V, 14 (PG, 9, 164 B).

⁷ Isa. 40: 18; cf. *ibid.* (PG, 9, 176 A).

⁸ Surah 42: 9.

⁹ Surah 112: 4.

¹⁰ Shahrastani, ed. Cureton, p. 60, ll. 8-9.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 64, ll. 9-10; 19-20.

¹² *Emunot we-De'ot* II, 1 (Arabic, p. 79, ll. 13-14; p. 80, ll. 5-6).

¹³ *Ḥobot ha-Lebabot* I, 10 (Arabic, pp. 76, l. 16-77, l. 6).

¹⁴ *'Olam Kaṭan* III, ed. S. Horovitz, p. 51, ll. 17 ff.

¹⁵ *Emunah Ramah* II, iii, p. 57.

¹⁶ *Moreh Nebukim* I, 55.

came to mean not only external unity but also internal unity, or rather simplicity, so also in the subsequent history of philosophy, whether Christian, Moslem, or Jewish, the unity of God is formally said to include also His simplicity. Among the Church Fathers the simplicity of God is the main premise which made it necessary to look for an explanation for the doctrine of the Trinity¹⁷ as well as for the use of divine predicates.¹⁸ In Arabic Moslem philosophy, the term one is formally divided into external unity and simplicity, and God is said to be simple and indivisible.¹⁹ In Arabic Jewish philosophy, the discussion of the unity of God always tries to show that God is not only numerically one but that He is also simple and indivisible. This formal statement is to be found in Bahya,²⁰ Joseph Ibn Şaddiğ,²¹ Judah ha-Levi,²² and Abraham Ibn Daud.²³ In mediaeval Latin philosophy, to take but one outstanding example, St. Thomas similarly says that the unity of God means both numerical unity and simplicity.²⁴

Then, as in Philo, the simplicity of God is said to exclude not only the composition of matter and form, or of the four elements, or of substance and accident, but also the composition of genus and species and, as a result of that, God is said to be incomprehensible (*ἀκατάληπτος*), unnamable (*ἀκατονώμαστος*), and ineffable (*ἄρρητος*). These views appear from now on throughout the history of philosophy,

¹⁷ Cf. John of Damascus, *De Fide Orthodoxa* I, 8.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 12.

¹⁹ Cf. Alfarabi, *Al-Siyāsāt al-Madaniyyah*, Hyderabad, 1346 A. H., pp. 13, l. 20-14, l. 20; Avicenna, *Najāt*, Cairo, 1331 A. H., pp. 375-383; Algazali, *Maqāsid al-Falāsifah* II, Cairo, no date, pp. 114-118.

²⁰ *Hobot ha-Lebabot* I, 8.

²¹ *'Olam Kaṭan* III, pp. 49-51.

²² *Cuzari* II, 2.

²³ *Emunah Ramah* II, ii, 1.

²⁴ *Sum. Theol.* I, 11, 3; 3, 1-8.

whether Christian, Moslem, or Jewish, and, also perhaps through the influence of Philo, in pagan Greek philosophy. All these Philonic terms, incomprehensible, unnamable, and ineffable, appear in the writings of almost all the Church Fathers. In Origen this incomprehensibility of God is said to be derived directly from His incorporeality. "Having refuted, then," he says, "as well as we could, every notion which might suggest that we were to think of God as in any degree corporeal, we go on to say that, according to strict truth, God is incomprehensible."²⁵ We have already shown that on purely philosophic grounds the mere incorporeality of God did not lead philosophers before Philo to say that God is incomprehensible. It must have been also as an inference from Philo's statements that God is "without quality"²⁶ and that He is the "highest genus"²⁷ that Clement of Alexandria came to say that God is "neither genus, nor difference, nor species, nor individual, nor number."²⁸ John of Damascus, summarizing what was commonly believed by Church Fathers about God, mentions among other things also that He is indescribable (*ἀπεριγραπτον*) and indefinable (*ἀπερίοριστον*).²⁹ In Arabic Moslem as well as in Arabic Jewish philosophy, the statements constantly occur that God has no name (*ism*) and no description (*ṣifah*) and that He cannot be defined or that He has no genus and species or difference.³⁰ In mediaeval Latin philosophy, to take again but one outstanding example, St. Thomas argues from the simplicity of God that in Him there is not only no

²⁵ *De Principiis* I, 1, 5.

²⁶ Cf. above, p. 104.

²⁷ Cf. above, p. 109.

²⁸ *Stromata* V, 12 (PG, 9, 121 A); cf. above, p. 113.

²⁹ *De Fide Orthodoxa* I, 8.

³⁰ Baghdadi, p. 93, l. 16 — p. 94, l. 1; Avicenna, *Najāt* III, p. 381; Algazali, *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah* II, p. 145; *Moreh Nebukim* I, 52.

composition of matter and form³¹ or of subject and accident³² but also no composition of genus and difference,³³ and hence that God cannot be defined.³⁴ Like Philo, he also maintains that "it is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend (*comprehendere*) God," inasmuch as God is "infinite" and is "infinitely knowable" and "no created intellect can know God infinitely,"³⁵ though he maintains that it is possible for souls of the blessed after death to see the essence of God³⁶ through a strengthening of their intellect³⁷ by the grace of God.³⁸

Furthermore, as in Philo, who finds the problem of the unknowability discussed in the prayer of Moses to God and in God's answer to that prayer, so also in Christian and Jewish philosophy the prayer of Moses is similarly interpreted. Clement of Alexandria, probably under the direct influence of Philo, though not verbally following him, says: "Whence Moses, persuaded that God is not to be known by human wisdom, said 'Show me thyself'; and into the thick darkness where God's voice was, pressed to enter — that is, into the inaccessible and invisible ideas respecting the Existent."³⁹ Again: "Therefore also Moses says, 'Show thyself to me' — intimating most clearly that God is not capable of being taught by man, or expressed in speech, but to be known only by His own power."⁴⁰ Similarly St. Augustine, from the prayers of Moses, which he quotes as "Show me now thyself plainly"⁴¹ and "Show me Thy glory,"⁴² infers

³¹ *Sum. Theol.* I, 3, 2c; *Cont. Gent.* I, 17 and 27.

³² *Sum. Theol.* I, 3, 6c; *Cont. Gent.* I, 23.

³³ *Sum. Theol.* I, 3, 5c; *Cont. Gent.* I, 24-25.

³⁴ *Cont. Gent.* I, 25.

³⁵ *Sum. Theol.* I, 12, 7c; cf. IV Sent., 49, 2, 3c.

³⁶ *Sum. Theol.* I, 12, 1c.

³⁷ *Stromata* II, 2 (PG, 8, 936 B-937 A).

⁴¹ Exod. 33: 13, following the Septuagint reading.

⁴² Exod. 33: 18, following the Hebrew reading.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 2c.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 4c.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, V, 11 (PG, 9, 109 B).

that what Moses prayed for was: "Show me Thy substance" and that "this was not granted to him."⁴³ In another place he similarly infers from the prayer "Show me Thy glory" that Moses "desired what he saw not."⁴⁴ And Maimonides, independently of Philo but like him, explains that the prayer of Moses contains two petitions. One of them, exactly as in Philo, is a petition for the knowledge of God's essence, to which God's answer was that His true essence could not be known.⁴⁵ The other, analogous to what Philo takes to be a petition for a knowledge of the essence of God's created powers,⁴⁶ is a petition for the knowledge of God's "attributes," to which God's answer was that "He would let him know all His attributes, and that these were nothing but His actions."⁴⁷ In mediaeval Latin philosophy, St. Thomas quotes the verse "Man shall not see me and live"⁴⁸ in God's answer to the prayer of Moses to prove that "God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life,"⁴⁹ though he adds that by his power to work miracles God may "raise the minds of some, who live in flesh but make no use of the senses of the flesh, even up to the vision of His own essence."⁵⁰ Elsewhere,⁵¹ however, he says of Moses that "he saw God's very essence, even as Paul in his rapture did according to Augustine,⁵² and to prove this he quotes Scripture to the effect

⁴³ *De Trinitate* II, 16, 27.

⁴⁴ *Super Genesim ad Litteram* XII, 27, 55 (PL, 34, 477). Cf. *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 98, 3, ad 2.

⁴⁵ *Moreh Nebukim* I, 54.

⁴⁶ Cf. above, p. 143.

⁴⁷ *Moreh Nebukim* I, 54.

⁴⁸ *Exod.* 33: 20; *Sum. Theol.* I, 12, 11 contra; *Cont. Gent.* III, 47; *De Veritate* X, 11, Obj. 2.

⁴⁹ *Sum. Theol.* I, 12, 11 c.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, ad 2.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, II, II, 174, 4 c.

⁵² *Super Genesim ad Litteram* XII, 27, 55 (PL, 34, 477), 28, 56 (PL, 34, 478); cf. *Sum. Theol.* II, II, 175, 3 c.

that "Moses beheld God 'manifestly and not in dark speeches.'" ⁵³

The answers given in the subsequent history of philosophy to the problem of divine predicates started by Philo went far beyond Philo's answer. New solutions will make their appearance in pagan, Christian, Moslem, and Jewish philosophy, solutions of which the complexity of history and meaning will be discussed by us in great detail in the subsequent volumes of this series of studies. But the solution offered by Philo to the problem by declaring that all predicates of God are descriptions of His property or power of action continues to be one of the standard solutions of the problem in Christian, Moslem, and Jewish philosophy. John of Damascus, speaking for the Church Fathers, declares that some of the predicates of God indicate an action (*ἐνέργεια*).⁵⁴ The explanation of divine predicates as actions is to be found also, either under the guise of the term relation, that is, the relation of the agent to the patient,⁵⁵ or directly under the term action, in Arabic Moslem and Arabic Jewish philosophers, such as Alfarabi,⁵⁶ Avicenna,⁵⁷ Algazali,⁵⁸ Bahya Ibn Paḳuda,⁵⁹ Joseph Ibn Ṣaddīq,⁶⁰ Judah ha-Levi,⁶¹ Abraham Ibn Daud,⁶² and Maimonides,⁶³ though, in the case of Maimonides, according to our interpretation of his view, the explanation of predicates as actions has an entirely new meaning.⁶⁴

⁵³ Literally the verse in question reads: "With him do I speak . . . manifestly, and not in dark speeches; and the similitude of the Lord doth he behold" (Num. 12: 8).

⁵⁴ *De Fide Orthodoxa* I, 9 (PG, 94, 836 A).

⁵⁵ Cf. above, p. 137.

⁵⁶ *Al-Siyāsāt al-Madaniyyah*, p. 20, ll. 2-3.

⁵⁷ *Najūt*, pp. 410-411.

⁵⁸ *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah* II, p. 150, ll. 8-9.

⁶⁴ Cf. H. A. Wolfson, "The Aristotelian Predicables and Maimonides' Division of Attributes," *Essays and Studies in Memory of Linda R. Miller*, 1938, pp. 220-232.

⁵⁹ *Ḥobot ha-Lebabot* I, 9.

⁶⁰ *Olam Kaṭan* III, p. 48.

⁶¹ *Cuzari* II, 2.

⁶² *Emunah Ramah* II, iii, p. 54.

⁶³ *Moreh Nebukim* I, 52.

If we were right in our reasoning from the absence in the extant writing of pre-Philonic Greek philosophers of any definite statement to the effect that God is "unnamable" or "ineffable" or "incomprehensible" that such descriptions of God were not used by Greek philosophers before Philo, then when we do find these terms used by pagan Greek philosophers after Philo we have reason to assume that they have come into use under the influence of Philo or, when chronology permits, under the influence of the Church Fathers who have used Philo. Of course I am aware of the opinion prevailing among some scholars today that no pagan authors of that time read the works of Philo.⁶⁵ But neither the absence of any mention of his name nor the absence of any direct quotation from his writings definitely proves that he was not read, or that those who had read him were not influenced by some of his ideas. In fact, Eusebius, who lived at a time when pagan philosophy was still flourishing, testifies that Philo was a man of great note not only among Christians but also among pagans.⁶⁶ We shall mention here two pagan Greek authors, after the time of Philo, in whose writings we find some of the views of Philo, discussed in this chapter, which we have tried to show were new with Philo.

First, there is Albinus. "God," he says, "is ineffable (*ἄρρητος*) and is comprehended (*ληπτός*) only by the mind (*νῶ*)." ⁶⁷ The first part of the statement is definitely like Philo's many assertions as to the ineffability of God, using the same term *ἄρρητος*.⁶⁸ The second part of the statement,

⁶⁵ Cf. Goodenough, *The Politics of Philo Judaeus with a General Bibliography of Philo* (Yale University Press, 1938), p. 250, n. 1; *idem*, *An Introduction to Philo Judaeus* (Yale University Press, 1940), p. 125. Cf. also A. D. Nock, "The Loeb Philo," *The Classical Review*, 75 (1943), pp. 77-78.

⁶⁶ *Historia Ecclesiastica* II, 4, 2; cf. above, I, 100, n. 64.

⁶⁷ *Didaskalikos* X, in C. F. Hermann, *Platonis Dialoghi*, VI, 165, ll. 4-5.

⁶⁸ Cf. above, p. 111.

that God is "comprehended only by the mind," would at first sight seem to be in contradiction to Philo's repeated statement that God is incomprehensible (*ἀκατάληπτος*)⁶⁹ and more so to his statement that "He is not comprehended by the mind" (*οὐδὲ τῷ νῶ καταληπτός*).⁷⁰ But Philo himself, despite his assertions of the incomprehensibility of God, says of God that He "can be comprehended (*καταλαμβάνεσθαι*) only by the mind (*νοήσει*)," ⁷¹ and from the context of that statement it is quite evident that by this positive statement that "God can be comprehended only by the mind" he merely means to deny that "God was seen by man," that is to say, in its positive form it is merely an assertion that God's existence can be comprehended only by the mind but cannot be seen by the eye;⁷² it does not mean that God's essence can be comprehended by the mind. That similarly here Albinus means by his positive statement only that God cannot be perceived by the senses, without implying that His essence can be comprehended by the mind, is evident from another statement of his in which he says that God is incomprehensible (*ἀληπτος*).⁷³ He furthermore says of God that "He is not a genus (*γένος*) nor a species (*εἶδος*) nor a difference (*διαφορά*)." ⁷⁴ This is exactly, as we have seen, the implication of Philo's statements that God is "the highest genus."⁷⁵ Finally, after asserting the ineffability and incomprehensibility of God, he argues that while on the one

⁶⁹ Cf. above, p. 111.

⁷⁰ *Immut.* 13, 62.

⁷¹ *Mut.* 1, 6.

⁷² Cf. above, p. 118.

⁷³ *Didaskalikos* IV, 154, l. 19. Cf. comment on these apparently contradictory statements in Albinus himself and between Albinus and Philo in J. Freudenthal, "Der Platoniker Albinus und der falsche Alkinoos" in his *Hellenistische Studien*, Heft 3, p. 284, n. **.

⁷⁴ *Didaskalikos* X, 165, ll. 5-6.

⁷⁵ Cf. above, p. 109.

hand we cannot say that God is of a certain quality (*ποιόν*), on the other, we cannot say of Him that He is without quality (*ἄποιον*).⁷⁶ This last part of the statement is quite evidently a criticism of Philo's repeated statement that God is without quality.⁷⁷

Second, there is Plotinus. In many places he repeats the statement that God is ineffable (*ἄρητος*),⁷⁸ that "He has no name"⁷⁹ or that to Him "no name is really suitable,"⁸⁰ and that "He cannot be grasped by thought,"⁸¹ or that "we have of Him neither knowledge nor thought."⁸² All these views about God, as we have seen, do not occur in Greek philosophy before Philo.

Spinoza, in his grand assault on traditional philosophy, discusses also all these traditional problems. He accepts what he can; what he cannot he rejects. He is willing to accept the traditional principle of the unity of God and to treat that principle of unity after its traditional manner as meaning both numerical unity and simplicity.⁸³ He is willing to say that his God, like the God of tradition, is one both in a numerical sense and in the sense of being simple and indivisible. He is willing also to describe his God by many of the predicates which traditional philosophy applied to its own God, including such predicates as omniscient, almighty, the highest good, of infinite compassion,⁸⁴ intelligent, endowed with will, living.⁸⁵ He is also willing to follow the tradition

⁷⁶ *Didaskalikos* X, 165, ll. 8-10.

⁷⁷ Cf. above, pp. 101 ff.

⁷⁸ *Enneads* V, 3, 13; cf. VI, 9, 4.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* 3, 13.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* VI, 9, 5.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* V, 3, 13 end.

⁸² *Ibid.* V, 3, 14 beginning.

⁸³ Cf. H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, I, chapter on "Simplicity of Substance," I.

⁸⁴ *Short Treatise* I, 7, § 2.

⁸⁵ *Cogitata Metaphysica* II, 11 end.

established by Philo by calling these predicates properties (*propria*)⁸⁶ and to define property, after Aristotle, as that which "may belong to an object and yet never explain what the object is,"⁸⁷ that is to say, it does not explain the "essence" of a thing,⁸⁸ though it necessarily follows from the definition of a thing.⁸⁹ Moreover, following also the tradition established by Philo, he is willing to describe these properties of God as having "reference to His activity"⁹⁰ or as explaining God's "active essence."⁹¹ But, in opposition to this traditional philosophy, he is unwilling to derive from the simplicity and indivisibility of God that he must also be incorporeal, contending that corporeal substance, if properly understood, can be simple and indivisible.⁹² God is thus not only what traditional philosophy used to call pure form; He is also pure corporeality. Using for the term pure corporeality the term extension and for the term pure form the term thought, he now says that we can predicate of God both extension and thought. But these two predicates, unlike all the other predicates, are not properties of God, for by property, as we have seen, is meant something which belongs to a substance but does not explain its essence, whereas extension and thought explain the essence of God. These two predicates, in order to distinguish them from all the other predicates, he calls by the mediaeval term "attributes." Having called these two predicates, extension and thought, by the mediaeval term attributes, he follows the mediaeval

⁸⁶ *Short Treatise* I, 7, § 6.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *Ethics* III, *Affectuum Definitiones*, VI, Expl.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* I, Prop. 16, Dem. Cf. Aristotle, *Topica* I, 5, 102a, 18-19; 101b, 39; V, 3, 131b, 38-132a, 1; *Metaph.* V, 30, 1025a, 30-34; cf. above, p. 132.

⁹⁰ *Short Treatise* I, 2, § 29.

⁹¹ *Cogitata Metaphysica* II, 11 end. Cf. *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, I, chapter on "Extension and Thought," II.

⁹² Cf. *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, I, chapter on "Infinity of Extension."

method in his explanation why the attribution of extension and thought to God does not vitiate the simplicity of His nature. His explanation is that extension and thought are not real beings which either constitute the essence of God or are appended to the essence of God. They are the way in which the essence of God manifests itself to us; or, to quote his own words, "By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance, as if constituting its essence,"⁹³ and on this point he is opposed even to the general tradition of Plato and Aristotle.

Then he is also unwilling to accept without reservation the traditional view that God is indefinable and hence incomprehensible. It all depends, he says, on what you mean by definition. If you mean by it definition in the Aristotelian sense as that which consists of genus and species, then, of course, God being the highest genus cannot be defined and hence cannot be known⁹⁴ and in this sense he says that "of God's essence we can form no general idea."⁹⁵ But this conception of definition, argues Spinoza, must be rejected.⁹⁶ According to him, there are two kinds of definition, one phrased in terms of the cause of the thing to be defined and the other phrased in terms of its attributes. If the thing to be defined is, like all things in the world, dependent upon a cause for its existence, then its definition must "comprehend its proximate cause";⁹⁷ and, if the thing defined is self-existent and has no cause, such as God is, then, since it has no cause to be comprehended in its definition, its definition must comprehend its attributes, the knowledge of which

⁹³ *Ethics* I, Def. 4.

⁹⁴ *Short Treatise* I, 7, §§ 3 ff.

⁹⁵ Epistola 50 (*Opera*, ed. Gebhardt, IV, 240, ll. 2-3); cf. *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, I, 142.

⁹⁶ *Short Treatise* I, 7, § 9.

⁹⁷ *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 96 (*Opera*, II, 35, ll. 15-16).

leads to a knowledge of its essence.⁹⁸ In his own way, then, God is defined as "substance consisting of infinite attributes," and inasmuch as two of these attributes, extension and thought, are known, to that extent God's essence is known, for these attributes are the manifestations of God's essence to our intellect, and these attributes and essence of God, moreover, are known to us immediately by that third kind of knowledge which Spinoza calls intuitive knowledge. The essence of God is thus, we may conclude for Spinoza, both definable and knowable, according to his own conception of definition and according to his own use of the term knowledge.

Finally, he is unwilling to accept the tradition established by Philo that Scripture, in the prayer of Moses and in other passages, teaches the unknowability of God's essence. Indeed he admits that "Scripture nowhere gives an express definition of God" ⁹⁹ or "an intellectual knowledge of God, which takes cognizance of His nature in so far as it actually is" ¹⁰⁰ nor does it teach anything "special about the divine attributes," ¹⁰¹ that is, about those attributes which express the essence of God. But this does not mean that God's essence cannot be known; it only means that the authors of Scripture "held quite ordinary notions about God, and to these notions their revelations were adapted" ¹⁰² and therefore they teach only what he calls properties or actions of God, namely, "that God is supremely just, and supremely merciful — in other words, the one single pattern of the true life." ¹⁰³ Taking up the prayer of Moses, which ever since Philo was taken to be a philosophic petition for a knowledge of God's es-

⁹⁸ *Ethics* II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2 (*Opera*, II, 122, ll. 16-19). Cf. *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, I, 383-385; II, 37-38; 142-144.

⁹⁹ *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, ch. 13 (*Opera*, III, 171, ll. 22-23).

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* (ll. 25-26).

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, ch. 2 (p. 37, ll. 12-13).

¹⁰² *Ibid.* (ll. 13-14).

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, ch. 13 (p. 171, ll. 21-22).

sence, he maintains that Moses was no philosopher, that his conception of God was rather primitive and that what he prayed for was actually to see (*videre*) God,¹⁰⁴ for "Moses believed that God is visible, that is, on the part of the divine nature the visibility of God involves no contradiction."¹⁰⁵ Then, he takes up the verse, "I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, as God Almighty, but by my name the Lord I made me not known to them,"¹⁰⁶ from which Philo, as we have seen, infers that according to Scripture God is unnamable¹⁰⁷ and hence unknowable in his essence. Here, again, Spinoza tries to show that, while indeed the meaning of the verse is, as maintained by Jewish interpreters, that the Patriarchs "were not cognizant of any attribute of God which expresses His absolute essence, but only of His deeds and promises, that is, of His power, as manifested in visible things,"¹⁰⁸ it does not mean that the divine essence, as well as the attributes which express it, is unknowable; it merely means that, as simple-minded believers, the Patriarchs "possessed no extraordinary knowledge of God."¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, ch. 2 (p. 40, l. 7).

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* (ll. 15-16).

¹⁰⁶ Exod. 6: 3.

¹⁰⁷ *Mut.* 2, 13.

¹⁰⁸ *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, ch. 13 (*Opera*, III, p. 169, ll. 22-24).

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* (ll. 26-27).

CHAPTER XII

ETHICAL THEORY

I. "UNDER THE LAW" AND "IN ACCORDANCE WITH NATURE"

HIS conception of the Pentateuch as a divinely revealed document which contains the true knowledge of things divine and human¹ has led Philo to a revision of the ethical theories of Greek philosophy analogous to his revision of its metaphysical theories. Making use again of common philosophic concepts and terms, he modifies them in conformity with certain presuppositions derived from Scripture.

Philosophic ethics, as developed by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, begins, in Aristotle's formulation of it, with the statement that "the good is that which all things aim at (*ἐφίεται*)"² or aspire to (*ὀρέγεται*).³ That good is generally agreed upon, as Aristotle says, by both the multitude and the refined few, to be happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*).⁴ But as to what happiness consists in there is no agreement. Some people identify it with pleasure (*ἡδονή*) or wealth (*πλοῦτος*) or honor (*τιμή*),⁵ or what both Plato and Aristotle call external goods.⁶ But Aristotle, and before him Plato, did not agree with this conception of happiness. Nor is happiness, according to them, what they call the goods of the body,⁷ or the virtue of the body,⁸ such, for example, as

¹ Cf. above, I, 149.

² *Eth. Nic.* I, 1, 1094a, 2.

³ *Ibid.* I, 4, 1095a, 15; (cf. *Sympos.* 205 A).

⁴ *Ibid.*, 18-19.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁶ *Laws* V, 743 E, *Philebus* 48 E; *Euthydemus* 279 A-B; *Eth. Nic.* I, 8, 1098b, 12-14.

⁷ *Eth. Nic.* I, 8, 1098b, 13-14; *Laws* III, 697 B.

⁸ *Eth. Nic.* I, 13, 1102a, 16; *Gorg.* 479 B.

health. It is rather the virtue of the soul.⁹ Moreover, inasmuch as the virtue of the soul may be either intellectual (*διανοητική*) or moral (*ἠθικὴ*),¹⁰ happiness consists in both these kinds of virtue.¹¹ This is how the problem of ethics is formulated by Aristotle. This formulation of the problem is repeated in a variety of ways in the Stoic literature, wherein happiness is defined in terms of the good,¹² the good is divided into three kinds, two of which are external goods and goods of the soul,¹³ and happiness is identified with the good of the soul or rather the virtue of the soul.¹⁴

Philo starts his discussion of ethics with a similar formulation of the problem. He begins with the statement that hope (*ἐλπὶς*) is "the fountainhead of the lives which we lead."¹⁵ This is evidently a paraphrase of Aristotle's statement that "the good is that which all things aim at" or "aspire to." The substitution of the term "hope" for the term "the good" may be explained by Plato's statements that "hope is an expectation of good"¹⁶ and that "we are always filled with hopes all our lives"¹⁷ and Philo's own statement elsewhere that "the beginning of the enjoyment of good things is hope."¹⁸ Then like Aristotle he proceeds to enumerate the various kinds of good things that men hope for. Though in this connection he mentions only two of the three objects of desire enumerated by Aristotle, namely, the hope of gain (*κέρδος*) and the hope of glory (*δόξα*),¹⁹ elsewhere he

⁹ *Eth. Nic.* I, 8, 1098b, 14-15; *Laws* III, 697 B.

¹⁰ *Eth. Nic.* I, 13, 1103a, 4-7.

¹¹ *Ibid.* II, 1, 1103a, 15-18.

¹² Cf. Arnim, III, 73.

¹³ *Idem*, III, 96, 97, 97a.

¹⁴ *Idem*, III, 57.

¹⁵ *Praem.* 2, 11.

¹⁶ *Definitions* 416 A; cf. Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, I, 6, 19.

¹⁷ *Philebus* 39 E.

¹⁸ *Abr.* 2, 7.

¹⁹ *Praem.* 2, 11.

mentions all the three, wealth (*πλοῦτος*), glory (*δόξα*), and pleasure (*ἡδονή*).²⁰ Finally he mentions "the hope of happiness" of which he says that "it incites the devotees of virtue to study philosophy, believing that thus they will be able to discern the nature of all that exists and to do what is agreeable to the perfecting of the best forms of life, the contemplative and the practical, on the attainment of which one is forthwith happy."²¹ This is quite evidently a restatement of Aristotle's view that the highest good is happiness and that happiness is an activity according to both the intellectual and the moral virtues. In another place happiness is said by Philo to consist of wisdom (*σοφία*) and prudence (*φρόνησις*),²² wisdom referring here to intellectual virtue and prudence to moral virtue.²³

Now when philosophers have arrived at the conclusion that happiness is based on virtue, both the moral and the intellectual kinds of virtue, they raise the question as to what is to guide man to a life based upon intellectual and moral virtues. To this Aristotle, speaking for all the philosophers, answers in his statement that "intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching," whereas "moral virtue comes about as a result of habit,"²⁴ so that we acquire intellectual virtues only after "experience and time"²⁵ and we acquire moral virtues only "by first having actually practiced them."²⁶ To be taught in the knowledge of the truth of things and to be trained in practices which develop character are thus the essential conditions in the attainment of the intellectual and moral virtues. Accordingly both Plato and Aristotle consider it as the duty of the state to educate

²⁰ *Sobr.* 12, 61; cf. 11, 56; *Decal.* 28, 153.

²¹ *Praem.* 2, 11.

²² *Praem.* 14, 81.

²³ Cf. above, I, 147; but cf. below, p. 211.

²⁴ *Eth. Nic.* II, 1, 1103a, 14-17.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 16-17.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 31.

its citizens in both moral and intellectual virtues,²⁷ and to enact laws with a view to making the citizens acquire the habits of right action. These laws, the obedience to which is to train men in the habits of moral virtues, are called by Aristotle practical virtues (*πρακτικαὶ ἀρεταί*),²⁸ or virtuous actions (*κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις*),²⁹ or virtuous activities (*κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι*),³⁰ and by the Stoics they are called befitting acts or duties (*καθήκοντα*).³¹

But what are the right opinions and the right laws which are to teach men intellectual virtues and train them in moral virtues? The Greek philosophers, when they began to speculate on these matters, had before them a set of intellectual virtues consisting of the popular beliefs about the deities and also a set of practical virtues consisting of the laws which prevailed in various Greek cities, and which were believed to have come from certain deities. But Greek philosophy on the whole was hostile to the beliefs about the deities and critical of the traditional laws. Even philosophers who endowed the popular deities with some philosophic meaning and advocated their worship did not allow their philosophy to be affected by the popular conception of the deities. In Plato, and even in the Stoics, despite their use of popular religious terms in the description of what they called God, their philosophic God remained a strictly philosophic concept unchanged by any view imported from religion. There was no harmonization of philosophic and religious beliefs among Greek philosophers; there was only a pragmatic union established between two systems of thought.

Nor did the Greek philosophers accept the popular belief

²⁷ *Statesman* 309 c-d; *Euthydemus* 292 b; *Politica* VIII, 1, 1337a, 21 ff.; cf. Zeller, II, 14, p. 896, nn. 3 and 4 (*Plato*, p. 465, nn. 14 and 15); II, 23, p. 732, n. 3 (*Aristotle*, II, p. 264, n. 1).

²⁸ *Eth. Nic.* X, 7, 1177b, 6.

³⁰ *Ibid.* I, 10, 1100b, 10.

²⁹ *Ibid.* IV, 1, 1120a, 23.

³¹ *Diogenes*, VII, 108.

about the divine origin of established laws, with the implication of the belief in the perfection of these laws. Obedient to the established law indeed they were and obedience to it they also advocated, but they had no belief in their perfection and immutability and divine origin. Socrates, even though the charges for which he was condemned were groundless, did not consider the Athenian constitution as perfect and was opposed to traditional morality based on the existent laws and customs.³² Plato did not believe that any of the laws existing in Greece at his time was perfect or of divine origin,³³ though in the *Laws*³⁴ and in *Minos*³⁵ he makes reference to the popular belief in the divine origin of the Cretan laws and in the *Laws* he makes an additional reference to the divine origin of the laws of Lacedaemon.³⁶ Still less did Aristotle believe that these laws of Crete and Lacedaemon were of divine origin and perfect.³⁷ The Stoic view is reëchoed in Cicero's statements that none of the existent laws in any of the states is divine; they are all man-made.³⁸

With their disbelief in the divine origin and hence perfection of any of the existent constitutions and any of the existent systems of law and with their disbelief also that what they called God in their philosophies could reveal constitutions and laws to men, various Greek philosophers took it upon themselves to devise ideal constitutions and laws, or at least constitutions and laws approaching the ideal.³⁹

³² Cf. Zeller, II, 14, pp. 221-224 (*Socrates*, pp. 189-193).

³³ Cf. *idem*, p. 894, n. 4 (*Plato*, p. 463, n. 8).

³⁴ *Laws* I, 624 A.

³⁵ *Minos* 320 B.

³⁶ *Laws* I, 624 A. Cf. similar reference to these popular beliefs among the Greeks in Josephus, *Apion*. II, 16, 161-162.

³⁷ *Politica* II, 10, 1271b, 31-32; VII, 2, 1324b, 5-9.

³⁸ Cicero, *De Re Publica* III, 11, 18 ff.; *De Legibus* II, 4, 11.

³⁹ Cf. below, pp. 375 ff.

Hippodamus is said by Aristotle to be the first person not a statesman, but a philosopher, who devised plans for an ideal state governed by laws drawn up according to philosophic principles.⁴⁰ Plato did the same in his *Republic* and *Laws*. Zeno and Chrysippus did it in their lost treatises, of which only the titles are preserved,⁴¹ and Cicero did it in his *Republic* and *Laws*. They devised laws which they considered ideal and hoped for the best.

These ideal laws enacted by philosophers for the guidance of men are described by them as being "in accordance with reason" or "in accordance with virtue." But whether enacted law can also be described as being "in accordance with nature" is a matter of discussion among them.

As reported by Plato, the Sophists maintain that "nature" is the opposite of "law." The term nature, when used in the sense of human nature, means to them the impulse to domination. As such it is regarded by them as the opposite of any law enacted by men. "A true life in accordance with nature (*κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ὀρθὸν βίον*)" is in their opinion the opposite of a life in accordance with any kind of law enacted by men, for a true life in accordance with nature, they maintain, means "to live in real dominion over others and not in legal (*κατὰ νόμον*) subjection to them."⁴² A similar view, but with a notable qualification, is also to be found in a work falsely ascribed to Hippocrates. According to this work, "law and nature . . . do not agree, though sometimes they do agree, for law was given by men, without their knowing why they gave it; but the nature of all things was ordered by the gods."⁴³ The implication of this statement quite

⁴⁰ *Politica* II, 8, 1267b, 29 ff.

⁴¹ Diogenes, VII, 4, 33, 131; Plutarch, *De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute* I, 6.

⁴² *Laws* X, 890 A.

⁴³ *De Victu* I, 11 (*Oeuvres d'Hippocrate*, VI, 486, ed. É. Littré). Cf. Zeller,

evidently is that not all laws are in opposition to nature; only those laws are in opposition to nature which were enacted by men without their knowing why they enacted them, that is, laws enacted without reason, but laws enacted on the basis of reason are in accordance with nature.

Plato himself seems to think that certain enacted laws can be in accordance with nature. The term nature, however, is used by him in two senses.

In one sense, like the Sophists, he takes the term nature to mean impulse. But the impulse to him is not one to domination but rather one to "reverence" or "friendship," as, for instance, when he says that "every right-minded man fears and respects the prayers of parents, knowing that many times and in many cases they have proved effective" and that these things are determined "by nature" (*φύσει*);⁴⁴ or when he says that "those philosophers who debate and write about *nature* and the universe" tell us that "like must needs be always friend to like."⁴⁵ Now a mode of conduct based upon the principle that "like is friend to like" is described by him as being "dear to God and following in His steps,"⁴⁶ that is to say, it follows the law of reason, for by the term God here, as is obvious from the context, he means that which he has previously described as "the immortal element within us,"⁴⁷ that is, reason (*νοῦς*), and law (*νόμος*), furthermore, is explained by him etymologically to mean the "ordering of reason" (*νοῦ διανομή*).⁴⁸ Accordingly, it may be inferred that laws enacted by wise legislators to further reverence or friendship would be described by Plato as

"Über Begriff und Begründung der sittlichen Gesetze," *Abhandlungen der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philos.-histor. Klasse*, 1882, Abh. II, p. 5.

⁴⁴ *Laws* XI, 931 E.

⁴⁵ *Lysis* 214 B.

⁴⁶ *Laws* IV, 716 B-C.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 714 A.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

being both "in accordance with reason" and "in accordance with nature."

In another sense, the term nature is taken by him to mean the capacities with which human beings were endowed by nature and therefore laws enacted in accordance with the natural capacities of those who are to be governed by those laws are described by him as laws in accordance with nature. Thus in his discussion of the law of the equality of men and women with regard to the holding of office in his ideal republic, he says that "the law which we have established is neither impossible nor a mere aspiration, since we have established it in accordance with nature (*κατὰ φύσιν*)," ⁴⁹ for "the gifts of nature (*αἱ φύσεις*) are alike diffused in both, and woman by nature (*κατὰ φύσιν*) shares in all the pursuits the same as man, though in all cases the woman is weaker than the man." ⁵⁰ Thus, in this sense, law in accordance with nature means with Plato rational laws enacted by wise legislators to secure for each individual the enjoyment of those rights to which he is entitled by his natural gifts and capacities.

That laws enacted by legislators may be in accordance with nature seems to be also the view of Plato's followers in the Old Academy, especially Polemo.⁵¹ The term "nature" by itself is used by them in the sense of "the primary endowments of nature" (*prima, data natura, τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν*) by which "they mean soundness of body and mind." ⁵² When therefore they say that the highest good or happiness is "to live in accordance with nature" one would expect them to mean thereby that happiness consists in the enjoyment of a sound body and a sound mind. However, they

⁴⁹ *Republic* V, 456 c.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 455 D-E.

⁵¹ Cf. below, n. 55.

⁵² Cicero, *De Finibus* II, 11, 34; *Academica Posteriora* I, 5, 19-20.

do not mean that. Happiness, according to them, does not consist in mere physical and mental well-being. To this must be added, they maintain, virtuous activity, which means an activity based upon reason. When they, therefore, happen to say that "the end of good is to live in accordance with nature," they immediately add, "that is to say, to enjoy the primary gifts of nature's bestowal with the accompaniment of virtue"⁵³ or "to live honorably, enjoying those things which nature makes most dear to man."⁵⁴ The implication, therefore, is that life in accordance with nature which is to constitute happiness is not opposed to enacted law; on the contrary, it is to include enacted law, provided only that the enacted law is a rational law and is based on virtue.⁵⁵

The two senses of the expression "in accordance with nature," one as the opposite of enacted law and the other as a description of law enacted on the basis of reason, are to be found also in Aristotle. The first of these two senses is used by him directly; the second sense is implied in some of his statements.

In his direct discussion of the subject, he uses the term law in accordance with nature (*κατὰ φύσιν*)⁵⁶ as the opposite of law enacted by legislators as a result of convention (*συνθήκη*).⁵⁷ By natural law he means, as he himself explains,

⁵³ *Idem, De Finibus* II, 11, 34.

⁵⁴ *Idem, Academica Priora* II, 42, 131. Cf. Zeller, II, 14, p. 1029, n. 2; p. 1045, n. 3, p. 1046, n. 1 (*Plato*, p. 600, n. 66; p. 617, n. 63; p. 618, n. 64).

⁵⁵ J. S. Reid, in a note to his edition of the *Academica, l.c.* (l. 19), and W. M. L. Hutchinson, in the Introduction, 26 (3), to his edition of the *De Finibus* are inclined to think that originally, in Polemo, the expression "life in accordance with nature" meant to be the opposite of life in accordance with convention (*θέσις*) or law (*νόμος*), the element of virtue having been added later by Antiochus who glossed it with Stoic phrases. Zeller, however, takes the element of virtue to have been added to this statement by Polemo himself (II, 14, pp. 1045-1046; *Plato*, pp. 617-618).

⁵⁶ *Rhet.* I, 13, 1373b, 7.

⁵⁷ *Eth. Nic.* V, 7, 1134b, 32; *Rhet.* I, 13, 1373b, 8-9.

a law arrived at by all men, without any communication or agreement between them, but by the mere fact that they all possess by nature a common idea of just and unjust.⁵⁸ As the equivalent of "law in accordance with nature" he therefore also uses the term "general law" (*νόμος κοινός*)⁵⁹ and, by implication, also the term moral (*ἠθικός*) law.⁶⁰ In contrast with this, conventional law is also called by him "particular law" (*νόμος ἰδίας*),⁶¹ and human (*ἀνθρώπινος*) law.⁶² By "particular law," he says, he means that law "in accordance with which a state is administered"⁶³ or "which each community lays down and applies to its own members."⁶⁴ Natural law and conventional law are also described by him respectively as "unwritten (*ἀγραφοῦς*) law" and "written (*γεγραμμένος*) law,"⁶⁵ though sometimes the term "unwritten law" is also used by him as a description of a subdivision of conventional law.⁶⁶ As illustrations of what he means by natural law he quotes Sophocles to the effect that the burial of the dead is "just by nature,"⁶⁷ he also quotes Empedocles to the effect that not to kill any living creature is an "all-embracing law,"⁶⁸ and he finally quotes Alcidas probably to the effect that "nature has made no man a slave."⁶⁹ As illustrations of particular or

⁵⁸ *Rhet. I*, 13, 1373b, 7-9.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁶⁰ *Eth. Nic. VIII*, 13, 1162b, 21-23: *φιλία ἠθική* and *νομική* are compared by him with *τὸ δίκαιον ἀγραφον* (= *κατὰ φύσιν*) and *κατὰ νόμον* respectively.

⁶¹ *Rhet. I*, 13, 1373b, 4.

⁶² *Eth. Nic. V*, 7, 1135a, 4, where he contrasts *δίκαια φυσικά* and *ἀνθρώπινα*.

⁶³ *Rhet. I*, 10, 1368b, 7-8.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 13, 1373b, 4-5.

⁶⁵ *Ibid. I*, 10, 1368b, 7-9; 15, 1375a, 27-33, *Eth. Nic. VIII*, 13, 1162b, 22.

⁶⁶ *Rhet. I*, 13, 1373b, 4-6; cf. R. Hirzel, "Ἀγραφοῦς νόμος, *Abhandlungen der sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, philol-histor. Klasse*, 20 (1903), pp. 3-13.

⁶⁷ *Rhet. I*, 13, 1373b, 10-11.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 14-16.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 18; cf. commentaries *ad loc.*

conventional law he mentions such laws as "that a prisoner's ransom should be a mina, or that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, and again all the laws that are passed for particular cases, for example, that sacrifice shall be made in honor of Brasidas."⁷⁰ The significant thing about these illustrations of conventional law is that they contain examples of what may be called ceremonial or religious laws.

What that human nature is that prompts all men without communication and agreement between them to evolve universal laws or universal conceptions of just and unjust common to all of them Aristotle does not say. Probably it is that nature in man with reference to which he says that "man is by nature a political animal"⁷¹ and that "a social impulse (*δρμή*) is implanted in all men by nature,"⁷² so that men "desire to live together."⁷³ These natural laws which arise from that social impulse or instinct are quite obviously not considered by Aristotle as the result of what he calls demonstrative reasoning or conclusions from premises. They are rather what he calls primary premises which according to his characterization of them are self-evident.⁷⁴

But indirectly it may be inferred that also enacted law, man-made law, if it is based upon reason, that is, upon demonstrative reasoning, is considered by Aristotle as being, in a certain sense, in accordance with nature. Happiness, he says, is an "activity in accordance with virtue,"⁷⁵ by which he explains is meant "the highest virtue,"⁷⁶ the virtue of "the best thing in us"⁷⁷ and the best thing within us is the contemplative activity of reason,⁷⁸ and consequently

⁷⁰ *Eth. Nic.* V, 7, 1134b, 21-24.

⁷¹ *Politica* I, 2, 1253a, 2-3.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 29-30.

⁷³ *Ibid.* III, 6, 1278b, 21.

⁷⁴ *Anal. Post.* I, 2, 71b, 21, and I, 9, 76a, 16-17.

⁷⁵ *Eth. Nic.* X, 7, 1177a, 12.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 17-18.

in the expressions "life in accordance with virtue" and "life in accordance with reason," the term virtue means intellectual virtue and the term reason means contemplative reason. But in a secondary degree, Aristotle maintains, happiness also means life in accordance with virtue which is not intellectual virtue but rather moral virtue.⁷⁹ Now moral virtue involves prudence (*φρόνησις*),⁸⁰ or practical reason, and is defined as being a state of character "in accordance with the right rule (*ὀρθὸν λόγον*)." ⁸¹ Furthermore, moral virtue, according to him, requires also good laws, for, as he says, "legislators ought to stimulate men to virtue" ⁸² and "the man who is to be good must be well trained and habituated." But this training and habituation can be secured only "if men live in accordance with a sort of reason, and by a right system, invested with adequate force," and it is law which provides that force and that reason and that right system for "the law has compulsive power, while it is at the same time a rule proceeding from a sort of practical wisdom and reason." ⁸³

Thus, according to Aristotle, life in accordance with virtue, which means the same as life in accordance with reason, may have two meanings. It may mean life in accordance with contemplative reason, which has nothing to do with law, or it may mean life in accordance with practical reason, in which case it means the same as life in accordance with law enacted by wise legislators. Now of contemplative reason Aristotle says that it is thought "to rule and lead us in accordance with nature (*κατὰ φύσιν*) and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine," ⁸⁴ for "the life in accordance with reason" is that which is proper "to the

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 8, 1178a, 9 ff.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 16-17.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* VI, 13, 1144b, 23.

⁸² *Ibid.* X, 9, 1180a, 6-7.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 1180a, 14-22.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 7, 1177a, 13-15.

nature (τῆ φύσει)" of man.⁸⁵ By the same token, of practical reason, or law based upon practical reason, Aristotle could logically also say that, in a secondary sense, it, too, is to rule and lead us "in accordance with nature" and that life in accordance with practical reason, or in accordance with law based upon practical reason, is proper "to the nature" of man. Law enacted by wise legislators, therefore, though it is not exactly "in accordance with nature" in the strictly technical sense of the term, for it often thwarts certain natural impulses of men, still, proceeding as it does "from a sort of practical wisdom and reason," it may be described as being "in accordance with nature," inasmuch as reason is that which is "to rule and lead us by nature and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine." For, as he himself seems to say, in man there are certain natural impulses which are good and rational, so that while, as a rule, "people hate men who oppose their impulses (ὀρμαῖς), even if they oppose them rightly, the law in its ordaining of what is good is not an object of hatred."⁸⁶

The conception of life in accordance with nature as a rational and virtuous life, and not a mere instinctive life, is to be found also in the Stoics. To them the purely instinctive life is life in its endeavor toward self-preservation. "An animal's first impulse (ὀρμήν), say the Stoics, is self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself."⁸⁷ For brute animals, therefore, whom nature has endowed with an impulse to self-preservation, and nothing more than that impulse, "that which is in accordance with nature means to be regulated by that which is in accordance with impulse."⁸⁸ For men, however, whom nature has endowed with reason in addition to impulse, to live in accord-

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 1178a, 5-7.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 9, 1180a, 22-24

⁸⁷ Diogenes, VII, 85; cf. Arnim, III, §§ 178 ff.

⁸⁸ Diogenes, VII, 86.

ance with nature means to live in accordance with reason, for "when reason (*λόγου*) by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life in accordance with reason rightly becomes life in accordance with nature, for reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically."⁸⁹ Or, as this last statement is phrased elsewhere, for the purpose of self-preservation "the sciences too have been invented, to bring aid to nature, and the chief among them is reckoned to be the science of conduct, which helps the creature to maintain whatever nature has bestowed, and to obtain that which is lacking."⁹⁰ The old formula that the highest good is "to live in accordance with nature" is therefore explained by the Stoics as meaning "to live with an understanding of the natural course of events, selecting things that are in accordance with nature and rejecting the opposite."⁹¹ All this merely means that life in accordance with nature is life in accordance with reason, which reason invents the arts and sciences as well as the laws and rules of human conduct. With reference to law, the Stoics, therefore, like Aristotle, while distinguishing between natural law and enacted law, or between universal law and particular law, or between unwritten law and written law, still admit,⁹² again like Aristotle, that enacted law, if based upon reason and virtue, is a law in accordance with nature. "Law is the distinction between things just and unjust, made in agreement with that primal and most ancient of all things, nature; and in conformity to nature's standards are framed those human laws which inflict punishment upon the wicked but defend and protect the good."⁹³

The main point in our analysis of the concept of natural

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Cicero, *De Finibus* IV, 7, 16.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, II, 11, 34; cf. IV, 6, 14.

⁹² Cicero, *De Legibus* II, 4, 8-5, 11.

⁹³ *Ibid.* II, 5, 13.

law in Greek philosophy was to show that, according to Plato, Polemo, Aristotle, and the Stoics, enacted laws, if they are enacted by wise legislators on the basis of reason, are in a certain sense also laws in accordance with nature. To Plato they are in accordance with nature in the sense that they secure for each individual the enjoyment of those rights to which he is entitled by his natural capacities, or in the sense that they are in accordance with the natural instincts of reverence and friendship. To Polemo they are in accordance with nature in the sense that they enable each individual to enjoy the primary gifts of nature "honorably" and "with the accompaniment of virtue." To Aristotle they are in accordance with nature because they are the work of reason and reason is that which is "to rule and guide us by nature" and because also life in accordance with reason is proper "to the nature" of men. To the Stoics they are in accordance with nature because it is nature which has implanted reason in man to aid him in his striving for self-preservation.

But still despite all this, these enacted laws, even when based on reason, are the work of men and not the work of nature and they differ from the work of nature in that they are not universal, they are not eternal, and they are not immutable. Plato gives expression to this view in his statement that "law could never, by determining exactly what is noblest and most just for one and all, enjoin upon them that which is best; for the differences of men and of actions and the fact that nothing, I may say, in human life is ever at rest, forbid any science whatsoever to promulgate any simple rule for everything and for all time."⁹⁴ Aristotle repeats the same sentiment in many passages in which he maintains that written or enacted laws "ought not always to remain unaltered" and this because, as has already been

⁹⁴ *Statesman* 294 B.

said by Plato, in law, as in other sciences, it is impossible that the law "should have been written down aright in all its details, for it must of necessity be couched in general terms, but our actions deal with particular things."⁹⁵ Indeed the Stoics express a desire that enacted laws which are based on reason and are in accordance with nature should never be abrogated, but knowing that they are only man-made laws they make this unabrogability of the laws dependent upon their acceptability to those who are to be ruled by them.⁹⁶

It is at this point that Philo steps in with his contention that, if it is law in accordance with nature that is sought after, then philosophers might as well give up their effort to devise such a law by their own reason. Only a law which was revealed by God, who is the creator of nature, can be in accordance with nature in the true sense of the term, for such a law, being the work of God, is like nature itself, and like nature it is universal and eternal and immutable. In the passages in which Philo tries to make this point we shall find him restate the general conception of Greek philosophers of (1) what is meant by natural law; we shall find him also restate the view generally accepted among Greek philosophers that (2) the prevailing laws of the cities are not always in accordance with nature; and, finally, we shall find him try to show (3) how the Mosaic Law is in the true sense of the term a law in accordance with nature.

With regard to the term natural law, Philo uses it in the strictly Aristotelian sense as "general" law or "unwritten" law, as opposed to "particular" law and "written" law. Referring to the laws of Moses as "particular" (*ἐπι μέρους*) laws and to the laws which existed prior to the revelation of

⁹⁵ *Politica* II, 8, 1269a, 8-12; cf. III, 11, 1282b, 4-6.

⁹⁶ Cicero, *De Legibus* II, 5, 14.

the laws of Moses as "more universal" (*καθολικωτέρους*) laws,⁹⁷ he says that "the first generations, before any at all of the particular (*ἐν μέρει*) statutes was set in writing (*ἀναγραφῆναι*), followed the unwritten (*ἀγράφω*) law with perfect ease — for they were not scholars or pupils of others, nor did they learn from teachers what was right to say or do: they listened to no voice or instruction but their own: they gladly accepted conformity with nature, holding that nature itself was, as indeed it is, the most venerable of statutes, and thus their whole life was one of happy obedience to law."⁹⁸ In another passage, he says of Enos that he has acquired the virtue of hope "by an unwritten, self-taught law, which nature has laid down."⁹⁹ In still another place, he describes Abraham as being "not taught by written law, but by unwritten nature, seeing that he was anxious to follow wholesome and untainted impulses (*δρμαῖς*)." ¹⁰⁰ In all these passages the term natural law is used exactly, as in Aristotle, in the sense of general and unwritten law. But, as in Aristotle, too, he sometimes uses the terms "written" and "unwritten" law as subdivisions of "particular" law, or, as Philo himself says, of "the laws of cities."¹⁰¹ The term "unwritten law," we may add in passing, is also used by Philo in the sense of the Jewish "oral law."¹⁰² Moreover, the "written" or Mosaic Law, which in contrast to the "unwritten" or pre-Mosaic laws, is described by him in these passages as the "particular" Law, is elsewhere said by him to contain the ten commandments which he describes as "general heads" (*γενικὰ κεφάλαια*), that is, general laws, in

⁹⁷ *Abr.* 1, 3.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 5-6; cf. also 3, 16; 46, 276.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* 3, 16.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* 46, 275.

¹⁰¹ *Heres* 59, 295; cf. Hirzel, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹⁰² Cf. above, I, 188-194.

contradistinction to all the other laws which he describes as particular (*κατὰ μέρος; ἐν μέρει*) laws.¹⁰³

But in his use of the term natural law we may notice three new elements which are not based upon Greek philosophy. First, the natural laws to him are not laws which exist by the side of the enacted laws, but they rather mark a stage in the history of the development of the enacted laws. They existed prior to the laws revealed by God through Moses, wherein they were later incorporated. Second, these natural laws are associated by him with certain scriptural personages of the pre-Mosaic age. Of these personages he mentions two groups of three, namely, (1) Enos, Enoch, and Noah; (2) Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.¹⁰⁴ Of these two trios, Noah and Abraham are the chief personages with whose names he connects the pre-Mosaic laws. Of Noah he says that unlike Enos and Enoch who had each acquired only one virtue, namely, hope and repentance respectively, "he acquired not one virtue but all, and having acquired them continued to exercise each as opportunities allowed."¹⁰⁵ With regard to Abraham he quotes the verse that Abraham kept "my laws" (*τὰ νόμιμά μου*),¹⁰⁶ which in his paraphrase becomes "all my law" (*πάντα τὸν νόμον μου*) and to which he adds that by law is meant the enjoining what we ought to do and the forbidding what we should not do.¹⁰⁷ Third, while the term "nature" in the various forms of the expression "law of nature" is used by him in its original Greek sense of natural instinct or impulse, as when he says that the natural law was learned by the pre-Mosaic generations from "no voice or instruction but their own"¹⁰⁸ or from their "wholesome and untainted impulses,"¹⁰⁹ it is also used by him in a new

¹⁰³ *Congr.* 21, 120; *Decal.* 5, 19; cf. below, p. 189.

¹⁰⁴ *Abr.* 1, 4 ff.; *Praem.* 2, 14 ff.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* 6, 34.

¹⁰⁶ *Gen.* 26: 5.

¹⁰⁷ *Migr.* 23, 130.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. above, n. 98.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. above, n. 100.

sense, as a law for men which is modeled after the law which exists for nature. The Patriarchs, he says, "gladly accepted conformity with nature, holding that nature itself was, as indeed it is, the most venerable of statutes."¹¹⁰ By "nature" here he does not mean the natural instinct or impulse or reason in man; he means thereby the law implanted in the universe as a whole. We may recall that to him there had been prior to the creation of the world an incorporeal Logos created by God¹¹¹ and that upon the creation of the world it was implanted by God in it to act as its Law.¹¹² When he says here, therefore, that the Patriarchs "gladly accepted conformity with nature, holding that nature itself was, as indeed it is, the most venerable of statutes," he means that the laws followed by the Patriarchs were modeled after those laws which they discovered in nature. Now these three new elements which appear in Philo's presentation of natural law are based, as we shall try to show, upon Jewish tradition.

According to Jewish tradition, certain laws which are found in the Law of Moses were observed by certain scriptural personages prior to Moses. These personages are Adam, Noah, and Abraham,¹¹³ but particularly Noah, after whose name these pre-Mosaic laws are known as the Noachian laws, of which a list of seven is generally given.¹¹⁴ Of these seven Noachian laws only two, that of not eating of the flesh cut from a living animal and that of not murdering, are mentioned as direct revelations of God to Noah.¹¹⁵ As for the others, no scriptural proof-text is to be found, though later rabbis try to derive them, by the usual homiletical method, from the verse "And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, of every tree of the garden thou mayest

¹¹⁰ Cf. above, n. 98.

¹¹¹ Cf. above, I, 229 ff.

¹¹² Cf. above, I, 326 ff.

¹¹³ *The Book of Jubilees* 7: 39; 21: 10; cf. below nn. 115, 116, 122.

¹¹⁴ Cf. below, p. 185.

¹¹⁵ Gen. 9: 4, 6.

freely eat.”¹¹⁶ But from certain statements by the rabbis with regard to these Noachian laws, and especially with regard to Abraham, we may gather that these pre-Mosaic laws were considered by them as having been discovered by what we may call “reason” or “nature.” Concerning these Noachian laws, with the exception only of the law prohibiting the eating of the flesh cut from a living animal, it is said that “if they were not written in the Law [as divine revelations], they would have to be written in it [on rational grounds].”¹¹⁷ Concerning two of these Noachian laws, those prohibiting robbery and adultery, it is said that, if they were not revealed by God, man would have discovered them by a study of the behavior of the ant and the dove.¹¹⁸ Especially emphatic are the statements in describing how Abraham arrived at a knowledge of the existence of God and a knowledge of the Law without divine revelation. As for his knowledge of the existence of God, Abraham is said to have “of himself recognized the existence of the Holy One, blessed be He; there was no man who taught him how to recognize the existence of God; he recognized it by himself,”¹¹⁹ and he obtained that knowledge, according to other statements, by a study of nature, the sun, the moon, the stars, and the elements.¹²⁰ As for his knowledge of the Law, one rabbi states that “Abraham learned it from himself, for it is said ‘and a good man shall be satisfied from himself.’”¹²¹ ¹²² Another rabbi raises the question: “No father instructed him,

¹¹⁶ Gen. 2: 16; *Sanhedrin* 56b. Cf. Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah, Melakim* IX, 1.

¹¹⁷ *Sifra, Ahre, Perek* 13, p. 86a.

¹¹⁸ *Erubin* 100b.

¹¹⁹ *Numbers Rabbah* 14, 2; cf. *Pesiḳta Rabbati*, 33, p. 150.

¹²⁰ Apocalypse of Abraham 1-7; *Midrash ha-Gadol* on Gen. 11: 28 (ed. Schechter, pp. 189-190). Cf. Ginzberg, *Legends of the Jews*, I, 189, 212-213; V, 210, n. 16; 217, n. 49.

¹²¹ Prov. 14: 14.

¹²² *Genesis Rabbah* 95, 3; *Tanḥuma, Waiyiggash*, § 11. Cf. Ibn Ezra on Exod. 20: 2.

nor had he a teacher, whence, then, did he learn the Law?" and, in answer to this question, he says: "The Holy One, blessed be He, made his two kidneys serve like two teachers for him, and these welled forth and taught him wisdom."¹²³ By this is meant that Abraham, with the help of God, discovered the Law by his own conscience and reason, for "kidneys" are conceived in the Bible and Talmud as the seat of moral conscience as well as of intellectual deliberation.¹²⁴ In these traditional utterances we find, then, the three new elements in Philo's discussion of natural law: (1) its existence prior to the revealed Law; (2) its association with certain scriptural personages; (3) the use of the term "natural" not only in the sense of conformity to a natural impulse in man but also in the sense of being modeled after laws implanted by God in nature.

A similarly striking analogy between the Noachian laws and Philo's natural laws is to be found in their respective enumerations of such laws. The Noachian laws are generally said to contain the following seven: (1) To establish courts of justice, (2) not to worship idols, (3) not to blaspheme the name of God, (4) not to commit adultery, (5) not to murder, (6) not to rob, (7) not to eat of the flesh cut from a living animal.¹²⁵ Now it is interesting to note that four out of this list of Noachian laws are described by Philo as natural laws. First, the belief that "the place of the created in all things is lower than that of the creator" and that "there must be a providence" is described by him as a law of nature.¹²⁶ This, of course, corresponds to the Noachian law

¹²³ *Genesis Rabbah* 61, 1, and parallels. Cf. above, nn. 108, 109.

¹²⁴ For Bible, see Jer. 11: 20; 12: 2; 17: 10; 20: 12; Ps. 7: 10; 16: 7; 26: 2; 51: 8; Job 38: 36, and cf. F. Delitzsch, *System der Biblischen Psychologie*, Leipzig, 1861, p. 269. For Talmud, see *Berakot* 61a.

¹²⁵ *Tos. 'Abodah Zarah* VIII (IX), 4-6.

¹²⁶ *Plant.* 32, 132; *Praem.* 7, 42.

prohibiting the worship of idols, for in another place he describes the sin of idolatry as consisting in the payment of the same tribute "to the creatures as to their Creator."¹²⁷ Second, courts of justice, both divine and human, are described by him as existing "in nature,"¹²⁸ which is only another way of saying that the establishment of courts of justice is a law of nature. Third, murder is described by him as a subversion of the laws of nature.¹²⁹ Fourth, adultery is similarly described by him as a violation of the laws of nature.¹³⁰ Still more interesting is the fact that the junction of heterogeneous animals by hybridization¹³¹ is described by him as "upsetting a law of nature."¹³² Now in a rabbinic tradition this prohibition is also included by one authority among the Noachian laws.¹³³ In Greek literature, to be sure, some of these things mentioned by Philo are also spoken of as natural laws, such, for instance, as worshipping the gods¹³⁴ and not killing that which has life.¹³⁵ But in Philo, the natural law does not command to worship the "gods," but it rather prohibits the worship of idols, that is, the "gods." Then also there is a similarity in the use of the term "courts of justice" in Philo's statement that "courts of justice" (*δικαστήρια*), the divine and the human, are both "in nature,"¹³⁶ and the rabbinic statement that the establishment of "courts of justice" (*batte dinin*)¹³⁷ in cities is one of the

¹²⁷ *Decal.* 13, 61. Cf. also his statement (*Somn.* II, 43, 283) that the denial of the existence of God is "against nature" (*κατὰ φύσιν*).

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* 23, 111.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.* 25, 132.

¹³⁰ *Abr.* 26, 135.

¹³¹ *Lev.* 19: 19.

¹³² *Spec.* IV, 39, 204.

¹³³ *Sanhedrin* 56b.

¹³⁴ Xenophon, *Memorabilia* IV, 4, 19.

¹³⁵ Aristotle, *Rhet.* I, 13, 1373b, 14-16; cf. above, p. 174.

¹³⁶ *Decal.* 23, 111.

¹³⁷ Cf. *Tos. 'Abodah Zarah* VIII (IX), 4.

Noachian laws. His inclusion of the prohibition of adultery among the natural laws also reflects Scripture and Jewish tradition. In Greek philosophy, Hippias, who argues for the existence of unwritten or universal laws, that is, natural laws, explicitly states that incest is not to be included among these laws.¹³⁸ Finally, his description of hybridization as "upsetting a law of nature" quite obviously reflects Scripture and the rabbinic tradition.¹³⁹

So much for Philo's treatment of natural law, which, as we have tried to show, reflects both Greek conceptions of natural law and traditional Jewish conceptions of the Noachian laws.

As distinguished from these natural or general laws are those particular laws which he describes as "the laws of cities."¹⁴⁰ These laws are man-made laws; they are neither the product of nature nor the work of God; they are "the ordinances of the legislators of the different cities."¹⁴¹ Philo's

¹³⁸ Xenophon, *Memorabilia* IV, 4, 20; *Cyropaedia* V, 1, 10.

¹³⁹ An allusion to the law of not eating the flesh of a living animal as being what the rabbis call a Noachian law is also to be found in Philo. This law is based upon Gen. 9: 4, which reads: "Only flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall ye not eat." Preceding this law, there is another law, in 9: 3, which reads: "Every moving thing that liveth shall be for food for you; as the green herb have I given you all." In rabbinic literature, just as verse 9: 4 is taken as a Noachian law, i.e., directed to all mankind, prohibiting the eating of the flesh of a living animal, so also verse 9: 3 is taken as a Noachian law permitting all mankind the eating of the flesh of dead animals (*Sanhedrin* 59b). Now Philo, commenting upon verse 9: 3, quotes "some persons" (*nonnulli*) who say that "by this expression, 'as the green herb have I given you all,' the eating of flesh was permitted," and subsequently adds that "the power of this command is not adapted to one nation alone [i.e., the Jews] . . . but to all mankind, who cannot possibly be universally prohibited from eating flesh" (*Qu. in Gen.* II, 58). The interpretation of verse 9: 3 quoted by him in the name of "some people" is the same as the rabbinic interpretation. His own comment that this law applies to all mankind again corresponds to the rabbinic interpretation. We may therefore reasonably assume that the law in verse 9: 4 prohibiting the eating of the flesh of a living animal is similarly taken by Philo as applying to all mankind, i.e., as being a Noachian law. In *Qu. in Gen.* II, 95, where Philo discusses verse 9: 4, he assumes that the verse contains a prohibition.

¹⁴⁰ *Heres* 59, 295.

¹⁴¹ *Mos.* I, 1, 2; cf. *Abr.* 3, 16; *Spec.* IV, 10, 61; 23, 120.

Hellenization never went so far as to accept the beliefs of popular Greek religion about the divine origin of certain Greek laws. In fact, it is not impossible that the environment in which he lived has made him doubt whether the Greeks themselves took these myths about the divine origin of some of their laws as truths, for he speaks of the Jews as being unique in "looking upon their laws as oracles given to them by God."¹⁴² Of Greek lawgivers he says that some of them "have nakedly and without embellishment drawn up a code of the things they considered to be right," while others "have sought to bewilder the people, by burying the truth under a heap of mythical inventions."¹⁴³ None of the Greek laws were thus, according to Philo, divine revelations. They were all inventions of lawgivers, and, if some lawgivers claimed for them a divine origin, their claims were only mythical inventions. In a general sense, indeed, he admits that "laws and customs," including evidently also Greek laws and customs, just like all the "arts and professions," are from God,¹⁴⁴ as he also says that philosophy was showered down from heaven,¹⁴⁵ but by this he only means that, like all other human achievements, the achievement of law and philosophy was made possible only by an act of divine providence,¹⁴⁶ for, as he says, that God himself "is the lawgiver and the fountain of laws, and on Him depend all particular lawgivers."¹⁴⁷ But while these laws, in so far as they contain rational elements, may be regarded as the work of divine providence, they are far from being ideal laws in accordance with reason and in accordance with nature. Re-echoing the common complaint of all the Greek philosophers against the existent constitutions and laws, he says that

¹⁴² *Legat.* 31, 210.

¹⁴³ *Opif.* 1, 1.

¹⁴⁴ *Leg. All.* III, 9, 30.

¹⁴⁵ *Spec.* III, 34, 185; cf. above, I, 142.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. above, I, 143.

¹⁴⁷ *Sacr.* 39, 131.

“the polity as seen in various peoples is an addition to nature,”¹⁴⁸ and “different peoples have different customs and regulations which are extra inventions and additions,”¹⁴⁹ so that “the laws of the different states are additions to the right reason of nature.”¹⁵⁰ The expression “an addition to nature” means here an excrescence upon nature, something adventitious to it and not in accordance with it.

In contradistinction to both these natural laws and the laws of the legislators of the different cities is the Law of Moses. Unlike natural law, which grows up spontaneously without a legislator, this law is described by him as “enacted laws” (τεθέντες νόμοι) or “enacted ordinances” (τεθειμένα διατάγματα).¹⁵¹ Unlike natural laws, too, which are unwritten and general, this law is written¹⁵² and also contains both general and particular laws.¹⁵³ But unlike the laws of the legislators of the different cities, who are human beings,¹⁵⁴ the legislator of this law is God himself, for legislator (νομοθέτης) is one of the terms by which Philo describes God.¹⁵⁵ Indeed Moses, too, is called legislator, but he is called so only because he was the prophet of God and, according to Philo’s conception of prophecy, one of the functions of prophecy is to act as a vehicle for divine legislation.¹⁵⁶ It is God, however, who is “the original and perfect lawgiver”¹⁵⁷ and who, by virtue of His being the creator of the world, is “in its truest sense also its lawgiver.”¹⁵⁸ “The holy books of the Lord,” he says, “are not monuments of knowledge or of vision, but are the divine command and the divine Logos.”¹⁵⁹

¹⁴⁸ *Jos.* 6, 28.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 29.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 31.

¹⁵¹ *Abr.* 1, 5.

¹⁵² *Post.* 43, 143; *Fug.* 13, 66; 18, 99; *Mos.* II, 8, 48.

¹⁵³ Cf. above, pp. 16 ff.

¹⁵⁴ *Fug.* 13, 66.

¹⁵⁵ *Mos.* II, 8, 48.

¹⁵⁶ *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 140. By “knowledge and vision” Philo means rational knowledge which ultimately rests upon sensation (cf. above, p. 6).

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 3; cf. above, n. 103.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. above, p. 187.

All these statements are not mere rhetorical phrases with Philo. They are an expression of his philosophic belief. According to him, before the creation of the world, God created the Logos.¹⁶⁰ Upon the creation of the world, the Logos was implanted in it by God to act as its law.¹⁶¹ Then later, when God revealed the Law to guide men in their conduct in the world, that Law was the application to human conduct of the same law which He had previously implanted in the world for the regulation of the order of nature. God is thus the true legislator of the laws for both nature and men, and the laws of Moses, though enacted laws, are still in the true sense of the term in accordance with nature, inasmuch as God who is their true legislator enacted them in harmony with those laws of nature of which He is also the legislator. No other enacted law is to Philo truly in accordance with nature, inasmuch as none of them was enacted by God who is the author of the laws of nature. Thus, commenting on the verses "And Abraham gave all that he had to Isaac, but unto the sons of the concubines, which Abraham had, Abraham gave gifts,"¹⁶² he says that the blessings bequeathed by Abraham to Isaac "resemble natural (*φύσει*) laws," whereas the blessings bequeathed by him to the sons of the concubines resemble "enacted (*θέσει*) laws."¹⁶³ When therefore he refers to the laws of the Pentateuch as "laws of God-beloved (*θεοφιλῶν*) men,"¹⁶⁴ he does not mean

¹⁶⁰ Cf. above, I, 229 ff.

¹⁶¹ Cf. above, I, 326 ff.

¹⁶² Gen. 25: 5-6.

¹⁶³ *Migr.* 16, 94; cf. above, p. 173. C. H. Dodd says: "In Hellenistic Judaism the idea of law had already been influenced" by the Stoic idea of a "law of nature" ("Hellenism and Christianity" in *Harvard Tercentenary Publications: Independence, Convergence, and Borrowing*, 1937, p. 113). The influence in our opinion was only to the extent that Hellenistic Jewish philosophers argued against the Stoics and other Greek philosophers that there was only one law which could be properly described as a "law of nature" and that was the revealed Law of Moses.

¹⁶⁴ *Deter.* 5, 13.

that those laws were enacted by men whom God loves; he means thereby that those laws were revealed by God to men out of His love for them.¹⁶⁵

Proof that "the laws were not the inventions of man but quite clearly the oracles of God" is found by Philo in the scriptural account of the revelation on Mount Sinai,¹⁶⁶ which he accepts as history.

Evidently having in mind the claims of divine origin for the laws of certain Greek states, he maintains that "Moses himself was the best of all lawgivers in all countries, better in fact than any that have ever arisen among either the Greeks or the barbarians, and that his laws are most excellent and truly come from God."¹⁶⁷ Evidently also counteracting the claim of a divine nature or origin for the laws of Minos on the ground, as restated by Plato, that they "have made Crete happy through the length of time, and Sparta happy also, since she began to use them,"¹⁶⁸ he maintains, quite obviously with reference to what happened to both Sparta and Crete between the time of Plato and his own time, that the institutions of other peoples "have been unsettled by numberless causes — wars, tyrannies or other mishaps — which the revolutions of fortune have launched upon them,"¹⁶⁹ whereas the laws of Moses alone "remain secure from the day when they were first enacted to now."¹⁷⁰ Evidently again having in mind the statements by Plato and Aristotle that laws cannot remain unaltered,¹⁷¹ he expresses

¹⁶⁵ Cf. above, I, 123, n. 65, 143.

¹⁶⁶ *Decal.* 4, 15; cf. *Probus* 12, 80.

¹⁶⁷ *Mos.* II, 3, 12. Josephus, in claiming for the Mosaic laws a divine origin, compares him to "Minos and later legislators," of whom, he says, Minos attributed his laws to Zeus and Lycurgus attributed his to Apollo, adding, however, cautiously, "either believing this to be the fact, or hoping in this way to facilitate their acceptance" (*Apion.* II, 16, 161-162).

¹⁶⁸ *Minos* 320 B.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹⁶⁹ *Mos.* II, 3, 13.

¹⁷¹ Cf. above, p. 179.

his hope, that is, his belief, that "they will remain for future ages as though immortal, so long as the sun and moon and the whole heaven and universe exist."¹⁷² Finally, he tries to show that laws of Moses are more widespread and more universal than all the other systems of law at his time, mentioning especially the laws of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians and the Egyptians and in general of the peoples of Asia and Europe.¹⁷³ "We may say," he concludes, "that mankind from east to west, every country and nation and state, show aversion to foreign institutions, and think they will enhance the respect for their own by showing disrespect for those of other countries. It is not so with ours. They attract and win the attention of all, of Barbarians, of Greeks, of dwellers on the mainland and islands, of nations of the east and west, of Europe and Asia, of the whole inhabited world from end to end."¹⁷⁴

Then, with this conception of the divine origin of the Law of Moses, he tries to show how that Law is what philosophers would describe as being in accordance with nature. God, argues Philo, is the founder both of the laws of nature and the laws revealed through Moses and, since both these systems of law emanate from the same divine source, they are in harmony with each other, and consequently life in accordance with nature, which is recommended by philosophers, and life in accordance with the Law, which is enjoined by Scripture, mean one and the same thing. Why, asks Philo, did Moses preface his laws with the story of the creation of the world? It is to show, he answers, "that the world is in

¹⁷² *Mos.* II, 3, 14.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.* II, 4, 19.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 19-20. So also Josephus argues for the superiority of the Mosaic laws on the ground that for a longer time than any other laws "they have stood the test of our own use," i.e., they have remained unaltered, and have also "excited the emulation of the world at large" (*Apion.* II, 39, 280).

harmony with the Law, and the Law with the world, and that the man who observes the Law is constituted thereby a loyal citizen of the world regulating his doings by the purpose and will of nature, in accordance with which the entire world itself is administered." ¹⁷⁵ In the historical part of the Pentateuch, he says again, Moses "wished to show two most essential things: first, that the Father and Maker of the world was in the truest sense also its Lawgiver; secondly, that he who would observe the laws will accept gladly the duty of following nature and live in accordance with the ordering of the universe." ¹⁷⁶ In another place he identifies the scriptural reference to "all His commandments and ordinances and judgments which are written in the book of this Law" ¹⁷⁷ with "the laws and statutes of nature." ¹⁷⁸ And so when he happens to quote in the name of "the best philosophers," that the end which man is to strive after is "to live in accordance with nature," which is attained "whenever the mind having entered on the path of virtue, walks in the tracks of right reason and follows God" ¹⁷⁹ — phrases and expressions borrowed from Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics ¹⁸⁰ — he hastens to add that by all these he means "remembering His commandments" ¹⁸¹ and as proof-text he quotes a Jewish traditional saying based upon a scriptural verse, to the effect that "Abraham did all thy Law," ¹⁸² adding "Law being evidently nothing else than the divine word, enjoining what we ought to do and forbidding what we should not do, as Moses testifies by saying 'he received

¹⁷⁵ *Opif.* 1, 3.

¹⁷⁶ *Mos.* II, 8, 48; *Opif.* 1, 3.

¹⁷⁷ *Deut.* 30: 10.

¹⁷⁸ *Somn.* II, 26, 174-175.

¹⁷⁹ *Migr.* 23, 128.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. above, pp. 171, 176, 178.

¹⁸¹ *Migr.* 23, 128.

¹⁸² The scriptural verse (*Gen.* 26: 5) reads: "Because Abraham thy father hearkened to my voice and kept My charge, My commandments, My statutes, and My laws." The Talmudic comment on this verse is: "Abraham our father had observed the entire Law even before it was given." (*Kiddushin* 82a.)

the law from His words.' ¹⁸³ ¹⁸⁴ Similarly also when he happens to speak of "those who take pains to cultivate virtue," he adds immediately "and set the holy laws before them to guide them in all they do or say in their private or in their public capacity." ¹⁸⁵ When philosophers speak of living in accordance with nature or reason or right reason, they mean thereby that man is to live in accordance with such principles discovered by human reason as would not bring him into conflict with his own nature or with the nature of the world around him. To Philo, however, it means to live in accordance with the revealed Law, for the Law revealed by God to man is in harmony with the law which God himself has implanted in man and in the universe.

He is especially eager to point out that while on the one hand there is a certain similarity between the *Laws* of Plato and the Law of Moses, on the other hand there exists an essential difference between them. The former is man-made and the latter is of divine origin. Evidently alluding to Plato's statement that all legislators before him have contented themselves with issuing only peremptory commands whereas he will preface his laws by preambles containing exhortations, ¹⁸⁶ he tries to show how Moses, while in one respect uses the same method as Plato, in another respect differs from Plato. Like Plato, he prefixes his laws by preambles containing exhortations. ¹⁸⁷ But unlike Plato, who began his laws with "the foundation of a man-made city" and hence with man-made laws, Moses began his laws "with the story of the creation of the Great City or the world" by God and hence also with the revelation of the Law by God. ¹⁸⁸ When therefore in one place he quotes Plato that we ought "to become like God, as far as this is possible; and to become like

¹⁸³ Deut. 33: 4.

¹⁸⁴ *Migr.* 23, 130.

¹⁸⁵ *Praem.* 20, 119.

¹⁸⁶ *Laws* IV, 722 B-E.

¹⁸⁷ *Mos.* II, 9, 49-51.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 51.

Him is to become holy, just and wise,"¹⁸⁹ and when also in several other places he re-echoes Plato's statements to the effect that our true end is "likeness to God" and to be "following Him step by step in the highways cut out by virtues"¹⁹⁰ or that "the goal of happiness is to become like God,"¹⁹¹ or that good rulers should "imitate" God's actions "if they have any aspirations to become like God,"¹⁹² or that "a man should imitate God as much as may be and leave nothing undone that may promote such likeness as is possible"¹⁹³ — in all these he means, as similar statements in native Jewish tradition mean, to live according to the Law. One of these characteristic statements in native Jewish tradition, commenting upon the verse "after the Lord your God shall ye walk,"¹⁹⁴ raises the rhetorical question, "Is it possible for a man to walk after the Shekinah?" and its answer is: "You cannot but say that it means to walk after the virtues or laws of the Holy One: as He clothed the naked (Gen. 3: 21), so do thou clothe the naked; as He visited the sick (Gen. 18: 1), so do thou visit the sick; as He comforted the mourners (Gen. 25: 11), so do thou comfort the mourners; as He buried the dead (Deut. 34: 6), so do thou bury the dead."¹⁹⁵

Other texts from which native Jewish tradition derives the principle of the imitation of God and the assimilation to Him are the verses "But ye that cleave unto the Lord thy God"¹⁹⁶ and "For as a girdle cleaveth" to the loins of a man, so have I caused to cleave unto me the whole house of

¹⁸⁹ *Fug.* 12, 63; cf. *Theaetetus* 176 B; *Laws* IV, 716 c f.

¹⁹⁰ *Opif.* 50, 144.

¹⁹¹ *Decal.* 15, 73.

¹⁹² *Spec.* IV, 36, 188.

¹⁹³ *Virt.* 31, 168.

¹⁹⁴ Deut. 13: 5 (4).

¹⁹⁵ *Sotah* 14a. On the principle of *imitatio Dei* in Judaism, see S. Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, pp. 199 ff.; G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, I, 441; II, 110 f., 172 f.

¹⁹⁶ Deut. 4: 4.

Israel,"¹⁹⁷ which verses are used as an explanation of the verse "Ye shall be holy, for I the Lord Thy God am holy."¹⁹⁸ Similarly Philo infers the same principle from the use of the word "cleave" in the verse "Thou shalt fear the Lord Thy God, and Him thou shalt serve and to Him shalt thou cleave."¹⁹⁹ "What then is the cementing substance?" he asks rhetorically, and his answer is: "Do you ask, what? Pity, surely, and faith: for these virtues adjust and unite the intent of the heart to the incorruptible Being: as Abraham when he believed is said to 'come near to God.'²⁰⁰ "²⁰¹

With his conception of the Pentateuch as a revealed system of law which aims to regulate life in accordance with virtue and hence leads to happiness, Philo tries to answer the question discussed by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle as to the acquisition of happiness or virtue. As stated by Aristotle, the "question is asked, whether happiness is to be acquired by learning (*μαθητῶν*) or by habit (*ἔθιστῶν*) or some other sort of practice (*ἀσκητῶν*), or comes in the way of some divine dispensation (*τινα θελαν μοίραν*)."²⁰² Or, as the same question is stated by him with reference to virtue, "some think that we are made good by nature (*φύσει*), others by habit (*ἔθει*), others by teaching (*διδασχῆ*)," and explains that by the term "by nature" is meant that it comes as a result of some divine causes (*τινας θελας αἰτίας*).²⁰³ By "some divine causes" he means what he himself in the other passage calls, in the language of Plato, "divine dispensation." His own

¹⁹⁷ Jer. 13: 11.

¹⁹⁸ Lev. 19: 2. Cf. *Yalḳuṭ Shim'oni* I, 604, quoting *Tanḥuma*; cf. *Tanḥuma* ed. Buber *Ḳedoshim*, § 5.

¹⁹⁹ Deut. 10: 20.

²⁰⁰ Gen. 18: 23.

²⁰¹ *Migr.* 24, 132. The same verse, Deut. 10: 20, is quoted also as proof-text for the same principle by a medieval rabbi, Eliezer of Metz, in *Sefer Yere'im*, § 3.

²⁰² *Eth. Nic.* I, 9, 1099b, 9-10.

²⁰³ *Ibid.* X, 9, 1179b, 20-23.

view is that virtue does not depend upon "nature" or "some divine dispensation" or "some divine causes"; it is acquired through learning (*μάθησις*) or teaching (*διδασκαλία*) and through practice (*ἄσκησις*) or habit (*ἔθος*).²⁰⁴ The Stoics, on the other hand, maintain that virtue comes to us only through knowledge²⁰⁵ and learning,²⁰⁶ denying therefore by implication that it can come through nature or through practice.²⁰⁷

This is how the problem stood at the time of Philo. With neither of these views, however, does he agree. To him virtue and happiness are acquired by all these three methods, nature, practice, and learning, and all these three methods ultimately come as a result of a divine dispensation or a divine cause. He thus attributes to Moses the view that "virtue is gained either by nature (*φύσει*) or by practice (*ἀσκήσει*) or by learning (*μαθήσει*),"²⁰⁸ qualifying, however, this statement elsewhere by adding that these three methods of acquiring virtue depend upon each other, for "teaching cannot be consummated without nature or practice, nor is nature capable of reaching its zenith without learning and practice, nor practice either unless the foundation of nature and teaching has first been laid."²⁰⁹ These three sources of virtue are repeatedly mentioned by him in many other passages.²¹⁰ On the whole, by the term "nature" he means, as it was explained by Aristotle, "some divine dispensation"²¹¹ or "some divine causes," except that with him it

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.* I, 9, 1099b, 15-16; cf. II, 1, 1103a, 14-18.

²⁰⁵ *Diogenes*, VII, 93.

²⁰⁶ *Idem.*, VII, 91.

²⁰⁷ Cf. Zeller, III, 14, p. 240 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*², p. 255).

²⁰⁸ *Somn.* I, 27, 167.

²⁰⁹ *Abr.* 11, 53.

²¹⁰ As, e.g., *Mut.* 14, 88; *Abr.* 11, 53; *Praem.* 11, 64-65; cf. Leisegang, *Indices*, under *ἄσκησις*, *ἀσκητικός*.

²¹¹ The term *θελα μοῖρα* occurs frequently in his writings; cf. Leisegang, *Indices*, under *μοῖρα*.

has assumed a more definite meaning, due to the fact that a dispensation which is divine or a cause which is divine means to him something different, not something which brings about a result by necessity but rather something which brings about a result by the free will of God. When Philo says, therefore, that virtue may be acquired "by nature," he means thereby that certain persons, by the special grace of God, have been endowed from birth with a predisposition for virtue.²¹² Similarly with regard to the terms "practice" and "learning," they have acquired with him some special meaning. It is not every kind of practice and every kind of learning through which one acquires virtue and hence also happiness; it is the practice and the learning of the laws revealed by God by His "graciousness and beneficence."²¹³ Ultimately, therefore, it is God who is the source of virtue and the source of happiness. In accordance with this view, God is described by him as "sowing for the race of mortals the seed of happiness in good and virgin soil"²¹⁴ and the service of God is said by him to be the source ($\pi\eta\gamma\eta$)²¹⁵ and the beginning ($\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta$)²¹⁶ of happiness. Again, the divine powers are said by him to descend, at the bidding of their Father, with laws and ordinances from heaven and sow in virtue-loving souls the nature of happiness.²¹⁷

His special emphasis upon God as the source of nature and the source of the laws of virtue and the source of happiness is to be discerned in passages in which he gives his own version of certain philosophic sentiments. In one place he reproduces the common Stoic view that "the hope of happiness incites also the devotees of virtue to study wisdom, believing that thus they will be able to discern the nature of

²¹² Cf. above, I, 450.

²¹³ *Mos.* II, 35, 189; cf. above, pp. 51-52.

²¹⁴ *Cher.* 14, 49.

²¹⁵ *Post.* 54, 185.

²¹⁶ *Spec.* II, 9, 38.

²¹⁷ *Cher.* 31, 106.

all that exists and to act in accordance with nature.”²¹⁸ But immediately after that he restates the same view with a new emphasis upon the need of setting one’s hope on God who is above nature and is the source of nature. “He alone is worthy of my approval,” he says, “who sets his hope on God both as the source to which his coming into existence itself is due and as the sole power which can keep him free from harm and destruction.”²¹⁹ Not merely “to discern the nature of all that exists” is the highest intellectual virtue but to know that God is “the source” of the existence of all things, not merely “to act in accordance to nature” is the highest practical and moral virtue but to act in accordance with the knowledge that God rewards and punishes each man in accordance with his deeds. In other places he says that “no man should be thought a man at all who does not set his hope on God”²²⁰ and only he who sets his hope on God is of the race of men which is “truly rational” (λογικόν).²²¹ This is evidently his own revision of Aristotle’s statement that “it is characteristic of the good man to work out the good, and he does so for his own sake, for he does it for the sake of the intellectual element (διανοητικῶν) in him, which is thought to be the man himself.”²²²

This conception of revelation was a logical consequence of his conception of God as a free agent who created the world by His own free-will and established within it laws which can be upset by His own free-will. Creation, miracles, and revelation are three fundamental concepts which are connected in Philo’s mind with the concept of the free-will of God. If asked for proof for the possibility of miracles, Philo refers to the act of creation which is to him the greatest of all mira-

²¹⁸ *Praem.* 2, 11.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 13.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.

²²¹ *Abr.* 2, 9.

²²² *Eth. Nic. IX*, 4, 1166a, 16-17.

cles.²²³ And if asked for proof for the possibility of revelation, he refers to miracles. In describing the revelation of the Law on Mount Sinai, he says: "I should suppose that God wrought on this occasion a miracle of a truly holy kind by bidding an invisible sound to be created in the air."²²⁴ Revelation, to him, is a miracle; given a God who can perform miracles, He can also reveal a law.

II. COMMANDMENTS AND VIRTUES

(a) *Classification of Commandments and Virtues*

With his identification of the Law of Moses with that ideal law in accordance with nature sought after by philosophers, Philo undertakes to show that the commandments which constitute the laws of Moses are identical with the virtues upon which the ideal philosophic law is to be based. As preliminary to this identification he tries to classify the Mosaic commandments as well as the philosophic virtues.

In his attempt to classify the commandments, he makes use of three methods of classification which were current in native Jewish tradition. First, he divides the laws into "commands (*προστάξεις*) and prohibitions (*ἀπαγορεύσεις*)."¹ This corresponds to the traditional Jewish division of the laws into positive and negative commandments,² though he expresses himself in language borrowed from the Stoics.³ Then, he divides the laws into two groups, one of them containing "duties to God" and the other "duties to men."⁴ This again corresponds to the traditional Jewish division of the laws into those between man and God and those be-

²²³ *Mos.* II, 48, 267; cf. above, I, 354.

²²⁴ *Decal.* 9, 33.

¹ *Spec.* I, 55, 299; cf. *Migr.* 23, 130; *Jos.* 6, 29; *Mos.* II, 1, 4; *Praem.* 9, 55.

² *Makkot* 23b.

³ *Arnim*, II, 1003; III, 314, 613, 614. Cf. Cohn, *Philos Werke*, and Colson, on *Praem.* 9, 55.

⁴ *Heres* 35, 168; *Decal.* 22, 106.

tween man and man.⁵ Then also the laws contained in the Pentateuch are regarded by him as special laws under the heading of the ten commandments, the latter of which he describes as heads (κεφάλαια),⁶ general heads (γενικὰ κεφάλαια), roots (ρίζαι), sources (ἀρχαί), and fountains (πηγαί).⁷ In rabbinic literature, it is similarly said that the ten commandments contain all the laws of the Torah.⁸ This last method of classification is adopted by Philo in his direct discussion of the laws of Moses. First, in his *De Decalogo*, he enumerates and discusses the ten commandments. Then, in his *De Specialibus Legibus*, he discusses the special laws which he arranges under the ten commandments.

To these three methods of the classification of the laws, all of which are of traditional origin, he adds two other methods, one based upon Scripture, to be discussed later under "*Deeds, Words, Intentions*," and another, a new method of his own, based upon his own conception that the Law of Moses is that ideal law looked for by philosophers which is to guide men in what philosophers call life in accordance with virtue. As that looked-for ideal code of law, the ten commandments of Moses as well as the special laws included under them are "the virtues of universal value," inciting and exhorting us to "wisdom and justice and godliness and the rest of the company of virtues,"⁹ they all "inculcate the highest standard of virtue,"¹⁰ and "those who take pains to cultivate virtue" are those who "set the holy laws before them to guide them in all they do or say,"¹¹ so that those who conform to these laws "must be exempt from every unreasoning passion and every vice in a higher degree

⁵ *M. Yoma* VIII, 9.

⁶ *Decal.* 5, 19.

⁷ *Congr.* 21, 120.

⁸ *Canticles Rabbah* to Cant. 5: 14. Cf. Bentwich, *Philo-Judaeus of Alexandria*,

⁹ *Spec.* IV, 25, 134.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 34, 179.

¹¹ *Praem.* 20, 119.

than those who are governed by other laws." ¹² Consequently the laws can be classified, according to him, under the headings of the various virtues which they are meant to implant in men. And so within his general scheme of classifying the laws under the headings of the ten commandments there is another scheme, that of classifying them under the headings of cardinal virtues. Now the conception that laws are to implant virtues is Platonic. In his criticism of the laws of Crete and Lacedaemon Plato contends that their purpose was to implant only one virtue, that of courage, which was necessary for war. ¹³ In his own ideal laws, he makes their purpose the implantation of all the virtues. ¹⁴ Philo's contention is that the laws of Moses are the ideal laws which do actually implant all the virtues. With this in view, he tries to classify the virtues, and in accordance with this classification of the virtues he classifies also the laws.

There is no single formal classification of the virtues in Philo. But throughout his writings he throws out certain hints at their classification. Examining all his statements on this subject and combining them together, we get the following general picture of his classification of virtues.

To begin with, in conformity with his acceptance of the Platonic theory of ideas, he believes there is an idea of virtue corresponding to every particular virtue in the visible world. This distinction between the idea and the copy of virtue is designated by him by the terms "heavenly virtue" and "earthly virtue." ¹⁵ This is a new classification of his own.

Then the virtues are divided by him into two classes. First, there are "virtues of the soul," such as "prudence,

¹² *Spec.* IV, 9, 55.

¹³ *Laws* I, 630 D f.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* III, 688 A f.

¹⁵ *Leg. All.* I, 14, 45. Cf. above, I, 233, 261.

temperance and each of the others." Second, there are "virtues of the body," such as "health, efficiency of the senses, dexterity of limb and strength of muscle." Third, in contradistinction to virtues, there are "external advantages," such as "wealth" and "glory" and "pleasures."¹⁶ In another place he describes all these "virtues" and "external advantages" as the "three goods" (*triplicia bona*), and refers to "Aristotle with the Peripatetics."¹⁷ The reference is to that passage in Aristotle, where the latter, referring to Plato,¹⁸ says that "goods (*ἀγαθὰ*) have been divided into three classes, and some are described as external, others as relating to soul or to body."¹⁹ In still another place he describes bodily goods as being more nearly connected with us (*οἰκειότερα*) than external goods.²⁰ Now in our first quotation from Philo, it will be noticed that under "virtues of the soul" he mentions only what Aristotle calls moral virtues. In Aristotle, however, the term "virtues of the soul" is used to include both intellectual and moral virtues.²¹ Again, in the same quotation from Philo it will also be noticed that bodily goods are called "virtues of the body." In Aristotle and Plato, however, the term virtue, in its strict and technical sense, refers only to the goods of the soul,²² and the Stoics, in their reproduction of this threefold classification of goods, say definitely that the virtues, according to the "Academics and the Peripatetics," belong

¹⁶ *Sobr.* 12, 61. A similar threefold division is implied in *Abr.* 38, 219 (cf. J. Cohn in *Philos Werke, ad loc.*).

¹⁷ *Qu. in Gen.* III, 16.

¹⁸ *Euthydemus* 279 A-B; *Philebus* 48 D-E; *Laws* V, 743 E.

¹⁹ *Eth. Nic.* I, 8, 1098b, 12-14.

²⁰ *Praem.* 20, 118.

²¹ *Eth. Nic.* VI, 1, 1138b, 35-1139a, 1.

²² Cf. Aristotle, *op. cit.*, I, 8, 1098b, 14-15: "We call those that relate to the soul most properly and truly goods." Similarly Plato, *Philebus* 48 E, after enumerating the three goods, applies the term virtue only to those of the soul.

only to the soul.²³ But Philo's application of the term virtue to bodily goods may be justified on the ground that the description of "health," and also of other bodily goods, as a "virtue of the body" occurs in Plato²⁴ and Aristotle.²⁵

Another division of the virtues in Philo is that into divine (*θειαι*) and human (*ἀνθρώπωναι*). These two terms are used by him in two senses. First, he uses the term "divine virtues" in the sense of "virtues of the soul" and the term "human virtues" in the sense of "virtues of the body," referring to them respectively as "real" and "reputed" virtues.²⁶ In a somewhat similar sense, these two terms are also used by Plato in his division of "good things" into divine and human.²⁷ Second, the terms "divine virtue" and "human virtue"²⁸ are used by him respectively in the sense of Aristotle's purely scientific type of both "intellectual virtue" and "moral virtue." Intellectual virtue of this purely scientific kind is described by Aristotle as that which has for its object that which exists "of necessity" and is "eternal" in the sense of being "ungenerated and imperishable."²⁹ Such an object would undoubtedly include what he calls God. So also the description of "divine virtue" in Philo is that which has God for its object.³⁰ "Human virtue" is described

²³ Sextus, *Adversus Ethicos*, 45; cf. Diogenes, VII, 102.

²⁴ *Gorgias* 479 B; 504 C.

²⁵ *Rhet.* I, 5, 1361b, 3; I, 6, 1362b, 15.

²⁶ *Migr.* 29, 158-160. In 158, he speaks of "virtues human and divine," characterizing them respectively as "the real and reputed virtues." In 160, he refers to these two classes of virtues as "the concerns of the soul" and "the concerns of the body" respectively.

²⁷ *Laws* I, 631 B-C. Under "human" goods Plato includes both bodily goods and external advantages, the latter of which is illustrated by him by the term "wealth."

²⁸ *Somn.* II, 42, 277.

²⁹ *Eth. Nic.* VI, 3, 1139b, 22-24.

³⁰ *Somn.* II, 43, 283, where those who oppose "divine virtue" are described as those who deny the existence of God as an incorporeal being who created the world and is its guardian and protector.

by Philo as that kind of virtue which is rejected by "the company of those devoted to their passions (*φιλοπαθοῦς*)."³¹ This kind of virtue quite obviously refers to moral virtue. Similarly Aristotle describes moral virtue as "human virtue."³²

In Aristotle a distinction is made between the possession (*κτησις*) of virtue and its use (*χρησις*), or between a state of mind or character (*ἔξις*) and an activity (*ἐνέργεια*).³³ This distinction is intimated by Philo when in contrast to "virtues" he speaks of (1) "activities in accordance with virtues" (*κατ' ἀρετὰς ἐνέργειαι*), (2) "right actions" (*κατορθώματα*) and (3) "what philosophers call duties (*καθήκοντα*)."³⁴ As the equivalent of "activities in accordance with virtues" he uses also the expression "actions (*πράξεις*) in accordance with virtues."³⁵ In another place, in addition to "duties" and "right actions," which are mentioned together with "virtue existing among men" (*κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἀρετή*), that is, human or moral virtue,³⁶ he mentions also (4) "acts in accordance with laws laid down by legislators" (*νόμιμα θέσει*).³⁷ In still another place he says: "Let that which seems good to virtue be law for each one of us."³⁸ We have thus in Philo four kinds of activities which are to be distinguished from virtue as a mere state of mind or character, namely, (1) "activities in accordance with virtue," (2) "right actions," (3) "duties," and (4) "acts in accordance with enacted laws." We shall comment upon the history and meaning of these four activities as well as upon the terms and expressions by which they are designated.

³¹ *Ibid.* 42, 277.

³² *Eth. Nic.* II, 6, 1106a, 22-24; cf. I, 13, 1102a, 14.

³³ *Ibid.* I, 8, 1098b, 31-33.

³⁴ *Leg. All.* I, 17, 56; cf. *Sacr.* 20, 73, where the term "duties" is omitted.

³⁵ *Abr.* 6, 31.

³⁷ *Leg. All.* III, 43, 126.

³⁶ Cf. above, n. 32.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 87, 245.

The expression "activity in accordance with virtue" is of Aristotelian origin,³⁹ and, in Aristotle, it applies to an activity which is either in accordance with intellectual virtue or in accordance with moral virtue.⁴⁰

The term "right action" (κατόρθωμα) occurs in Aristotle,⁴¹ but it was made popular by the Stoics, who invested it with a special technical meaning.⁴² Philo seems to use it in the same sense as "activity in accordance with virtue" or "action in accordance with virtue," though he sometimes uses it in the same list together with either one of these two expressions.⁴³ He once says that "right action proceeds from virtue,"⁴⁴ which means the same as "action or activity in accordance with virtue."

The term "duties" in the passage quoted is introduced by the statement "what philosophers call duties." The reference is, of course, to the Stoic use of the term.⁴⁵ Within duties we find that he distinguishes between two kinds of duties. First, he speaks of duties which he describes as sufficient in themselves (αὐτάρκη).⁴⁶ This seems to reflect a combination of (1) that class of "preferred things" (προηγμένα) which the Stoics describe as being preferred "for their own sake" (δι' αὐτά)⁴⁷ and that class of duties which they describe as being unconditional (ἄνευ περιστάσεως),⁴⁸ always (ἀεί) incumbent⁴⁹ and perfect (τέλεια).⁵⁰ With this

³⁹ *Eth. Nic.* I, 10, 1100b, 10; X, 6, 1177a, 10; X, 8, 1178a, 9-10.

⁴⁰ Cf. *loc. cit.*

⁴¹ *Magna Moralia* II, 3, 1199a, 13.

⁴² See Arnim, Index, s.v.; cf. Zeller, III, 14, p. 250, nn. 4 and 5 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*², p. 265, nn. 1 and 2).

⁴³ Cf. *Leg. All.* I, 17, 56; *Sacr.* 20, 73.

⁴⁴ *Probus* 9, 60.

⁴⁵ Cf. Diogenes, VII, 108; Arnim, Index, sub καθήκον; Zeller, III, 14, pp. 271-274 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*², pp. 287-290).

⁴⁶ *Leg. All.* III, 57, 165.

⁴⁷ Diogenes, VII, 107.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, VII, 109.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Stobaeus, *Eclogae* II, p. 85, l. 19.

kind of duty the Stoics also identify right action (*κατὸρθωμα*).⁵¹ Second, he speaks of intermediate (*μέσα*) duties.⁵² In one place, without mentioning the word duty, he speaks of "indifferent" (*ἀδιάφορα*) actions as distinguished from "right actions proceeding from virtue."⁵³ Both these terms are used by the Stoics synonymously as a description of a certain type of duty.⁵⁴

His inclusion of acts performed in accordance with established law among virtuous acts reflects Aristotle's statement that "all lawful acts (*νόμιμα*) are in a sense just acts, for acts laid down by the legislative art are lawful, and each of these, we say, is just."⁵⁵

Another division of the virtues found in Philo is that into contemplative (*θεωρητική*) virtue and practical (*πρακτική*) virtue.⁵⁶ This division in its verbal form is taken from the Stoic Panaetius,⁵⁷ with whom it probably means the same as Aristotle's division of the virtues into intellectual and moral, for, according to Aristotle, the activity of intellectual virtue is "contemplative"⁵⁸ and the activity of moral virtue is an "activity of practical virtue."⁵⁹ But with Philo the term "contemplative" seems to include both intellectual and moral virtues, as distinguished from "practical" which similarly includes actions corresponding to both intellectual and moral virtues. We may gather this from his statement in which he explains that virtue is contemplative on the ground that "it clearly involves contemplation, since philosophy, the road that leads to it, involves contemplation

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, I, 20.

⁵³ *Probus* 9, 60; cf. *Leg. All.*, I, 30, 93.

⁵² *Sacr.* 10, 43; *Plant.* 22, 94; 23, 100.

⁵⁴ Stobaeus, *Eclogae* II, p. 86, ll. 10-16; f. Arnim, Index, sub *ἀδιάφορον, καθήκον, μέσον*.

⁵⁵ *Eth. Nic.* V, 1, 1129b, 12-14.

⁵⁶ *Leg. All.* I, 17, 57.

⁵⁸ *Eth. Nic.* X, 7, 1177b, 19-20.

⁵⁷ Diogenes, VII, 92.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

through its three parts, logic, ethics, physics.”⁶⁰ In this statement, as will be noticed, contemplative virtue is said to involve ethical philosophy, which means that it involves the philosophy of moral virtue. On the whole, Philo’s distinction here between “contemplation” and “practical” virtues, with his use of the term “contemplative” to include both “intellectual” and “moral” virtues, may correspond to the Aristotelian distinction, already quoted above, between the “possession” of virtue and the “use” thereof,⁶¹ the former meaning only a state of mind or character, the latter meaning certain actions in conformity with that state of mind or character.

The result of our analysis of Philo’s texts bearing upon the classification of the virtues is that on the whole he divides virtue into three classes, (1) intellectual, (2) moral, and (3) practical, calling both “intellectual” and “moral” virtues by the general term “contemplative” and using the term “practical” as a designation of the actions corresponding either to the intellectual or to the moral virtues. It is according to this threefold classification of the philosophic virtues that he undertakes to classify the laws of Moses, treating them, when they involve no actions, as virtues—contemplative, intellectual, or moral—and, when they involve actions, as actions corresponding to virtues or, as he himself calls them, practical virtues.

(b) *Intellectual Virtues and Actions*

Intellectual virtues, which in the language of Philo are called divine virtues, have God as their object. They include right opinions not only of God in His own nature but also of God as creator and of His creations in so far as they were

⁶⁰ *Leg. All.* I, 17, 57.

⁶¹ Cf. above, p. 205.

created by Him. These right opinions have been enumerated in our discussion in a previous chapter of the eight fundamental principles which to him constitute the religious teachings of Scripture: (1) that God exists, (2) that He is one, (3) that He exercises providence, (4) that He created the world, (5) that the world which He created is one, (6) that He created incorporeal ideas, (7) that He revealed a Law, and (8) that the Law which He revealed is eternal.⁶² All these principles are taught, according to him, in the various verses which he quotes as proof-texts. But they are also taught, he maintains, indirectly in the historical framework of the Pentateuch which forms the setting of the laws. For the Pentateuch, which in native Jewish tradition as well as in Philo is considered primarily as a book of Law, is in its framework a history, beginning with the story of the creation of the world, passing on to the history of mankind, and tapering off to a history of the Jewish people. The question why a book which is primarily intended to be a code of law should begin with the creation of the world must have occurred to many a mind. A rabbi gave utterance to this question in the statement that "the Torah should have started with the verse 'This month shall be unto you the beginning of months,'" ⁶³ which is the first legal injunction delivered to the people of Israel as a whole, and his answer to this question is that the story of creation as well as the subsequent historical part is for the purpose of "making known the power of His might, as it is said 'He hath declared to His people the power of His works, that He may give them the heritage of the nations.' ⁶⁴" ⁶⁵ Philo similarly says: "We must give the reason why he began his law book with the history, and put the commands and prohibitions in the sec-

⁶² Cf. above, I, 164 ff.

⁶³ Exod. 12: 2.

⁶⁴ Ps. 111:6.

⁶⁵ *Tanḥuma* ed. Buber, *Bereshit*, § 11, p. 4a.

ond place.”⁶⁶ His answer is that this history, unlike the history of other writers, is not written for the purpose of entertainment; it is meant “to show two most essential things.”⁶⁷ The story of the creation of the world is meant to show that, since God is the creator of the world and the founder of the laws of nature, the Law for human guidance which was subsequently revealed by him is in harmony with these laws of nature. The story of mankind is meant to show that all human beings are rewarded and punished according to their conduct and hence it is the duty of man to live in accordance with the Law revealed by God.⁶⁸ In other words, the narrative part of the Pentateuch contains proofs for the existence of God and divine providence.

Thus Scripture contains certain teachings of intellectual virtues, or right opinions about God and the things created by God. Now in Aristotle, “intellectual virtue” is said to owe “its origin and development, for the most part, to teaching . . . whereas moral virtue comes about as a result of habit.”⁶⁹ The qualifying expression “for the most part” is significant, for it means that even the intellectual virtues may receive some help in their rise and development from habit.⁷⁰ Then also, according to Aristotle, habits are formed “by first having actually practiced them”⁷¹ and it is in order to habituate people in the practice of good actions that laws are enacted by legislators.⁷² With these views in the back of his mind, Philo tries to show that many of the laws of Moses have for their purpose the inculcation of intellectual virtues.

⁶⁶ *Mos.* II, 8, 47.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁶⁸ *Mos.* II, 8, 48; *Praem.* I, 1-2; *Opif.* I, 1-3.

⁶⁹ *Eth. Nic.* II, 1, 1103a, 15-17.

⁷⁰ Cf. J. A. Stewart's note in his edition.

⁷¹ *Eth. Nic.* II, 1, 1103a, 31.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 1103b, 2-6.

The laws of this class are thus identified by him with those practical virtues which correspond to the contemplative virtues of the intellectual type. To this class of laws belong, in the first place, the first four of the ten commandments, dealing with polytheism, the worship of images, the taking God's name in vain, and the sacred seventh day,⁷³ and, in the second place, the particular laws which fall under these four commandments, namely, the laws about the temple service, oaths and vows, festivals and the sabbatical year.⁷⁴ In all of these laws he finds that their purpose is to train those who practice them in the attainment of the intellectual virtues.

These intellectual virtues as well as the laws which promote them are described by Philo in their totality as the virtue of "wisdom." Let us study the origin and meaning of this virtue.

The term wisdom (*σοφία*), in the history of the enumeration of virtues in Greek philosophy, has undergone several changes of meaning. In Plato it is used as synonymous with the term prudence (*φρόνησις*) and in his various enumerations of the cardinal virtues these two terms are used by him interchangeably.⁷⁵ In Aristotle a distinction is made between wisdom and prudence, the former dealing with things divine⁷⁶ and the latter with things human,⁷⁷ but still both of them are classified by him as intellectual virtues in contradistinction to moral virtues.⁷⁸ The Stoics widen still further the difference between these two terms. The term prudence is used

⁷³ *Decal.* 12, 52-21, 105.

⁷⁴ *Spec.* I-II, 36, 222.

⁷⁵ Cf., e.g., *Laws* I, 631 c, where *φρόνησις* is used and *Republic* IV, 428 b, where *σοφία* is used.

⁷⁶ *Metaph.* I, 2, 983a, 6-7; cf. above, I, 147.

⁷⁷ *Eth. Nic.* VI, 5, 1140a, 24-1140b, 30; cf. above, I, 148.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* I, 13, 1103a, 5-6; cf. VI, 5, 7, 12.

by them as one of the four cardinal virtues.⁷⁹ As for the term wisdom, they contrast it with the term philosophy, the former being mere knowledge and the latter being practice; but, as a designation of mere knowledge, the term "wisdom" is used by them, as distinguished from its use by Aristotle, both with reference to things divine and with reference to things human. They thus say that "philosophy is the practice (*ἐπιτήδευσις*) of wisdom, and wisdom is the knowledge (*ἐπιστήμην*) of things divine and human."⁸⁰ Now as for Philo, while on the one hand he differs from all the philosophers in the use of the term wisdom, on the other he follows both Aristotle and the Stoics. Differing from all the philosophers, he uses the term wisdom as a designation of the teachings contained in the revealed Law.⁸¹ But within that revealed Law, sometimes, like the Stoics, he defines wisdom as "the knowledge of things divine and human,"⁸² and sometimes, like Aristotle, he distinguishes between wisdom which is "the service of God" and prudence which is "the regulation of human life."⁸³ Like the Stoics, however, he uses the term prudence in his various enumerations of the cardinal virtues.⁸⁴ Thus wisdom becomes with Philo a designation of the intellectual or divine virtues together with the actions corresponding to them. In other words, the term wisdom is used by him as a designation of both the revealed doctrines and the revealed laws contained in the Pentateuch.⁸⁵

But in the same sense as the virtue of wisdom, which he defines as "the service of God," he uses also four other

⁷⁹ Arnim, III, 262 ff.

⁸⁰ Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 13 (Arnim, II, 36); Zeller, III, 14, p. 243, n. 5 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*,² p. 258); cf. above, I, 148.

⁸¹ Cf. above, I, 148-149.

⁸² *Congr.* 14, 79; cf. above, I, 148.

⁸³ *Praem.* 14, 81; cf. above, I, 147.

⁸⁴ *Post.* 37, 128; for other references see Leisegang, *Indices*, under *ἀρετή*, 7.

⁸⁵ Cf. above, I, 149.

virtues, namely, piety (*εὐσέβεια*), godliness (*θεοσέβεια*), holiness (*δσιδρως*), and faith (*πιστις*). Let us see how the grouping of these four virtues together with wisdom has come about.

The first three of these four virtues which Philo uses in the same sense as wisdom are to be found in Greek philosophic literature. Piety is defined as being "either a part of justice or an accompaniment of it" ⁸⁶ and as having among its four meanings also that of an act of justice "towards the gods." ⁸⁷ It is defined as "the knowledge of how to serve God" ⁸⁸ or the "science of the service to the gods," ⁸⁹ and the "service of God" is placed together with the "contemplation of God" as a characterization of the virtuous life.⁹⁰ And just as "piety" is defined as "the knowledge of how to serve God," so also "the godly" or rather literally "those who fear God" (*θεοσεβεις*) are described as "having acquaintance with the rites of the gods." ⁹¹ In Plato, man is described as "the most God-fearing (or godly) of all living creatures." ⁹² Similarly, "holiness" is in some of Plato's dialogues reckoned as a fifth cardinal virtue ⁹³ and together with piety it is defined by him as being that part of justice which has to do with service to the gods,⁹⁴ or it is intimated by him as being connected with justice.⁹⁵ Among the Stoics it is similarly defined as a "kind of God-ward justice." ⁹⁶ It is in accordance with Greek philosophic usage, then, that Philo uses the

⁸⁶ *De Virtutibus et Vitiis*, 5, 125ob, 22-23.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 19-20. Cf. also Plato, *Definitiones* 4.12 E; Diogenes, III, 83.

⁸⁸ Diogenes, VII, 119.

⁸⁹ Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 123 (Arnim, II, 1017).

⁹⁰ *Eth. Eud.*, 15, 1249b, 20.

⁹¹ Diogenes, VII, 119.

⁹² *Timaeus* 41 E; *Laws* X, 902 B.

⁹³ *Protagoras* 330 B; *Laches* 119 D.

⁹⁴ *Euthyphro* 12 E.

⁹⁵ *Protagoras* 329 C, 349 D.

⁹⁶ Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 124.

terms "piety," "godliness," and "holiness" as the equivalent of "wisdom" in the sense of the "service of God." It is also in accordance with Greek philosophic usage that he considers these three virtues as a special kind of justice, for in several places where he enumerates various virtues he puts immediately after justice either piety⁹⁷ or godliness⁹⁸ or holiness.⁹⁹ In one place he gives a more direct indication that these virtues are a sort of justice towards God in his statement that "the same person will also exhibit both qualities, holiness to God and justice to men."¹⁰⁰ Previous to this, in the same passage, for "holiness" he uses the term "piety." "Piety and holiness" are also used by him as a description of studies about God or theology, in contradistinction to "natural philosophy," "meteorology," and "moral philosophy."¹⁰¹

But in connection with two of these three virtues Philo makes a statement which calls for special comment. Piety and holiness are each described by him as queen (*βασίλισ*) or leader (*ἡγεμονίς*)¹⁰² among the virtues. Now in Plato and among the Stoics there are statements to the effect that prudence or wisdom is the leader (*ἡγεμών*, *princeps*) among the virtues,¹⁰³ and Philo himself re-echoes these statements in his attempt to explain why prudence (*φρόνησις*) should be the first (*πρώτη*) among the four cardinal virtues.¹⁰⁴ Neither of them, however, has said that piety and holiness are the leaders among the virtues.

⁹⁷ *Cher.* 28, 96; *Deter.* 21, 73.

⁹⁸ *Spec.* IV, 25, 134; 33, 170.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* I, 56, 304; II, 3, 12; *Virt.* 8, 47; *Praem.* 11, 66.

¹⁰⁰ *Abr.* 37, 208.

¹⁰¹ *Ebr.* 22, 91.

¹⁰² *Spec.* IV, 27, 147, and *Praem.* 9, 53 (piety); *Spec.* IV, 25, 135, and *Decal.* 23, 119 (piety, holiness); *Virt.* 18, 95 (piety, philanthropy, cf. below, p. 220); *Abr.* 46, 270 (faith).

¹⁰³ Plato, *Laws* III, 688 B (*φρόνησις*); Cicero, *De Officiis* I, 43, 153 (*σοφία*).

¹⁰⁴ *Leg. All.* I, 22, 70-71.

In Aristotle, however, there are the statements that "justice is often thought to be the greatest (*κρατιστη*) of virtues" ¹⁰⁵ and that "piety" is "either part of justice or an accompaniment of it." ¹⁰⁶ By such statements as these Philo could have justified his own statements that "piety," and with "piety" also "holiness," is the "queen" or "leader" among the virtues. But more likely his assignment of leadership to the virtue of "piety" was inspired by Scripture. It happens that the Greek term for piety (*εὐσέβεια*), composed of the two words "well" and "fear," is used in the Septuagint as the equivalent of the Hebrew word "fear" in connection with God, in the verse which in the Septuagint reads: "The fear of the Lord (*φόβος Κυρίου*) is the beginning (*ἀρχή*) of wisdom . . . and piety towards God (*εὐσέβεια εἰς θεόν*) is the beginning of discernment." ¹⁰⁷ That it is this scriptural verse that is responsible for Philo's assignment of leadership to the virtue of "piety" may be gathered from his use of the scriptural term "beginning" in his statement elsewhere that "piety is the beginning (*ἀρχή*) of the virtues." ¹⁰⁸ So also the Letter of Aristeas, with evident reference to this scriptural verse, in one place says: "Our Lawgiver first of all (*πρώτον*) laid down the principles of piety and justice," ¹⁰⁹ and in another place says: "If you take the fear of God as your starting-point (*καταρχήν*), you will never miss the goal." ¹¹⁰

The fourth virtue, namely, faith (*πίστις*) in God or simply faith, which, together with piety, the fear of God and holiness, is used by Philo as connected with wisdom in the sense

¹⁰⁵ *Eth. Nic.* V, 1, 1129b, 27-28.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. above, n. 86.

¹⁰⁷ *Prov.* 1: 7.

¹⁰⁸ *Decal.* 12, 52 (the term *ἀρχή* here is to be supplied from the context).

¹⁰⁹ Aristeas, 131; cf. 229.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 189; cf. 200, 235.

of the "service of God," is not found in Greek philosophy as a virtue. It is used indeed in Greek philosophy as an epistemological term and as such it is defined by Plato as an opinion (*δόξα*) about real things,¹¹¹ by Aristotle as a vehement assumption (*ὑπόληψις σφοδρά*),¹¹² and by the Stoics as a strong assumption (*ὑπόληψις ἰσχυρά*).¹¹³ This definition is also used by Philo in his comment on the verse "And Abraham believed (*ἐπίστευσε*) in God"¹¹⁴ that "he had an unswerving and firm assumption (*ἀκλινη καὶ βεβαλαν ὑπόληψιν*)."¹¹⁵ But in Greek philosophy prior to Philo neither faith in general nor faith in God in particular is spoken of as a virtue on a par with piety, the fear of God and holiness. Philo's treatment of it as a virtue is based, as may be gathered from his many texts, on the verse just quoted, where it is said concerning Abraham's belief in God that "it was counted to him for justice (*δικαιοσύνην*)."¹¹⁶ On the basis of this verse Philo therefore describes faith in God by the adjective just (*δίκαιος*)¹¹⁶ and considers it as a species of the virtue of justice, that is, justice towards God, in the same way, as we have seen, piety, the fear of God and holiness are considered in Greek philosophy as justice towards the gods. Accordingly, just as piety and holiness were said by Philo, on the basis of the verse that the "fear of God" or "piety" is the beginning of wisdom, that they are the queens or leaders or the beginning of virtues, so also with regard to faith he says that it is the queen (*βασιλεύς*) of virtues¹¹⁷ or the most perfect (*τελειωτάτη*) of virtues¹¹⁸ or the most certain (*βεβαιοτάτη*) of

¹¹¹ Cf. *Republic* VII, 534 A; cf. VI, 511 E.

¹¹² *Topica* IV, 5, 126b, 18.

¹¹³ Stobaeus, *Eclogae* II, p. 112, l. 12; Arnim, III, 548, p. 147, l. 11. Wachsmuth's change of *ὑπόληψις* to *κατάληψις*, adopted also by Arnim on the basis of the statement in Aristotle, does not seem necessary.

¹¹⁴ Gen. 15:6.

¹¹⁵ *Virt.* 39, 216. Cf. above, I, 152.

¹¹⁷ *Abr.* 46, 270.

¹¹⁶ *Heres* 19, 94-95.

¹¹⁸ *Heres* 18, 91.

the virtues ¹¹⁹ or "a perfect good" (*ἀγαθὸν τέλειον*).¹²⁰ As the queen and most perfect of virtues faith in God is contrasted by him with faith in "high offices or fame or honors or abundance of wealth and noble birth or health and efficacy of the senses or strength and beauty of body."¹²¹ All these, as will be recalled, constitute what is called "external goods" or "external advantages," and some of them "virtues of the body," all of which are contrasted with true virtue, the virtue of the soul.¹²² As defined by him, faith in God means to believe (1) that "there is one cause above all,"¹²³ that is, "to believe in God alone and join no other with Him,"¹²⁴ and (2) that God "provides for the world and all that there is therein."¹²⁵ Belief in the existence of one God who exercises His providence over the world is thus that which, according to Philo, constitutes the virtue of faith.¹²⁶

But this faith in God is contrasted by him not only with the allurements of external goods but also with the allurements of reason, for in one passage, in a comment on the verse quoted above about Abraham's faith in God and on the verse "Not so my servant Moses; he is faithful (*πιστός*) in all my house,"¹²⁷ he says: "So then it is best to have faith in God and not in our dim reasonings (*λογισμοῖς*) and insecure conjectures (*εἰκασίας*)," for "if we repose our faith in our own reasonings, we shall construct and build up the city of mind that corrupts the truth."¹²⁸ Thus faith, or faith in God, means to him belief in the revealed truths of Scripture, in contrast to opinions which are discovered by reason. But then faith, or faith in God, means to him also belief in the fulfillment of the promises made by God

¹¹⁹ *Virt.* 39, 216.

¹²⁰ *Migr.* 9, 44.

¹²¹ *Abr.* 45, 263.

¹²² Cf. above, p. 203.

¹²³ *Virt.* 39, 216.

¹²⁴ *Heres* 19, 92.

¹²⁵ *Virt.* 39, 216.

¹²⁶ Cf. also above, I, 151-152.

¹²⁷ *Num.* 12: 7.

¹²⁸ *Leg. All.* III, 81, 228.

as recorded in Scripture, for, again, commenting upon the apparent inconsistency between the verse "and Abraham believed in God" and the verse in which Abraham asks "O Lord God, whereby shall I know that I shall inherit it,"¹²⁹ he says: "He has believed that he will be the inheritor of wisdom, but he merely asks how this shall come to pass; that it will come to pass is a fact that he has completely and firmly grasped in accordance with the divine promises."¹³⁰ It is in its first sense that the term faith is taken by St. Augustine in his interpretation of the verse "and Abraham believed in God."¹³¹ Hence the term faith means with Philo two things: (1) belief in the unity and providence of God as well as in all the truths revealed directly by God, (2) trust in God. Both these meanings are logically interrelated, and it is faith in both these meanings that he has in mind when he says that "faith in God is one sure and infallible good"¹³² or when he describes "faith in the Existent" as "the queen of virtues."¹³³

(c) *Moral Virtues and Actions*

The cardinal virtues of the intellectual type are thus piety, godliness, holiness, and faith, all of which are included under wisdom, by which is meant the service of God. As for the cardinal virtues of the moral type, they are prudence, courage, temperance, and justice,¹³⁴ which list by the time of Philo was already a philosophic commonplace. There is much of the preacher's eloquence in his discussions of these cardinal virtues, but they are not of any philosophic significance, except in so far as they deal with the problem of the mean, which will be discussed later.¹³⁵ With the virtue of justice he often couples the virtue of humanity (*φιλανθρω-*

¹²⁹ Gen. 15: 8.

¹³⁰ *Heres* 21, 100-101.

¹³¹ *De Spiritu et Littera* XXXI, 54 (PL, 44, 235).

¹³² *Abr.* 46, 268.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 270.

¹³⁴ *Mos.* II, 39, 216; *Leg. All.* II, 6, 18.

¹³⁵ Cf. below, pp. 268 ff.

πλα),¹³⁶ and both justice and humanity in their relation to actions corresponding to the moral virtues are compared by him to piety and holiness in their relation to actions corresponding to the intellectual virtues, for both these two sets of virtues are the "two mainheads" of all the "particular lessons and doctrines," the former two constituting the rules regulating one's conduct towards men and the latter two constituting the rules regulating one's conduct towards God.¹³⁷ The term humanity (φιλανθρωπια), is used by him in the sense of giving help to those who are in need of it,¹³⁸ and he describes it as "the virtue closest akin to piety, its sister and its twin," for it is a "high road leading to holiness"¹³⁹ and "the nature which is pious is also humane, and the same person will exhibit both qualities, holiness to God and justice to men."¹⁴⁰ Then, also, with the virtue of humanity he connects the virtues of fellowship (κοινωνια), concord (ὁμόνοια), equality (ισότης),¹⁴¹ grace (χάρις),¹⁴² and mercy (ἐλεος).¹⁴³

All these, on the whole, reflect such statements in Greek philosophy as that in which "equality" (ισότης) and "kindness of heart" (εὐγνώμοσίνη) are said to be connected with justice.¹⁴⁴ But the term *philanthropia*, for which we have been using the English "humanity," judging from a passage in which it is discussed, does not seem to rank in Greek philosophy among the virtues,¹⁴⁵ though in later Latin philosophy the term *humanitas* does occur as a virtue under

¹³⁶ *Mut.* 40, 225; *Mos.* II, 2, 9; *Decal.* 30, 164.

¹³⁷ *Spec.* II, 15, 63.

¹³⁸ *Virt.* 13, 80 ff.

¹³⁹ *Virt.* 9, 51.

¹⁴⁰ *Abr.* 37, 208.

¹⁴⁴ Diogenes, VII, 126; cf. also "caritas, amicitia, iustitia, reliquae virtutes" in Cicero, *Academica Priora* II, 46, 140.

¹⁴⁵ Diogenes, III, 98; cf. Colson, VIII, General Introduction, p. xi, n.b. Cf. also R. Reitzenstein, *Werden und Wesen der Humanität im Altertum*, 1907.

¹⁴¹ *Spec.* I, 53, 295.

¹⁴² *Mos.* II, 43, 242.

¹⁴³ *Somn.* I, 23, 147.

the virtue of justice.¹⁴⁶ Then, again, as of piety and holiness, so also of justice he says that it is the "leader" and "ruler" among the virtues,¹⁴⁷ and similarly of humanity he says that it is one of the two "leaders of the virtues,"¹⁴⁸ the other being piety. Now his statement with regard to justice may reflect Aristotle's statement quoted above that "justice is often thought to be the greatest of virtues,"¹⁴⁹ and one can readily see how Philo, having coupled humanity with justice, should consider also humanity as the greatest of virtues. But there may be another reason for his elevation of humanity or philanthropy to the leadership of the virtues, and that is the influence of Jewish tradition, which we have already found to be the direct reason for his treatment of piety and holiness as leaders among the virtues. In the Septuagint the Greek word for justice (*δικαιοσύνη*) translates the Hebrew word *ṣedaḳah*,¹⁵⁰ and the same term *ṣedaḳah* is also translated there by the Greek term for "mercy" or "alms" (*ἐλεημοσύνη*),¹⁵¹ which, as we have seen, is treated by Philo as a virtue akin to the virtue of humanity.¹⁵² Thus the Hebrew term *ṣedaḳah* means both justice and philanthropy or humanity, the latter in the sense of giving help to those who are in need of it. Now in native Judaism the view has been expressed that "the commandment of *ṣedaḳah* is balanced against all the commandments together."¹⁵³ Philo's statement that justice and humanity are the leaders among the virtues is probably only another way of expressing the same traditional view. So also in the Letter of Aristeas

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Macrobius, *Commentarius ex Cicerone in Somnium Scipionis* I, 8 (M. Nisard, *Collections des Auteurs Latins*, p. 33, col. 1).

¹⁴⁷ Plant. 28, 122 (ἕταρχος, ἡγεμονίς); cf. *Abr.* 5, 27 (ἡγεμονίς).

¹⁴⁸ *Virt.* 18, 95.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. above, p. 215.

¹⁵⁰ Gen. 18: 19.

¹⁵¹ Deut. 6: 25; 24: 13; Isa. 1: 27; Dan. 4: 24.

¹⁵² Cf. above, n. 138.

¹⁵³ *Baba Baira* 9a.

justice (*δικαιοσύνη*) is said to be one of the two principles which "our Lawgiver first of all (*πρώτον*) laid down,"¹⁵⁴ the other being "piety."¹⁵⁵

Connected with the four cardinal virtues, of which in this particular passage he happens to mention only temperance and justice, is also nobility, for "we must give the name of noble to the temperate and the just."¹⁵⁶ "Nobility," he echoes the common sentiment of the Stoics,¹⁵⁷ does not mean descent from "many generations of wealth and distinction,"¹⁵⁸ but is rather "the peculiar portion of a mind purged of every spot."¹⁵⁹ He speaks of it therefore as "nobility of soul" (*ψυχῆς εὐγένεια*) and couples it with "greatness of spirit" (*φρονήματος μέγεθος*),¹⁶⁰ and asserts that the wise "alone is noble."¹⁶¹ In Judaism, while importance is attached to nobility of descent, there was a similar tendency to lay greater importance upon nobility of learning, which is the equivalent of the Stoic nobility of virtue. The most characteristic expression on this point is that a learned bastard has precedence over an ignorant high priest.¹⁶²

Following again Aristotle's statements that "moral virtue comes about as a result of habit," that habits are formed by practice, and that the practice of good actions is the purpose of laws,¹⁶³ Philo tries to show that the laws of Moses have for their purpose the inculcation of moral virtues. Such laws are in the first place the last five of the ten commandments and, in the second place, the many particular laws which fall

¹⁵⁴ Aristeas, 131.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. above, p. 214.

¹⁵⁶ *Virt.* 35, 189.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Cohn, *Philos Werke*, II, p. 367, n. 2; Colson, VIII, p. 449, § 189; Arnim, Index, s.v.

¹⁵⁸ *Virt.* 35, 187.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 189.

¹⁶⁰ *Mos.* I, 27, 149; cf. *Eth. Nic.* I, 10, 1100b, 32-33: γεννάδας καὶ μεγαλόψυχος.

¹⁶¹ *Sobr.* 11, 56; cf. Arnim, III, 594, 597.

¹⁶² Cf. *M. Horayot* III, 8.

¹⁶³ Cf. above, p. 210.

under them. These laws are each intended to promote a certain particular moral virtue. The laws concerning witnesses, judges, kings, and trade all tend to promote the virtue of justice; ¹⁶⁴ those concerning the poor, the stranger, and the orphan — the virtues of humanity as well as of justice; ¹⁶⁵ those concerning the waging of war — the virtue of courage; ¹⁶⁶ and those concerning circumcision, ¹⁶⁷ marriage, ¹⁶⁸ and diet ¹⁶⁹ — the virtue of temperance. ¹⁷⁰ However, this classification of the laws according to virtues, we are warned by Philo, should not be taken too rigidly, for each of the ten commandments, as well as the particular laws which fall under it, “separately and all in common incite and exhort us to wisdom and justice and godliness and the rest of the company of virtues.” ¹⁷¹ In native Jewish tradition the same view is expressed in the statement that the ten commandments “are all held fast to one another,” ¹⁷² that is to say, they are inseparable from one another, they are implied in one another. With regard to the fifth commandment, about honoring one’s father and mother, he shows how it has both an intellectual and moral purpose, ¹⁷³ for this commandment, he says, “stands on the border-line between the human and the divine,” ¹⁷⁴ for “parents are to their children what God is to

¹⁶⁴ *Spec.* IV, 25, 132–52, 238.

¹⁶⁵ *Virt.* 9, 51–32, 174.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.* I, 1–8, 50.

¹⁶⁷ *Migr.* 16, 92; *Spec.* I, 2, 8–11.

¹⁶⁸ *Spec.* III, 2, 7–14, 82.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.* IV, 14, 79–24, 131.

¹⁷⁰ In connection with circumcision Philo says that its purpose is “the excision of excessive and superfluous pleasure” (*Spec.* I, 2, 9; cf. *Migr.* 16, 92), which means temperance (cf. *Eth. Nic.* II, 7, 1107b, 4–6). In connection with the marriage laws and the dietary laws, he says that their purpose is “continence” (ἐγκράτεια) (*Spec.* III, 4, 22; IV, 16, 97), which term he constantly uses as synonymous with “temperance” (cf. *Leisegang, Indices*, s.v.), evidently following Aristotle’s statement that by analogy “temperance” is called “continence” (*Eth. Nic.* VII, 10, 1151b, 32–1152a, 3); cf. below, p. 235.

¹⁷¹ *Spec.* IV, 25, 134.

¹⁷² *Mekilta de- Rabbi Simeon ben Yoḥai* on Exod. 20: 17, p. 112; *Pesikta Rabbati*, 21, p. 107a.

¹⁷³ *Spec.* II, 38, 224–43, 241.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 38, 224; cf. *Decal.* 22, 106.

the world.”¹⁷⁵ In native Jewish tradition the same view is expressed in the statement that “Scripture places the honoring of father and mother on a level with the honoring of God.”¹⁷⁶

The intellectual and moral virtues which the laws are meant to inculcate are called by Philo their underlying meaning (*ὑπόνοια*) as contrasted with the external observance which is their literal (*δητή*) or obvious (*φανερὰ*) meaning.¹⁷⁷ The underlying meaning is compared by him to the soul of the law and their external observance to the body.¹⁷⁸ It would seem that he considered all the laws of the Pentateuch as having some intellectual or moral purpose; there is no indication that some laws were considered by him as being arbitrary commands of God without any purpose. But the fact that the laws have an intellectual or moral purpose, a purpose which may perhaps be attained in some other way or by some other practices, does not mean that the external observance of the law can be neglected. These laws are God-given and therefore their mere observance has an intrinsic value. The laws of the Sabbath and of the festivals and of the Temple service have indeed an intellectual purpose, and so also indeed has the rite of circumcision a moral purpose, still the external observance of these laws and this rite as means of attaining that intellectual and moral purpose is of equal importance.¹⁷⁹ There is, however, one condition which is required in order to make the external observance of the law a meritorious act. The law must be performed, like any moral act, with intention, for “right

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 38, 225.

¹⁷⁶ *Mekilta, Bahodesh*, 8, F, p. 70a; W, p. 78; HR, p. 321; L., II, p. 258; *Sifra, Kedoshim*, Proem, p. 86d; *Ḳiddushin* 30b. Cf. Heinemann, *Philos Werke*, II, p. 170, n. 2.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. above, I, 115.

¹⁷⁸ *Migr.* 16, 93; cf. above, I, 67; *Cont.* 10, 78.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 89-93.

actions (κατορθώματα) that spring from forethought (ἐκ προνοίας) are of greater worth than those that are involuntary”¹⁸⁰ and “those who perform any other thing that they ought to do without the assent (ἀσυγκαταθέτω) of their mind or will, but by doing violence to their inclination, do not achieve righteousness.”¹⁸¹ The language used by Philo in these passages is Stoic.¹⁸² But it also reflects the native Jewish sentiments with regard to the requirement of intention (*kavvanah*) and a feeling of joy (*simḥah*) in the performance of any commandment of the Law, expressed in the statement that “commandments require intention”¹⁸³ and in the frequent allusions to “the joy of the performance of a commandment.”¹⁸⁴ The Hebrew “intention” and “joy” which must accompany the performance of a commandment are the equivalents of the Stoic “forethought” (πρόνοια) and “assent” (συγκατάθεσις) which must accompany right actions. The assent of the mind which according to Philo is to accompany the performance of any virtuous act is sometimes described by him as joy, as, for instance, in his statement that “the reward which is set aside for the victorious champion who gained his virtue through nature and without a struggle is joy (χαρὰ),”¹⁸⁵ or in his statement that “there is no sweeter delight (τέρψις) than that the soul should be charged through and through with justice,”¹⁸⁶ or in his statement that only when a man “feels more joy at being the servant of God than if he had been king of all the human race” will he speak out freely to God, instead of

¹⁸⁰ *Post.* 3, 11. Cf. Aristotle's definition of virtue in *Eth. Nic.* II, 6, 1106b, 36.

¹⁸¹ *Immut.* 22, 100.

¹⁸² Cf. Arnim, III, 500 ff.; III, 177.

¹⁸³ *Berakot* 13a.

¹⁸⁴ *Berakot* 31a; *Shabbat* 30b; *Pesahim* 117a.

¹⁸⁵ *Praem.* 5, 31.

¹⁸⁶ *Spec.* IV, 26, 141.

being struck speechless out of fear of Him.¹⁸⁷ All these are nothing but what the rabbis, reflecting many scriptural passages,¹⁸⁸ refer to as the "joy" which is to be experienced in the performance of the commandments of the Law.

III. THE VIRTUE OF THE CONTROL OF DESIRE

In his discussion of the intellectual virtues, Philo has shown that the Pentateuch not only commands the performance of certain actions which symbolize such beliefs as the existence of God and His unity and His providence, but that it also teaches directly that man must believe in these principles and harbor them in his mind as an intellectual conviction. He now wants to show that similarly in the case of the moral virtues the Pentateuch demands not only what Aristotle calls the "use" of virtue but also what he calls the "possession" of it.¹ Not only must one act virtuously; one must also be of a virtuous state of character. Not only must one refrain from wronging others; one must also refrain from having wrong emotions. Had Philo chosen he could have quoted such direct commands as "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart . . . nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."² He could have further shown how these commands not to hate and not to bear a grudge and to love all deal with what in philosophic language is called the emotion of desire, for "hatred" (*μῖσος*) and "grudge" (*μῆνις*) are ranged by the Stoics under the emotion of desire

¹⁸⁷ *Heres* 2, 7.

¹⁸⁸ As, for instance, Jer. 15: 16; Ps. 19: 9; 119: 162. Cf. S. Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, pp. 148-169.

¹ *Eth. Nic.* I, 8, 1098b, 31-33; cf. above, p. 205.

² Lev. 19: 17-18. These verses are taken by Maimonides as examples of purely moral commandments dealing with emotions (*Sefer ha-Miṣwot, Shoresh* 9).

(ἐπιθυμία),³ and "affection" (ἀγάπησις) is placed by them under the good emotional state (εὐπάθεια) of wishing (βούλησις), which is the counterpart of desire (ἐπιθυμία).⁴ Philo, however, does not comment directly on these commandments not to hate and not to grudge but to love, though he touches upon such vices of pure emotion as pride and arrogance.⁵ But he comments directly upon the last of the ten commandments, "Thou shalt not desire," and in his comments on it he points out the special character of this commandment as being one which does not deal with action but rather with pure emotion.⁶

The special character of this commandment as dealing with pure emotion rather than with action is already found in native Jewish literature. Drawing upon the distinction between the two Hebrew terms *taḥmod*⁷ and *ti'aveh*,⁸ used in the tenth commandment, which for the sake of convenience we shall translate respectively by "covet" and "desire,"⁹ a Tannaitic Midrash says that the prohibition "Thou shalt not desire," as distinguished from the prohibition "Thou shalt not covet," means that one is not to desire that which belongs to another even though he has no intent to acquire possession of the object desired. According to this interpretation, the tenth commandment contains two prohibitions, one of them a prohibition against merely having a desire for that which belongs to another and the transgression of this prohibition, on purely legal grounds, is completed as soon as the desire is conceived in the heart, and the other a pro-

³ Diogenes, VII, 113.

⁴ *Idem.*, VII, 116.

⁵ *Virt.* 30, 161-163.

⁶ *Decal.* 28, 142-153; *Spec.* IV, 14, 79-15, 94.

⁷ Exod. 20: 14 (17); Deut. 5: 18 (21).

⁸ Deut. 5: 18 (21).

⁹ In the Authorized Version the terms "covet" and "desire" are used indiscriminately in the translation of this commandment.

hibition against coveting that which belongs to another and the transgression of this prohibition, again on purely legal grounds, is not completed until the object coveted is obtained possession of. The original text on this subject reads as follows: "To 'desire' is in the heart, as it is said, 'thou mayest eat flesh after all the desire of thy soul'¹⁰; to 'covet' is in action, as it is said, 'thou shalt not covet the silver and the gold that is on them and take it unto thee.'¹¹"¹² The reason why the mere desiring of that which belongs to another is prohibited is explained as follows: "If a man desires that which others have, he will be led finally to covet [and to think of means to obtain] that which others have . . . if a man covets [and thinks of means to obtain] that which others have, he will be led finally to rob."¹³ It is furthermore explained that the transgression of the commandment "thou shalt not covet or desire," as well as the transgression of any of the other commandments, will lead to the transgression of all the other commandments, for "all the commandments are held fast to one another, so that if a man has broken through one of them he will be led finally to break through all of them."¹⁴

The Septuagint, just as some of the later rabbis,¹⁵ takes no cognizance of the difference between the two Hebrew terms used in the tenth commandment. Both these terms are translated by the same Greek word *ἐπιθυμῆσεις*. Nor is such a distinction assumed by Philo in his discussion of this commandment. Like the Septuagint, he uses the term *ἐπιθυμία*

¹⁰ Deut. 12: 20.

¹¹ Deut. 7: 25.

¹² *Mekilta de- Rabbi Simeon ben Yoḥai* on Exod. 20: 17 (14), p. 112.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 113; cf. *Pesikta Rabbati*, 21, p. 107a.

¹⁵ *Rashi* on Deut. 5: 18; *Sefer Mišwot Gadol*, Negative Commandment 158; *'Ammude Golah (Sefer Mišwot Ḳaṭan)*, 19.

for both Hebrew words. From his discussion of this commandment it is quite evident that Philo takes the term *ἐπιθυμία* to mean the same as the term "desire" is taken in the Tannaitic Midrash in its distinction from the term "covet" and the commandment is accordingly interpreted by him as a prohibition of a mere desire, even though it is not accompanied by an intent to gain possession of the thing desired, so that the infraction of that commandment is completed as soon as such a desire is conceived. It is of course also to be assumed that the desire legally prohibited in this commandment is a desire for something which belongs to somebody else, for this is the obvious meaning of the commandment which reads "thou shalt not desire thy neighbor's house," or similar things which belong to one's neighbor. Though Philo speaks of desire in general, that is, of a desire for what we have not got,¹⁶ and not of a desire for that which belongs to somebody else, still his discussion, in so far as it is a commentary upon the commandment, implies that the desire of which he speaks is that desire which the commandment explicitly describes as a desire for that which belongs to another person. When in his explanation why desire is prohibited he says, almost in the words of the rabbis quoted above, that "if the desire is directed to money, it makes men thieves and cut-purses and robbers and house-breakers,"¹⁷ the opening statement, to be sure, does not speak of a desire directed to the money which belongs to another person, still the subsequent statement that a desire for money leads to robbery and purse-cutting and house-breaking makes it quite evident that the desire for money spoken of was not a desire for money in general but rather for the money in the pocket or the purse or the house of one particular person, for

¹⁶ This point is unduly stressed by Colson, VIII, General Introduction, p. x.

¹⁷ *Spec.* IV, 15, 87.

however general the desire for money spoken of may be originally, it will certainly be transformed into a desire for the money of certain particular persons if it is to lead to stealing and robbery and house-breaking. It is exactly the latter kind of desire, the desire for that which belongs to somebody else, that the tenth commandment as a law, and not a mere moral maxim, legally prohibits, according to Philo, for the ten commandments, as Philo himself says, are not merely moral maxims but "laws or statutes in the true sense of the term."¹⁸ Then, also, as the rabbis in their discussion of the commandment, so also Philo intimates that the breaking of the tenth commandment will ultimately lead to the breaking of all the other commandments. Speaking of the wrongdoings that desire might lead to he mentions "plunderings and robberies and repudiations of debts and false accusations, also seductions, adulteries, murders, and, in short, wrongful actions, whether private or public, whether in things sacred or in things profane."¹⁹ This list of wrongdoings is almost a summary of the things prohibited in the ten commandments. Philo seems to say that the reason why the tenth commandment prohibits one from desiring a neighbor's house or wife or manservant or maidservant or ox or ass or anything that belongs to him, is that such a desire will lead to the breaking of the commandments against murder and adultery and stealing and bearing false witness against one's neighbor and also the first five commandments which deal with things sacred.

In his discussion of the legal prohibition not to desire that which belongs to one's neighbor, a prohibition, as we have said, of a mere desire for that which belongs to one's neighbor, even when not accompanied by an intent to get posses-

¹⁸ *Decal.* 9, 32.

¹⁹ *Spec. IV*, 15, 84; cf. *Decal.* 28, 151-153.

sion of the thing desired, Philo takes occasion to deliver himself of a homily on the evils of desire on purely moral grounds. Beginning with a diatribe against the evils of emotion in general,²⁰ describing it as "the vilest thing in itself and the cause of the vilest actions,"²¹ he particularly denounces the emotion of desire as "a battery of destruction to the soul,"²² characterizing it as "the fountain of all evil"²³ and urging that, in order to obtain perfection and happiness, desire "must be done away with or brought into obedience to the guidance of reason."²⁴ In native Judaism the same sentiments would be expressed in a diatribe against the evil *yeşer* and the advice that "at all times let man stir up his good *yeşer* against his evil *yeşer*."²⁵ The evil *yeşer* and good *yeşer*, literally, the evil imagination and the good imagination, are the rabbinic equivalent of what Greek philosophers call emotion and reason, and sometimes the "evil *yeşer*" is identified with "desire."²⁶ As we shall show later, Philo alludes to the terms evil and good *yeşer* as meaning emotion and reason,²⁷ and his description here of emotion as "vilest thing" (*αἰσχιστον*)²⁸ also has its equivalent in the

²⁰ *Spec.* IV, 14, 79; *Decal.* 28, 142-146.

²¹ *Spec.* IV, 16, 95.

²² *Ibid.*; cf. *Decal.* 28, 142.

²³ *Spec.* IV, 15, 84.

²⁴ *Ibid.* IV, 16, 95; cf. *Decal.* 28, 150, where only the second remedy, that of checking desire by reason, is mentioned. Both these alternatives reflect the two definitions of virtue, the Stoic and the Aristotelian. The Stoic definition maintains that virtue is complete exemption from emotion (*ἀπάθεια*). Cf. Zeller, III, 14, p. 240, nn. 1-2 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*,² p. 254, nn. 4-5); Arnim, III, § 201. The Aristotelian definition means that the emotion is to be controlled by reason; cf. below, pp. 268 ff.

²⁵ *Berakot* 5a.

²⁶ Cf. *M. Abot* IV, 21: "Envy, desire and ambition take a man out of the world," in which the term "desire" evidently corresponds to the term "evil *yeşer*" in *M. Abot* II, 11: "The evil eye, the evil *yeşer* and hatred of his fellow-creatures put a man out of the world." Cf. *Tosefot Yom-Ṭob* on IV, 21.

²⁷ Cf. below, p. 288.

²⁸ *Spec.* IV, 16, 95; cf. above, n. 21.

rabbinic description of the evil *yeşer* as the "vile thing" (*menuwwal*)²⁹ or the "unclean thing" (*tame*).³⁰ Sometimes instead of desire Philo makes pleasure the source of all sin and evil.³¹ Sometimes the terms desire (*concupiscentia*) and pleasure (*voluptas*) are used by him interchangeably.³² It is the Stoics, however, whom Philo follows here in the external formulation of his views. The particular teachings of the Stoics that are reflected in the passages quoted from Philo are those which are reported in their name to the effect that "the emotions of fear, grief, and lust (*libido*) are sins, even when no extraneous result ensues"³³ and that, while there is a difference between the various ailments of the soul, "in practice at any rate they are combined and their origin is found in lust (*libido*) and delight (*laetitia*),"³⁴ or that "the fountain of all disorders is intemperance, which is a revolt from all the guidance of mind and right reason."³⁵ He similarly follows the Stoics in his definition of emotion as an "inordinate and excessive impulse" and as an "irrational and unnatural movement of the soul."³⁶ Also of Stoic origin is his enumeration of the four primary emotions, namely, pleasure, pain, fear, and desire.³⁷

But here as elsewhere he does not follow the Stoics blindly. Whenever forced by certain native Jewish presuppositions, he departs from the Stoics and follows some other philosopher or presents a new view of his own. In his discussion of desire in these passages he departs from the Stoics on one funda-

²⁹ *Ḳiddushin* 20b.

³⁰ *Sukkah* 52a.

³¹ *Leg. All.* II, 18, 71-72; 19, 77-78; 26, 107; III, 21, 68; 35, 107; 36, 112; 37, 113.

³² *Qu. in Gen.* I, 31.

³³ Cicero, *De Finibus* III, 9, 32.

³⁴ *Idem, Tusculanae Disputationes* IV, 11, 24.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, IV, 9, 22.

³⁶ *Spec.* IV, 14, 79; cf. Arnim, III, 377 ff.; I, 205 ff.

³⁷ *Decal.* 28, 143-149; cf. Arnim, I, 205 ff.; III, 377 ff.

mental point. In his attempt to explain why desire is worse than all the other emotions and why it is singled out by Moses for special condemnation, he says that "while each of the others, coming from the outside (*θύραθεν*) and assaulting from the outside (*ἔξωθεν*), seems to be involuntary, desire alone derives its origin from ourselves and is voluntary."³⁸ This distinction between desire and the other emotions is in direct opposition to the view of the Stoics. According to the Stoics, there is no such distinction between the emotion of desire and the other emotions. To them all our emotions are voluntary, for to them all the emotions are judgments (*κρίσεις*)³⁹ and hence voluntary (*voluntaria*)⁴⁰ and within our power (*in nostra potestate*).⁴¹

At first sight, this distinction drawn by Philo between the emotion of desire and all the other emotions would seem to be based upon Aristotle, for it contains two elements which would seem to reflect two statements by Aristotle. To begin with, his description of the contrast between involuntary and voluntary as a contrast between that which comes from the outside (*θύραθεν*, *ἔξωθεν*) and that which derives its origin from ourselves corresponds exactly to Aristotle's description of the contrast between involuntary and voluntary as a contrast between actions whose "origin is from the outside (*ἔξωθεν*)"⁴² and actions whose "origin lies in the agent."⁴³ Then, also, his singling out of desire as the only emotion which is voluntary would seem to reflect Aristotle's argument

³⁸ *Decal.* 28, 142.

³⁹ Diogenes, VII, 111.

⁴⁰ Cicero, *Academica Posteriora* I, 10, 39; cf. J. S. Reid's note in his edition.

⁴¹ *Idem*, *Tusculanae Disputationes* IV, 7, 14; cf. Zeller, III, 14, p. 234, nn. 1-3 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*,² p. 248, nn. 1-3); A. Dyroff, "Die Ethik der Alten Stoa," *Berliner Studien für classische Philologie und Archaeologie*, N. F. 2 (1897) p. 155, n. 4.

⁴² *Eth. Nic.* III, 1, 1110b, 15-17.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 3-6.

that, while on the whole emotions may be called involuntary, actions done from desire or from anger cannot be called involuntary.⁴⁴ "Anger," which in this passage is coupled by Aristotle with "desire," was, by the time of Philo, under the influence of the Stoic classification of the emotions, treated as a subdivision of desire.⁴⁵ Thus, according to Aristotle, desire is singled out from all the other emotions as not being involuntary. But as against these two similarities between Philo and Aristotle there is the following important difference. In Aristotle, all the emotions are said to have their origin in the agent himself and if some of the emotions, despite their being in the agent himself, are described by him as involuntary, it is only because, as he himself says, the agent is ignorant of the particular circumstances under which the emotions are experienced by him.⁴⁶ In Philo, on the other hand, all the emotions, with the exception of desire, are described as "coming from the outside and assaulting from the outside."⁴⁷ It is therefore not a preference of Aristotle that has led him to depart from the Stoics on this point. What has led him to depart here from the Stoics in declaring all the emotions, with the exception of desire, as being involuntary and to depart also from Aristotle in declaring all the emotions, with the exception of desire, as coming from without, must be something else.

That something else is his own particular use of the term voluntariness as distinguished from the use of that term by both Aristotle and the Stoics. The voluntariness which Philo attributes here to desire and denies of all the other emotions is unlike the voluntariness which the Stoics attribute to all

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 1111a, 22 ff.

⁴⁵ Stobaeus, *Eclogae* II, p. 91, ll. 10 ff.; Diogenes, VII, 113 (cf. Arnim, III, §§ 395-398).

⁴⁶ *Eth. Nic.* III, 1, 1110b, 18 ff.

⁴⁷ *Decal.* 28, 142; cf. above, n. 38.

the emotions and which Aristotle hesitates to deny altogether of the emotions of desire and anger. To both the Stoics and Aristotle the voluntariness under consideration is only a limited and determined voluntariness; it is not an absolute voluntariness. With them, the question whether the emotions, or any of the emotions, are to be considered as voluntary is only a question of whether they take place (1) without external compulsion and (2) with a knowledge of the circumstances. To Philo, however, the voluntariness under consideration is that undetermined free-will, the freedom to do either good or evil, which is a gift of God to man.⁴⁸ Such voluntariness and such freedom is attributed by Philo only to desire. Free choice, Philo seems to argue, must imply free desire (*ἐπιθυμία*), for free choice means the freedom to choose between good and evil, and at the basis of such a choice, according to the accepted Aristotelian psychology, there is appetency (*δρεξις*),⁴⁹ and desire is nothing but "a species of appetency," that kind of appetency which moves a man "in opposition to reason."⁵⁰ Freedom or free choice means both free will (*βούλησις*) and free desire (*ἐπιθυμία*): the former, rational appetency, is freedom to do good; the latter, irrational appetency, is freedom to do evil.⁵¹ But, while on the ground of his belief in the absolute freedom of the will Philo had to assume also the freedom of the emotion of desire, there was no need for him to assume also on that ground the freedom of all the other emotions. With regard to all these other emotions, therefore, as far as he himself was concerned, Philo could have left it to the Peripatetics and the Stoics to fight it out among themselves whether, in the limited sense in which they all use the term voluntary, they are to be called voluntary or involuntary. For himself, to

⁴⁸ Cf. above, I, 431.

⁴⁹ *De Anima* III, 10, 433a, 13.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 25-26.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 23-26; cf. above, I, 431 ff.

whom voluntariness means absolute free will, all these other emotions, though they are commonly spoken of as having their origin within ourselves, really do not originate within ourselves in the sense of their being the choice of our absolutely free will. In comparison with the absolute freedom of desire and of will, they may be considered as coming from the outside and as assaulting us from the outside, for they are involuntary. His statement indeed literally reads, "while each of the others, coming from the outside and assaulting from the outside, *seems to be involuntary*," but in reality it means that each of the other emotions *is involuntary*, for, even though it is strictly speaking within us, *it seems as if it were coming from the outside* and assaulting from the outside. Desire, on the other hand, is voluntary in the absolute sense of the term, for it "derives its origin from ourselves," inasmuch as its freedom has been implanted within us by God as a special gift.

The negative tenth commandment is thus a command to control one's desire. Now, the control of any emotion by reason, if the control establishes a mean between two excesses, is to Aristotle, as well as to Philo, as we shall see,⁵² a virtue, and as most of the other virtues it can be expressed by some positive term. What the positive term is by which the control of excessive desire is to be described is supplied by Aristotle. It is called by him the virtue of continence (*ἐγκράτεια*),⁵³ for, "a man acts continently," he says, "when ever he acts against his desire in accordance with reason."⁵⁴ "Continence" is also a virtue according to the Stoics, though, with their definition of virtue as the extirpation of emotion rather than its control, they probably would con-

⁵² Cf. below, p. 272.

⁵³ *Eth. Eud.* II, 7, 1223b, 11-12.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* II, 7, 1223b, 12-14; cf. *De Anima* III, 9, 433a, 7-8.

sider continence as a virtue when its corresponding emotion is utterly extirpated.⁵⁵ "Continenence" is thus defined by them as "a disposition which is never overcome in that which concerns right reason, or a habit which no pleasures can get the better of."⁵⁶ Following Aristotle in all this, Philo says that "the opposite of desire is continence"⁵⁷ and declares it to be "a pure and stainless virtue,"⁵⁸ or "the most profitable of virtues," which has "thriftiness (*εὐτέλεια*) and contentment (*εὐκολία*) and frugality (*ὀλιγόδεια*) for its bodyguards."⁵⁹ It is linked by him with "piety"⁶⁰ and "humanity"⁶¹ and "godliness,"⁶² and both "continence" and "contentment" (*εὐκολία*) are included by him among the virtues possessed by the Essenes.⁶³ It is the virtue of "continence," he says, that is taught by the tenth commandment⁶⁴ as well as by all those special laws of which the purpose, as seen by him, is to teach the control of desire.⁶⁵ In the Letter of Aristeas the same sentiment is expressed in the king's question "What is the highest form of government?" to which one of the elders answers: "To rule oneself and not to be carried away by impulses."⁶⁶ In native Jew-

⁵⁵ Cf. below, p. 269.

⁵⁶ Diogenes, VII, 93; cf. Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 153. The connection of "continence" with pleasure is found in Aristotle's statement that both the "continent man" and the "temperate man" "do nothing contrary to rule for the sake of bodily pleasures" but that the continent man has "bad appetites" and feels pleasure but is not led by it (*Eth. Nic.* VII, 9, 1151b, 34-1152a, 3). Similarly Philo connects it with pleasure in his statement that "the lover of pleasure is barren of all the chief necessities, temperance, modesty and continence" (*Jos.* 26, 153) and also in his treatment of "the love of pleasure" and "continence" as opposites (*Abr.* 4, 24).

⁵⁷ *Spec.* I, 29, 149.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* I, 29, 150.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* I, 35, 173.

⁶⁰ *Probus* 12, 84. "Contentment" is also mentioned by him among the virtues of the Therapeutae (*Cont.* 9, 69).

⁶¹ *Spec.* IV, 16, 96-97.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 97 ff.; I, 29, 150; 35, 172-173; III, 4, 22.

⁶³ *Ibid.* I, 35, 193; IV, 16, 97.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* IV, 16, 97.

⁶⁵ *Mos.* I, 55, 303.

⁶⁶ Aristeas, 222.

ish tradition, without the benefit of philosophic terminology, the praise of the virtue of the control of desire and of its kindred virtue of contentment is expressed in the following maxims: "Who is mighty? He that subdues his desire. Who is rich? He that is contented with his portion." ⁶⁷

IV. PRAYER, REPENTANCE, AND STUDY AS VIRTUES

In our study of Philo's lists of virtues so far we have come across two new virtues, faith ¹ under intellectual virtues and humanity ² under moral virtues. Three other new virtues mentioned by Philo are prayer, repentance, and study. These require special treatment.

(a) Prayer

Prayer is known in Greek literature by various terms,³ and thanksgiving (*εὐχαριστία* or *χαριστία*) is mentioned in at least one source, as a virtue under the virtue of justice,⁴ but prayer is not identified with the term "thanksgiving," and no Greek philosopher recommends it as a virtue. Philo, however, speaks of prayer, which, for reasons to be explained presently, he calls thanksgiving, as one of the virtues. "Each of the virtues (*ἀρετῶν*)," he says, "is a holy matter, but thanksgiving is preëminently so."⁵ Again, "the mind that blesses (*εὐλογῶν*) God, and is ceaselessly engaged in conning hymns of thanksgiving to Him" is described by him as the mind of those who are "of a rational and virtuous

⁶⁷ *M. Abot* IV, 1.

¹ Cf. above, pp. 212 f.; 215 ff.

² Cf. above, pp. 218 ff.

³ Cf. below, p. 239.

⁴ Cf. Andronicus of Rhodes, *De Affectibus: De Justitia* (F. W. A. Mullach, *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum* III, p. 577).

⁵ *Plant.*, 30, 126.

(*σπουδαίας*) nature.”⁶ This inclusion of prayer among the virtues is due to the fact that prayer is considered in Judaism as one of the commandments, and the commandments, as we have seen, are identified by Philo with what the philosophers call virtues. For him to speak of the virtue of prayer was the same as for a Palestinian Jew of his time to speak of the *miṣvah* or commandment of prayer.

In native Jewish tradition one of the pentateuchal sources for the commandment of prayer is found in the verses “Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, Him thou shalt serve, and to Him thou shalt cleave, and by His name shalt thou swear. He is thy praise, and He is thy God.”⁷ Taking the expression “He is thy praise” to mean that God alone is to be praised, a Tannaitic source comments upon it that “prayer and praise mean the same thing.”⁸ There is an intimation in Philo that this verse was considered by him, too, as the pentateuchal source for the commandment of the virtue of prayer. It happens that the Hebrew expression which we have quoted as “He is thy praise” and is taken by the rabbis to mean that God alone is to be praised or prayed to, is translated in the Septuagint by “He is thy boast,” meaning that God alone is that of which one is to be proud or to boast.⁹ Philo, making use of this Septuagint translation, paraphrases it by “let God alone be thy boast (*αὔχημα*) and thy chief glory (*κλέος*)”¹⁰ and explains it, exactly in the sense in which it is taken in the Septuagint, to mean that we are to pride ourselves only on God and not on wealth or

⁶ *Ibid.* 33, 135.

⁷ Deut. 10: 20-21.

⁸ *Mishnat Rabbi Eliezer* XII, ed. Enelow, p. 228, ll. 15-16. For another pentateuchal source of prayer see below, n. 62.

⁹ This is also the explanation of this expression given by the mediaeval Hebrew commentator Ibn Ezra, *ad loc.*

¹⁰ *Spec.* I, 57, 311. The combination of the two terms *αὔχημα* and *κλέος* occurs also in Philo elsewhere (*Spec.* IV, 32, 164; *Virt.* 36, 197).

dominion or beauty or strength. But then he concludes: "Let us follow after the good that is stable, and unswerving and unchangeable, and let us cleave to our prayer (*ικεστας*) to Him as suppliants and to our worship (*θεραπειας*) of Him."¹¹ This concluding statement makes it quite evident that, like the Tannaitic source, he takes the expression "He is thy boast" in connection with the expressions "Him thou shalt serve, and to Him thou shalt cleave" as having also the meaning of prayer and divine worship.

Not only is his description of prayer as a virtue based upon the institution of prayer in Judaism, but also of Jewish origin are the terms which he uses in connection with prayer as well as his fundamental conceptions of prayer.

In Greek, the principal terms for prayer are four. (1) *εὐχεσθαι*, referring primarily to a prayer of petition, (2) *προσεύχεσθαι*, normally meaning a prayer of thanksgiving, (3) *ἐπέυχεσθαι*, having also the meaning of praying a curse, and (4) *λιτέσθαι*, chiefly used in the sense of praying for forgiveness.¹² The first three of these terms, and many other Greek terms, are used in the Septuagint indiscriminately as translations of the various Hebrew words for prayer or for the various forms of prayer. In Philo, in addition to the terms used in the Septuagint, many other terms are used as designations of prayer or of the various kinds of prayer. As a rule, these terms are used indiscriminately. But occasionally we notice an attempt to individualize these terms, to define them and to classify them. The most general term for prayer, he suggests in one place, is the term "praise" (*αἴνεσις*),¹³ which is used in the Septuagint most often as a translation of the Hebrew word *todah*. But inasmuch as

¹¹ *Spec.* I, 57, 311-312.

¹² Cf. A. W. Mair, "Prayer (Greek)," *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, X, pp. 182-183, § 1.

¹³ *Spec.* I, 41, 224.

this term in the original Hebrew means not only (1) praise, but also (2) thanksgiving and (3) confession of sin, the Septuagint is trying to convey all these meanings of the term by translating it besides by the term (1) *αἰνεσις*, also by the terms (2) *δῶρον, χαρμοσύνη* and (3) *ἔξομολόγησις*.¹⁴ Philo similarly shows that he was aware of the three meanings of the Hebrew word *todah* when, in his attempt to explain the etymology of the Hebrew name Judah, he gives its meanings as (1) praised (*αἰνετός*) by God,¹⁵ as (2) he "who blesses (*εὐλογῶν*) God and is ceaselessly engaged in conning hymns of thanksgiving (*εὐχαριστους*) to Him,"¹⁶ and hence as the thanksgiver (*εὐχάριστον*)¹⁷ and as (3) confession (*ἔξομολόγησις*) to the Lord,¹⁸ that is, confession of thankfulness or praise to the Lord.¹⁹ Evidently, therefore, when he says that the most general term for prayer is *αἰνεσις*, he uses this term as embracing all the meanings of its corresponding Hebrew term *todah*. Under this term *αἰνεσις* he therefore includes, as he says, all "expressions of thanksgiving (*εὐχαρισταις*) as religion demands," of which he mentions in particular "hymns (*ὑμνοῖς*) and predications of happiness (*εὐδαιμονισμοῖς*) and prayers (*εὐχαῖς*) and sacrifices (*θυσλαῖς*)." ²⁰ "Prayer" (*εὐχή*), however, which is here included under "thanksgiving" and "praise," he explains elsewhere in one place as "a petition (*αἴτησις*) for good things" ²¹ and in an-

¹⁴ Cf. Hatch and Redpath, *A Concordance to the Septuagint*, s.v.

¹⁵ *Plant.* 33, 135.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*; cf. *Somn.* II, 5, 34.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 136.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 134; cf. *Leg. All.* I, 26, 80; II, 24, 96; III, 8, 26; 49, 146; *Mut.* 23, 136; *Somn.* I, 6, 37.

¹⁹ There is no implication of confession of sin in his explanation of the meaning of the name Judah in any of the passages quoted in the preceding note, nor does Philo use the term *ἔξομολόγησις* in the sense of confession of sin. In the Septuagint it is used mostly in the sense of a confession of thankfulness but sometimes also in the sense of a confession of sin (cf. Josh. 7: 19; Dan. 9: 4).

²⁰ *Spec.* I, 41, 224.

²¹ *Agr.* 22, 99.

other place as that which Moses "is accustomed to call benedictions (*εὐλογίας*)," ²² that is, the Hebrew *berakot*.²³ Later we shall show that he also uses it in the sense of "confession of sin."²⁴ From all this we may gather that, while literally the Greek term *εὐχαριστία* is a translation of the Hebrew term *todah* in the sense of thanksgiving, the same Greek term is also used in the sense of (1) praise, *αἰνεσις*, (2) petition, *εὐχή*, (3) benediction, *εὐλογία*, (4) confession, *ἔξομολόγησις*. It is the term "thanksgiving" in this general sense of "praise," "petition," "benediction," and "confession" that Philo has in mind when he speaks of "thanksgiving" as a virtue, that is, a religious commandment. The use of the term "thanksgiving" by Philo in the general sense of prayer in all its forms is analogous to the use of the term *berakah*, benediction, in Hebrew in the same general sense of prayer.²⁵ It must be in this general sense that the term "thanksgiving" is also used in other Hellenistic Jewish writings.²⁶ From the New Testament we know that the terms *εὐλογία* and *εὐχαριστία* are used interchangeably,²⁷ and both of them undoubtedly as a translation of the Hebrew *berakah*.

Essentially Jewish is also Philo's conception of the relation of prayer to sacrifice.

Philo lived at a time when the temple in Jerusalem was still in existence and sacrifices were still in vogue. The Jews of the Diaspora, including those in Alexandria, participated

²² *Praem.* 14, 79; cf. *Migr.* 20, 117.

²³ Deut. 28: 2.

²⁴ Cf. below, p. 245, nn. 47-48.

²⁵ Thus the "Eighteen Benedictions" contain "praises," "petitions" and "thanksgivings."

²⁶ Cf. Wisdom of Solomon 16: 28.

²⁷ Cf. Matt. 26: 26, and Mark 14: 22: *εὐλογήσας*; Luke 22: 17, and 1 Cor. 11: 24: *εὐχαριστήσας*, though it is possible that the latter term refers to Hallel which is recited on Passover Eve.

in these sacrificial rites, not only vicariously through their annual contribution of the temple tax, which was used for the purchase of the public sacrifice, but also personally through their pilgrimages to Jerusalem during the holidays. But by the side of the sacrificial worship in the temple there existed in Palestine and in the countries of the Diaspora another form of divine worship, that of organized prayer. Both these forms of worship were considered by Jews in Palestine as well as by those outside of Palestine as two acceptable modes of divine worship. Philo himself testifies to his belief in these two modes of divine worship in his statement in which he describes his pilgrimage to Jerusalem as "the time I was journeying to the Temple of my fathers to offer prayers and sacrifices."²⁸

But the Jews at the time of Philo, who were brought up upon the prophets as well as the Pentateuch, while they accepted sacrifices as a prescribed form of divine worship, considered them acceptable to God only when combined with right conduct. The denunciation of sacrifices by the various prophets was taken by them not as a rejection of sacrificial worship but merely as an emphasis of the moral purpose that sacrifice ought to symbolize. This reconciliation of the Law and the prophets is already reflected in Sirach's statement to the effect that sacrifices are acceptable to God only when accompanied by the observance of the Law and the practice of righteousness.²⁹ It is in this sense also that one is to understand such statements in Hellenistic Jewish literature as that "to honor God" is to be done "not with gifts and sacrifices, but with purity of soul and holy conviction"³⁰

²⁸ *Provid.* 2, 64 (Eusebius, *Præparatio Evangelica* VIII, 14, 389b; Richter VI, 200; M. II, 646); Aucher, II, 107.

²⁹ Sirach 35: 1-11 (13).

³⁰ Aristæas, 234. That Aristæas does not completely eliminate sacrifices is evident from 170 and 172.

or that "when the Lord demands bread, or candles, or flesh, or any other sacrifice, then that is nothing; but God demands pure hearts." ³¹ Moreover, inasmuch as divine worship by sacrifices was inaccessible to the great numbers of Jews living outside of Palestine, there must have gradually arisen the view that prayer can serve as a substitute for sacrifices and that it is even better than sacrifices. In Palestine this conception of prayer as a substitute for sacrifices and as better than sacrifices found expression in many statements attributed to rabbis after the destruction of the temple.³² All this is given utterance to by Philo in several passages.

In one passage, he begins with a statement that "God does not rejoice in sacrifices even if one offer hecatombs, for all things are His possessions and, because He possesses all things, He needs none of them." ³³ The wording and sentiment of this statement quite evidently reflect such verses as "Will the Lord be pleased with thousand of rams?" ³⁴ "For the world is mine and the fulness thereof: will I eat the flesh of bulls?" ³⁵ That Philo does not mean by this the rejection of sacrifices as a proper means of divine worship is quite evident from his own account of his pilgrimage to Jerusalem for the purpose of offering sacrifices ³⁶ and from his elaborate description of the sacrificial rites.³⁷ What he means by this statement is merely to emphasize, as did also Sirach, that the mere external performance of sacrifices, when not ac-

³¹ The Book of the Secrets of Enoch 45: 3. That this does not mean the complete rejection of sacrifices, see 59: 1-2; 66: 2.

³² *Berakot* 32b; *Tanḥuma, Ki Tabo*, § 1; cf. below, p. 245.

³³ *Spec. I*, 50, 271.

³⁴ Micah 6: 7.

³⁵ Ps. 50: 12-13. Cf. comment on this verse in *Sifre Numbers*, § 143, F, p. 54a; H, pp. 191-192: "There is no eating and drinking with reference to God. . . . But why did I tell you to bring sacrifices to me? It was only that you do my will." Cf. *Menahot* 110a.

³⁶ Cf. above, n. 28.

³⁷ Cf. *Spec. I*, 33, 162 ff.

accompanied by the observance of the Law and the practice of righteousness, is not acceptable to God. Philo then proceeds to say: "But He rejoices in the will to love Him and in men that practice holiness, and from these he accepts cakes of ground barley and things of least price, holding them most precious rather than those of highest cost."³⁸ This again reflects (1) such verses as "Hath the Lord as great delight in burnt-offerings and sacrifices as in hearkening to the voice of the Lord?"³⁹ (2) the law stating that meal offerings are to be prepared either (a) in the form of cakes or (b) in the form of flour,⁴⁰ and (3) such native Jewish sentiments as that expressed by the rabbis in their statement that "it does not matter whether a man brings a large offering or a small, provided he directs his heart to Heaven."⁴¹ Finally he concludes: "And indeed, though the worshipers bring nothing else, in bringing themselves they offer the best sacrifices, the full and truly perfect oblation of noble living, honoring God, their Benefactor and Savior, with hymns and thanksgivings."⁴² Here, too, the wording and the sentiment reflect such verses as "We will render for bullocks the offering of our lips";⁴³ "Let my prayer be set forth before Thee

³⁸ *Spec.* I, 50, 271.

³⁹ I Sam. 15: 22.

⁴⁰ I take it that Philo's ψαιστὰ and κριθὰς here refer to the two kinds of meal-offering, namely, (a) cakes (Lev. 2: 4-8; 6: 13-14; 7: 9) and (b) flour (Lev. 2: 2; 5: 12; 6: 8). I do not accept Colson's translation here: "plain meal or barley" or "barley ground or unground." "Barley" is mentioned in the Pentateuch only in connection with the jealousy meal-offering (Num. 5: 15); in all other cases the term *solet* is used, which in the Septuagint is translated by σμιδαλις, the finest wheaten flour. According to the Mishnah, all the meal-offerings are of wheat, except the jealousy meal-offering and the wave-offering, which are of barley (*M. Soṭa* II, 1). Philo himself elsewhere, in connection with the meal-offering of the sinner (Lev. 5: 11), explicitly says that it was of wheaten flour (λευκοκύροι) (*Mut.* 41. 235).

⁴¹ *Menahot* 110a; *Sifra*, *Wayyikra*, *Pereḥ* 9, p. 9b. Cf. Heinemann, *Philos Werke*, II, p. 87, n. 1.

⁴² *Spec.* I, 50, 272.

⁴³ Hosea 14: 3 (LXX: "We will render to Thee the fruit of our lips").

as incense.”⁴⁴ In this last statement of Philo there is also an intimation of that view which among the rabbis, after the destruction of the temple, gave rise to the statements that for those who cannot worship God by means of sacrifice, prayer may serve as a substitute,⁴⁵ and that “prayer is greater than sacrifices.”⁴⁶

In another passage the condemnation, which in the preceding passage he utters against sacrifices when not connected with right conduct, is extended by him to prayer when it is similarly not connected with right conduct. “If the worshiper is without kindly feeling and justice, the sacrifices are no sacrifices, the consecrated oblation is desecrated, the prayers (*εὐχαι*) are words of ill omen with utter destruction waiting upon them. For, when to outward appearance they are offered, it is not a remission but a reminder of past sins which they effect. But, if he is holy and just, the sacrifice stands firm, though the flesh is consumed, or rather, even if no victim at all is brought to the altar. For the true oblation, what else can it be but the piety of a soul which loves God?”⁴⁷ In this passage, it will be noticed, he speaks of both sacrifices and prayer as if they took place simultaneously, and both of them are condemned when not offered in the right spirit and when not connected with right conduct. Prayer, furthermore, is assumed to be a part of sacrifice and connected with it. This undoubtedly refers to the prayer of confession of sin which, by Biblical law, was to accompany every expiatory sacrifice.⁴⁸ Rather than sacrifice as a mere

⁴⁴ Ps. 141: 2.

⁴⁵ *Tanḥuma, Korah*, § 12.

⁴⁶ *Berakot* 32b; cf. *Tanḥuma, Ki Tabo*, § 1.

⁴⁷ *Mos.* II, 22, 107–108.

⁴⁸ *Sifra, Wayyikra, Pereḥ* 17, on Lev. 5: 5, p. 24b; *Tos. Menahot* X, 12; *Yoma* 36a. By a post-Biblical enactment certain prayers were also recited in the Temple with the daily burnt-offering (*M. Tamid* V, 1). But from the context it would seem that the reference here is to the prayer of confession.

external ceremony and prayer as a mere confession with the lips, the true service of God, he says, is piety. All this is merely a paraphrase of the words of God in the prophecies of Isaiah, calling out to those whose hands "are full of blood": "To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? . . . It is an abomination to me. . . . And though you multiply prayer, I will not hearken to you. . . . Wash and become clean." ⁴⁹ There is in it also an echo of the words of the Psalmist. "The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit." ⁵⁰

In a third passage he deals with the superiority of prayer to sacrifices. He says: "It is impossible genuinely to express our gratitude to God by means of buildings and oblations and sacrifices, as is the custom of most people, for even the whole world could not be a temple adequate to yield the honor due to Him; nay, it must be expressed by means of praise and hymns." ⁵¹ A statement as to the superiority of prayer, which needs only a devoted "soul," to sacrifices, which requires "buildings," is to be found also in another passage, in which he asks: "What house shall be prepared for God the King of kings? . . . Shall it be of stone or wooden material?" His answer is: "away with the thought, the very words are impious. . . . One worthy house there is — the soul that is fitted to receive Him." ⁵² The sentiment expressed in these passages must have been common, at the time of Philo, among the Jews living outside of Palestine, whose only direct mode of worship was that of prayer, just as it was later, with the destruction of the temple, to become common among the Jews in Palestine. But the wording of this passage is nothing but a paraphrase of two passages in Scripture. First, a passage in Isaiah, wherein, in order to show

⁴⁹ Isa. 1: 11-16.

⁵⁰ Ps. 51: 19.

⁵¹ *Plant.* 30, 126.

⁵² *Cher.* 29, 99-100.

that unrighteous sacrifices are like cutting off a dog's neck and unrighteous libations are like offering swine's blood, the prophet exclaims in the name of God: "The heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool: where is the house that ye may build unto me? and where is the place that may be my resting-place?"⁵³ Second, a passage in the prayer of King Solomon upon his completion of the building of the temple: "If the heaven and the heaven of heaven will not suffice thee, far less indeed this house which I have built for thy name. Yet thou, O Lord, the God of Israel, wilt look down on this supplication of mine to hearken to the prayer which thy servant this day in thy presence prayeth to thee."⁵⁴

In all these passages we have noticed there is no indication that sacrifices are rejected by Philo as an improper means of divine worship; there is only an insistence that they must be inspired by a right motive and that they must be accompanied by righteous conduct. This is quite evident in his explanation of the Deuteronomic law of the centralization of sacrificial worship. "The highest, and in the truest sense the holy, temple of God," he says, "is, as we must believe, the whole universe, having for its sanctuary the most sacred part of all existence, even heaven, for its votive ornaments the stars, for its priests the angels."⁵⁵ Still despite all this he admits that there is need also for "the temple made by hands," except that there is to be "only one temple."⁵⁶

It will have been further noticed that when improper sacrifices are condemned the substitute offered for them is always prayer. All this, as we have seen, reflects traditional Jewish views. It is quite possible that Philo was acquainted with some of the sayings of certain early Greek philosophers preserved by later authors to the effect that the gods are to

⁵³ Isa: 66: 1.

⁵⁴ I Kings 8: 27-28.

⁵⁵ *Spec.* I, 12, 66.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 67.

be honored "not by luxurious display but rather by deeds of piety" ⁵⁷ or that you must "consider that the noblest sacrifice and best divine worship is that you make yourself as good and as just as you possibly can." ⁵⁸ If he was acquainted with such Greek sayings he must have found in them corroboration of some of the teachings which he has derived from the prophets, and perhaps, according to his own belief, he has considered them as having been inspired by the teachings of the prophets. ⁵⁹ But there is not enough in the Greek sayings of this type to account for the language and the sentiment expressed by Philo in the passages quoted. ⁶⁰

Another recognizably Jewish feature in his conception of prayer is his discussion of the question as to the manner of praying. In native Jewish tradition there is a question as to whether prayer should be in silence or in a whisper or in an audible voice or in a loud voice. The origin of this discussion is evidently due to contradictory statements with regard to prayer that appeared to be found in Scripture. On the one

⁵⁷ Heinemann, *Bildung*, p. 66, n. 3; cf. also *Philos Werke* II, p. 86, n. 4.

⁵⁸ *Id.*, *Bildung*, p. 472. Cf. also above, I, 18.

⁵⁹ Cf. above, I, 141.

⁶⁰ According to Heinemann, Philo's chief contention in *Mos.* II, 22, 108, is that actual sacrifices are not necessary, for the true oblation is nothing but the piety of a God-loving soul. This he finds to be a Greek idea, altogether unknown to the rabbis (*Bildung*, pp. 66-67). But, as we have tried to show, in that passage Philo's contention is only that sacrifices, even when accompanied by external confession, are not acceptable, if not inspired by the right motives and accompanied by right conduct.

Again, says Heinemann, Philo betrays no knowledge of the rabbinic view that prayer and fasting and charity are substitutes for sacrifices (*ibid.*, p. 67). But, as we have suggested, at the time of Philo there was no need of stressing the importance of substitutes for sacrifices, and there is no evidence that it was stressed by the rabbis before the destruction of the temple. In so far as prayer was a substitute for sacrifices to the Jews in the diaspora, we have shown that there is an allusion to it in Philo. As for charity and fasting, they are included in his general statement to the effect that only the sacrifice of the holy and just and God-loving man is acceptable.

hand, the expression "to serve Him with all your heart" ⁶¹ was taken to refer to prayer, whence prayer was described as "the worship of God within the heart." ⁶² But on the other hand, such verses as "I prayed therefore unto the Lord and said," ⁶³ "I prayed unto the Lord my God and made my confession and said," ⁶⁴ and "Give ear to my prayer, O God. . . . Evening and morning and noon will I pray and cry aloud, and He shall hear my voice" ⁶⁵ would seem to indicate that prayer was a matter of speech. The nature of the speculation on this question is reflected in a few characteristic statements written in the form of interpretations of the verse, "Now Hannah, she spoke in her heart; only her lips moved, but her voice could not be heard." ⁶⁶ One interpretation of this passage reads: "One might think that he who prays should let his ears hear his voice, it is therefore explained in the case of Hannah that 'she spoke in her heart.'" ⁶⁷ Another interpretation reads: "One might think that he who prays should raise his voice, it is therefore explained in the case of Hannah that 'she spoke in her heart'; one might then think that he who prays should only think his prayer in his heart, the text therefore says 'only her lips moved.' How is it then? He moves his lips." ⁶⁸ A third interpretation reads: "'Now Hannah, she spoke in her heart,' — from which we infer that he who prays must direct his heart [to Heaven]; 'only her lips moved,' — from which we infer that he who prays must pronounce clearly with his lips; 'but her voice could not be heard,' — from which we infer that it is not

⁶¹ Deut. 10: 13.

⁶² *Sifre Deut.*, § 41, F, p. 80a; HF, p. 88; *Ta'anit* 2a.

⁶³ Deut. 9: 26.

⁶⁴ Dan. 9: 4.

⁶⁵ Ps. 55: 2, 18.

⁶⁶ I Sam. 1: 13.

⁶⁷ *Tos. Berakot* III, 5; *Berakot* 31a; *Deuteronomy Rabbah* 2, 1.

⁶⁸ *Jer. Berakot* IV, 1, 7a.

allowed to raise one's voice in prayer." ⁶⁹ Disapproval of prayer both in an audible voice and in a loud voice is expressed in the following statement: "He who lets his voice be heard in prayer is of those who are of little faith; he who raises his voice in prayer is of those who prophesy lies." ⁷⁰ Another characteristic statement, which expresses common conceptions as to the manner in which one is to pray, is in the form of an interpretation of the verse, "Tremble, and sin not; commune with your heart upon your bed, and be still." ⁷¹ This verse is interpreted to mean that, if you cannot say your prayers, "think them in your heart." ⁷² Even with reference to the reading of the *shema'*, which reading must be audible to one's own ears,⁷³ there is a difference of opinion as to whether "thinking in the heart is as good as audible speech." ⁷⁴ Of two Palestinian rabbis it is reported that "Rabbi Abba bar Zabda [when he prayed in the synagogue] prayed in a [n audible but not loud] voice; Rabbi Jonah, when he prayed in the synagogue, prayed in a whisper, but, when he prayed at home, he prayed in a [loud] voice, in order that the members of his household might learn the prayers." ⁷⁵ In synagogues, however, there was a leader of public prayer who recited some of the prayers aloud, and

⁶⁹ *Berakot* 31a.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* 24b; cf. Luke 12: 28, for the expression "of little faith," and Jer. 23: 26, for the expression "who prophesy lies."

⁷¹ Ps. 4: 5.

⁷² *Midrash Tehillim, ad loc.*, § 9, p. 23b; *Pesiḳta de-Rab Kahana, Shubah*, p. 158a.

⁷³ *M. Berakot* II, 3.

⁷⁴ *Berakot* 20b.

⁷⁵ *Jer. Berakot* IV, 1, 7a. See L. Ginzberg in his critical study of this passage in his *Perushim we-Hiddushim Birushalmi*, III, pp. 8-22, where he shows that the "voice" in which Rabbi Abba bar Zabda prayed in the synagogue was an "audible but not loud voice," whereas the "voice" in which Rabbi Jonah prayed at home was a "loud voice." Hence the bracketed additions in our translation of this passage.

it is reported that, "when Rabbi Jesa went up [from Babylonia] to Palestine, he saw the people bending down and whispering a prayer," while the leader of the congregation was reciting one of the Eighteen Benedictions, evidently in a loud voice.⁷⁶ There is evidence that also in the synagogue of Alexandria there was such a leader of the congregation.⁷⁷ The customary Jewish mode of praying in a whispering voice is contrasted by the rabbis with the heathen mode of praying in a loud voice. "The heathen," they say, "has his god in his own house and he cries aloud to him until he is dead, but his god does not hear him and does not save him from his distress. . . . A Jew enters a synagogue, takes a position behind the stand, prays in a whisper, and the Holy One, blessed be He, gives ear to his prayer."⁷⁸ While there is no complete agreement among these statements, they all maintain that prayer, with the exception of that of the leader in the synagogue, should not be in a loud voice; some of them approve of prayer in the heart; most of them require that he who prays should move his lips or pronounce his words clearly with his lips or utter his words in a whisper.

Reflecting all these various opinions and practices in Judaism with regard to spoken and silent prayer, Philo says of prayer that thereby the worshipers honor God "sometimes with the organs of speech, sometimes without tongue and mouth, when within the soul alone and appreciable only by the intellect they make their confessions and invocations, which one ear only can apprehend, the ear of God, for human hearing cannot reach to the perception of such."⁷⁹ In this passage, what Philo calls prayer "within the soul" quite obviously means silent prayer, corresponding to what the

⁷⁶ *Jer. Berakot* I, 8 (5), 3c.

⁷⁷ Cf. *Tos. Sukkah* IV, 6; *Jer. Sukkah* V, 1, 55a-b.

⁷⁸ *Jer. Berakot* IX, 1, p. 13a.

⁷⁹ *Spec.* I, 50, 272.

rabbis characterize as "the worship of God within the heart," and what he calls prayer "with the organs of speech" or with "tongue and mouth" is quite obviously to be taken as corresponding to what the rabbis describe as prayer in an "audible voice," or perhaps also to that kind of prayer concerning which they say that "he who prays must move his lips" or "pronounce clearly with his lips," the terms "tongue and mouth" used by Philo being thus the equivalent of the term "lips" used in Scripture and by the rabbis. No mention is made here by Philo of prayer in a loud voice, and we may assume that prayer in a loud voice on the part of the general public, as distinguished from the leader, would be discountenanced by him no less than by the rabbis. These Jewish modes of prayer, as described by both Philo and the rabbis, are in contrast to what is known of the modes of prayer among the Greeks. The latter are known to have been prejudiced against prayer in silence or in a low voice. Among the Pythagoreans there was a rule that all prayers should be uttered aloud. Only when there was some special reason for not praying aloud were prayers offered in silence or in a low voice.⁸⁰ In the Talmudic passage quoted above, the reference to the heathen crying aloud to his god thus reflects an actual acquaintance with the heathen method of praying.

(b) *Repentance*

It is also to scriptural teachings that we must go for the origin of Philo's view that repentance is a virtue. In Greek philosophy repentance is never held up as a virtue. Aristotle indeed describes the experience of regret or rather repentance (*μεταμέλεια*), observing that a man who has done wrong

⁸⁰ Cf. P. Gardner and F. B. Jevons, *A Manual of Greek Antiquities*, 2nd ed., 1898, p. 224; A. W. Mair, *op. cit.*, p. 184, § 3.

out of ignorance and, on finding out what he has done, repents, is to be described as an involuntary agent (ἀκων)⁸¹ and that "he who cannot repent cannot be cured."⁸² But he does not urge repentance as a virtue. To him the penitent is a bad man; the good man is he who has nothing to repent of. This view is expressed by him in such statements as that "bad men are full of repentance"⁸³ but it is characteristic of good men that they do no wrong⁸⁴ and consequently a good man is "not given to repentance (ἀμεταμέλητος),"⁸⁵ nor, "like the penitent," does he find fault with his former actions.⁸⁶ The Stoics are reported to re-echo the same view in a statement which says of them that "they do not believe that the mind of the wise is able to repent, for repentance (μετάνοια) pertains to a false assent, as if one had previously gone utterly wrong."⁸⁷ According to these statements, then, never to have been wrong is a virtue; to have been wrong and repented is not in itself a virtue.

In Judaism, however, with the general belief that "there

⁸¹ *Eth. Nic.* III, 1, 1110b, 22-23. ⁸² *Ibid.* VII, 7, 1150a, 22. Cf. Democritus, Fr. 43 in Diels: "Repentance for shameful deeds is lifesaving."

⁸³ *Ibid.* IX, 4, 1166b, 24-25: μεταμελετας οι φαυλοι γειμουσι. Exactly the same statement, רשעים סלאים חרטה (read *hara'ut* as an abstract noun and not *hara'ot* as a plural), is ascribed by Elijah ben Solomon ha-Kohen (d. 1729) in his *Shebet Musar*, ch. 25, to the sages of the Talmud. No such statement occurs in the Talmud (cf. A. Hyman, *Ozar Dibre Hakamim u-Pitgamehem*, 1933, p. 514). The statement occurs verbatim in the Hebrew translation of Aristotle's *Ethica Nicomachea* (*Sefer ha-Middot* IX, 5) made from the Latin at the beginning of the 15th century. However, the author of the *Shebet Musar* makes use of this Aristotelian statement as evidence that repentance is a virtue, seeing that even the wicked have a consciousness of sin and are full of repentance.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* VIII, 8, 1159b, 6-7.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* IX, 4, 1166a, 29.

⁸⁶ *Eth. Eud.* VII, 6, 1240b, 21-23.

⁸⁷ Stobaeus, *Eclogae* II, p. 113, ll. 5-7 (Arnim, III, 548, p. 147, ll. 21-23). Cf. E. F. Thompson, *Metanokos and metamêles in Greek Literature until 100 A.D., including Discussion of their Cognates and their Hebrew Equivalents*, 1908; E. Norden *Agnostos Theos*, 1913, pp. 134-140; W. W. Jaeger, "Norden, *Agnostos Theos*," *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeiger*, 175 (1913), pp. 589-592; A. H. Dirksen, *The New Testament Concept of Metanoia*, 1932, pp. 161-162, 165-196.

is not a righteous man upon earth, that doeth good, and sinneth not,"⁸⁸ the conception of repentance as an act which is desired by God and towards which man was urged by Him runs throughout Scripture and is given the fullest expression in the verse: "Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts: and let him return unto the Lord, and He will have mercy upon him; and to our God, for He will abundantly pardon."⁸⁹ What is more significant, repentance, or rather confession of sin, which is the outward symbol of repentance, came to be regarded as a Mosaic commandment. In the Pentateuch, to be sure, confession is prescribed only in certain special instances — twice for lay individuals in connection with certain sacrifices which are to be offered in the case of the transgression of certain commandments,⁹⁰ once for the high priest, also in connection with a certain sacrifice,⁹¹ and once for the people as a whole in connection with general apostacy.⁹² According to a Tannaitic Midrash, however, confession is a prescribed duty in the case of the transgression of "all the other commandments," whether "negative commandments" or "positive commandments," including also commandments for the transgression of which there is "divine punishment" or "capital punishment," and furthermore this duty of confession devolves both upon individuals and upon congregations and is to be in force both at the time when sacrifices are being offered and at the time sacrifices are no longer offered and both in Palestine and outside of Palestine.⁹³ Repentance, with

⁸⁸ Eccl. 7: 20; 1 Kings 8: 46; 2 Chr. 6: 36.

⁸⁹ Isa. 55: 7.

⁹⁰ Lev. 5: 5; Num. 5: 7.

⁹¹ Lev. 16: 21.

⁹² Lev. 26: 40.

⁹³ *Sifre Zuṭa, Naso*, on Num. 5: 6. It is this Midrash which is quoted by Maimonides in his *Sefer ha-Miṣwot*, Positive Commandment 73, under the name of *Mekilta*, and upon which his statement in *Mishneh Torah, Teshubah I, 1*, is based. Cf. Commentary *Ambuḥa de-Sifre on Sifre Zuṭa, ad loc.*, by Jacob Ze'eb Joskowitz. Cf. also above, p. 245.

its outer symbol confession, as an act desired by God is also urged by Sirach.⁹⁴ In Hellenistic Jewish literature God is said to have made His sons "to be of good hope" because He gave "repentance when men have sinned"⁹⁵ and He is also said to overlook the sins of men "to the end that they may repent."⁹⁶

It is in accordance with this conception of repentance as a Mosaic commandment, which in the language of Philo means that it is a practical virtue, that repentance is described by him as a virtue. His description of repentance as a virtue is to be found in his inclusion of his treatise on "repentance," together with his treatises on "courage," "piety," and "humanity" under the general title, "On the Virtues."⁹⁷ It is also implied in his statement that it is because "our most holy Moses" is "a lover of virtue and of goodness and especially of his fellow men" that "he offers to the repentant, as to conquerors, great rewards."⁹⁸ Almost in direct opposition to Aristotle and the Stoics, who consider it as a characteristic of the good or the wise man never to have occasion to repent⁹⁹ and that only the bad man is full of repentance,¹⁰⁰ he maintains that "the change from sin to a blameless life is characteristic of a wise man who has not been utterly ignorant of what is for his good."¹⁰¹ In another place he similarly says that, in decreeing repentance, God is "not in any degree mocking or reproaching these men, who are believed to have offended."¹⁰² The reason

⁹⁴ Sirach 18: 21; 4: 26; 17: 25-32.

⁹⁵ Wisdom of Solomon 12: 19; cf. 12: 10.

⁹⁶ Wisdom of Solomon 11: 23.

⁹⁷ The title "On the Virtues" for the group of treatises which includes that on "repentance" is found in Eusebius and in the oldest manuscript (cf. L. Cohn, *Philos Werke*, II, pp. 315-316). Hence it must have been used by Philo himself.

⁹⁸ *Virt.* 33, 175.

⁹⁹ Cf. above, p. 253.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. above, p. 253, n. 83.

¹⁰¹ *Virt.* 33, 177.

¹⁰² *Qu. in Gen.* I, 82.

why repentance is not unbecoming to a wise man is again the Jewish principle as to the impossibility of sinlessness for the ordinary run of man which, as restated by Philo, reads: "for absolute sinlessness belongs to God alone, or possibly to a divine man."¹⁰³ His conception of repentance as a virtue is the logical consequence of his belief in the absolute freedom of the will.

Not only is the general conception of repentance as a virtue based upon Jewish tradition, but also the details of his description of the virtue of repentance go back to the same source.

In Judaism, repentance requires confession, and confession means an open acknowledgment of sin. In the language of the rabbis this open acknowledgment of sin is called "confession of words" (*widduy debarim*).¹⁰⁴ One of the scriptural sources for this expression is the verse: "Take with you words and return to the Lord; say unto Him: Forgive all iniquity, and accept that which is good, so we will render for bullocks the offering of our lips."¹⁰⁵ But besides confession of words or with the lips, Jewish tradition, drawing upon various scriptural verses, speaks also of the need, in the case of repentance, of a feeling of shame for one's sins,¹⁰⁶ of a feeling of remorse¹⁰⁷ and of a feeling of chastisement in the heart.¹⁰⁸ Reflecting all these Jewish traditions, Philo describes repentants as those who "feel shame" (*καταιδεσθέντες*), "reproach themselves" (*κακίσαντες*), and "openly confess and

¹⁰³ *Virt.* 33, 177; cf. above, I, 451, on this qualification with regard to a "divine man." *Fragmenta*, Richter, VI, 222 (M, II, 662): "I think it absolutely impossible that no part of the soul should become tainted, not even the outermost and lowest part of it, even if the man appeared to be perfect among men."

¹⁰⁴ *Sifra*, *Ah're*, *Pereḡ* I, p. 80d, on Lev. 16: 6; *Pereḡ* II, p. 81a, on Lev. 16: 11; cf. the same expression in Maimonides in *Sefer ha-Miṣwot*, Positive Commandment 73; *Mishneh Torah*, *Teshubah* I, 1.

¹⁰⁵ Hos. 14: 3; cf. *Pesiḡta Rabbati*, 47, p. 189b.

¹⁰⁶ *Berakot* 12b.

¹⁰⁷ *Hagigah* 5a.

¹⁰⁸ *Berakot* 7a.

acknowledge all their sin, first within themselves . . . secondly with their tongues.”¹⁰⁹ Again, in Jewish tradition, repentance and confession avail only in the case of sins between man and God; in the case of sins between man and man, in addition to repentance and the asking for forgiveness, reparation for the injury caused in the commitment of the sin must be made.¹¹⁰ So also Philo says that in cases of sin between man and man, besides confession of the wrong and the asking for forgiveness, the repentant must give evidence of the truth of his repentance by actions, by restoring what he has taken from the other unlawfully.¹¹¹

There are more such striking similarities. According to both Jewish tradition and Philo, there had been an idea of repentance before the repentance of an individual human being, Adam in the case of the rabbis and Enoch in the case of Philo, actually came into existence.¹¹² Again, in Jewish tradition, Enoch is represented as one whose life has not always been perfect¹¹³ and hence as one who is “an example of repentance to all generations.”¹¹⁴ So also in Philo Enoch is represented as a repentant.¹¹⁵ In Scripture as well as in Jewish tradition repentance is described as a “healing.”¹¹⁶ So also in Philo repentance is compared to the recovery from a disease.¹¹⁷ In Jewish tradition repentance is said to cause redemption to come to Israel.¹¹⁸ So also Philo says that Israel will be redeemed as a result of repentance.¹¹⁹ In Scrip-

¹⁰⁹ *Praem.* 28, 163.

¹¹⁰ *M. Yoma* VIII, 9, and *M. Baba Kamma* VIII, 7.

¹¹¹ *Spec.* I, 43, 235-236.

¹¹² Cf. above, I, 185.

¹¹³ *Genesis Rabbah* 25, 1.

¹¹⁴ *Sirach* 44: 16.

¹¹⁵ *Abr.* 3, 17 ff.; *Praem.* 3, 15 ff.

¹¹⁶ *Isa.* 6: 10; *Rosh ha-Shanah* 17b; *Hos.* 14: 5; *Yoma* 86a-b.

¹¹⁷ *Abr.* 4, 26; *Virt.* 33, 176.

¹¹⁸ *Yoma* 86b.

¹¹⁹ *Praem.* 28, 163-164. Cf. below, pp. 411 f.

ture it is said that God, who is "merciful and gracious . . . forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin,"¹²⁰ does not deal with us "according to our sins" nor does He retribute to us "according to our iniquities,"¹²¹ and the rabbis similarly say that "there is no creature that is not indebted to God, but He is gracious and merciful and forgives the sins of the past."¹²² So also Philo says that God is "merciful and forgiving"¹²³ and that through His "gracious nature" He "sets forgiveness before chastisement."¹²⁴ Finally, in native Jewish tradition, as contrasted with the "repentant" there is what is called the "perfectly righteous," and there is a question whether the "perfectly righteous" or the "repentant" is of a higher rank. Rabbi Abbahu of Caesarea, who held the view that the "repentant" is of a higher rank, expresses himself in the statement that "in the place where the repentant stand the perfectly righteous do not stand."¹²⁵ Philo similarly compares "repentance" with "perfection" or with "perfect guiltlessness" and expresses his view, which happens to be that the perfectly righteous is of a higher rank, in the statement that "repentance holds the second place to perfection"¹²⁶ or that repentance is "the younger brother of perfect guiltlessness."¹²⁷ Though it is not impossible that Rabbi Abbahu (third century A.D.) uttered his statement in direct opposition to Philo, for he is reported to have had a knowledge of Greek¹²⁸ and to have even visited Alexandria,¹²⁹ the problem itself as to relative merit of the repentant and the perfectly righteous undoubtedly reflects an old Jewish tradition which is the common

¹²⁰ Exod. 34: 6-7; cf. Ps. 78: 38.

¹²¹ Ps. 103: 10.

¹²² *Exodus Rabbah* 31, 1.

¹²³ *Spec.* III, 21, 121.

¹²⁴ Cf. W. Bacher, *Die Agada der palästinensischen Amoraer*, II, p. 97.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* II, 32, 196.

¹²⁵ *Berakot* 34b.

¹²⁶ *Abr.* 4, 26.

¹²⁷ *Somm.* I, 15, 91.

source of both Philo and the rabbis. The reason given by Philo for the inferiority of the repentant is that just as wounds leave behind them bodily scars so "in the souls of the repentant there remain, in spite of all, the scars and prints of their old misdeeds."¹³⁰ So also in Jewish tradition the verse "I will heal your backslidings"¹³¹ is taken to mean that the repentant are compared to those that have been wounded in whom scars remain even after they have been healed.¹³²

(c) *Study and Teaching*

In addition to the virtue of prayer and the virtue of repentance, by which, as we have tried to show, Philo means the commandment of prayer and the commandment of repentance, Philo dwells also upon the study and the teaching of the Law as a religious commandment which he ranges under the virtue of justice.¹³³ In native Jewish tradition, the religious duty of studying the Law and of teaching it to others is based upon such verses as "ye shall learn them, and observe to do them"¹³⁴ and "ye shall teach them your children, speaking of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, when thou liest down, and when thou risest up."¹³⁵ The term "thy children" in a parallel verse¹³⁶ is taken to mean "thy pupils."¹³⁷ Now

¹³⁰ *Spec. I*, 19, 103. See Heinemann, *Philos Werke*, and Colson, *ad. loc.*, for Greek parallels.

¹³¹ Jer. 3: 22.

¹³² *Yoma* 86a and cf. *Rashi*, *ad loc.*

¹³³ *Spec. IV*, 26, 136-142.

¹³⁴ Deut. 5: 1; cf. *Ḳiddushin* 29b. In *Sifre Deut.*, § 41, F, p. 80a; HF, p. 87, it is derived from the word "to serve Him" in Deut. 11: 13. Cf. Maimonides, *Sefer ha-Miṣwot*, Positive Commandments 5 and 11.

¹³⁵ Deut. 11: 19; cf. *Ḳiddushin* 29b.

¹³⁶ Deut. 6: 7.

¹³⁷ *Sifre Deut.*, § 34, F, p. 74a; HF, p. 61; cf. Ps. 34: 12; Prov. 1: 8; Sirach 2: 1, 17.

Philo does not directly discuss the pentateuchal source of the religious duty of the study of the Law, but that the study of the Law is a Jewish duty is assumed by him in the statement that the "holy congregation" is that "in which it is ever the practice to hold conferences and discussions about virtue,"¹³⁸ by which he means, it is ever the practice to meet for the study of the Law.¹³⁹ With the assumption that the study of the Law is a religious duty, evidently prescribed in the Pentateuch, he tries to find in the Pentateuch further specifications of this duty in the verse "and ye shall lay up these my words in your heart and in your soul, and bind them for a sign upon your hand, that they may be movably before your eyes."¹⁴⁰ The first of these three figurative expressions, he says, intimates that the learning of the Law is not to be a matter of mere hearing with the ear but rather one of understanding with the mind.¹⁴¹ The second expression intimates that learning must be reinforced by action.¹⁴² The third expression intimates that the laws which we learn must be a vital force within us, moving us to action.¹⁴³ When a man has achieved this last stage of the knowledge of the Law, he says, "he is no longer to be ranked among learners and pupils but rather among teachers and instructors."¹⁴⁴ Drawing, therefore, upon the verse¹⁴⁵ from which the rabbis derive the religious duty to teach the Law to others and taking also the words "your children" in that verse to mean "your pupils," he paraphrases it as follows: "Indeed he must be forward to teach the principles of justice

¹³⁸ *Immut.* 24, 111.

¹³⁹ Cf. below, nn. 174-177.

¹⁴⁰ Deut. 11: 18. *σαλευτόν* was Philo's reading of the Greek for the Hebrew word usually translated by frontlets. Cf. Colson VIII, p. 435, § 137.

¹⁴¹ *Spec.* IV, 26, 137.

¹⁴² *Ibid.* 138.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* 139.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 140.

¹⁴⁵ Deut. 11: 19.

to kinsfolk and friends and to all young people at home and in the street, both when they go to their beds and when they arise." ¹⁴⁶

There is also in Philo a reflection of the problem raised in rabbinic Judaism as to the relative importance of the study of the Law and the practice of the Law. The generally accepted opinion is that not learning but doing is the main object of the Law,¹⁴⁷ so that even those who claimed that study is the greater thing did so only because "study leads to doing."¹⁴⁸ In rabbinic literature this view is expressed in a comment upon the verses "For if ye shall diligently keep all this commandment which I command you, to do it . . . then will the Lord drive out all the nations from before you."¹⁴⁹ Taking the word "keep" in this verse to mean to "remember" what one has "studied,"¹⁵⁰ the rabbis say: "From the first part of the verse I might have inferred that once a man has memorized any precept of the Law he may seat himself down and do nothing, it therefore adds 'to do it,' intimating that you must still do the commandments, so that if a man has studied the Law, he has fulfilled one commandment; if he has studied it and remembered it, he has fulfilled two commandments; if he has studied it and remembered it and practiced it, there is nothing higher than that."¹⁵¹ In the same way Philo, evidently drawing upon these same verses, in which the Septuagint reads "if ye shall diligently hearken" instead of "if ye shall diligently keep," restates them as follows: "If, he says, you keep the divine commandments in obedience to His ordinances and accept His precepts, not merely to hear them [i.e., to learn

¹⁴⁶ *Spec.* IV, 26, 141.

¹⁴⁷ *M. Abot* I, 17.

¹⁵⁰ After the analogy of the expression: "And the father kept the saying [in mind]" (*Gen.* 37: 11).

¹⁵¹ *Sifre Deut.*, § 48, F, p. 84b; HF, p. 113.

¹⁴⁸ *Kiddushin* 40b.

¹⁴⁹ *Deut.* 11: 22-23.

them] but also to fulfill them by the actions of your lives, the first boon you will have is victory over your enemies,"¹⁵² for "while the commandments of the Law are only on our lips our acceptance of them is little or none, but when we add thereto deeds which follow in their company, deeds shown in the whole conduct of your lives, the commandments will be as it were brought up out of the deep darkness into light."¹⁵³ Reflecting the same verse, the Letter of Aristeas similarly says: "The good life consists in the keeping of the enactments of the Law, and this end is achieved much more by hearing [i.e., by learning them] than by reading."¹⁵⁴

Sometimes the question as to whether the study of the Law or the practice of the Law is superior is reflected in Philo's treatment of the problem current in the philosophy of his time as to the comparative value of the contemplative and the practical life.

In both Plato and Aristotle the priority of the contemplative life to the practical is assumed. In Plato there are several long passages in which the contemplative life is exalted above the practical life.¹⁵⁵ In Aristotle it is expressed in the statement that happiness is primarily a contemplative activity¹⁵⁶ and that life in accordance with non-contemplative virtue is happy only in a secondary degree.¹⁵⁷ The Stoics, on the other hand, reverse this order of importance, arguing that a speculative life, or rather a scholastic life (*σχολαστικὸν βίον*), is as bad as a life of mere amusement (*διαγωγή*) and pleasure (*ἡδὸς*).¹⁵⁸

¹⁵² *Praem.* 14, 79; cf. *Deut.* 30: 10; 11: 22-27.

¹⁵³ *Praem.* 14, 82.

¹⁵⁴ Aristeas, 127. Evidently "keeping," "hearing," and "reading" correspond to the rabbinic "practice," "remember" and "study" quoted above. But see H. G. Meecham's edition of *Aristeas*, p. 321, on "hearing" and "reading."

¹⁵⁵ *Theaetetus* 173 c ff.; *Gorgias* 481 ε ff.

¹⁵⁶ *Eth. Nic.* X, 7, 1177a, 12-18.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.* X, 8, 1178a, 9.

¹⁵⁸ Plutarch, *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* 2, 3.

Philo does not follow the view of the Stoics. In fact, the Stoics themselves did not follow their own view, and the discrepancy between their teaching of the preference of the practical to the contemplative life and their actual pursuit of the contemplative life in preference to the practical is one of the glaring contradictions that were found in the Stoics.¹⁵⁹ Many of the leading Stoics, it was argued by their opponents, in contradiction to their doctrine of the preferability of the practical life, "left their countries, not because they had anything to complain against them, but in order that they might, while engaged in studying and disputing, pass their life quietly, more pleasantly, and in full leisure."¹⁶⁰ It is no wonder then that Philo in many of his utterances aligns himself with Plato and Aristotle as over against the Stoics in placing the contemplative life over the practical. Thus, in one passage, re-echoing Plato and Aristotle, he describes the contemplative life as "the more excellent way of life, for it is proper to go through the practical life before beginning the theoretical one, as being a sort of rehearsal of the more perfect contest."¹⁶¹ In another passage, classifying the three kinds of life, the contemplative, the practical, and the pleasurable,¹⁶² he describes the practical life as low (*parva*) when it is close to the pleasurable life, and as high

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 2, 4.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ *Fug.* 6, 36.

¹⁶² *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 47: *contemplativa, operativa, condecens*. The last term reflects the Greek *συμπετής* but, as required by the context, it should be some Latin term which translates the Greek *ἡδύς*. Professor Ralph Marcus informs me that the underlying Armenian term here is generally used as a translation of both the Greek *πρέπων* and the Greek *τερπνός*. Judging by the context, therefore, we may conclude that the term in the original Greek was undoubtedly the latter, for the term *τερπνός* is used by Aristotle as the opposite of *λυπῶν* (*Eth. Nic.* IV, 8, 1128a, 26-27) and hence as the equivalent of *ἡδύς*. Consequently, while the Armenian translation of this term here is only ambiguous, the Latin translation from the Armenian is incorrect.

(*magna*) when it is close to the contemplative life. It is evidently also because the practical life may degenerate into a life of pleasure that he is led to speak with approval of those who flee society and seek solitude in order to be able to lead a life of contemplation.¹⁶³

But all these statements as to the greater importance of the contemplative life mean nothing more than that statement of the rabbis that the study of the Law is the greater thing, whereby they mean only, as we have seen, that it is greater in the sense that it leads to doing. With his belief that the laws of the Pentateuch are to be obeyed and followed and practiced, Philo believed that they had an intrinsic value, and a practical life based upon these laws, and upon the contemplation or the study of these laws, could not be dismissed as valueless nor even reduced to a secondary position. Accordingly we shall find many passages in which he asserts the equality of the practical life and the contemplative life, provided the practical life is a life in accordance with the Law. Thus in one passage he says that "while virtue contains both contemplation and practice, nevertheless it is of surpassing excellence in each of these two, for the contemplation of virtue is perfect in beauty, and the practice and exercise of it is a prize to be striven for."¹⁶⁴ The intrinsic value of the practical life based on virtue is affirmed by him in his statement that "happiness consists in the practice and enjoyment of virtue, not in its mere possession,"¹⁶⁵ or that "happiness results from the practice of perfect virtue."¹⁶⁶ Drawing upon his own experience, he tries to show that to lead a contemplative life one does not necessarily have to escape from the practical life. "For

¹⁶³ *Abr.* 4, 22-23; *Spec.* II, 12, 44; *Prob.* 10, 63; cf. also *Spec.* III, 1, 1-6.

¹⁶⁴ *Leg. All.* I, 17, 58.

¹⁶⁵ *Deter.* 17, 60.

¹⁶⁶ *Agr.* 36, 157.

many a time," he says, "have I myself forsaken friends and kinsfolk and country and come into a wilderness, to give my attention to some subject demanding contemplating, and derived no advantage from doing so, but my mind scattered or bitten by passion has gone off to matters of the contrary kind. Sometimes, on the other hand, amid a vast throng I can bring my mind into solitude. God has dispersed the crowd that besets the soul and taught me that a favorable and an unfavorable condition are not brought about by differences of place, but by God who moves and leads the ear of the soul in whatever way He pleases."¹⁶⁷ Not only is it not necessary to escape from practical life in order to lead a contemplative life, but the former may serve as a preparation for the latter, for "it is proper to go through a practical life before beginning the contemplative one: as being a sort of prelude to a more advanced contest."¹⁶⁸ His conception of the equality of the practical life and the contemplative life is discerned in his treatment of the Essenes¹⁶⁹ and the Therapeutae.¹⁷⁰ The former are praised by him as an exemplification of the practical life; the latter are praised by him as an exemplification of the contemplative life.¹⁷¹ Finally, a proof-text for the equality of the practical and contemplative life is found by him in the verses in which the command to rest and to cease work on the seventh day is explained on the ground that on that day God rested from His work of creation.¹⁷² "Always follow God, it says, find in that single six-day period in which, all-sufficient for His purpose, He created the world, a pattern of the time set apart to thee for activity. Find, too, in the seventh day the pattern of the duty to

¹⁶⁷ *Leg. All.* II, 21, 85.

¹⁶⁸ *Fug.* 6, 36.

¹⁶⁹ *Prob.* 12, 75-13, 91; *Hypot.* 11, 1-18 (*Fragmenta*, Richter, VI, 183-185; M. II, 632-634).

¹⁷⁰ *Cont.* I, 1.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² *Exod.* 20: 8-11.

study wisdom, that day in which we are told that He surveyed what He had wrought, and so learn to meditate thyself on the lessons of nature and all that in thy own life makes for happiness. Let us not then neglect the great archetype of the two best lives, the practical and the contemplative." ¹⁷³ By the contemplative here he means study and teaching, for elsewhere he explains that the seventh day, which is to be devoted to contemplative life, is a day devoted to study and teaching.¹⁷⁴ This study and teaching he explains as meaning the study and teaching of "virtue" or of "philosophy" or of the "duty to God" and the "duty to men" ¹⁷⁵ or of "the philosophy of their fathers," ¹⁷⁶ but by all these he means nothing but what he calls elsewhere "the sacred laws." ¹⁷⁷

(d) *Deeds, Words, Intentions*

These three commandments, prayer, repentance, and the study of the Law, are distinguished from most of the other commandments in that they are expressed not in actions but in words. They constitute, therefore, with similar other commandments which are expressed in words, such as the prohibitions of reviling or cursing,¹⁷⁸ of calumniating,¹⁷⁹ and of swearing falsely,¹⁸⁰ and the command to rebuke one's neighbor,¹⁸¹ a special class of commandments. But in addition to these two types of commandments dealing with practical virtues,¹⁸² there are also, as we have seen above, commandments which deal with intellectual¹⁸³ and moral virtues,¹⁸⁴

¹⁷³ *Decal.* 20, 100-101; cf. *Spec.* II, 15, 64.

¹⁷⁴ *Mos.* II, 39, 215-216; *Spec.* II, 15, 61-62; *Fragmenta*, Richter VI, pp. 181-182 (M. II, 630-631).

¹⁷⁵ *Spec.* II, 15, 61-63; *Mos.* II, 39, 215. Cf. above, I, 79-80.

¹⁷⁶ *Mos.* II, 39, 216.

¹⁷⁷ *Fragmenta*, Richter VI, p. 182 (M. II, 631).

¹⁷⁸ *Exod.* 21: 17; 22: 27; *Lev.* 19: 14.

¹⁷⁹ *Exod.* 23: 1; *Lev.* 19: 16.

¹⁸⁰ *Lev.* 19: 12.

¹⁸¹ *Lev.* 19: 17.

¹⁸² Cf. above, p. 208.

¹⁸³ Cf. above, pp. 208 ff.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. above, pp. 218 ff.

that is, with beliefs and feelings, both of which may be regarded as constituting one type of commandment, dealing with what may be called duties of the heart.¹⁸⁵ Evidently referring to these three types of commandments and describing the third type by terms meaning "thoughts" and "intentions," he says that "offenses and right actions exist in three things: thoughts or intentions (*διάνοιαι, βουλαί*), words (*λόγοι*), and deeds (*πράξεις, ἔργα*)." ¹⁸⁶ He bases this view on a verse which in the Septuagint reads: "The word is very near thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart, and in thy hand, to do it." ¹⁸⁷ Commenting upon this verse, he says that the words "mouth," "heart," and "hand" symbolize respectively "words," "intentions," and "deeds." ¹⁸⁸ In another place, alluding to the same verse,¹⁸⁹ he restates the same interpretation of it as follows: "For if our words (*λόγοι*) correspond with our intentions (*βουλεύματα*) and our actions (*πράξεις*) with our words, and the three mutually follow each other, bound together with indissoluble bonds of harmony, happiness prevails." ¹⁹⁰ In the Wisdom of Solomon, similarly, the condition in the pursuit of wisdom is said to be purity in thought,¹⁹¹ purity in word,¹⁹² and purity in deed.¹⁹³

This new distinction thus raises Philo's classifications of the commandments to five: (1) positive and negative; (2) duties to God and duties to men; (3) as subdivisions of the ten commandments; (4) according to the classification of virtues into intellectual, moral, and practical;¹⁹⁴ (5) those of the hands, those of the mouth, and those of the heart, or deeds, words, and intentions.

¹⁸⁵ Cf. below, p. 309.

¹⁸⁶ *Mut.* 41, 236, and cf. 237.

¹⁸⁷ Deut. 30: 14. In the Hebrew the words "and in thy hand" are omitted.

¹⁸⁸ *Mut.* 41, 237; cf. *Virt.* 34, 183; *Probus* 10, 68.

¹⁸⁹ *Praem.* 14, 80.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 81.

¹⁹¹ Wisdom of Solomon 1: 1-5.


¹⁹² *Ibid.* 1: 6-11.


¹⁹³ *Ibid.* 1: 12-16.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. above, pp. 200-201, 208.

V. THE DEFINITION OF VIRTUE

Philo had before him two definitions of virtue. One was the Aristotelian definition, according to which virtue is "a mean (*μεσότης*) between two vices, one of excess and one of defect."¹ There is an anticipation of this doctrine of the mean in Plato's statement that a man should always choose "the life that is seated in the mean (*μέσον*) and shun the excess in either direction."² The other was the Stoic definition, according to which virtue consists in the complete exemption from emotion (*ἀπάθεια*).³ The difference between these two definitions may be gathered from the discussions among the Stoics as to the differences between their own view and that of the Peripatetics. "Between virtue and vice," they say, "there is nothing intermediate (*μεταξύ*), whereas according to the Peripatetics there is, namely, the state of improvement (*προκοπή*)."⁴ The difference between these two definitions of virtue may be illustrated by a diagram in which the area of human conduct is represented by a quadrangle *ABCD*, and this quadrangle is divided in the middle by a line *EF* which is equidistant from *AB* and *CD*.



A  *B* According to Aristotle, the extremes *AB* and *CD* constitute vices, the mean *EF* constitutes virtue, but the entire area of conduct between *AB* and *EF* or between *CD* and *EF* is to be called neither complete virtue nor complete vice but rather the field of progressive virtue or progressive vice, wherein one may move either in the direction of virtue or in the direc-

¹ *Eth. Nic.* II, 6, 1107a, 2-3.

² *Republic* X, 619 a; *Laws* III, 691 c; V, 728 e; VII, 792 c.

³ Cf. above, p. 230, n. 24.

⁴ Diogenes, VII, 127.

tion of vice. To the Stoics, too, virtue is the line *EF*, but vice to them is not merely the extremes *AB* and *CD* but the entire area of conduct between *AB* and *EF* and between *CD* and *EF*. Consequently, according to them, any deviation from the line on either side is a deviation from virtue into the area of vice, there thus being no progressive virtue nor progressive vice.

As a result of their new definition of virtue the Stoics lay down three principles with regard to emotion.

First, as reported in the names of their chief exponents, in opposition to the Peripatetics, who found some emotions useful, the Stoics argue that none of the emotions are useful. They particularly try to show that there is nothing good or useful in such emotions as anger,⁵ pain,⁶ and pity.⁷ Anger (*ὀργή*), hatred (*μῖσος*), pity (*ἔλεος*), and pain (*λύπη*) are all described by them as irrational emotions,⁸ without any qualification, though in later Stoicism some qualifications are made.⁹ To the Stoics, therefore, the wise man is to extirpate all his emotions so as to become free of them, whereas to the Peripatetics the wise man is not to extirpate all his emotions; he is only to indulge in them in moderation.¹⁰

Second, there is no difference of degree of importance between the various virtues or the various vices. "They hold that the goods (i.e., virtues) are equal and that all good is desirable in the highest degree and admits of no lowering or heightening of intensity" and similarly, "it is one of their tenets that sins are all equal . . . for if one truth is not more

⁵ Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes* IV, 22, 49 ff.; cf. 19, 43.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 23, 51 ff.; cf. 20, 45.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 25, 56; cf. 20, 46.

⁸ Diogenes, VII, 111, 113.

⁹ Cf. Zeller, III, 14, p. 275, nn. 1-3 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*², p. 29, nn. 1-3).

¹⁰ Diogenes, V, 31.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, VII, 101.

than another, neither is one falsehood more false than another, and in the same way one deceit is not more so than another, nor sin than sin." ¹²

Third, there is no intermediate class of human beings between those who are perfectly virtuous and those who are perfectly vicious. Men are either virtuous or vicious, and either of these in an absolute sense, "for, say the Stoics, just as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust." ¹³

To all these three points in the Stoic doctrine Philo must have found the teachings of Judaism in opposition.

First, not all the emotions are bad and useless. With regard to such emotions as anger and hatred and pity and pain and their like, there are definite statements that under certain conditions they are good and useful. Moses is on many occasions said to have become angry.¹⁴ In many a place in Scripture the hating of evil is approved of.¹⁵ The people are urged by the Prophet Zechariah to "show mercy and compassion every man to his brother."¹⁶ Jacob is said to have been afraid and distressed.¹⁷ In rabbinic literature, similarly, the moral hero is not he who has extirpated his evil *yeşer*, but rather he who has brought it under control.¹⁸ The same view is also expressed by the rabbis in the story of the consequences that followed when for three days the evil *yeşer* was imprisoned and was made completely powerless.¹⁹ By the time of Philo, the question whether virtue means the extirpation of the emotions or only their control seems to have been a subject of discussion among Hellenistic Jews who had a knowledge of philosophy. In the Fourth

¹² *Ibid.*, VII, 120.

¹³ *Ibid.*, VII, 127.

¹⁴ Exod. 16: 20; Lev. 10: 16; Num. 31: 14 (*ώργισθη*).

¹⁵ Amos 5: 15; Ps. 45: 8; 97: 10; 139: 21; Prov. 13: 5.

¹⁶ Zech. 7: 9.

¹⁸ *M. Abot* IV, 1.

¹⁷ Gen. 32: 8.

¹⁹ *Yoma* 69b.

Book of Maccabees this question is the principal topic of discussion. Guided by Jewish tradition the author comes out in opposition to the Stoics. The question as posed by him is whether "the Inspired Reason is the supreme ruler over the passions."²⁰ By passions, as he subsequently explains, he does not mean such mental defects as "forgetfulness and ignorance" but rather moral defects "that are adverse to justice and courage and temperance and prudence," and the view which he upholds is that the action of reason is "not to extirpate the passions, but to enable us to resist them successfully."²¹ The prohibition, according to the Law, not to eat the meat of certain animals does not mean that we should extirpate any desire for it but rather that we should control that desire.²² As proof-text he quotes, among others,²³ the case of Moses who "was angered against Dathan and Abiram" but "governed his anger by his reason."²⁴

Second, not all sins and virtues are equal. While indeed all the laws are to be observed with equal scrupulousness, some laws are considered weightier than others. This is implied in Scripture itself, in the fact that different sacrifices are required and different punishments are meted out in cases of violation of different laws. In rabbinic literature the laws are explicitly described as being either "heavy" or "light."²⁵ Similarly, in the Fourth Book of Maccabees there is a reference to a distinction between a "small sin" and, by implication, a great sin, or between a "transgression of the law" in "small things" and that in "great things,"

²⁰ IV Macc. 1: 1.

²¹ *Ibid.* 1: 5-6; 3: 1-2.

²² *Ibid.* 1: 34-35. Cf. *Sifra, Qedoshim, Pereḡ* 11, p. 93d: "A man should not say 'I have no desire to eat swine's flesh.' . . . Nay, he should say 'I have a desire for it, but what can I do seeing that my Father who is in heaven has forbidden me.'"

²³ *Ibid.* 2: 19-20; 3: 6-16.

²⁴ *Ibid.* 2: 17; 3: 3.

²⁵ *M. Abot* II, 1.

though in accordance with the teachings of Judaism, it adds, both are to be equally avoided.²⁶ The emphasis in this book is as much on the distinction between different grades of laws as upon their equality with reference to the observance of them, and it is therefore not in agreement with the Stoic view of the equality of sins, but rather in disagreement with it.²⁷

Third, not all men are either perfectly righteous or perfectly wicked. Scripture explicitly asserts that "there is not a righteous man upon earth that doeth good and sinneth not."²⁸ Among the rabbis it is held that between the completely righteous and the completely wicked there is a class of men, described as intermediate (*benonim*), who are neither completely righteous nor completely wicked.²⁹

With these traditionally Jewish conceptions of virtue and the virtuous men in the back of his mind, Philo starts out on his treatment of the philosophic conception of virtue.

To begin with, he adopts the Aristotelian definition of virtue as a mean. In one place, commenting upon the verse, "we will go along the king's highway, we will not turn aside to the right hand nor to the left,"³⁰ he says that "it is better to proceed along the middle road, the road that is truly the royal road, seeing that God, the great and only King, laid it out a broad and goodly way for virtue-loving souls to keep to; hence it is that some of those who followed the mild and social form of philosophy have said that virtues are means."³¹ In another place, where he similarly reproduces the definition

²⁶ IV Macc. 5: 19-20 (18-19); cf. *M. Abot* II, 1; *Jer. Kiddushin* I, 7, 61b.

²⁷ Cf. Townshend's note on IV Macc. 5: 20 in Charles's *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, where he tries to show that these verses in IV Macc. reflect the Stoic view as to the equality of sins.

²⁸ Eccles. 7: 20; cf. I Kings 8: 46; II Chron. 6: 36.

²⁹ *Berakot* 61b; *Rosh ha-Shanah* 16b.

³⁰ Exod. 20: 17.

³¹ *Migr.* 26, 146-147.

of virtue as a mean, he adds the Aristotelian statement to the effect that "deviations in either direction, whether of excess or of deficiency, whether they tend to strain or to laxity, are in fault."³² The implication of the Aristotelian conception of virtue as a mean is also to be discerned in the lesson which he derives from the verse, "Behold I rain upon you bread out of heaven, and the people shall go out and they shall gather the day's portion for a day, that I may prove them whether they will walk in My law or not."³³ This lesson is stated in the form of an apostrophe to the soul. "Gather together, therefore, O soul, what is sufficient of itself and what is suitable, and neither more than sufficient so as to be excessive, nor on the other hand less so as to fall short, that dealing in just measures thou mayest do no injustice."³⁴ In two other places, he tries to show, in conformity with Aristotle's definition of virtue, and more especially with his statement that "the law is the mean,"³⁵ that the practical virtues or the laws taught by Moses are themselves means. First, speaking of the dietary laws, he says: "He approved neither of rigorous austerity, like the Spartan legislator, nor of dainty living, like him who introduced the Ionians and Sybarites to luxurious and voluptuous practices. Instead he opened up a path midway between the two."³⁶ Second, commenting on the verse, "Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you, neither shall ye take from it,"³⁷ he explains this injunction on the ground that "each of the virtues is free from all deficiency and is complete, deriving its perfection from itself, so that if there be any adding or taking away, its whole being is changed and transformed into the opposite condition."³⁸ The implica-

³² *Immut.* 34, 162; cf. 35, 164.

³³ *Exod.* 16: 4; cf. *Leg. All.* III, 56, 162.

³⁴ *Leg. All.* III, 57, 165.

³⁵ *Politica* III, 16, 1287b, 4-5.

³⁶ *Spec.* IV, 17, 102.

³⁷ *Deut.* 4: 2; 13: 1 (12: 32).

³⁸ *Spec.* IV, 27, 144.

tion is that the Law is a mean between opposites. So also in the Letter of Aristeas, the elders selected by the high priest as translators of the books of the Law are praised in that "they espoused the middle course — and this is always the best course to pursue." ³⁹

But having aligned himself with Aristotle in his definition of virtue as a mean, he becomes conscious of the traditional Jewish view, which he himself has restated elsewhere, that certain individuals, by the free grace of God, were virtuous by birth.⁴⁰ He is thus compelled to admit that there may be some truth also in the Stoic definition of virtue, inasmuch as for the few favored perfectly righteous persons virtue would mean the complete extirpation of the emotions. Accordingly he stages a debate on the question as to what constitutes virtue, with Aaron and Moses as the exponents of the two opposite views. Aaron is the exponent of the Aristotelian view, who believes in the control of emotions, and therefore with regard to his emotion of irascibility "he cures and controls it, first by reason, that being driven by an excellent charioteer it may not get restive; next by the virtues of speech, distinctness, and truth."⁴¹ Moses, on the other hand, is the exponent of the Stoic view, who "thinks that it is necessary completely to extirpate and eradicate anger from the soul, for he is contented not with a moderation of emotion but rather with a complete absence of emotion."⁴² But as for his own view on the subject, Philo considers complete exemption of emotions to be possible only for a wise man like Moses who by special grace of God was endowed with "a share of surpassing excellence, even the power to

³⁹ Aristeas, 122.

⁴⁰ Cf. above, I, 450 ff.

⁴¹ *Leg. All.* III, 44, 128.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 129. Cf. Heinemann, *Philos Werke*, and Colson, *ad loc.*

cut out the emotions,"⁴³ for Moses is one of those individuals who receive virtue "as a gift from God without any toil or difficulty."⁴⁴ For the majority of men, who like Aaron make only gradual progress, virtue consists in the moderation of emotion.⁴⁵

For the majority of mankind, then, according to Philo, the cure for the emotions is not their extirpation but rather their control and moderation. Moreover, he argues, an emotion when controlled by reason becomes transformed into a virtue, to which he gives the special name of eupathy (εὐπάθεια) or a good emotional state. Now the term eupathy is of Stoic origin; Philo uses it, however, in a new sense. To the Stoics, to whom virtue consists in complete freedom from emotion or, as they call it, apathy, the term eupathy is used only as a description of certain emotions, such as joy (χαρά), caution (εὐλάβεια), and wishing (βούλησις), which they concede to be of a rational nature (εὐλογος).⁴⁶ While these eupathies, to them, are not pure emotions, for pure emotions by definition are the cause of "instability" (ἀκαταστασία),⁴⁷ whereas eupathies are equable states (*constantiae*) of the soul,⁴⁸ still they are not virtues, for virtue by definition consists in complete apathy. They are to them something between pure emotions and virtues. Philo goes further than that. Any emotion that is controlled by reason is a virtue and therefore the Stoic eupathies will according to him be virtues. He therefore very often uses the terms "virtue and eupathy" or "eupathy and virtue" as if they were synonymous.⁴⁹ In one place, evidently reflecting Aristotle's differ-

⁴³ *Ibid.* III, 45, 131.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* III, 46, 135; cf. above, pp. 450 f.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* III, 45, 132.

⁴⁶ Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes* IV, 6, 14.

⁴⁷ *Leg. All.* III, 7, 22; *Sacr.* 31, 103; *Migr.* 39, 219; *Abr.* 36, 204; *Praem.* 27, 160.

⁴⁶ Diogenes, VII, 116.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, VII, 110.

entiation of virtue from emotion in that the former involves choice (*προαίρεσις*),⁵⁰ he says that "the Passover is," that is to say, the attainment of virtue takes place,⁵¹ "when the soul studies to unlearn irrational emotion and of its own free will (*ἐκουσίως*) experiences rational eupathy (*εὐλογον εὐπάθειαν*)." ⁵² Here then he has restated Aristotle's definition of virtue, the chief characteristic of which is that it is an act of choice or free will, by identifying the term virtue with the Stoic term eupathy. When, therefore, he says in another place that "we extol those philosophers who declare that virtue is eupathy,"⁵³ the reference is undoubtedly not to the Stoics, who have never identified virtue with eupathy, but rather to the Aristotelians, whose definition of virtue Philo himself has rewritten in terms of eupathy.⁵⁴

Then, actuated again by Jewish traditional teachings, he aligns himself with the Peripatetics as against the Stoics in regarding some emotions as good and useful. He thus speaks with approval of "righteous anger" (*ὀργή δίκαια*)⁵⁵ and of the "severe anger against men-stealers."⁵⁶ Similarly, pity (*ἔλεος*) is considered by him a virtue and a quality of the wise.⁵⁷ And so also he approves of the hatred of evil

⁵⁰ *Eth. Nic.* II, 5, 1106a, 2-4.

⁵¹ See Philo's allegorical interpretation of the Passover in *Sacr.* 17, 63: "For we are bidden to keep the Passover which is the passage from the life of passions to the practice of virtue."

⁵² *Heres* 40, 192.

⁵³ *Mus.* 31, 167.

⁵⁴ Cf. Colson *ad loc.* (V, 591): "Who are the philosophers alluded to? Hardly the Stoics. . . . I can hardly think, however, that he speaks without authority." My discussion of Philo's treatment of the term eupathy here will explain this statement, unless some literary source is discovered, and if such happens, I dare say it will be a Peripatetic source.

⁵⁵ *Fug.* 17, 90; *Somn.* I, 15, 91; II, 1, 7. Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* IV, 5, 1125b, 31-32: "The man who is angry at the right things and with the right people, and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought, is praised."

⁵⁶ *Spec.* IV, 4, 14.

⁵⁷ *Sacr.* 37, 121.

(μισοπονηρία),⁵⁸ an emotion which Chrysippus explicitly declares to have no existence in the experience of any good man.⁵⁹ In speaking of the ideal legislator as represented by Moses, he finds that his chief characteristics are "love of humanity, love of justice, love of goodness, and hatred of evil,"⁶⁰ and of the ideal magistrates to be appointed by a king he says that one of their chief qualifications should be their hatred of arrogance as a thing pernicious and utterly evil.⁶¹

Then also, in conformity with Jewish tradition, not all vices and not all virtues are of an equal degree of importance. Using the same descriptive terms, light (*kal*) and heavy (*hamur*),⁶² that are used by the rabbis, he speaks of sin (*ἀμάρτημα*) as being either lighter (*κουφότερον*) or heavier (*βαρύτερον*).⁶³ Similarly with regard to virtues, he describes some of them, like piety (*εὐσέβεια*) and holiness (*δσιότης*), as great virtues (*μεγάλαι ἀρεταί*),⁶⁴ and piety and holiness, as well as faith and justice, are described as the queen (*βασίλισ*) or the leader (*ἡγεμονίς*) or the chief (*ἔξαρχος*) of the virtues.⁶⁵ That he considers virtues as differing in importance, and that like Aristotle and in opposition to the Stoics he considers the middle course as a virtue, may be also gathered from his statement that, according to Scripture, rewards are offered "for the acquisition of virtue, and to those who cannot reach the highest virtues, even the acquisition of the middle ones (*τῶν μέσων*) is serviceable."⁶⁶

⁵⁸ *Mos.* II, 2, 9; *Spec.* I, 9, 55.

⁶⁰ *Mos.* II, 2, 9.

⁵⁹ Plutarch, *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* 25.

⁶¹ *Spec.* IV, 33, 170.

⁶² *M. Yoma* VIII, 8.

⁶³ *Sacr.* 13, 54; *Mut.* 42, 241, 243; *Spec.* III, 11, 64. Cf. the expression "one of these least commandments" in Matt. 5: 19.

⁶⁴ *Plant.* 8, 35.

⁶⁵ *Plant.* 28, 122; *Abr.* 5, 27; *Decal.* 23, 119; *Spec.* IV, 25, 135; 27, 147; *Praem.* 9, 53; cf. above, pp. 214, 220.

⁶⁶ *Agr.* 27, 121.

Finally, the majority of men to whom, according to Philo, virtue does not mean the extirpation of emotion, but rather its control, constitute a class of people who are not perfectly righteous nor perfectly wicked, for, reëchoing a fundamental Jewish view, he maintains "absolute sinlessness belongs to God alone, or possibly to a divine man." ⁶⁷ Between the "virtuous" (σπουδαῖος) or "perfect" (τέλειος) man and the "wicked" (φαῦλος) man there is the man whom Philo, like the rabbis, describes as "the intermediate man (ὁ μέσος), the man who is neither wicked nor virtuous," ⁶⁸ and "quite naturally, then," he adds, "does God address the recommendations and exhortations before us to the earthly mind which is neither wicked nor virtuous but intermediate." ⁶⁹ Another reference to the "intermediate" is to be found in a passage in which he says that between the wise (σοφοί) and the bad (κακοί) there are the practicers (ἀσκηταί) of virtue, who are described by him as being "on the boundary (μεθόριοι) between two extremities." ⁷⁰ In another passage, speaking of "sin" rather than of "sinners," he applies the term "intermediate" to sin committed unintentionally and compares his term "intermediate" with the Stoic term "indifferent." ⁷¹ "As to sin intentionally," he says, "is unjust, so to sin unintentionally and out of ignorance is not at once justifiable, but perhaps it is something on the boundary (μεθόριον) between the two, that is, between righteousness and unrighteousness, and is what some persons call indifferent (ἀδιάφορον), for no sin can be an act of righteousness." ⁷² The comparison between unintentional

⁶⁷ *Virt.* 33, 177; cf. above, p. 256.

⁶⁸ *Leg. All.* I, 30, 93.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 95.

⁷⁰ *Somn.* I, 23, 151-152.

⁷¹ Cf. *Arnim*, III, 117-123.

⁷² *Fragmenta*, Richter, VI, 205-206 (M, II, 651).

sin described by him as "intermediate" and what the Stoics call "indifferent," it may be remarked, is only in so far as the Stoic "indifferent" is also defined as "those things which are between virtue and vice."⁷³ The Stoics, however, do not mean to imply by this definition that there is an intermediate class of human beings who are neither perfectly virtuous nor perfectly vicious.

VI. THE REWARD OF VIRTUE

The problem of virtue and its reward presents itself in Greek philosophy and in Judaism after the same pattern. In both of them, it is assumed that in man there is a continuous struggle between two motive forces. In philosophy these forces are called emotion and reason; in Judaism they are called the evil imagination (*yeşer ra'*, *yeşer ha-ra'*) and the good imagination (*yeşer tob*). In both of them, man is told what force is best for him to follow. In philosophy, he is told to follow reason; in Judaism, he is told to follow the good imagination. But why should man follow reason or the good imagination with all its demand for self-restraint and self-denial? To this both philosophy and Judaism give the same answer. In philosophy, it is promised that a life of virtue in accordance with reason will be rewarded by happiness, whereas a life of vice in accordance with emotion will be punished by unhappiness, for "virtuous activities are what determine happiness, and the opposite activities its opposite."¹ In Judaism, it is similarly promised that life in obedience to the Law will be rewarded by blessings, whereas life in disobedience to the Law will be punished by curses, for "Behold, I set before you this day a blessing

⁷³ Stobaeus, *Eclogae* II, p. 79, ll. 14-15 (Arnim, III, 118, p. 28, l. 26).

¹ *Eth. Nic.*, I, 10, 1100b, 9-11.

and a curse; a blessing, if you obey the commandments of the Lord your God . . . and a curse, if you will not obey the commandments of the Lord your God.”²

But philosophers were quite fully aware of the common complaint of mankind that “injustice pays better than justice, for the most part,”³ and Plato quotes the complaint of religious-minded Greeks that “the gods themselves assign to many good men misfortunes and an evil life, but to their opposites a contrary lot.”⁴ Similarly, Scripture and rabbis were aware of the fact that not all those who are obedient receive the promised blessings and not all those who are disobedient receive the threatened curses, and the question is therefore raised, “Wherefore holdest Thou thy tongue when the wicked devoureth the man that is more righteous than he?”⁵ and “Wherefore doth the way of the wicked prosper?”⁶ In post-biblical Judaism the problem is stated in the form of the question: “Why is there a righteous man who fares well and another righteous man who fares badly, and why is there a wicked man who fares well and another wicked man who fares badly?”⁷

Many answers are given to the question of the suffering of the righteous and the prosperity of the wicked, but the main answers fall into four groups.

First, no really righteous man will suffer and no really wicked man will prosper. If a righteous man appears to us to suffer, it is because of some sin of his which is unknown to us, and similarly, if some wicked man appears to us to prosper, it is because of some meritorious deeds of his which are unknown to us. Among philosophers, Plato declares that “the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive from

² Deut. 11: 26-28.

³ *Republic* II, 364 A.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 364 B.

⁵ Hab. 1: 13.

⁶ Jer. 12: 1.

⁷ *Berakot* 7a.

them all things at their best, excepting only such evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins,"⁸ and in Judaism a rabbi similarly declares that "the righteous who fares badly is one who is not perfect in his righteousness" and that the "wicked who fares well is one who is not wicked throughout."⁹

Second, no real evil will befall the righteous nor will real good come to the wicked. Real evil and real good are not those of the body in life but those of the soul after death, and even in life, what appears to be evil may be a prelude to something good. Plato expresses this view in his statement that even when the just man is "in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death"¹⁰ and especially certain is he of "the recompenses which await both just and unjust after death."¹¹ Among the Stoics, the evil which befalls the righteous is itself sometimes said to serve some good purpose, for "these things which you call hardships, which you call adversities and accursed are . . . for the good of the persons themselves to whom they come."¹² The rabbis similarly declare that the real reward of the righteous and the real punishment of the wicked are in the world to come¹³ and, as for the evils in this world, they say that "whatever the Merciful does is for a good purpose."¹⁴

Third, sometimes the evil which God brings upon the righteous is merely for the purpose of trying and testing them. Seneca declares that God "does not make a spoiled pet of a good man; He tests him, hardens him, and fits him for His own service,"¹⁵ and that "the gods follow the same

⁸ *Republic* X, 613 A.

⁹ *Berakot* 7a.

¹⁰ *Republic* X, 613 A.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 614 A.

¹² Seneca, *De Providentia* III, 1.

¹³ *Ta'anit* 11a; *Ḳiddushin* 39b; 40b.

¹⁴ *Berakot* 60b.

¹⁵ *De Providentia* I, 6.

rule that teachers follow with their pupils; they require most effort from those of whom they have the surest hopes. Do you imagine that the Lacedaemonians hate their children when they test their mettle by lashing them in public?"¹⁶ So also the rabbis, commenting upon the verse "The Lord trieth the righteous,"¹⁷ say: "A potter does not test defective vessels, for he cannot give them a single blow without breaking them. What kind of vessels does he test? Good vessels, for however many blows he gives them, they are not broken. Similarly the Holy One, blessed be He, does not test the wicked but only the righteous. . . . When a flax-worker knows that his flax is of good quality, the more he beats it the more it improves and the more it glistens, but when he knows that it is of inferior quality he cannot give it one knock without its splitting. Similarly the Holy One, blessed be He, does not test the wicked but only the righteous."¹⁸ The analogy of father and son as an explanation of the seemingly unmerited suffering of the righteous occurs in Scripture in the verses "and thou shalt consider in thy heart, that, as a man chasteneth his son, so the Lord thy God chasteneth thee"¹⁹ and "for whom the Lord loveth He correcteth, even as a father the son in whom he delighteth."²⁰

Fourth, sometimes the righteous suffer not for their own sins but for those of their ancestors, and similarly sometimes the wicked prosper for the meritorious deeds of their ancestors. Seneca declares, with reference to the prosperity of the wicked, that "some people are treated [by the gods] with greater indulgence because of their parents and ancestors, others because of their grandchildren and great-

¹⁶ *Ibid.* IV, 11.

¹⁷ Ps. 111: 5.

¹⁸ *Genesis Rabbah* 32, 3.

¹⁹ Deut. 8: 5.

²⁰ Prov. 3: 12.

grandchildren and the long line of their descendants, whose qualities are as yet unrevealed.”²¹ The rabbis declare that “the righteous who fares badly is a righteous man who is the son of a wicked man” and “the wicked who fares well is a wicked man who is the son of a righteous man”²² and also that “a son can make his father acquire merit.”²³

All these justifications of God’s dealings with the righteous and the wicked imply a belief in individual providence. Now in Judaism such a belief was compatible with its conception of God, for its conception of Him was that of a miracle-working God who is not bound by the laws of nature which He himself has implanted in the world. It was also compatible with the conception of the gods in Greek popular religion, who were endowed with human emotions as well as with human qualities. But the god of Plato and of the Stoics as conceived in their respective philosophies could not exercise individual providence in the world. He was a god who could not deviate from certain inexorable laws of nature. If they wished at all to attribute to him providence, it had to be a universal providence, a providence that extends only to the species. They could all say, as indeed the Stoics did say, that “the gods attend to great matters; they neglect small ones.”²⁴ If they do speak of divine providence as if it were individual divine providence and try to find explanations for certain deviation from such individual divine providence, they do not speak as philosophers from their own philosophic premises but rather as statesmen and citizens who believed in the need of bolstering

²¹ *De Beneficiis* IV, 32, 1.

²² *Berakot* 7a.

²³ *Sanhedrin* 104a; cf. S. Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, pp. 196-197.

²⁴ Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* II, 66, 167; cf. III, 35, 86; Plutarch, *De Stoicorum Repugnantibus* 37, 2.

up popular religion as a valuable sanction for right conduct. Aristotle who kept his philosophy apart from his good citizenship does not commit himself philosophically to individual providence. He cautiously says that "if the gods have any care for human affairs, as they are thought to have, it would be reasonable both that they would delight in that which was best and most akin to them (i.e., reason) and that they should reward those who love and honor this most, as caring for things that are dear for them and acting both rightly and nobly."⁴⁵

To Greek philosophers, then, because of their disbelief in individual providence, there was no problem of divine justice, and hence to them there was no need for any theories as to its vindication. It happens, however, that all of them were interested not only in what they called speculative philosophy but also in practical philosophy, and in practical philosophy, which was to deal with both society and the individual, they were concerned with the problem of how to maintain order in society and also how to make men shun evil and pursue good. Now, for the great mass of men who were still unshaken in their inherited beliefs, these philosophers felt they could justifiably invoke the help of certain notions of popular religion, even though they themselves did not believe in them, and this they did quite profusely. But at the same time they also realized that there were many men, who, though not professional philosophers, had already been deeply affected by the teaching of philosophy, and these could not be expected to relish the pap of popular religion handed out by the philosophers for the consumption of the masses. For such men, they must have felt, the only deterrent from evil that was thus left was the fear of being punished by the laws of the state, and the only incentive for

⁴⁵ *Eth. Nic.* X, 8, 1179a, 24-29.

good was the hope of being rewarded by some of the various kinds of external goods. As philosophers, however, they knew full well that mere fear of punishment and hope of reward were not strong enough motives to assure right conduct, for the motives of fear and hope, they could not help feeling, would only invite each man to take a chance on his own calculation as to whether any action contemplated by him would be more likely to bring punishment or to bring reward. As philosophers, too, they felt that it was a part of their business to provide mankind with some universal principle of guidance; but here, again, on the basis of their own philosophy, the only principle of guidance they could provide mankind with was the practical advice that it was for each man to take care not to be caught, if he has committed a punishable crime, and not to be overlooked, if he has done something for which there is a reward. The problem for Greek philosophers, therefore, was to find some universal principle of guidance more effective than the individual calculation of each man as to the outcome of any contemplated action of his, and more lofty than advice for the need of precaution on the part of each man against the possibility of being caught or of being overlooked.

The solution offered by them for this problem is to be found in their common advice that virtue is to be practiced for its own sake. Plato suggests it in his statement that "justice in itself is the best thing for the soul itself";²⁶ Aristotle restates it in more general terms when he says that "to do noble and virtuous deeds is a thing worthy of choice for its own sake";²⁷ and the Stoics formulate it as a general principle that "virtue is worthy of choice for its own sake."²⁸

²⁶ *Republic* X, 612 B; cf. *Theaetetus* 176 B ff.

²⁷ *Eth. Nic.* X, 6, 1176b, 8-9.

²⁸ Diogenes, VII, 89, 127.

Now when closely examined in its various philosophical contexts, it will be found that this advice implies a confession of lack of faith in the rewardfulness of virtue. All those who have used it, whether Plato or Aristotle or the Stoics or any of their followers, seem to argue that, inasmuch as despite every possible calculation there is no certainty as to what, in the form of external goods as a reward or external evils as a punishment, will follow as a result of one's actions, it is advisable for one to take a chance on the practice of virtue rather than on the practice of vice, for, they must have argued, while both virtue and vice may each bring either external goods or external evils, it is quite certain that virtue will always bring internal happiness and vice will always bring internal unhappiness. Underlying this advice is evidently the observation so often stressed by the philosophers themselves that external goods do not constitute happiness,²⁹ coupled also with the common human experience, in which even the philosophers must have shared, that it is easier for one to induce in himself a feeling of happiness in the misery that may follow a life of virtue than it is to induce in himself such a feeling of happiness in the misery that may follow a life of vice. To philosophers, then, the formula that virtue is to be chosen for its own sake was a counsel of despair, which had grown out of the realization that no other reward can be expected with certainty for the choice of virtue.

The advice that one is to practice virtue for its own sake is given also by the rabbis. As expressed by them, it reads: "Be not like servants who minister to their master in expectation of receiving a reward; but be like servants who minister to their master in no expectation of receiving a reward."³⁰ It is also expressed by them in the statement

²⁹ *Eth. Nic.* I, 5, 1095b, 14-1096a, 10; 8, 1098b, 9-1099b, 8.

³⁰ *M. Abot* I, 3.

that only "if thou hast done the words of the Law for their own sake will they be life unto thee."³¹ But with the rabbis this advice has a different meaning than with the philosophers. With their belief in individual providence and divine justice, no righteous deed can go unrewarded, even though occasionally, as in the case of those who are not perfectly righteous, the reward for some righteous deeds may be overwhelmed by the punishment for some wicked deeds, and sometimes also, even in the case of the perfectly righteous, the reward for some righteous deed may be of such a nature that it is not evident to the eye. What then do the rabbis mean by saying that man should not serve God in expectation of receiving a reward? They certainly cannot mean thereby that the service of God might not bring any reward at all. Quite obviously what they mean thereby is that, even though a reward, in some form, is sure to come, still one should not serve God in expectation of any reward. Underlying this advice is evidently the belief that rewards are distributed by God according to the principle of justice, and that therefore rewards are to be proportionate to the number of good deeds done and to the manner in which they are done. "All is according to the amount of the work,"³² say the rabbis, and also "greater is he who does the commandments of God out of love than he who does them out of fear."³³ The service of God out of love, then, is of a higher quality than the service of God out of fear and will therefore bring a greater reward. Now the opposite of serving God out of love is not only to serve Him out of fear, as in the passage quoted, but also to serve Him in expectation

³¹ *Sifre Deut.* § 306, F, p. 131b; HF, p. 338; cf. *Ta'anit* 7a; *Pesiḳta Zuḥarta* on Deut. 32: 2.

³² *M. Abot* III, 15. This is the meaning of the statement according to one of its traditional interpretations. Cf. Commentary of Bertinoro *ad loc.*

³³ *Sota* 31a.

of a reward. Thus in another passage, which expresses the same sentiment, the rabbis, commenting upon the scriptural words "to love the Lord your God,"³⁴ derive therefrom the lesson that "whatever you do should be done by you only out of love" and that consequently one should not say "I will study the Torah in order that I may . . . acquire a reward in the world to come."³⁵ In the light of all this, then, when the rabbis urge men to serve God without the expectation of a reward, they merely mean to emphasize the principle that one is to serve God out of love, and this not because of any doubt as to whether a reward will be forthcoming but because the service of God out of love is intrinsically the highest kind of service.

These two traditions, the philosophic and the Jewish, are combined in Philo in his treatment of the same problem. The continuous conflict that goes on within man between good and evil is usually described by him in philosophic language as a conflict between the irrational soul and the rational soul³⁶ or between emotion and reason.³⁷ But it is also described by him in the traditional language of Judaism as a conflict between the evil *yeşer* and the good *yeşer*. Explaining the symbolism of Isaac as the father of twins, he says: "For the soul of every man from the first, as soon as he is born, bears in its womb twins, namely, good and evil, having the image (*φαντασιουμένη*) of both of them."³⁸ The expression "having the image of both of them" undoubtedly reflects the Hebrew terms 'good *yeşer*' and 'evil *yeşer*,' for "imagination" (*φαντασία*) is a good rendering of *yeşer*, even though it is not used as such in the Septuagint. Moreover,

³⁴ Deut. 11: 13.

³⁵ *Sifre Deut.* § 41, HF, p. 87; cf. F, p. 80a.

³⁶ Cf. *Spec.* IV, 23, 123-24, 125; *Opif.* 46, 134; *Leg. All.* I, 12, 31.

³⁷ Cf. below, n. 43.

³⁸ *Praem.* 11, 63; cf. IV Macc. 2: 21-23.

his statement that the soul of man has this image "from the first, as soon as he is born" undoubtedly reflects the verse saying that "the *yeşer*-of-the-heart (*διάνοια*) of man is studiously bent upon evils from his youth" ³⁹ and also the traditional Jewish interpretation of the verse "God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed upon his face a breath of life" ⁴⁰ as meaning that God formed man with the two *yeşarim*, the good and the evil.⁴¹ Philo himself, in his direct comment on this last-quoted verse, expresses the same view in philosophic language by saying that the man whose creation is described in this verse, unlike the man whose creation is described in a previous verse,⁴² is of a

³⁹ Gen. 8: 21 (LXX), quoted by Philo in *Heres* 59, 296. I take the Greek *διάνοια* in this verse to represent the Hebrew יצר לב just as the Greek *διανοείται* (Gen. 6: 5) and *εσθίμμημα* (I Chron. 28: 9) and *διάνοια* (I Chron. 29: 18) represent the Hebrew יצר מחשבות. I do not think that Schleusner, in his *Lexicon in LXX*, and Hatch and Redpath, in their *Concordance of the Septuagint*, are right in taking the Hebrew יצר in this verse to be represented by the Greek verb *ἐγκείται*. In Deut. 31: 21, the Septuagint translates the Hebrew *yeşer* by *πνευμα*, indicating that it has taken this term there in the sense of evil *yeşer* (as the term is so also used in this specific sense in *M. Abot* IV, 1). In Sirach 15: 14, the Hebrew *yeşer* is reflected in the Greek *διαβούλιον*.

Evidently it was as difficult to find an exact equivalent of *yeşer* in Greek as it is in modern languages. Literally the term means "formation," whence "the formation of images or thoughts," "device," "design," "desire," "bent of mind," "inclination," "impulse." Of mediaeval Jewish authors, Saadia in his Arabic version of the Pentateuch translates *yeşer* in Gen. 6: 5 and 8: 21 by *hāşir*, probably in the sense of "imagination" (see my study on "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts," *Harvard Theological Review*, 28 (1935), p. 106). As "imagination" (*fikr*, see again my study, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-92; *hāşir*) it is also translated by Ibn Janaḥ in his Hebrew-Arabic Lexicon *Sefer ha-Shorashim*, s.v. Ibn Ezra in his Commentary on the Pentateuch (Gen. 8: 21) explains it by *toladah*, "nature," "inborn quality," "disposition." Kimḥi in his Hebrew Lexicon *Sefer ha-Shorashim*, s.v., explains it by *ta'awah*, "desire," *ra'yon*, "thought," "imagination" (see my study as above, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-132).

On the *yeşer* in general, see Strack and Billerbeck, "Exkurs: Der gute und böse Trieb," in their *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrash*, IV, pp. 466-483; Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, pp. 242-292; Moore, *Judaism*, I, 479-486.

⁴⁰ Gen. 2: 7.

⁴¹ *Genesis Rabbah* 14, 4.

⁴² Gen. 1: 27.

double nature, consisting of an earthlike soul which is the seat of desire and the other irrational emotions and a spiritual soul which is the seat of reason acting as a restraint upon the emotions.⁴³ So also in the Letter of Aristeas this same verse is rephrased in philosophic language to read: "All men are by nature intemperate and inclined to pleasure."⁴⁴ Men are therefore urged by Philo, in the language of philosophy, to follow reason and virtue and, in the language of Scripture, to obey the commandments of the Lord their God, and as a reward for such a life of reason and virtue and obedience of the commandments he promises, in the language of philosophy, happiness⁴⁵ and, in the language of Scripture, blessings. In a special treatise he describes the "blessings" and "curses,"⁴⁶ or the rewards and punishments, which Scripture holds out to each according to his desert, "as affecting individual men, families, cities, countries and nations, and vast regions of the earth."⁴⁷

But, like Scripture and philosophy, Philo was troubled by the question of the suffering of the righteous and the prosperity of the wicked. In his treatise on Providence, he is asked by Alexander: "Are you alone ignorant that to the worst and vilest of men good things in abundance come crowding in, wealth, high repute, honors paid to them by the masses, authority . . . while those who love and practice wisdom and every kind of virtue are, I may almost say, all of them poor, obscure, of little repute and in humble position?"⁴⁸

The answers given by Philo are like those common to

⁴³ *Spec.* IV, 24, 123; cf. *Opif.* 46, 134; *Leg. All.* I, 12, 31.

⁴⁴ Aristeas, 277; cf. 108, 222.

⁴⁶ *Praem.* 14, 79; 20, 126.

⁴⁵ Cf. above, pp. 165 ff.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 1, 7.

⁴⁸ *Provid.* 2, 1 (Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VIII, 14, 386b; Aucher, II, 3). With the treatment of the subject here, cf. P. Barth, "Die stoische Theodizee bei Philo," *Philosophische Abhandlungen. Max Heinze . . . gewidmet*, 1906, 14-33.

philosophers and rabbis. In these answers he sometimes deals only with the suffering of the righteous and sometimes he deals only with the prosperity of the wicked, but in each case one may apply the same reasoning to the opposite case.

First, if some righteous men suffer, it is because they are not really perfect in their righteousness. "It does not follow," he says, "if certain persons are considered good by us, they are so in reality, for God judges by standards more accurate than any which the human mind employs." ⁴⁹

Second, the good which befalls the wicked is not the real good. "Mayest thou never be so led astray from the truth as to think that happiness is the lot of any of the wicked though he excel Croesus in wealth, Lynceus in keen sight, Milo of Crotona in muscular strength and Ganymede in beauty," ⁵⁰ for when you have attained to a closer conception of the true and only good, you will laugh at those things which you have for some time admired, ⁵¹ for of these things "none ranks of itself in the sight of God as a good." ⁵² In these particular passages he speaks of real good as the good of the soul in this world, but elsewhere, as we know, he also speaks of the real good of the soul after death as well as the real evil of the soul after death. ⁵³

Third, the suffering of the righteous may come from God as a trial or test. Drawing upon the verses "and it shall come to pass, because ye hearken to these ordinances . . . the Lord will take away from thee all sickness," ⁵⁴ he first says: "He promises that those who take pains to cultivate

⁴⁹ *Provid.* 2, 54 (Eusebius, *op. cit.*, 396b; Aucher, II, 102).

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 2, 7 (Eusebius, *op. cit.*, 387a; Aucher, II, 16).

⁵¹ *Ibid.* 2, 9 (Eusebius, *op. cit.*, 387c; Aucher, II, 17).

⁵² *Ibid.* 2, 10 (Eusebius, *op. cit.*, 387d; Aucher, II, 22).

⁵³ Cf. above, I, 406 ff.

⁵⁴ Deut. 7: 12, 15.

virtue and set the laws before them . . . will receive as well the gift of complete freedom from disease"; but then adds: "And if some infirmity should befall them it will come not to do them injury but to remind the mortal that he is mortal, to humble his over-weening spirit and to improve his moral condition." ⁵⁵ The analogy of father and son which Scripture and Stoics use as an explanation for the seemingly unmerited suffering of the righteous is used by Philo as an explanation of the seemingly unmerited prosperity of the wicked. "Just as parents do not lose thought of their wastrel children . . . and often too they lavish their kindness on the wastrel more than on the well behaved . . . so God also . . . takes thought even for those who live a mis-spent life, thereby giving them time for reformation and also keeping within the bounds of His merciful nature." ⁵⁶

Fourth, while in his discussion of divine providence Philo does not mention the fact that the wicked are sometimes dealt with kindly by God for the sake of the merit of their ancestors, we know that in several places of his writings he discusses this characteristically Jewish doctrine. ⁵⁷

In the course of his discussion of divine providence, Philo also says that individuals may sometimes suffer undeservedly because God's "care is for the whole human race" or "for the whole world," ⁵⁸ for "Providence or forethought is contented with paying regard to things in the world of the most importance, just as in kingdoms and commands of army it pays regard to the cities and troops, not to some chance individual of the obscure and insignificant kind." ⁵⁹ Superficially this statement would seem to be nothing but a

⁵⁵ *Praem.* 20, 119.

⁵⁶ *Provid.* 2, 4-6 (Eusebius, *op. cit.*, 387a; Aucher, II, 15).

⁵⁷ Cf. above, I, 454 f., and below, p. 413.

⁵⁸ *Provid.* 2, 44 (Eusebius, *op. cit.*, 394c-d; Aucher, II, 99).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 2, 54 (Eusebius, *op. cit.*, 396b-c; Aucher, II, 102).

restatement of the Stoic doctrine quoted above that "the gods attend to great matters; they neglect the small ones." But Philo could not have meant by it the same as the Stoics. The Stoics meant by it to deny individual providence and to assert that what they call providence is merely the uniformity and unity and continuity and immutability of the universal laws of nature. Philo, however, did believe in individual providence. This is indirectly implied in his belief in miracles, which to him means that God may upset the universal laws of nature out of his care for certain favored individuals,⁶⁰ and it is directly expressed in his statement that God "guides and controls the universe by the law and right of an absolute sway, having a providential regard not only for those which are of greater importance, but also for those which appear to be of less importance."⁶¹ Now, if as he says in this last-quoted statement that God's providential regard is not only for things which are "of greater importance" but also for things which are "of less importance," he certainly could not mean by his previously quoted statement what it would superficially seem to mean, namely, that God sometimes actually neglects the individual because of this primary concern "for the whole human race" or "for the whole world" or for things "of the most importance." What he really means by this previously quoted statement is this: Providence is both universal and individual. Universal providence means the operation of the laws of nature. Individual providence includes among other things, the miraculous suspension of the laws of nature by God for the benefit of some individual. Such a miraculous intervention on the part of God in the order of nature, however, takes place only in the case of individuals who are especially deserving of it. If they are not deserving of it, the

⁶⁰ Cf. above, I, 347 ff.

⁶¹ *Migr.* 33, 186.

laws of nature are left undisturbed. It is in this sense that Philo says in the previously quoted statement, that individuals who are not deserving of a miraculous intervention on the part of God in their behalf may sometimes suffer undeservedly by the operations of the laws of nature, inasmuch as in their case God's direct care is "for the whole human race" or "for the whole world" or for things "of the most importance." Philo's belief in individual providence, but his belief also that divine providence acts in accordance with justice and in accordance with the deserts of man, is clearly brought out in the following statement: "It is not possible with God that a wicked man should lose his good reward for a single good thing which he may have done among a great number of evil actions; nor, on the other hand, that a good man should escape punishment, and not suffer it, if among many good actions he has done wickedly in anything." ⁶² This reflects a view similar to that expressed by rabbis in such statements as "the Holy One, blessed be He, does not withhold the reward of any creature" ⁶³ and "he who says that the Holy One, blessed be He, overlooks any sins of man ought to forfeit his right to the protection of his life by law." ⁶⁴

Like the philosophers, Philo also urges men to practice virtue for its own sake. "For," he says, "prudence is itself the reward (*ἀθλον*) of prudence, and justice and each of the other virtues is its own recompense (*γέρας*)." ⁶⁵ The expression of the principle of virtue for its own sake in terms of its being its own "recompense" or "reward" does not

⁶² *Fragmenta*, Richter, VI, 203 (M. II, 649).

⁶³ *Pesahim* 118a.

⁶⁴ *Baba Ḳamma* 50a. Cf. Sirach 5: 6: "And say not, 'His mercies are great, He will forgive the multitude of mine iniquities,' for mercy and wrath are with him, and His indignation abideth upon the ungodly."

⁶⁵ *Spec.* II, 47, 259.

occur in Stoic literature, in so far as it has been preserved, until after the time of Philo,⁶⁶ and one may speculate on the question whether Philo's use of the terms "recompense" and "reward" represents an original Stoic version of the principle, or whether it reflects some other source. In the rabbinic equivalent of this principle, formulated long before Philo, the term used, as we have seen above, is "recompense" or "reward."⁶⁷ This principle Philo finds implied in the verse "and the people shall go out and gather a day's portion for a day, that I may prove them, whether they will walk in My law, or not."⁶⁸ Commenting upon this verse, he says, "the man of worthy aims sets himself to acquire day for the sake of the day, light for the sake of light, the beautiful for the sake of the beautiful alone, not for the sake of something else," and concludes: "this is the divine law, to value virtue for its own sake."⁶⁹ The phrase "virtue for its own sake" is, of course, Stoic, but whereas among the Stoics and in Greek philosophy in general, as we have seen, it means an admission that the practice of virtue may not be rewarded, in Philo, as in Judaism, it means that the worship of God

⁶⁶ Heinemann in *Philos Werke* (II, p. 181, n. 3) quotes Epictetus, III, 24, 51, who uses the term *επαθλον*, and Colson (VII, 630, § 259) quotes Servius (Arnim, III, 45), who uses the term *praemia*. Cf. also Seneca's use of the terms *merces* and *commodum* in *De Beneficiis* IV, 25, 3.

⁶⁷ Cf. *M. Abot* I, 3 (quoted above, p. 286) where the Hebrew term used is *peras*. Cf. also *M. Abot* IV, 2: "For the recompense (*sekar*) of the performance of a commandment is the performance of another commandment." Antigonus of Soko, the author of the maxim in *M. Abot* I, 3, flourished in the third or the second century B.C. No dependence of the rabbis upon the Stoics is to be assumed in such pious utterances as the one under consideration on the mere basis of similarity. Cf. Bergmann, "Die stoische Philosophie und die jüdische Frömmigkeit," *Judaica: Festschrift zu Hermann Cohens siebenzigstem Geburtstage*, pp. 145-166, especially p. 161, n. 1, on the maxim under consideration, and p. 165, general conclusion. Cf. also Julius Guttmann, *Die Philosophie des Judentums*, pp. 50-51; A. Kaminka, "Ha-Musar she-be-Sifre Seneca ve-ha-Musar ha-Yehudi," *Moznayim*, 4 (1935), pp. 46-51; Weiss, *Dor Dor we-Dorshaw*, II^a, p. 27.

⁶⁸ Exod. 16: 4.

⁶⁹ *Leg. All.* III, 57, 167.

out of love will bring the highest reward. That this is what Philo means by his restatement of the philosophic principle of virtue for its own sake may be gathered from several places in his writings. In one place he says: "These virtues are said to be chosen for their own sake, but they will assume a grander and loftier aspect if practiced for the sake of honoring and pleasing God."⁷⁰ What he quite evidently means is that these virtues, which are urged by philosophers to be chosen for their own sake, will assume a grander and loftier aspect if, as recommended in Judaism, they are practiced for the sake of honoring and pleasing God, that is, for the love of God. In another place, speaking of piety, that is, the worship of God, which to him is one of the virtues,⁷¹ he expresses himself in terms like those used by the rabbis, contrasting the worship of God from fear with the worship of Him from love. "For I observe," he says, "that all the exhortations to piety through the laws refer either to our loving or our fearing the Existent," concluding that while to fear God is quite suitable for some people, to love God implies a higher conception of the nature of God and marks a higher form of the worship of God.⁷² A reference to these two modes of worshiping God is to be found also in his contrast between the "lovers (*φίλοι*) of God," such as Moses, and those who are only "servants (*δούλοι*) of God."⁷³ In still another place he says that with regard to the worship of God, "there are three classes of human temperaments,"⁷⁴ and to these three classes of worshipers he makes God address himself as follows: "My first rewards will be set apart for (1) those who worship Me for myself

⁷⁰ *Congr.* 14, 80.

⁷¹ Cf. above, pp. 212 ff.

⁷² *Immut.* 14, 69; cf. Moore, *Judaism*, II, 99, n. 2.

⁷³ *Migr.* 9, 45.

⁷⁴ *Abr.* 25, 124.

alone, the second for those who worship Me for their own sakes, either (2) hoping to win blessings or (3) expecting to obtain remission of punishments.”⁷⁵ These three classes, it is quite obvious, refer respectively (1) to those who worship God from love, (2) to those who worship Him in expectation of a reward, and (3) to those who worship Him from fear. Among the rabbis, as we have seen, to worship God from love is contrasted, on the one hand, with worshipping Him in expectation of a reward and, on the other hand, with worshipping Him from fear.⁷⁶

Despite, then, his urging that man should practice virtue for its own sake, Philo believes that the practice of virtue is to be rewarded by a good that is a real good, and that real good is what philosophers call happiness and what Scripture calls blessings. This identification of the real good or happiness with the scriptural blessings has led Philo to throw himself into the philosophic controversy as to what “goods” are and to allow himself to be guided in this question by the scriptural description of what the “blessings” are.

Both Plato and Aristotle divide goods (*τὰ ἀγαθὰ*) into three classes, (1) those which they both describe as the goods of the soul, (2) those which they also both describe as the goods of the body, and (3) those which Aristotle describes as external goods.⁷⁷ Under the first they put the moral and intellectual virtues, under the second they put health and beauty⁷⁸ and similar bodily qualities, and under the third they put what Plato describes as “the so-called

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 128.

⁷⁶ Cf. above, pp. 287 f.

⁷⁷ *Laws* III, 697 B; V, 728 E; V, 743 E; cf. I, 631 C; *Philebus* 48 E; *Euthydemus* 279 A-C; *Eth. Nic.* I, 8, 1098b, 12-16; Sextus, *Adversus Ethicos*, 45.

⁷⁸ The term “beauty” (*κάλλος*) occurs in *Eth. Nic.* I, 8, 1099b, 3, and in *Rhet.* I, 5, 1360b, 22.

goods of substance (*οὐσία*) and property (*χρήματα*)”⁷⁹ or “the possession of property (*χρήματα*) and chattels (*κτήματα*)”⁸⁰ or wealth (*πλοῦτος*)⁸¹ or “good birth (*εὐγένεια*) and talents (*δυνάμεις*) and distinctions (*τιμαί*) in one’s own country,”⁸² and what Aristotle describes as friends (*φίλοι*), riches (*πλοῦτος*), political power (*πολιτικὴ δύναμις*), good birth (*εὐγένεια*), and goodly children (*εὐτεκνίαι*).⁸³ In the Stoic literature, summarizing the views of Plato and Aristotle, under goods of the body are placed “health (*ὑγίεια*) and well-being (*εὐεξία*) and keenness of sense (*εὐαίσθησις*) and beauty (*κάλλος*) and everything which is of a similar character,” and under external goods are placed “wealth (*πλοῦτον*), country (*πατρίδα*), parents (*γονεῖς*), children (*τέκνα*), friends (*φίλους*), and the like.”⁸⁴ Both Plato and Aristotle admit that only the goods of the soul are real goods,⁸⁵ but differ in their statements as to the relation of the bodily and external goods to the goods of the soul. Plato expresses his view in the statement that “the human goods (i.e., the bodily and external goods) are dependent on the divine (i.e., on the goods of the soul) and he who receives the greater acquires also the less or else he is bereft of both.”⁸⁶ But how bodily and external goods are acquired by one who possesses the goods of the soul he does not say. Evidently what he means is that in the long run moral conduct leads to health and wealth and that without moral conduct health and wealth will not be permanent. Aristotle expresses his view in the statement that “happiness also requires external goods in addition, as we said, for it is impossible, or at least not easy, to play a noble part unless furnished with

⁷⁹ *Laws* III, 697 B.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* V, 728 E.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* I, 631 C.

⁸² Cf. above, pp. 165 f.

⁸³ *Laws* I, 631 B. Cf. *Apology* 30 A-B.

⁸⁴ *Euthydemus* 279 B.

⁸⁵ *Eth. Nic.* I, 8, 1099b, 1-3.

⁸⁶ *Sextus, Adversus Ethicos*, 45.

the necessary equipment.”⁸⁷ Among the Stoics, however, with the exception of Posidonius who retained the Platonic and Aristotelian classification of the goods,⁸⁸ some excluded both bodily and external goods from their classification⁸⁹ and others excluded only bodily goods.⁹⁰ Those things which are excluded by them from their classifications of the goods are described by them as being neither good nor evil (*οὐδέτερα*)⁹¹ or as being indifferent (*ἀδιάφορα*),⁹² but still they admit that they may contribute to happiness, describing them, therefore, as preferred (*προηγμένα*).⁹³

Now Philo approaches the classification of the goods with certain prepossessions derived from the Law of Moses. In the books of this Law, all those things which in Greek philosophy are described as bodily and external goods, such as health, wealth, and children, are described as blessings which God will grant to those who walk in His commandments.⁹⁴ These blessings are described as God’s “good treasure”⁹⁵ and as “good.”⁹⁶ Accordingly Philo was bound to reject the Stoic exclusion of bodily and external goods from the classification of goods. He was furthermore bound to accept the Platonic formula that the bodily and external goods depend upon the goods of the soul, but more explicitly than Plato he could say that these bodily and external goods are sure to be given by God as a reward for the observance of the Law. In the light of these remarks, let us see how Philo treats of the classification of the goods.

⁸⁷ *Eth. Nic.* I, 8, 1099a, 31-33.

⁸⁸ Diogenes, VII, 103.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 101-102.

⁹⁰ Sextus, *Adversus Ethicos*, 46.

⁹¹ Diogenes, VII, 101.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 102-104; cf. Sextus, *Adversus Ethicos*, 5 ff.

⁹³ Diogenes, VII, 105-106; Sextus, *Adversus Ethicos*, 62-63.

⁹⁴ Deut. 28: 1 ff.; Lev. 26: 3 ff.

⁹⁵ Deut. 28: 12.

⁹⁶ Deut. 30: 15.

To begin with, in opposition to the Stoics, with the exception of Posidonius, he follows the Platonic and Aristotelian classification of the goods. He invariably speaks of three classes of goods, and describes them as those which pertain to the soul, as those which pertain to the body, and as those which are external.⁹⁷ Drawing directly upon the writings of Plato and Aristotle, as well as upon the Stoic restatements of their views, he describes the goods of the souls as consisting of the moral and intellectual virtues, of the goods of the body as consisting of health (*ὕγεια*), keenness of sense (*εὐαίσθησις*), power (*δύναμις*), and strength (*δύναμις*), and of external goods as consisting of wealth (*πλοῦτος*), reputation (*δόξα*), the enjoyment and use of necessary pleasures,⁹⁸ and nobility of birth (*εὐγένεια*).⁹⁹ Sometimes he describes the goods of the body as the virtues of the body, and external goods as external advantages (*ἐκτὸς πλεονεκτήματα*).¹⁰⁰ The terms "virtue of the body" and "advantages" are both used by Aristotle.¹⁰¹ Like Plato and Aristotle he maintains that bodily and external goods are not true goods, asserting that "the true good cannot find its home in anything external, nor yet in things of the body."¹⁰² In one place, he says that "it is well to pray on the behalf of him who holds bodily and external advantages to be goods,"¹⁰³ by which he evidently refers not to those who classify bodily and external advantages as goods, which he himself, as we have seen, has done, but rather to those who classify these as real goods or the main goods. Still almost in the words of Aristotle he

⁹⁷ *Deter.* 3, 7; *Sobr.* 12, 61; *Virt.* 35, 187; *Qu. in Gen.* III, 16.

⁹⁸ *Sobr.* 12, 61.

⁹⁹ *Virt.* 35, 187.

¹⁰⁰ *Sobr.* 12, 61.

¹⁰¹ *Rhet.* I, 5, 1361b, 3 (*σώματος ἀρετή*); *Politica* V, 10, 1311a, 5 (*πλεονεκτήματα*).

¹⁰² *Virt.* 35, 187; cf. *Deter.* 4, 9.

¹⁰³ *Sobr.* 13, 67.

admits that of these three kinds of goods "each is in need of each and all of all, and that the aggregate resulting from taking them all together in a body is a perfect and really complete good,"¹⁰⁴ or that "happiness is not peculiarly to be sought for either in the external things, or in the things of the body, or in the things of the soul, taken by themselves . . . but it must be looked for in the combination of them all together."¹⁰⁵

Then, evidently following Plato's formula that bodily and external goods are dependent upon the goods of the soul, he explains in accordance with that formula the blessings for right conduct promised in Scripture.¹⁰⁶ He formally divides these blessings into "blessings of the body" and "external blessings."¹⁰⁷ Under the former he puts "freedom from disease," "health," and "keenness of sense," adding that if some injury should befall the righteous it would be only by way of trial and warning and chastisement.¹⁰⁸ Under the latter he puts riches (*πλοῦτοι*), honors (*τιμαί*), offices (*ἀρχαί*), and praises¹⁰⁹ (*ἐγκώμια*), and goodly children (*εὐπαιδα*).¹¹⁰ Besides these bodily and external blessings, both of which were promised to the individuals as individuals, he finds in Scripture also three other kinds of promises.

First, there is the promise of a bodily as well as a spiritual good here on earth to the Jewish people as a whole and with it to all mankind. For the Jewish people it is the promise of an ultimate national restoration, which is known as the Messianic ideal. Drawing upon the verse "Though thy dispersion may have been from one end of the earth to the other, thence the Lord thy God will gather thee,"¹¹¹ he says:

¹⁰⁴ *Deter.* 3, 7.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* 3, 8.

¹⁰⁶ *Praem.* 1, 2; 1, 7; 4, 22.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.* 20, 118.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.* 20, 119.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* 20, 118.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* 18, 110.

¹¹¹ *Deut.* 30: 4.

“For even though they dwell in the uttermost parts of the earth, in slavery to those who led them away captive, one signal, as it were, one day will bring liberty to all.”¹¹² With this ultimate liberation of Israel there will furthermore come an age when all mankind will be united by the Law of Moses which is described by him as being based upon democracy and equality by which the whole world will be united as a single city.¹¹³

Second, there is the promise of a purely spiritual good here on earth to the individuals, for as a result of obedience to the Law God will favor them with that divine grace by which he helps those who try of their own free will to do good.¹¹⁴ Drawing again upon the verse “Though thy dispersion may have been from one end of the earth to the other, thence the Lord thy God will gather thee,” he interprets it allegorically as follows: “And therefore those who would imitate these examples of good living so marvelous in their loveliness, are bidden not to despair of changing for the better or of a restoration to the land of wisdom and virtue from the spiritual dispersion which vice has wrought. For when God is gracious He makes all things light and easy, and He does become gracious to those who depart with shame from incontinence to self-restraint and deplore the deeds of their guilty past, abhor the base sensitive images which they imprinted on their souls and first earnestly strive to still the storm of the passions, then seek to lead a life of serenity and peace.”¹¹⁵

Finally, there is the promise of a purely spiritual good, not here on earth, but in heaven, and that is the promise of immortality as a reward of good conduct. We have already shown how in common with the Jewish tradition of his time

¹¹² *Praem.* 28, 164.

¹¹³ Cf. below, pp. 425 f.

¹¹⁴ Cf. above, I, 445 ff.

¹¹⁵ *Praem.* 19, 115–116.

he sought and also found scriptural evidence for the belief in the immortality of the soul and how immortality was conceived by him as a reward for righteous conduct during lifetime.¹¹⁶

VII. CONCLUSION, INFLUENCE, ANTICIPATION

In common with all philosophers Philo formulates the problem of ethics as a search for the good, identifying the good with happiness and defining happiness as an activity according to virtue, both intellectual and moral. With the philosophers, too, he agrees that intellectual virtue owes its birth and growth to teaching, and moral virtue comes about as a result of habit and that the inculcation of intellectual and moral virtues is the duty of the state, the former by education and the latter by laws, which are called practical virtues. But as to what should constitute the object of education which is to inculcate intellectual virtues and what should be the laws which are to train one in moral virtues Philo differs from the philosophers. To the philosophers the object of the teaching should be those doctrines which philosophers attained by reason, and the practical virtues should be those laws which philosophers similarly worked out by reason and in accordance with virtue. These rational and virtuous laws of the philosophers, being as they are enacted by men, are not what the philosophers themselves call natural laws in the true sense of the term, for by natural laws are meant laws spontaneously arrived at by all mankind by virtue of some common instinct that is inherent in them and they are therefore universal and eternal and immutable. Still these laws, though not natural in the primary sense of the term, are described by the philosopher as being in accordance with nature in a secondary sense, in the sense

¹¹⁶ Cf. above, I, 396-398, 408-410.

that they are in harmony with certain human impulses or capacities or are calculated to attain certain gifts of nature.

To Philo, however, the intellectual and practical virtues consist respectively of those doctrines and laws which were revealed by God through Moses. These laws of Moses, like the laws of the philosophers, are to be sure enacted laws and not natural laws, but, being enacted by God who is the creator of nature, they are, more than the laws of the philosophers, in accordance with nature, not only in the sense that they are in harmony with human impulses or capacities or that they are best fitted to the attainment of the gifts of nature, but also in the sense of their being universal, eternal, and immutable. With Philo, therefore, the philosophic maxims that happiness is life in accordance with virtue or in accordance with reason or in accordance with nature come to mean life in accordance with the Law. All the philosophic maxims about man's duty to follow God or to imitate God or to be like God come to mean with him that man must act in accordance with the Law. All the philosophic discussions as to whether virtue come to man by learning or habit or nature or divine dispensation comes to mean with him that virtue comes to man by God through nature as a divine grace, or through learning the truths taught in the book of His Law and through training in the performance of the precepts of this Law.

The Law of Moses, therefore, contains a system of law given by revelation which accomplishes all that the philosophers aim to attain by those ideal systems of law which they try to devise by reason. The laws of Moses are therefore what the philosophers call virtues. Being virtues, these Mosaic laws, besides their traditional classification into positive and negative, into ten main headings corresponding to the ten commandments, and into those relating to

God and those relating to men, are also to be divided in accordance with the philosophic classification of the virtues.

Various classifications of the virtues are attempted by Philo, but the classification which he adopts is that of (a) contemplative virtues, by which he means (1) the possession of certain intellectual virtues in the form of beliefs, and (2) the possession of certain moral virtues in the form of good emotions, and (b) practical virtues, by which he means (3) actions corresponding to intellectual virtues and (4) actions corresponding to moral virtues. Accordingly the Law of Moses is held by him to contain these four kinds of virtues, which may be briefly stated as (1) beliefs, (2) virtuous emotions, (3) actions symbolizing beliefs, and (4) actions symbolizing moral virtues.

While the philosophic discussion of virtue has furnished Philo, on the one hand, with a framework for the classification of the commandments, his identification of the commandments with virtues has caused him, on the other hand, to introduce certain innovations into the theory of virtue.

First, under the influence of Judaism he introduces new virtues. "Faith" is added by him as a virtue under intellectual virtues, and "humanity" is added under moral virtues. Under the influence of Judaism, too, he makes "faith" and "piety" and "holiness," and probably also "godliness," leaders among intellectual virtues, and "justice" and "humanity" leaders among moral virtues. Again, under the influence of Judaism, the term faith assumes with him two special meanings: (1) belief in the existence, unity, and incorporeality of God as well as belief in His providence; (2) assent to the truth of Scripture in contradistinction to assent to truths discovered by reason; (3) trust in God. Then also, to the list of practical virtues, under the influence of Judaism, he adds the virtues of prayer, study, and repent-

ance. Moreover, under the influence of Judaism, he considers the emotion of desire as a voluntary emotion and adopts parts of both the Aristotelian and the Stoic definitions of virtue. Finally, in his discussion of the question of the reward of virtue, under the influence of Judaism, he departs from the philosophers in his assertion of individual providence, in his certainty of reward and punishment, and in his classification of the goods.

The essential point in Philo's theory of ethics is the view that the Mosaic Law is a law unique in its kind, unlike any other law. The laws known to Philo were of a threefold kind. There were natural laws, which consisted of common conceptions of right and wrong universal to all men. These were described as general laws. Then there were enacted laws, which consisted of laws enacted by unscientific legislators for the guidance of particular groups of peoples. These laws were not always based upon reason; they were sometimes contrary to nature and not always in accordance with virtue. Finally there were ideal laws enacted by philosophers or scientific legislators which were supposed to be in accordance with reason and nature and virtue. The Mosaic Law, according to Philo, is unlike any of these three kinds of law in its origin, for unlike any of them it is not man-made, being neither the work of human impulse nor of human reason. It is a law revealed by God. In its content, however, it accomplishes what all philosophers aimed to accomplish by their ideal laws. It is in accordance with reason and nature and virtue. Every law in it is a philosophic virtue, every law in it has a rational purpose, every law in it is in accordance with the nature of man and the nature of the world.

From now on in the history of philosophy, whether Jewish, Christian, or Moslem, there will be a conception of a revealed law which is to establish successfully what philoso-

phers aimed to establish by their ideal laws and failed. In Jewish philosophy this claim will continue to be made, as in Philo, on behalf of the Mosaic Law; in Christianity it will be made on behalf of the Mosaic Law as well as on behalf of the teachings of the Gospels; in Islam it will be made on behalf of the Koran. In all of them attempts will be made to identify their respective scriptural doctrines and commandments with philosophic virtues; in all of them attempts will therefore be also made to find reasons for doctrines and commandments. Certain departures from Philo will indeed appear. New classifications of virtues will be made; new rational explanations will be offered. The most radical departure will appear in the rise of the view that not all the revealed laws are laws of reason or of virtue or in accordance with nature; that some of them are of a statutory nature, for which either there is no reason or no reason can be discovered by the human mind.

Directly connected with Philo is the treatment of the Mosaic Law among the Church Fathers, though an additional source for their method of treatment is St. Paul's statement, which in itself reflects Jewish tradition, that "the gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law,"¹ the implication of which is that the revealed Law of Moses contains laws which are in accordance with nature and are known by reason.

Clement of Alexandria, evidently having in mind such passages in Philo as that in which "all His commandments and ordinances and judgments which are written in the book of this Law"² are identified with "the laws and statutes of nature,"³ says that "both the law of nature and the law of instruction (i.e., revelation) are one," inasmuch

¹ Rom. 2: 14.

² Deut. 30: 10.

³ *Somn.* II, 26, 174-175; cf. above, p. 193.

as both are of God.⁴ Like Philo, too, he identifies the commandments with what philosophers call virtues. Dividing the commandments into four groups, (1) historic, (2) legislative, (3) those which relate to sacrifice, and (4) those which relate to theology, he describes the first two divisions as those "which properly belong to an ethical treatise" and the fourth as that which "Aristotle calls metaphysics,"⁵ and declares in general that "the Mosaic Law is the foundation of all ethics, and the source of which the Greeks drew theirs."⁶ In his description of that class of laws which relate to sacrifice he says that it "belongs to physical speculation."⁷ By this he means that these are laws which have an allegorical⁸ meaning besides their obvious meaning, without necessarily implying that they were never meant to be observed literally, at least before their abrogation at the advent of Christianity. In this, too, he follows Philo.⁹

Reflecting the same view of Philo that the revealed Law of Moses is identical with the law of nature and is to be contrasted with all other systems of law which are the work of men, Origen contrasts the Law of Moses with all other laws as "the law of nature" with "the written laws of cities,"¹⁰ describing the former as the law "of which God would be the legislator," as "the law of God" and as "the laws in harmony with the will of God,"¹¹ and affirming concerning it that "the first who created these laws and delivered them

⁴ *Stromata* I, 29 (PG, 8, 929 A).

⁵ *Ibid.* I, 28 (PG, 8, 921 C-924 A). Aristotle does not call it metaphysics.

⁶ *Ibid.* II, 18.

⁷ *Ibid.* I, 28 (PG, 8, 924 A).

⁸ The term physical (*φυσική*) is used here in the Stoic sense of a special kind of allegorical interpretation, as distinguished from ethical interpretation, in which sense the term is often used also by Philo, as, e.g., *Leg. All.* I, 13, 39. Cf. Leisegang's note on *Post.* 2, 7, in *Philos Werke*, IV, p. 6, n. 2.

⁹ Cf. above, I, 127-131.

¹⁰ *Contra Celsum* V, 37.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

to Moses was God who was the creator of the world.”¹² Consequently he declares that when various Greek writings are compared with the laws of Moses, “histories for histories and ethical discourses with laws and commandments,” the latter “are better fitted to change the character of the hearers on the very spot.”¹³ Unlike Philo, however, he maintains that many laws are irrational and were not meant to be taken literally.¹⁴

From the Church Fathers these speculations about the distinction between a revealed law, on the one hand, and a natural or rational or legislated law, on the other, and also the view that the revealed law is either in whole or in part a law in accordance with nature or in accordance with reason, had drifted also into Arabic philosophy, both Moslem and Jewish. Among the Moslems, with reference to the Koran, and among the Jews, with reference to the Pentateuch, the view was maintained that the laws within them were in accordance with reason, though the question was debated whether any of the laws were not in accordance with reason.¹⁵ Moreover analogous to Philo’s interpretation of the scriptural term “heart” as dealing with commandments which are not concerned with actions or words is the distinction which appears both in Jewish and Moslem philosophy between duties of the heart and duties of the body.¹⁶

The continuity of this Philonic method of dealing with the Mosaic law may be illustrated by its treatment in Maimon-

¹² *Ibid.* I, 18.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *De Principiis* IV, 1, 17.

¹⁵ In Islam, the discussion of this problem is between the Mutazilites and the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā; among the Jews the discussion is between the author of the *Kitāb Ma’āni al-Nafs* and Maimonides, on the one hand, and Saadia, for instance, on the other. Cf. I. Goldziher, *Kitāb Ma’āni al-Nafs*, *Vorwort*, pp. 22–23.

¹⁶ Cf. Bahya’s *Ḥobot ha-Lebabot*, *Haḳdamah*; for Moslem parallels, see A. S. Yahuda, *Al-Hidāja ’ilā Farā’id al-Qulūb des Bachja ibn Josef ibn Paqūda*, *Einleitung*, pp. 59–60. Cf. above, p. 267.

ides and St. Thomas, though neither of these authors was directly influenced by Philo.

Maimonides does not use the term natural law in its primary Aristotelian sense of general laws arrived at by all men instinctively by their innate sense of justice.¹⁷ He uses it rather in its secondary sense of laws enacted by wise legislators on the basis of reason — a sense in which, as we have shown, it is used by Aristotle as well as by other Greek philosophers.¹⁸ In his discussion of the revealed law of Moses in its relation to natural law, Maimonides starts with the Aristotelian observation that “man is by nature a political animal, and therefore, men, even when they do not require one another’s help, desire to live together,”¹⁹ which he paraphrases in the statement “that man is by nature a political animal and that by virtue of his nature he desires to live together with other people.”²⁰ To this observation he adds also the observation that “by its nature the human species shows a greater variation among its individuals than any other species.”²¹ From these two observations he infers that by nature men require a leader able to “prescribe actions and morals which all would practice always according to the same rule so that the natural diversity would disappear by the great conventional agreement and society would become well ordered.”²² Beneficial laws enacted by wise legislators for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a well-ordered society are thus according to Maimonides to be described as natural laws, on the ground that they ultimately rest upon the fact that men by nature differ from one another and by nature also desire to live in harmony with one another. Now since the laws of

¹⁷ Cf. above, pp. 173 f.

¹⁸ Cf. above, pp. 176, 178 f.

¹⁹ *Politica* III, 6, 1278b, 19-21.

²⁰ *Moreh Nebukim* II, 40.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

Moses are not human enactments dictated by the natural differences among men and by their natural desire for harmonious living together, they cannot, in respect to their origin, be described as natural laws; they are, strictly speaking, revealed laws. But inasmuch as the purpose of the revealed laws of Moses is like that of the natural laws enacted by wise legislators, namely, to establish and maintain a well-ordered society, they can, in respect to their purpose, be described as being in accordance with nature. "I therefore maintain," says Maimonides, "that the Law, though not natural, is still in accordance with nature."²³ Being in accordance with nature, the laws of Moses are in their entirety what Aristotle would describe as being in accordance with reason. And consequently, in describing the Law as being in accordance with nature and in accordance with reason, Maimonides, just like Philo, makes no distinction between the various ordinances contained therein. All of them are in accordance with nature and reason. All of them, therefore, had they not been revealed, would have been discovered by men themselves, by virtue of the special nature and the special reason which they possess, and now that these laws have been revealed the human mind can discern the reason and purpose of their revelation. There are, however, certain laws which Maimonides admits would not have been discovered by man himself had they not been revealed. Such are the laws which are described in the Pentateuch as statutes (*hukkim*).²⁴ But even in the case of these laws, while they would not have been discovered by mere reason, and the reason for their revelation is not evident to the human mind, there are still good reasons for their existence, reasons which are unknown to us. Even these laws then are in accordance with reason and in accordance with nature.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.* III, 26 and 31; *Shemonah Perakim*, 6.

With this conception of the laws as being in accordance with nature and in accordance with reason, Maimonides describes them also as being in accordance with virtue. The commandments are thus identified by him with virtues and are classified in accordance with the classification of the virtues. Several classifications of the commandments are openly discussed by Maimonides. Of course, he divides them according to their external form of expression, into the traditional positive and negative.²⁵ He divides them according to their contents into those between men and God and those between men and men,²⁶ and also into fourteen classes.²⁷ More general and more characteristic, however, is his division of the laws into four classes, namely, (1) those dealing with principles of belief, (2) those dealing with actions, (3) those dealing with states of moral character, and (4) those dealing with speech²⁸ — a classification analogous to that we have found in Philo.²⁹ But underlying these fourteenfold and fourfold classifications is the classification of the laws, as in Philo, in accordance with the classification of the philosophic virtues. These virtues are divided by Maimonides into (1) intellectual, (2) moral, and (3) practical, and consequently all the laws either teach directly (1) intellectual virtues or (2) moral virtues, or else they are (3) practical virtues, that is, actions, which are intended to train man in intellectual or moral virtues.³⁰

St. Thomas' treatment of the old problem of the relation of the laws of Moses to laws of nature or reason was determined by his special attitude as a Christian toward those

²⁵ As for example in his *Sefer ha-Miṣwot*, and *Moreh Nebukim* III, 36.

²⁶ *Moreh Nebukim* III, 36.

²⁷ *Moreh Nebukim* III, 35, with which the same fourteenfold division of the laws in the *Mishneh Torah* is to be compared.

²⁸ *Sefer ha-Miṣwot*, *Shoresh* 9.

²⁹ Cf. above, pp. 208, 218, 266-267.

³⁰ *Moreh Nebukim* III, 27.

laws. On the one hand, he believed that these laws were divinely revealed and hence they had to be perfect, universal and eternal, but on the other hand he believed that they were abrogated with the advent of Jesus and that even before their abrogation they were obligatory only upon the Jews. Consequently he could neither declare, like Philo or Maimonides, that all the laws were in accordance with nature, nor could he declare that none of them was in accordance with nature. To get out of this difficulty he had drawn a distinction between various kinds of law, some of them being in accordance with nature and others not in accordance with nature. The drawing of such a distinction was made possible by him by his adoption of the use of the term natural law in its strict Aristotelian sense.

Unlike Maimonides, therefore, St. Thomas uses the term natural law as it is directly used by Aristotle, in the sense of self-evident principles of ethics which man by his very nature as a rational and social being would arrive at without any act of agreement or convention.³¹ "The principles of the natural law," he says, "are to the practical reason what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are self-evident principles."³² How man arrives at these principles of natural law is explained by him in his statement that "there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society."³³ This reflects Aristotle's statements that "all men by nature desire to know"³⁴ and that "men are by nature political animals and, therefore, even when they do not require one another's

³¹ Cf. above, pp. 173 f.

³² *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 94, 2 c.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Metaph.* I, 1, 980a, 21.

help, desire to live together.”³⁵ But as in Philo, this nature in man was implanted by God and is in itself divine.³⁶ Then, like Aristotle, he distinguishes such natural laws from laws which came about by agreement and convention, the latter of which he calls human law, that is, laws “framed by men.”³⁷ But though, unlike Maimonides, he does not include human law under natural law, still he admits that human law, if it is just, is derived from the law of nature, either as a conclusion from premises or by way of determination of certain generalities.³⁸ The latter kind of human law is likened by him to that “whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details,”³⁹ thus reflecting Aristotle’s distinction between natural law and conventional law as a distinction between general law and particular law.⁴⁰ Finally, besides natural law and human law, there is also a divine law, of which there is an old and a new, the Law of Moses and the Gospel.⁴¹

Now with regard to the Old Law, which is our present subject of study, St. Thomas suggests several classifications. Like Philo and Maimonides, he divides it into positive (*affirmativa*) and negative (*negativa*)⁴² and also into laws which direct “men to God” and laws which direct “men to one another.”⁴³ But then he divides them into three classes, moral, ceremonial, and judicial,⁴⁴ a classification which is implied in Philo and Maimonides and in all those who have attempted to classify the precepts of the Pentateuch. Under the moral precepts he includes the precepts “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God”⁴⁵ and “Thou shalt love thy neighbor,”⁴⁶

³⁵ *Politica* III, 6, 1278b, 19–21.

³⁶ *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 91, 2 c and 4 Obj. 1.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 95, 1.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 2 c.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Rhet.* I, 13, 1373b, 4–6; cf. above, p. 174.

⁴¹ *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 91, 4–5.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 100, 4, Obj. 2.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 99, 3 c.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 2–4; 5 c.

⁴⁵ Deut. 6: 5; 11: 1.

⁴⁶ Lev. 19: 18.

the ten commandments, and a number of special laws which "are reducible to the precepts of the ten commandments, as so many corollaries."⁴⁷ Unlike Philo and Maimonides and all Jewish philosophers who considered all the laws of Moses as eternal, St. Thomas, as a Christian, considers only the moral laws universal and eternal, whereas the ceremonial laws and judicial laws were meant to be binding only upon Jews and were abrogated with the advent of Jesus. In his own restricted use of the term natural law as applying only to self-evident general principles of morality he finds an explanation for his distinction within the laws of Moses, despite their all being divine revelations. The moral precepts are precepts of natural law and hence they were revealed by God to all men and for eternity;⁴⁸ the ceremonial and judicial precepts are not precepts of natural law and hence they were revealed only for a particular and temporary purpose.⁴⁹ His use of the term "moral precepts" as a description of those laws in the Pentateuch which are natural reflects Aristotle's indirect use of the term "moral" as the equivalent of the term "natural."⁵⁰

Still, despite his use of the term natural laws exclusively as an application to the moral laws of the Pentateuch, St. Thomas describes not only its moral laws but also its judicial laws and ceremonial laws as being in accordance with virtue and hence in accordance with reason. Of the moral laws in the Pentateuch he repeatedly says that they are "about acts of virtue"⁵¹ or "about acts of all the virtues"⁵² and that "they accord with reason."⁵³ Similarly of the judicial

⁴⁷ *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 100, 11 c; cf. 3.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 100, 8 c.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 103, 3 c; 104, 3 c.

⁵⁰ *Eth. Nic.* VIII, 13, 1162b, 21-23; cf. above, p. 174.

⁵¹ *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 99, 2 c: de actibus virtutum.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 100, 2 c: de actibus omnium virtutum.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 1 c: rationi congruunt.

laws he says that they "relate to the virtue of justice,"⁵⁴ and, while they were not to be eternal, they "directed the people to justice and equity,"⁵⁵ and on the whole they are "fitting," "suitably framed," and are based on reason (*ratione*).⁵⁶ And so also of the ceremonial laws he says that they are particular determinations of the worship of God, the latter of which is "an act of virtue,"⁵⁷ and, while they were not meant to be eternal,⁵⁸ there is a reason for them, though the reason, as says also Maimonides, is not always evident.⁵⁹

Their identification of the commandments of the Pentateuch with virtues has led both Maimonides and St. Thomas to add, like Philo, some new virtues borrowed from the list of scriptural commandments. Thus to Maimonides, belief in the existence of God, almsgiving, or what Philo calls philanthropy or humanity, prayer, repentance, and the study of Scripture are all commandments⁶⁰ and hence are to be included in the list of virtues. Similarly St. Thomas explicitly states that faith (*fides*) is a virtue, one of the three virtues described by him as theological virtues,⁶¹ and this inclusion of faith among the virtues is based upon a verse in the New Testament.⁶² So also almsgiving is called by him a virtue. In one place, using scriptural language, he says that almsgiving (*eleemosyna*)⁶³ is included under works of charity (*opera caritatis*), of which he further says that they are "essential to virtue" (*de necessitate virtutis*) and pertain to the moral precepts of both the Old Law and the New Law.⁶⁴ In another place, using classical language and

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 104, 3, Obj. 1; cf. 100, 2 c.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, ad 3.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 105, 1-4.

⁶⁰ Cf. *Sefer ha-Miṣṣot*, Positive Commandment 1, 195, 5, 73, and 11 respectively.

⁶¹ *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 62, 3 c.

⁶² I Cor. 13: 13.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 99, 3, ad 2; cf. 101, 1 c.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 103, 3 c; cf. above, p. 315.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 100, 1, ad 4; cf. 2 c; 3 c.

⁶³ *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 108, 3, Obj. 4.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 2 c.

quoting Macrobius⁶⁵ and Andronicus of Rhodes,⁶⁶ he says that humanity (*humanitas*), which he explains to mean beneficence (*beneficentia*), or liberality (*liberalitas*), which he explains to mean the same as humanity, is a virtue under the virtue of justice (*iustitia*).⁶⁷ Repentance (*poenitentia*), too, is explicitly said by him to be a virtue.⁶⁸ He does not say directly that prayer (*oratio*) is a virtue, but he does say that it is an act of religion,⁶⁹ which means that it is a virtue, for religion is said by him to be a virtue.⁷⁰ As for the study or the reading of Scripture, in the early history of Christianity, Scripture was read in the meetinghouses for the same reason as that described by Philo, namely, to inculcate virtue.⁷¹ Says Tertullian: "We assemble to read our sacred writings. . . . With the sacred words we nourish our faith, we animate our hope, we make our confidence more steadfast; and no less by inculcations of God's precepts we confirm good habits."⁷² Had this view persisted in Christianity, St. Thomas would have undoubtedly recommended the reading of Scripture as a virtue. But it happens that in the history of Christianity, first in the Greek Church, in the ninth century, and then in the West, toward the end of the twelfth century, from fear of heresy, the reading of Scripture on the part of the people was restricted.⁷³ The reading of Scripture thus for a time ceased to be a virtue in Christianity, until it was later revived under new conditions.

As true Aristotelians, both Maimonides and St. Thomas

⁶⁵ Cf. above, p. 220, n. 146.

⁶⁶ Cf. above, p. 237, n. 4.

⁶⁷ *Sum. Theol.* II, II, 80, 1, Obj. 2 and 4, and ad 2 and 4.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* I, 95, 3, Obj. 3; III, 85 1 c and 2 c.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* II, II, 83, 3 c.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* II, II, 81 3 c and 4 c.

⁷¹ Cf. above, pp. 259 ff.

⁷² Tertullian, *Apologeticus*, Cap. 39.

⁷³ Cf. K. R. Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines*, § 162, nn. 5 and 6.

define virtue as a mean.⁷⁴ But as to what is to be done with the Stoic definition that virtue is the extirpation of emotion, they differ. Maimonides, like Philo, considers the extirpation of the emotions as the guiding principle of the chosen few whom he describes as men of superior piety.⁷⁵ St. Thomas, following St. Augustine, tries to show that the difference between the Stoics and the Peripatetics is "one of words rather than of opinions" and that the Stoics by their extirpation of the emotions mean the control of the emotions by reason.⁷⁶

Differences of opinion appear, however, between Philo and Maimonides on the one hand and St. Thomas on the other with regard to the attitude of Judaism toward certain aspects of the commandments and virtues.

First, with regard to the meaning of the tenth commandment "Thou shalt not desire" or "Thou shalt not covet." As we have already seen, the old Tannaitic rabbis,⁷⁷ and following them Maimonides,⁷⁸ and, reflecting the same old Jewish tradition, also Philo,⁷⁹ take this prohibition to refer not only to the external act of desire but also to the mere emotion of desire. Furthermore, as we have seen, the commandment not to desire, both to the rabbis and to Philo, was a prohibition of any kind of emotion which might lead to the violation of any of the ten commandments, such as adultery and murder.⁸⁰ With regard to adultery, the rabbinic interpretation of the seventh commandment reads that "also he who commits adultery with his eyes is called

⁷⁴ Maimonides, *Shemonah Peraḳim*, 4; St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 64, 1-5.

⁷⁵ *Shemonah Peraḳim*, 6.

⁷⁶ *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 59, 2 c.

⁷⁷ Cf. above, pp. 226 f.

⁷⁸ *Sefer ha-Miṣwot*, Negative Commandment 266.

⁷⁹ Cf. above, pp. 227 ff.

⁸⁰ Cf. above, pp. 227, 229.

adulterer.”⁸¹ So also the commandments not to “hate thy brother in thine heart”⁸² and not to “bear any grudge”⁸³ are taken as prohibitions of the mere emotion of hatred⁸⁴ and of the mere emotion of revenge.⁸⁵ But St. Thomas, deriving his knowledge of Judaism from the New Testament, maintains that “the Scribes and Pharisees . . . thought that the prohibition of adultery and murder covered the external act only, and not the internal desire”⁸⁶ and also “they thought that desire for revenge was lawful . . . that the emotion of covetousness was lawful . . . that the emotion of hatred was lawful.”⁸⁷

Second, with regard to the question as to what is to be the right motive in the worship of God. The rabbis, Philo, and Maimonides, all of whom derived their knowledge of Judaism from an inherited belief and practice — a belief and practice antedating Christianity — proclaim in unison that Judaism as based upon the Old Testament demands that one is to worship God not out of fear but out of love⁸⁸ and, in the case of Philo, in addition to expressing himself in rabbinic terms,⁸⁹ he expresses himself also in philosophic terms, that virtues are to be chosen for their own sake.⁹⁰ St. Thomas, however, insists that “the Jews so distorted the true meaning” of the promises of the Old Testament “as to think that we ought to serve God with these things [i.e., exalted honors and exalted riches] as the end in view,” concluding, “wherefore Our Lord set this aside by teaching, first of all, that works of virtue should not be done for human

⁸¹ *Pesiḳta Rabbati*, 24, p. 124b; *Leviticus Rabbah* 23, 12. Cf. Strack-Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament*, Matt. 5: 28.

⁸² Lev. 19: 17.

⁸³ Lev. 19: 18.

⁸⁴ *Sifra, Kedoshim, Pereḳ* 4, p. 89a.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 89b; *Yoma* 23a.

⁸⁶ *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 108, 3, ad 1.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, ad 2.

⁸⁸ Cf. above, pp. 286 ff.

⁸⁹ Cf. above, p. 296.

⁹⁰ Cf. above, p. 294.

glory,"⁹¹ or, quoting St. Augustine,⁹² he says: "In a word the difference between the Law and the Gospel is this — fear and love."⁹³

Like the rabbis and Philo and Maimonides, St. Thomas believes in the reward of virtue. Now the rabbis and Philo and Maimonides all declare in unison that, according to their own belief as Jews, a belief based upon the traditional Jewish understanding of the Old Testament — a traditional Jewish understanding antedating Christianity — the ultimate reward of virtue is eternal spiritual life. The rabbis ask: What is the meaning of the words "that thy days may be prolonged, and that it may go well with thee"⁹⁴ which Scripture promises as a reward for the performance of certain commandments? and their answer is: "'that it may go well with thee' — in a world which is wholly good; 'that thy days may be prolonged' — in a world which is wholly lasting."⁹⁵ Philo similarly explains the promises for right conduct to mean either spiritual goods on earth or immortal life.⁹⁶ Maimonides, on the basis of the same scriptural expression quoted above, declares that "the good reserved for the righteous is life in the world to come."⁹⁷ St. Thomas, however, insists that in the Old Law man was directly ordained to "a sensible and earthly good," whereas in the New Law, man was ordained to "an intelligible and heavenly good,"⁹⁸ or, quoting St. Augustine,⁹⁹ he declares: "The promises of temporal goods are contained in the Old Testa-

⁹¹ *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 108, 3, ad 4.

⁹² *Contra Adimantum Manichaei Discipulum*, Cap. 17, 2 (PL, 42, 159).

⁹³ *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 91, 5 c.

⁹⁴ Deut. 5:16; cf. 22: 7.

⁹⁵ *Kiddushin* 39b.

⁹⁶ Cf. above, pp. 302 f.

⁹⁷ *Mishneh Torah, Teshubah* VIII, 1.

⁹⁸ *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 91, 5 c.

⁹⁹ *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* IV, Cap. 2 (PL, 42, 217-218).

ment, for which reason it is called old; but the promise of eternal life belongs to the New Testament."¹⁰⁰

In his grand assault upon traditional philosophy, by his denial of the revealed origin of Scripture, Spinoza has knocked out the main prop of the view commonly held ever since Philo that the doctrines and commandments of the Pentateuch are to be identified with the intellectual and moral virtues of the philosophers. The doctrines of the Pentateuch, contends Spinoza, reflect the beliefs of simple-minded people, from which no knowledge of what philosophers usually call intellectual virtues can be gained.¹⁰¹ Indeed Scripture teaches what philosophers would call moral virtues,¹⁰² but the moral virtues taught in Scripture are based upon faith and not upon philosophy,¹⁰³ and they are not to be identified with philosophic virtues which are based on reason. When therefore he himself sets out to draw up a philosophic system of ethics he returns to Aristotle and partly also to the Stoics. He discusses all the standard problems of ethics, the highest good, the emotions, the virtues, the reward of virtue, all in the manner of Aristotle and without the benefit of scriptural quotations.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 91, 5 c.

¹⁰¹ *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, ch. 2 (*Opera*, ed. Gebhardt, III, p. 29, ll. 29-31); cf. ch. 13.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, ch. 13.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, ch. 14.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. *Ethics* III-V, and H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, chapters on "Emotions," "Virtues," and "Love, Immortality, and Blessedness."

CHAPTER XIII

POLITICAL THEORY

I. THE MOSAIC CONSTITUTION

BESIDES the classification of the laws into the ten commandments and into positive and negative and into those which deal with the relation of men to men and those which deal with the relation of men to God, there was in the mind of Philo another classification. His identification of the laws with what Aristotle calls "practical philosophy," has led him also to divide them, after the manner of the Aristotelian division of practical philosophy,¹ into ethics, household management, and state management. "The business of life," that is, practical philosophy, he says, deals with private affairs (*ιδίους*), that is, ethics, and with public affairs (*κοινοῖς*), and under the latter he includes household-management (*οἰκονομική*) and state-management (*πολιτική*).² Sometimes using the term "ethic" (*ἠθική*) in the general sense of a science which "tends to the improvement of human conduct," he says that it takes various forms: "politic, dealing with the state; economic, with the management of a house; sympotic, or the art of conviviality, with banquets and festivities; and further we have the kingly faculty dealing with the control of men, and the legislative dealing with commands and prohibitions."³

The component parts of the household, according to Aristotle, are human beings and property,⁴ and consequently under the science of household-management he

¹ Diogenes, V, 28; cf. also Plato, *Statesman* 258 E.

² *Fug.* 6, 36; cf. *Leg. All.* III, 9, 30; *Jos.* 8, 38; *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 165.

³ *Ebr.* 22, 91.

⁴ *Oecon.* I, 2, 1343a, 18.

deals with the family⁵ and the manner of procuring and preserving property, including under this latter agriculture, trade and wage-earning employments,⁶ slavery,⁷ and interest on money.⁸ With this general classification of the topics of the science of household-management in mind, Philo challenges the man who would have regard only for his individual advantage to tell him whether he would do away with "honor due to parents, loving care of a wife, bringing up children, happy and blameless relations with domestic servants, management of a house."⁹ Here, then, we have an informal classification of the conventional topics under the science of household-management, and all these topics are dealt with by him in his exposition of the laws of the Pentateuch. He deals with laws relating to marriage, divorce, inheritance, parents, children, slavery, free labor, land, animals, personal property, loans, and interest. Philo expounds all these laws in great detail in several of his works.¹⁰

In his challenge to that man who would have regard only for his individual advantage Philo also asks him to tell whether he would do away with "the government of a city, the firm establishment of laws, the guardianship of morals, reverence towards elders, respect for the memory of the departed, fellowship with the living, piety in words and actions towards the Deity."¹¹ Here, then, we have a classification of the conventional topics that are usually included under the science of government in the works of Plato and Aristotle and the Stoics. In all of them religion is considered as one of the functions of a state. To Plato, the state is to provide

⁵ *Ibid.* I, 3, 1343b, 7-4, 1344a, 22.

⁶ *Ibid.* I, 2, 1343a, 26-30.

⁷ *Ibid.* I, 5, 1344a, 23 ff.

⁸ *De Vita Mosis* II, 43, 233-242; *De Decalogo*; *De Specialibus Legibus* I-IV; *De Virtutibus*.

¹¹ *Post.* 53, 181.

⁹ *Ibid.* II, 1, 1346a, 13.

¹⁰ *Post.* 53, 181.

priests for the care of the sacred places and the services of the gods” and “impiety either by word or deed” is to be punished by the state,¹³ in some instances even by death.¹⁴ So also to Aristotle, in the state “there must be a care of religion, which is commonly called worship”¹⁵ and “people who are puzzled to know whether one ought to honor the gods and love one’s parents or not need punishment.”¹⁶ All those laws which in a purely philosophic treatise would have been included under the heading of the management of the state are treated in his exposition of the special laws of the Pentateuch, arranged under the headings of some of the ten commandments. He deals with laws regulating the office of king, the appointment of magistrates, the administration of justice, the position of strangers within the state, the relation of the state to other states in war, the office of the priest, the regulation of divine worship in the temple and outside the temple.¹⁷ The art of government is described by him as “an art of arts and a science of sciences” and as an art which is to concern itself, in its broadest sense, with the care of “matters private, public, and sacred.”¹⁸

Here, too, in his restatement of the laws of Moses of this group, he does not follow the text of the Pentateuch literally. For his subject-matter he draws upon certain oral Jewish traditions and for his literary form he draws upon terms and expressions familiar to his non-Jewish readers.

Let us, then, see how Philo, on the basis of the knowledge available to him, analyzes the Mosaic constitution.

¹³ *Laws* VI, 758 E ff.

¹³ *Ibid.* X, 907 D ff.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 908 E; 909 A.

¹⁵ *Politica* VII, 9, 1328b, 11-13.

¹⁶ *Topica* II, 11, 105a, 5-7.

¹⁷ Similarly Josephus singles out all the laws which deal with the management of the state and describes them as laws dealing with the form of government (πολιτεία). Cf. *Antt.* IV, 8, 4, 198; IV, 8, 2, 184.

¹⁸ *Spec.* IV, 29, 156.

(a) King

There is nowhere in Scripture a definite statement as to what form of government the Jewish state should take. The verse in Deuteronomy about the appointment of a king is couched in language which suggests that the appointment of a king was permissible if it should happen that, in imitation of all the neighboring nations, the Jews could not resist the temptation of having a king set up over them. "When thou art come unto the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, and shalt possess it, and shalt dwell therein; and shalt say: 'I will set a king over me, like all the nations that are round about me,' thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose."¹⁹ From the story in Samuel about the appointment of the first king, introduced by the words of the elders of Israel to Samuel "make us a king to judge us like all the nations" and followed by God's comment "they have rejected Me, that I should not be king over them" and by Samuel's unfavorable description of kingship,²⁰ it may be gathered that, according to the author of that story in Samuel, kingship was not considered either as an obligatory form of government nor as the best form of government. In post-Biblical Judaism a difference of opinion existed as to the meaning of the Deuteronomic verse with regard to the appointment of a king. Josephus regards it as optional.²¹ In rabbinic sources, some authorities are recorded as considering it as optional, others as obligatory.²² The latter had to explain the reluctance of Samuel in granting the people's request for a

¹⁹ Deut. 17: 14-15.

²⁰ I Sam. 8: 4-22; 12: 17.

²¹ *Ant.* IV, 8, 17, 223.

²² *Sifre Deut.*, § 156, p. 105a; *Midrash Tannaim*, on Deut. 17: 14, pp. 103-104; *Sanhedrin* 20b.

king. The explanation offered is that the people were not yet ripe for the royal form of government or that the ignorant elements of the population couched their demand for a king in the wrong term, namely, their desire to have a king "like all the nations."²³

Nor is there in the Pentateuch any definite statement as to the manner in which a king is to come to office. In the Pentateuch it only says: "Thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose."²⁴ In the case of Moses, who according to Jewish tradition based upon the verse "And he was king in Jeshurun"²⁵ held the office of king, there seems to be a difference of opinion as to the manner in which he came to office.²⁶ There is one statement in which it is said that he was appointed by God,²⁷ but there is another statement in which it is intimated that he was king by virtue of his election by the assembly of the seventy elders.²⁸ In the case of Saul and David, Saul is said to have been first chosen by God through the prophet Samuel²⁹ and then chosen by lot.³⁰ David, again, is said to have been chosen by God through the prophet Samuel³¹ and then anointed first by "the men of Judah"³² and later again by "all the elders of Israel."³³

Of these four methods of election of a king, lots, prophet, all the people, the elders of the people, the first is never mentioned in post-Biblical literature. The other three are men-

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Deut. 17: 15.

²⁵ Deut. 33: 5.

²⁶ Cf. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, III, 153-154; 455.

²⁷ *Exodus Rabbah* 40, 2.

²⁸ *Midrash Tannaim*, on Deut. 33: 5, p. 213.

²⁹ I Sam. 9: 15-17.

³⁰ I Sam. 10: 20-21. According to tradition, lots were also used in the selection of the seventy elders by Moses (cf. *Sifre Num.*, 95, F, p. 26a; H, p. 95).

³¹ I Sam. 16: 1-13.

³² II Sam. 2: 4.

³³ II Sam. 5: 3.

tioned in various sources. In the First Book of Maccabees, when Simon the Maccabean was made high priest (ἀρχιερεύς) and captain (στρατηγός) and governor (ἐθνάρχης; ἡγούμενος),³⁴ with all the dignities and honors of a king,³⁵ though without the title of king, it is said first that "the Jews and priests were pleased"³⁶ that he should be all these and then that "all the people consented to ordain for Simon"³⁷ all these, with the proviso, however, "until a faithful prophet should arise."³⁸ The implication of all this is that, according to the understanding at that time of the scriptural law, such an election had to be made by (a) a prophet and by (b) the people, but, inasmuch as there was no prophet by whom Simon could be chosen, his choice was made by the people "until a faithful prophet should arise."³⁹ In the Tannaitic literature, one source, using as proof-text the cases of Saul and David, declares that a king is to be chosen by a prophet;⁴⁰ another source, evidently dealing with the time after the close of prophecy, declares that a king is to be set up by a council of seventy-one members.⁴¹

Nor, finally, is there in the Pentateuch any definite statement as to how long the office should be held by the king,

³⁴ I Macc. 14: 41, 47; 13: 42; 15: 1, 2.

³⁵ *Ibid.* 14: 43, 44.

³⁶ *Ibid.* 14: 41.

³⁷ *Ibid.* 14: 46.

³⁸ *Ibid.* 14: 41.

³⁹ Or it may also mean that his rule was to be temporary, as a true ruler of the house of David would ultimately be announced by a faithful prophet. Cf. H. Graetz, *Geschichte der Juden*^s, III, p. 59; S. Krauss, "Simon Maccabaeus," *Jew. Enc.* XI, 371; J. Klausner, *Ha-Ra'ayon ha-Meshihi be-Yisra'el*, p. 164.

⁴⁰ *Midrash Tannaim*, on Deut. 17: 16, p. 104; cf. *Sifre Deut.*, § 157, F, p. 105a; HF, p. 208.

⁴¹ *Tos. Sanhedrin* III, 4. Maimonides, in *Mishneh Torah: Melakim* I, 3, referring to Biblical time says the election of a king is to be by seventy elders and a prophet. In *Sanhedrin* V, 1, he says the election of a king is to be by a council of seventy-one elders, evidently referring to post-Biblical times. Cf. Ritter, *Philo und die Halacha*, p. 100, n. 2.

and as to whether the office of king should be hereditary. All that is said on this point is that the king should observe the Law "to the end that he may prolong his days in his kingdom, he and his children, in the midst of Israel."⁴² This implies lifelong tenure of office and heredity, but both are conditioned on merit. When David became king, however, he was promised by God through Nathan the prophet that his throne "shall be established for ever."⁴³ This continuity of the Davidic dynasty, as would seem from Scripture, was not to be conditioned on the merits of his successors, for it says that "if his children forsake My law, . . . then will I visit their transgressions with the rod . . . but My mercy will not break off from him, . . . his seed shall endure for ever, and his throne as the sun before Me."⁴⁴

In post-Biblical literature it is generally assumed that the statement in Deuteronomy "to the end that he may prolong his days in his kingdom, he, and his children"⁴⁵ means that the office is of lifelong tenure and is hereditary, provided the children are qualified for the office by merit.⁴⁶ This conception of the royal office as hereditary, but conditioned on merit, is also implied in the discussion of Joshua's succession to Moses. There are three traditions on this point. First, Moses is represented as having expected his sons to inherit his office of king in accordance with the general law of inheritance, but God told him that Joshua was more deserving than they, for "while thy sons sat idle and neglected the study of the Torah, Joshua attended much upon thee and paid much regard to thee and studied early and late in thy

⁴² Deut. 17: 20.

⁴³ II Sam. 7: 16.

⁴⁴ Ps. 89: 31-37.

⁴⁵ Deut. 17: 20.

⁴⁶ *Midrash Tannaim*, on Deut. 17: 20, p. 106; *Horayot* 11b; *Tos. Shekalim* II, 15; *Sifre Deut.*, § 162, F, p. 106a; HF, pp. 212-213.

schoolhouse and did also arrange the benches and spread the mats." 47 Second, Moses is represented as having desired to be succeeded by his sons as kings, but God told him that kingship was in His design to be given to David and his descendants.48 Third, Moses is represented as having himself desired that Joshua should succeed him in preference to his own sons.49 In the case of the dynasty of David, its perpetuity is assumed without any attached condition.50

Philo, in his restatement of the Pentateuchal laws with regard to the government of the state, probably assumes, as did some of the exponents of Jewish tradition,51 that kingship is the prescribed form of government.52 Following strictly the Mosaic legislation and in conformity with post-Biblical Jewish tradition which passes over in silence the precedent of casting lots in the case of the election of Saul, Philo declares that "Moses does not even mention appointment of rulers by lot, but determines to institute appointment by election" and by the free choice of the "whole multitude" (*σὺμπασα ἡ πλῆθὺς*).53 This statement is preceded by a diatribe against "some [legislators who] have introduced the system of filling magistrates by lot." 54 Elsewhere he condemns also the election of rulers "by the votes of men for the most part hirelings." 55 His criticism of election by lots is evidently directed against Plato and Aristotle, both of whom recommend that method of elec-

47 *Numbers Rabbah* 21, 14; *Tanḥuma, Phinehas* 11; cf. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, III, 398.

48 *Exodus Rabbah* 2, 6.

49 *Sifre Zuta*, on Num. 27: 18, 22; *Sifre Num.*, § 140, F, p. 526; H, p. 186; cf. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, III, 400; VI, p. 142, n. 837.

50 Cf. *Sirach* 47: 11, 22; 48: 15; *I Macc.* 2: 57; *Psalms of Solomon* 17: 5 (4).

51 Cf. above, p. 325.

52 *Spec.* IV, 30, 157. Cf. Ritter, *Philo und die Halacha*, p. 100; Heinemann, *Bildung*, p. 184.

53 *Ibid.*

54 *Ibid.*, 29, 151-156; cf. *Mut.* 28, 151.

55 *Mut.* 28, 151.

tion.⁵⁶ His mention of election "by votes of men for the most part hirelings" undoubtedly refers to events in the Roman principate to which he refers also elsewhere in his statement that Moses was "invested with this office of kingship, not like some of those who thrust themselves into position of power by means of arms and engines of war and strength of infantry, cavalry, and navy, but on account of his goodness and nobility of conduct and the universal benevolence which he never failed to show."⁵⁷ His emphasis upon the fact that the king is to be elected by the "whole multitude" is obviously in criticism of those views which would restrict the right of electing rulers only to some of the citizens,⁵⁸ to be determined by qualifications of property or of birth. His omission, however, to mention the council of elders as being intrusted with the power of electing a king is due to the fact, as we shall see later,⁵⁹ that according to his conception of the Mosaic constitution no specific provision was made by it for the continued existence of a council of seventy elders. Again, like one of the two Tannaitic sources referred to above,⁶⁰ he makes no mention of the election of kings by a prophet.

Still the divine element is not missing in the election of kings. Drawing evidently upon the wording of the verse "thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose,"⁶¹ he declares that even though the election of the king is done by the people, "God himself will add His vote in favor of such an election and set His seal to ratify it,"⁶² that is to say, the choice of the people is an expression of the will of God. In another place, drawing

⁵⁶ Plato, *Laws* VI, 759 B; Aristotle, *Politica* IV, 9, 1294b, 7-8.

⁵⁷ *Mos.* I, 27, 148; cf. S. Tracy, *Philo Judaeus and the Roman Principate* (Williamsport: 1933), p. 50.

⁵⁸ Aristotle, *Politica* IV, 15, 1300a, 15.

⁵⁹ Cf. below, p. 350.

⁶⁰ Cf. above, p. 327.

⁶¹ Deut. 17: 15.

⁶² *Spec.* IV, 30, 157.

upon the verse "thou art a king from God among us,"⁶³ he rephrases it in philosophic language, declaring that rulers are "appointed for ever by nature herself,"⁶⁴ that is to say, by God himself. The king selected by the people is to be assumed he says, to "have been judged worthy to fill the highest and most important office."⁶⁵ What he means by this divine element in the vote of the people is explained by him in his statement with regard to the manner in which Moses was elected to the office of king. Combining the two Jewish traditions, one that Moses was appointed by God and the other that Moses was elected by the people through their representatives in the assembly of the seventy elders,⁶⁶ he says that "he was appointed by God with the free consent of those who were to be governed by him, for God wrought in his subjects a willingness to make such a voluntary choice,"⁶⁷ but in order to show that his recognition of a divine source for royal authority is not to be confused with the common pagan conception that the king in person is divine and is to be worshiped,⁶⁸ he says that "in his material substance a king is equal to every man, but in the power of his authority and rank he is like the God of all, for there is nothing on earth that is higher than he."⁶⁹

Similarly in accordance with native Jewish tradition is his treatment of the problem of the length of the king's tenure of office and the problem of succession.

The office of king is to be held for life, and he criticizes those who elect rulers only "for a short time,"⁷⁰ evidently

⁶³ Gen. 23: 6 (LXX).

⁶⁶ Cf. above, p. 326.

⁶⁴ *Mut.* 28, 151-152.

⁶⁷ *Praem.* 9, 54.

⁶⁵ *Spec.* IV, 33, 170.

⁶⁸ Cf. above, I, 14, 29.

⁶⁹ *Fragmenta*, Richter, VI, pp. 235-236 (M. II, 673); cf. Goodenough, *The Politics of Philo Judaeus*, pp. 98-99. On the traditional Jewish conception as to the divine element in kingship, see Ch. Tchernowitz, *Toledoth ha-Halakah* I, ii, pp. 14-17.

⁷⁰ *Mut.* 28, 151.

referring to the office of royalty of ancient Hellas which, according to Aristotle, was sometimes held "until certain fixed limits of time." ⁷¹ He is silent on the question whether the office is to be hereditary or not. In his comment on the verse "to the end that he may prolong his days in his kingdom, he and his children, in the midst of the children of Israel," ⁷² he interprets it allegorically, maintaining that the verse does not mean to teach that God "grants him long years of life in presiding over the state, but to teach the ignorant that the law-abiding ruler, even when deceased, lives an age-long life through the actions which he leaves behind him as immortal, monuments of high excellence which can never be destroyed." ⁷³ In this allegorical interpretation, then, the phrase "and his children" is evidently taken by him to mean "the actions which he leaves behind him." But, as in all his allegorical interpretations of legal passages, the literal meaning is not wholly to be discarded. Literally the law means to him, as it does in native Jewish tradition, that the office is hereditary, but conditioned on merit. This may be gathered from the address to Moses which he puts in the mouth of an imaginary person. In that address Philo makes the imaginary person say to Moses: "Master, what do you mean, have you not lawful sons, have you not nephews? Bequeath the sovereignty to your sons as first choice, for they naturally take precedence as heirs, or, if you reject them, at least to your nephews." ⁷⁴ The meaning of this would seem to be that lawfully the office

⁷¹ *Politica* III, 14, 1285a, 34-35.

⁷² Deut. 17: 20 (LXX).

⁷³ *Spec.* IV, 32, 169. Cf. rabbinic non-literal interpretation of the words "that thou mayest prolong thy days" (Deut. 22: 7) as referring to the hereafter (*Kiddushin* 39b; *Hullin* 142a) and also the statement "no monuments are set up for the righteous; their words are their monuments" (*Genesis Rabbah* 82, 10; *Jer. Shekalim* II, 7, 47a).

⁷⁴ *Virt.* 10, 59.

belonged first to his sons and next to his nephews. This corresponds exactly to the view of the rabbis that "kingship passes as an inheritance to sons, and he who has precedence in inheritance in general has precedence in the inheritance of the office of king."⁷⁵ Philo seems to treat Moses' bequeathal of his office to Joshua rather than to his sons or nephews as a case of disinheritance, and the reason for that, as suggested by Philo, is the possibility that "the claims of his sons were under suspicion"⁷⁶ and that Joshua was more worthy than they on the ground that he was "the imitator of his amiable characteristics."⁷⁷ This, again, is exactly like the expression used by the rabbis, namely, "provided the son conducts himself in the manner of his fathers."⁷⁸ This native Jewish view that no man is elected to the office of king or inherits the office of king unless he is worthy of it is expressed by Philo also in a statement, couched in philosophic language, that "no foolish man is a king even though he is invested with supreme power by sea and land, but he only is a king who is a virtuous and God-loving man."⁷⁹ No reference is made by Philo to the hereditary dynasty of David, evidently because he was writing on the ideal state as it was outlined in the laws of Moses and not on the history of the Jewish state. David is once mentioned by him by name and is referred to as "psalmist" only,⁸⁰ and when the psalms are quoted David is referred to as "a prophet"⁸¹ or a "divinely inspired man"⁸² or "a member of Moses' fellowship."⁸³ Similarly Solomon, who is also mentioned by

⁷⁵ *Midrash Tannaim*, on Deut. 17: 20, p. 106; *Tos. Sheḡalim* II, 15.

⁷⁶ *Virt.* 9, 53.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* 11, 66.

⁷⁸ *Tos. Sheḡalim* II, 15; cf. *Midrash Tannaim*, on Deut. 17: 20, p. 106.

⁷⁹ *Fragments*, Richter, VI, 215 (M. II, 657). Heinemann (*Bildung*, p. 183) uses this quotation as proof of the influence of Hellenic culture upon Philo's conception of kingdom.

⁸⁰ *Conf.* 28, 149.

⁸² *Plant.* 7, 29.

⁸¹ *Agr.* 12, 50.

⁸³ *Ibid.* 9, 39.

him only once by name, is referred to only as the author of Proverbs and is described as "one of the disciples of Moses"⁸⁴ or "some one of the men of the divine company."⁸⁵

The duties and powers of a king as conceived in Jewish tradition rest upon the Mosaic laws in Deuteronomy and upon Samuel's address in which, in answer to the people's request for a king, he undertook to describe for them "the prerogative of the king who shall reign over them."⁸⁶ The powers enumerated by Samuel are those of levying taxes in money and in forced labor. The people themselves mentioned that the king was to judge them and to lead them in war.⁸⁷ In post-Biblical Jewish law, based upon the statements in the Book of Samuel, taxation and leadership in war are considered the chief prerogatives of a king.⁸⁸ Neither of these two prerogatives is dwelt upon by Philo, evidently because they are not mentioned in the Pentateuch, for, as we have already seen, his purpose was to describe the Mosaic constitution and not the actual working of that constitution in Jewish history. The duties and functions which he does ascribe to a king are fourfold: (1) He is to rule and judge the people in accordance with the law.⁸⁹ (2) He is to appoint subordinates to act in his place in minor matters.⁹⁰ (3) He is to rule the people for their benefit and judge them with righteousness.⁹¹ (4) He is to defer in doubtful cases to legal authorities.⁹² Though none of these four duties is definitely said in the Pentateuch to be the duties of a king,

⁸⁴ *Congr.* 31, 177.

⁸⁵ *Ebr.* 8, 31.

⁸⁶ I Sam. 8: 9 ff. On the powers of a king, see Ch. Tchernowitz, *Toledoth ha-Halakah* I, ii, pp. 113 ff.

⁸⁷ I Sam. 8: 20.

⁸⁸ *M. Sanhedrin* II, 4; *Sanhedrin* 20b; cf. Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah*, *Melakim* IV, 1; V, 1.

⁸⁹ *Spec.* IV, 32, 160-169.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 35, 183-187.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 33, 170-175.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 36, 188-192.

still Philo, we shall try to show, was not without justification in describing them as royal duties.

The first duty ascribed by Philo to the king, that of acting as judge, would seem to have been derived by him from the verse in which the king is ordered, upon his assumption of office, to write out a copy of the Law and to have it with him and to read therein all the days of his life in order "that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the words of this law and these statutes, to do them."⁹³ In the Septuagint the last part of the statement reads: "and to keep all these commandments (*ἐντολάς*) and to do (*ποιεῖν*) all these statutes (*δικαιώματα*)." We have translated the Greek *δικαιώματα* here by "statutes" on the basis of its underlying Hebrew *hukkim*, of which it occurs as a translation also in other places in the Septuagint. But it is not impossible that Philo took this term here in its original Greek sense of "acts of justice" or "just claims," in which sense the term is also sometimes used in the Septuagint.⁹⁴ The last words of the statement accordingly meant to him that the king was to administer justice. For such an understanding of the verse he could have derived support from the fact that Moses, David, and Solomon, all in their capacity as kings, were also judges.⁹⁵ He could have also derived support from the verses "O house of David, thus saith the Lord, administer justice (*κρίμα*) in the morning"⁹⁶ and "the king that faithfully judgeth the poor, his throne shall be established for ever."⁹⁷ Similarly when the rabbis interpret the verse commanding that a copy of the book of the Law "shall

⁹³ Deut. 17: 18-19.

⁹⁴ Cf. Deut. 10: 18; I Kings 8:45, 59, as a translation of the Hebrew *mishpat*, and Jer. 11: 20, as a translation of the Hebrew *rib*.

⁹⁵ Exod. 18: 13; II Sam. 14: 5 ff.; 15: 2; I Kings 3: 16 ff.

⁹⁶ Jer. 21: 12.

⁹⁷ Prov. 29: 14.

be with him" ⁹⁸ to mean that "when he sits in judgment it shall be with him," ⁹⁹ the implication is that they understood the verse to mean that the king acts as judge. This, we may assume, was the original law. It was only during the time of Alexander Jannaeus that a new law was enacted, according to which non-Davidic kings were not to act as judges.¹⁰⁰ This scriptural and traditional Jewish view about the judicial function of the king is often expressed by Philo in words, which reflect a similar Greek conception of kingship, namely, that "it is a king's duty to command what is right and forbid what is wrong" ¹⁰¹ or that the royal power "is the root of the punishing and the law-making power." ¹⁰²

The other three duties ascribed by him to the king are based upon verses in the Pentateuch which do not directly deal with kings. The verse upon which the second duty rests only reads: "Judges and officers shalt thou make thee

⁹⁸ Deut. 17: 19.

⁹⁹ *M. Sanhedrin* II, 4.

¹⁰² *Qu. in Exod.* II, 68.

¹⁰⁰ *Sanhedrin* 19a; *M. Sanhedrin* II, 2.

¹⁰¹ *Mos.* II, 1, 4.

Heinemann's view is that Philo's attribution of judicial power to kings is of non-Jewish origin, for the following reasons: (1) Philo had but little acquaintance with the books of Samuel, Kings, and Proverbs, where kings are described as judges. (2) Deuteronomy does not confer upon kings judicial powers. (3) The statement in *M. Sanhedrin* II, 2 that a king cannot be a judge represents the old tradition; the distinction between non-Davidic kings and Davidic kings is a later innovation. (4) Philo quotes Greek sayings in support of the judicial function of kings (cf. *Bildung*, pp. 183-184).

In answer to all these points, it may be said: (1) No one knows how much Philo was acquainted with the books of Samuel, Kings, and Proverbs. All these books, we know, are quoted by him. (2) In Deuteronomy, as we have shown, Philo could have found a direct statement as to the judicial power of a king. (3) That kings, according to Deuteronomy, are judges is definitely stated in *M. Sanhedrin* II, 4, and consequently the statement in II, 2 that kings cannot be judges must inevitably refer, as is explained in the Talmud, to a later act of legislation (cf. J. Juster, *Les Juifs dans l'Empire Romain*, II, p. 127, n. 2). (4) Philo's quotations of Greek sayings about the judicial function of kings is in accordance with his general practice of quoting Greek authorities in support of scriptural teachings.

¹⁰³ Deut. 16: 18. Cf. below, pp. 345-348.

¹⁰³ Deut. 16: 18. Cf. below, pp. 345-348.

in all thy gates.”¹⁰³ The verse upon which the third duty rests reads only: “Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment: thou shalt not respect the person of the mighty. In righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor. Thou shalt not go about with deceit among thy people.”¹⁰⁴ The verse upon which the fourth duty rests only reads: “If there arise matters too hard for thee in judgment . . . thou shalt come unto the priests, the levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days.”¹⁰⁵ In none of these laws is the word king mentioned. But inasmuch as in the first duty which he assigns to the king Philo assumes that the king is to act as judge, it was quite natural for him to interpret all those verses dealing with the administration of justice to apply to the king.

(b) High Priest

The conception of high priesthood with which Philo started and upon which he based his own discussion of the subject is that which one may gather from the Pentateuch and post-scriptural native Jewish tradition. Moses, according to Jewish tradition, supported by the verse “Moses and Aaron among his priests,”¹⁰⁶ was not only king but also priest. Originally, so the tradition runs, it was God’s design that Moses should be priest and Aaron only a levite, but as a punishment for Moses’ hesitation to undertake his mission to Egypt the priesthood was transferred to Aaron. Moses officiated as high priest during the week of the installation of Aaron, but even after that, according to one view, he continued to officiate together with Aaron.¹⁰⁷ The

¹⁰⁴ Lev. 19: 15-16. In *Spec.* IV, 35, 183, Philo quotes only the last part of this verse. Cf. Colson, *ad loc.* ¹⁰⁵ Deut. 17: 8-9. ¹⁰⁶ Ps. 99: 6.

¹⁰⁷ *Zebahim* 102a; *Leviticus Rabbah* 11, 6; Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, II, 139; V, 422, n. 139.

priesthood is explicitly said to descend to the sons of Aaron.¹⁰⁸ From among these priests a high priest is elected by a court of seventy-one members.¹⁰⁹ The office of the high priest is hereditary, the order of succession following the regular law of inheritance, but this is conditioned upon the qualifications of the son in piety.¹¹⁰

Philo follows the same outline. Moses, besides being king, was also high priest, and in this capacity he built the tabernacle and its equipment and designed the vesture of the high priest and of the ordinary priests, all of these, of course, by the direction of God.¹¹¹ Then, when he was about to select permanent priests to perform the service in the Tabernacle, he did not select his sons, because "neither of his sons, of whom he had two, did he judge worthy of this distinction."¹¹² He selected Aaron as high priest "because of his superior virtue" and he appointed Aaron's sons as priests also because of "the piety and holiness which he observed in their characters."¹¹³ But having selected them, naturally by the order of God, "he installed them in office with the consent of the whole nation."¹¹⁴ During the seven days of installation, Moses himself, as is told in the Pentateuch, officiated as priest.¹¹⁵ Whether he continued to officiate as priest even after that Philo does not say. The reason, according to Philo, why the sons of Aaron, who were found morally worthy to be priests and hence could not be assumed to be unworthy to be kings,¹¹⁶ were not selected by Moses to succeed him as kings is that "very likely he

¹⁰⁸ Exod. 40: 15.

¹⁰⁹ *Tos. Sanhedrin* III, 4.

¹¹⁰ *Sifra, Šav, Pereš* 5, pp. 31d-32a; *Aḥre, Pereš* 8, p. 83b; *Midraš Tannaim*, on Deut. 17: 20, p. 106.

¹¹¹ *Mos. II*, 15, 71 ff.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 28, 142.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 143.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 28, 143-30, 152; cf. Lev. 8: 30-9: 24.

¹¹⁶ *Virt.* 9, 53.

considered that it was impossible for the same persons to do justice to both offices, the priesthood and the royal authority, one of which professes the service of God, the other guardianship of men."¹¹⁷ There is in these words the unmistakable ring of a criticism of a theory or a practice to combine these two offices, and the theory or practice alluded to may be that of ancient Greece and Egypt or of Rome in his own time.¹¹⁸ He, himself, refers to such non-Jewish theory and practice when he speaks of "ancient kings" who "were at the same time also priests."¹¹⁹ Or perhaps it may be a repercussion of the smoldering criticism that prevailed among certain Jews in Palestine against the Maccabees for combining the royal and priestly office.¹²⁰

With the appointment of Aaron and his sons to the priesthood, the office was to remain within that family to eternity,¹²¹ which means that it is to be hereditary. Accordingly in his summarization of the laws of marriage which are to govern priests he says that they provide for the "pure descent from a noble stock."¹²² No rules for the appointment and succession of high priests are mentioned by him. But indirectly we may gather from his writings his view as to at least one rule governing the succession of high priests. In his comment on the verse with regard to Phinehas, "and it shall be unto him, and to his seed after him, the covenant of an everlasting priesthood,"¹²³ he paraphrases the last

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 9, 54.

¹¹⁸ But see Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, p. 190; *The Politics of Philo Judaeus*, pp. 97 ff.

¹¹⁹ *Qu. in Exod.* II, 105; cf. below, p. 344.

¹²⁰ Concerning which, see V. Aptowitz, *Parteilpolitik der Hasmonäerzeit*, 1927, pp. 49-63.

¹²¹ *Mos.* II, 34, 186; cf. Badt in *Philos Werke* and Colson, both *ad loc.*, on the question whether this verse is to be taken literally as referring to the priestly tribe of Aaron or symbolically as referring to Israel or the soul.

¹²² *Spec.* I, 16, 82.

¹²³ *Num.* 25: 13.

words to mean "complete possession (*παγκρατησία*) of the priesthood, a heritage to himself and his family which none could take from them."¹²⁴ The substitution of the words "complete possession of the priesthood" for the original word "priesthood" is undoubtedly meant by Philo to interpret the verse as meaning that the high priesthood is to belong to the family of Phinehas, and this evidently in order to obviate the difficulty that the priesthood had already belonged to Phinehas by virtue of his being a son of Aaron. Similarly in Palestinian literature, in order to obviate this difficulty, one of the explanations given is that the reference here is to the high priesthood, and to prove this it is added that eighteen high priests during the period of the first Temple were descendants of Phinehas.¹²⁵ So also Ben-Sira takes the "covenant of an everlasting priesthood" promised to Phinehas to refer to the high priesthood¹²⁶ and prays on behalf of the high priest Simeon: "May His mercy be established with Simeon, and may He raise up for him the covenant of Phinehas."¹²⁷ Philo does not explicitly say that unfitness with reference to piety would disqualify one from succeeding his father in the office of high priesthood. But virtuous perfection is set up by him as a moral, if not a legal, requirement even for the subordinate priests. Commenting upon the laws of bodily perfection which are to govern priests, he says that "all these seem to me to symbolize perfection of soul"¹²⁸ and to provide for the perfection of priests "both of body and soul."¹²⁹ When, therefore, he

¹²⁴ *Mos.* I, 55, 304.

¹²⁵ *Sifre Num.*, § 131 on Num. 25: 13, F, p. 48b; H, p. 173. The other explanation is that Phinehas, owing to his absence at the time of the installation of Aaron and his sons in the priesthood, was not made priest until after he had shown his zeal for God; cf. *Zebahim* 101b.

¹²⁶ *Sirach* 45: 23-24.

¹²⁸ *Spec.* I, 16, 80.

¹²⁷ *Sirach* 50: 24.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 82.

says that the "true priest" is "advanced to the service of the Truly Existent not more by birth than by virtue,"¹³⁰ he does not mean to deny the principle of heredity in priesthood. All he means to say is that, inasmuch as the first priests were chosen on the ground of their superior virtue and inasmuch also as the later hereditary priests are to be perfect in virtue, the true priest may be said to attain to his office not merely by birth but also by virtue.

In the Pentateuch priests are presented as having a two-fold function. Primarily they are to be in charge of the sacred rites in the sanctuary.¹³¹ But secondarily they are also to be the interpreters of the Law both as teachers and judges.¹³² In the post-Biblical period, after the restoration from the Babylonian exile, with the rise of lay scribes and scholars, the priests still continued to dominate whatever organized bodies existed for the interpretation of the Law until shortly before the time of the Maccabean uprising. In Palestine, from that time on the function of the priests as the custodians of the Law and as its interpreters disappeared. In Alexandria, however, where the Jewish community was established by Palestinian Jews at a time when in Palestine the priests were still the interpreters of the Law, the priests would seem to have continued to function in that capacity until a much later time. In his own community, during his own time, Philo reports that priests, together with others who were not priests, read and interpreted the laws to the people on Sabbaths.¹³³ In accordance with all this, Philo describes the function of priests as being twofold, that of

¹³⁰ *Ibid.* IV, 36, 192.

¹³¹ Exod. 28: 1 ff.

¹³² Deut. 17: 8-9; 21: 5; 33: 10; Isa. 28: 7; Jer. 2: 8; 18: 18; Ezek. 7: 26; Hos. 4: 6; Micah 3: 11. On priests as judges, see Ch. Tchernowitz, *Toledoth ha-Halakah* I, ii, pp. 64 ff.

¹³³ *Fragmenta*, Richter VI, pp. 181-182 (M. II, 630-631).

having charge of the sacred rites¹³⁴ and that of being the interpreter of the law.¹³⁵ The first function belongs to them by right of birth and inheritance and cannot therefore be transferred to non-priests; the second function, however, belongs to them only by virtue of their special training and may therefore be transferred to non-priests who possess a knowledge of the law. The second function is assigned to priests, says Philo, for two reasons. First, they are especially trained for it.¹³⁶ Second, "the true priest is necessarily a prophet, advanced to the service of the Truly Existent not more by birth than by virtue, and to the prophet nothing is unknown."¹³⁷ What he means to say is that the priest is more likely to have a knowledge of the Law in cases where the question cannot be decided by reasoning, for, owing to his virtuous character, he may receive knowledge by divine inspiration. Prophet here is used in the sense of scholar, and perhaps especially in the sense of a scholar who is aided in the acquisition of knowledge by divine inspiration.¹³⁸

The functions of the king and the high priest are according to Mosaic law so clearly delimited that in the words of Philo the high priest "professes the service of God," whereas the king professes "guardianship of men."¹³⁹ Theoretically, therefore, in matters of the government of the state, the two offices should not come into conflict with one another and there should be no question of precedence between them. Still, with regard to matters of dignity and honor, different opinions are expressed in post-Biblical Jewish literature as to which one of these offices is prior to the other.

¹³⁴ Cf. *Mos.* II, 1, 5; 15, 71 ff.; *Praem.* 9, 56.

¹³⁵ *Spec.* IV, 36, 190.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 191.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 192; cf. above, p. 14, n. 31.

¹³⁸ Cf. above, p. 53. So also Josephus, in *Antt.* IV, 8, 14, 218, substitutes for "the judge" in Deut. 17: 9 the words "the prophet and the council of elders," evidently using the term "prophet" in the sense of one trained in the Law.

¹³⁹ *Virt.* 9, 54; cf. below, p. 344.

In the Testament of Judah it is said that the Lord "set the kingdom beneath the priesthood," for to the former "He gave the things upon the earth" and to the latter "the things in heaven" and, "as the heaven is higher than the earth, so is the priesthood of God higher than the earthly kingdom, unless it falls away through sin from the Lord and is dominated by the earthly kingdom."¹⁴⁰ In a Baraita, with reference to the ransom of captives, the order of priority is scholar, king, high priest, and prophet¹⁴¹ and the proof-text for the priority of king to high priest is the verse wherein David says to Zadok the priest and Nathan the prophet "take with you the servants of your lord,"¹⁴² David thus calling himself the lord of the high priest. In a Tannaitic Midrash, however, in a comment upon the verse "and he (i.e., Joshua) shall stand before Eleazar the priest,"¹⁴³ it is said: "the Holy One blessed be He has apportioned such dignity to Eleazar that even a king (i.e., Joshua) is to stand before him."¹⁴⁴ The implication of the priority of high priesthood to kingship is also to be noticed in the order in which the terms are arranged in the statement of the Mishnah that "there are three crowns: the crown of Torah, the crown of priesthood, and the crown of royalty."¹⁴⁵ In Philo, the words of the Testament of Judah as to the priority of high priesthood to royalty is put into the mouth of Agrippa I, when he is made to say that his ancestors thought that "the high priesthood is as much superior to the power of a king as God is superior to man, for the one is occupied in render-

¹⁴⁰ Testament of Judah 21: 2-4.

¹⁴² I Kings 1: 33.

¹⁴¹ *Horayot* 13a; *Jer. Horayot* III, 7, 48b.

¹⁴³ Num. 27: 21.

¹⁴⁴ *Sifre Zuṭa*, on Num. 27: 21; Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah: Melakim* II, 5; cf. commentary *Ambuha de-Sifre* by Jacob Ze'eb Joskowitz on *Sifre Zuṭa*, ad loc., p. 477, n. 31; Ch. Tchernowitz, *Toledoth ha-Halakah*, I, ii, pp. 56-59.

¹⁴⁵ *M. Abot* IV, 13; the order in a corresponding passage in *Yoma* 72b is priesthood, Torah, and royalty, or literally, altar, ark [of the Law], and [royal] table.

ing service to God, and the other has only the care of governing men.”¹⁴⁶ Again, commenting upon the fact that the high priest is to wear a miter,¹⁴⁷ Philo says that “in setting a miter on the priest’s head, instead of a diadem, he expresses his judgment that he who is consecrated to God is, during the time of his exercising his office, superior to all others, not only the ordinary laymen, but even kings.”¹⁴⁸ Note the qualification “during the time of his exercising his office.” Similarly in his explanation of why Aaron and his sons themselves are ordered to light the lamp,¹⁴⁹ he says that it is “because nothing is more pleasant and agreeable or glorious than to devote one’s attention to God, which service surpasses even great royal power,” and to show the importance of performing this service to God personally, without entrusting it to others, he refers to the ancient custom among non-Jews of having kings officiate as priests: “To me, however, it seems that the ancient kings were at the same time also priests, in order publicly to show by their service that it is necessary that they who rule others should themselves respectfully worship God.”¹⁵⁰ Previous to that in the same passage, trying to explain the meaning of this order to Aaron and his sons to light the lamp by themselves, he says that it is meant to be a censure of “the negligence of their successors in later times who on account of their indolence entrusted the service of the holy things to their second and third assistants.”¹⁵¹ The reference is

¹⁴⁶ *Legat.* 36, 278; cf. above, p. 342.

¹⁴⁷ *Exod.* 28: 4.

¹⁴⁸ *Mos.* II, 26, 131.

¹⁴⁹ *Exod.* 27: 21.

¹⁵⁰ *Qu. in Exod.* II, 105.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* Goodenough takes this passage to mean that Aaron and his sons became kings, and paraphrases it as follows: “Aaron and his sons have been initiated for the divine ministry and have become greater kings than the Great King; like all kings they must thus be priests and serve God if they are to rule others” (*By Light, Light*, p. 113). I cannot accept this interpretation for the following reasons. First, in *Virt.* 9, 53, Philo definitely says that the sons of Aaron were only priests

undoubtedly to the actual practice in the Temple of Jerusalem, as Philo himself observed it there, of assigning the task of lighting the perpetual lamp to one of the subordinate priests by means of lots.¹⁵²

(c) *Judges and Officers*

In the constitution established by Moses there is also a provision for two classes of officers described in the Pentateuch by two terms: (1) *shofetim*, "judges," and (2) *shoṭerim*,¹⁵³ "officers," the latter term of which in this place is translated in the Septuagint by *γραμματοεισαγωγείς*, and elsewhere simply by *γραμματεῖς*, terms which in Egyptian Greek mean "officers."¹⁵⁴ From the few places where the function of the *shoṭerim* is described we may gather that they made proclamations¹⁵⁵ and conveyed orders¹⁵⁶ to the people in time of war and that during the sojourn of Israel in Egypt they were Israelite officers subordinate to Egyptian taskmasters supervising the forced labor of the Israelites.¹⁵⁷ In rabbinic tradition *shoṭerim* are said to be "the managers that lead or rule the community"¹⁵⁸ or those who enforce the law.¹⁵⁹ As to who appoints these judges and these community rulers who enforce the law, the Pentateuch does not

and did not succeed Moses as kings. Second, this is quite obviously not the meaning of the passage. The passage begins with the following statement: "He received Aaron as one initialed by divine influence and as one endowed with prophetic spirit, reprehending the negligence of priests following afterwards, who on account of their indolence entrusted the service of the holy things to their second or third assistants." Then follows the passage quoted in the text. It is quite evident that the example of ancient kings is brought in only to show the importance of personally serving God on the part of those who rule others. The criticism of priests of later generations refers to the actual practice in the Temple.

¹⁵² *M. Tamid* III, 1 and 9; *M. Yoma* II, 3. On Philo's pilgrimage to the Temple, see above, p. 242.

¹⁵³ Deut. 16: 18.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. G. A. Deissmann, *Bible Studies*, 1901, p. 110.

¹⁵⁵ Deut. 20: 5, 8, 9.

¹⁵⁶ Josh. 1: 10; 3: 2.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Exod. 5: 6, 10, 14-16.

¹⁵⁸ *Tanḥuma*, *Shofetim*, § 2.

¹⁵⁹ *Pesikta Rabbati*, § 33, p. 149b.

say. The commandment on this point simply reads: "Judges and officers shalt thou appoint thee in all thy gates."¹⁶⁰ In the Pentateuch, we are told that the first judges and officers were appointed by Moses himself,¹⁶¹ who, according to native Jewish tradition and Philo, was king.¹⁶² Who appointed the judges from the time of the death of Joshua to the establishment of the kingdom Scripture does not say. During the existence of the kingdom there is mention of two kings who appointed "judges and officers," David¹⁶³ and Jehoshaphat.¹⁶⁴ Upon the restoration from Babylon, when there was no king, Ezra is said to have been empowered by the Persian king to appoint "officers (*shofetim*, γραμματεῖς) and judges (*dayyanin*, κριτάς)."¹⁶⁵ With the reestablishment of the kingdom under the Hasmoneans it is not unlikely that judges were again appointed by the king. The Talmudic expression "the court of the Hasmoneans" may not refer to a court which supported the Hasmoneans at the beginning of their insurrection¹⁶⁶ or to "the leaders of the nation and the elders of the country" mentioned at the time Simon was elevated to the office of "prince of the people of God,"¹⁶⁷ but rather to a court appointed by Simon after his having acquired princely or kingly power.¹⁶⁸ Accordingly, judges were appointed by a king whenever there

¹⁶⁰ Deut. 16: 18.

¹⁶¹ Deut. 1: 15; Exod. 18: 25-26.

¹⁶² Cf. above, pp. 337, 338.

¹⁶⁶ Frankel, *Darke ha-Mishnah*, ed. 1923, p. 43.

¹⁶⁷ Weiss, *Dor Dor ve-Dorshaw I*, p. 102; cf. I Macc. 14: 28.

¹⁶⁸ Cf. above, p. 327. The appointment of the judiciary by the king continued also under the Herodians, as may be gathered from *Antt.* XX, 9, 6, 216, where the Levites are said to have urged King Agrippa II to "assemble a sanhedrin" which would allow them to wear linen garments like the priests. The king's prerogative to "assemble" a court of justice was nothing but an extension of his scriptural prerogative to appoint judges. And since it was the king's prerogative to assemble the sanhedrin, it was also his prerogative to adjourn it, as may be gathered from the action of Hyrcanus II during the trial of Herod (*Antt.* XIV, 9, 5, 177).

¹⁶³ I Chron. 23: 4; 26: 29.

¹⁶⁴ II Chron. 19: 4-11.

¹⁶⁵ Ezra 7: 25.

was a king, but they were appointed in some other way, whenever there was no king. In Tannaitic tradition, therefore, the law of the appointment of judges is restated as a duty which rests upon the people, without making any mention as to who has the appointive power.¹⁶⁹

In the light of these historical and traditional views, we may study the passages in which Philo undertakes to describe the institution of "judges and officers." He deals with conditions when there is a king. The "judges and officers" are therefore to be appointed by the king. Being appointed by the king, they are therefore the king's "lieutenants" (*διάδοχοι*; ¹⁷⁰ *ὑπαρχοι*¹⁷¹). The use of this term reflects the description of the first judges and officers as having been appointed by Moses to act as his lieutenants, and more particularly the description of the officers, including the *shofetim*, appointed by David as those "who serve the king" (*λειτουργοῦντες*)¹⁷² as well as the use in the Septuagint of the term *διάδοχος* as a description of those servants of the king who are next to him in rank.¹⁷³ Then, following tradition, he defines the duty of the *shofetim*, *γραμματοεισαγωγείς*, as that of governing together with the king (*συνάρξουσι*),¹⁷⁴ as distinguished from the duty of the *shofetim*, *κριταί*, in his own language *δικασταί*,¹⁷⁵ which is that of judging together with the king (*συνδικάσουσι*).¹⁷⁶ The terms *ἄρχοντες* (implied in *συνάρξουσι*) and *δικασταί* used here by Philo for the pentateuchal *shofetim*, *κριταί*, and *shofetim*, *γραμματοεισαγωγείς*, are taken from the Athenian constitution.¹⁷⁷ But whereas in Athens the judges and magistrates were elected by the general assembly from among themselves, in the Mosaic con-

¹⁶⁹ *Sanhedrin* 16b.

¹⁷⁰ *Spec.* IV, 33, 170.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 174.

¹⁷² I Chron. 27: 1; 28: 1.

¹⁷³ I Chron. 18: 17; II Chron. 26: 11; II Chron. 28: 7.

¹⁷⁴ *Spec.* IV, 33, 170.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 174; cf. below, p. 351.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 170.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Aristotle, *Politica* III, 1, 1275a, 22-31.

stitution they were appointed by the king. Following also his conception of the state as it existed under the reign of Moses, he limits the duties of these judges and officers to cases of lesser importance; cases of higher importance are to be attended to by the king himself,¹⁷⁸ as was the custom under the reign of Moses.¹⁷⁹ Again following the example of Moses who appointed "rulers of thousands, and rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers of tens,"¹⁸⁰ he prescribes for future kings to choose officers "to act as second and third to themselves."¹⁸¹

(d) *Council of Elders*

Besides the institution of "judges and officers" which was established under the reign of Moses and for the continuation of which there is a special law, there is also mention of a body of "seventy men," selected by Moses from among "the elders of the people, and officers over them," the function of that body being described in the words that "they shall bear the burden of the people" with Moses.¹⁸² There is no special law in the Pentateuch, for the continuation of that body of seventy elders. But bodies of elders continue to be mentioned throughout the books of the Hebrew Scripture. Sometimes they are the elders of the city¹⁸³ or of the gate¹⁸⁴ or of a particular place¹⁸⁵ or of a particular tribe¹⁸⁶ or of the priests,¹⁸⁷ but sometimes they are also the elders of Israel,¹⁸⁸ the elders of the people,¹⁸⁹ or the elders of the land,¹⁹⁰ and once there is mention of "seventy men of the elders of

¹⁷⁸ *Spec.* IV, 33, 171.

¹⁷⁹ *Exod.* 18: 22.

¹⁸⁰ *Exod.* 18: 21.

¹⁸¹ *Spec.* IV, 33, 175.

¹⁸² *Num.* 11: 16-17.

¹⁸³ *Deut.* 21: 3.

¹⁸⁴ *Deut.* 25: 7.

¹⁸⁵ *Judges* 11: 5.

¹⁸⁶ *Deut.* 31: 28; *II Sam.* 19: 12.

¹⁸⁷ *II Kings* 19: 2.

¹⁸⁸ *Exod.* 3: 16.

¹⁸⁹ *Num.* 11: 16.

¹⁹⁰ *I Kings* 20: 7.

the house of Israel.”¹⁹¹ Sometimes the “elders” are bracketed with “officers,” without any mention of “judges,”¹⁹² sometimes they are bracketed with “judges,” without any mention of “officers,”¹⁹³ but sometimes they are bracketed with both “officers” and “judges,”¹⁹⁴ all of which shows that “elders” as distinguished from “officers” were “judges” and as distinguished from “judges” were “officers” but as distinguished from both were something else altogether. That something else is described in Scripture as their acting in the capacity of counselors. “Counsel” (βουλή), according to Scripture, is sought from “elders,”¹⁹⁵ and Rehoboam, on becoming king, seeks counsel from the elders.¹⁹⁶ After the restoration from the Babylonian exile, with the emergence of various governing bodies which continued to exist under various names and with constantly changing powers, throughout the period of the second commonwealth, both at the time when there was no king and during the Hasmonean and Herodian kings, the members of these governing bodies were also known as “elders”¹⁹⁷ and one of these bodies, during the Hellenistic and Maccabean periods, is known in Greek sources as *gerusia*, council of elders, a term which was used also as a designation of the governing body of the Jews of Alexandria at the time of Philo.¹⁹⁸ During the Roman period all such governing bodies among the Jews in Palestine came to be known, even among Jews who did not speak Greek, by the Greek name Synedrion, or, in its Hebraized form, Sanhedrin.

¹⁹¹ Exod. 8: 11.

¹⁹⁴ Josh. 8: 33; 23: 2.

¹⁹² Num. 11: 16; Deut. 31: 28.

¹⁹⁵ Ezek. 7: 26; Ezra 10: 8.

¹⁹³ Deut. 21: 2.

¹⁹⁶ I Kings 12: 6-8; II Chron. 10: 6-8.

¹⁹⁷ Ezra 5: 5, 9; 6: 7, 14; 10: 8; Judith 6: 16; 7: 23; 8: 10; 10: 6; 13: 12; I Macc. 7: 33; 11: 23; 12: 35; 14: 20; II Macc. 1: 10; 4: 44; 11: 27; Matt. 28: 41; Mark 11: 27; Acts 4: 23.

¹⁹⁸ Flac. 10, 74.

This is the picture which we have reason to believe Philo has formed in his mind of the institution of elders, and this picture could have been formed in his mind out of the books available to him at his own time as well as out of a knowledge of conditions in Palestine at his own time. It is in the light of this that we shall try to understand the full meaning of his brief references to the institution of elders. That he does not directly describe this body in his delineation of the Mosaic constitution can be explained on the ground that no special law for its continuation is laid down in the Pentateuch. But he does not overlook the fact that such a body of seventy elders was established by Moses. He refers to these seventy elders of Moses in several places,¹⁹⁹ in one of which he describes them as *synedroi* (σύνεδροι)²⁰⁰ of Moses. His description of them as *synedroi* would seem to suggest a conscious effort on the part of Philo to connect the Synedrion of Jerusalem at his own time with the seventy elders of Moses, thus reflecting the native Jewish tradition that the Synedrion of Jerusalem had a continuous history, under various names, from the council of the seventy elders of Moses.²⁰¹

What Philo considered as the functions of these seventy elders gathered together by Moses, whom he calls *synedroi*, is not clear. In Palestine during Philo's own time the function of the Sanhedrin was primarily that of a court of justice,

¹⁹⁹ References to these seventy elders of Moses are to be found in *Gig.* 6, 24; *Sobr.* 4, 19; *Migr.* 36, 199, and 201. His mention of the seventy γενάρχαι of the nation in *Mos.* 1, 34, 189, does not refer to the seventy elders of Moses but rather to the seventy souls with which Jacob came to Egypt (*Gen.* 46: 27; *Deut.* 10: 22), to which reference is made by Philo also in *Migr.* 36, 201. Cf. *Fug.* 33, 187, where the seventy palm-trees (*Exod.* 15: 27) are different from the seventy elders of Moses (*Num.* 11: 16) and also *Mos.* 1, 34, 188-189, where the seventy γενάρχαι are said to be symbolized by the seventy palm-trees.

²⁰⁰ *Sobr.* 4, 19.

²⁰¹ *M. Sanhedrin* 1, 6; *Jer. Sanhedrin* 1, 5, 19b.

though it had also other functions, and it is used interchangeably with the term *bet din*, court of justice.²⁰² In the same sense is the term *synedrion* also used in the Septuagint where it quite evidently reflects the reading *bet din*²⁰³ in the Hebrew text upon which it is based. In Greek, however, the primary meaning of *synedrion* is that of a council and not many years after Philo in a work written probably in Alexandria it is contrasted with the term *δικαστήριον*, court of justice.²⁰⁴ As for Philo, the term *synedrion* is sometimes used by him in the sense of council²⁰⁵ and sometimes in the sense of court.²⁰⁶ Similarly with regard to the term *synedros*, it is used by him both in the general sense of counselor and in the specific sense of an officer in a court of justice.²⁰⁷ Philo's double use of the term *synedrion* is brought

²⁰² *Jer. Sanhedrin* I, 6, 19c.

²⁰³ Prov. 22: 10; cf. Commentaries of Paul de Lagarde, 1863, Ant. J. Baumgartner, 1890, and C. H. Toy, 1899, *ad loc.*; cf. also Schürer, *A History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, II, i, p. 169, n. 461.

The use of the term *synedrion* in the sense of court of justice is implied in the verse "sit (*synedreue*) not in judgment with sinners" (Sirach 11: 9) and also in the verses stating that the profane man who sits in "the *synedrion* of the pious . . . is severe in speech in condemning sinners in judgment, and his hand is first upon the sinner as though acting in zeal" (Psalms of Solomon 4: 1-3). The last statement, moreover, quite evidently refers to Deut. 13: 10 and 17: 7, which deal with the execution of the judgment of a court of justice. Undoubtedly the term *synedrion* here is a translation of the Hebrew *'edah*, which means not only "assembly" but also a "court of justice" (cf. Num. 35: 24). So also in the verse "In the synagogues (*συναγωγαῖς*) he will judge the peoples" (Psalms of Solomon 17: 48), the word "synagogues" is undoubtedly also a translation of the Hebrew *'edah* in the special sense of "courts of justice." Professor Louis Ginzberg has called my attention to the term *'edah* in Num. 25: 7, which in *Targum Jonathan* and *Jer. Sanhedrin* X, 2, 28d, is translated by *sanhedrin*.

²⁰⁴ Pseudo-Aristotle, *De Mundo* 6, 400b, 15-18. However, the use of the Greek term *synedrion* in the sense of a court occurs in a papyrus of 120 B.C. (cf. Moulton and Milligan, *The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament*, 1914-1929, s.v.).

²⁰⁵ *Conf.* 18, 86; *Somn.* I, 34, 193; *Legat.* 31, 213.

²⁰⁶ *Probos* 2, 11. In this passage, speaking of men who are not guided by reason, Philo says of them figuratively that their "unstable *synedrion* is always open to bribes from those who are brought to trial (*κρινόμενων*)."

²⁰⁷ Compare *Legat.* 33, 244, and 34, 254, where the term *synedros* is used simply

out in two passages, in one of which he connects it by the conjunction "and" with the term court (*δικαστήριον*)²⁰⁸ and in the other with the term council (*βουλευτήριον*).²⁰⁹ Now, if the conjunction "and" (*καί*) is used in both passages to join two contrasting terms, then in the first passage the term *synedrion*, being used in contrast to the term *dikasterion*, is definitely a council, but in the second passage, being used in contrast to the term *bouleuterion*, the term *synedrion* is definitely a court of justice. And if the conjunction "and" is used to join two terms of the same meaning, then in the first passage the term *synedrion* is definitely a court of justice, whereas in the second passage it is definitely a council. It was quite natural for Jews, in whose own form of government the same body of elders acted both as council and as court, to attach to the Greek term *synedrion* primarily the meaning of court.

(e) *The People: Native-born and Proselytes*

The "whole multitude" ²¹⁰ which, according to Philo, is to elect the king corresponds to what Scripture calls "the people" ²¹¹ or "the congregation of the Lord" ²¹² or "the assembly of the Lord." ²¹³ But when Philo substitutes for these scriptural terms the term "the whole multitude" (*σύμπασα ἡ πλῆθὺς*), he had in mind what Aristotle calls the "political multitude" (*πλῆθος πολιτικόν*),²¹⁴ that is to say, the multitude of citizens. Now, according to Aristotle, "a mul-

in the sense of counsellor, with 44, 350, where Philo complains that Caligula acted not as a judge (*δικαστής*) sitting with his *synedroi*, but as an accuser (*κατήγορος*). The terms "judge" and "accuser" quite clearly show that the term *synedroi* in this last passage is used in the sense of members of a court of justice.

²⁰⁸ *Praem.* 5, 28.

²¹¹ Exod. 18: 10.

²⁰⁹ *Cont.* 3, 27.

²¹² Deut. 23: 2-4; cf. above, p. 394.

²¹⁰ *Spec.* IV, 30, 157; cf. above, p. 329.

²¹³ Num. 27: 17.

²¹⁴ *Politica* III, 13, 1283b, 2-3; VII, 6, 1327b, 18; 10, 1329b, 24-25.

titude of citizens" (πολιτῶν πλῆθος) constitutes a state (πόλις),²¹⁵ and a citizen (πολίτης) in the strictest sense of the term is defined by his right "to participate in the administration of justice and in office,"²¹⁶ for a citizen, according to him, must possess the ability not only to be ruled but also to rule.²¹⁷ But as to who is to have these rights whereby he is to be a citizen is a question which causes Aristotle some difficulty. Some maintain, he says, that a citizen is he whose both parents are citizens; others maintain that his ancestors to the second or third preceding generation, or even further, must be citizens; still others wonder how these remote ancestors came to be citizens.²¹⁸ Then, in addition to citizens by birth, Aristotle finds that in every state there are also those who have been adopted as citizens.²¹⁹ But concerning these adopted citizens Aristotle finds that the manner in which they acquire their citizenship is purely arbitrary, and he suspects that not all who are usually admitted to citizenship deserve to be admitted.²²⁰ He himself, however, fails to suggest any definite method by which aliens are to be admitted to citizenship. Moreover, in view of the fact that a citizen must be able to rule, Aristotle raises the question whether certain classes of the native-born population should not be excluded from citizenship on account of the occupations in which they happen to be engaged, and he answers this question in the affirmative.²²¹ Finally, besides these two classes of citizens, native-born and adopted, Aristotle also finds that among the inhabitants of various states there are aliens (ξένοι) and resident aliens (μέτοικοι).²²² The legal

²¹⁵ *Ibid.* III, 1, 1274b, 41.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 4, 1277a, 26-27.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1275a, 22-23.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 2, 1275b, 21-26.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1, 1275a, 6.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 2, 1275b, 34-39; cf. V, 3, 1303a, 38 f.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 5, 1277b, 33-1278b, 5; VII, 6, 1327b, 8-15; VII, 9, 1328b, 39-41.

²²² *Ibid.* III, 5, 1277b, 38-39.

status of these, however, he finds, is nowhere definitely established, for, as he observes, the rights of resident aliens differ in different places.²²³

Philo, therefore, undertakes to treat that "assembly (*ἐκκλησία*) of the Lord" or "congregation (*συναγωγή*) of the Lord" as a polity (*πολιτεία*),²²⁴ as a political state governed by a constitution embodied in the laws of Moses, and to show how the constitution of that state defines with clearness and precision as well as with fairness the status of the various classes of inhabitants.

Without any direct reference to other constitutions, he describes the status of the various classes of inhabitants under the Mosaic constitution in such a way as to be indirectly a criticism of their status under other constitutions. Under the man-made constitutions discussed by Aristotle, he would seem to argue, a citizen must have the ability not only to be ruled but also to rule, and it is because of this conception of citizenship that Aristotle demands that certain native-born inhabitants should be excluded from citizenship on account of their occupation and it is probably also because of this conception of citizenship that no definite law for the admission of aliens to citizenship is offered by him. Citizenship, according to Aristotle, could be conferred on aliens only by the good will of the people. Under the divinely ordered constitution, however, Philo would seem to say, a citizen is he who is willing to be ruled by the Law. No one born under the Law can be excluded from citizenship; no alien who is willing to accept the Law can be refused citizenship. Moreover, under the divinely ordered constitution the rights of temporary aliens and resident aliens are well defined by law.

²²³ *Ibid.*, 1, 1275a, 11 ff.

²²⁴ Cf. below, pp. 374 ff.

In the Mosaic state, as in the states dealt with by Aristotle, there are two classes of citizens. The first class consists of native-born Jews. These, says Philo, form a nation (*ἔθνος*), composed of twelve tribes (*φυλαί*), being descendants of twelve tribal ancestors (*ἡγεμόνες*), who were connected not by being merely members of the same household (*οἰκία*) or by mere kinship (*συγγένεια*) but by being all brothers (*ἀδελφοί*) having one and the same father.²²⁵ Native-born Jews are therefore described by him as fellow-nationals (*δμοθενοῖς*)²²⁶ or fellow-tribesmen (*δμόφυλοι*)²²⁷ or kinsmen (*συγγενεῖς*),²²⁸ or simply as native-born (*αὐτόχθονες*),²²⁹ which term is generally used in Scripture.²³⁰ Members of the assembly of this kind are all equal before the law: every one of them is eligible to any office and is excluded from no privilege. Wealth or birth or occupation is no barrier. Even the so-called Hebrew slave is only a hired laborer,²³¹ with all his duties and privileges of the law remaining intact. The only discrimination between native-born Jews is to be found in the laws regarding priests and bastards, but for these discriminatory laws Philo offers explanations both rational and allegorical.²³²

Members of the assembly of the second kind are described by Philo by the Septuagint term proselytes (*προσήλυτοι*), that is, those who have come over, and also by the term

²²⁵ *Praem.* 10, 57. With all these terms used by Philo, compare the Greek terms *ethnos*, *genos*, *patra*, *phratría*, and *phyle*, for groups in the city-state.

²²⁶ *Spec.* II, 17, 73; 25, 122; *Virt.* 19, 101; 20, 102; *Legat.* 31, 212; cf. also *Spec.* I, 9, 54: τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθνους τινέσ. Cf. below, pp. 359, 360, 363.

²²⁷ *Spec.* IV, 31, 159. Cf. below, p. 359.

²²⁸ *Ibid.* But see S. Zeitlin, "The Jews: Race, Nation or Religion," *Jewish Quarterly Review*, N.S., 26 (1936), pp. 333-336, who argues that the terms *δμόφυλοι* and *ἔθνος*, in their application to Jews, are always used by Philo in a religious sense. Cf. below, pp. 400-402.

²²⁹ *Ibid.* I, 9, 52, *et passim*.

²³⁰ Exod. 12: 49.

²³¹ *Spec.* II, 18, 79-85; *Virt.* 24, 121-123.

²³² *Spec.* I, 15, 79-22, 111; 60, 326-329, and *Decal.* 24, 128-130.

epelytes (ἐπηλύται), that is, those who have come in. "These Moses calls proselytes," he says, "because they have come over to the new and God-loving polity," ²³³ and the "epelytes," he says, are those who "have taken a journey to a better home, from idle fables to the clear vision of truth." ²³⁴ With the exception of certain restrictions in the case of Amonites, Moabites, Edomites, and Egyptians, ²³⁵ all aliens are accepted at once into the Mosaic polity on equal terms with the native-born Jew. Drawing upon the verse which in the Septuagint reads "the proselyte who cometh to you shall be as one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself," ²³⁶ he says, "thus, while giving equal rank to all in-comers with all the privileges which he gives to the native born, he exhorts the old nobility to honor them not only with marks of respect but with special friendship and with more than ordinary good will" ²³⁷ and "he commands all members of the nation to love the in-comers, not only as friends and kinsfolk but as themselves both in body and soul." ²³⁸

The admission of proselytes on equal terms with native-born Jews into the Jewish polity indicates, according to Philo, that the basis of that polity is not common descent but rather the common heritage of the Law which was revealed by God to the people of Israel. Even the native-born Jew is a member of that polity, in the full sense of the term membership, not only because he is a descendant of the stock that founded that polity but also, and primarily so, because he remained loyal to the Law which is the heritage of that stock. "The native-born Jews," he says, "obtain the approval of God not because they are members of the God-loving polity from birth (ἐξ ἀρχῆς) but because they were

²³³ *Spec.* I, 9, 51.

²³⁴ *Virt.* 20, 102; cf. *Spec.* IV, 34, 178.

²³⁵ Deut. 23: 4-9; cf. *Virt.* 21, 108.

²³⁶ Lev. 19: 34; cf. Deut. 10: 19.

²³⁷ *Spec.* I, 9, 52.

²³⁸ *Virt.* 20, 103.

not false to the nobility of their birth (εὐγένειαν)"; the proselytes obtain His approval "because they have thought fit to make the passage to piety." ²³⁹ It is for this reason, he says, that the latter, who have left "their country, their friends (φίλους), and their kinsfolk (συγγενεῖς) for the sake of virtue and holiness," are not to be denied "other states (πόλεις) and other households (οἰκείων) and other friends (φίλων)," for "the most effectual love-charm and the chain which binds indissolubly the good will which makes us one is to honor the one God." ²⁴⁰ These statements, while Jewish in sentiment, are couched in language in which one may discern an echo of Aristotle's statements that "friendship (φιλία) seems to hold states (πόλεις) together" ²⁴¹ and friendship may be either that of fellow-citizens (πολιτικαί) or that of kindred (συγγενικῆν), ²⁴² the former being based on a sort of compact (ὁμολογία) ²⁴³ and the latter being based upon the same blood (ταὐτὸν αἷμα) or the same stock (ὀλζαν), ²⁴⁴ but "perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good and alike in virtue." ²⁴⁵

The superiority of a kinship which is based upon a common belief to that which is based upon a common descent is repeatedly asserted by Philo in other passages. In contrast to "the so-called kinships (συγγένειαί) which have come down from our ancestors and are based on blood-relationships" the relationship based upon common belief is called by him "kinships of greater dignity and sanctity" ²⁴⁶ and it is this latter kind of kinship which, according to him, is meant when

²³⁹ *Spec.* I, 9, 51. Similarly, according to rabbinic law, an apostate Jew is not allowed to eat of the paschal lamb, whereas a proselyte is allowed to eat of it (*Pesahim* 96a; *Yebamos* 71a; *Sifre Num.*, § 71, F, p. 18b; H, p. 67).

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 52.

²⁴¹ *Eth. Nic.* VIII, 1, 1155a, 22-23.

²⁴² *Ibid.* VIII, 12, 1161b, 12-13.

²⁴⁶ *Spec.* I, 58, 317.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, 13-14.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 32.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.* VIII, 3, 1156b, 7-8.

Scripture describes all those who do what is pleasing to nature, that is, to God, as "sons of God."²⁴⁷ Such a kinship is established by one's "willingness to serve God."²⁴⁸ By the expression "to serve God" he means here, as he does elsewhere, to serve God in the manner prescribed by the Law of Moses,²⁴⁹ for, speaking of the law about resting on the Sabbath, to observe which the proselyte is explicitly commanded,²⁵⁰ Philo says "He commanded those who should live in this polity to follow God in this as in other matters."²⁵¹ The superiority of the kinship based upon the service of God to that based upon blood relationship is also asserted by him in his comment upon the verse "The proselyte who is with thee shall rise higher and higher; but thou shalt fall lower and lower."²⁵² The proselyte, he says, will be exalted "because he has come over to God of his own accord . . . while the nobly born who had falsified the sterling of his high lineage will be dragged down to the lowest depths . . . in order that all men who behold this example may be corrected by it, learning that God received gladly virtue which grows out of ignoble birth, utterly disregarding its original roots."²⁵³ It is not impossible that his use of the terms "he has come over to God of his own accord" (*αὐτομολῆσαι*)²⁵⁴ and "they have thought fit (*ἤξλωσαν*) to make the passage to piety"²⁵⁵ and that any stranger may become a proselyte "out of an excess of virtues" (*ὑπερβολαῖς ἀρετῶν*)²⁵⁶ all imply that a proselyte is he who has accepted Judaism out of pure and disinterested motives, thus corresponding to the rabbinic teaching that the "righteous" or "true"

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 318; cf. Deut. 14: 1; Wisdom of Solomon 9: 7; 12: 19, 21; 16: 10, 26; 18: 4.

²⁴⁸ Deut. 28: 43 (LXX).

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 317.

²⁵³ *Praem.* 26, 152.

²⁴⁹ Cf. above, pp. 51-52.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁰ Exod. 20: 10.

²⁵⁵ *Spec.* I, 9, 51.

²⁵¹ *Decal.* 20, 98.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.* II, 17, 73; cf. below, p. 417.

proselyte is he who embraces his new religion "for the sake of heaven" ²⁵⁷ or "for the sake of the holiness of Israel" ²⁵⁸ or "for the sake of covenant," ²⁵⁹ and without any ulterior motive.

With this conception of the Mosaic polity as being based upon a common law but within which there are two kinds of citizens, one descendants of the original founders of the polity and the other those who have joined it later, the question may be raised as to what is meant by the term "thy brother" in those laws where it is explicitly mentioned that they apply only to "thy brother." Is this term to apply only to a brother by race or also to a brother by religion? In answer to this question we shall examine the passages in which Philo happens to comment upon those laws in which the term "thy brother" is mentioned.

First, there is the law with regard to the election of a king in which it is specified that the king is to be elected from among "thy brethren" and that "thou mayest not set a stranger over thee, who is not *thy brother*." ²⁶⁰ In his discussion of this law, Philo defines the term "thy brother" as meaning "one who was their fellow-tribesman (*δμόφυλον*) and fellow-kinsman (*συγγενῆ*)," ²⁶¹ that is, a Jew by birth, adding, however, that this Jew by birth must also share "in that relationship which brings the highest kinship (*συγγένειαν*) — and that highest kinship is one citizenship (*πολιτεία*) and the same law (*νόμος*) and one God who has taken all members of

²⁵⁷ *Jer. Kiddushin* IV, 1, 65b.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁹ *Tos. 'Abodah Zarah* III, 13.

²⁶⁰ Deut. 17: 15. This, according to tradition, excludes a proselyte from kingship. A Jewish mother, however, qualifies his descendants for the office (*Midrash Tanna'im*, on Deut. 17: 15, p. 104).

²⁶¹ Both these terms here, we take it, are used in their original racial sense, as above, nn. 227–228. The passage under consideration reads literally as follows: "A fellow-tribesman and fellow-kinsman, who had a share in the relationship which makes for the highest kinship."

the nation (*ἔθnovous*) for His portion,"²⁶² that is, this Jew by birth must also be a Jew by religion. In this passage, then, Philo takes the term "thy brother" to mean both a Jew by descent and a Jew by loyalty to his religion. This is in agreement with the traditional Jewish interpretation of this law that one to be chosen as king must not only be worthy of the office by his manner of life²⁶³ but also by his descent, thus disqualifying a proselyte from the office of king.²⁶⁴ Whether Philo would extend this law, as do the rabbis, to include all other offices of magistrates and judges²⁶⁵ is not certain. In Athens a naturalized citizen was not allowed to become an archon or to hold a priesthood,²⁶⁶ the latter of which was a state office. Though, following the Septuagint, Philo calls the king *archon*, he does not include other officers under it, for he does not require their election by the people.²⁶⁷

Second, in connection with the Hebrew slave who is to be set free on the year of the jubilee or on his seventh year of service, Philo explains the terms "thy brother"²⁶⁸ and "thy brother, a Hebrew man"²⁶⁹ to mean "a fellow-tribesman" (*ὁμόφυλον*)²⁷⁰ or "of the same nation (*ἔθnovous*), perhaps also of the same tribe (*φυλέρης*) and of the same family (*δημό-της*)." ²⁷¹ All these terms imply kinship based upon descent.²⁷² The implication then is that the laws regulating

²⁶² *Spec.* IV, 31, 159; for the last part of the quotation, cf. *Post.* 25, 89-90; *Mos.* II, 35, 189.

²⁶³ Cf. above, p. 328.

²⁶⁴ Cf. above, n. 260.

²⁶⁵ *Midrash Yannaim*, *loc. cit.*; *Jer. Kiddushin* IV, 5, 66a.

²⁶⁶ Cf. P. Gardner and F. B. Jevons, *A Manual of Greek Antiquities*, 2nd ed., 1898, p. 456.

²⁶⁷ Cf. above, p. 347. But see Heinemann, *Bildung*, p. 189; Belkin, *Philo and the Oral Law*, p. 185.

²⁶⁸ *Lev.* 25: 39.

²⁶⁹ *Deut.* 15: 12.

²⁷⁰ *Spec.* II, 18, 80.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 82.

²⁷² The last two terms in this list, *φυλέρης* and *δημότης*, undoubtedly correspond respectively to the Hebrew *shebet*, tribe, and *mishpahah*, family, (cf. Num. 36: 3, 6, 12. 1: 20, 22; 2: 34) and do not refer to contemporary classifications of citizens in Alexandria (cf. Colson, *ad loc.*).

the Hebrew slave do not apply to a proselyte. This corresponds exactly to the rabbinic view, according to which a proselyte sold into slavery does not come under the laws of a Hebrew slave; the reason given is that on his release he cannot return, as the verse says, "unto his own family,"²⁷³ inasmuch as he has no family.

Third, in connection with the law about restoring lost property which in one place reads "If thou meet thy enemy's ox or his ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again,"²⁷⁴ and in another place reads, "Thou shalt not see thy brother's ox or sheep go astray, and hide thyself from them: thou shalt in any case bring them back unto *thy brother*,"²⁷⁵ Philo describes the term "thy enemy" in a rather general way, without indicating whether he takes it to refer to a Jew or to a non-Jew,²⁷⁶ and similarly in his description of the term "thy brother" he says that it refers to "one of your relations (*οικειων*) or friends (*φιλων*), or in general a person you know,"²⁷⁷ without indicating whether he takes it to refer only to a native-born Jew, or also to a proselyte, or even also to a heathen. One may reasonably assume, however, that Philo takes this law to apply not only to a proselyte but also to a heathen. In rabbinic literature a proselyte is definitely included under the term "thy brother" in this case, for the term is said to exclude only "a heathen."²⁷⁸ But even with regard to a heathen there seems to be a difference of opinion, for among the various interpretations of the term "thy enemy," there is one interpreta-

²⁷³ Lev. 25: 41; cf. *Baba Meši'a* 71a; but see opposite view in *Mekilta, Neziḳin* 1 (F, p. 75a; W, p. 81b; L, III, p. 5).

²⁷⁴ Exod. 23: 4.

²⁷⁵ Deut. 22: 1.

²⁷⁶ *Virt.* 23, 117; cf. 116.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 18, 96.

²⁷⁸ *Midraš Tannaim*, on Deut. 22: 3, p. 134; *Jer. Baba Meši'a* II, 5, 8c; *Baba Ḳamma* 113b.

tion which takes it to mean "a heathen," ²⁷⁹ thus making the laws about the restoring of lost property apply even to the property of a heathen. Moreover, even those who on strictly legal grounds exclude a heathen from the benefit of this law maintain that on higher moral grounds he is to be included within this law.²⁸⁰

Fourth, in connection with the law about the release of debts in the seventh year, Philo, commenting upon the verse "of an alien thou mayest exact what may be due to thee from him but to *thy brother* thou shalt make a release of what he oweth thee," ²⁸¹ says that "He does not allow them to exact their money from their fellow-nationals (*δμοεθνῶν*), but does permit the recovery of dues from the others," for "the condition of being an alien excludes any idea of partnership, unless indeed any alien (*τις*) out of an excess of virtues should transform that condition of being an alien (*ταύτην*) into a kinship of relationship, since it is a general truth that the [best] polity rests on virtues and laws which propound the morally beautiful." ²⁸² In this passage Philo quite evidently wishes to say that the term "thy brother" used in this law is to include a proselyte. An "alien" (*ἀλλότριος*), he argues, is not a fellow-national (*δμοεθνής*) of the Jews, and consequently Scripture excludes him explicitly from the law of the release of debts in the seventh year. But should such an alien through an excess of virtue, that is, through "the willingness to serve God" or "to follow God" in the observance of the Sabbath and the

²⁷⁹ *Mekilta, Kaspa* 2, F, p. 99a; W, 104b; HR, p. 324; L, III, p. 163. Other interpretations are that it means a proselyte who reverted to heathenism, or a Jew who became a heathen, or simply a Jew by descent and religion with whom the finder of the lost property happens to be on unfriendly terms.

²⁸⁰ *Midrash Tannaim*, on Deut. 22: 3, p. 134; *Jer. Baba Meši'a* II, 5, 8c; *Baba Ḳamma* 113b.

²⁸¹ Deut. 15: 3 (LXX).

²⁸² *Spec.* II, 17, 73.

other laws, join the "holy polity" which is based upon "one manner of life and the same law and one God," then he is brought into "the highest kinship" with the rest of the Jews and thereby becomes entitled to the benefit of this law. Similarly in the Tannaitic law, the term "thy brother" in this verse is taken to include a proselyte ²⁸³ and to exclude a resident alien (*ger toshab*).²⁸⁴

Finally, in connection with the law about not lending money on interest, Philo commenting upon the verses "thou shalt not lend upon interest to *thy brother*" ²⁸⁵ but "unto an alien thou mayest lend upon interest," ²⁸⁶ says that the term "thy brother" means "not merely a child of the same parents, but anyone who is a fellow-townsmen (*ἀστικός*) and fellow-tribesman (*δμόφυλος*)." ²⁸⁷ Now while the term "fellow-tribesman" may mean here, as it does in its original sense, a native-born Jew, the term "townsman" (*ἀστικός*) usually means in Greek the same as the term "citizen" (*πολίτης*),²⁸⁸ and consequently at least the term "fellow-townsmen," if not also the term "fellow-tribesman," is undoubtedly to be taken here as referring to a proselyte, who, as we have seen, is a member of the Jewish polity (*πολιτεία*).²⁸⁹ His statement here that the term "thy brother" includes "anyone who is a fellow-townsmen and a fellow-tribesman" means, therefore, that it includes both native-born Jews and proselytes. His inclusion of proselytes in this prohibition is further emphasized by him in his statement that "he absolutely commands those who shall be members of his holy polity to

²⁸³ *Midrash Tannaim*, on Deut. 15: 2, p. 80.

²⁸⁴ *Sifre Deut.*, § 112, F, p. 97b; HF, p. 173; cf. below, p. 362.

²⁸⁵ Deut. 23: 20.

²⁸⁶ Deut. 23: 21.

²⁸⁷ *Virt.* 14, 82.

²⁸⁸ Cf. Aristotle, *Politica* III, 7, 1279a, 34-36; Philo, *Mos.* I, 7, 35; cf. below, p. 399.

²⁸⁹ Cf. above, p. 356.

discard such methods of profit-making.”²⁹⁰ Proselytes, as we have seen, are members of the holy polity. In this latter statement, Philo tries to emphasize the fact that just as it is prohibited for a Jew to lend money on interest to a proselyte, so it is prohibited for a proselyte to lend money on interest to a Jew or to another proselyte. In rabbinic law it is similarly assumed that the proselyte is included in the law prohibiting interest, both to be exacted interest by a Jew and to exact interest from a Jew.²⁹¹

From all this it may be gathered that, with the exception of certain laws regarding king and slave, Philo, like the rabbis, took the term “thy brother” to include a proselyte.

(f) *Aliens, Resident Aliens, and Spiritual Proselytes*

Within this Mosaic polity, in which citizens are those who are “sons of God” in the sense of their willingness to serve God and to follow Him in the observance of His laws, there is also room for three other classes of people who are neither native-born Jews nor proselytes.

First, there is the alien who in the Septuagint is described by the term *ἀλλογενής* or *ἀλλότριος*, which translates the Hebrew *ben nekar* or *nokri*. He is mentioned in the legal portions of the Pentateuch as one (1) who is not allowed to eat of the passover,²⁹² (2) to whom a Jew is not allowed to sell his Jewish maidservant,²⁹³ (3) to whom anything that dies of itself is to be sold,²⁹⁴ (4) whose debt is not to be released in the seventh year,²⁹⁵ (5) who cannot be made king,²⁹⁶ and (6) to whom money may be lent on interest.²⁹⁷ Of these six laws in which the alien is specifically mentioned Philo

²⁹⁰ *Virt.* 14, 87.

²⁹¹ *Baba Mezi'a* 72a.

²⁹² *Exod.* 12: 43.

²⁹³ *Exod.* 21: 8.

²⁹⁴ *Deut.* 14: 21.

²⁹⁵ *Deut.* 15: 3.

²⁹⁶ *Deut.* 17: 15.

²⁹⁷ *Deut.* 23: 21 (20).

happens to deal with him only in his discussion of the laws about the release of debts in the seventh year²⁹⁸ and the office of king.²⁹⁹ In his discussion of the alien in connection with both these laws the assumption is that they are confessing as well as practicing heathen.

Second, there is the resident alien who in the Septuagint is called *πάροικος*. This term translates the Hebrew *toshab*, who is mentioned in the Pentateuch as one (1) who is not allowed to eat of the passover,³⁰⁰ (2) who, if he lives with a priest, is not allowed to eat of the consecrated things,³⁰¹ (3) who is to eat of the after-growth of the harvest and of the grapes of the undressed vine in the sabbatical year,³⁰² (4) who is to be helped if he is poor,³⁰³ (5) who may be bought as a slave,³⁰⁴ (6) from whom a Hebrew slave is to be redeemed,³⁰⁵ and (7) who is among those for whose benefit the six cities of refuge were to be built.³⁰⁶ In addition to these usages of the term *paroikos* as a translation of the Hebrew *toshab*, this term is used in the Septuagint also as a translation of the Hebrew term *ger*, (8) to whom anything that dies of itself is to be given.³⁰⁷ Of these eight laws about a *paroikos*, Philo happens to reproduce only one, that of the verse that "the *paroikos* of a priest, or an hired servant, shall not eat of the holy things."³⁰⁸ But in this case, he does not take the term *paroikos* in the sense of a resident alien but rather in the sense of neighbor, that is, a Jewish neighbor (*γελτων*) who happens to live with a priest.³⁰⁹ So also in rabbinic law the term *toshab* in this verse is taken to refer

²⁹⁸ *Spec.* II, 17, 73.

³⁰⁰ Exod. 12: 45.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.* IV, 30, 157-31, 158.

³⁰¹ Lev. 22: 10.

³⁰² Lev. 25: 5-6. In this verse the expression "thy settler that sojourn with thee" is taken to include a heathen (cf. *Sifra*, *Behar*, *Perek* 1, p. 106c).

³⁰³ Lev. 25: 35.

³⁰⁷ Deut. 14: 21.

³⁰⁴ Lev. 25: 45.

³⁰⁸ Lev. 22: 10.

³⁰⁵ Lev. 25: 47 ff.

³⁰⁶ Num. 35: 15.

³⁰⁹ *Spec.* I, 24, 120.

to a Jew who happens to live with a priest, or more particularly to a Hebrew slave of a priest who on the completion of his years of service has preferred to have his ear bored³¹⁰ and to remain with his master.³¹¹ None of the other laws dealing with the *paroikoi* or resident aliens is discussed by him; nor does he give any clear indication whether he considered these "resident aliens" as heathen who differed from "aliens" only by their permanence of residence among Jews, or whether he considered them as differing from "aliens" also in their religious beliefs and practices. Now in Tannaitic law, the "resident alien" (*ger toshab*), the equivalent of the *paroikos* of the Septuagint, is not a heathen but rather one who, while uncircumcised, has abandoned idolatry or, in addition to his abandonment of idolatry, is also practicing certain Jewish laws generally referred to as the Noachian laws.³¹² According to Tannaitic law, then, the "resident alien" of the Pentateuch, while not a full proselyte, was not a practicing idolater. Among later rabbis, moreover, probably as a result of this Tannaitic conception of the "resident alien" of the Pentateuch, the question was debated whether practicing idolaters were allowed at all to establish permanent residence in Palestine under Jewish rule.³¹³ While Philo does not discuss either of these two problems directly, there are three passages in his writings which may have a bearing upon them.

First, there is his reference to the non-Jewish population of Jamnia. "There is a city called Jamnia," he says, "one of the

³¹⁰ Cf. Exod. 21: 5-6.

³¹¹ *Sifra, Emor, Pereḳ* 4, p. 97a; *Yebamot* 70a.

³¹² *Aboda Zarah* 64b; cf. below, p. 373, and above, p. 185.

³¹³ Cf. Maimonides, *Sefer ha-Miṣwot*, Negative 51; *Mishneh Torah: 'Akum X*, 6, and *Rabad, ad loc.*; *Sefer Miṣwot Gadol (Semag)*, Negative 49; *Sefer ha-Hinnuk* 94; *Rashi on Gitṭin* 45a. The question turned on the meaning of the verse "They shall not dwell in thy land" (Exod. 23: 33), whether it referred only to the original seven nations or to heathens in general.

most populous cities in Judea, which is inhabited by a promiscuous multitude, the greatest number of whom are Jews; but there are also some persons of other tribes from the neighboring nations who have mischievously made their way in, who are in a manner residents (*μέτοικοι*) among the original native citizens (*αὐθιγενέσι*), and who do them a great deal of injury and cause them a great deal of trouble, as they are constantly undoing (*παραλύοντες*) some of the ancestral national customs of the Jews." Then he goes on to tell how during the reign of Caligula, "thinking that they have now an admirable opportunity for attacking them themselves, they have erected an extemporaneous altar of the most contemptible materials, having made clay into bricks, for the sole purpose of plotting against their fellow citizens; for they knew well that they would never endure to see their customs transgressed; as was indeed the case."³⁴

Now in this passage, it will be noticed, he describes the heathen population in Jamnia as being "in a manner *metoikoi*," and he complains of their being "constantly undoing some of the ancestral national customs of the Jews." We take it that Philo uses the Athenian term *metoikos* as synonymous with the Septuagint term *paroikos*,³⁵ and consequently what he means to say is that these non-Jews in Jamnia have enjoyed among the Jews the privilege of what the Septuagint calls *paroikoi*, which "in a manner" is the equivalent of what the Athenians call *metoikoi*. His complaint against them, it will be noticed, is not that they themselves do not observe Jewish customs but rather that they are constantly "undoing," that is to say, trying to destroy, Jewish customs, and that at the time of Caligula they openly joined with those who tried to force the Jews to violate their law. The inference to be drawn from this

³⁴ *Legat.* 30, 200-201.

³⁵ Cf. below, n. 317.

passage is that practicing idolaters were allowed to establish residence among Jews in Palestine and, in accordance with the prescription of the Mosaic Law, were treated as "resident aliens."

Second, there is his interpretation of the verse "thou shalt not abhor an Egyptian because thou wast a resident (*πάροικος*, Hebrew *ger*) in his land."³¹⁶ Commenting upon this verse, he says that "residents" (*μέτοικοι*)³¹⁷ in a foreign land should "pay some honor (*τινὰ τιμὴν*) to those who have accepted them."³¹⁸ The implication is that "residents in a foreign land" in general, that is, both Jews in the diaspora and non-Jews in Palestine, are legally bound to "pay some honor to those who have accepted them." Now with reference to the honor to be paid by the Jews to those who have accepted them, Philo makes it clear that he means by it prayer offered for the welfare of the government under whose rule they happen to live. Speaking of his own native city, he says that the Jews of Alexandria pay honor (*τιμὴ*) to the Augustan house by setting forth their gratefulness (*εὐχάριστον*) in the synagogues,³¹⁹ that is, by praying for it. It is quite reasonable to assume that the "some honor" which he expects of non-Jewish residents in Palestine is of a similar nature, and nothing more.

Finally, there is his interpretation of the verses "Whosoever curses god shall be guilty of sin"³²⁰ and "Thou shalt not revile the gods"³²¹ as referring generally to "the gods of the different cities who are falsely so called"³²² or to "the

³¹⁶ Deut. 23: 8 (7); cf. *Virt.* 21, 106.

³¹⁷ On the interchangeability of the terms *πάροικος* and *μέτοικος*, see M. Engers, *Klio* 18 (1923), p. 83, n. 4.

³¹⁸ *Virt.* 21, 105; cf. Jer. 29: 7.

³¹⁹ *Flac.* 7, 48-49.

³²⁰ Lev. 24: 15 (LXX).

³²¹ Exod. 22: 27 (LXX).

³²² *Mos.* II, 38, 205.

gods whom others acknowledge.”³²³ The reason given by him for this law is that, by speaking insultingly of these other gods, one might “get into the habit of treating lightly of the word ‘God’ in general.”³²⁴ Inasmuch as this Mosaic law was meant primarily for the Jews residing in Palestine, we may assume that according to Philo heathens were to be allowed by the Mosaic law to live among Jews in Palestine.

All these passages would thus seem to indicate that the “resident alien,” according to Philo’s conception of the Mosaic Law, was, unlike the rabbinic *ger toshab*, a practicing idolater who was allowed to live among Jews in Palestine under the Pentateuchal laws regarding a *toshab*.

But, besides the “alien” and the “resident alien” Philo, in one single passage, speaks of a third type of non-Jewish resident in the Mosaic polity. He calls him “proselyte,” but unlike the proselyte who has adopted all the practices and beliefs of Judaism and is a full member of the “congregation of the Lord,” this new kind of proselyte is like the *ger toshab* of the rabbis, who, while he has not undergone circumcision and has not adopted all the Jewish practices and beliefs, has renounced polytheism and idolatry and has given up certain other heathen practices. We shall refer to this kind of proselyte as the “spiritual proselyte” instead of the more common name “semi-proselyte” to which objection has been raised.³²⁵ A reference to such spiritual proselytes is found by Philo in the verses which in the Septuagint are translated “A proselyte (*ger*) shall you not wrong, neither shall you oppress him, for you were proselytes (*gerim*) in the land of Egypt”³²⁶ and “A proselyte (*ger*) shall you not op-

³²³ *Spec.* I, 9, 53. Cf. G. Allon in *Tarbiz*, 6 (1934-35), p. 30, n. 1.

³²⁴ *Mos.* II, 38, 205; cf. *Spec.* I, 9, 53; *Qu. in Exod.* II, 5.

³²⁵ Cf. Moore, *Judaism*, I, 339.

³²⁶ *Exod.* 22: 20 (21).

press, for you know the soul of a proselyte (*ger*), for you were proselytes (*gerim*) in the land of Egypt.”³²⁷ Commenting upon these verses, Philo tries to show that the term proselyte in them does not refer to a proselyte in the technical sense of the term, namely, one who is circumcised and follows all the laws. His reason for this interpretation of the term “proselyte” in these verses is its comparison to the term “proselytes” applied to the Jews in Egypt. According to Philo, the Jews, during their servitude in Egypt, did not practice circumcision,³²⁸ and consequently, he argues, the proselyte who is not to be wronged must also refer to one who has not undergone circumcision. Still, while not circumcised, the “proselyte” in question is assumed by Philo to have accepted certain principles of Judaism.³²⁹ What

³²⁷ Exod. 23: 9. Cf. Belkin, *Philo and the Oral Law*, pp. 46-48.

³²⁸ This view of Philo is based upon the Septuagint version of Joshua 5: 4, which reads: “All who had been born on the way, and all who had been formerly uncircumcised when they came out of Egypt, all these Joshua circumcised.” So also according to native Jewish tradition none but the tribe of Levi practiced circumcision while in Egypt. *Sifre Num.*, § 67, F, p. 17b; H, p. 62; *Exodus Rabbah* 19, 5; cf. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews* III, 211; VI, p. 78, n. 409; cf. also *Kimhi* on Josh. 5: 5.

³²⁹ The reasoning employed by Philo to show that the term “proselyte” in the two verses in question is to be taken in the sense of a “spiritual proselyte” because of its comparison to the Jews who were “proselytes” in Egypt is not followed out by him in his interpretation of the term “proselyte” in two other similar verses. In the verse “The proselyte who cometh to you shall be as the native-born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself” (Lev. 19: 34), the term “proselyte” is taken by him, as by the rabbis, to refer to a full proselyte (*Spec.* I, 9, 52; *Virt.* 20, 103; cf. *Sifra*, *Qedoshim*, *Perek* 8, p. 91a), though the verse concludes with the clause “for you were proselytes in the land of Egypt.” Similarly in the verse “He administereth justice to the proselyte and the orphan and the widow, and loveth the proselyte in giving him food and raiment (Deut. 10: 18), the term “proselyte” is taken by him to refer to the full proselyte (*Spec.* I, 57, 308-309; *Virt.* 20, 104), even though it is followed by the verse “Love ye therefore the proselyte, for you were proselytes in the land of Egypt” (Deut. 10: 19). Evidently in these verses he takes the term “proselyte,” which is applied to the Jews while they were in Egypt, merely in the general sense of one who is a newcomer, a stranger, and not a native. In one place the Jews in Egypt are described by him as aliens (*ἔθνοι*) (*Mos.* I, 7, 34) and in another place this term “alien” is taken by him to mean the

those principles are he does not specify. He only describes them as (a) a circumcision of "the pleasures and the desires and the other passions of the soul" and (b) "an estrangement (*ἀλλοτριωσις*) from the opinions of the worshipers of many gods, and establishing a relationship (*οικειωσις*) with those who honor the one God, the Father of the universe."³³⁰ Why such an uncircumcised gentile should be described as "proselyte" when this term in its technical sense means circumcision and the acceptance of all the laws is explained by Philo on the ground that the term "proselyte" is used here figuratively in two senses. First, as he himself has already indicated, such a gentile, while he is not circumcised in the flesh and has not fully joined the "holy polity," has "circumcised" his "pleasures" and "desires" and "other passions of the soul" and has become a stranger (*ἀλλοτριωσις*) to polytheists and a relation (*οικειωσις*) to those who believe in one God. Second, referring to "some persons," he says that they explained the figurative use of "epelyte," which to Philo means the same as "proselyte," on the ground that the term "epelytes" in its literal sense means any aliens (*ξένοι*) "who have newly arrived (*ἐπήλυδες*) in the country," even though they have not been established in it as citizens, and consequently in its figurative sense it may be applied to "aliens who have come over to the truth" of some beliefs, even though they have not become fully converted.

In connection with Philo's interpretation of the term "proselyte" in the commandment about not wronging and not oppressing a "proselyte," it is interesting to note that in native Jewish tradition this commandment is similarly taken to refer to what is called a "resident alien" (*ger toshab*),

same as the term *παροικος*, which in Deut. 23: 7, is applied to the Jews in Egypt (*Virt.* 21, 106).

³³⁰ *Qu. in Exod.* II, 2; *Fragmenta*, Richter, VI, pp. 241-242 (M. II, 677).

which is the equivalent, as we have seen, of what we have called for Philo a "spiritual proselyte." This native Jewish interpretation of the law may be inferred from the rabbinic interpretation of the verses "Thou shalt not deliver unto his master a slave that escaped from his master unto thee; he shall dwell with thee, in the midst of thee, in the place which he shall choose within one of thy gates, where it liketh him best; thou shalt not wrong him."³³¹ Commenting upon these verses, the rabbis say that the laws contained in them apply not only to a fugitive slave but also to a "resident alien" (*ger toshab*).³³² The inference to be drawn is that the last words in these verses, "thou shalt not wrong him," are taken by the rabbis, as the similar words in other verses are taken by Philo, to include a "spiritual proselyte."

Whatever the value of Philo's interpretation of the term "proselyte" in the verses in question, his reference to what we have called spiritual proselytes reflects the actual ex-

³³¹ Deut. 23: 16-17.

³³² *Sifra, Behar, Pereḥ* 7, on Lev. 25: 40, p. 109c; *Sifre Deut.*, § 259, F, p. 121a; HF, p. 282; *Midrash Tannaim*, on Deut. 23: 16, p. 149; *Gittin* 45a; *Arakin* 29a. In a homiletical interpretation of the law in question, however, the term "proselyte" is explicitly taken by the rabbis in the sense of a full proselyte. Thus, commenting upon the verses "If a proselyte sojourn with thee in your land, ye shall not do him wrong; the proselyte that sojourneth with you shall be unto you as a native-born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself, for ye were proselytes in the land of Egypt" (Lev. 19: 33-34), they say as follows: "'As a native born': just as the 'native-born' is he who has accepted the entire law, so also the 'proselyte' is he who has accepted the entire Law" (*Sifra, Kedoshim, Pereḥ* 8, p. 91a; *Megillah* 17b; *Yebamot* 46b). In another homiletical passage, commenting upon the verse "Thou shalt not wrong a proselyte" (Exod. 22: 20), the rabbis say: "Thou shalt not wrong him with words . . . Thou shalt not say to him: Yesterday thou wast worshipping Bel, bowing down [to] Nebo (cf. Isa. 46: 1) and behold swine's flesh is still between thy teeth, and now thou darest to say things against me" (*Mekilta, Neziḳin* 18, F, p. 95a; W, p. 101a; HR, p. 311; L, III, p. 137). In this passage, it is not clear whether the expression "and behold swine's flesh is still between thy teeth" should be taken literally, the reference thus being to one who is not a full proselyte, or whether it should be taken figuratively and the reference would thus be to a full proselyte. Legally, however, as we have seen, the law in question is taken by the rabbis, as it is by Philo, to apply also to a spiritual proselyte.

istence at his time of a class of gentiles who, while uncircumcised, had renounced idolatry and otherwise led a virtuous life. In the literature of a time shortly after Philo there are specific references to the existence of such spiritual proselytes in all parts of the Jewish world. They are called by the name of "God-fearers" (*οἱ φοβούμενοι* or *σεβόμενοι τὸν θεόν*),³³³ derived from a similar scriptural expression.³³⁴ A reference to such "God-fearers" occurs also in Tannaitic literature, where they are explicitly distinguished from "righteous proselytes," that is, full proselytes.³³⁵ These "God-fearers" in that Tannaitic passage, in so far as they are distinguished from the full proselyte, are probably identical with the "resident alien" who observes the seven Noachian laws, or, at least, they belong to the same class of gentiles who have adopted certain Jewish beliefs and practices. Identical with these "God-fearers" and "resident aliens" are probably also what the rabbis call "righteous gentiles" or "pious gentiles," concerning whom they say that they have a portion in the world to come.³³⁶ In the light of this application of the term "righteous" or "pious" to gentiles who have adopted a certain number of Jewish beliefs, called by the rabbis "resident aliens," who are identical with Philo's spiritual proselytes, it is not impossible that when Philo speaks of the "blameless life of pious men (*δὸςτων ἀνθρώπων*) who follow nature and her ordinances"³³⁷ and of "all who practice wisdom either in Grecian or bar-

³³³ Cf. J. Klausner, *From Jesus to Paul*, pp. 29 ff., for a general survey of the subject, with bibliography.

³³⁴ Cf., e.g., Ps. 15: 4.

³³⁵ *Mekilta, Nezikin*, 18, F, p. 95b; W, p. 101b; HR, p. 312; L, III, p. 141; *Maseket Gerim* IV, 5 (ed. Higger, p. 79). Cf. J. Klausner, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

³³⁶ *Tos. Sanhedrin* XIII, 2. Maimonides identifies the "pious of the nations" with the "resident alien" (*Mishneh Torah: Issure Bi'ah* XIV, 7; *Melakim* VIII, 10-11).

³³⁷ *Spec.* II, 12, 42.

barian lands, and live a blameless and irreproachable life,"³³⁸ the reference, in so far as it includes non-Jews, is to his spiritual proselytes. The expression "nature and its ordinances" which these "pious men" are said by him to follow, includes, as we have shown above,³³⁹ five laws which are characteristically similar to laws generally described by the rabbis as Noachian. Similarly when he includes among "the wise and just and virtuous"³⁴⁰ not only the Jewish Essenes³⁴¹ but also the seven wise men of Greece,³⁴² the Magi among the Persians,³⁴³ and the Gymnosophists in India,³⁴⁴ he would call them all spiritual proselytes. The "spiritual proselytes" of Philo are, therefore, not only those gentiles who have acknowledged the Jewish God and accepted certain Jewish laws of conduct but also those gentiles who by the power of their own reason have arrived at a philosophic conception of God and a philosophic life of virtue.

II. THE IDEAL CONSTITUTION

In Philo's delineation of the Mosaic constitution there is nothing the like of which we do not find in the constitutions of the various states analyzed and examined by Aristotle. There is a king, there are judges and magistrates and a council of elders, there are citizens, both native and naturalized, and there are aliens and resident aliens. In his analysis and description of the Mosaic constitution, however, it was not Philo's purpose to bring to the knowledge of his Greek readers a constitution which had been overlooked by Aristotle. Nor was it his purpose to show that this constitution was like all other constitutions. His purpose was to show that

³³⁸ *Ibid.*, 44.

³³⁹ Cf. above, pp. 185-187.

³⁴⁰ *Probos* 11, 72.

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 12, 75.

³⁴² *Ibid.*, 11, 73.

³⁴³ *Ibid.*, 74.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

it was unlike any of the other known constitutions; it was better than any of them; in fact, it was the ideal constitution which philosophers had been looking for.

In Greek philosophy the question is raised whether any of the existing forms of government can be characterized as the ideal form of government. Both Plato and Aristotle answer it in the negative.

Plato divides all forms of government into what he describes as right (*ὀρθή*) and not right (*οὐκ ὀρθή*),¹ the former being those which rule according to law and the latter those which rule without law. Under the former he places (1) kingship, (2) aristocracy, and (3) democracy; under the latter he places (1) tyranny, (2) oligarchy, and (3) a lawless democracy.² Still, no form of government which is based upon a fixed law, though called by him a right form of government, is according to him, in his *Statesman* and *Republic*, an ideal form of government. And the reason why he does not consider any such form of government as ideal is that no fixed law, according to him, can be perfect, complete, eternal, immutable, and operating in the interest of all the people. Plato clearly expresses this view in his statements that "law could never, by determining exactly what is noblest and most just for one and all, enjoin upon them that which is best; for the differences of men and of actions and the fact that nothing, I may say, in human life is ever at rest forbid any science whatsoever to promulgate any simple rule for everything and for all time,"³ and that "each form of government enacts the laws with a view to its own advantage, a democracy democratic laws and tyranny autocratic, and the others likewise."⁴

Aristotle similarly divides all forms of government into

¹ *Statesman* 302 B-C.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* 294 B.

⁴ *Republic* I, 338 E.

what he describes as faultless (*ἀναμάρτητος*) or right (*δρθή*) and faulty (*ἡμαρτημένη*) or perverted (*παρεκβεβηκυία*),⁵ the former being those which rule "with a view to the common interest" and the latter those which rule "with a view to the private interest."⁶ Under the former he places (1) kingship, (2) aristocracy, and (3) polity, that is, what Plato calls democracy; under the latter he places (1) tyranny, (2) oligarchy, and (3) democracy,⁷ that is, what Plato calls lawless democracy. Still, none of the right forms of government is regarded by him as an ideal form of government, and the reason for this again is ultimately to be traced to the fact that the laws in accordance with which these forms of government are supposed to rule for the common interest are imperfect laws and often they operate in the interest of only certain groups of people. Aristotle indirectly expresses this view in his statements that while laws "are rules according to which the magistrates should administer the state,"⁸ laws vary in accordance with the forms of government, and, while indeed true forms of government will of necessity have just laws,⁹ faulty forms of governments will have unjust laws, for laws are made by those who are empowered to legislate by what happens to be the constitution of the state, and therefore they cannot be more ideally just than the men themselves who constitute the ruling class in the state and make its laws.

The reason, then, why both Plato and Aristotle despaired of an ideal state is that there is no ideal law. An ideal state, therefore, according to Plato, would be one in which "the rulers are found to be truly possessed of science, not merely to seem to possess it, whether they rule by law or without law,

⁵ *Politica* III, 1, 1275b, 1-2; 7, 1279a, 24-25.

⁶ *Ibid.* III, 7, 1279a, 28-31.

⁷ *Ibid.* 1279a, 32-1279b, 10.

⁸ *Ibid.* IV, 1, 1289a, 19-20.

⁹ *Ibid.* III, 11, 1282b, 10-13.

whether their subjects are willing or unwilling . . . so long as they act in accordance with science and justice and preserve and benefit it by making it better than it was,"¹⁰ and he is looking forward to the coming of a "scientific law-maker" to establish such an ideal state.¹¹ In his *Republic* he himself sketches the constitution of such an ideal state, wherein philosophically trained guardians would rule the people in accordance with science and justice. When later in the *Laws*, he conceived of another type of state, wherein the people are to be ruled by fixed laws, that state is described by him not as the best but as the second best.¹² Similarly, Aristotle, while disagreeing with Plato's earlier view that a government without fixed laws can be the best government, provided it is ruled by wise men, and while also maintaining that the best form of government is that which is based on law, for "he who bids the law rule may be deemed to bid God and reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast,"¹³ still does not think that any government that is devised by man can be the absolutely best government, "for the best," he says, "is often unattainable,"¹⁴ and any government called best is best only "relatively to given conditions."¹⁵ And the reason for this is again that he does not believe there can be an ideal law upon which an ideal state is to be based, for "what are good laws has not yet been clearly explained"¹⁶ and the law everywhere is made and will always have to be made by men, and consequently he rightly asks, "What if the law itself be democratical or oligarchical, how will that help us out of our difficulties?"¹⁷

¹⁰ *Statesman* 293 c-d.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 295 e.

¹² *Laws* V, 739 a; 739 e; *Statesman* 297 e.

¹³ *Politica* III, 16, 1287a, 28-29.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* IV, 1, 1288b, 25.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* III, 11, 1282b, 6-7.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* III, 10, 1281a, 36-38.

Taking his cue from both Plato and Aristotle, Philo seems to argue as follows: Suppose we have a "scientific lawgiver" who is even better than the scientific lawgiver of Plato, and that that scientific lawgiver produces a law which is, as Plato says, "in accordance with science and justice," which is "noblest and just for one and all," which takes into cognizance "the differences of men and of actions" and which promulgates a "simple rule for everything and for all time."¹⁸ Suppose also that that law, unlike all the laws with which Aristotle was acquainted, was not promulgated by legislators in an established government which happened to be of a certain form, but rather by a legislator who was neither "democratic" nor "oligarchic."¹⁹ Such a law would undoubtedly be admitted by both of them to be a perfect law, and a form of government founded on the basis of such a law would also be admitted by both of them to be a perfect form of government. Now such a law, contends Philo, is the Law of Moses. Unlike the man-made constitution and laws framed by Plato which are only the second best and suitable only to certain conditions of place and time, and unlike also all the man-made laws envisaged by Aristotle which are relative to the constitution of the state, this Law of Moses is God-given and hence suitable to all conditions of place and time and is not relative to the constitution of a state. In this view of the exceptional character of the Mosaic law he must have confirmed himself by his knowledge of its internal development whereby it was possible for it to function as a living law for the Jews of his own time both in Palestine and in the various lands of the diaspora, and this despite the vast changes in the condition of the life of the people. In one place he explicitly argues for the future eternity of the Law on the ground of past experience, for in

¹⁸ Cf. above, n. 3.

¹⁹ Cf. above, n. 17.

the past, "though the nation has undergone so many changes, both to increased prosperity and the reverse, nothing, not even the smallest part of the ordinances, has been changed."²⁰ The last statement would seem to be rather strange, especially in view of the fact that his own exposition of the Mosaic laws as they were practiced at his own time shows many changes from the original form in which they are recorded in the Pentateuch. But these changes, according to Philo, came about as a result of the operation of the oral law, and, with his conception of the oral law as implicit within the written law,²¹ it was quite natural for him not to consider the many changes wrought in the Mosaic Law by means of interpretation and enactment as innovations in the Law. He rather considered them, after the rabbis, as the unfolding of the true meaning of the Law.

This argument which we have put in the mouth of Philo may be discerned in the introductory statement to his exposition of the laws of Moses. Referring to those whom he describes as thinking themselves "superior legislators," he says that those superior legislators, "having first founded and established a city in accordance with reason, have then, by framing laws, adapted to it the constitution which they thought most agreeable and suitable to the form in which they had founded it."²² The reference is primarily to Plato, but it applies also to Aristotle. When Plato wished to establish, not an ideal state, but the next best to an ideal state, he found it necessary to try his experiment in a new colony to be established on a deserted site and to have a constitution and laws prepared for the colony by a committee of ten.²³ The constitution and the laws in Plato's next best to the ideal state are thus man-made and are thus particularly

²⁰ *Mos.* II, 3, 15.

²¹ Cf. above, I, 194.

²² *Mos.* II, 9, 49.

²³ *Laws* III, 702 B ff.

devised to meet the requirements of a particular city, of a special size, built on a special site and inhabited by a special kind of population. They are not a universal constitution and universal laws suitable for all men, and for all time, and for all places. The same criticism would apply also to the relatively best state in Aristotle's *Politics*, for according to Aristotle, too, laws are always relative to constitutions²⁴ and constitutions are best only relatively to circumstances,²⁵ and, as in Plato, therefore, any system of law presupposes a special kind of state inhabited by a special kind of population.²⁶

The laws of Moses, argues Philo, are different. They are not laws framed by men for a "city made with hands"; they are laws revealed by God, "too good and too divine to be limited as it were by any circle of things on earth"; they are laws suitable for all cities within this "Great City" created by God, for they are veritable laws of nature, being "a faithful image of the constitution of the whole world."²⁷ Why were the laws of Moses promulgated "in the depths of the deserts instead of in cities?" asks Philo, and his answer is that it was for three reasons: first, because in the desert the people could be convinced through a variety of miracles that the laws were "not the inventions of a man but quite clearly the oracles of God";²⁸ second, because also these laws, not being the work of legislators in a society already established, or, at least, conceived of according to a certain form of government, but rather the revelation of God to be served as the foundation of a society as yet to be estab-

²⁴ *Politica* III, 11, 1282b, 10-11.

²⁵ *Ibid.* IV, 1, 1288a, 24-27.

²⁶ *Ibid.* VII, 4, 1325b, 35 ff. There is no ground for Colson's statement (VI, 473, note) that "Aristotle's *Politics* hardly fits the case." Philo's essential criticism, as herein presented, will apply to any ideal state conceived by philosophers.

²⁷ *Mos.* II, 9, 51.

²⁸ *Deal.* 4, 15.

lished, had to be revealed in the desert before the people organized themselves into a form of government;²⁹ third, because the people among whom this law was to be established were to start as new-born babes, free from the wrong opinions and the passions acquired by them during their life in the cities of Egypt, and therefore they had to undergo a period of purgation in the desert.³⁰ These laws, continues Philo, consist of "just principles" (τῶν δικαίων) prepared for the people from beforehand,³¹ which are complete, perfect, suitable for all men, in all places, and under all circumstances, "firm, unshaken, immovable," that "will remain for all future ages as though immortal."³² And so the law of Moses is presented by Philo as the ideal law sought after by all philosophers, to serve as the basis of a new constitution in a new state to be established by a new people in a new country.

Such a state ruled by a law revealed by God has its source of authority in God, and should therefore be described as a state ruled by God. There is in it, indeed, a king, but that king, though elected by the people, rules by virtue of his having been chosen by God.³³ God is, then, according to the Pentateuch, the real ruler; the king rules only when he is chosen by God. The same view is directly expressed in other parts of Scripture. When Gideon refused the kingdom it was because, as he said, "the Lord shall rule over you,"³⁴ and when the elders of Israel asked Samuel to give them a king, God is made to say concerning this request: "They have rejected me, that I should not be king over them."³⁵ On the basis of scriptural terminology, then, the constitution

²⁹ *Ibid.* 3, 14.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 1, 2-3, 13.

³¹ *Ibid.* 3, 14.

³² *Mos.* 11, 3, 14.

³³ Cf. above, pp. 326, 330.

³⁴ Judges 8: 23.

³⁵ I Sam. 8: 7.

of the state as outlined by Moses should be called a government by God. For such an appellation Philo could have found philosophic support in Aristotle's statement that "he who bids the law rule may be deemed to bid God and reason alone to rule."³⁶ In fact, Josephus suggests that the Mosaic constitution "may be termed a theocracy, placing all sovereignty and authority in the hands of God."³⁷ This term is indirectly suggested also by Philo when he describes the people of the tower of Babel as those who "enroll themselves as rulers and kings, making over the undestroyable rule of God (τὸ θεοῦ κράτος) to creation that passes away and perishes"³⁸ and when he also explains that as a retribution for their attempt to destroy "the eternal kingship" in the world, God has punished them with the destruction of government among them.³⁹ It is also suggested in his constant description of God as exercising "monarchical rule," as being "ruler" and "king,"⁴⁰ and especially in his description of God as the ideal king after whom the human king is to model himself.⁴¹

Philo, however, wished to describe the Mosaic form of government in terms familiar to Greek readers. But how should he describe it? Certainly it is not to be described as a tyranny or an oligarchy or a lawless democracy. It would have to be one of the three forms of government which Plato and Aristotle characterize as good, and of these three it would have to be that which is the best among them. But which is the best among the three good forms of government? There is no definite answer for that in either Plato

³⁶ *Politica* III, 16, 1287a, 28-30; cf. Quotations from Plato above.

³⁷ *Apion*. II, 16, 165.

³⁸ *Somn.* II, 43, 290.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 285-286.

⁴⁰ *Decal.* 29, 155; for more references see Leisegang, *Indices*, sub *θεός*, p. 368.

⁴¹ *Spec.* IV, 34, 176 f.

or Aristotle. Plato in one place says that "monarchy, when bound by good rules, which we call laws, is the best of all the six" forms of government enumerated by him,⁴² but in other places he says that aristocracy is the best form of government.⁴³ Similarly Aristotle maintains that monarchy and aristocracy are the two best forms of government,⁴⁴ though, under certain conditions, he considers aristocracy preferable to monarchy.⁴⁵ But then, again, even though democracy is considered by them less desirable than monarchy and aristocracy as a form of government, still both of them describe democracy by a term which is laudatory. The chief characteristic of democracy, according to both Plato and Aristotle, is equality,⁴⁶ and, concerning equality, Plato quotes what he terms "an old and true saying" that "equality produces amity"⁴⁷ and Aristotle says that "when men are equal they are contented."⁴⁸ Moreover, among the Peripatetics and Stoics there was a tendency to find the best form of government in a combination of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. The Peripatetic Dicaearchus is said to have held such a view.⁴⁹ The Stoics are reported to have maintained that the best form of government is "a mixture of democracy, kingship, and aristocracy."⁵⁰ Such also was the view of Polybius⁵¹ and Cicero.⁵² With all this in the back of his mind, Philo is trying to show that the

⁴² *Statesman* 302 E.

⁴³ *Republic* IV, 445 c; VIII, 544 E.

⁴⁴ *Politica* IV, 2, 1289a, 31-33.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* III, 15, 1286b, 3-7.

⁴⁶ *Republic* VIII, 558 c; *Politica* IV, 4, 1291b, 30-31.

⁴⁷ *Laws* VI, 757 A.

⁴⁸ *Politica* V, 7, 1307a, 18.

⁴⁹ Zeller, II, 23, p. 893, n. 1 (*Aristotle* II, p. 441, n. 5).

⁵⁰ Diogenes, VII, 131.

⁵¹ Polybius, VI, 3, 7.

⁵² Cicero, *De Re Publica* I, 29, 45.

Mosaic constitution contains the best features of all the good forms of government.

In the first place, the Mosaic form of government contains the best feature of the monarchical form of government. According to Plato, as we have seen, "monarchy, when bound by good written rules, which we call laws, is the best of all the six" ⁵³ forms of government which he has enumerated. Philo therefore tries to show that the scriptural form of government is in part a monarchy bound by good written rules. In that scriptural monarchical form of government, the duty of the monarch is not only to be law-abiding himself but also to enforce the rule of the law. The injunction that the king is to write out with his own hand the Sequel to the laws ⁵⁴ and to read it and to familiarize himself with it is all for the end "that he may have a constant and unbroken memory of ordinances, so good and profitable to all," ⁵⁵ for by knowing these laws he will follow them. ⁵⁶ "Other kings," he says, "carry rods in their hands as scepters but my scepter is the book of the Sequel to the law." ⁵⁷ It is because the king rules by law that Philo contrasts kingship with ochlocracy and oligarchy, both of which stand for lawless rule. ⁵⁸ He does not contrast it, however, with aristocracy or democracy, and this undoubtedly because he considered either of these two forms of government as compatible with kingship, for as says Aristotle, kingship according to law may be found either in an aristocracy or a democracy. ⁵⁹ And so Philo will next try to show how the monarchical form of government of the Mosaic constitution is at the same time also an aristocracy and a democracy.

⁵³ *Statesman* 302 E.

⁵⁴ Deut. 17: 18-20. By the "Sequel" Philo means the Book of Deuteronomy.

⁵⁵ *Spec.* IV, 32, 161.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 165-169.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 164.

⁵⁸ *Decal.* 29, 155; *Fug.* 2, 10.

⁵⁹ *Politica* III, 16, 1287a, 3-6.

In the second place, he therefore says, it contains also the best features of the aristocratic form of government. By definition an aristocracy is a government in which "the rulers are the best" or "they have at heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens."⁶⁰ In his contention that rulers must be men of merit and of special equipment for their task, Plato is fond of drawing upon the illustration of physicians and steersmen.⁶¹ These two kinds of illustration are also drawn upon by Aristotle.⁶² In accordance with these conceptions of aristocracy, Philo tries to show that the Mosaic government, though a monarchy in form, insists upon the rule of the best and for the best interest of the state and of the citizens. The head of the government, though a king, is to be chosen on the ground that he "has been judged worthy to fill the highest and most important office."⁶³ The king is to have as his lieutenants, "to share with him the duties of governing, giving judgment, and managing all the matters which concern the public welfare,"⁶⁴ men who are "all chosen according to their merit (*ἀριστινότην*) in good sense, ability, justice, and godliness."⁶⁵ He reproduces with great embellishment Plato's favorite example of the physician and the steersman to illustrate the wisdom of scriptural law with regard to its insistence upon merit in the appointment of kings and magistrates.⁶⁶ The king together

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* III, 7, 1279a, 35-37.

⁶¹ Cf. *Statesman* 293 A; 295 B; 296 B; 297 E; *Laws* XII, 963 A; *Gorgias* 464 B ff.; *Republic* VI, 488 A.

⁶² *Politica* III, 6, 1279a, 3-5; 11, 1281b, 38-1282a, 7; 1282a, 10; VII, 2, 1324b, 29-31.

⁶³ *Spec.* IV, 33, 170.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 29, 153-156; *Jos.* 12, 63. It is in this sense that Philo also says that "it is advantageous to submit to one's betters" (*Fragmenta*, Richter, VI, 207; M, II, 652).

with the magistrates appointed by him is to manage everything which is for the "common advantage" (κοινωφελής)⁶⁷ of all the citizens, not only of those who are "distinguished" or "rich" or are "men in high office" but also of "the commoner or the poor or the obscure,"⁶⁸ for the commands of the Law are "good and profitable to all."⁶⁹

In the third place, the Mosaic form of government contains also the best features of democracy. Now both Plato and Aristotle, as we have seen, identify democracy with equality⁷⁰ and both of them speak highly in praise of equality,⁷¹ and yet both of them repudiate democracy as an undesirable form of government. What is wrong then with democracy? The answer which they both give is that equality in democracy is not always the right kind of equality. Equality (ισότης), they say, may be either numerical or proportional.⁷² The former means the distribution of things equally among all men irrespective of merit, that is, all men by virtue of their being citizens have a right to vote and to determine policies of state, and are entitled also to hold any kind of office to administer affairs of the state; the latter means the distribution of things among all men according to their individual merits, that is, no man is to be excluded from voting or from holding office if he has the proper technical qualifications for the performance of his duties. Now, in democracy, they argue, the equality on which it is based often

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 33, 170.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 172.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 32, 161.

⁷⁰ Cf. above, n. 46.

⁷¹ Cf. above, nn. 47, 48.

⁷² Plato, (1) *Laws* VI, 757 B-C; (2) V, 744 C; (3) *Gorgias* 508 A-B; Aristotle, (4) *Politica* V, 1, 1301b, 29-1302a, 8; (5) *Eth. Nic.* V, 3, 1131a, 29-32; (6) VIII, 7, 1158b, 29-36.

Terms for numerical equality are: ἀριθμῶ (1, 4); κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἀριθμητικὴν (5); μέτρον (1); σταθμῶ (1); πλῆθει (4); μεγέθει (4); κατὰ ποσόν (6).

Terms for proportional equality are: κατὰ λόγον (1); λόγῳ (4); ἀνίσω ξυμμέτρον (2); γεωμετρικὴ (3); κατ' ἀναλογίαν γεωμετρικὴν (5); κατ' ἄξιαν (4, 6).

degenerates into numerical equality and, when that happens, then the democracy becomes what Aristotle describes as a form of government "in which, not law, but the multitude (*πληθος*), have the supreme power, and supersede the law by their decrees."⁷³ This lawless sort of democracy, Aristotle says further, "becomes despotic" and "is relatively to other democracies what tyranny is to other forms of monarchy."⁷⁴ In such a democracy there is disorder (*ἀταξία*) and anarchy (*ἀναρχία*), which ultimately lead to revolution and ruin.⁷⁵

With all this in the back of his mind, Philo tries to show, on the one hand, how numerical equality is denounced in Scripture, how it is really inequality and not better than oligarchy and tyranny and despotism, and how it is disorder, anarchy, and lawlessness; but, on the other hand, how proportional equality is true democracy which makes for harmony, order, and stability, and how such true democracy is embodied in the Mosaic constitution.

The denunciation of numerical equality is found by him in two places in Scripture.

First, alluding to the verse, "Take heed to thyself that thou be not snared by following them . . . saying, How did these nations serve their gods? even so will I do likewise,"⁷⁶ he says: "Some people suppose that what the many think right is lawful and just, though it be the height of lawlessness; but they do not judge well, for it is good to follow nature, and the headlong course of the multitude runs counter to what nature's leading would have us do."⁷⁷

⁷³ *Politica* IV, 4, 1292a, 4-6.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 15-18.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* V, 3, 1302b, 27-30; VI, 4, 1319b, 14-17; cf. *Republic* VIII, 557 E-558 C; 562 B-E.

⁷⁶ Deut. 12: 30.

⁷⁷ *Spec.* IV, 8, 46. I take Sections 45-47 to allude to Deut. 12: 30, for the Sections immediately following, 48-50, quite evidently refer to Deut. 13: 2-6.

Second, drawing upon the story of the uprising of Korah against Moses,⁷⁸ he says that at the root of the uprising was the issue whether the few who are qualified by merit should rule, or whether the rule should be entrusted to the many irrespective of their qualification. The lower temple attendants, under the leadership of Korah, says Philo, "puffed with pride over their own numerical superiority over the priests, despised their fewness, and combined in the same deed two trespasses, by attempting on the one hand to bring low the superior, on the other to exalt the inferior," thereby overthrowing "that most excellent promoter of the common weal, order."⁷⁹

Then taking numerical equality, which Aristotle describes as a form of democracy "in which, not the law, but the multitude, have the supreme power,"⁸⁰ he describes it as ochlocracy,⁸¹ characterizing the latter as "the counterfeit of democracy."⁸² Like Aristotle, who says that in a democracy based upon numerical equality the multitude "supersede the law by their decrees"⁸³ and that in such a democracy there is "disorder" (*ἀταξία*) and "anarchy" (*ἀναρχία*), which ultimately lead to "sedition" (*στράσις*),⁸⁴ he says that in ochlocracy "lawlessness" is paramount,⁸⁵ that "disorder" (*ἀταξία*) prevails in existing things as a result of ochlocracy,⁸⁶ that "anarchy" (*ἀναρχία*) is the mother of ochlocracy,⁸⁷ and that through being infected with ochlocracy "we

⁷⁸ Num. 16: 1 ff.

⁷⁹ Mos. II, 50, 277.

⁸⁰ *Politica* IV, 4, 1292a, 4-6.

⁸¹ The use of the term "ochlocracy" as a description of lawless democracy occurs in Polybius, VI, 4, 6, and 10; VI, 57, 9.

⁸² *Agr.* 11, 45; cf. *Conf.* 13, 108.

⁸³ *Politica* IV, 4, 1292a, 6-7.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* V, 3, 1302b, 27-30; cf. VI, 4, 1319b, 14-17; *Republic* VIII, 557 B-558 c; 562 B-E.

⁸⁵ *Conf.* 23, 108.

⁸⁶ *Fug.* 2, 10.

⁸⁷ *Agr.* 11, 46.

pass our lives forever amid tumults, and commotions, and intestine seditions (*ἐμφυλίοις στάσεσιν*).”⁸⁸ Again, like Aristotle, who says that this sort of lawless democracy “is relatively to other democracies what tyranny is to other forms of monarchy”⁸⁹ and compares it also to that one of the three forms of oligarchy which is lawless,⁹⁰ Philo also adds tyranny to ochlocracy as another form of lawless government⁹¹ and brackets “oligarchy and ochlocracy” as two “mischievous forms of government, which arise among the vilest of men, produced by disorder and covetousness.”⁹² Finally, like Aristotle, who tries to show that democracy which is based upon numerical equality is a perversion of “proportionate equality” and “justice,”⁹³ Philo says that ochlocracy “admires inequality.”⁹⁴ It is in this sense of numerical equality that Philo says that “to give equal things to unequal people is an action of great injustice.”⁹⁵

In contradistinction to all these evils of numerical equality, when made a principle of government, is proportional equality. Speaking for himself as well as for Plato, Aristotle says, “the only stable principle of government is equality according to proportion, and for every man to enjoy his own”⁹⁶ and this stable principle of government, as may be gathered from his discussion, is not confined to any particular form of government; it may be found in any form of government, especially in those forms of government which he calls constitutional governments (*πολιτεῖαι*) and which he describes as inclining more to the side of the “multitude” (*πληθος*)⁹⁷ and to “democracy” (*δημος*).⁹⁸ Indirectly thus

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁸⁹ *Politica* IV, 4, 1292a, 17-18.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1292b, 7-9.

⁹¹ *Agr.* 11, 46.

⁹² *Decal.* 29, 155.

⁹³ *Politica* V, 1, 1301a, 25 ff.

⁹⁴ *Conf.* 23, 108.

⁹⁵ *Fragmenta*, Richter, VI, 206 (M, II, 651).

⁹⁶ *Politica* V, 7, 1307a, 26-27.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 21-22.

Aristotle suggests that proportional equality is to be described as a tendency to democracy, even if it is not to be described by the term democracy itself.⁹⁹ Such proportional equality, according to Aristotle, constitutes justice, for, as he says, "all men think justice to be a sort of equality"¹⁰⁰ and "proportional equality"¹⁰¹ at that. But to be just means also to act in accordance with law.¹⁰² Consequently, democracy means to Aristotle not only equality but also a government of law.

With all these statements on proportional equality in the back of his mind, namely, that it is the only stable principle of government, that it is to be found especially in those forms of government which incline more to the side of democracy and that it is the basis of justice and of law, Philo designates it by the simple term democracy, contrasting it with numerical equality which he calls ochlocracy. The term democracy is thus not used by him in the sense of any particular form of government; it is rather used by him in the sense of that general principle of justice according to which each man enjoys that which is justly due to him under any form of law-abiding government, be it monarchic or aristocratic or democratic. This use of the term democracy as meaning a certain principle of government rather than any particular form of government seems to have been common at the time of Philo. Thus Dio Cassius quotes Maecenas to the effect that the change by Augustus of the Roman form of government into what is "strictly speaking" a monarchy¹⁰³ will result in that "all will gain the true democracy and freedom which does not fail."¹⁰⁴ To the

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* V, 1, 1301a, 28-30.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* III, 12, 1282b, 18.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* V, 1, 1301a, 27; 1301b, 35-36; *Eth. Nic.* VIII, 7, 1158b, 30-31.

¹⁰² *Eth. Nic.* V, 1, 1129b, 11 ff.

¹⁰³ Dio Cassius, LII, 1, 1.

¹⁰⁴ *Idem*, LII, 14, 4; cf. Goodenough, *The Politics of Philo Judaeus*, p. 88, nn. 11, 12. For various explanations of why Philo calls the Mosaic state democracy, see

mind of Philo, associated as democracy was with the principle of proportional equality, democracy meant, as proportional equality did to Aristotle, the principle of justice. Quoting therefore in the name of "the masters of natural philosophy," that is, the Pythagoreans, that "the mother of justice is equality,"¹⁰⁵ he elaborates this statement, evidently on the basis of statements culled from Plato, to show how proportional equality, democracy, and justice all mean the same. Says Plato: "It is of the nature of proportion (*ἀναλογία*) to accomplish this [unity] most perfectly";¹⁰⁶ "justice imparts harmony and friendship";¹⁰⁷ "heaven and earth and gods are held together by communion and friendship, by orderliness, temperance, and justice; and it is this reason, my friend, why they call the whole of this world by the name of cosmos";¹⁰⁸ without justice "states cannot be";¹⁰⁹ "what health and disease are in the body justice and injustice are in the soul";¹¹⁰ virtue is a harmony of the soul.¹¹¹ With all these Platonic statements in his mind, and in addition to this his general use of the term democracy in the sense of proportional equality, he says that "all that keeps its due order is the work of equality, which in the universe as a whole is most properly called the cosmos, and in cities is democracy, the best legally regulated and most excellent of constitutions, in bodies is health and in souls virtuous conduct."¹¹² The term democracy, in this passage, described by him as "the best legally regulated and most

F. Geiger, *Philon von Alexandria als sozialer Denker*, 1932, pp. 52-57; E. Langstadt, "Zu Philos Begriff der Demokratie," *Occident und Orient . . . [Moses] Gaster Anniversary Volume*, 1936, pp. 349-364; Goodenough, *op. cit.*, 1938, pp. 86-90; Colson, 1939, VIII, 437-439.

¹⁰⁵ *Spec.* IV, 42, 231. Cf. Heinemann (*Philos Werke*) and Colson, *ad loc.*

¹⁰⁶ *Timaeus* 31 c.

¹⁰⁷ *Republic* I, 351 d.

¹⁰⁸ *Gorgias* 508 a.

¹⁰⁹ *Protagoras* 323 a.

¹¹⁰ *Republic* IV, 444 c.

¹¹¹ *Phaedo* 93 e.

¹¹² *Spec.* IV, 42, 237.

excellent of constitutions," is, as we have seen, not used in the sense of a particular form of government which is opposed to that of monarchy or aristocracy, but rather in the sense of any form of government which is based upon just laws and in which all men are equal before the law, for, as he has said, it is equality of this kind that keeps things in due order. Descriptions of proportional equality as making for peace and harmony and order are also to be found in his statements that "equality of measurement (*ισόμετρον*) is the cause of the most perfect blessings," that "equality is free from all annoyances and contributes to unite men for advantageous ends," and that "obedience to the law and equality are the seeds of peace and the causes of safety and continued durability."¹³

It is equality in this sense, the equality of proportion, which means, as Aristotle says, "for every man to enjoy his own,"¹⁴ and which he himself refers to as democracy, that Philo finds embodied in the Mosaic constitution. That constitution, as he has already shown, is a mixture of monarchy and aristocracy: at the head of the state is a king, who is elected to the throne or inherits it, but only on the basis of merit; judges and officers are appointed by the king, but again only on the basis of merit; the law is fixed and it changes only by the interpretation of competent authorities and not by the vote of the multitude. Still this constitution has also an ingredient of democracy in it, not democracy in the perverted sense of a government "in which the multitude and not the law has supreme power,"¹⁵ but rather democracy in the true sense of the term, in the sense of a government based upon law and upon the principle of proportional equality, wherein each man gets what he de-

¹³ *Fragmenta*, Richter, VI, 226 (M, II, 665).

¹⁴ Cf. above, n. 96.

¹⁵ *Politica* IV, 4, 1292a, 5-6.

serves. "According to the law of such a democracy," says Aristotle, "equality implies that the poor are to have no more advantages than the rich."¹¹⁶ Philo similarly says that the Law, in its insistence upon justice, by which is meant equality, despite its many injunctions to show pity and kindness to the poor, explicitly admonishes "not to show pity to the poor man in giving judgment."¹¹⁷ "Our law," he says again, "exhorts to equality when it ordains that the penalties inflicted on offenders should correspond to their actions."¹¹⁸ The principle of equality of proportion is found by him also in the verse in which three different kinds of repentance are prescribed for the sinner.¹¹⁹ His comment thereon is that "small offenses do not require great purifications, nor are small purifications fit for great offenses, but they should be equal and similar and in due proportion."¹²⁰ He also finds the same principle in the verse in which the king is enjoined to copy and read and memorize the Law in order "that his heart be not lifted up above his brethren."¹²¹ His restatement of this verse is as follows: "And if I always keep the holy laws for my staff and support I shall win . . . the spirit of equality, and no greater good can be found than this."¹²² So also in the Letter of Aristeas one of the elders counsels the king that in governing his subjects he should punish those who deserve punishment "in accordance with their deserts"¹²³ and maintain "a just bearing towards all"¹²⁴ and be "equally fair (*ἰσος*) in speech to all"¹²⁵ — in other words, he should act in accordance with what Philo calls the spirit of equality.

The Mosaic polity thus embodies within itself all the best

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1291b, 31-33.

¹¹⁷ *Spec.* IV, 13, 72; cf. *Exod.* 23: 3.

¹¹⁸ *Spec.* III, 33, 182.

¹¹⁹ *Lev.* 5: 7-11.

¹²⁰ *Mut.* 41, 235.

¹²¹ *Deut.* 17: 20.

¹²² *Spec.* IV, 32, 165.

¹²³ Aristeas, 188.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 189.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 191.

elements of the various good forms of government that could be devised by philosophers. Moreover, like any good state which, according to the philosophers, is not to exist for the sake of mere companionship¹²⁶ or for the sake of merely supplying the necessaries of life¹²⁷ but rather for the sake of the highest good,¹²⁸ of virtue,¹²⁹ of noble actions,¹³⁰ of the most eligible life,¹³¹ and of the best life possible,¹³² the Mosaic state exists for the purpose of establishing a life in accordance with the Law, which to Philo is identical with life in accordance with virtue and the best life. But inasmuch as the Law of Moses, as distinguished from the laws devised by the various legislators and philosophers, is God-given, it is the ideal law, for it implants the highest virtues and leads to the best kind of life, and therefore the Mosaic state based upon that law is the ideal state. In contradistinction to every other form of government which he describes by the general name of the "human polity" (*ἀνθρωπίνῃ πολιτεία*),¹³³ he describes the Mosaic state as the holy polity (*ιερά πολιτεία*),¹³⁴ the God-loving polity (*φιλόθεος πολιτεία*),¹³⁵ the best polity (*ἀρίστη πολιτεία*),¹³⁶ and the irreproachable polity (*πολιτεία ἀνεπλήπτως*);¹³⁷ or, drawing upon the scriptural expressions the "ecclesia or church (*ἐκκλησία*) of the Lord"¹³⁸ and "congregation or synagogue (*συναγωγή*) of the Lord,"¹³⁹ he calls it "divine ecclesia (*ἐκκλησία*) and congregation (*σύλλογος*)"¹⁴⁰ or "holy congregation and ec-

¹²⁶ *Politica* III, 9, 1281a, 3-4.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.* IV, 4, 1291a, 17-18.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* I, 1, 1252a, 3-6.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.* III, 9, 1280b, 6-7.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 1281a, 2-3.

¹³¹ *Ibid.* VII, 1, 1323a, 15-16.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 4, 24; cf. Wisdom of Solomon 10: 15: "a holy people and a blameless (*ἀμειπτον*) seed."

¹³³ Deut. 23: 2-4.

¹³⁴ Num. 7: 17.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.* VII, 8, 1328a, 36-37.

¹³⁶ *Somn.* I, 38, 219.

¹³⁷ *Spec.* IV, 9, 55, *et passim*.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.* I, 9, 51.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.* III, 30, 167.

¹⁴⁰ *Leg. All.* III, 25, 81.

clesia" ¹⁴¹ or "holy congregation." ¹⁴² What he means by ecclesia is explained by him in the statement that Scripture "called them no longer multitude (*multitudinem*) or nation (*gentem*) or people (*populum*) but ecclesia (*ecclesiam*)," and this because they were united not only "in body" (*corpore*) but also "in mind" (*mente*).¹⁴³ In contrast with man-made political constitutions which may be at variance with truth,¹⁴⁴ the divinely revealed constitution of the Mosaic state is described by him as "a polity which is eager for the truth" ¹⁴⁵ or "a polity which is full of true life and vitality." ¹⁴⁶ Finally, this "divine ecclesia" was established on earth, "because God wished to send down from heaven to earth an image of His divine virtue, out of His compassion for our race, that it might not be destitute of a more excellent portion, and that He might thus wash off the pollutions which defile our miserable existence, so full of dishonor." ¹⁴⁷

III. THE MESSIANIC AGE

Such, then, is Philo's conception of the ideal state. It is a state in which every individual has his primary allegiance to God and to the Law revealed by God. Whatever human authority exists in it, such as the king in governing the relations of man to man and the high priest in presiding over the temple and governing the relations of man to God, that authority is derived from the Law and functions only as an instrument in the application of the Law or in the interpretation of the Law. This ideal polity was to exist in Palestine and the temple was to exist only in Jerusalem, for, loyal to the Deuteronomic law, Philo adhered to the principle of

¹⁴¹ *Somn.* II, 27, 184; cf. *Immut.* 24, 111.

¹⁴² *Spec.* I, 60, 325; 63, 344.

¹⁴³ *Qu. in Exod.* I, 10.

¹⁴⁷ *Fragmenta*, Richter, VI, 231 (M, II, 669).

¹⁴⁴ *Deter.* 3, 7; 9, 28.

¹⁴⁵ *Spec.* III, 33, 181.

¹⁴⁶ *Virt.* 39, 219.

the centralization of sacrificial worship, and even tried to explain rationally why there should be only one temple.¹ No mention is made by him of the temple which existed in Egypt at Leontopolis. When urged by a desire to worship God by means of sacrifices as prescribed by the Law, he made a pilgrimage to the Temple in Jerusalem.²

But Philo could not help feeling that the reality of the Jewish polity in Palestine in his own time fell short of the ideal pattern as described by Moses. There were still there the external trappings of a state. There was a king, there was a high priest, there were judges and magistrates, and there were also elders sitting in council. But the founder of the then reigning dynasty, Herod, had not come into power through an election by "the whole multitude" and certainly God did not "set His seal to ratify" him, and, though Agrippa I is presented by him sympathetically as a devoted Jew,³ the succession of Herod's rule to his children was certainly not because they were worthy of it. Nor were the high priests under the Herodian dynasty always elected for their superior virtue. There were indeed native-born Jews and proselytes and aliens and resident aliens in that Jewish polity in Palestine. But often these aliens were in control of historically Jewish cities, acted as masters of them, and treated the Jews as aliens, sometimes even denying them the hospitality due to aliens. During his own time, under Caligula, the non-Jewish settlers in Jamnia openly outraged the religious feelings of their Jewish hosts.⁴

Then there was the diaspora. By the time of Philo the Jewish polity transcended the boundaries of Palestine. Jew-

¹ *Spec.* I, 12, 67. Cf. Deut. 12: 5-7, 11-14, 17-18.

² *Provid.* 2, 64 (Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VIII, 14, 398b; *Fragmenta*, Richter VI, 200; M. II, 646); Aucher, II, 107.

³ *Legat.* 35, 261-42, 333.

⁴ *Ibid.* 30, 200-201.

ish polities, governed by the laws of Moses, as much as it was possible for these laws to be practiced outside of Palestine, existed throughout the Roman-Hellenistic world as well as throughout the Parthian world. How Philo looked upon these widespread Jewish polities in their relation to the Palestinian polity may be gathered indirectly from scattered passages in his writings.

The Jews in the diaspora are described by him as colonies (*ἀποικίαι*) of the Jewish population in Judea, and these colonial Jews, he says, while "holding the Holy City where stands the sacred Temple of the most high God to be their mother city (*μητρὸς πόλις*)," still account each city in which they have been born and brought up as their native city (*πατρὶς*),⁵ just as Jerusalem is the native city (*πατρὶς*) of the Jews born therein.⁶ The Jews of Palestine and of all these colonies constitute to him one whole nation (*ἅπαν ἔθνος*), of which the Jews in each locality are a part (*μέρος*).⁷ That whole nation of the Jews forms a polity which, in comparison with the local polities of each individual Jewish locality, is described by him as the more universal polity (*ἡ καθολικωτέρα πολιτεία*), which bears the general name of the nation (*τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ ἔθνους ὄνομα*), that is, the name Israel, and which depends for its existence upon the existence of the Temple.⁸

In Alexandria the Jews are said by him to have a polity

⁵ *Flac.* 7, 46; *Legat.* 36, 281.

⁶ *Legat.* 36, 278, and 281.

⁷ *Ibid.* 29, 184.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 194. That by this "general name of the nation" he refers to the name of Israel may be gathered from the full statement that in the destruction of the Temple Caligula "will also order the general name of the whole nation to be blotted out (*συναφανισθῆναι*)." This undoubtedly reflects such scriptural expressions as "Thou wilt not blot out (*ἀφανιεῖς*) my name" (I Sam. 24: 22) and "he will surname himself by the name of Israel" (Isa. 44: 5) and "who are called by the name of Israel" (Isa. 48: 1), and especially the verse "And the Lord said not that he would blot out (*ἐξαλείψαι*) the name of Israel" (II Kings 14: 27) in which, however, the Septuagint has "seed" (*σπέρμα*) for "name."

(πολιτεία),⁹ which, from his description of it, entitles them to the pursuit of “ancestral customs and the enjoyment of political rights.”¹⁰ The term “ancestral customs” quite clearly describes the Jewish *politeia* in Alexandria as a religious organization. The second term, “the enjoyment of political rights,” is not so clear, but it is quite certain, on the evidence of the Claudine letter to the Alexandrines, that the Jews were not full citizens of Alexandria.¹¹ When Philo, therefore, speaks of the Jews of Alexandria as well as of other Hellenistic cities as citizens (πολίται),¹² he does not mean that they were full citizens; he uses that term only in the sense of their being members of the Jewish *politeia*. Accordingly, Philo describes the Alexandrian Jews in their relation to each other as “their own fellow-citizens” (τῶν ἰδίων πολιτῶν), whereas Alexandrian gentiles in relation to Alexandrian Jews are described as belonging to a different tribe (ἀλλόφυλοι),¹³ and are contrasted with “us”, and “our people” as “them” and “Alexandrians.”¹⁴ Still, being residents of Alexandria, the Jews there are described by him as “Alexandrians” (Ἀλεξανδρεῖς).¹⁵

This conception of the Jews in Alexandria as “citizens” of the Jewish *politeia* but not of the city of Alexandria itself is expressed by him in a statement which evidently refers to conditions in Alexandria at his own time. In that state-

⁹ *Flac.* 8, 53; *Legat.* 44, 349; 45, 363.

¹⁰ *Flac.* 8, 53.

¹¹ H. I. Bell, *Jews and Christians in Egypt* (1924), pp. 23-29; cf. pp. 11-13 for a summary of earlier views on the problem; cf. also M. Radin, *The Jews among the Greeks and Romans* (1915), pp. 109-110; A. Tscherikower, *Ha-Yehudim we-ha-Yevanim ba-Teḥufah ha-Hellenistit* (1930), pp. 314-339.

¹² *Flac.* 7, 47.

¹³ *Legat.* 31, 211. The term “tribe” here may perhaps also have the additional reference to the “tribes” into which full citizens of Alexandria were enrolled (cf. above, p. 360, n. 272).

¹⁴ *Flac.* 6, 43; 10, 78-79.

¹⁵ *Legat.* 29, 194.

ment he pleads on behalf of strangers in the following words: "For strangers (ξένοι), in my judgment, must be regarded as suppliants of those who receive them, and not only suppliants but settlers (μέτοικοι) and friends, eagerly seeking equality of privilege with burgesses (ἀστῶν) and already being near in status to citizens (πολίταις), differing but little from natives (αὐτοχθόνων)." ¹⁶

In this passage, it will be noticed, Philo contends that "strangers" are to be regarded as "settlers" and the condition of the latter is described by him in its relation to that of three other classes of the population, namely, "burgesses," "citizens," and "natives." Now the term "burgesses" is technically applied to the most privileged class of the Alexandrian population, the Greeks, for Alexandria, like Athens, strictly speaking, was a town or burg (ἄστυ) and the privileged Greeks there, again strictly speaking, were burgesses,¹⁷ though they are also called citizens (πολίται). The term "natives" refers to the native Egyptians, known as the λαοί, whom Strabo and Josephus call ἐπιχώριοι.¹⁸ The term "citizens" which in this passage stands between "burgesses" and "natives," is used by Philo, as we have already seen, as a description of the Jews of Alexandria. Thus the Jews in Alexandria were not included among the "burgesses." His description of "settlers" as "eagerly seeking equality of privilege with burgesses" implies that there was an opportunity for them of becoming "burgesses" and that they were availing themselves of that opportunity. From the Claudius letter to the Alexandrines we gather that settlers had the

¹⁶ *Mos.* I, 7, 35.

¹⁷ H. S. Jones, "Claudius and the Jewish Question in Alexandria," *The Journal of Roman Studies*, 16 (1926), p. 28. For a more precise definition of this term see E. Bickermann, "A propos des ἀστοί dans l'Égypte Gréco-Romaine," *Recue de Philologie*, 3e Série, 1 (1927), pp. 362-368.

¹⁸ Strabo, XVII, 1, 12; Josephus, *Bell. Jud.* II, 17, 7, 487.

opportunity of becoming burgesses, or, as he would say, of becoming Alexandrian citizens, by joining the *ephebi* and that during his reign many have availed themselves of that opportunity.¹⁹ His description of settlers as "differing but little from natives" undoubtedly refers to the fact that both of them were subject to the payment of a poll tax,²⁰ from which "burgesses" and Jewish "citizens" were exempt.²¹ His description of settlers as "already being near in status to citizens" probably means that settlers enjoy the privileges of religious autonomy like those enjoyed by Jews.²²

From all this it may be gathered that the unity of all the scattered Jews rested, according to Philo, on two facts: first, their common racial origin, on which account he describes them by the term "nation" (*ἔθνος*);²³ second, their common religion, on which account he describes them as a "universal polity" or a "divine ecclesia,"²⁴ that is to say, a number of individual communities, geographically and politically dispersed, but united by a common law, a common form of organized life and a common way of living. Inasmuch, however, as at the time of Philo there was no group of racial Jews who did not confess Judaism, and inasmuch also as the prose-

¹⁹ Cf. Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 24, ll. 53-57; p. 28 (9); Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 28. No special term is used by Claudius as a description of those settlers whom he confirmed as citizens because of their having joined the *ephebi*. But we take it that it is settlers of the same kind that Philo means by his *metoikoi*. On Philo's use of the term *metoikoi*, see above, pp. 367, 368.

²⁰ There is no explicit statement that those settlers whom Philo describes as *metoikoi* were subject to poll-tax, but from the list of those who were exempt from such a tax it may be inferred that all "settlers" who were not "citizens" had to pay it. Cf. L. Mitteis und U. Wilcken, *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde*, I, 1, pp. 57 and 189; Laum, *Λαογραφία*, Pauly-Wissowa, 23, col. 733, ll. 54-65; S. L. Wallace, *Taxation in Egypt from Augustus to Diocletian* (1938), pp. 116 ff.

²¹ Cf. Tschirikower, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

²² Cf. H. A. Wolfson, "Philo on Jewish Citizenship in Alexandria," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 63 (1944), pp. 165-168.

²³ Cf. above, p. 355.

²⁴ Cf. above, pp. 394-395.

lytes at that time were as a rule absorbed individually in the Jewish community and did not constitute a distinct group of Jews by religion only, the term "nation," and similarly the terms designating subdivisions of a nation, such, for instance, as "tribe" (φυλή), came to have also a religious connotation, expressed by him in his description of proselytes as being related to Jews by "kinships of greater dignity and sanctity" than kinships of blood and in his interpretation of the scriptural term "sons of God" as applying also to proselytes.²⁵ In this conception of Jews as constituting a nation which transcends race and local citizenship, Philo thus formulates a new conception of nationality, one expressed not in terms of race or territory or political government, but rather in terms of religion or culture. Native-born Jews constituted a nation in both these senses; proselytes were part of the Jewish nation in the second sense, which to Philo was the more important sense. Palestine, symbolized by its capital city Jerusalem, was looked upon as the mother country of all the Jews, and this because it was the home

²⁵ *Spec.* I, 58, 317-318; cf. above, p. 357, nn. 246, 247; p. 363, nn. 288, 289; cf. also above, p. 364, Philo's interpretation of the scriptural term "thy brother."

With regard to the term "Israel," which he considers as "the general name of the nation" (cf. above, p. 397), it may be assumed that in his allegorical interpretation of it as meaning "the race endowed with vision" (τὸ δραστικὸν γένος) (*Immut.* 30, 144), he applies it also to proselytes. But when he singles out Israel as the people especially favored by God with the highest grade of prophecy, namely, prophecy by the voice of God, such as manifested itself on Mount Sinai (*Mos.* II, 35, 189), he would seem to exclude proselytes. Cf. above, pp. 51-52.

Corresponding to the change in the term Israel or Jew from a racial to a spiritual conception in Philo as well as in Judaism in general is a similar change in the term Hellene among the Greeks (cf. J. Jüthner, *Hellenen und Barbaren*, 1923, pp. 34 ff.; Heinemann, *Bildung*, pp. 567 f). Expression to the change of conception among the Greeks is given by Isocrates in his statement that "Athens has brought about that the name Hellenes suggests no longer a race but an intelligence, and that the title Hellenes is applied rather to those who share our culture than to those who share a common blood" (*Panegyricus* 50). So also Aristotle is reported to have said of the Jew he had met that "he was Hellenic not only in speech but also in soul" (*Apion.* I, 22, 180).

from which the various Jewish colonies in diaspora had originally migrated and because it had the Temple which was the recognized center of Jewish religious worship and also because it was the place to which they hoped to return ultimately, when the looked-for redemption came. If we find that no mention is made by Philo of any political unity of the Jews, it is because no political unity existed then among Jews. Again, if we find that Palestine as the seat of a Jewish government under Agrippa I is not spoken of by him as a political center of the Jews, it is because at that time Palestine exercised no political authority upon the Jews abroad. Agrippa I is described by him as ruling by an appointment from Rome over part of Palestine, as was his contemporary Flaccus over Egypt, except that the former was favored by Rome with the title of king.²⁶ In short, Philo describes the Jews of his time as a nation either in the sense of a people connected by ties of blood or in the sense of a people having like beliefs and institutions or in both these senses. If he does not describe them as a nation in the sense of a people united under a single government, it is for two reasons: first, the Jews of his time were not united under a single government; second, the term nation had not yet acquired that strictly political sense. Philo, as all the Jews of his time, however, considered the diaspora only as a temporary stage in Jewish history—a stage which was to be terminated with the coming of the Messianic age when all the exiles would become reunited under one government of their own.

To Philo as a student of Greek literature and one who undoubtedly knew the works of the historians, especially the *Histories* of Polybius, on the rise and growth of states, the spread of the Jewish population and the establishment of Jewish colonies outside of Palestine would not by itself pre-

²⁶ *Flac.* 5, 25-30.

sent any anomaly. He undoubtedly looked upon it as the natural growth of the Palestinian Jewish polity analogous to that of the Roman empire. Both of them, starting from a single country, spread out to other countries, the one through being conquered by others, the other through conquering others. But as a student of Scripture he could not help looking upon the dispersion of the Jews as a divine punishment for their sin. The Jewish polity in Alexandria, despite its external semblance of a self-government, still represented to him what Scripture calls captivity. The existence of that Jewish polity in Alexandria was made possible as a result of new political conceptions which arose after the conquests of Alexander out of the necessity to organize the heterogeneous conquered populations into political unities. But these new political conceptions never struck root into the hearts of those who carried within them the ancient political traditions of the Greeks. According to the new political conceptions of the founders of Alexandria, the city was to be a confederacy of autonomous religious polities, but the Greek inhabitants of Alexandria could not help thinking of their city as a city of the old Greek type based upon a common religion. The classical Greek political philosophy upon which the cultivated Greeks of the Hellenistic age were brought up recommended as its example of an ideal polity the city-state of the old Greek type with a population which, though made up of different kinds of men,²⁷ was still united by living together in the same place, by continuous intermarriage, by common religious sacrifices, and by common amusements.²⁸ The newer political theory, that of the Stoics, reflected indeed the changed conditions of the new Hellenistic cities and later of the Roman empire. It spoke of a world polity in

²⁷ Aristotle, *Politica* II, 2, 1261a, 22-24.

²⁸ *Ibid.* III, 9, 1280b, 35-38.

which there was no distinction of race and nations and religions, but that universal polity was in fact nothing but the ancient Greek city magnified, in which Zeus and the other traditional Greek deities continued to be worshiped under the new guise of cosmic forces. It was a universal polity of the old pagan world. In this new universal polity the Jews, with their own beliefs and worship and practices, were considered as strangers just as much as in the old pagan cities. The poets, statesmen, and historians of that period, all of them inspired by the Stoic teachings, could find a philosophic rationalization for old Greek religious beliefs and a social sanction for old Greek religious customs, but they could see nothing but superstition in Jewish beliefs and inhospitality in Jewish customs.²⁹

When Caligula forgot that he was a Roman emperor and acted like a Hellenic hero, demanding to be worshiped by his subjects, and when also popular feeling and thinking in Alexandria threatened the existence of the autonomous Jewish polity, Philo did his best to defend it. First, he appeals to the Jewish constitutional rights, which have been confirmed by the Roman emperors.³⁰ Second, he condemns popular agitation against the Jews as falsely masquerading under the guise of patriotism, or, as he expresses himself, under the guise of wishing "to do honor to the Emperor."³¹ Third, he dwells upon the antiquity of the Jews in Alexandria and elsewhere, arguing that in some places they were among the original founders.³² Fourth, he parades Jewish patriotism, maintaining that the Jews are bound by their religion to pay honor (*τιμή*) to the ruler of the country

²⁹ Cf. Th. Reinach, *Textes d'Auteurs Grecs et Romains relatifs au Judaïsme*, 1895, "Index" under "Superstitions des Juifs" and "Misoxénie."

³⁰ *Legat.* 23, 153-24, 161.

³¹ *Flac.* 7, 51.

³² *Ibid.*, 47.

which treats them hospitably,³³ evidently having in mind his own interpretation of the verse "thou shalt not abhor an Egyptian because thou wast a sojourner in his land" ³⁴ as constituting a commandment that "settlers" in a foreign land should "pay some honor (τιμὴν) to those who have accepted them." ³⁵

This was his formal defense. But he knew that by such arguments one can win a debate, but one cannot change a social situation. He knew that the root of the problem was too deep to be overcome by such palliative arguments. The root of the problem, as he himself states it, was to be found in the peculiar laws (νόμοι ἑξάλρητοι) practiced by the Jews.³⁶ Many before Philo, and Philo himself, had tried to convince the world of the intrinsic merits of these laws. But he knew that the world was offended by these laws not because they were harmful, but because they were different; more so if it were constantly told that these laws were superior; and still more so if it actually felt that these laws were superior. These laws, says Philo, "are necessarily grave and severe, because they inculcate the highest standard of virtue; but gravity is austere, and austerity is held in aversion by the great mass of men because they favor pleasure." ³⁷ Indeed one might argue, as Josephus later did argue,³⁸ that similar religious differences exist also among non-Jews themselves. But Philo felt that the differences between the Jews and non-Jews are unlike the differences that may exist between various religious groups of non-Jews. The former are more fundamental. They place the Jews as a group apart from the totality of non-Jews, with all the varieties of religions and sects among the non-Jews themselves. Whenever any hos-

³³ *Ibid.*, 49-50.

³⁴ Deut. 23: 8 (7).

³⁵ *Virt.* 21, 105; cf. Jer. 29: 7; and above, p. 368.

³⁶ *Spec.* IV, 34, 179.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Apion.* II, 6, 65.

tility breaks out between two groups of non-Jews, he says, the hostile groups do not stand alone, for "by reason of their frequent intercourse with other nations, they are in no want of helpers who join sides with them." Not so, however, is the case of the Jews. "The Jewish nation has none to take its part" and "one may say that the whole Jewish nation is in the position of an orphan compared with all other nations in other lands." ³⁹

What, then, is the solution of the problem? Long before Philo, when for the first time Jews became conscious of the gulf created between themselves and non-Jews by reason of their Law, we are told, "there came forth out of Israel lawless men, and persuaded many, saying: 'Let us go out and make a covenant with the nations that are round about us, for since we separated ourselves from them many evils have come upon us,'" ⁴⁰ and this covenant which they advocated to be made with the nations, we are told, resulted in that "they repudiated the holy covenant; yea, they joined themselves to the gentiles." ⁴¹ Individual Jews at the time of Philo in Alexandria undoubtedly offered the same solution for the Jewish problem of their own time. His own nephew, Tiberius Julius Alexander, thus solved the Jewish problem for himself in that way. He forsook Judaism and henceforth found no difficulty in rising to high office, and in his subsequent behavior toward his own people, both in Alexandria and Palestine, ⁴² showed that he succeeded in completely emancipating himself from what was then called Jewish "inhospitality," the common opprobrium of that time for the natural desire on the part of the Jews to preserve their own existence. He must have been looked upon by his non-

³⁹ *Spec.* IV, 34, 179.

⁴⁰ I Macc. 1: 11.

⁴¹ I Macc. 1: 15.

⁴² Cf. *Bell. Jud.* II, 18, 8, 494; *Antt.* XX, 5, 2, 102.

Jewish contemporaries as an example of what they considered as the better kind of Jew, the desirable Jew, the Jew against whom they had no prejudice. There must undoubtedly have been in Alexandria other Jews like him who, alienated from the spiritual and intellectual sources of Judaism, came to look upon their heritage as a heap of meaningless customs and beliefs and thus sought to emancipate themselves from Jewish "inhospitality" and "superstition" and "atheism" by learning to relish swine's flesh, to idle on a week-day instead of resting on the Sabbath, and to see piety in the worship of images rather than in the worship of the imageless Jehovah. But, having torn themselves away from Judaism, they were evidently contented to enjoy their newly discovered liberties privately, and did not exhibit themselves to the world as examples of an ideal solution of a vexatious problem.⁴³

The solution found by Philo for the Jewish problem of his time was the revival of the old prophetic promises of the ultimate disappearance of the diaspora. Without mentioning the term Messiah, he deals in great detail with what is known in Jewish tradition as the Messiah and the Messianic age. His discussion of these topics is to be discerned in his comments on various passages in the Pentateuch.

In his comments upon the blessings of Moses before his death, in which the future of each of the twelve tribes is foretold,⁴⁴ he says: "Some of these have already taken place, others are still looked for, since confidence in the future is assured by fulfillment in the past."⁴⁵ Those blessings which have not as yet been fulfilled are described by him as "exhortations for the future expressed in hopeful words of comfort which needs must be followed by their fulfillment,"⁴⁶

⁴³ Cf. above, I, 82 ff.

⁴⁴ Deut. 33.

⁴⁵ *Mos.* II, 51, 288.

⁴⁶ *Virt.* 11, 75.

for, he concludes, "that these blessings will be fulfilled we must believe."⁴⁷ Similarly in the Tannaitic literature some of these blessings of Moses are also taken to refer to the Messianic age.⁴⁸

Then in his comment on the blessings promised for obedience to the commandments,⁴⁹ he describes in great detail his conceptions of the Messianic age, which on the whole reflect what in his time were already common conceptions of the Messianic age.

First, there will be a reunion of the exiled. Alluding to the verses that "the Lord thy God . . . will gather thee again out of all the nations among which the Lord hath dispersed thee; though thy dispersion may have been from one end of the earth to the other . . . thence thy God will bring thee, into the land which thy fathers possessed, and thou shalt possess it,"⁵⁰ he says that "when they have gained the unexpected liberty, those who but now were scattered in Greece and the outside world over islands and continents will arise and post from every side with one impulse to the one appointed place."⁵¹

Second, this reunion of the exiled will be followed by national prosperity in the homeland to which they will have returned. Drawing on the verse "and He will do thee good and will make thee abundant beyond thy fathers,"⁵² he says: "When they have arrived, the cities which but now lay in ruins will be cities once more; the desolate land will be inhabited; the barren will change into fruitfulness; all the prosperity of their fathers and ancestors will seem a tiny

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 12, 77.

⁴⁸ *Sifre Deut.*, § 352, on Deut. 33: 12, F, p. 145b; HF, p. 410; *Midrash Tannaim*, on Deut. 33: 3, p. 212.

⁴⁹ Lev. 26: 3-13; Deut. 28: 1-14; 30: 1-10.

⁵⁰ Deut. 30: 3-5; cf. *Praem.* 28, 164.

⁵¹ *Praem.* 29, 165.

⁵² Deut. 30: 5.

fragment, so lavish will be the abundant riches in their possession, which flowing from the gracious bounties of God as from a perennial fountain will bring to each individually and to all in common a deep stream of wealth leaving no room for envy." ⁵³ In another place, in contrast to the condition of the Jews in his own times, of which he says that "our nation has not prospered for many years," ⁵⁴ he describes the Messianic age as a time when "a fresh start is made to brighter prospects" and as a period of "national prosperity." ⁵⁵

Third, following the reunion of the exiled and the establishment of national prosperity there will be a reign of peace between men and men and between men and beasts. Drawing upon such verses as "And I will give peace in the land, and ye shall lie down, and none shall make you afraid; and I will cause evil beasts to cease out of the land, neither shall the sword go through your land," ⁵⁶ he describes in great detail the blessing of victory over enemies and the establishment of peace between men and men and between men and beasts.⁵⁷ Now there is nothing in this verse to indicate that it refers to the Messianic age nor is there in Philo's comment upon it any direct indication that he has taken it to refer to the Messianic age. But in his description of the pacification of animals he says: "For this is one war where no quarter or truce is possible; as wolves with lambs, so all wild beasts both on land and water are at war with all men. This war no mortal can quell; that is done only by the Uncreated, when He judges that there are some worthy of salvation. . . . But a very necessary preliminary to this is that the wild beast within the soul shall be tamed . . . when that

⁵³ *Praem.* 29, 168.

⁵⁴ *Mos.* II, 7, 43.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁵⁶ *Lev.* 26: 6; cf. *Deut.* 28: 1, 7.

⁵⁷ *Praem.* 14, ¶79-16, 94.

time comes I believe that bears and lions and panthers . . . will no longer as heretofore be roused to ferocity by the sight of man . . . then too the tribes of the scorpions and serpents and the other reptiles will have no use for their venom. . . . Among all these the man of worth will move sacrosanct and inviolate because God has respected virtue and given it the privilege that none should imagine mischief against it.”⁵⁸ This passage bears the unmistakable evidence of the influence of the Messianic verses in Isaiah: “And the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fattling together; and a little child shall lead them . . . and the suckling child shall play on the hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put his hand on the basilisk’s den. They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain; for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of God.”⁵⁹ Peace between men and men and between men and beasts is thus a third characteristic feature of the Messianic age.

These three features of the Messianic age described by Philo reflect common conceptions of the Messianic age current in Jewish tradition.⁶⁰ But then Philo dwells upon a fourth characteristic feature, and that is the divine punishment of the unrepented enemies of Israel. Thus, drawing upon the verse “and the Lord thy God will put all these curses upon thine enemies, and on them that hate thee, that persecuted thee,”⁶¹ he says: “Everything will suddenly be

⁵⁸ *Praem.* 15, 87-90.

⁵⁹ Isa. 11: 6, 8, 9. Heinemann (*Bildung*, p. 419), thinks that in the passage of Philo there is no direct allusion to Isaiah. Colson (VIII, 455, § 87), on the other hand, asserts that there is such an allusion. Cf. Z. Frankel, “Alexandrinische Messias Hoffnungen,” *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums*, 8 (1859), 328-329; J. Kroll, “Posidonios und Vergils vierte Ekloge,” *Hermes*, 50 (1915), 139-141.

⁶⁰ Cf. J. Drummond, *The Jewish Messiah*, chs. xviii, xx; J. Klausner, *Ha-Ra'ayon ha-Meshihi be-Yisra'el*, pp. 146-148.

⁶¹ Deut. 30: 7.

reversed, God will turn the curses against the enemies of these penitents, the enemies who rejoiced in the misfortunes of the nation and mocked and railed at them ⁶² . . . who have mocked at their lamentations, proclaimed public holidays on the days of their misfortunes, feasted on their mourning, in general made the unhappiness of others their own happiness.” ⁶³ The description of what the enemies had done to the Jews before the liberation undoubtedly reflects local conditions in Alexandria in the relation between Jews and non-Jews,⁶⁴ and it is quite understandable why Philo, whose God in mercy and forgiveness remembers justice, should look forward toward divine punishment of these enemies. Still, while punishment of enemies is characteristic of the Messianic age as depicted in Jewish tradition, especially characteristic as a feature of the traditional conception of the Messianic age is the uprising of the heathen nations under the leadership of Gog and Magog and their ultimate defeat either by God or by the Messiah.⁶⁵ This statement in Philo may therefore be a description in terms of local Alexandrian experience of the war of Gog and Magog. That it should take place after the gathering of the exiled and the reestablishment of national prosperity reflects the verses in Ezekiel according to which Gog will make war on the Jewish people after they have been “gathered out of the nations” and after they have established themselves in quiet and safety.⁶⁶

The condition that will bring about the Messianic age is repentance. Drawing upon the verses that the gathering of the people from the lands of their exile will take place when

⁶² *Praem.* 29, 169.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 171.

⁶⁴ Cf. *Flac.* 5, 25-11, 96; *Legat.* 18, 120-20, 135.

⁶⁵ Drummond, *op. cit.*, ch. xii; Klausner, *op. cit.*, pp. 323-325; Moore, *Judaism*, II, 333, n. 3.

⁶⁶ Ezek. 38: 11-12; Zech. 12 and 14; cf. Klausner, *op. cit.*, pp. 80, 124; Moore, *op. cit.*, II, 344, n. 4.

“they will confess their iniquity”⁶⁷ or when “thou shalt return to the Lord thy God,”⁶⁸ he describes this confession of iniquity and return to God in terms of what, as we have seen, constitute repentance in Judaism, consisting of a feeling of shame and of self-reproach and of a confession and acknowledgment of sin both within one’s self and with one’s tongue.⁶⁹ Accordingly he describes those who are to return as those who have repented (*μετανοησάντες*),⁷⁰ thus reflecting the double meaning of the Hebrew *shabim*. Now, according to Scripture, even when man is slow in his repentance, God in his mercy, by special grace, may sometimes forgive his sin, for “God is merciful and gracious . . . forgiving iniquities and transgression and sin”⁷¹ and “He hath not dealt with us according to our sins, nor retributed to us according to our iniquities.”⁷² Moreover, forgiveness and redemption are promised to Israel for the sake of the merit of the Patriarchs, for “I will remember my covenant with Jacob, and also my covenant with Isaac, and also my covenant with Abraham will I remember; and I will remember the land.”⁷³ Reflecting all these, Philo says that “three intercessors (*παράκλητοι*) they have to plead for their reconciliation with the Father. *One* is the clemency and kindness of Him to whom they appeal . . . the *second* is the holiness of the founders of the nation⁷⁴ . . . the *third* is one which more than anything else moves the loving kindness of the other two to come forward so readily, and that is the improvement [i.e., repentance] working in those who are being brought to make a covenant of peace.”⁷⁵ So also in native Jewish tradition, using the Hebraized Greek term *praxlit* (*παράκλητος*), the very same Greek term that is used by

⁶⁷ Lev. 26: 40.

⁶⁸ Deut. 30: 2.

⁶⁹ *Praem.* 28, 163; cf. above, p. 256.

⁷² Lev. 26: 42.

⁷⁴ Cf. *Spec.* IV, 34, 181.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 9, 169.

⁷¹ Exod. 34: 6-7; cf. Ps. 78: 38.

⁷² Ps. 103: 10; cf. above, p. 258.

⁷⁵ *Praem.* 29, 166-167.

Philo, in the sense of an intercessor who pleads in favor of man before God, and using also the Hebrew term *zekut*, merit, in the sense of that on account of which God acts in favor of man, the rabbis say that (1) God confers merit on men and acts in their favor through His "mercy,"⁷⁶ that (2) He also confers merit on the Jewish people and acts in their favor through the merit of the Patriarchs,⁷⁷ and that (3) "repentance and good deeds" are "man's paracletes" to plead for him before God.⁷⁸ Again, as in Philo, repentance is considered by the rabbis as the chief condition in the coming of the final redemption of Israel.⁷⁹ But redemption may also come, according to them, through the merit of the Patriarchs or by the mercy of God. It is because of the merit of the Patriarchs, they say, that God knew that He would have to redeem Israel from Egypt⁸⁰ and by the same token, we imagine, He knows that because of the merit of the Patriarchs He will have to bring about their ultimate redemption. Again, it is argued, on the basis of many verses, that, even without their repentance, God by His own initiative will bring about the redemption of Israel.⁸¹ Ezekiel expresses this view in the verse: "Thus saith the Lord God: I do not this for your sake, O house of Israel, but for my holy name."⁸² In the Testament of Asher, the same view is expressed in the statement: "But the Lord will gather you together in faith through His tender mercy, and for the sake of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob."⁸³

Whether Philo believed that the final redemption will take place under the leadership of a particular person such as is known in Jewish tradition as the Messiah is not clear. No-

⁷⁶ *Sanhedrin* 12a; cf. above, n. 71.

⁷⁷ Cf. above, I, 455.

⁷⁸ *Shabbat* 32a.

⁷⁹ Ezek. 36: 22; cf. Klausner, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

⁸⁰ The Testament of Asher 7: 7.

⁷⁹ *Yoma* 86b.

⁸⁰ *Exodus Rabbah*, I, 36, on Exod. 2: 25.

⁸¹ *Sanhedrin* 97b-98a.

where in his writings is there any explicit mention of a personal Messiah. There are two vague statements, however, which may refer to such a Messiah.

First, in the course of his discussion of the blessings promised to those who obey the commandments, he quotes from the prophecy of Balaam the verse which in the Septuagint reads: "There shall come forth a man"⁸⁴ and then paraphrases the rest of the verse in his statement "and leading his host to war he will subdue great and populous nations."⁸⁵ Among students of Philo there is a difference of opinion as to whether this refers to a personal Messiah or not.⁸⁶ But inasmuch as in native Jewish tradition this verse in its Masoretic reading, "He shall pour forth water out of his buckets," is sometimes taken as referring to the Messiah,⁸⁷ there is no reason why we should not assume that Philo has also taken it in this sense. Moreover, in describing that "man" who shall "come forth," Philo says that "God has sent to his aid the reinforcements that befit the godly, and they are dauntless courage of soul and all-powerful might (*ισχύς*) of body."⁸⁸ Now, in Isaiah's description of the Messiah, it is said: "And the spirit of God will rest upon him . . . a spirit of counsel and might (*ισχύος*)."⁸⁹ In the light of this, when Philo describes the "man" who "shall come forth" as one to whose aid God will send "dauntless courage of soul and all powerful might (*ισχύς*)," he undoubtedly means by that "man" the Messiah of the prophecy of Isaiah.

Second, in his discussion of the ultimate return of the scattered exiled to their home land, he says that the return-

⁸⁴ Num. 24: 7.

⁸⁵ *Praem.* 16, 95.

⁸⁶ Cf. Drummond, *The Jewish Messiah*, p. 272; Klausner, *From Jesus to Paul*, pp. 197-198.

⁸⁷ Cf. *Targum pseudo-Jonathan* and *Targum Yerushalmi*, ad loc.

⁸⁸ *Praem.* 16, 95.

⁸⁹ Isa. 11: 2; cf. Bréhier, p. 5, n. 1.

ing exiles will be "guided by some vision, more divine than is compatible with its being of the nature of man, invisible indeed to everyone else, but manifest only to those who were saved."⁹⁰ With regard to this passage, too, there is a difference of opinion among students of Philo as to whether it refers to the Messiah or not.⁹¹ According to one interpretation, it refers to the Messiah as well as to the Logos, thus identifying the two. According to another interpretation, it refers to the Logos but not to the Messiah. According to a third interpretation, it refers to something like the cloud by which the people were guided in their first deliverance from Egypt.

As in native Judaism so also in Philo the Messianic age is conceived not only as an age of national deliverance and national prosperity but also as an age during which Judaism will become a universal religion. The Mosaic Law, which he has declared to be eternal,⁹² will, as in native Judaism,⁹³ continue to exist during the Messianic age, in a form, of course, evolved through a continuous process of interpretation. But more than that. With the restoration and the renewed prosperity of the Jewish people, he says, "I think that each nation would abandon its peculiar ways, and, throwing overboard their ancestral customs, turn to honoring our laws alone, for, when the brightness of their shining is accompanied by national prosperity, it will darken the light of the others as the risen sun darkens the stars."⁹⁴

⁹⁰ *Praem.* 29, 165.

⁹¹ Dähne, I, pp. 437-438; Gfrörer, I, 528-530; Drummond, *The Jewish Messiah*, pp. 271-272; L. Cohn, *Philos Werke*, II, 382; Colson, VIII, 418, n. 9; F. Gregoire, "Le Messie chez Philon d'Alexandrie," *Ephemerides theologiae lovanienses*, 12 (1935), 28-50.

⁹² *Mos.* II, 3, 14; cf. above, I, 187-188.

⁹³ Cf. discussion on this point, Drummond, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-327; Klausner, *op. cit.*, pp. 287-289; 333-334. M. Higger, *The Jewish Utopia* (The Lord Baltimore Press, 1932), pp. 106-109; Moore, *Judaism*, I, 271-274. ⁹⁴ *Moses* II, 7, 44.

On the whole this reflects such Messianic prophecies as that in which it is predicted that "it shall come to pass in the end of days, that the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established as the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow unto it; and many peoples shall go and say: Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob, and He will teach us of His ways, and we will walk in His paths, for out of Zion shall come forth the law."⁹⁵ Similar hopes, couched almost in the same language as used by Philo and reminiscent again of the scriptural verses quoted, are expressed also in the Sibylline oracles: "Then again all the sons of the great God shall live quietly around the temple, rejoicing in those gifts which He shall give, who is the Creator, and sovereign righteous judge. . . . Free from war shall they be in city and country . . . and then all the isles and cities shall say, How doth the Eternal love these men! For all things work in sympathy with them and help them. . . . A sweet strain shall they utter from their mouths in hymns. Come, let us fall upon the earth and supplicate the Eternal King, the mighty everlasting God. Let us make procession to His Temple, for He is the sole Potentate, and let us ponder the law of the most high God, who is the most righteous of all on earth. But we had gone astray from the path of the Eternal, and with foolish heart worshiped the work of men's hands, idols and images of men that are dead."⁹⁶ Comparing, however, the Sibylline passage with the Philonic passage, we notice one striking difference. In the Sibylline passage, despite its reference to the "law," and the reference in other lines to "sacrifices,"⁹⁷ the main emphasis is upon the abandoning of idolatry. In Philo it is

⁹⁵ Isa. 2: 2-4; Micah 4: 1-2.

⁹⁶ Sibylline Oracles III, 702-722.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 573-579.

clear that in the Messianic age the gentiles will not only abandon idolatry and polytheism but they will also abandon their "peculiar ways" and "their ancestral customs" and will honor our "laws." In short, in the Messianic age, according to Philo, the gentiles will become full proselytes, and not merely "God-fearers." A similar view is expressed also in the Talmud by various Amoraim, who, from the verse, "For then will I turn to the people a pure language, that they may all call upon the name of the Lord, to serve Him with one consent,"⁹⁸ inferred that in the Messianic age⁹⁹ gentiles will not only abandon idolatry but will also become full proselytes.¹⁰⁰

The motive for the conversion of the gentiles during the Messianic age is outrightly said by Philo, as will have been noticed, to be the splendor and glory and prosperity which the Jewish people will come into. This is avowedly not a purely religious motive, such as Jewish tradition and Philo himself would require of a proselyte.¹⁰¹ Now in native Jewish tradition there is a question as to the status of those who become converted to Judaism for motives other than purely religious. The question is especially raised with reference to those who became converted to Judaism during the prosperous reigns of King David and King Solomon and also those who will wish to become converted during the prosperity of the Jewish people in the Messianic age. From the various opinions expressed, it may be gathered that while those who wish to become proselytes for ulterior motives are not to be accepted, those who have already become proselytes for such ulterior motives have the legal status of proselytes.¹⁰² The

⁹⁸ Zeph. 3: 9.

⁹⁹ Literally: "in the future age" (*le-'atid la-bo*).

¹⁰⁰ 'Abodah Zarah 24a.

¹⁰¹ Cf. above, pp. 358 f.

¹⁰² *Yebamot* 24b; 'Abodah Zarah 3b and 24a; cf. Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah*, *Issure Bi'ah*, XIII, 15 and 17.

same view seems to be reflected also in Philo's statement about the conversion of gentiles during the Messianic age.

In native Jewish tradition the abolition of war during the Messianic age, and the establishment of peace, does not mean the abolition of the existence of distinct nations and governments. In the prophecies of Isaiah and Micah, the peace to be established in the end of days means that "nation shall not lift up sword against nation,"¹⁰³ which implies that nations will still exist. In the vision of Daniel, the Messiah is depicted as one to whom was given "dominion and glory and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve him."¹⁰⁴ There will thus still be different peoples and nations and languages. The Sibylline oracles predict that "neither shall there be any sword throughout the land nor battle din . . . but there shall be a great peace throughout all the earth and king shall be friendly with king till the end of the age, and a common law for men throughout all the earth shall the Eternal perfect in the starry heaven."¹⁰⁵ Kings and states over which they rule will thus still continue to exist. The rabbis in their utterances about the days of the Messiah predict that "no nation or language shall be able to have dominion over them."¹⁰⁶ National and linguistic differences will thus still continue to exist. This is also the conception of the Messianic age in Philo. The peace which will be ultimately established will be a peace among nations, and a peace established by "a man" who shall come forth and subdue those great and populous nations who out of their lust for war started an attack.¹⁰⁷ The nations who will abandon their "peculiar ways" and "ancestral customs"

¹⁰³ Isa. 2: 4; Micah 4: 3.

¹⁰⁴ Dan. 7: 14.

¹⁰⁵ Sibylline Oracles III, 751-758.

¹⁰⁶ *Megillah* 11a; cf. Klausner, *Ha-Ra'ayon ha-Meshihi be-Yisra'el*, p. 326.

¹⁰⁷ *Praem.* 16, 93-95.

and turn to honor our "laws" will indeed be united, as the Sibyl says, by "a common law," but they will continue to exist as nations.

By the time of Philo, corresponding to the Jewish ideal of a Messianic age, there existed a Stoic ideal of a Messianic age. In this Stoic Messianic ideal all differences of nationality or of historic states will disappear. There is to be a universal state governed by universal law in which peace is to reign and no distinction of race or creed is to exist. Their aim was, as it is recorded in their name, that "all the inhabitants of this world of ours should not live differentiated by their respective rules of justice into separate cities and communities, but that we should consider all men to be of one community and one polity, and that we should have a common life and an order common to us all, even as a herd that feeds together and shares the pasturage of a common field."¹⁰⁸ In the empire established by Alexander contemporary historians and philosophers saw the beginning of that universal empire and in the Roman empire they saw its completion.¹⁰⁹ Now the depiction of the Messianic age in Philo is quite evidently colored with Stoic phraseology, but upon a close examination we shall find it to be really in opposition to the Stoic conception of a Messianic age. There is to be indeed a universal state, as the Stoics say, but that state has not yet been established; it is yet to come into being with the fulfillment of the ancient prophetic promises to the Jewish people. That universal state will indeed be governed by a universal law, but that universal law will be the "laws" of Moses, as Philo calls it, or "a common law for men" which "the Eternal shall perfect in the starry heaven," as the Sibyl describes it. There will indeed be a cosmopoli-

¹⁰⁸ Plutarch, *De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute* I, 6.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*; Strabo, *Geography* I, 4, 9; Polybius, *Histories* I, 2, 7; VIII, 2 (4), 3-4.

tanism, a world-citizenship, as the Stoics preach, but this will be due to the fact that all mankind will honor the laws of Moses and thereby become citizens of that polity which Philo describes as "holy," "God-loving," "best," "irreproachable" and "divine." Finally, within that universal state, based upon a common law, there will still continue to exist all the various historic states and the various ethnic and linguistic groups of mankind.

It is in the light of this conception of the Messianic age that we are to understand another Messianic passage in Philo, one of a more general nature, in which the Jewish people is not mentioned. In that passage Philo begins with a reference to the rise and fall of states and nations, mentioning Greece and Macedonia, Persians and Parthians, Egypt, the Ethiopians, Carthage, the kingdoms of Libya, the kings of Pontus, Europe and Asia.¹¹⁰ Then he concludes with the following reflection: For cyclewise moves the revolution of that divine Logos which most people call fortune (*τύχη*). And then, as it continually flows on among cities and nations and countries, it allots what some have to others and what all have to all, changing the affairs of individuals only in point of time, in order that the whole world may, as one city, enjoy the best of polities, a democracy."¹¹¹ From the last part of the passage it may be inferred that just as history shows the rise and fall of states so it also shows the rise and fall of various forms of governments, culminating in a world state having democracy as its form of government.

The sentiment expressed in this passage is based upon certain statements of Polybius.¹¹² In one place Polybius speaks

¹¹⁰ *Immut.* 36, 173-175; cf. *Jos.* 23, 135-136, where he mentions also the successors of Alexander and the Ptolemies.

¹¹¹ *Immut.* 36, 176.

¹¹² The general connection between this passage of Philo and Polybius has been pointed out by R. von Scala, *Die Studien des Polybios* (1890), I, 177, n. 2, who sug-

of the rise and fall of states, mentioning Ilium, Assyria, Media, Persia, and Macedonia.¹¹³ In another place he attributes this rise and fall of states to fortune (τύχη).¹¹⁴ In still another place he shows how forms of governments, such as monarchy, aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and then again monarchy, follow one another in a cycle,¹¹⁵ concluding with the general observation: "This is the cycle of political revolutions (πολιτειῶν ἀνακύκλωσις), the course appointed by nature (φύσεως οἰκονομία) in which constitutions change, disappear, and finally return to the point from which they started."¹¹⁶ This cycle of political revolutions dwelt upon by Polybius, it has been shown by students, is nothing but the application of the Stoic theory of cycles in the course of the natural history of the universe to the political history of human society.¹¹⁷

The analogy between Polybius and Philo in their respective statements is quite striking. Still, when we scrutinize the statements of Philo in the light of what we know about his philosophy and compare them with the statements of Polybius in the light of what we know about the Stoic philosophy which is reflected in them, we notice certain fundamental differences between them.

In Polybius it is fortune which causes this rise and fall of states and the changes in forms of government. Fortune is often presented in Greek literature as a divine agency. In

gests that Philo knew Polybius through Posidonius. Leisegang (*Philos Werke*, IV, 109, n. 1) rejects this suggestion about Posidonius. Cf. also F. Geiger, *Philon von Alexandria als sozialer Denker*, pp. 81-82.

¹¹³ Polybius, *Histories* XXXVIII, 22, 2.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.* XXIX, 21, 3-6.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.* VI, 6, 1-9, 9.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.* VI, 9, 10.

¹¹⁷ Cf. R. Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Cicero's philosophischen Schriften* (1882), II, 871; R. v. Scala, *Die Studien des Polybios* (1890), I, 236-246; E. Täubler, *Tyche* (1926), p. 92.

Plato fortune is said to "co-operate with God in the government of human affairs."¹¹⁸ Polybius himself speaks of the "gods" and "fortune" as if they were related terms.¹¹⁹ But this fortune which Polybius describes as causing the rise and fall of states is nothing but what he himself calls "the course appointed by nature"¹²⁰ which he similarly describes as causing the rise and fall of forms of government. Now this "course appointed by nature" is described by him as taking place "necessarily (*ἀναγκαιώς*) and naturally (*φυσικῶς*)."¹²¹ Consequently the "fortune" of Polybius is nothing but what the Stoics would call God or nature or universal law or fate or providence or the Logos of the world, all meaning nothing but the fixed immutable order of nature or the concatenation of cause and effect.¹²² Philo, however, significantly says that the changes in states and governments are due to "that divine Logos which most people call fortune." What he means by this locution is this: It is not fortune in the sense of fate or a fixed order of things or even in the sense of God or providence or the Logos of the world as these terms are commonly used in philosophy, and especially in the Stoic philosophy, that is the cause of changes in state governments; it is rather what he himself, Philo, calls the "divine Logos," namely, the providence of a God who is not bound by any fixed laws of nature, but who can upset these laws of nature fixed by himself.¹²³ All this is a corollary of his belief in the individual providence of God. So also St. Augustine, as a corollary of the belief in individual provi-

¹¹⁸ *Laws* IV, 709 B; cf. above, I, 330.

¹²⁰ Cf. above, n. 116.

¹¹⁹ *Histories* X, 9, 2.

¹²¹ *Histories* VI, 10, 2.

¹²² Cf. above, I, 327, 329, and Arnim, Index, under *theos*, p. 70, col. 2. On the relation between "fortune" and "fate," see H. R. Patch, *The Goddess Fortuna in Mediaeval Literature*, 1927, pp. 10-11; V. Cioffari, *Fortune and Fate from Democritus to St. Thomas Aquinas*, 1935, pp. 33-53.

¹²³ I think that W. Bousset has overlooked the special significance of Philo's phraseology in this passage when in his *Die Religion des Judentums im neutestament-*

dence, argues that "the cause, then, of the greatness of the Roman empire is neither fortuitous nor fatal. . . . In a word, human kingdoms are established by divine providence, and if any one attributes their existence to fate, because he calls the will or the power of God itself by the name fate, let him keep his opinion, but correct his language."¹²⁴ This view that fortunes of states and nations are directly guided by God reflects the many scriptural prophecies about the rise and fall of nations¹²⁵ and such verses as "For I will rise up against them, saith the Lord of hosts, and cut off from Babylon the name, and remnant, and son and nephew. . . . I will break the Assyrian in my land."¹²⁶ "Thus saith the Lord to his anointed, to Cyrus, whose right hand I have holden, to subdue nations before him."¹²⁷ "Who smote great nations, and slew mighty kings . . . and gave their land for an heritage, an heritage unto Israel his people."¹²⁸ In the Wisdom of Solomon the same view is expressed in the statement, "Because your dominion was given you from the Lord, and your sovereignty from the Most High."¹²⁹

Second, to Polybius the most perfect state was already produced, and that was Rome. Fortune, he says, has accomplished the most surprising feat "in our own times, that is, to bring all the known parts of the world (*οικουμένης*) under one rule and dominion, a thing absolutely without precedent."¹³⁰ Philo, who lived under Roman rule during the

*lichen Zeitalter*², p. 509, he restates it as follows: "Gott trägt nicht mehr mit mächtiger Hand die Geschichte der Völker und seines Volkes, er greift nicht mehr lohnend und strafend in sie ein. Nach dem ehernen Gesetze einer vernünftigen Notwendigkeit bewegt sich, immer gleichmässig und in derselben Weise, das Weltall."

¹²⁴ *De Civitate Dei* V, 1.

¹²⁵ Cf. Isa. 13; 17-19; Jer. 46-51; Ezek. 27-28; 35; 38-39; Obad.; Nah. 1.

¹²⁶ Isa. 14: 22, 25.

¹²⁷ Isa. 45: 1.

¹²⁸ Ps. 135: 10, 12.

¹²⁹ Wisdom of Solomon 6: 3.

¹³⁰ *Histories* VIII, 2 (4), 3-4; cf. I, 4, 5.

period of its greatness, does not say that Rome is that ideal state aimed at by "the divine Logos." Roman rule is indeed praised by him, its sovereignty indeed extended over all land and sea, and peace and harmony and prosperity and happiness indeed reigned throughout it,¹³¹ but still it was not the ideal state aimed at by the divine Logos. The divine Logos has not as yet accomplished its revolution, it is still to bring about its desired purpose "that the whole world should be as one city, enjoying that best of constitutions, democracy."¹³²

Third, to Polybius the cycles of states and constitutions, like the cycles of worlds in the Stoic doctrine, are eternal. To eternity will states rise and fall; never will that process stop; never will a state rise not to fall again. To eternity will monarchies change into aristocracies, aristocracies into oligarchies, oligarchies into democracies, and democracies again into monarchies; never will there evolve a best form of government which will remain stable for ever. Rome indeed is to him the greatest state ever produced by fortune, but Scipio, impressed by the Stoic teaching of the eternal cycle, could not help saying to Polybius at the moment of Rome's triumph over Carthage: "A glorious moment, Polybius; but I have dread foreboding that some day the same doom will be pronounced upon my own country,"¹³³ and to this Polybius adds: "It would be difficult to mention an utterance more statesmanlike and more profound."¹³⁴ Again, Rome to him had the best form of government; still, impressed by the Stoic theory of the eternal cycle, he could not help feeling that in the Roman form of government a change for the worse was sure to follow some day, for, he says, "This state, more than any other, has been formed and has

¹³¹ *Legat.* 2, 8-14.

¹³² *Immut.* 36, 176.

¹³³ *Histories* XXXVIII, 21, 1.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

grown naturally, and will undergo a natural decline and change to its contrary." ¹³⁵ For Philo, however, though he says of the revolution of the Logos that it moves "cycle-wise," there is no eternal cycle of the rise and fall of states, or of the perfection and decline of forms of government. The reason for his rejection of an eternal cycle in social history is the same as that for which he rejects it in cosmic history. ¹³⁶ An eternal cycle in either of them, according to him, implies a process of events driven on by a blind necessary fate. But to him it is not blind fate but an intelligent and wise God who guides the destinies of the world and nations. The divine Logos which in this passage he substitutes for fortune or fate is the individual providence of God, and this works according to a certain plan. The plan of God is to bring about in due time a perfect state of society which should remain perfect. After various states have attained power and fallen, after various forms of government have been tried and found wanting, ultimately one state will emerge which will not fall, and that state will have the best form of government which will not become corrupt. This is the Messianic state which will be governed by the Law of Moses, a Law described by him elsewhere as being based upon democracy and equality. ¹³⁷ This view reflects such Messianic predictions as that expressed in the book of Daniel, where the dominion established in the Messianic age is said to be "an everlasting dominion, which shall never pass away." ¹³⁸

Finally, while the Mosaic Law will be universally accepted during the Messianic age, there will still exist, as according to native Jewish tradition, many distinct national states. The "one city," after the analogy of which Philo visualizes the "whole world" in the future, is the city as

¹³⁵ *Ibid.* VI, 9, 12-13.

¹³⁶ Cf. above, I, 299-300.

¹³⁷ Cf. above, p. 392.

¹³⁸ Dan. 7: 14, 27.

he has known it, his own native Alexandria, a confederacy of many distinct polities. The "whole world," then, will be a confederacy of many polities, united into one general polity, and that one general polity will be based upon the principle of democracy or proportional equality or justice, which, according to him, is embodied in the Law of Moses.

IV. CONCLUSION, INFLUENCE, ANTICIPATION

When Philo identified the laws of the Pentateuch with what in philosophic literature was called "practical philosophy," it was quite natural for him to identify the laws dealing with rulers and subjects to that branch of practical philosophy called politics. Accordingly he presents all the laws of this kind in terms of political theories derived from the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. The entire body of such laws is presented by him as a constitution dealing with the form of organization of the inhabitants of the state planned by Moses. In that state there are citizens and non-citizens. Citizens are all those who live according to the Law, whether they are native-born Jews or strangers who came over to the Law, called proselytes. Among the non-citizens there are aliens, resident aliens, and those who may be called spiritual proselytes. Besides these various classes of inhabitants there are rulers. The two chief rulers are the king and the high priest. The manner in which the king and high priest are to be chosen, their qualification for office, the length of their tenure of office, and the functions of their office are all discussed by him. The two offices, according to him, are independent of each other, the king being charged with the administration of justice and the high priest with the administration of temple service and the interpretation of the Law. In a moral sense, however, he evaluates the high priesthood as being superior to kingship.

The king in his capacity as administrator of justice is also to appoint judges and officers. In addition there is also a council of elders.

Philo's delineation of the Mosaic constitution does not contain directly any criticism of other institutions, except on two points, the election of rulers by lot and the short tenure of office. But indirectly his entire presentation of that constitution is aimed as a criticism of certain Greek theories of state. To begin with, as a criticism of Plato in his *Statesman* and *Republic*, he tries to emphasize that the Mosaic constitution is opposed to any form of personal government; the government which the Mosaic constitution sets up is one of fixed laws. Then, as a criticism of Plato in his *Laws* and Aristotle in his *Politics*, he tries to show that the fixed laws upon which the Mosaic state is to be based, in contradistinction to the laws upon which the Platonic and the Aristotelian state are to be based, are not man-made but divinely revealed. Finally, in criticism of both Plato and Aristotle who, because they believed that no man-made law can be an absolutely ideal law, argued that there can be no absolutely ideal state, Philo maintains that the Mosaic state, because it is based upon a divinely revealed and hence an ideal law, is an absolutely ideal state. In this ideal state, citizenship means obedience to the Law revealed by God, and authority means only the authority of the Law. The power which king and high priest enjoy is only that of administering the Law or of interpreting it. The ultimate ruler is then God, who is the author of the Law. Philo almost coined the term theocracy, by which later Josephus described the Mosaic state. In political terms of his own time, however, Philo describes the Mosaic state as combining the best features of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy, the term democracy being used by him not in the sense of the government of the

many but rather in the sense of a government in which each one enjoys his own in accordance with law.

The Law was revealed originally to Israel, and the state to be established on the basis of that Law was originally meant to be the state of a single people in a single country under a single ruler. But it is not to be confined to one single people or to one single country or to one single ruler. The state envisaged by Moses is an ideal concept of a society of various peoples in various countries under various rulers living under the same Law according to the principles of democracy and equality. Such a society is described by him as the "holy polity," the "best polity," the "irreproachable polity," the "ecclesia of the Lord," or the "holy ecclesia." This ideal society is ultimately to be realized in the Messianic age, when, besides the reunited Jewish polity, there will be other polities recognizing the Mosaic Law, and all these polities will constitute what Philo would probably call a "universal ecclesia" or a "catholic church."

The identification of the commandments with virtues on the part of mediaeval Jewish philosophers and also their philosophic explanation of some or all of the commandments would naturally lead us to expect that they would also attempt to explain the laws regarding rulers and subjects in terms of political theories known to them. No such attempt, on a large scale and in a systematic way, is, however, made by them. Maimonides, in one place, reproduces the conventional classification of the sciences, in which, under practical philosophy, he enumerates the topics of politics;¹ in another place he discusses philosophically the source of inspiration of "statesmen";² in still another place he discusses again philosophically the origin of the state³ and the

¹ *Millot ha-Higgayon*, ch. 14.

² *Moreh Nebukim* II, 37.

³ *Ibid.* II, 740; cf. above, p. 14, n. 29.

function of the king in it.⁴ But no attempt is made by him to present the Mosaic form of government in terms of political theories of his time. The form of the Mosaic state and its institutions are dealt with by him in his code of Jewish law,⁵ and there he confines himself to a logical and systematic arrangement of traditional material. It was not until toward the end of the fifteenth century that Isaac Abrabanel, under the influence of Christian authors, made a faint effort to discuss the institution of kingship in Scripture in terms of current political theory.⁶

More in line with Philo's treatment of the Mosaic constitution is the treatment of it in Christian literature. St. Thomas, in his fourfold division of what he calls the judicial laws of the Pentateuch, describes two of its divisions in terms suggesting two of Aristotle's branches of practical philosophy, namely, political management and household management.⁷ Suggesting the former is his description of one division of judicial laws as dealing with the relation "of the people's sovereign to his subjects" and "of the citizens to foreigners"; suggesting the latter is his description of another division as dealing with the relations "of members of the same household, such as the relations of the father to his son; of wife to her husband; of the master to his servant."⁸ With regard to the Mosaic form of government in general, he describes it again in terms of current political theory and, like Philo, he finds that it is a mixture of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy, which mixed form of government he describes as "the best form of the organization of rulers . . .

⁴ *Ibid.* II, 40.

⁵ *Mishneh Torah: Sanhedrin and Melakim.*

⁶ Isaac Abravanel, Commentary on I Sam. 8: 4; cf. L. Strauss, "On Abravanel's Philosophical Tendency and Political Teaching," *Isaac Abravanel, Six Lectures*, Cambridge University Press, 1937, pp. 93-129.

⁷ Cf. above, p. 322, n. 1.

⁸ *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 104, 4 c.

in a state or kingdom" (*optima ordinatio principum . . . in aliqua civitate vel regno*).⁹ It was a kind of kingship, "for Moses and his successors governed the people in such a way that each of them was ruler over all"; there was an element of aristocracy in it, for "seventy elders were chosen, who were elders in virtue"; "but it was a democratical government in so far as the rulers were chosen from all the people" and "by the people."¹⁰ It will be noticed that, unlike Philo, he uses the term democracy here loosely in the general sense of the rule of the people.¹¹ With his belief that these judicial laws were divinely revealed, he considered those laws concerning rulers and foreigners and the members of the household as having been all suitably (*convenienter*) ordered,¹² and with regard to laws concerning rulers, in so far as it was a mixture of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy, as being "the best form of organization" (*optima ordinatio*).¹³ But still the Mosaic form of government was not meant to be an ideal form of government and one which was to exist forever and to serve as a model for all future forms of governments, for "the judicial laws did not bind forever, but were annulled by the coming of Christ," so that "when the state of the people changed with the coming of Christ, the judicial precepts lost their binding force."¹⁴ Still St. Thomas makes a distinction between the abrogation of the ceremonial laws and the abrogation of the judicial laws. The former are not only "dead" (*mortua*) but also "deadly" (*mortifera*) and the observance of them is a sin; the latter are only "dead" but not "deadly" and consequently "if a sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom he

⁹ *Ibid.*, 105, 1 c.

¹² *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 105, 1, 3, 4.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1 c.

¹¹ Cf. *Statesman* 291 D; *Politica* IV, 4, 1290a, 30 ff.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 104, 3 c.

would not sin: unless perchance they were observed, or ordered to be observed, as though they derived their binding force through being institutions of the Old Law.”¹⁵ The traditional Christian view with regard to the Mosaic state, namely, that it is good but not the best, had been summed up long before St. Thomas by Clement of Alexandria in his statement that Moses “furnished a good polity, which is the right discipline of men in social life”¹⁶ and also in his statement that of the three forms of polity that of the Greeks is brass, that of the Jews is silver, and that of the Christians is gold.¹⁷ It is because of this attitude toward it that the Mosaic constitution, as well as subsequent Biblical history in general, continues to be frequently quoted by Christians as proof-text in political controversies, especially in the problem of the relation of church and state, in the Middle Ages¹⁸ and also later in Protestantism.¹⁹ This general Christian view that the Old Testament, though no longer binding, is still, by reason of its divine origin, to be used as a source of good examples in political theory is expressed by Petrus Cunaeus in his description of the Mosaic state as a “commonwealth than which no commonwealth on earth was ever holier and richer in good examples . . . for, by Hercules, as its author and founder it has not man foredoomed by reason of his mortal frame but rather the immortal God himself.”²⁰

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Stromata* I, 26 (PG, 8, 916 B).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, V, 14 (PG, 9, 145 B).

¹⁸ Cf. C. H. McIlwain, *The Growth of Political Thought in the West* (Macmillan Co., 1932), pp. 147, 206, 212.

¹⁹ Cf. A. F. S. Pearson, *Church and State: Political Aspect of Sixteenth Century Puritanism* (Cambridge University Press, 1928), pp. 11, 32, 27, 81, 107, 125.

²⁰ Petrus Cunaeus, *De Republica Hebraeorum*, Leyden, 1631, Praefatio, p. *2a: “offero Republicam, qua nulla unquam in terris sanctor, nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit . . . quoniam illa hercle non hominem quenquam mortali concreione fatum, sed ipsum deum immortalem, autorem fundatoremque habet.”

But while the Mosaic state with its particular laws and institutions was declared in Christianity to have been abolished with the coming of Christ, whose coming was the fulfillment of the promise of a Messianic age, its essential character as described by Philo and Jewish tradition was taken over by Christianity and perpetuated in the Church. Just as in Philo the expression "divine ecclesia" is used as a description of the entire body of professing Jews,²¹ so also in Christianity the entire body of professing Christians is described as constituting an "ecclesia of God."²² Just as in Philo all those who profess Judaism, whether native-born Jews or converts, are called the "sons of God,"²³ so also in Christianity all those who "are led by the Spirit of God" are called the "sons of God."²⁴ Just as in Philo all those who profess Judaism are called Israel,²⁵ so also Christianity, considering itself the heir of Judaism,²⁶ calls itself "the Israel of God."²⁷ Just as Philo describes the whole body of professing Jews as the "universal polity" (ἡ καθολικωτέρα πολιτεία),²⁸ by which he means "universal ecclesia"²⁹ or "catholic church" so in Christianity the whole body of professing Christians came to be called the "universal ecclesia" or "catholic church" (ἐκκλησία καθολική).³⁰

But there is the following fundamental difference. In Christianity, with the abrogation of the Law, Christ takes the place of the Law and fulfils the functions of the Law. Just as in Judaism God is the ruler of the Mosaic state through His Law, so in Christianity God is the ruler of the

²¹ Cf. above, p. 394.

²² Acts 20: 28.

²³ Cf. above, pp. 358, 359.

²⁴ Rom. 8: 14.

²⁵ *Legat.* 29, 194; cf. above, p. 401, n. 25.

²⁶ This expression first occurs in about the year 169 (cf. Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines*, § 71, n. 2).

²⁶ Gal. 3: 29.

²⁷ Gal. 6: 16.

²⁸ Cf. above, p. 397.

²⁹ Cf. above, p. 358.

Church through His Son. As the Law provides for two instruments of its rule, king and high priest, so Christ combines in his person two functions, that of king³¹ and that of high priest.³² Consequently, in the history of Christianity, those who came to be recognized as the vicars of Christ were in theory to combine in their person the same two functions. They were to be kings and they were to be also high priests.

Christianity, however, did not appear in a desert among roving Bedouins. It appeared in a world already organized in states, governed by established laws, and headed by kings, and in this world it had to make its way, largely by accommodating itself to existing conditions. Accordingly it did not try to abrogate Roman law, nor did it dare set up kings in defiance of the Roman emperor. It had the precedent of its founder, who had taught to render "unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's,"³³ as a justification for not trying the former, and it had the memory of the crucifixion of its founder on the charge that he claimed to be the king of the Jews as a justification for not daring the latter. And so when Christianity became the religion of Rome it was willing to leave to the emperor the power of kingship and to claim for itself only the power of high priesthood. It was similarly willing to recognize all the Roman laws in matters relating to men and to claim for itself only the power to legislate in matters relating to God.

In theory, however, he who was recognized as the vicar of Christ was to succeed to all the powers of Christ. He was to be both king and high priest. And hence the protracted conflict between church and state throughout the Middle Ages. In that conflict the Old Testament, as a rule, was the

³¹ Matt. 25: 34.

³² Heb. 4: 14.

³³ Matt. 23: 21.

great arsenal for arguments in favor of the independence of these two officers. This, as we have seen, was also Philo's view in his analysis of the Mosaic constitution.³⁴

A new mode of treatment of the Mosaic constitution appears with Spinoza. In his grand assault upon traditional philosophy, with his denial of the divine origin of the Mosaic Law, Spinoza treats of the Hebrew state as a state founded by men like all other states. He feels himself free to dwell upon its defects, though he does not hesitate to mention some good features it contained.³⁵ Analyzing it like any other human institution, he describes it, like others before him, as a theocracy.³⁶ During the lifetime of Moses, he finds, it contained elements of democracy, kingship, and aristocracy. "As in a democracy," he says, "all surrendered their rights equally," and "all were equally bound by the covenant" and "all had an equal right to consult the Deity, to accept and to interpret His laws, so that all had an exactly equal share in the government."³⁷ But then the people "absolutely transferred to Moses the right to consult God and interpret His commands."³⁸ Thus, through his election by the people,³⁹ Moses became "supreme judge"⁴⁰ and "held the supreme authority."⁴¹ Then there was also, he says, an aristocratic element in the Mosaic state, for Moses chose from among the elders of the tribes "his seventy coadjutors, who formed with himself the supreme council,"⁴² and these seventy elders, as may be judged from his subsequent description of the captains of

³⁴ Cf. above, pp. 342, 344.

³⁵ *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, ch. xvii (*Opera*, ed. Gebhardt, III, p. 212, l. 4-p. 217, l. 13); cf. ch. iii (p. 47, ll. 33-34).

³⁶ *Ibid.* ch. xvii (p. 206, l. 17; p. 211, l. 29-p. 212, l. 3).

³⁷ *Ibid.* (p. 206, ll. 24-29).

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* (p. 207, ll. 7-8).

³⁸ *Ibid.* (p. 207, ll. 2-4).

⁴¹ *Ibid.* (p. 207, l. 9).

³⁹ *Ibid.* (p. 207, ll. 14-15).

⁴² *Ibid.* (p. 211, ll. 17-18).

each tribe, are conceived by Spinoza as having been "not superior to others in nobility or birth, but only . . . by reason of age and virtue."⁴³ It will be recalled that also Philo and St. Thomas found in the Mosaic states elements of these three forms of government.⁴⁴ After the death of Moses, throughout the existence of the republic under the Judges, he finds, the state was "neither monarchic, nor aristocratic, nor popular,"⁴⁵ for "affairs were not all managed by one man, nor by a single council, nor by popular vote, but partly by one tribe, partly by the rest in equal shares."⁴⁶ Another reason why it was neither a monarchy nor an aristocracy nor a democracy is that "the right of interpreting the laws and of communicating God's answers was vested in one man, while the right and power of administering the state according to the laws thus interpreted and the answers thus communicated was vested in another man."⁴⁷ This division between those who interpreted the law and those who administered the state continued to exist even after the establishment of the monarchy, and it is this division between civil and religious authority that led to many dissensions and ultimately to the fall of the state.⁴⁸ The object lesson to be drawn from scriptural history, concludes Spinoza, is not to allow ministers of religion to participate in affairs of the state and to establish the supreme authority of the state over matters religious.⁴⁹ Thus, unlike all religious philosophers before him, who saw in scriptural history examples of good government which are to be

⁴³ *Ibid.* (p. 214, ll. 3-5).

⁴⁴ Cf. above, pp. 383 ff.; 429 f.

⁴⁵ *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, ch. xvii (p. 211, ll. 27-28).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* (p. 211, ll. 24-27).

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* (p. 208, ll. 3-6).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* (p. 217, l. 3-p. 220, l. 30).

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, ch. xviii (p. 225, ll. 12-17; p. 226, ll. 7-13).

followed, Spinoza found in it examples of bad government which are to be avoided.

With his abandonment of the belief in the divine origin of the Mosaic constitution, Spinoza also abandoned the belief in a divinely designed Messianic age, whether yet to come or whether already come. Though he succumbed sufficiently to the influence of the environment to repeat the conventional distinctions drawn by Christian theologians between the prophetic gift of Moses and that of Christ,⁵⁰ he did not consider the coming of Christ as the fulfillment of the promise of a Messianic age. With his denial of the belief in a God who acts by design in natural as well as in human history, he could not with any show of consistency affirm the belief in the coming of an ideal age by the design of God. Men to him were to be saved neither by a revealed Law nor by a revealed Messiah; the only source of salvation for them was to be found in their own reason. But while he had faith in the saving grace of reason and while he also urged men to live in accordance with it, he held out to mankind as a whole no hope of an ideal age of reason. For the future of mankind as a whole, he, like Aristotle, saw only an improved form of government, guided by reason, to be sure, but by no means ideal, and he himself tinkered with the mechanism thereof.

But though Spinoza did not envisage a Messianic age in its universal aspect, as taught by Philo and Jewish tradition in general, he still retained a belief in the old Messianic ideal in its limited aspect, which he undoubtedly must have understood to be its original sense, and that is the redemption of the people of Israel. Speaking of the future of the Jews, he says: "If the foundations of their religion have not enfeebled their spirits, I would go so far as to believe that, with the

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, ch. iv (p. 64, l. 2-p. 65, l. 1).

opportunity offered, for so changeable are human affairs, they may raise their government again and God may elect them anew." ⁵¹

The enfeeblement of their spirits which Spinoza feared might stand in the way of the redemption of the Jews was the suspension of reason in the guidance of human affairs, which to him was the greatest weakness of man and the source of his bondage. The strength and freedom of man to him consists in a life according to reason, and to live according to reason, as defined by him, after Aristotle, means first to understand our own nature, our own particular virtue or excellency, and then to act intelligently toward its preservation. For groups no less than for individuals he lays down the general rule that our highest good is "to act, to live, and preserve our being in accordance with the dictates of reason," ⁵² and just as the being of the individual is not his physical existence but the identity of his personality so also the being of the group is not its biological continuity but rather its social inheritance.⁵³ In the erstwhile experience of his own people, the Jewish exiles of Spain and Portugal, he could not help but see the working of a native conatus or striving for the self-preservation of a group, unguided by what he would consider as reason. By the blind working of that conatus these Spanish and Portuguese Jews had chosen a life of exile as Jews in preference to a life of ease no longer as Jews. But without thoughtful planning for the future, they allowed themselves to become scattered in all the havens of refuge that happened to be open to them at that time, where they only exposed themselves to the dangers of new exterminations and banishments in the future. Had

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, ch. iii (p. 57, ll. 3-6).

⁵² *Ethics* IV, Prop. 24.

⁵³ Cf. chapter on "Virtues," in my *The Philosophy of Spinoza*.

they let reason guide their desires, emotions, hopes, and beliefs, then, with their young and with their old, with their sons and with their daughters, with their flocks and with their herds, they would all have sped homeward toward the land of their fathers, to rebuild its wastes, to fasten themselves as a nail in a sure place, and thus to secure their future. Instead they entrusted their future to what in the philosophy of Spinoza was the height of credulity, the care of a miracle-working Deity who, they believed, in His own good time would gather together the exiles and bring to them redemption. Spinoza himself witnessed the actual manifestation of that belief when the descendants of those exiles flocked to the banner of a self-proclaimed Messiah, Shabbethai Zebi.

In his belief in the power of reason, Spinoza visualized the possible fulfillment of the Messianic promises of the ultimate redemption of Israel. The time would come, he believed, when reason would guide the affairs of nations as it did already guide to some extent the affairs of individuals. Then all nations in their natural striving for the preservation of their own being would consider it also their duty to help the preservation of the being of those who are small and powerless and homeless and unable to help themselves — and they would do so even at the sacrifice of some of their own overabundance of wealth and territorial possessions. Should such a change in the affairs of nations take place, says Spinoza, — “for so changeable are human affairs” — then, if there should still be a surviving remnant of Jews to take advantage of the opportunity offered to them, “they may raise their government again.” And, unconsciously perhaps, slipping into the traditional vocabulary of Messianic promises, he concludes: “and God may elect them anew.”

CHAPTER XIV

WHAT IS NEW IN PHILO?

WE ALL have a feeling that between ancient Greek philosophy which knew not Scripture and the philosophy which ever since the seventeenth century has tried to free itself from the influence of Scripture there was a philosophy which placed itself at the service of Scripture and was willing to take orders from it. As to what this intervening period in the history of philosophy should be called, historians offer us two choices. Sometimes they call it "Mediaeval Philosophy" and start it with the Church Fathers in the second century,¹ even though in political history the mediaeval period is generally supposed to start many centuries later, either with the death of Theodosius in 395 or with the fall of Rome in 476. Sometimes, however, they call it "Christian Philosophy"² and reserve the term mediaeval as a description of that part of Christian philosophy which begins with St. Augustine (354-430) or with Boethius (480-524),³ both of whom lived close enough respectively to the dates which are generally considered as the beginning of the mediaeval period politically.

But scholarship likes to adorn itself with footnotes and to garnish itself with appendixes. And so the main text of the history of philosophy is generally annotated by, or has appended to it, two philosophical incidents. The first of these incidents is the philosophy of Philo, which is introduced

¹ Cf. J. H. Erdmann, *A History of Philosophy*, I, 225 ff.

² Cf. F. Ueberweg-B. Geyer, *Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie* (1928), pp. 1, 3, and 141; E. Gilson and Ph. Böhmer, *Die Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie* (1937).

³ Cf. M. De Wulf, *History of Mediaeval Philosophy*, I, 1-23; 77-82; 105-114.

as a postscript to ancient Greek philosophy. The second incident is Arabic Moslem and Jewish philosophy, which is introduced as a prefatory note to the scholasticism of the thirteenth century. The value of these two philosophic incidents, it must be admitted, is not entirely overlooked; in their subordinate position they are dutifully evaluated; but whatever value is attached to them is that of furnishing certain ingredients in the reconstruction of the background of two periods in Christian philosophy — in the case of the former that of the Church Fathers and in the case of the latter that of the scholasticism of the thirteenth century.

On the whole, this treatment of the history of philosophy reflects that prevailing conception of history in general which, as theologically formulated by Eusebius and St. Augustine, maintains that everything that came before Christianity is to be considered only as preparatory to it and everything that happened outside of Christianity is to be considered only as tributary to it. In Hegel's metaphysical restatement of this theological conception of history, the particular application of this view to the history of philosophy is bluntly stated without any circumlocution. "The history of philosophy," he says, "falls into three periods — that of Greek philosophy, the philosophy of the Middle Ages and modern philosophy,"⁴ the first of which "has found its place in the religion of the heathen," whereas the second and third have their sphere "within the Christian world,"⁵ for the philosophy of the Middle Ages, in which the scholastics are to be included, "mainly falls within the Christian Church,"⁶ and similarly modern philosophy, which is essentially "Teutonic philosophy," is also "philosophy within Christendom."⁷ Though "Arabians and Jews

⁴ Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, I, 109.

⁵ *Ibid.*, III, 1; cf. I, 101.

⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 110.

⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 101.

are also historically to be noticed,"⁸ they "have only to be noticed in an external and historic way."⁹ As for Philo, he says, "we must make cursory mention of" him, before we enter upon our discussion of "the Neo-Platonists,"¹⁰ the latter of which are to be considered as being "closely connected with the revolution which was caused in the world by Christianity"¹¹ though only as a sort of precursor to its philosophy, for, as he adds, while the Neo-Platonists had some adumbration of "the Idea of Christianity,"¹² they "still had not proved their doctrine that the Trinity is the truth."¹³

There is much to be said on this conception of the history of philosophy, both for it and against it. One could go on and argue endlessly whether historical facts, and facts in the history of philosophy in particular, are to be studied — to use the language of Aristotle — as *known to us* or as *known by nature*, and consequently one could also go on and argue endlessly whether in our attempt to break up the continuity of historical events into periods we should look at all for any differentiating characteristics other than those which are visibly known to us and which have palpably proved themselves of consequence in the experience of a great part of mankind who share common beliefs and a common way of life. But such speculative arguments would lead us nowhere. They would be as useless as the old-fashioned speculations as to how to classify species, when species were held to be unalterably and firmly fixed from creation and their classifications were only half-intuitive generalizations based upon inadequate data superficially studied. When, however, as a result of a century's research, beginning with Linnaeus and ending in Darwin's voyage on H. M. S. Beagle, investigators began to base their speculations concerning

⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 110.

⁹ *Ibid.*, III, 1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 387.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, I, 374.

¹² *Ibid.*, III, 1.

¹³ *Ibid.*, III, 2.

species on extensive accumulations of specimens and the study of the internal structures of those specimens, the various attempts at their classification from then on were based upon a solid foundation of reality, even though the boundary lines between species were no longer firmly fixed. Let us also set sail on some Beagle of our own in search of philosophic specimens and, after we have found them, let us study their internal structures and then, from their internal structures, let us try to learn something about the origin and classification of their species, which species we commonly call periods in the history of philosophy or systems of philosophy. It is also possible that as a result of such an investigation so-called periods and systems of philosophy might prove to be not so distinctly and deeply separated from each other as they are generally assumed to be.

The specimens which we bring back from the voyage on our own Beagle are in the form of books, printed books and manuscript books, books preserved in their entirety and books of which only fragments have been preserved in other books, and books of which only the titles have been preserved. In our study of our specimens, we begin, as every scientific study of a subject usually begins, with a classification of them. Taking first as the basis of our classification that which externally differentiates them from one another, namely, language, we find that they fall into five groups, Greek, Latin, Syriac, Arabic, and Hebrew. The Greek specimens date from the fragments of pre-Socratic philosophers to the fifteenth century, falling short by about a century of the reputed end of mediaeval philosophy. The Latin specimens date from Cicero and continue to the end of mediaeval philosophy. The Syriac specimens, the smallest of the five groups, date from the fifth to about the end of the thirteenth century. The Arabic specimens date from the eighth to the end of the twelfth century. The Hebrew

specimens date from the tenth century and continue to the reputed end of the medieval period of philosophy.

Continuing then to examine the contents of these specimens, we discover that these five linguistic groups are not independent of each other. To begin with, the last four of them are all dependent upon the Greek specimens. In all of them Greek works are translated, names of Greek philosophers are quoted, certain Greek terms are transliterated in their own respective alphabets, many more Greek terms are translated literally in their own respective languages, and problems of Greek philosophy invariably form the starting point of discussions. Then, the last four of these five groups have certain relations among themselves. Some philosophic specimens are translated from the Syriac into Arabic or are Syriac paraphrases of Arabic works; Some are translated from the Arabic into Hebrew and a few from Hebrew into Arabic; some are translated from both Arabic and Hebrew into Latin; some are translated from the Latin into Hebrew; and together with these translations there go also the adoption of terminology, both in transliterated and translated forms, the quotation of names, and the borrowing of ideas.

Studying our philosophic specimens still more closely, we notice that all of them are streaked through with material drawn from another type of literature, namely, the religious literature. But with respect to this streak of religious literature which runs through the entire field of philosophy, we notice that not long before the rise of Christianity a sudden change takes place in the type of literature drawn upon. Before that time in Greek and also Latin philosophy, and for some time after that in a certain part of Greek and Latin philosophy, the religious literature drawn upon, in the form of quotations, references, or allusions, is pagan Greek literature. But beginning with that time the re-

ligious literature drawn upon is that of Scripture in its threefold division, the so-called Old and New Testaments and the Koran. This scriptural streak in its threefold division is variously distributed in our five groups of philosophic specimens. In the Greek philosophic specimens, those dating from before the middle of the first century of the Christian era are Jewish and quote the Old Testament, but those dating after that period are all Christian and quote both the Old and the New Testament. The Latin specimens, beginning with Tertullian toward the end of the second century, are all Christian, and the quotations are from both the Old and the New Testament. The Syriac specimens are Christian, and the quotations in them are from both the Old and the New Testament. The Arabic specimens are both Moslem and Jewish and to a lesser extent also Christian. The Moslems quote only the Koran, the Jews only the Old Testament, and the Christians both the Old and the New Testament. The Hebrew specimens are only Jewish and the Scripture quoted is only the Old Testament. Not only, however, is this break from ancient pagan philosophy marked by a change in the quotations from religious literature, but it is also marked by a new form of philosophic literary expression. Before that time the forms of philosophic literary expression were the gnomic saying, the dialogue, the poem, the diatribe, and the formal discourse. From now on a new form of exposition appears in philosophic literature, the homily on some scriptural text or the running commentary upon some scriptural books.

This change in the type of religious literature drawn upon and in literary form, we discover upon still further study, is not a mere matter of externality; it marks a fundamental break in philosophic doctrines, which break ushers in a fundamentally new period in the history of philosophy, that

intermediate or mediaeval period which we all feel intervenes between ancient philosophy which knew not Scripture and modern philosophy which began with an attempt to free itself from Scripture. Mediaeval philosophy, so defined and delimited, is thus the common philosophy of three religions — Judaism, Christianity, and Islam — consisting of one philosophy written in five languages — Greek, Latin, Syriac, Arabic, and Hebrew. It is indeed a continuation of pagan Greek philosophy but at the same time also a radical revision of that philosophy, stressing certain doctrines by which it is distinguished from ancient pagan philosophy. From its very beginning in its original language, even before its spread into other languages, it formed a new school of Greek philosophy, more distinct in fundamental problems from the totality of all the pagan Greek schools of philosophy than those pagan schools are distinct from one another. When we speak of Christian philosophy, and for that matter also of Jewish or Moslem philosophy, and the question is raised as to what we mean thereby apart from Greek philosophic problems dealt with by Christians or Jews or Moslems, or apart from the employment of certain concepts or a certain form of reasoning from Greek philosophy in defense of certain religious doctrines borrowed from Scripture,¹⁴ the answer to be given is that it is a fundamental revision of Greek philosophy on the basis of certain principles common to these three religions, resulting in the introduction of new elements into every branch of pagan Greek philosophy — its epistemology, its metaphysics, its physics, and its ethics.

Let us then take a fleeting glance at these common principles which constitute the common characteristics of that

¹⁴ See the collection of forty-seven opinions as to the meaning of Christian philosophy in E. Gilson, *L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale* (1932), I, 297-324, and Gilson's own discussion on the subject in chs. i and ii.

mediaeval philosophy and let us invent a synthetic mediaeval philosopher, made up of all the common elements of the Christian, the Moslem, and the Jewish philosopher, and let us follow in the track of his reasoning as he proceeds to revise Greek philosophy.

Our synthetic mediaeval philosopher begins with the belief that there is one infallible source of truth, and that is revelation, and that revelation is embodied in Scripture, be it Old Testament or New Testament or Koran. In Scripture he finds a description of the world, perhaps not so full as he would have liked to have, but he finds in it enough references to water and earth and air and fire and heavens and stars and minerals and plants and living beings to furnish him with enough materials for an orderly description of the world as he knows it. He also finds in it an explanation of those things which he wants to know about the world, how it came into being and how it is governed. Finally, he finds in it rules for the guidance of man in his various relations to his fellow men, both as an individual to other individuals and as a member of society to the society of which he is a part.

But the God who furnished certain men with certain truths directly by revelation has also equipped men with reason. Thus equipped, certain men were able by their own effort to discover some of those truths which God made known to other men directly by revelation — to discover the nature of the world, to describe it, to explain it, and to lay down rules for the conduct of mankind. And just as the truths of revelation are embodied in the threefold Scripture, written in Hebrew, Greek, and Arabic, so the truths discovered by reason are embodied in a philosophic literature written primarily in Greek. Two bodies of literature thus contain all human wisdom: one the wisdom made known

through revelation; the other the wisdom discovered by reason.

Since God is the author both of the truths made known by revelation and of the truths discovered by reason, there can be no conflict between them. If a conflict should appear to exist between them, it must be no real conflict. Any such conflict must be due either to our misunderstanding of Scripture or to the vagaries of human reason which has gone astray. For revelation must of necessity be communicated to man in the language commonly spoken by man, and such a language does not always convey to the ordinary man the real meaning intended by the revelation. Similarly, human reason must of necessity be encased in a human body and function through a human body, and thus, hemmed in by a body, reason sometimes is led astray and errs. Scripture, to our synthetic mediaeval philosopher, is always true, if only its language could be properly understood; reason would always be true, if only it were not misguided by the body in which it is encased. In the proper study of the relation of Scripture to reason, therefore, Scripture has to be interpreted in the light of what is most evidently true in reason, and reason has to be corrected in the light of what is most evidently the true teachings of Scripture. There may be differences of opinion, among those who make up our synthetic philosopher, as to what is most evidently true in reason as well as to what is most obviously the true teaching of Scripture, but they all agree that this is the proper method of procedure.¹⁵

And so our synthetic philosopher begins to compare the teachings of Scripture with the teachings of philosophy.

Among the teachings of Scripture our synthetic philosopher finds principles which he assumes to constitute what

¹⁵ Cf. above, I, 155-163, 194-199.

Scripture considers as essential to any true religion, namely, the existence of God, the unity of God, creation of the world, divine providence, and the divine origin of the rules for human conduct.¹⁶ He then begins to look into the writings of the philosophers to see what reason has discovered about these principles.

He finds that with the exception of one school of philosophers, the Epicureans, reason has guided all the philosophers to the discovery of the existence of God.¹⁷ He is delighted with the arguments advanced by reason in proof of the existence of God; he appropriates them and makes use of them. He makes a few changes in some of them, especially in the argument which maintains that the existence of God is an innate idea, but on the whole he is willing to follow the pagan philosophers in the proofs they have discovered by reason.¹⁸

He also finds that reason has led philosophers to discover that God is numerically one and, like Scripture, to come out against popular polytheism. Reason has also led some philosophers, like Plato and Aristotle, to discover that God is internally one, in the sense that He is incorporeal, though some philosophers, like the Stoics, have been led astray by reason to think that God is himself corporeal and never leaves the inwards of the corporeal world. Similarly, reason has led philosophers to discover that God is one in the sense of His being self-sufficient and in need of nothing outside himself,¹⁹ though they do not exploit that property of God to its full extent.

But he finds that reason has failed to guide philosophers to the discovery of two other phases of the unity of God.

First, unlike Scripture, reason has failed to see the unity

¹⁶ Cf. above, I, 194.

¹⁷ Cf. above, I, 177-180.

¹⁸ Cf. above, pp. 92-93.

¹⁹ Cf. above, I, 172.

of God as implying His uniqueness in the sense of His being the only one who is both uncreated and a creator. In Plato, God is indeed spoken of as a creator, but by the side of God there are to Plato also ideas, concerning which he sometimes says that they are uncreated and that they possess a creative power of their own. In Aristotle, God is spoken of mainly as a mover, not as a creator, and the world, which is not God, is spoken of as being uncreated. Our synthetic philosopher, in opposition to all this, does not admit by the side of God anything that possesses a creative power of its own and anything that is uncreated; and, if he is occasionally inclined to admit the existence of something coeternal with God, he will try to show that its eternity does not mean uncreatedness.²⁰

Second, unlike Scripture, reason has failed to conceive of the unity and unlikeness of God as implying the unknowability and indescribability of His essence. Neither Plato nor Aristotle, despite their belief in the immateriality and simplicity and indivisibility of God, had any conception of the unknowability of God's essence and its indescribability. Indeed our synthetic philosopher will be unable to make up his mind as to what extent God is unknowable and indescribable, and in what sense one is to understand the terms by which as a rule God is described. But he starts his philosophy with a principle of the unknowability and the indescribability of God; and, while he is conscious of the difficulties that this principle may give rise to, he debates these difficulties in his own mind and finds some kind of solution for them without giving up that principle.²¹

Less satisfactory to our synthetic philosopher and requiring correction by him is the finding of reason with regard to the problem of the origin of the world. While reason has

²⁰ Cf. above, I, 172, 195.

²¹ Cf. above, pp. 153 ff.

led some philosophers to regard our present world as having been created out of some preëxistent matter, it has led others to regard it as eternal. For himself, our synthetic philosopher is unable to make up his mind as to the real meaning of the teaching of Scripture with regard to the beginning of the world, though he is inclined to favor the view, never envisaged by reason, that the world came into being *ex nihilo*. But of one thing he is certain: however the world came into being, its coming into being must be so conceived as to make God the cause of its being. Of one other thing is he certain: however the world came into being, it came into being by the will of God, which will of God is to be understood in such a way as to lead to the conclusion that had God willed it He could have created a different kind of world.²²

Still less satisfactory to our synthetic philosopher and requiring correction by him is the finding of reason with regard to divine providence. On the whole, reason has led philosophers to believe that the world is governed by certain laws, laws which make for order and stability, for permanence and preservation, as if some wise being were presiding over it and supervising it and caring for it. Philosophers even speak of the laws of nature as being the work of God. In Plato they are said to be implanted in the world by the Demiurge at the time of His creation of the world. In Aristotle they are said to be the immutable movements imparted to the world by the prime mover who is God. In the Stoics they are said to be the working of the primordial fire, out of which the world unfolded itself but which continues to abide in the world as an internal Reason. The philosophers also sometimes describe these laws of nature as divine

²² Cf. above, I, 322-324.

providence. But their divine providence is fated; more often and more correctly do they describe it by the term fate. The laws of nature which they trace to their respective gods are absolutely unchangeable, inexorable; even their gods cannot change them. There is no room in their systems for miracles and individual providence.

Now our synthetic philosopher, on the whole, agrees with the finding of reason that there are immutable laws of nature. God to him is not only the creator of the world but also the cause of its preservation and its governance and its orderly processes. God it is who has implanted in the world that order and regularity of the recurrence of events which we call laws of nature. Because God is unchangeable, these laws of nature which He has implanted in the world are also unchangeable. Still, with all their unchangeability, God has reserved to himself the right of a free agent to change these laws of His own making. The possibility of miracles is a fundamental belief which our synthetic philosopher will insist upon. He may offer different explanations of miracles; he may not be quite certain what extraordinary events reported in the various religious Scriptures and traditions are to be regarded as miracles; but he does not question the principle that God is a free agent who can change the order of nature and perform miracles. This principle is the basis of our synthetic philosopher's belief that divine providence is individual. To him, God's implanting of laws of nature in the universe is a token of His universal providence, for these laws of nature are for the purpose of the preservation of the world as a whole and of all the kinds of genera and species within it. But the upsetting of these laws of nature by God through the working of miracles is to our synthetic philosopher a token of God's individual providence, for these miracles have for their purpose the preservation of

individuals or groups of individuals when all the forces of nature are lined up against them for their destruction.²³

As a corollary to the conception of freedom in God is the conception of freedom in man, and on this point, too, our synthetic philosopher finds that reason has gone astray and failed to attain to the truth of the matter. Man, say the philosophers, is a part of nature, and as everything in nature is determined so also everything in human nature is determined. There is no such thing as freedom, by which man can break the chain of causes which have led him up to the point of being faced with the making of a decision. If Plato and Aristotle and the Stoics do speak of a distinction in human actions between actions which are voluntary and actions which are compulsory, they mean by voluntary actions only actions that are performed without ignorance and without external compulsion. To the philosophers, all the forces that bear upon human action are divided into forces of emotion and forces of reason. When man is faced with a choice between two alternative modes of action, the choice, according to them, will be determined, as in the case of any physical conflict in nature between opposing forces, by the relative strength of the forces of reason and the forces of emotion. If the forces of reason are stronger, the victory will be that of reason; if the forces of emotion are stronger, the victory will be that of the emotions. Will itself is merely a description of that choice determined either by reason or by the emotions; there is no such thing as a will which is free and independent of these forces of reason and emotion. If philosophers urge man to act in accordance with the dictates of reason, it does not mean that they believe that at the crucial moment which calls for a decision man is free to choose whether to follow the dictates of reason or the

²³ Cf. above, I, 356-359.

dictates of the emotions. It is only an exhortation to man that he should continually, throughout his lifetime, cultivate and strengthen his reason, by the only means by which reason can be cultivated and strengthened, and that is by the acquisition of knowledge, so that when the crucial moment arrives reason will be found the stronger force and will dominate the emotions.

Our synthetic mediaeval philosopher is opposed to this. Man, indeed, may be considered as part of nature and as subject to its laws. But just as the laws of nature may be upset by God's freedom, so also the laws which govern human action, as part of nature, may be upset by man's freedom. Our synthetic philosopher is indeed conscious of the many difficulties which this belief in human freedom gives rise to and in his attempt to solve all these difficulties he may make all kinds of qualifications as to the nature and exercise of this freedom, but despite all this he will cling strenuously to the belief that the human soul is endowed by God with part of His own power of freedom, to work miracles in man as He himself works miracles in the world. When man is faced with a decision and the forces of his own nature are all set so as to determine his decision in one particular way, he can by the freedom with which he is endowed by God decide to act contrary to all those determining forces. Only external obstacles or forces can defeat the free human decision, for by these external obstacles or forces man may be prevented from acting according to his own free choice or he may be forced even to act contrary to his own free choice, but even these external obstacles and forces may be miraculously removed by God, if man is found worthy of such a direct divine intervention.²⁴

Another corollary to the belief in God's freedom and hence

²⁴ Cf. above, I, 456-462.

also to human freedom is the belief that the immortality of the soul depends by the will of God upon one's individual conduct, so that while each soul can be immortal it can also be destroyed. Now our synthetic philosopher is ready to admit that reason also has led some pagan philosophers, and especially Plato, to a belief in the immortality of the soul, and he may perhaps be also ready to admit that it was the teachings of pagan philosophy that led him to discover the full meaning of this principle in the pages of his Scriptures, but he will insist that reason has failed to discover the full truth of that belief. To those pagan philosophers, even when they have that belief, immortality is assumed to belong to the soul by the necessity of its very nature and hence not only may it be immortal but it must be so. Even to those pagan philosophers who happen to speak of a certain kind of destructibility of the soul, this destructibility also comes to it by a necessary process of nature; it is not the result of individual divine providence. To our synthetic philosopher, however, immortality is a special gift of God and an exercise of individual divine providence. The soul, which is assumed by him to have an existence of its own in the human body, is endowed by God not only with freedom but also with immortality, for by its own nature, like anything else created by God, it cannot be immortal. Of this gift of immortality man must prove himself worthy, and he can prove himself worthy of it only by the exercise of his freedom in a manner approved of by God. If man does not prove himself worthy of immortality, he forfeits it; his soul may suffer destruction. Our synthetic philosopher is perhaps not always quite certain as to how the soul remains immortal as an individual entity and as to how it suffers destruction. But after all his debating with himself on the problem, he comes out with a confession of a belief that each man's soul may

by God's grace survive in some sense as an individual entity but of itself it is subject to some kind of destruction.²⁵

Finally, a third corollary of divine freedom and hence also of human freedom is the divine origin of morality. To our synthetic mediaeval philosopher the efforts of pagan philosophers to attain by human reason perfect rules for the conduct of men, both as individuals and as members of society, have by their own confession proved to fall short of perfection. To him, the only rule of conduct which is perfect is that which has been revealed by God, for if, as the pagan philosophers maintain, perfect rules of conduct must be in accordance with nature and in accordance with reason, they cannot be discovered by reason, for reason itself never attains perfection in its knowledge of nature; they can be perfect only when revealed by God who is the creator of both reason and nature. In his study of the laws revealed by God, carefully comparing them with the teachings of the pagan philosophers, our synthetic philosopher finds in the divine laws the perfect fulfillment of all that the pagan philosophers have vainly striven to attain. Indeed our synthetic philosopher may debate with himself whether that divine law was to continue eternally to be the Law revealed to Moses, or whether the Law of Moses was to be replaced in part by the law of the Gospels and the Apostles, or whether even this latter law was to be replaced by the law of the Koran; but whatever decision he may arrive at on this particular question he remains firm in his belief that man's conduct is to be guided by a divine law.²⁶

These are the main principles of our synthetic mediaeval philosopher. The endless discussions to be found in the voluminous literature of the various languages in which mediaeval philosophy is embodied are only elaborations upon

²⁵ Cf. above, I, 416-417.

²⁶ Cf. above, pp. 306 ff.

these principles — explanations of these principles in their manifold implications, discussions of various difficulties arising from these principles, homilies on various scriptural proof-texts advanced in support of them, and discourses on various philosophical passages which appear to be either in agreement or disagreement with them. Taken altogether, these principles of mediaeval philosophy constitute a radical departure from ancient pagan Greek philosophy — they radically change its theory of knowledge, by introducing into it a new source of knowledge; they radically change its metaphysics, by introducing a new conception into the nature and causality of God, who is the main subject of metaphysics; they radically change its physics, by introducing a new conception into the working of its laws; they radically change its ethics, by introducing a new source of morality. The changes thus introduced by our synthetic philosopher into Greek philosophy are as great as those introduced into it by Plato and greater than those introduced into it by any other philosopher after Plato. Our synthetic mediaeval philosopher, indeed, has not introduced anything radically new into what he learned from pagan Greek philosophic works about the description of the structure and composition of the physical universe. He was quite willing to follow Aristotle in his description of the heavens, of the earth, of growing and living things, of the human body, of the human soul, and of the rules of human reasoning, though not without an occasional grumble and not without an occasional excursus into the writings of some other Greek philosophers. He assiduously studied the works of Aristotle as well as those of other Greek philosophers dealing with these subjects, commenting upon them, paraphrasing them, epitomizing them, questioning and disputing about them, and even making some slight original contributions in the course of his study

of them — but all this in harmony with those fundamental principles which set off his own philosophy from that of the Greek philosophers. Similarly, when toward the end of mediaeval philosophy, in the sixteenth century, new conceptions of nature and of the physical universe began to make their appearance, exponents of mediaeval philosophy, among whom Descartes is to be included, tried to show how easy it was for them to adjust their inherited principles of mediaeval philosophy to their new conception of nature and the physical universe.

This fundamental departure from pagan Greek philosophy, if the facts of the history of philosophy are to be presented as they are actually *known by nature* and not as they merely happen to be *known to us*, appears first in Hellenistic Judaism,²⁷ where it attains its systematic formulation in Philo. Philo is the founder of this new school of philosophy, and from him it directly passes on to the Gospel of St. John and the Church Fathers, from whom it passes on to Moslem and hence also to mediaeval Jewish philosophy. Philo is the direct or indirect source of this type of philosophy which continues uninterruptedly in its main assertions for well-nigh seventeen centuries, when at last it is openly challenged by Spinoza.

Historically, a certain nibbling at this type of philosophy, which is properly to be called the Philonic philosophy, started before Spinoza; and historically, too, Philonic philosophy did not completely disappear even after Spinoza. But Spinoza it was who for the first time launched a grand assault upon it, and if the Philonic philosophy did not completely disappear as a result of that assault, it no longer held a dominant position. Henceforth, in order to gain attention at all, it had to disguise its meaning and adopt a new vocabu-

²⁷ Cf. above, I, 26-27.

lary. It is only recently that Philonic philosophy, through the increasing influence of one of its most distinguished Mediaeval Christian exponents, began to gain vogue and currency in quarters where it is not an inherited tradition, but that is due only to the breakdown of philosophy as a learned discipline, from which some inquiring minds try to seek escape in scholasticism as a substitute for scholarship.

In his grand assault upon Philonic philosophy, Spinoza starts with an attack upon its chief basis, the belief in revelation. This part of his assault he makes in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*,²⁸ a work written in the Philonic manner, in the form of homilies upon scriptural texts. With his denial of revelation, he then undertakes to restore philosophy to the status in which it was prior to the Philonic revolution. Like most Greek philosophers, he does not deny the existence of God, if by God is meant what the Greek philosopher meant by the principle of causality in the world.²⁹ Like the Greek philosophers, he similarly does not deny the unity of God, understanding by unity not only the numerical oneness of the cause of the world but also its self-sufficiency and simplicity. Moreover, like Aristotle in the Neoplatonized form in which he understood him, he takes the unity of God to mean His uniqueness as an uncaused cause. He denies, however, with some qualification, the Philonic tradition that the simplicity of God means also His unknowability and indefinability.³⁰ But, in this particular instance, going beyond the Philonic tradition, he comes out even against the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition which takes the simplicity of God to mean His incorporeality.³¹ Then, going back

²⁸ Cf. above, I, 163.

²⁹ Cf. the present writer's *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, chapters on "Proofs of the Existence of God" and "The Causality of God."

³⁰ Cf. above, pp. 162 f.

³¹ Cf. above, pp. 161 f.

to general classical Greek philosophy, he denies God that supposed freedom of the will by which He can change the order of nature, though by a special definition of the term freedom he calls the necessity of God's action by the name of freedom.³² Again going back to general classical Greek philosophy, he denies man that vaunted freedom of his with which Philonic philosophy has endowed him as a gift of God.³³ With Aristotle, he also denies the separability of soul from body,³⁴ though by following the Neoplatonized form of Aristotelianism he speaks of the immortality of the soul, and even of an individual immortality, without resorting to the Philonic view of the destructibility of the soul.³⁵ Finally, without a belief in revelation, he goes back to the classical tradition of Greek philosophy in restoring to reason its paramount position as the source of morality.³⁶

This, then, is the new period in the history of philosophy, ushered in by Philo and ushered out by Spinoza. If we still choose to describe this period as mediaeval, for after all it comes between a philosophy which knew not of Scripture and a philosophy which tries to free itself from Scripture, then mediaeval philosophy is the history of the philosophy of Philo. For well-nigh seventeen centuries this Philonic philosophy dominated European thought. Nothing really new happened in the history of European philosophy during that extended period. The long succession of philosophers during that period, from among whom various figures are selected by various historians for special distinction as innovators, have only tried to expound, each in his own way,

³² Cf. *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, chapters on "The Causality of God" and "Necessity and Purposelessness."

³³ Cf. *ibid.*, same chapters and also chapter on "Will."

³⁴ Cf. above, I, 420-421.

³⁵ Cf. above, I, 421-423.

³⁶ Cf. above, p. 321.

the principles laid down by Philo. To the question, then, what is new in Philo? the answer is that it was he who built up that philosophy, just as the answer to the question what is new in Spinoza? is that it was he who pulled it down.³⁷

³⁷ Cf. *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, chapter on "What is New in Spinoza?"

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The quotations from Philo are from the Colson and Whitaker translation in the Loeb Classical Library, with occasional verbal changes. Use has also been made, however, of Yonge's English translation as well as of the German translation under the editorship of Cohn, Heinemann, and Adler.

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ABBREVIATIONS OF WORKS CITED

PHILO'S WORKS

- Abr.* = *De Abrahamo.*
Aet. = *De Aeternitate Mundi.*
Agr. = *De Agricultura.*
Cher. = *De Cherubim.*
Conf. = *De Confusione Linguarum.*
Congr. = *De Congressu Eruditionis Gratia.*
Cont. = *De Vita Contemplativa.*
Decal. = *De Decalogo.*
Deter. = *Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari Soleat.*
Ebr. = *De Ebrietate.*
Flac. = *In Flaccum.*
Fug. = *De Fuga et Inventione.*
Gig. = *De Gigantibus.*
Heres = *Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres.*
Hypoth. = *Hypothetica.*
Immut. = *Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis.*
Jos. = *De Josepho.*
Leg. All. = *Legum Allegoria.*
Legat. = *Legatio ad Gaium.*
Migr. = *De Migratione Abrahami.*
Mos. = *De Vita Mosis.*
Mut. = *De Mutatione Nominum.*
Opif. = *De Opificio Mundi.*
Plant. = *De Plantatione.*
Post. = *De Posteritate Caini.*
Praem. = *De Praemiis et Poenis.*
Probus = *Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit.*
Provid. = *De Providentia.*
Qu. in Exod. = *Quaestiones et Solutiones in Exodum.*
Qu. in Gen. = *Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesin.*
Sacr. = *De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini.*
Sobr. = *De Sobrietate.*
Somn. = *De Somniis.*
Spec. = *De Specialibus Legibus.*
Virt. = *De Virtutibus.*

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